Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Can he give a practical example of when there has ever been a relevant criminal offence committed against a person because they are not deaf?

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I cannot—not as a lawyer; I cannot refer to case law on this—but I would not rely on past example alone. If we are passing laws that seek to apply equality, we should seek to apply it on the basis of somebody’s disability status, whether they are disabled or not. It is not implausible—though I accept it is far less likely and far less numerous in past occurrence—for that to be the case. In some of the other areas in the heated debates that we see, it is not as implausible as many of us would like to assume. If it is possible to tighten this up in the drafting, I think it would do the job the Government are seeking to do in a complete way.

That would not prevent the Government fulfilling their manifesto commitment for delivering protections to trans people and disabled people; it would simply ensure that everybody was treated in this area of the law on the basis of protected characteristics in the same way. At the moment, there are greater protections for everybody of every conceivable sexual orientation and people of either sex, but there are not on each of the areas set out in the Equality Act. More pertinently, it would avoid fuelling what is already a very unhelpful public discourse about two-tier policing and laws, or some of the more charged debates that we have in the darker corners of the internet or from the more far-fetched foreign critics who have been mentioned previously.

On Amendment 336 from my noble friends Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, while it is understandable that they are probing this area, I do not think that their amendment is warranted. It probes the question of whether protections for transgender people should apply to people who are “proposing to undergo” a process of gender reassignment. In fact, Section 2 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which has been the law of the land for 22 years, requires somebody applying for a gender recognition certificate to undergo that process to have

“lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years”

preceding their application. Signalling an intention to propose to go through that process is an important part of the law as it stands, and therefore Amendment 336 is not needed.

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[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. I was just about to get on to that in my second point, which is that the whole idea of an aggravated crime increasingly weaponises and politicises the concept of hate.

In the previous debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made some very affecting comments. I was able to talk with her about the incident that she also mentioned this evening outside the Chamber. Over the years, my very long-standing and noble friend Lord Shinkwin has told me some very harrowing things that have happened to him. The disabled protected characteristic having an aggravated crime is possibly the most difficult of these to speak against.

But whatever that protected class is, it is exactly the point that the noble Baroness was making. This is an aggravator to a crime that exists. If the crime is committed, it does not matter why it was committed; it can still be prosecuted. If it cannot be prosecuted, you cannot prosecute the aggravated aspect of it either. Weaponising hate and making it into a thing ignores the fact that these are merely aggravator laws. They are not laws that in and of themselves create a crime; they merely aggravate an existing crime. That has received very little attention in the debate this evening.

Thirdly, it further creates and promotes the concept of society as identity groups. I have the view that we are all human beings and the way to have a coherent and well working society is for us all to work together, whereas with aggravated crimes, people with one or another protected characteristic are encouraged to say, “I’ve been discriminated against. They are the things against me. These people are hateful”, instead of saying, “Let’s all join together and just stop crime”.

I would like to lean on two actors who I very much respect and think of as very thoughtful people: Denzel Washington and Morgan Freeman. They have both been quoted on numerous occasions as saying, “How do you stop hate crime? How do you stop racial hatred? The answer is you stop talking about it”. If they believe that, and I happen to agree with them, what is it about what they say that noble Lords disagree with?

My final point is on this idea of looking into people’s minds. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about a case where the difference between committing a bad crime and committing it because you dislike the gender or whatever it was of the individual was a wrap on the knuckles or going to jail for six weeks. How do you know exactly what was in that person’s mind? Was it just an off-the-cuff remark, or was it some deep hatred that deserved society’s censure? You do not know. Queen Elizabeth I said, “I do not want to look into men’s souls”. It has been a fundamental part of British jurisprudence since the 17th century—I do not know why the noble Baroness thinks that is funny; it is fundamental to the way we conduct our society.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Will he accept that there is no question of a court looking into someone’s soul? The aggravation has to be proved. It has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt by what the person has said, or what they have done, and the circumstances of the case. That is a matter for the judge.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

The noble Lord evinces the certainty that comes from a lifetime in the courts. Those of us who sit outside those courts are maybe a little less certain of the courts’ ability to reach such a fine state of discernment.

I will wrap up; it is getting late.

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[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Government for tabling their Amendments 339 and 340, and thank all noble Lords who supported this call in Committee.

These amendments respond to a campaign from Karma Nirvana and 60 other specialist violence against women and girls organisations, along with survivors and their families, calling on the Government to introduce the statutory definition of honour-based abuse. That campaign was established in memory of Fawziyah Javed, whose case demonstrates the tragic consequences of failing to identify honour-based abuse. Despite multiple calls for help, including two police visits just days before her murder, the abuse she endured was never recognised as honour-based abuse. Crucially, professionals failed to identify the multi-perpetrator nature of the abuse, which involved not only her partner but members of his family. Sadly, Fawziyah’s case is not isolated. Again and again, inquiries and serious case reviews show that, when honour-based abuse is not recognised early, victims are left unprotected, escalation is missed, and all those involved in abuse are not held to account.

The hope is that this definition, supported by clear guidance, will enable front-line professionals to identify, understand and respond to honour-based abuse before tragedies occur, and, crucially, to recognise all perpetrators involved. While this progress in the Bill is welcome, the Government’s chosen approach does not explicitly recognise the specific multi-perpetrator nature of honour-based abuse—an omission with real safeguarding consequences. The current wording risks being read as referring to only one additional perpetrator. Honour-based abuse, however, commonly involves multiple family or community members acting collectively, often across households and generations. Failing to reflect this reality in the Bill risks embedding the very misunderstanding that the definition seeks to correct.

My Amendment 340A would address this by making a simple and proportionate change to subsection (2) of the Government’s amendment. It would clarify that honour-based abuse can involve a person or persons, ensuring that statutory language reflects operational reality. It would align the law with the lived experience of victims, the expertise of specialist services and existing safeguarding practice. It is a modest change with major consequences for victim safety.

I am grateful for the engagement of Ministers and officials on this issue. I anticipate that the Minister may argue in response that this amendment is unnecessary because Section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1978 provides that

“words in the singular include the plural”—

I acknowledge that. However, this principle does not translate effectively in safeguarding practice. I appreciate that this issue will be made explicit in the guidance, and I am grateful for the Minister’s reassurances on that point, but we are concerned that legislation may be read literally, and that the harm of relying on “person” is therefore not theoretical. Focusing on a single actor risks professionals misunderstanding the collective nature of the threat and failing to safeguard against a wider group. That is precisely the gap that has led to missed risks and preventable deaths.

I very much hope that the Minister can accept my amendment or perhaps commit to coming back at Third Reading with the Government’s own version. If he cannot, please can he explain two things? First, what is the legal risk or harm of including the words “or persons”? The safeguarding risks of not including them are clear and substantial. Secondly, why have other areas of the criminal law, such as legislation on harassment, organised crime, gangs, affray and riot, been able to use explicit plural language, yet this Bill has not? In each of those contexts, Parliament has recognised the need for clarity where multiple actors are inherent to the offence. Honour-based abuse is no different; indeed, it is a textbook example of collective harm.

In closing, I am very grateful to the Government for taking this significant step forward. I pay tribute to the many survivors of honour-based abuse, and to the families of those who have been killed. Despite unimaginable trauma, they have fought for this definition so that others may be protected. They are following this debate closely, and their message is clear: honour-based abuse is collective abuse; if the law does not say this plainly, professionals may not act on it. I very much hope that the Minister recognises the strength of feeling, the weight of evidence and the safeguarding imperative, and accepts this small but vital amendment that will materially improve professional understanding and, most importantly, save lives.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that it is not merely that, under the Interpretation Act, “person” includes “persons” unless the context requires otherwise—which I do not think it does here. I hope that the Minister will make it clear that the object of his amendment is indeed to cover cases where there is more than one person. If the Minister can say that that is the Government’s objective, the courts will have regard to that if there is any ambiguity at all, which I do not think there is.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Government on bringing forward these amendments. However, reading Amendment 340 as it is written, in the context of our treatment of Lord Mandelson in this House, I cannot see how we are not guilty of honour-based abuse. We are a community that considers that a person has dishonoured us; we have subjected them to economic abuse and greatly restricted their access to money and income. How does it not apply? How would it not apply to a part of a community deciding to ostracise people who have been involved with a grooming gang? There is nothing in this definition that exempts “abuse” directed at people who have done serious wrong.

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[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support this amendment, which would have been avoided if we had been able to have proper regulation of psychotherapy professionals. The problem is that the voluntary registration through the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy, the UK Council for Psychotherapy or the National Counselling & Psychotherapy Society requires people to be appropriately trained and have ethical standards. But if there is a serious complaint against them and they are removed from there, they can still carry on seeing clients and practising in a completely unethical way. There is absolutely no recourse for people who are seriously harmed by whatever activities are undertaken.

There are times in people’s lives when they are particularly vulnerable. One of those is when they are bereaved. Some older people, when they are bereaved, may be in what you could call that pre-dementia phase of being particularly emotionally vulnerable. They may have people who recommend in good faith that they go to see somebody who has some counselling label up, but who then goes on to exploit them tremendously to create dependency, charge huge fees and make the person emotionally dependent on them, which results in coercive behaviour to carry on seeing this person and carry on handing over money. They may also, in the process, implant the idea that their family are being unsupportive and that the best thing they could do would be to cut off contact with their family.

I have seen this first hand, when a family, who were well-meaning and wanting to provide support, had the most awful acrimonious correspondence sent to them by the person who was being advised for their own good in their counselling to have no contact whatever with these family members, and the counselling service that this person was accessing drained many thousands of pounds from their personal account. The problem is that, at the moment, there is no recourse for the public. They can complain and try to take a legal process against the person, but they are very vulnerable people. This amendment would provide a route to having some control, if you like, over some of these quack practitioners who should not be out there, putting up nameplates and calling themselves counsellors.

It is worth remembering that, particularly in primary care, we have talking therapies that have very good outcomes, such as cognitive behavioural therapy, delivered by people who are properly trained, subject to ethical standards and have appropriate diplomas. They provide non-judgmental, confidential, professional assistance and guidance to help people find a solution to their problems. It has become popular in primary care and in the community, but the backlash against it is that an unsuspecting person and their friends may not realise, or have any way of knowing, that somebody who claims to be a counsellor is completely bogus.

In 2024, Alastair Campbell campaigned hard against this, and there was a very good article in the i newspaper about it—I do not think it is advertising for me to name the paper. I recall the discussions we had about trying to get the registration of professionals, so that those who are providing a valuable service can carry on doing so and are not tainted in the minds of the public by those who are completely bogus. This amendment seems to be essential to protect the public.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned the reservations which I expressed in Committee. I have thought further about this matter since Committee. Indeed, the purpose of the gap between Committee and Report is precisely so that all noble Lords—not only noble Lords on the Cross Benches and Back Benches but Ministers—can reflect on what was said in Committee.

I have looked in particular at the provision which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned, Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which creates an offence of:

“Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship”.


It uses, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, rightly said, the same concepts that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, seeks to implement in the law in the present context. It seems to me that there is a very close analogy between that existing criminal offence and the present context, which is not in the same intimate or family relationship but in the relationship between the psychotherapist or counsellor and the patient.

For my part, I cannot see why the mischief—and it is a mischief—which the amendment seeks to identify should not be a criminal offence. Why should it be that persons who carry out conduct that is defined in this provision should not be subject to the criminal law? Regulation is important, but it is not the answer. The mischief defined in Amendment 358 should be a criminal offence. I have changed my mind.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for bringing his amendment back on Report, and commend him for his continued championing of this issue. Regrettably, these Benches cannot endorse his amendment. We acknowledge that there is plainly a gap in the current law that is causing an issue within the counselling and psychotherapy sector, but are less sure that the amendment as drafted would best serve victims and help them get redress.

As has just been said, the amendment would introduce an offence modelled on Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which itself introduced the offence of controlling and coercive behaviour by intimate relations or family members. Like the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I understand the parallel with this, but I believe that they are fundamentally different in nature, with counselling and psychotherapy being a relationship with a client and a provider in a different setting.