Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Merron Excerpts

Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

My Lords, I hesitate to rise as I want to ensure that everyone feels that their voice has been heard in this debate. We do not want to make law on a basis on which people look back and say that we did not properly debate a particular issue. If all noble Lords who wish to speak in this debate have spoken, I am very happy to make my contribution, but if there are any other noble Lords who wish to make their point, I should give way.

Well, that answers that question; I tried my best. I want to make that point clear. It is really important that everyone who feels they want to speak can do so, but I also say to noble Lords, including my noble friends, that it is also important to respect the rules and conventions, to speak to the amendments and not to repeat Second Reading speeches or make wider debates. I hope we can get that appropriate balance. I have taken time making those points, so I will try to be brief.

I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, especially for the way in which she delivered the Select Committee process that preceded our deliberations in Committee. The evidence submitted to that committee will be invaluable to noble Lords as we continue our work to scrutinise the Bill.

Without making a long speech, I will reflect on the specific amendments on changing the minimum age. I was talking to a noble and learned friend about this, and he said that, frankly, the law around age is a mess—and that has come out in some discussions. Sometimes we are speaking from our own experience. My two children are in their 20s, and I wonder whether they would really have the capacity to make this decision. But at other times, I sit in awe of them and the decisions they make. They express maturity way beyond 20 years, and, in fact, more maturity than much older people.

It very much depends on the individual in these cases. We have to look at whether there is a way to achieve that right balance; otherwise, we will just be making another age limit. You can join the Army at 16 but you cannot serve in combat until you are 18. The Government are talking about reducing the voting age to 16, but then we are hearing debates on neurological competence and capacity. It is important that we understand and express these points.

The point that came out for me in this whole debate about neurological development is that there is no such thing as “the science”. Science is contestable. We heard this from noble Lords who are experts in their field. We must be very careful about saying that “the science says this”. It also has implications for other decisions.

I turn to a couple of points which may already be treated in the Bill. I want to check the understanding of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, on what is in the Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, asked: what happens if a new treatment is available? Clause 2 says

“which cannot be reversed by treatment”,

which probably takes care of that point, but I would like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to share his interpretation and say whether it addresses her concerns. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said that we should think about these young people who will be suffering and in pain, yet nowhere in Clause 2 are the words “pain” or “suffering”. We must be very careful to read what is in the Bill when we are making these points.

I welcome the intervention by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that while he is quite clear about 18, he is sympathetic to the idea of cognitive development and maturity between 18 and 25, and there might be some discussion. Who knows—I cannot speak for the noble and learned Lord, who has looked into this issue very deeply—but perhaps in those discussions he may be persuaded. He is saying 18 at the moment, but clearly he is open to enhanced measures for those aged between 18 and 25. That is something that I hope the whole Committee will welcome.

There are many other points that I could make, but it is important to hear from the Government and what the noble and learned Lord believes in response to the points that have been raised.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate on the age of eligibility for those who are provided with assistance under the Bill. I have made it clear previously, and reiterate, that I will keep my comments limited to the issues on which the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns.

The amendments tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Berger, Lady Lawlor and Lady Hollins, seek to raise the age at which an individual would be eligible for the provision of assistance under the Bill. The points that I wish to raise here relate to the European Convention on Human Rights. There are potential risks that I am raising to inform the decision-making of noble Lords, but the underlying policies are rightly a matter for Parliament. Under the convention, the amendments in this group could give rise to legal challenge; for example, that excluding people who are under 21 or 25 from accessing assisting dying may not be justified under Articles 2 or 8 of the EHCR, or that this amounts to unjustified discrimination under Article 14.

Noble Lords will be aware that differential treatments, such as raising the age of eligibility, may be lawful if it is possible to persuade the courts to agree that the age limit is justified, necessary and proportionate. There would need to be a reasonable justification for restricting access to assisted dying to people aged either 21 and over or 25 and over. Noble Lords will want to consider this in relation to these amendments.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Can the Minister be clear? If we decided to limit—whether by age or in some other way that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, might decide—and put that into primary legislation, is that then not the law of the country? All that the European court could then do is say that it is not compatible but remains the law—or is the Minister saying something different? If we pass primary legislation, that is the law of the land, is it not?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

The point that I was making just before I sat down was that noble Lords will want to consider the points that I have raised in relation to these amendments. I am sure that they will take into account what the noble Lord has just said too.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to everybody who has contributed to the debate. I have made my position moderately clear in relation to what we should do—and I sense that the Committee is happy that we should take that course.

I completely understand the points about people aged 18 being impulsive and often emotionally immature. On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, that is why the Sentencing Council refers to it. However, it is a different question here as to what the age limit should be. If people are emotionally immature, they will not have a settled view about what to do in these circumstances, but some people will. The noble Lord, Lord Kamall, asked: what happens if there are new developments in medicine that would extend life? The answer is that you would not have six months or less to live, which I think was the answer that he was giving in relation to it.

I have made my position clear. I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, in the light of where we have got to, to withdraw her amendment so that we can move on to the next issue.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I can be extremely brief, because of the confirmation given by the noble and learned Lord and also knowing that the substantive issues of domestic abuse, interpreters and various other matters will be dealt with in their appropriate place.

At the risk of underlining my reputation as a legal geek, I invite the noble and learned Lord’s attention to his Amendment 350, and in particular the Member’s Explanatory Statement. I understand the amendment, but I do not understand the statement. The amendment leaves out from “to” to end of the line and inserts “section 12(4) and (7)”, which are about “sharing of specialists’ opinions”. The Explanatory Statement says:

“This is a drafting change (consequential on subsection (4) being added to clause 12)”.


Now, Clause 12 already has a subsection (4), and the noble and learned Lord’s amendments to Clause 12 are to subsections (5) and (8). I do not know whether the Explanatory Statement has confused me and in fact the change is not consequential on a new subsection (4) being added but just stands in and of itself. It may be that I am confused unnecessarily, but if the noble and learned Lord could just clear up that minor point, I would be grateful.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, shall be brief. All but three of the amendments in this group have been tabled by the Bill’s sponsor and, as has been discussed, they make a series of drafting changes to the Bill, including making sure that terms are consistent throughout and removing ambiguity and duplication.

The Government are neutral on all the policy choices reflected in these amendments, as they are on the Bill as a whole, but have as usual provided drafting support to make the Bill legally workable. As a part of the discussion today, it is of course for the sponsor and for Parliament to determine whether any of the amendments that the sponsor has chosen to table have changed the intent of amendments that were debated in the other place.

Amendment 7 in this group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, seeks to amend Amendment 6 by changing a reference in Clause 1(2)(b) from “a preliminary discussion” to “their first preliminary discussion”. It does not make any wider changes to the Bill to provide for more than one preliminary discussion to take place, so this may lead to uncertainty. As with all amendments that have not had technical input from the Government, noble Lords may wish to note that the current drafting of this amendment may require further consideration to make it fully workable, effective and enforceable.

Amendments 8 and 9, on which I raise no major workability issues, appear to be trying to achieve the same purpose as Amendment 6, tabled by the Bill’s sponsor. But I would note that Amendments 8 and 9 have not had the technical drafting support from officials and therefore may not be fully workable, effective and enforceable.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for all the interventions. These changes are only drafting changes. Some legitimate points were made, particularly by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Lawlor, but they did not really go to the drafting points.

I go to the concerns various Members have expressed. Amendments 6 and 7, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, would prevent doctors having a conversation with people—I am not saying this in a bad or a good way, but that is what she wants to do—particularly before they reach 18. There is a point there, but it is nothing to do with the change I have introduced in my Amendment 6. My amendment would simply make it clear that there has to be a preliminary discussion before you can go ahead to assisted death. I have done that to make it clear that it is one of the eligibility conditions; it says nothing about what should be talked about or whether such a conversation should take place under the age of 18.

In fact, as the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, said, Clause 6 states:

“No registered medical practitioner or other health professional shall raise the subject of the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act with a person under the age of 18”.


I do not think that the noble Baroness’s amendment would add to that protection. The key point is that all Amendment 6 is doing is saying that you have to have a Clause 5 discussion.

The next point, raised by a number of Peers, is that I am watering down the protection in relation to domestic abuse. That, as a matter of drafting, is wrong. It is only a matter of convenience that, having defined domestic abuse as including everything so defined in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, you get coercion, control and economic abuse as forms of domestic abuse. To avoid having to repeat that every time the Bill refers to training, I have simply referred to domestic abuse, and that is then defined at the top of page 41. I very much hope that people will accept that that is the position.

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, who is shaking her head, raises a different point about the position in relation to abuse that is not domestic. Perhaps your lawyer is exercising undue influence on you. That is a point that I will respond to in writing, but it is not a point raised by my drafting change, because all the restrictions have been in relation to domestic abuse, not to what the lawyers would call undue influence. But it is a perfectly legitimate point, which I will come back to in correspondence with her.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My noble friend is absolutely right; on that point they do change the policy intention. I am grateful. I would welcome the thoughts of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, on that.

Finally, in the absence of my noble friend Lord Howe, I have been asked on his behalf to formally speak on his Amendments 301A and 305A. In speaking to those amendments, I want to highlight the threshold which is set for determining whether an individual is in England and Wales at the time of the first assessment. I hope the noble and learned Lord will be able to pick up this point.

As the Bill is drafted, the question as to whether somebody is ordinarily resident in England and Wales rests on what is called the

“opinion of the coordinating doctor”.

My concern is that an opinion without any further evidential requirement may be too low a bar, particularly given the need to guard against the risk of what has been called death tourism. In other parts of the Bill, the noble and learned Lord has used the word “satisfied”, and I think we would agree that that entails a higher evidential bar than merely “opinion”—indeed, that is also higher than “believes” or “reasonably believes”. “Satisfied” is a higher standard. When the noble and learned Lord replies, can he use that opportunity to explain why the test here is only “opinion” and not “satisfied”, as that test is used in other parts of the Bill?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate on the issue of residency and eligibility criteria. As I have already made clear and will now repeat, I will confine my comments to amendments on which the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns.

First, I turn to the amendments which narrow the residence criteria in respect of eligibility for assistance under the Bill. Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would change the residence criteria for assistance under the Bill from requiring a person to be “ordinarily resident” to “permanently resident”. Unlike “ordinarily resident”, “permanently resident” does not have a set definition in the context of UK immigration law. It is possible that it would be taken as referring only to those who have citizenship or indefinite leave to remain, which is a much narrower scope than the current wording of “ordinarily resident”.

Similarly, Amendments 23, 309, 300A and 306A would restrict access to assisted dying support to British citizens or people with indefinite leave to remain. This may result in migrants on long-term work or study visas who have resided in England and Wales for longer than 12 months being denied access to an assisted death, thereby potentially giving rise to indirect discrimination based on race. These amendments may be subject to challenge under Article 14 of the ECHR when read with Article 8, on the basis that this may amount to unjustified discrimination. This differential treatment would require an objective and reasonable justification.

In addition, under various international agreements, the UK has an obligation not to discriminate against EU, EEA and Swiss nationals on the basis of nationality, although the agreements do not prevent restrictions on the basis of residency. Since these amendments would prevent individuals from those countries from accessing these services on an equal basis to UK citizens in the same circumstances, they are likely to be contrary to the UK’s international obligations under those agreements.

Amendments 11A, 258A, 306B and 449A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, seek to change the residency requirement from “ordinarily resident” to “domiciled”. These amendments would add complexity and potential uncertainty to the eligibility requirements. “Domiciled” refers to the determination of a person’s permanent home largely for tax purposes, meaning that a person can be domiciled in a place without being resident there. It is not a familiar concept in domestic law outside of taxation, so it is unclear how it would apply in this context. Further elaboration in guidance would be needed to make these amendments workable. It is also unclear what practical impact this change would have when the Bill would still require people to be physically present in England and Wales in respect of the steps under Clauses 8, 10, 11 and 19.

I will next turn to Amendment 14, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

Before the Minister moves on, Kim Leadbeater specifically introduced this concept of England and Wales, and, in Committee, Stephen Kinnock did not raise any issues with it at all in terms of operability or similar. I am astonished to hear some of the other elements that are now coming out for the first time in the consideration of this Bill.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am sorry to hear of the noble Baroness’s surprise. I am simply setting out where the Government have particular concerns within the scope to which I referred. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer may be able to comment more appropriately, if he wishes to do so, on the points that she raises.

Amendment 14, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, would widen the eligibility criteria to include UK citizens of pensionable age who are living abroad. There are two main issues with this amendment. The first is that the UK has obligations under international agreements that enable residents of partner countries to receive certain benefits, including some health service provision, in the UK. These agreements are, as I mentioned, with the EU, EEA states and Switzerland. As I set out, these agreements prevent restrictions based on nationality, although they permit those based on residency. Therefore, the amendment would have the effect of opening access to provision of assistance under the Bill to EU, Swiss and EEA residents of pensionable age, provided that they satisfy other eligibility criteria. Widening access only to UK nationals of pensionable age would be contrary to the UK’s obligations under those agreements.

Secondly, by including those who have “moved to live abroad”, the amendment would enable pensionable-age citizens from Northern Ireland or Scotland who have moved abroad to access the provision of assistance, in accordance with the Bill, if they satisfy the other eligibility criteria.

For all the other amendments in this group, on which I make no comment, any workability concerns are less significant. For example, Amendment 10 would remove two eligibility criteria from Clause 1, while Amendment 13 would change the requirements relating to ordinary residence in England and Wales. As Clause 1 is largely descriptive, these amendments would have limited legal effect without corresponding amendments being made to operative provisions later in the Bill.

While these are choices for noble Lords, these amendments may introduce inconsistencies and ambiguity into the Bill. As noble Lords will be aware, these amendments have not had technical drafting support from officials, so the way in which they are currently drafted means that they may not be fully workable, effective or enforceable—but, of course, the issues raised are rightly a matter for noble Lords to consider and decide on.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

Given that Jersey and the Isle of Man, if I am correct, are not EEA countries, how is the contract for health service delivery affected by this Bill in the light of the problems that I highlighted right at the beginning of what has turned into quite a lengthy debate? I was trying to look at a carve-out for those countries so that those contracts could continue, but I was told that it was deemed out of scope of the Bill.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am sure the noble Baroness will understand that I am restricted in the comments that I can appropriately make here. I heard my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer say that all these matters needed consideration, and I am sure that he will expand further on that very point.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I will come to that question when I go through the points.

The purpose of Clause 1(1)(c)—namely, that to qualify you have to be ordinarily resident in England and Wales and have been so resident for at least 12 months—is, as noble Lords have said, to avoid people coming here specifically for the purpose of having an assisted death. It therefore would not be adequate to say that people should be ordinarily resident at the moment they apply, because they would have come specifically for that period. Hence you need a period, and 12 months is taken as a reasonable period in relation to that.

The phrase “ordinarily resident” appears right throughout the statute book in a whole range of settings and reflects the policy choice made by regulations or statutes. It says, “We want to give this right to people who permanently live in this country”, using the word “permanently” not in a legal sense but in an ordinary sense. In applying that phrase, the courts have not generally had any real difficulty as to what it means. It is a reflection of this Parliament saying that we want to give particular rights to the people who live here, and sometimes we say, as we are suggesting here, that we do not care what their citizenship status is—if they live here permanently, they get that right. For example, in relation to the National Health Service we say that if people live here permanently, they get that right.

With the greatest respect to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the cases have made it pretty clear that you can be ordinarily resident here but have temporary absences abroad—for example, if you go to work as a diplomat abroad, serve in the Armed Forces or take a job that takes you away for two months. The big case is somebody whose family lived here and who went to be educated in India for a period of time, who is still held to be ordinarily resident here. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Mackinlay, I do not think that adopting the phrase “ordinarily resident” gives rise either to injustice or to legal difficulties.

I will deal with the points made by individual Peers. I am very sympathetic to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, as I made clear in my intervention. I do not think she was putting in the word “permanently” other than to probe the question of those who live on the Isle of Man or Jersey and get all their medical treatment habitually in England. When the doctor in England says, “I will help you go home to the Isle of Man to get an assisted death”, assuming that it becomes legal in the Isle of Man, the doctor there will be committing a criminal offence under the Bill unless there is an amendment.

The BMA has proposed an amendment that, if you help somebody go home for an assisted death—home being, say, the Isle of Man or Jersey—and it is legal there, that should not be a criminal offence. I talked to the BMA about that. We need to work together to see whether we can get an amendment that satisfies the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has made. I would welcome her input in relation to this.