Referral of Prime Minister to Committee of Privileges

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Tuesday 28th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Chris Vince]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for a far better intervention. The comment I made about the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister while he had popped out was that, as he is aware, I have contributed many times when he has spoken about the Humble Address, and have asked him a number of questions about the vetting process, as well as the impact that this ongoing issue obviously has—

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Trade envoy to Harlow, right there.

[Chris Vince]

Trade envoy to Harlow, did you say?

I asked the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister about the impact that this ongoing issue has on the victims of Jeffrey Epstein. I think it is really important that we recognise that, and I ask him to comment on it in his wind-up.

The point that I wish to make, and I hope it is taken on its merits, is that I absolutely appreciate that the Labour Members who have spoken in support of the motion did so because they believe that it is right. However, do not assume that those of us who are not speaking in support of the motion believe the same. The majority of Members, whatever political party they represent, vote in the Lobby for what they genuinely believe is the right thing to do, for whatever reason. I reject the concept that that is not the case. Opposition Members should trust me when I say that it would be far easier for me to join them in the Lobby this afternoon, but I do not believe that is the right thing to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Madam Deputy Speaker,

“Why does the Prime Minister think everybody else’s actions have consequences except his own?”—[Official Report, 20 April 2022; Vol. 712, c. 155.]

That is a question the country would like an answer to. It is, given the appearance of several recently defenestrated senior civil servants, a prescient question. But it is not my question—it is the Prime Minister’s own question from 2022. How hollow those words must feel now. The testimonies from Sir Oliver Robbins last week, and from his predecessor, Sir Philip Barton, and the Prime Minister’s former chief of staff, Morgan McSweeney, this morning—all casualties trailing in the wake of a Prime Minister who will stop at nothing to save his own skin—have torpedoed what last vestiges of credibility the Prime Minister is desperately clinging on to.

The Prime Minister set the conditions for Peter Mandelson to be the UK ambassador to the United States with a devil-may-care attitude with regard to the consequences. The public announcement of his appointment in December 2024, His Majesty the King being informed and the agrément with the United States being secured all before vetting had taken place ensured that the appointment was a fait accompli.

Peter Mandelson then being granted access to the FCDO building and higher-classification briefings before he was granted developed vetting reveals a shockingly lax approach to our national security, but it is not without precedent. We saw much of the same laissez-faire attitude with a previous ministerial appointment: that of the Prime Minister’s special envoy to the British Indian Ocean Territory, Jonathan Powell. A similar pattern was followed, with access to the FCDO granted and access to classified documents, use of unsecured email for communications and question marks over potential foreign influence all confirmed to have taken place prior to his developed vetting within the last few hours by Morgan McSweeney. That was six months prior to the Mandelson farrago. As I said at PMQs last week, playing fast and loose with national security is a key characteristic of the Prime Minister’s chumocracy.

The question of Mandelson’s security clearance itself poses a host of further questions. When Peter Mandelson commenced his role, he had already been given developed vetting, although UKSV had highlighted concerns—that is now well established. But if full due process was followed, why was Olly Robbins sacked?

On 4 February, less than a week before Mandelson started his role, the appointments and interchange officer of the FCDO informed him via email that the role required STRAP-level clearance in addition to DV and that a new STRAP application would need to be made. Sir Oliver Robbins confirmed that it was clear to him that Mandelson had received STRAP clearance from the STRAP authorities. During the urgent question in the Chamber on 16 March, I asked the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister what level of security clearance Mandelson had been granted, notwithstanding the minutiae of whether developed vetting is a clearance level and STRAP is a role-specific access. The reply I received from the Minister for the Indo-Pacific, the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra)—somewhat conveniently one hour after The Guardian broke its story—stated only that Mandelson had developed vetting upon commencement of his role on 10 February. So when was his STRAP application made, and when was it granted? When I asked the Prime Minister last week, despite his legendary forensic eye for detail, he had no idea. Did the intelligence services also have access to the UKSV vetting report?

The wider question is this: what assessment did the US intelligence services make of Peter Mandelson? Did he pass vetting by the US Department of State? As the nexus for all Five Eyes intelligence and US-UK eyes-only intelligence coming from the United States, was Mandelson granted access to all the available intelligence in order to discharge all his responsibilities as ambassador? Would the US, for example, have given him visibility of TK-level imagery?

What assessment have the Government made of the damage this debacle has done to the UK’s relationship with the United States? It is surely no coincidence that the special relationship has soured at the same time that this fiasco has unravelled, quite apart from the other faux pas that the Government have made in recent weeks.

Even more damning in Sir Olly Robbins’ testimony was the Prime Minister’s dogged determination to reward the now Lord Doyle:

“I was under strict instruction not to discuss that with the then Foreign Secretary, which was uncomfortable… I found it very hard to think how I would explain to the office what the credentials of Matthew were to be in an important head of mission role, when I was in danger of making very senior, very experienced diplomats leave the office.”

The fact is that the Prime Minister put pressure on the FCDO to give Lord Doyle a head of mission role in the diplomatic service in March last year despite his complete lack of qualification for the role. That same individual later had the Labour Whip removed owing to his relationship with Sean Morton, a man subsequently convicted of possessing indecent images of children. The Prime Minister deliberately directed that information to be withheld from the then Foreign Secretary; I suspect that is not the first time he has done that.

Those two men with proximity to convicted paedophiles were both Labour peers and both key figures in the Starmer project—the Government’s cronyism is second only to their nepotism. Given what we know about the role that Peter Mandelson played in the last reshuffle, what confidence can the general public have that Ministers who owe their careers to him will vote honestly in the coming vote? It is not on the Opposition side of the House that we have to worry about whether Peter Mandelson paid for anybody’s wedding.

The laissez-faire attitude to Peter Mandelson’s appointment has illustrated the nonchalance, arrogance and incompetence of the Government under this milquetoast premiership. There is a key question that we come back to once again: why does the Prime Minister think everybody’s actions have consequences except his own? The public must be assured that there has been an investigation into whether the Prime Minister misled the House. The Privileges Committee must investigate the Prime Minister. Labour MPs must vote for the motion, for transparency and truth, not the defence of a Prime Minister who does not deserve their blinkered loyalty.

Oral Answers to Questions

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Tuesday 21st April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Falconer]

My hon. Friend is a committed advocate for his constituents. I would be very happy to meet him. As he will know, it is a matter of long-standing policy and practice that the UK can neither confirm nor deny the existence of an Interpol alert in a public forum, to protect legitimate criminal justice inquiries, but I would be delighted to meet him.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The Government recently informed me that they have received 64 category 2 type B extradition notices under section 70 of the Extradition Act 2003, of which 56 have been certified. Fewer than five of those come from Bangladesh. Can the Minister confirm how many of those relate to Members of this House, and whether there are any Interpol red notices that apply to Members of this House?

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 13th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

The right hon. Gentleman is clearly familiar with the history, so he will know the judgments in the courts of England and Wales on the matter of the right of abode. I am not going to comment on ongoing legal proceedings, save to say that we were disappointed by the position that was taken. Our understanding is that the BIOT is appealing that judgment and we have taken an interest in that matter.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The Minister talks about convenient amnesia, but he did not go back to discuss what the previous Labour Government did. All the way back in 2008, Gordon Brown met Navinchandra Ramgoolam, when he was the Prime Minister of Mauritius for the first time, and agreed to establish a dialogue on the British Indian Ocean Territory. The first official meetings took place in January 2009—Wednesday the 14th, to be precise—and the topic of sovereignty was discussed. I appreciate that the Minister might not have the details to hand, so he is welcome to write to me, but will he outline exactly what discussions took place with the previous Government, up to the end of their time in 2010, that set the conditions for the subsequent ICJ appeal that Mauritius put in following that discussion?

[Stephen Doughty]

I will happily write to the hon. Gentleman on that matter, but what I am absolutely clear about is that it was his Government who started the process of negotiations, under the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly), who conceded the principle of sovereignty and conceded a financial element, and did not put in place some of the key security provisions that we were able to secure in the negotiations. I will happily write to the hon. Gentleman.

Middle East

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Tuesday 17th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

My hon. Friend is right that at every stage we have been urging the protection of civilians. That is immensely important as part of this and is also why we need to work so immensely hard to prevent further escalation. It is one of the issues we have been raising particularly around Lebanon, where I am concerned that we are on the brink of what could be much greater devastating humanitarian consequences. It is also why we have been looking forward to what diplomatic process and settlement process could prevent Iran from posing a threat in future.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The morning after the drone attack on RAF Akrotiri, the Foreign Secretary said in the media round that the drone had struck the runway at RAF Akrotiri. I clarified that with the Ministry of Defence, which went on to confirm that it in fact struck the hangar. The hangar in question was widely reported in the media as containing the U-2 spy planes of detachment one of the US air force’s 9th operations group, which is tasked with flying intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions over the middle east. To that extent, given that the Foreign Secretary stated that Cyprus is not being used in those US operations, could she clarify unequivocally whether Operation Olive Harvest is being used by the US to fly reconnaissance over the middle east in defensive support of these US operations? If she is sure that it is not, could she confirm what conversations she has had with the US that made her come to that assessment?

[Yvette Cooper]

The hon. Member is right about the strike around the hangar. The request from the US to provide basing support for the operations against the ballistic missiles was a request for RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia. The agreement that we have reached to provide that basing support is confined to RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia.

Strait of Hormuz

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 16th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

British citizens do come first. The Prime Minister has set out clearly the basis for the decisions he has made, which includes, of course, the defence of our allies and partners in the Gulf, which I am sure the hon. Member would agree is important, and indeed British citizens and interests in the Gulf. Again, I am not exactly sure what policy he is suggesting we should follow. The Prime Minister will continue to approach this in a calm and level-headed way in the British national interest.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

In January, with impeccable timing, the US withdrew its Avenger class minesweepers from the Arabian gulf and replaced them with littoral combat ships; at roughly the same time, we withdrew HMS Middleton, our last minehunter in the region. As of yesterday, two of those littoral combat ships were seen in Malaysia, several thousand miles away, leaving only one, the USS Canberra, which potentially has the ability to deploy autonomous vehicles. This morning, the Prime Minister said that we would deploy autonomous ships to help clear the minefields, but HMS Stirling Castle—potentially the support ship for that—left Portsmouth only this morning, so it is three weeks away. What is the earliest date when the Minister thinks the strait of Hormuz could begin to be cleared, irrespective of the conversations he is currently having with our allies?

[Stephen Doughty]

The hon. Member will know that it is not for me to answer at the Dispatch Box about US operational matters. He has just had a chance to ask the Defence Secretary questions on detailed UK operational matters. I will not go into the details of specific deployments —where they may or may not be or timelines—because that simply would not be appropriate. This is an extraordinarily complex situation. What we need is a credible and viable plan.

Ukraine

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 25th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

When will this House see the force structure of the British component of Multinational Force Ukraine so that we can properly scrutinise it?

[John Healey]

The detail of the structure and the deployment will become clear and depend on the context and detail of the peace agreement. In the context of a decision to deploy, the Prime Minister has said that the House will have the chance to debate and vote on that deployment, and I suspect that we will be able to set out the detail at that point. The hon. Member and other experts in the House will then have the chance to examine and debate it and, I trust, give it their approval so that any British forces will be deployed into Ukraine in the context of a peace deal with all-party support.

There is no more serious a decision for any Defence Secretary or any Government than committing our armed forces on operations, but I want to be the Defence Secretary who deploys British troops to Ukraine, because that will mean that we will have a negotiated peace and that the war will finally be over. Britain has been united for Ukraine from day one. The House, as the Father of the House said, has been united for Ukraine from day one.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

As he marked the fourth anniversary of the conflict in Ukraine, following Russia’s illegal invasion, President Zelensky said that Putin “has already started” world war three. He went on:

“The question is how much territory he will be able to seize and how to stop him…Russia wants to impose on the world a different way of life and change the lives people have chosen for themselves.”

It is humbling to address the House as we enter the fifth year of this conflict—seemingly a conflict without end; peace talks are faltering and at an impasse. The last four years of conflict in Ukraine have been savage, unrelenting and at a level of total war that we have been fortunate enough to become unacquainted with in this country during of our lifetime. The toll that has taken on the civilian population has been horrific: there have been over 15,000 Ukrainian civilian deaths, thousands more displaced, and an entire population whose lives have been put on hold, forever changed. We have seen lives lost, families devastated and future hopes and dreams shattered, yet Ukraine has held firm against the Russian onslaught. It did in 2022 as it does today.

The Government have remained steadfast in their support for Ukraine, and that same support was extended when they were in opposition. When we were in government, we stood four-square behind Ukraine from the very start, and we were the first nation to openly back the Ukrainian forces with weapons. This House has been united in its support, and that support has been vital. Not only is it there to protect Ukrainian sovereignty in the face of such flagrant disregard for international law, but it represents the FLOT—the forward line of own troops—for the defence of Europe.

We have all seen the changes that this war has brought: a new cold war—maybe even a phoney war—and a generational leap in the nature of warfare in just four years that has catapulted drones from a nerdy hobby to a horrific “Black Mirror” reimagining of modern warfare.

[Melanie Ward (Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman talks about drones. A couple of weeks ago, I was at the Munich security conference, where I had the privilege of hearing President Zelensky speak. He said that in January, Ukraine was attacked by more than 6,000 Shahed drones, which are made in Iran, or in Russia based on Iranian design. Does he agree that the sheer scale of bombardment that Ukraine faces from those drones, and from countries that also wish our country ill, is just one reason why the United Kingdom is right to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I wholeheartedly concur. The Iranians, in particular, are global leaders in exporting terror, backing, as they do, the Houthis, Hezbollah and Hamas. Their provision of the Shahed drone to Russia and the bombardment that the Ukrainians face lead to a terrible toll and are a terrible result.

Anyone who has seen any of the innumerable videos of first-person-view drone footage of soldiers being stalked and killed by drones cannot fail to appreciate the new reality of modern warfare. On the point made by the hon. Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward), the last year alone has seen Russia increase its use of drones by 200%. Such a capability sea change cannot be overstated.

Four years into Putin’s three-day special military operation, Russia has sustained a staggering 1.2 million casualties, 325,000 of them fatalities. That is fast approaching the number of soldiers that we lost in the entirety of the second world war. The majority of casualties—reportedly 70% to 80%—are now caused by drones. It is reported that Russia can no longer recruit new soldiers at the rate that they are being lost, and in the past fortnight, Ukraine has liberated 300 square kilometres in its southern counter-offensive.

We are four years into this conflict, and the remarkable bravery of the Ukrainian armed forces remains undiminished. Yes, we have supported them with matériel, intelligence, rapid procurement and funding, but the human sacrifice required to win, or crucially not lose, a war of sovereignty and survival is something that we perhaps do not address enough. Fifty-five thousand Ukrainian soldiers have been killed since 2022—the equivalent of more than two thirds of our regular Army. From the contributions this afternoon, it is clear that Members on both sides of this House want an end to this conflict, and an end on Ukraine’s terms—one that does not see them acquiesce to the Russian threat that it has given so much to keep at bay.

In the broader context of European security, what comes next? There are significant lessons to be learned from the conflict in Ukraine. No war has been as visually documented at such close quarters as this. The Lessons Exploitation Centre at the Land Warfare Centre will have been busy shaping our future tactics. An example of that is the recently released outcome of NATO’s Exercise Hedgehog 2025 in Estonia, in which a team of just 10, training against experienced Ukrainian drone operators, were able to render two battalions combat-ineffective in just half a day. We are through the looking glass.

Last Saturday, the Defence Secretary wrote a piece for The Telegraph in which he explicitly stated:

“I want to be the Defence Secretary who deploys British troops to Ukraine–because this will mean that the war is finally over.”

But to quote Winston Churchill, that will simply be

“the end of the beginning.”

The Minister does not need me to tell him that the ceasefire will simply facilitate a reconstitution of Russian forces. To use an old adage, Russia will trade space for time. When it returns to its barracks in the Leningrad military district, it will be based only a few minutes from the Estonian border. Pskov, home of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division and the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade, is just 35 km away.

The NATO Forward Land Forces already man the line in Estonia via Operation Cabrit—one of our ongoing commitments. The battlegroup deployed there serves as a deterrent to further Russian expansionism and belligerence. No longer just a strategic tripwire, it is now a force equipped with a capability in Project Asgard that presents a lethal recce-strike system—a force whose very presence provides Estonia with the security of the NATO umbrella; a force so vital that its ongoing presence is apparently written into Estonia’s defence strategy.

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

The hon. Member is making an excellent speech. While we want the war in Ukraine to end and, of course, for Britain to play a leading role in that, including, if appropriate, the provision of troops, does he not share my fear, when we zoom out and look at the geopolitical context, that putting the troops in Estonia in Ukraine stops us from guarding other areas on the eastern flank, and—to use military terminology—fixes most of our forces there when they might be needed elsewhere?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank the hon. Member for his contribution. I hope he has not stolen a look at my speech, as I am about to come on to just that point, but I agree with him. There is potentially a trade-off to be made between putting troops on the ground in Ukraine and in the High North. There is a possibility that doing both those things to the sufficient level that we require may prove too much of a challenge.

We are committed in Estonia, just as we are to be committed in Ukraine. It has been reported that our commitment to a post-ceasefire force would be around 7,500 troops. That is smaller than our peak commitment in Afghanistan, but that reflects the difference in posture. While 7,500 does not sound like a lot—only circa 10% of the current Army—it does not reflect the fact that three times that number is needed to sustain the deployment. By the time of a second six-month rotation through Ukraine, we would have 7,500 who have just returned from the first tour, the second 7,500 currently doing the job and the next 7,500 training to go. That is 22,000-odd from a field army of, say, 40,000, meaning that over half the Army will be committed to manning the eastern flank deterrence line.

It was reported in The Telegraph yesterday that multiple members of the coalition of the willing have privately conceded that their contributions to the post-ceasefire peacekeeping mission depend on permission from Vladimir Putin. Could the Minister in his summing-up confirm whether every country in the coalition of the willing has committed to deploying troops to the peacekeeping mission in Ukraine alongside us?

If we include the aforementioned battlegroup in Estonia, that is another 3,000 troops operating on the same cycle. If we factor in ongoing commitments, such as NATO’s Allied Reaction Force special operations component, which we lead for the next year, the Falkland Islands Roulement Infantry Company and the Resident Infantry Battalion in Dhekelia, as well as the process of retraining and rearming for the plethora of planned new capabilities, the number of personnel quickly adds up under the stacked readiness of multiple commitments. With the Prime Minister announcing our commitment to Operation Firecrest this year with the carrier strike group, as well as the expanded Royal Marines commitment in Norway, suddenly our armed forces are on the cusp of looking overstretched, and doubly so in the event that anything else comes into scope or goes hot.

I highlight these challenges to draw out the complexity of the broader strategic issue. The only way this level of operational commitment will be feasible is if, like our European allies, we properly fund defence. That is why we have called on the Government to go faster and spend 3% of GDP on defence by the end of this Parliament to ensure that they can deliver the 62 recommendations in the strategic defence review that they have already pledged to deliver. But the defence investment plan itself is six months late, strongly suggesting that the plan as it stands is unaffordable. Can the Minister confirm that the plan will finally be published before the Easter recess? It is imperative that the plan addresses the growing capability gaps as the warfare spiral develops in eastern Europe.

In conclusion,

“I believe we are on a collision course with a Russia that is on a war footing, that is replenishing its lost equipment and that is re-arming fast… Putin will only take us seriously when he sees our factories producing at wartime rates. And that’s why I believe so strongly in the need to rebuild our own national arsenal and reconnect society with its Armed Forces… The urgency could not be clearer. Just ask yourself: If you knew now that our soldiers would be involved in large-scale combat operations in 2027, what would you be doing differently—and why are you not doing it?”

Those are not my words, but the words of the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Roly Walker. He said them yesterday. As we mark the fourth anniversary of Vladimir Putin’s needless and tragic war, I am sure everyone in this House would agree with me when I say that I hope we are not here to mark a fifth. Slava Ukraini.

Diego Garcia and British Indian Ocean Territory

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 25th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Falconer]

Madam Deputy Speaker, I apologise. I am failing again. The hon. Member will appreciate the scepticism on the Government Benches given that the Conservative Government started this process, two American Administrations recognised that there was a real issue to be addressed, and this American Administration supported the steps we had taken in May.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I will push back slightly on what the Minister is saying. As we know, the discussion between the UK and the Government of Mauritius around the sovereignty of the Chagos islands started in January 2009 under the previous Labour Government. That was confirmed to me by the Minister for the Overseas Territories, so he might want to bear that in mind.

The question I want to ask is about Jonathan Powell, the National Security Adviser who, prior to being National Security Adviser was the Prime Minister’s special envoy to the British Indian Ocean Territories—and still is today. Prior to being appointed on 6 September, he conducted meetings with the FCDO. He confirmed that he had already seen the deal prior to being in post and was then given a hard copy of the deal when he reached Port Louis. When did he attend Port Louis? Was it prior to his appointment as the PM’s special envoy? What security clearance did he have when he saw the Chagos deal for the first time?

[Mr Falconer]

On the first question, as I understand it the talks first started under the Conservative Government, but I am very happy to check the Foreign Office records and come back on that question. Whether they were started in 2009 or in 2010, that was quite a long period afterwards during which the Conservative Government were in charge and this strength of feeling was not demonstrated. Indeed, other hon. Members did not raise these issues in their time in office—[Interruption.] The suggestion, if I may say so, from the Conservatives that they were vociferously against this decision—they just took 11 occasions to work that out—does not feel very plausible to me. The hon. Member asked specific questions about Jonathan Powell’s work—[Interruption.] I thought I answered the first set of questions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

The hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) might not be satisfied with the response, but that was a response none the less. We will not continue the debate.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. On 9 February I asked a named day question about the role of Jonathan Powell in the Chagos islands deal, which was due for answer on 12 February. As of now, 25 February, it has still not been responded to by the Government. How can I best encourage the Government to produce timely and accurate answers to named day written questions on this subject?

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I am sure that those on the Treasury Bench, including Ministers, heard that. It is not good enough when Members put in for bits of information and table written questions and the responses do not come back in a timely fashion. I see those on the Treasury Bench and the Ministers nodding. One can assume that a response will be forthcoming very quickly. The hon. Member has got his point on the record. We do not want to continue the debate.

Jimmy Lai: Prison Sentence

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 9th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The Minister appears to have come to the Chamber today with absolutely nothing to say. The recent visit to China was an absolute disaster, with people taking burner phones and a burner plane—we even appear to have taken a burner Prime Minister. The Minister referred earlier to progress being made in these discussions, so can she outline exactly what progress has been made, and what was the response from the Chinese Government when the Prime Minister raised the case of Jimmy Lai with them directly?

[Seema Malhotra]

The Prime Minister’s recent visit allowed us to open up discussion and dialogue directly with the Chinese Government at the highest level. The Conservatives seem to have forgotten that it is actually quite important to engage in such discussions and dialogue with other Governments, including on incredibly difficult issues. There is absolutely no point in trying to call for something when you are shouting into a void, and the Conservatives should know better. It is much better to have a relationship that allows us to make our case directly to the Chinese President, rather than talking to ourselves. As the Prime Minister has said, the purpose of engaging is to seize the opportunities that open up as a result of engagement, but also to provide an opportunity for those discussions. If you sit outside the room, if you refuse to engage, you cannot even have the conversation. I come back to the point that I have made a number of times in the Chamber today: we continue those discussions, publicly and privately, to secure the release of Jimmy Lai, which is this Government’s priority.

British Indian Ocean Territory

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Tim Roca]

I cannot clear up that point for the right hon. Member, but I have great confidence that ministerial colleagues would be able to. We have been told at all points that this treaty would ensure the continued effectiveness of the base in the way that it is run now. There was an Ohio class submarine there in 2022, and I hope those arrangements continue under this treaty. From what I have heard from Ministers, there is no reason that they would not.

Let us turn to the costs of the deal. It will cost a fraction of the defence budget for an irreplaceable asset—

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Could the hon. Member clarify precisely how much of the cost of the Chagos islands deal will come from the Ministry of Defence budget?

[Tim Roca]

I am sure that has been set out already in several debates. The point that has not been set out adequately and cannot be set out in huge detail is that, in exchange for providing the United States with facilities on Diego Garcia, the in-kind support in terms of intelligence and other matters that we receive from the United States must run into the billions every single year. Although we cannot put a figure on that, it is a really important element in this debate.

There is no prosperity without security, and there is no security without certainty. In an interconnected world, those are not abstract principles; they are strategic necessities. That is why, in my view, this is a sensible, hard-headed deal, and a confident assertion of the United Kingdom’s national interest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

So wrote the President of the United States only a week ago:

“The UK giving away extremely important land is an act of GREAT STUPIDITY.”

For once, he is not wrong. I have lost track of the number of times I have spoken about the Chagos deal in this House, but each time brings a new stick with which to beat the Government. It is genuinely difficult to see how the Government have got to this point, but their kamikaze negotiating tactics have led them to a situation where they can no longer even muster the collective energy of their Back Benchers to defend it. The dogged determination of the Government to capitulate to a 2019 advisory ruling by the International Court of Justice would be commendable, were it not so timid. The UN General Assembly adopted resolutions urging the UK to comply with the ICJ’s advisory opinion, but crucially, the US voted in support of the UK, clearly not fearing the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, of which it is not a member.

As I am sure everybody here already knows, the United States’s support is significant because of the presence of the naval support facility, Diego Garcia. It is a strategically important location that is effectively a persistent aircraft carrier in the Indian ocean, critical for force projection in the southern hemisphere and across INDOPACOM—the United States Indo-Pacific Command. On Monday, the Minister of State responsible for the overseas territories, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth responsible (Stephen Doughty) was quick to imply that discussions regarding the deal with the United States were an almost daily occurrence. With that in mind, perhaps the Minister in his summing up could outline to the House what discussions the Government have had with their US counterparts regarding the limitations placed on operations by compliance with the Pelindaba treaty.

This was the answer I received to a recent written question:

“Both the UK and Mauritius are satisfied that our existing international obligations are fully compatible with the Agreement”,

but what precisely does that exclude going forward? The African nuclear weapon-free zone treaty was signed by Mauritius in 1996 and prohibits myriad functions relating to nuclear weapons, including possession or control of nuclear weapons. There are obviously no intercontinental ballistic missiles based at Diego Garcia, but the US nuclear triad is designed to provide a second-strike capability that includes air-launched warheads.

Naval support facility Diego Garcia is a strategic waypoint for the US air force bomber fleet, the B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers. Following 9/11, the US used Diego Garcia for operations in Afghanistan, and subsequently during the start of the Iraq war. As recently as last May, the US air force had B-2 bombers stationed on the island. This is critical because the B-2 Spirit is the delivery method for the Mod 11 B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb, the primary weapon for the ground-penetrating mission. This capability matters, and while it will likely never be used, we cannot afford to let enemies in the region know that that will never be on the table.

We should bear in mind that the Prime Minister is in China this week. Strategic posture across the Pacific, particularly in Taiwan and the second island chain, will surely come up in conversation. Ceding the Chagos islands to a country within China’s orbit is yet another strategic mis-step in the Prime Minister’s inability to deal with China robustly.

On the ongoing issue of sovereignty, in note No. 25 between the ambassador of the United States of America and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, written on 30 December 1966, point (1) states very clearly:

“The Territory shall remain under United Kingdom sovereignty.”

This time last year, I asked the Government whether the 1966 exchange of notes would require amendment as a result of the change in sovereignty, and they answered:

“The 1966 Exchange of Notes between the UK and US regarding the joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia has been subject to routine amendments and supplementation since signature. Any amendments resulting from the proposed agreement with Mauritius will be factored into this existing process.”

Can the Minister outline what progress the Government have made? I asked that question on 5 February last year, and here we are, a year letter, with the treaty on the brink and no update from the Government, other than through a slightly churlish appearance from the Minister at the Dispatch Box in Monday’s urgent question. Crucially, the legislation was pulled from the other place that afternoon.

Throughout the passage of the Bill, the Government have deflected, obfuscated, been dragged to the Chamber, given us the run-around on detail, gaslit us, and generally tried to force this deal through. The lack of speakers on the Government Benches is testament to the fact that Labour MPs simply do not want to put their name to this legislation. All it achieves is a weakening of our military options in the southern hemisphere, and the exemption of 80% of Mauritian workers from income tax. Kudos to Mauritian Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam, clearly a savvier negotiator than our dear Prime Minister.

“There is no doubt that China and Russia have noticed this act of total weakness”,

said President Trump. Perhaps the Prime Minister could ask Xi Jinping about it before he offers him a state visit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Luke Pollard]

The right hon. Gentleman nearly got to why the Conservatives started the negotiations. It did not quite hit my bar for an intervention, but I appreciate him giving it a good go.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

rose—

[Luke Pollard]

Let me see if the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) can do any better.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

Could the Minister explain why the previous Labour Government entered into negotiations in 2009, when the first talks took place with the Mauritian Government, which were ultimately ruled out after being criticised for being a unilateral decision around the marine protected area?

[Luke Pollard]

Again, the hon. Gentleman did not quite hit my bar, but I am sure I will get a parliamentary question from him about it.

The Conservatives started the negotiations, I am afraid, and they want everyone to forget it. They want the public to forget it; they want their own MPs to forget it. If they cannot do deals, they are in the wrong place.

Some interesting questions were asked today, and I want to try to deal with some of them.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

Again, I am slightly baffled by the question, because I answered it right at the beginning when the shadow Foreign Secretary asked me. I will read out my answer again. I said that we had been consistently clear that before the UK can ratify the treaty, we will need to do the following: pass primary and secondary legislation; update the UK-US agreement—the exchange of notes; and put in place arrangements on the environment, maritime security and migration. Indeed, that was very much the tenor of the answer that was given to Lord Callanan in the other place.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Last week we had a discussion about the cost of this deal, and I asked the Minister whether he would confirm the figure of £34.7 billion from the Government Actuary’s Department. He did not give me a direct answer, but later in the debate he confirmed that it was a nominal amount, not adjusted for inflation or the social time preference rate. With that in mind, will the Minister give the House the most accurate assessment he can of the true figure for the total cost of the deal, adjusted for inflation and the social time preference rate?

[Stephen Doughty]

The hon. Member asks an important question. The Government were clear about the forecast costs when they signed the deal, which were that the average cost per year was £101 million and the net present value was £3.4 billion. As I made clear the other day, forecast costs are, of course, forecasts; we expect any number to change over time, in particular to reflect things such as the Office for Budget Responsibility forecast inflation rate, which was updated in November 2025. I mentioned that the Treasury was updating the methodology for the social time preference rate. We are not going to keep recalculating every day, but at the time when the treaty was published we were very clear and gave a lot of information; we have given answers on this issue on many occasions and will continue to keep the House updated in the usual way.