British Indian Ocean Territory

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Tim Roca]

I cannot clear up that point for the right hon. Member, but I have great confidence that ministerial colleagues would be able to. We have been told at all points that this treaty would ensure the continued effectiveness of the base in the way that it is run now. There was an Ohio class submarine there in 2022, and I hope those arrangements continue under this treaty. From what I have heard from Ministers, there is no reason that they would not.

Let us turn to the costs of the deal. It will cost a fraction of the defence budget for an irreplaceable asset—

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Could the hon. Member clarify precisely how much of the cost of the Chagos islands deal will come from the Ministry of Defence budget?

[Tim Roca]

I am sure that has been set out already in several debates. The point that has not been set out adequately and cannot be set out in huge detail is that, in exchange for providing the United States with facilities on Diego Garcia, the in-kind support in terms of intelligence and other matters that we receive from the United States must run into the billions every single year. Although we cannot put a figure on that, it is a really important element in this debate.

There is no prosperity without security, and there is no security without certainty. In an interconnected world, those are not abstract principles; they are strategic necessities. That is why, in my view, this is a sensible, hard-headed deal, and a confident assertion of the United Kingdom’s national interest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

So wrote the President of the United States only a week ago:

“The UK giving away extremely important land is an act of GREAT STUPIDITY.”

For once, he is not wrong. I have lost track of the number of times I have spoken about the Chagos deal in this House, but each time brings a new stick with which to beat the Government. It is genuinely difficult to see how the Government have got to this point, but their kamikaze negotiating tactics have led them to a situation where they can no longer even muster the collective energy of their Back Benchers to defend it. The dogged determination of the Government to capitulate to a 2019 advisory ruling by the International Court of Justice would be commendable, were it not so timid. The UN General Assembly adopted resolutions urging the UK to comply with the ICJ’s advisory opinion, but crucially, the US voted in support of the UK, clearly not fearing the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, of which it is not a member.

As I am sure everybody here already knows, the United States’s support is significant because of the presence of the naval support facility, Diego Garcia. It is a strategically important location that is effectively a persistent aircraft carrier in the Indian ocean, critical for force projection in the southern hemisphere and across INDOPACOM—the United States Indo-Pacific Command. On Monday, the Minister of State responsible for the overseas territories, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth responsible (Stephen Doughty) was quick to imply that discussions regarding the deal with the United States were an almost daily occurrence. With that in mind, perhaps the Minister in his summing up could outline to the House what discussions the Government have had with their US counterparts regarding the limitations placed on operations by compliance with the Pelindaba treaty.

This was the answer I received to a recent written question:

“Both the UK and Mauritius are satisfied that our existing international obligations are fully compatible with the Agreement”,

but what precisely does that exclude going forward? The African nuclear weapon-free zone treaty was signed by Mauritius in 1996 and prohibits myriad functions relating to nuclear weapons, including possession or control of nuclear weapons. There are obviously no intercontinental ballistic missiles based at Diego Garcia, but the US nuclear triad is designed to provide a second-strike capability that includes air-launched warheads.

Naval support facility Diego Garcia is a strategic waypoint for the US air force bomber fleet, the B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers. Following 9/11, the US used Diego Garcia for operations in Afghanistan, and subsequently during the start of the Iraq war. As recently as last May, the US air force had B-2 bombers stationed on the island. This is critical because the B-2 Spirit is the delivery method for the Mod 11 B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb, the primary weapon for the ground-penetrating mission. This capability matters, and while it will likely never be used, we cannot afford to let enemies in the region know that that will never be on the table.

We should bear in mind that the Prime Minister is in China this week. Strategic posture across the Pacific, particularly in Taiwan and the second island chain, will surely come up in conversation. Ceding the Chagos islands to a country within China’s orbit is yet another strategic mis-step in the Prime Minister’s inability to deal with China robustly.

On the ongoing issue of sovereignty, in note No. 25 between the ambassador of the United States of America and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, written on 30 December 1966, point (1) states very clearly:

“The Territory shall remain under United Kingdom sovereignty.”

This time last year, I asked the Government whether the 1966 exchange of notes would require amendment as a result of the change in sovereignty, and they answered:

“The 1966 Exchange of Notes between the UK and US regarding the joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia has been subject to routine amendments and supplementation since signature. Any amendments resulting from the proposed agreement with Mauritius will be factored into this existing process.”

Can the Minister outline what progress the Government have made? I asked that question on 5 February last year, and here we are, a year letter, with the treaty on the brink and no update from the Government, other than through a slightly churlish appearance from the Minister at the Dispatch Box in Monday’s urgent question. Crucially, the legislation was pulled from the other place that afternoon.

Throughout the passage of the Bill, the Government have deflected, obfuscated, been dragged to the Chamber, given us the run-around on detail, gaslit us, and generally tried to force this deal through. The lack of speakers on the Government Benches is testament to the fact that Labour MPs simply do not want to put their name to this legislation. All it achieves is a weakening of our military options in the southern hemisphere, and the exemption of 80% of Mauritian workers from income tax. Kudos to Mauritian Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam, clearly a savvier negotiator than our dear Prime Minister.

“There is no doubt that China and Russia have noticed this act of total weakness”,

said President Trump. Perhaps the Prime Minister could ask Xi Jinping about it before he offers him a state visit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Luke Pollard]

The right hon. Gentleman nearly got to why the Conservatives started the negotiations. It did not quite hit my bar for an intervention, but I appreciate him giving it a good go.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

rose—

[Luke Pollard]

Let me see if the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) can do any better.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

Could the Minister explain why the previous Labour Government entered into negotiations in 2009, when the first talks took place with the Mauritian Government, which were ultimately ruled out after being criticised for being a unilateral decision around the marine protected area?

[Luke Pollard]

Again, the hon. Gentleman did not quite hit my bar, but I am sure I will get a parliamentary question from him about it.

The Conservatives started the negotiations, I am afraid, and they want everyone to forget it. They want the public to forget it; they want their own MPs to forget it. If they cannot do deals, they are in the wrong place.

Some interesting questions were asked today, and I want to try to deal with some of them.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

Again, I am slightly baffled by the question, because I answered it right at the beginning when the shadow Foreign Secretary asked me. I will read out my answer again. I said that we had been consistently clear that before the UK can ratify the treaty, we will need to do the following: pass primary and secondary legislation; update the UK-US agreement—the exchange of notes; and put in place arrangements on the environment, maritime security and migration. Indeed, that was very much the tenor of the answer that was given to Lord Callanan in the other place.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Last week we had a discussion about the cost of this deal, and I asked the Minister whether he would confirm the figure of £34.7 billion from the Government Actuary’s Department. He did not give me a direct answer, but later in the debate he confirmed that it was a nominal amount, not adjusted for inflation or the social time preference rate. With that in mind, will the Minister give the House the most accurate assessment he can of the true figure for the total cost of the deal, adjusted for inflation and the social time preference rate?

[Stephen Doughty]

The hon. Member asks an important question. The Government were clear about the forecast costs when they signed the deal, which were that the average cost per year was £101 million and the net present value was £3.4 billion. As I made clear the other day, forecast costs are, of course, forecasts; we expect any number to change over time, in particular to reflect things such as the Office for Budget Responsibility forecast inflation rate, which was updated in November 2025. I mentioned that the Treasury was updating the methodology for the social time preference rate. We are not going to keep recalculating every day, but at the time when the treaty was published we were very clear and gave a lot of information; we have given answers on this issue on many occasions and will continue to keep the House updated in the usual way.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

With the greatest of respect to the right hon. Lady, I do not think she has been present in many of the other debates on this issue—she popped up here today to make these points. I have been clear and answered the question already, so I will not do so again.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for giving way and for his detailed explanation of how the calculations have been made. The Government Actuary’s Department clearly stated that this deal would cost £34.7 billion. That figure was then confirmed by his colleague, the Minister for the Middle East, who said that all the figures had been ratified by the Government Actuary’s Department, but his colleague sitting next to him, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, told me that that figure was inaccurate. Will the Minister therefore clarify how much this deal costs?

[Stephen Doughty]

We set out the costs clearly at the time, as I have done for the hon. Gentleman in the Chamber a number of times. What I will confirm is that they have been verified by the Government Actuary’s Department. The House of Commons Library has been through them and reached the same conclusion. The Office for Statistics Regulation has welcomed the Government’s approach and said that it is in line with intelligent transparency, and the Office for Budget Responsibility also confirmed separately to it that the discount rates were correct. I have given the hon. Gentleman four good reasons and the costs. However much Opposition Members bandy about the costs, it is simply unhelpful.

I will move on to the other amendments. Lords amendment 6 would introduce an ongoing estimates and supply scrutiny process for expenditure under the treaty, including parliamentary approval for future payments and supplementary estimates. The agreement has undergone intense scrutiny, and the treaty provides robust mechanisms for dispute resolution under article 14. It is normal practice for payments under treaties to be made under the prerogative power and charged on the Consolidated Fund under the authority of the Supply Acts. Furthermore, the amendment would infringe on the financial privilege of the Commons and affect the Commons’ arrangements for authorising expenditure. These are long-standing practices that members of the former Government will know. The same applied under them, and it applies under this Government, too.

Finally, subsection (4) would infringe on the prerogative power to make and unmake treaties. It is not wise to impose any immovable requirements about a hypothetical set of circumstances that might arise in the future. This provision risks requiring the Government to breach the UK’s obligations under a treaty. It is clearly preferable for all options to be open to a future Government, so that they can deal with whatever the future may bring and act in the UK’s best interests, taking into account all the circumstances.

I am conscious of your exhortations about time, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I know that a number of right hon. and hon. Members wish to speak. The previous Government recognised that there was a problem. They engaged in 11 rounds of negotiations, but failed to reach a deal that was in our interests and those of the United States. We secured this deal. It protects the base, and the interests of the United States and our Five Eyes partners.

Iran: Protests

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 19th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Falconer]

I will. The BBC World Service and BBC Persian are a lifeline, as are so many of the other World Service channels. I pay tribute to the vital work that they do in reporting, even in the most difficult circumstances.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

If I may, I will return to the topic of Craig and Lindsay Foreman. The Minister will be aware that they have been imprisoned for more than a year and are in Evin prison, regarded as the harshest in Iran. Can the Minister update the House on their medical condition since the outbreak of violence in Iran in recent weeks? Can he say when he was last informed of their medical condition, and whether they are still safe?

[Mr Falconer]

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I do not want to provide too much personal information to the House, but I can confirm that we have had consular access relatively recently. I have spoken to the families twice, I think, since the protests began. Those people are very much at the forefront of my mind.

Ukraine

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

My hon. Friend is right to point out the contribution of the many organisations across the country that have reached out to support Ukrainian communities. I have certainly seen that in Cardiff, where some fantastic groups have done that; I know that is reflected in my hon. Friend’s constituency. There is a strong heritage in this country of individuals who fled conflict working to support others who have done the same. I have seen that repeatedly in many different groups. I pay tribute to all of them, and to all the people up and down Britain who have brought Ukrainians into their homes and supported these efforts in many other ways.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

While we are on the subject of Russian war crimes, James Scott Rhys Anderson is one of the only Britons to have been captured by the Russians. He was tried—the Foreign Office believes on false charges—and charged with being part of a terrorist group and illegally entering Russia. He was sentenced to five years in a Russian prison, and will then be transferred to a Russian penal colony, rather than being treated in accordance with the Geneva convention. What progress has been made on securing his release?

[Stephen Doughty]

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we are well aware of the number of cases. Russia has obligations under the Geneva convention, and we expect them to be upheld. We regularly raise these cases at the appropriate levels. I am happy to talk to him separately about that specific case, but he can be assured that I am well aware of that and a number of other cases. We are clear that international law must be upheld, including the basic principles of treatment of prisoners of war and situations involving children. That goes to the heart of the nature of what the Russian regime has been doing and the lengths it is willing to go to. We urge the upholding of the commitments to basic decency and the treatment of individuals, to which we are all signed up.

We are standing with Ukrainian people on the ground in their hour of need. We have provided more than £577 million in humanitarian support for vulnerable citizens since the invasion began, including those forced to flee their homes. This year we will spend up to £100 million on support, including to help families through this harsh winter. We have upped our support in energy, particularly in response to regular attacks on energy infrastructure. A lot of our work is to help to mitigate that, but the scale of those attacks is severe and they have a daily impact, as Members can see in media reporting and from what we know on the ground.

There is no firmer friend for Ukraine than the UK. Indeed, our commitment runs deep. I have mentioned the crucial 100-year partnership that the Prime Minister signed with President Zelensky in Kyiv. That agreement has enhanced co-operation across defence and security, science, trade and culture.

Venezuela

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 5th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

I can assure my hon. Friend that we continue to support and uphold the 2016 peace accord. We are the penholder, as he says, so we work closely with the Colombian Government on that, and on how to deal with a range of threats to their stability. I recognise that the Maduro regime contributed to instability in Colombia as a result of migration and criminal operations. We will continue to work with the Colombian Government.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

In November, I asked the Government what our position would be if the US took military action in Venezuela, in the light of the new US national security strategy, which clearly outlines the US Administration’s position on the western hemisphere and denial of influence to non-hemispheric competitors. The answer was not clear. Following her discussion with Secretary Rubio, what assessment has the Foreign Secretary made of the risk that Venezuela may be the first domino in a chain across central America, ending with Mexico? If we do not now recognise Delcy Rodríguez as the legitimate President of Venezuela, is it because she is one of the individuals we have already sanctioned?

[Yvette Cooper]

We want to see regional stability and calm across the region, and partnership working between nations—that is crucial. Delcy Rodríguez has clearly been part of the Maduro regime for a long time. We believe that there needs to be a transition to democracy that engages all the different Opposition parties and players in Venezuela. That is what we will work to do, and it is what I have discussed with Secretary Rubio.

Chagossians: Trust Fund and Resettlement

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Tuesday 16th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Falconer]

As I set out in my response to the shadow Foreign Secretary, the trust fund will have a majority of Chagossians on it and a chair appointed by the Chagossians. The conduct of the trust fund will also be observed by our own high commission.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Last month, after a three-month wait for an answer, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry informed me in a written answer that the Government Actuary’s Department’s figure for the cost of the Chagos deal of £34.7 billion is inaccurate. I struggle to believe that the Government Actuary’s Department would have published the figure in error in August. It was widely reported at the time, and the Department has never publicly corrected the figure. Will the Minister confirm that the Government Actuary’s Department figure of £34.7 billion over the length of the deal is correct and that the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry is misinformed?

[Mr Falconer]

I will have to consult the Ministry of Defence to be sure where the error is. My understanding is that all costs have been verified by the Government Actuary’s Department, and I cannot provide any further clarification.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Monday 20th October 2025 Commons Chamber

We are seeing another page in the dramatic history of the Indian ocean. Surely we should recognise the human rights of the people who were so disgracefully treated by Britain—and by the United States, but principally by Britain. They, at last, will see some degree of justice and the ability to return to their islands. I hope, when the Minister replies, that he will be able to give me some hope and comfort on the question of access to Diego Garcia, and also explain why it is necessary to have these incredibly long leases for the US to continue its operations on Diego Garcia. It seems to me that we should be working towards the Indian ocean being an ocean of peace, not an ocean of conflict between rival powers.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

For no apparent reason, and in a crowded field, the Government have chosen the Chagos islands as one of the many hills they wish to die on. The surrender of the sovereignty of the Chagos islands has been a puzzling mis-step for months, with today’s votes the culmination of it.

There was a clumsy rush to try to force the deal through, first before the elections in Mauritius and then before the US elections, and there now appears to be an attempt to salvage some dignity, having seemingly surrendered

“meekly to a Mauritian shakedown”,

as my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) has put it, while trying to upsell the deal to a US Government that publicly backs it, given that it will not cost them a penny, but privately must have concerns over the impact of allowing Chinese encroachment in the region. With recent developments shifting the focus of US foreign policy to the Indo-Pacific, the Chagos islands deal surely takes on greater significance. The base is now more important to US policy, not less.

Last December, the previous Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), who is in his place, announced that the deal

“secures the future of the UK-US base on Diego Garcia”,

and said that

“when everyone looks at the detail of the deal, they will back it”.—[Official Report, 2 December 2024; Vol. 758, c. 28.]

Indeed, the Minister for the Overseas Territories, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) confirmed to me that

“There has been no change to the substance of the deal”.—[Official Report, 5 February 2025; Vol. 761, c. 764.]

That is strange, because the new Prime Minister of Mauritius, Navin Ramgoolam, described the deal struck with the previous Mauritian Government as a “sell-out”, stating that the deal should be indexed to inflation, take exchange rates into account and fully recognise Mauritius’s ownership of the islands, which could affect the UK’s unilateral right to renew the lease. That was in mid-January. Less than a fortnight later, the Minister confirmed to me in a written answer that the UK would not have the unilateral ability to extend the agreement at the end of the lease. What changes were made to the original deal during discussions with the Government of Mauritius, and why have the Government gone on record as saying that the deal has not changed, in direct contradiction with the statements of the Prime Minister of Mauritius? Surely the Minister for the Overseas Territories is not suggesting that Prime Minister Ramgoolam is mistaken.

In January, when I asked the Prime Minister whether he had ever discussed the Chagos islands with Philippe Sands KC, his answer was a brusque, “No.” Brevity is key when trying not to give too much away. Philippe Sands has represented Mauritius at the International Court of Justice in multiple disputes over the Chagos islands. In 2022, Mr Sands published “The Last Colony: A Tale of Exile, Justice and Britain’s Colonial Legacy” about Chagos. It is worth highlighting that Philippe Sands and the Prime Minister have apparently been very good friends for several years; they even interviewed one another at the Hay festival.

Earlier this year, The Telegraph reported that the national security justification for surrendering the Chagos islands used by the Prime Minister came from Philippe Sands, who wrote about it in the 2023 book, “The International Legal Order in the 21st Century”. With Mr Sands apparently no longer representing Mauritius following the change in regime, it does make one wonder if that was the reason why there was such a rush to conclude the deal before the election, after which Mr Sands’ services were no longer required—did the Government lose their in?

I would be interested to know how the Government think the International Telecommunication Union would block our use of the electromagnetic spectrum. How would it block communications equipment on Diego Garcia without encroaching on our territory? What active blocking of electromagnetic frequencies is a UN agency capable of doing anyway? What steps would the ITU have taken to block the US military’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum had we not progressed this deal? The national security argument simply does not stack up.

New clause 6 would require the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the impact of UNCLOS on the operation of the treaty. The Government have previously stated that it is ITLOS that would pose the greatest threat to the operation of Diego Garcia. It was cited specifically by the Defence Secretary for the first—and only—time on 22 May, when he said:

“There are a range of international legal challenges and rulings against us. The most proximate, and the most potentially serious, is the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.”—[Official Report, 22 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 1291.]

In July, the Minister for the Overseas Territories referred to ITLOS for the first time since he was a shadow Minister for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, when, in December 2022, he had stated that the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

“did not have competence on territorial disputes”,

going on to say:

“It is a fact that China has made increasing encroachments into the territorial waters of its neighbours and vast claims in the South China sea while ignoring judgments against itself. That has been matched by a growing assertiveness, and even belligerence, towards some of our allies and partners in the region”.—[Official Report, 7 December 2022; Vol. 724, c. 162WH.]

He asked for assurances then. Now, nearly three years later, with a belligerent China flexing its naval muscle in the region and adopting a robust posture towards us over the delay to the decision on its London embassy and the obvious ongoing spy debacle, what assurances can the Government give the Committee that this opportunity will not be exploited by the Chinese Communist party?

As recently as August, the Mauritian Government referred to

“The strategic role of Mauritius as an investment gateway to Africa and a trusted partner for Chinese enterprises seeking to expand their footprint therein”.

Mauritius is committed to working closely with China—far closer, it would appear, than it is to working with us. Why are the Government prepared to embolden Chinese ambition in the Pacific? Why are they prepared to embolden Chinese spying in Parliament? Why are they prepared to allow the Chinese to build an embassy in London without absolute clarity on its structural plans? With all that in mind, why will the Government not include China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? The shadow of Jonathan Powell looms large over this deal, as it has over every aspect of the Government’s dealings with the Chinese Communist party.

Across the globe, we are seeing changes in the rules-based order. We must navigate this better. My fear, which is shared by all on the Conservative Benches, is that this capitulation shows no understanding of the changes we are facing. We need to ensure that this great nation stands up for safety, freedom and security across an increasingly dangerous world, and this opaque and furtive deal puts that at unacceptable risk.

[Sammy Wilson]

A deal of such implication, one would have thought, would have been hotly debated in this House, yet as has been pointed out, there has been no attempt to defend it by the Government. In fact, one could hardly call this a debate—it has all been one-sided. In a debate, people usually argue in favour of whatever the proposal happens to be and listen to and rebut the arguments from the other side. We have had no rebuttal from the other side—the Government—today, despite the fact that this is such an important deal.

For some people outside the House, this deal might seem to be an unimportant issue—where are the Chagos islands, and why do they matter? However, even if the attitude taken by Government Members is to say, “Our constituents are not all that interested in the issues around the Chagos islands,” there are issues with this deal that have been raised this evening that should concern them all.

Let us look at the issues, because they are addressed by the amendments. The first is human rights—the human rights of the people who were displaced in the 1960s and who are ignored in this deal. Their rights to self-determination and to decide where they live are being ignored, yet we are not getting any response from the Government—the party that talks about human rights all the time. They say that we cannot leave the European convention on human rights because human rights are so important, but they are ignoring the human rights of the people who are affected by this deal.

Ambassador to the United States

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Tuesday 16th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The now former ambassador to the United States has been sacked due to the nature of his relationship with a convicted paedophile—a relationship that has come as no surprise to anybody except the Prime Minister, it would appear. The Prime Minister and the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), knew of Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Epstein, yet his appointment was felt to be worth the risk. That is despite warnings from President Trump’s co-campaign manager Chris LaCivita, who criticised the replacement of the former ambassador, Dame Karen Pierce, as replacing a

“professional universally respected ambo with an absolute moron”.

Even the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), who was effusive in her praise for Lord Mandelson, asked for him to come before her Committee to

“allow my colleagues to hear directly why the Prime Minister has appointed him”.—[Official Report, 14 January 2025; Vol. 760, c. 143.]

With her face pressed up against the Cabinet Room window like Tiny Tim out in the cold, I am surprised that she could be heard, but the Minister for the Overseas Territories, who is looking sheepish in his place on the Front Bench, was emphatic. He stated:

“We are absolutely convinced that Lord Mandelson will do an excellent job as our representative in Washington”.—[Official Report, 14 January 2025; Vol. 760, c. 143.]

Yet that whole time, the Government were aware of the security warnings that Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Jeffrey Epstein crossed the line of what is acceptable and failed to meet the standard expected of what is arguably our most critical ambassadorial appointment.

The President of the United States arrives for his second state visit tomorrow, yet we now suffer the embarrassment and indignity of having had to sack our ambassador for his proximity to a man found guilty of soliciting prostitution from a child—a man whose girlfriend was convicted in 2021 of sex trafficking, conspiracy and transportation of a minor for illegal sexual activity. Indeed, an aspect of this matter that remains unclear is the nature of Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Ghislaine Maxwell. The New York Times has described this issue as “a stinging embarrassment” that

“casts a shadow over the planned state visit”.

How has the Prime Minister allowed this to happen, ignoring the advice from his security assessment to appoint him anyway, embracing the risk then having it blow up in his face?

Prior to entering Parliament, I worked for Barclays bank. In 2021, the bank’s CEO Jes Staley resigned amid a regulatory probe into whether he mischaracterised his relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. I actually raised a complaint with my managers, which was roundly ignored and never advanced beyond managing director level, such was the squeamishness that surrounded the story. I was furious that Barclays still paid Staley his £2.4 million salary and £120,000 pension contribution while being defenestrated for his relationship with Epstein. That is not privileged information—it was widely reported—yet while the financial world saw fit to wash its hands of Staley, this Labour Government welcomed Lord Mandelson with open arms.

Those linked to Jeffrey Epstein who maintained a relationship with him after his conviction and who many times visited his island, where the crimes took place, have long since been deplatformed and deemed too toxic to hold positions of power, yet the hubris of the Prime Minister saw him ride roughshod over such glaringly obvious concerns. Being the Prime Minister is to take the mantle of the UK’s decision-maker-in-chief; it is to own the responsibility of making not just difficult decisions, but the most difficult decisions. Appointing an ambassador to the United States is not the political banana skin that should bring down the Government, yet here we are. The Government are teetering on the brink.

Yesterday the Prime Minister gingerly began climbing down over his handling of the Mandelson sacking. When he came to the Chamber last Wednesday, he robustly defended Lord Mandelson and played to the baying crowd. He even had the chutzpah to claim that the Conservative party has a leadership contest going on—was it not interesting to see him in the Smoking Room last night between votes? [Laughter.] Last Wednesday, the Prime Minister stated that

“full due process was followed during this appointment”.—[Official Report, 10 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 859.]

He said that twice. If that is true, the Prime Minister knew the full scope of Mandelson’s relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. If he did not know and new information subsequently came to light, either the vetting standards of the Government are incompetent or the claim of “full due process” is inaccurate. The Prime Minister also said that

“I have confidence in the ambassador”.—[Official Report, 10 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 860.]

He said that twice, too.

The Prime Minister’s explanation yesterday stated that there were three reasons for his tergiversation:

“The nature and extent of the relationship being far different to what I’d understood to be the position at the point of appointment, the questioning and challenging of the conviction, which…goes to the heart and cuts across what this government is doing on violence against women and girls and the unsatisfactory nature of responses from Peter Mandelson last week to the inquiries made of him by government officials – I took the decision to remove him.”

Can the Government lay out precisely what was the full due process that was followed? The Prime Minister claims that he did not learn the content of the Bloomberg emails until after his robust defence at PMQs, so did Lord Mandelson fail to disclose that information during his vetting interview? Was there even a vetting interview, or did Lord Mandelson disclose everything and the Prime Minister is displaying wilful ignorance?

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

The hon. Member’s speech reminds me of an earlier episode in UK-US relations, when Donald Rumsfeld referred to known knowns, unknown unknowns and known unknowns. While the Government might be forgiven for not holding Peter Mandelson to account for unknown unknowns, does he agree that it is unforgivable that they have staked Britain’s diplomatic relationship with the US on known unknowns?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I wholeheartedly agree with the hon. Member. It is incredible that the Government have engaged in such lax vetting regarding such an obvious conflict of interest.

On the nature and extent of the relationship, we knew about Mandelson’s closeness to Jeffrey Epstein when the notorious birthday book was published, in which Lord Mandelson described the convicted paedophile as his “best pal” and signed off his many pages of unctuous praise with the line “yum yum”. What else did the Prime Minister learn beyond that? He claims that he knew only of Mandelson’s “association” with Jeffrey Epstein—that would appear to be questionable.

Turning to Lord Mandelson’s questioning and challenging of the conviction, was he asked his opinion of the conviction of his “best pal” during his vetting interview? Did Lord Mandelson disclose that he felt, or had ever felt, that the conviction was unjustified? Either he was not asked, in which case the vetting was incompetent; he did not disclose it, in which case he was not a suitable appointment; or he did disclose it, and it was ignored by the Prime Minister. Which is it?

The unsatisfactory nature of the responses is the only aspect of the investigation we are yet to learn about. The Prime Minister must publish the new information, so that this House can fully understand. If Lord Mandelson’s answers are unsatisfying now, but were not before, that suggests that full due process was not followed, in contradiction to what the Prime Minister claimed last week.

This whole sorry episode looks set to derail the visit of the President of the United States tomorrow. We are a long way from the chummy bonhomie of the Prime Minister feeling that he had stuck the landing with his perfectly stage-managed hand delivery of an invitation letter to President Trump. I wonder how he is going to explain all this to the President tomorrow. The Prime Minister knows that his days are numbered; those in his new Cabinet know his days are numbered; his Back Benchers know his days are numbered—perhaps he should try talking to them on a regular basis, not just greasing up to them in the Smoking Room when he needs their support. If the Prime Minister cannot exercise the judgment required of his office, he must resign.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

British Indian Ocean Territory: Sovereignty

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

I will not take any lessons from a party that fawns over Vladimir Putin.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

In the Defence Secretary’s statement on 22 May, he stated with regard to potential legal rulings against us that

“The most proximate, and the most potentially serious, is the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.”—[Official Report, 22 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 1291.]

The US, which operates the base, is not even a signatory to UNCLOS. How would ITLOS have ruled a binding legal judgment that we would have recognised? It is notable that ITLOS has not been mentioned since that statement?

[Stephen Doughty]

I am confused—I have mentioned ITLOS on a number of occasions, including just a moment ago. The long-standing view of the United Kingdom is that the UK would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such litigation. Even if we chose to ignore binding judgments made against us—we would not do so—their legal effect on third countries and international organisations would give rise to real impacts to the operation of the base and the delivery of its national security functions.

International organisations have already adopted decisions based on Mauritian sovereignty, and others would follow suit following such litigation. That could affect the electromagnetic spectrum, access to the base by air and by sea, and the ability to patrol the maritime area around the base and to support the base’s critical national security functions. Further, the UK would likely face a provisional measures order in a matter of weeks. The position is clear, and we have explained it. The hon. Member’s previous Government knew exactly the same. [Interruption.] However much he shouts and however much he does not like the arguments, they are the facts.