Russia’s Grand Strategy

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 19th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the matter of Russia’s grand strategy.

I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this debate again, because I secured a debate last year about the same topic. Then, I outlined Putin’s global policy and I set out how Russia was threatening Ukraine as part of a campaign of blackmail and hybrid warfare directed at the Americans and NATO. I explained how Russia’s grand strategy was being conducted across the whole spectrum of foreign, defence, security and domestic policy. I discussed Russia’s warlike strategic headquarters at its national defence management centre at the old Russian army staff HQ on the Moskva river. Today, I make the same fundamental point as I made last year: Russia has a grand strategy, but we do not.

The idea of global Britain demands a global strategy, which means grand strategy and must be a whole-of-Government enterprise. It is fair to ask, “If Russia has an effective grand strategy, why has it not done better in Ukraine?”, because when the war started, all the assessments predicted that the Russian army would be much more successful. The answer is simple: Putin’s decision bypassed the usual strategy process and went against the views of his general staff.

This is about the difference between policy and strategy. Policy is the aim—the political objective—and strategy is the interactive process by which that policy objective might be achieved. Putin was driven by his obsession to subjugate Ukraine. He overrode the general staff’s strategy process and disregarded the limitations of the army. It could be considered odd that he did that, but he had used lethal force before with great success. In Georgia and Crimea, surprise and speed brought him a quick victory, although on those occasions the general staff were behind him; in Ukraine, they advised him against going to war.

Of course, Putin is not the first to override his general staff in pursuit of an obsessive policy; the same was Hitler’s undoing. It seemed, until a week ago, that it might also be Putin’s, but he has learned from his mistake and has rediscovered strategy. Last week’s appointment of the chief of the general staff Gerasimov as the overall commander brings the general staff back into the planning and command chain. Other commanders, warlords and private military companies will be brought under his authority. As Gerasimov gets a grip of things, I am afraid that we must expect to see Russian performance in Ukraine improve considerably.

Russia is not giving up, so Ukraine’s survival will now depend on western military and economic help being delivered a lot more rapidly and in far greater quantities than it has been so far. Unfortunately, the approach of the UK’s current foreign and defence integrated review refresh process is underpinned by an explicit but premature assumption that Russia will lose in Ukraine and will then prioritise investment in maritime, particularly sub-surface, as well as space, cyber and special forces. It argues that Russia will not invest meaningfully in land forces, but our eastern European and Nordic colleagues do not share that view.

The integrated review refresh risks over-optimism that would allow us to tilt our posture and capabilities away from the most immediate threat in Europe and, instead, towards long-term gambles on technological superiority and a focus on the Indo-Pacific. AUKUS and the tilt to the Indo-Pacific are certainly policies, but they are not backed up by any strategy process to determine if they can be achieved with the limited ways and means that we have available.

The policies of global Britain and AUKUS are admirable and, conveniently, cheaper, but they are not enough on their own. Painful though it is, we need much stronger land power as well. We must still gear up to defend the UK and to deter a war in Europe against a peer enemy. Of course, Russia will invest in sub-surface, space and cyber, but it shows no sign of dispensing with large-scale ground forces, heavy armour and artillery. If anything, the Ukraine war has convinced the general staff of the need to reinvest in their army.

The Nordics and the Poles know that Russia is a land animal. Strategic missile submarines excepted, Russia sees its navy as flank protection for a land war and its air force as the third dimension of that land war. Despite evident lack of progress and perceived weaknesses, Putin shows no signs of intending to stop, of scaling down his demands, of looking for a way out or of making serious proposals for peace. In fact, Ukraine is expecting a new all-out assault in the spring or even sooner.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

In the debate last year, I made the point that I felt that we were already in a cold war, which some disagreed with. Does my hon. Friend think that our European allies have changed their position on that or is there still a resistance to accepting that a new cold war is well and truly under way?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I think that we are in denial of not just a cold war, but a hot war. The hot war that is being conducted in Ukraine is laced with rhetoric and invective about NATO being the threat and about the United States of America provoking that threat, so NATO and the United States must somehow be defeated in this war. If we do not understand that Putin is now conducting a hybrid and political war against Europe and NATO, backed by a hot war in Ukraine, we are not yet living in the real world.

If the process of reinvigorating Russia’s armed forces and preparing for a further assault on Ukraine is not derailed and Putin is successful, by 2024, the west will face a more formidable Russia that believes that it can establish its place in a future world order by force of arms. This is a long-term strategic challenge that requires a long-term strategic response from the UK Government, all European Governments and NATO.

Putin’s strategy depends on time. We all admire Ukraine’s bravery and agility, which have left the Russian army in something of a quagmire, but it would be an epic tragedy if we now allowed Russia the time to mass its forces, so that its brutal war of attrition could become overwhelming. It is crucial for the west to increase the tempo of its supply of weapons systems to Ukraine, so that Ukraine, rather than Russia, can be first to develop the mobile formations necessary to break the current battlefield deadlock. The reality is that Russia’s whole grand strategy is on a knife edge and the next few months could be crucial.

We should not be deterred by Putin’s so-called red lines. In war and crisis, red lines are political and flexible. We proved that when Russia’s build-up to the invasion last year crossed several NATO red lines, and we did nothing. Likewise, Putin’s incorporation of Donbas into the Russian Federation was intended to set up a red line of Russian territory being attacked, but when Ukraine attacked, it turned out there was no red line.

[Richard Foord (Tiverton and Honiton) (LD)]

On the point about how we in the west might have set some red lines, I thought at the time that the west was not being firm enough in the red lines it was laying down. What we saw in mid-February was the US President and others talking only about sanctions, and how there would be nothing more than sanctions as a consequence of a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I regard the United States as our closest and most important ally and personally I love the United States of America, but on its response to this crisis—it has been voluminous compared with that of the rest of Europe and a lot of money has been devoted to it—its signalling has been very weak. What matters in wartime is not what red lines we set; it is what we actually do.

I am afraid our own Government made a terrible error when we set a red line about the use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2013, and then what did we do? We backed off when chemical weapons were used. The effect of that has been to weaken the influence of the United States, the United Kingdom and the whole of the west in the countries that really count in this war as potential allies or neutral states—for example, the Gulf states, which despaired of our lack of resolve in that conflict. Red lines are less important than what we do, and what we must now do is send far more matériel into this conflict to support the Ukrainians, so that the Russians are deterred or fail to achieve what they attempt to do.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

On my hon. Friend’s point about doing as opposed to just saying, with which I entirely agree, does he agree with me that part of this is that the German Government should now release their legal hold over the export of Leopard tanks from European allies to the Ukrainians to allow them a chance to counter-attack?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I certainly think that is the case, and I think the constant fear of our escalating the conflict has been misplaced because Putin has escalated the conflict anyway. There is nothing we can do to prevent him from escalating. In fact, the signal we have sent by being too timid and too slow in sending support into Ukraine has encouraged him to escalate. There is no deterrence in timidity, which is what too many western Governments have shown.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

To drag together that point with something my hon. Friend said earlier, surely such timidity also follows failure to have the capability to be more assertive. In other words, now that their defence budgets have been stripped out, western Governments are worried that any attempt to try to show that they are more belligerent, shall we say, exposes the very fact that most of them are simply incapable of delivering any of that belligerence at all.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I entirely agree with that, but in more direct response to my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), the timidity of the Germans not just to release their own tanks, but to allow the tanks of other nations, such as Poland, to be sent into the conflict to support the Ukrainians sends more than a signal of timidity—it is appeasement. I am sorry to use that word, which I know has a loaded connotation, but it is appeasement. However, we must congratulate Germany on having come a very long way from the days of Gazprom being chaired by a former Chancellor of Germany and Angela Merkel making Germany dependent on Russian gas as a matter of policy. We have come a long way, and we should welcome the fact that Germany has committed to spend €100 billion more on defence, but we are still yet to see what that really means, and it means nothing if Germany is not prepared to help send heavy armour into this conflict.

If I may say so, we have committed to send 12 tanks, but why not 120 tanks? What are our tanks for? Are they there to sit around on Salisbury plain and in Germany to decorate the British Army’s capability, or should we tool them up and get them into this conflict so that the taxpayer can actually get value for money out of this investment? If necessary, we can launch an urgent operational requirement to acquire some more tanks to replace those that we will probably not ever see again in our own country.

[John Howell (Henley) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I will, but I do want to press on, and I will probably be overrunning my time very shortly.

[John Howell]

I will try not to interrupt my hon. Friend for too long. Does he agree with me that the timidity on the part of the UK is exampled by the fact that when I asked Zelensky how many air defence missile systems he had, he said 10%—that is all? When I got back to the UK, there was an email from a well-known Cabinet Minister saying, “Be very quiet about this, because we do not want to stress the fact that we are giving him so few.” Does my hon. Friend agree that that is a prime example of such timidity?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

We should not trash what the Government have done, which is considerable, but we should point out that the failure to do much more—much more—is going to cost us in the short term, the medium term and the long term. We must also dispense with the false hopes that some kind of regime change would be likely to reverse the Russian urge to control its near abroad, or to use its army as a tool for suppressing dissent and keeping the country together.

My conclusion is that if the UK is going to help lead the NATO alliance, which protects Europe against Russia, we need meaningful land power to make an effective contribution, supported by mobile air cover and a Navy to deliver the Army to where the action is. For that, we need a new mobilisation system to come out of the integrated review refresh, and a procurement system to back it up that looks much more like a system of urgent operational requirements, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford suggested during the statement earlier this week, than the absurdly slow and costly peacetime procurement process that we somehow insist we have to maintain, despite its delivering—or not delivering at all—equipment, at vast expense, with limited capability.

This demands a drastic—even revolutionary—change of UK grand strategy, which I suppose is why we seem to avoid having one and, I suspect, why the IRR is stuck where it is. In the long term, how do we find a way to stop burgeoning state-backed health and welfare systems crowding out defence and security spending? In the short term, Whitehall in general and the Ministry of Defence in particular must accept that, if we continue to spend defence money as we have done over the last 20 years, we really are lost. We need a complete revolution in defence acquisition and procurement, making it look and feel much more like a continuing series of urgent operational requirements—a system based on wartime emergency procedures that, historically, delivered much cheaper and more timely equipment. We need to regain the ability to adapt our force structure, kit and tactics to outmatch an active enemy, just as the Ukrainians have done and the Poles are doing.

Madam Deputy Speaker, I am drawing to a close. There are growing pockets of awareness and belief in the value of strategy in the civil service, the diplomatic service, the security services, the National Security Council, the MOD, the Foreign Office and No. 10, but Whitehall as a whole is still miles away from the kind of capability and capacity for constant strategic analysis and assessment that would provide Ministers with the right questions and might lead them to the right answer. Why do we not have a Minister in the Cabinet Office for national security who is responsible for answering on grand strategy? Without the right apparatus and the right culture in government, we will always be behind the curve of events, as we seem to be now, and mis-appreciating what is really happening. We need to find the right answers to the new and evolving threats the UK and the whole of the free world must confront before it is too late.

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[John Howell (Henley) (Con)]

When I started the process in the Council of Europe that had Russia expelled, I was unsure where it would end up. One of the things I have done since then is to introduce what I hope will turn into a new convention or treaty that will hold Russia to account for its aggression against the environment. Human lives and human aggravation are already accounted for, but there is nothing to be able to hold it to account for aggression against the environment.

Secondly, I have asked for a current affairs debate on two countries: Serbia and Kosovo. Why have I asked for a debate on Serbia and Kosovo? Because it is clear to me that Putin is making a big effort to make Serbia a second front to take our attention away from Ukraine. I think he is also doing it as a result of wanting to expand Russia. It is a pretty good example of that.

In 2015, the Russian state media, Sputnik, began broadcasting anti-EU and anti-NATO disinformation. It began broadcasting it not from Russia, but in the western Balkans from its regional base in Belgrade. Only at the end of last year, on 13 December, a rally was held in Belgrade to demand the intervention of the Serbian Government in Kosovo. Members may think there is nothing to be said about that, but many of the people attending that rally were waving Russian flags and chanting hateful and racist comments.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

In fact, it is even worse than that. The state-controlled media in Serbia simply broadcasts Russian propaganda and has recently accused Ukraine of killing its own civilians, when in fact those civilians were being killed by Russian missile attacks.

[John Howell]

I am glad my hon. Friend has taken away a large part of what I was going to say, which has made it much easier to concentrate.

Russia and Belarus have provided Serbia with 14 MiG-29 fighter jets. Eight are donations from Belarus and six are from Russia, and Serbia has bought the rest. Russia has also beefed up Serbia with 30 T-72 tanks and 30 other armoured vehicles. The Pantsir-S1 air defence system has reportedly also been sold to Serbia, along with the longer-range Buk air defence system. A shipment of Kornet anti-tank missiles has also arrived from Russia. The co-operation in military activities has gone from 50 in 2016 to over 100 joint military exercises in 2021. It is no wonder that, according to the US Department of Defense, Serbia provides the “most permissive environment” for Russian influence in the Balkans. When Kosovo took reciprocity measures regarding the temporary licence plate issues in 2021, Serbia escalated the military provocation, flying Russia-donated MiG-29 fighter jets and continuing to make available Russian helicopters on the border with Kosovo.

We know the short-term reasons why Russia is doing this: to stop Kosovo having a role to play in the EU and in the Council of Europe. We have defied Russia in the Council of Europe and given Kosovo seats so it is able to participate in debates, even though, for the moment, it cannot vote; that is because of the opposition of Serbia and that will be dealt with.

This is a serious situation because it affects not just Kosovo. We must not forget that Serbia is also influential in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hon. Members may have seen that, only last week, in the Republika Srpska, the Muslim part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader, with great pride said that he was giving Putin the highest medal of honour for his

“patriotic concern and love for Republika Srpska.”

I ask you. Members can judge for themselves what that concerned.

We are dealing with some very unpleasant people. The Republika Srpska has the site of the genocide of Srebrenica. We are not allowed to call it a genocide because the Serbians do not like that term being used for it, yet it was a genocide of almost 8,000 Muslim people killed in that area.

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[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) on once again bringing this important debate to the House. I also congratulate all the Members who are attending it, many of whom were here for the previous debate a year ago.

“Russia’s grand strategy” is an interesting title, which leads to the question of what constitutes the counter-strategy. As was said a year ago and as has been said by several Members today, where the current actions have come from has been laid out along the line by Putin, whose actions are pretty clear. If you are a citizen of Lithuania, probably Belarus, east Poland or the Caucasus, you will notice that you are mentioned in Putin’s essay of 20 July, and you will certainly not sleep easily if you think that we will step back and let Russia win the battle in Ukraine.

I have a concern that many have touched on which is that a certain amount of hubris is starting to develop among western nations when they say, “We will win in Ukraine.” I very much hope that that is true, and we are doing everything we can to do so, but it does not seem to take into account the way in which Russia is now regrouping, restrategising and re-energising, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex said in his opening speech. We have to take a strong look at how we are going to supply Ukraine and how it is to move forward.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) has already made the point about Leopard tanks. European defence as a whole needs to take a long, hard look at itself. There can be no excuse for countries to say, “We will supply the tanks that are needed, but we need Germany to approve it” and for Germany to say, “Well, it’s up to the US.” It really is not up to the US. It is really up to nations within Europe. What concerns me, and Putin will be well aware of this when we are looking at the grand strategy, is that he will see that article 42 of the Lisbon treaty—the permanent structured co-operation, or PESCO, commitment—and where that leads to could spell a real problem for NATO.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I reflect on the irony that one of the reasons why some of us wanted to leave the European Union was that it was insisting on having its own defence policy and armed forces, ostensibly in order to be independent of the United States, because of course it is NATO that guarantees peace in Europe and the EU would be incapable of doing so on its own. So it is a bit of an irony that Germany is now saying that it cannot send tanks to Ukraine until the US approves. It rather gives the lie to the idea that the EU is capable of even thinking independently of American defence policy.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point. I do not seek to raise an EU Brexit issue here. I want to highlight where I think there is a real concern about the future of NATO, what Putin will be looking at and why it is so important that we do not allow Russia to be victorious.

The hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Richard Foord) made a good speech, and I congratulate him on researching the speeches that we all made last year in this debate. It is important to know the context. He said that the Budapest memorandum was not worth the paper it was written on. That is an important statement to make because with Putin, nothing is worth the paper it is written on. When people talk about moving towards a negotiated settlement, what does that actually mean? If we get commitments on paper from Putin, it is frankly a waste of everybody’s time. The only way this conflict will be resolved is by winning it militarily.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alec Shelbrooke]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I thank everyone who has taken part ably in this debate, and my hon. Friend the Minister for his response. I would point out to the Scottish nationalists that I do not think that President Putin would have attacked Ukraine if Ukraine still had nuclear weapons. But the main point that I wish to make—for all the positive things that my hon. Friend said—is that it is complacent to say that Putin’s strategy is failing and our strategy is succeeding. Setbacks, yes, but two words keep coming up in military literature in Russia at the moment: Stalingrad and Finland. Stalingrad because its doctrine is victory at any cost and Finland because that is where it expects the west to compromise to cede territory in order to gain peace, which is what Finland did in 1938.

Russia is tooling up its entire economy for war. It is reported in Vedomosti, the business daily in Russia, that Putin when visiting a factory called the work of the Russian military-industrial complex one of the factors of victory in the Ukraine war. We have yet to hear that the UK Government are doing enough to support Ukraine—I regret that—although we are leading many other European nations from the front. Russian grand strategy has been clear for at least a decade, yet the west has been continually blindsided because we do not have a strategy of our own. We do not have the capacity for analysis and assessment that would keep us alert to these threats. This is a topic to which I will return, I can assure this House.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the matter of Russia’s grand strategy.

Missile Incident in Poland

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 16th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

I remind the hon. Lady that that scheme is closed and has been for some time. Obviously, visas are a matter for the Home Office rather than the Foreign Office, but I remind her that, in a number of instances, people come to this country because they are fleeing persecution in the countries of their birth. I know that, for a number of British nationals of Russian heritage, that was very much the case.

I am very proud that the UK was one of the first countries to bring in sanctions specifically to target the money people around Vladimir Putin and to choke off the supply of funds that helped him to prosecute this conflict. We will continue to work in conjunction and co-ordination with our international allies to do likewise.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. Friend for making it so clear that it is irrelevant whose missile it was and that the state of affairs is the responsibility of the aggressor: Putin’s Russia. In that context, can he use this incident to amplify to our allies in Europe, and to some of our colleagues in the Government, that Putin’s Russia is not just at war in Ukraine, but at war with us? His hybrid campaign—cyber-attacks, assassinations, sabotage of critical national infrastructure in European countries and, of course, the energy war—is against us. Unless we defeat Russia in the war in Ukraine, it will be a defeat for the west. Therefore, we must galvanise ourselves and put ourselves on the right footing and in the right frame of mind to ensure that the Ukrainian people prevail.

[James Cleverly]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point about the multiple things that are at stake in this conflict. We have seen military lives lost, civilian lives lost and, sadly, in ground that has been ceded by the Russian military, what appears to be evidence of widespread and systematic human rights abuses. Those are the things that we are defending against, but in addition, we are defending the UN charter and the concept of adherence to international law. As he rightly said, we in the UK have been the recipients of cyber-attacks and attacks on our homeland that we have attributed to Vladimir Putin and the Russian regime. All those things are at stake all at once. We have to defend ourselves against the full range of threats, and he is absolutely right to highlight that.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 27th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

We set out the case extremely clearly in the legal advice, and the doctrine of necessity has been used by other Governments in the past where there is a severe issue and the other party is unwilling to renegotiate that treaty. That is the position we are in with the Northern Ireland protocol. What I would ask the hon. and learned Lady and other Members on the Opposition Benches is this: given that the EU refuses to reopen the Northern Ireland protocol, and issues around customs and tax are specifically baked in, what is their solution for dealing with the real issues in Northern Ireland? We have looked at all the alternative solutions, and the only effective solution is this Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, in the absence of the EU being willing to negotiate a new protocol.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend could also point out that the protocol itself contains provisions for it to be changed, and the EU refuses to contemplate using those provisions. May I also point out that at the time we signed the protocol, we did not know the shape of the trade and co-operation agreement, and it was reasonable to expect the EU to give mutual recognition of products and standards, including SPS standards, as it has with New Zealand, for example? The EU refuses to give us those provisions. The problems in the protocol would be much less if the EU had given us a better trade deal.

[Elizabeth Truss]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right that the protocol is not set in stone. That is why for the past 18 months this Government have sought to achieve negotiated changes to the protocol. In the absence of the EU being willing to change the text, the only way to resolve this matter is for us to legislate.

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[Mr Lammy]

I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s experience in these matters, and indeed when the protocol was being negotiated in the first place. May I say that I met EU ambassadors in London last week and made that very point? I point him to the speech that I made last week, in which I highlighted exactly what he has just said.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I do not think that anyone in this House can doubt the right hon. Gentleman’s personal commitment to the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, after the remarks that he has made. As someone whose father was nearly blown up in the Grand Hotel, I share that passion, but the problem that the right hon. Gentleman has to grapple with is that he wants a negotiation. What if the EU will not negotiate? What would he do then? That is the position that we are in. We cannot elevate the protocol to be more important than the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. That is the necessity we face.

[Mr Lammy]

I accept the sincerity with which the hon. Gentleman makes his remarks. Let me just say that they have said that trust is at an all-time low. The question for this House is whether the Bill maintains or assists trust, given that ultimately this will be an agreement and it will be negotiated.

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[Simon Hoare]

I am going to make some progress, if I may.

I suggest that we have to be the party of the rule of law, or we are nothing. It is sad that we have to be reminded of that. This a power grab, with all these Henry VIII clauses. If we were being asked to pass powers to Ministers so we could polish an already superlative protocol, we might have some faith, but they have admitted that the results of what they negotiated have caught them by surprise—that they did not understand the import of what they were signing up to, or they did not quite understand the terms or the meaning of the words. We are told that they were surprised that the other side would expect us and them to fulfil the obligations we had negotiated.

Given our deep understanding of the complexities and difficulties of the politics of Northern Ireland— I have little or no doubt that we can all unite on that—I suggest that to enter into something so lightly without understanding precisely all the details, and then to say, “We’re having to do this because we didn’t expect the other side to do it in the way that they want us to do it,” is for the birds. It is totally bonkers. The Government told us that, having reached a difficult compromise on the final text of the protocol, they expected the EU to do something else. With all the history, all we relied on was expectation.

These Henry VIII clauses really will not stick. Seventeen of the clauses give unspecified powers to Ministers. Was taking back control about this Parliament handing powers to the Executive to use for unspecified purposes? Even worse, one clause tells us that powers will be used to change powers that might have been changed in the Bill if those changes are subsequently thought to have been wrong or ill-advised. That is not only someone marking their own homework, but someone copying somebody else’s homework and then claiming all the credit themselves.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I find it astonishing that my hon. Friend has got eight minutes into his speech and he has still not mentioned the Belfast/Good Friday agreement.

[Simon Hoare]

My hon. Friend was obviously not listening, because I made it very clear at the start that the constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom is not touched by the protocol. The constitutional integrity of Northern Ireland within our United Kingdom is contained within the clauses of the Good Friday agreement—that is the only way. Anybody who tries to position this protocol—

Northern Ireland Protocol

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 17th May 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

May I just point out to my right hon. Friend that I only reluctantly voted for the protocol and the withdrawal agreement on the basis that we were not allowed to conclude a permanent trading agreement with the EU until we left and that it would be superseded or overtaken in due course? May I also just point out that apart from the disagreement about whether we should have legislation, there seems to be very broad agreement across the House, as there was when I proposed a motion to this House on 15 July last year, which the Labour party actually supported with very warm words, saying there were legitimate concerns among the Unionist community that had to be addressed? It is a shame that the Labour party will not will the means as well as the ends, but can I invite my right hon. Friend to engage with the reasonable elements of the Labour party to support her negotiating position so that we can reach a negotiated settlement?

[Elizabeth Truss]

I am very happy to engage with colleagues across the House, in particular to explain why there needs to be a change in the protocol itself to fix the issues about making a clear green lane between GB and Northern Ireland and on resolving the taxation issues. That is the fundamental issue in the negotiations with the EU, which we have conducted in good faith. I have had numerous negotiations and conversations with Commissioner Šefčovič over the past six months, but fundamentally the EU’s mandate does not allow the changes to be made that would help us to create the green lane and the free flow of goods between GB and Northern Ireland, and to address the unfairness in the tax system whereby a cut in VAT on solar panels announced by the Chancellor cannot be implemented for the people of Northern Ireland.

Sanctions

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 28th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

They will not be going about their business freely for much longer.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

If the BBC World Service comes to my right hon. Friend to ask for additional funding to increase the broadcasting in Russia and among Russia’s supporters and allies, will she entertain and agree to such requests?

[Elizabeth Truss]

I will certainly entertain the request, and I will ensure it is value for money.

Relationship with Russia and China

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 24th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), who stands out as the only Scottish Member of Parliament who voted for the renewal of Trident in 2016. That is a great credit to him and to his prescience, because, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) said, if there was ever a demonstration of the futility of nuclear disarmament, it is the position that Ukraine finds itself in now. Yet that is the policy of the SNP and of a great number of Labour MPs, and they are a threat to our national security.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) on securing this debate. As the dark shadow of war once again falls across our entire continent, I reflect on the adage attributed to Leon Trotsky:

“You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”

Everyone who loathes war and wants peace should reflect on that. If other people are determined to foment war, we have to take an interest.

The question in this debate is how we should now see Russia and China and the relationship between them. In the UK, we see Russia as an immediate threat, but China as perhaps the much greater long-term challenge. In the US, it is different. All US presidents since Obama have seen China as the existential threat and today’s Russia as yesterday’s problem, Europe’s problem, and a regional rather than a global threat. There are, to be sure, specialists in the US who understand that, like China, Russia is a long-term opponent, but their voices must compete with those who are effectively advocating appeasement for Russia—resets, normalisation, and the overlooking of previous illegal incursions, overseas assassinations, cyber-attacks on NATO allies and so on.

In Europe, Germany understands the existential nature of the Russian threat, but has until very recently pursued a policy of engagement with Russia. This now looks to have been deeply unwise. It has created serious vulnerability for Germany and for Europe as a whole. France, historically anti-American, must now accept that Russia presents the threat. Even this week, the French were, understandably, trying to use this to their advantage to prove their global influence and to try to secure peace. But all of Europe must now be united.

Nor is the United Kingdom beyond criticism. We have a firm understanding of the Russia problem in our analytical community, and of China, but until recently successive Prime Ministers chose to turn a blind eye to both problems. This is now changing, but the UK finds itself without the necessary tools to tackle the Russia threat and the China challenge. Our military has lost its ability to fight a peer enemy. Our legal system allows Russians and Chinese agents to exploit the vulnerabilities inherent in democracy. Our own blind reliance on spot markets to obtain cheaper gas has undermined our energy security. I have spoken before about how the UK Government lack the capacity for deep continuous strategic thinking to match the strategy and planning of our enemies, and I will return to that point.

Putin and President Xi have observed years of western failure to react to Russian encroachments and Chinese anti-democratic influence. We have encouraged them to join together in thinking that, despite our bluster, Putin’s taking Ukraine and China’s expanding influence are in their mutual interests and will remain largely unchallenged. That must now change, and it is changing. Until recently, it seemed that Putin might succeed, as he did in Georgia and Crimea, but Putin has miscalculated. His bullying has mobilised Ukraine’s resistance, is galvanizing support for NATO in previously neutral nations such as Sweden and Finland, and is rekindling Washington’s concern about Russia’s threat to global peace.

[Geraint Davies]

The hon. Gentleman will have seen a map drawn by Putin of Ukraine, where a lump is given to Ukraine by Stalin, another lump by Lenin and another lump by Brezhnev. Does he agree that the implicit plan is to take all that bit, to leave a little bit, like a doughnut, for the Ukrainians to be corralled in, to have them like the Uyghur population, to Russify the rest, to finish off Ukraine and to take the large majority of it?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

What is completely clear is that President Putin has repudiated his own words and security guarantees that were given to Ukraine on its existing borders.

Last night’s strikes by Russia on Ukraine’s military infrastructure and border guard units, and the incursions of military vehicles, show that there can be no compromise with Putin. We will only find peace through strength. What is there to negotiate? Putin is now seized by an irrational obsession to crush Ukraine by one means or another. His performance on Russian TV addressing his security council underlined how Putin is now acting out his emotions—his frustration, wounded pride and lust for revenge. According to him, only great powers count, and if you cannot bully your smaller neighbours into submission, you are not really a great power.

President Xi is very different from the usurper Putin. While Russia represents great culture and history, Putin’s rogue regime is fundamentally weak, trying to prove its power despite Russia’s internal dysfunctionality and economic failure. China, however, represents a far older, more consistent and altogether more considered philosophical tradition. Putin acts impetuously; President Xi demonstrates strategic patience. Russia is trying to distract from its failures; China is building upon its success. The task of the west is not only to deal effectively with Putin, but to give a clear message to China and to other countries that might consider endorsing or imitating Putin’s aggression.

To his credit, President Xi has now backed off from his earlier strong support for Putin, as he came to realise that a full-scale invasion of Ukraine will mobilise the west and enable the west to strengthen its defences and have a more competitive stance, against not only Russia, but China. China should reflect on the questions now being asked in Washington and Europe, as raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset. Why should we not formally recognise Taiwan’s sovereignty and its right to self-determination, if China is to co-operate so easily with Putin in Ukraine? China can use this moment to build trust with the west. The west will continue to have great differences with China, but we want to work together with China for global peace and security and for a sustainable planet. We cannot begin to do so if China aligns itself with the now rogue regime in Moscow.

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[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. I very much regret having to do this. I apologise to you, Mr Deputy Speaker, to the House and to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), because I misconstrued his record. It was in fact my right hon. Friend the Member for Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale (David Mundell) who was the only Scottish MP who voted for the renewal of Trident in 2016. To the right hon. Gentleman’s credit, however, he is not actually a unilateral disarmer.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

Thank you for the point of order, Sir Bernard. The record will now be corrected.

Russia

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 6th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

That is absolutely the work the UK is doing. That is why we had a very extensive discussion on this subject at the G7. We announced that there would be severe consequences, and we are absolutely working on co-ordination. That is vital. It is very important that the United States is involved. It is very important that the EU is involved. It is very important that the wider world is involved, because this is not just a threat to peace and stability in Europe; it is a global issue about whether we are clear that aggressors will not benefit from aggressive behaviour.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for her statement, which will inform the debate that we are having later about Russia’s grand strategy. We keep saying that Russia’s aggression must not be rewarded, but the past decade and a half has seen Russia’s aggression effectively rewarded and go unpunished again and again. To that extent, how can she ensure that the meetings taking place on 9 and 10 January in Geneva will actually mark a significant departure in past practice from the west so that from now on we will act much more decisively and be completely united? We cannot succumb to the divisive way in which Russia is attempting to separate the United States from its NATO allies.

[Elizabeth Truss]

I agree with my hon. Friend: we do need to step up our efforts as the free world. In fact, in a speech I made before Christmas I said that there had not been enough action, and that peace and security in Europe and beyond had been taken for granted not just by the western alliance but more broadly by the free world. That is why we are stepping up in the work we are doing to challenge Russia and encourage our allies. We are encouraging the United States and the EU and working with them to develop the very clear consequences of any Russian action.

FCDO Staffing

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 16th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

The hon. Gentleman knows that I have a huge degree of respect for him. However, his questions are predicated on a starting point which I have just said at the Dispatch Box is not the case. He starts throwing around figures like 20% in terms of staff reductions in a clear attempt to generate scaremongering. I have said, and the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have both said, that there will not be 10% cuts, as has been brought up—[Interruption.] There will not be. Therefore, his whole line of questioning is predicated on a statement that is incorrect.

The hon. Gentleman said that we have had to spend less on ODA this year and, of course, that is the case. I remind the House that that is because we have experienced the largest economic contraction in three centuries as a direct result of the pandemic. Nevertheless, we still remain one of the largest ODA-donating countries in the world. We maintain one of the largest diplomatic networks in the world. The Foreign Secretary hosted G7 Foreign Ministers in Liverpool, showing global leadership on a range of issues, including girls’ education and humanitarian issues. At COP26, we saw the UK demonstrate global leadership on the existential crisis of our generation—climate change. We will remain a top-tier diplomatic powerhouse.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Can we just remind ourselves that the UK diplomatic service is in fact part of our vital capability to maintain the competitive stance of this country around the world? The cost of the diplomatic service is a minute pinprick in the overall scheme of public expenditure, well within the margin for error of many other Government Departments’ expenditures. Why would we want to squeeze this capability when it is so vital for our global future? Can we also think about what the diplomatic service is for? We value real subject knowledge and expertise, and country knowledge and the ability to speak the local languages more than perhaps we have recently. We value our history and understanding of our place in the world and the intelligence that those in the service gather and feed back to the centre. It is the centre that has to value that if our diplomatic service is to produce value for money.

[James Cleverly]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important and accurate point about the value that our diplomatic network and our diplomats around that network provide. We are all incredibly proud of the level of expertise of the FCDO staff, and I know the Foreign Secretary has said this to them directly. Our diplomats are an absolutely top-tier team. We retain a high ambition for our international relations, as set out in the integrated review. We will continue investing in our people, including in language skills and other skills, to ensure that we retain that position. He is right that they are the primary means by which we exercise soft power around the world, and they will continue to be very much at the forefront of our thinking when it comes to planning for the future.

Ukraine

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 7th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Vicky Ford]

I cannot comment on hypotheticals. Let me just say again that any military excursion would be a terrible miscalculation and the Russian Government should expect massive strategic consequences, including severe economic sanctions.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) on being granted this urgent question, but may I express my disappointment that this matter has had to be raised in an urgent question and that the Government have not volunteered a statement? There was a NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting last week. We have a crisis in the Balkans. We have Russia spiking our gas supplies. We have Russia creating the migration crisis in Belarus, and we have Russia on aggressive military manoeuvres around Europe with its massively renewed military hardware. When will the Government take on board the fact that we are in a hybrid war against Russia now and that there needs to be a comprehensive and united western response, because, at the moment, NATO is weak and divided?

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Stability and Peace

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 2nd December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I very much welcome the points made by the hon. Member for Rochdale (Tony Lloyd), and I wholeheartedly agree with them, except for one: I think it is NATO’s job not to interfere in the internal affairs of a state but, if invited to secure the security of that state—and we feel we can do that—to make an offer to it to save it from conflagration. I will come back to that. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns) on securing this debate, on the very knowledgeable way in which she introduced the topic and on the passionate way that she spoke. I have wonderful words in my prepared speech, Madam Deputy Speaker, but in the interests of brevity, I shall cast aside my beautiful turns of phrase and say what I think needs to be said.

I think there are only three Members here this afternoon who sat through the 1992 to 1997 Parliament. We heard Paddy Ashdown every week at Prime Minister’s Question Time—it was twice a week then—asking questions on what we were going to do about the Balkans crisis. I have to say, I am one of the guilty ones who sat on the Government Benches and thought that he had become obsessed with something that we could not do anything about or should not get involved with. But he was right. It was only when the bread queues in Sarajevo were being shelled by the Serbians that we began to realise that something terrible was happening in our own continent.

I happened to make a visit, I think with the armed forces parliamentary scheme, to NATO, and I heard the then Supreme Allied Commander of NATO describe this as the biggest security failure in the European continent since the second world war. We began to wake up to the fact that something terrible was happening. What had gone wrong? My hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton said that we are repeating the same mistakes as we did in the early 1990s. Oh yes we are.

First, there is complacency. Secondly, there are different voices. We talk about the European Union, but the European Union has different voices. Different countries have different approaches. I am afraid that the German Government are pretty ambivalent at the moment about whether the Bosnian state should be secured permanently. The French have always had a stronger relationship with the Serbs than with any other part of the Balkans. The United States now, as it did then, feel that this was a post-cold war European security problem that it should not get involved with. And then there was some precipitate action by an external actor, Germany—the recognition of Croatia, I think in 1990—that triggered the whole Balkan crisis. It took years before it was understood what we had to do—we tried an air campaign, which did not succeed, and we had to put troops on the ground to stop the fighting—but at least when we got in there and did it, we got an agreement.

We got the agreement with tacit Russian co-operation—Russia did not prevent it. This time, Russia is a player in the conflict. It is stoking the ethnic tensions and encouraging the separatists and the break-up of the state, because I imagine Putin regards it as in his national interest to see 1.8 million Bosnian refugees flooding into Europe when western Europe is already facing a refugee crisis. He would love that, and the Chinese are helping, too.

What are we going to do? Are we just going to carry on pussyfooting around? The solution is for EUFOR, which is a small European Union force, to be reinforced very substantially, now. I differ from the hon. Member for Rochdale on this point: I think that if the Bosnian Government requested that, NATO would have to respond. However, that would require persuading the United States’ Mr President Biden, who has become far more isolationist and unhelpful to NATO. I have no brief for Trump, but at least Trump managed to get us all to spend more money; Biden looks completely disinterested from foreign wars. He has to become interested. Just as Clinton started from that position—

[Alicia Kearns]

I apologise for interrupting my hon. Friend, who is making a very good point. I just want to briefly make a point about wars. What we are saying, and what Biden does not appear to have an appetite for, is that we are trying to create a forever peace, not a war or a conflict. It takes guts, commitment and determination; I thank all hon. Members who have spoken so far and have shown that. That is a slight divergence from my hon. Friend’s point, but it is important that this is about forever peace, not war.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

My hon. Friend is quite right. I was going to go on to the point that it was Madeleine Albright, bless her, who persuaded President Clinton that the Americans had to be involved. President Clinton nicknamed it Madeleine’s war, but this time it has to be Secretary of State Blinken’s peace. My hon. Friend is completely right.

The point is that we can pre-empt war if we get in there with sufficient deterrent force to deter those who are arming the separatists and encouraging their withdrawal from the Bosnian state institutions. The October mandate that Dodik issued that Republika Srpska elements should cease to operate as part of the Bosnian armed forces is an act of revolution, and it must be stopped. It is contrary to international agreements and it is contrary to the UN resolutions. The UN resolutions are still in force under which we can act—and we should act.

What if Russia objects? That is the question that I want to deal with.

[Bob Stewart]

I wonder whether my very good friend agrees that we could do something unilaterally: deploy a spearhead battalion under operational control of EUFOR now.

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[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

We could. I do not know whether we should do that in order to help to secure international agreement and consensus, or whether we should do it after we have secured international agreement and consensus, but if securing agreement takes too long, that may be something that we should do. Brave nations need to act to prevent another conflagration on our continent—it need not be inevitable.

These are my final questions to the Minister. What happened at the Riga NATO summit? What was discussed? When will we have a statement from the Government about what has been decided and how we, as NATO, will proceed on the matter? I am quite certain that the EU cannot do it on its own. One of the myths created by the EU is that there is something called European defence and security, or a European army, or whatever it is. It cannot act. There must be much wider international agreement. The United Kingdom must support EU action and NATO action to do this together.

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[Fleur Anderson (Putney) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. Members for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns) and for Glasgow South (Stewart Malcolm McDonald) and my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) for securing this important debate, which is very close to my heart. We have had an excellent debate this afternoon. The House should be united on this issue, and I think it is. This debate has shown our close links with Bosnia and Herzegovina and, without a doubt, it has shown the urgent need for action. I am delighted to have seen the Minister in her place throughout the debate, listening carefully.

I declare my interest as co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on prevention of genocide and crimes against humanity and vice-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Bosnia and Herzegovina. I was a humanitarian aid worker during the war, living in Serbia and Bosnia, and four years later I returned with my small family to head Christian Aid’s Bosnia office, rebuilding villages in north-west Bosnia and supporting the return of refugees.

I saw how a country that seemed to be peaceful and communities that seemed to be ethnically diverse and happily co-existent could slide into conflict, and I saw how devastating that is for everyone. I lived in communities and spoke to the relatives of elderly people who fled with an hour or two’s notice and never returned to their home. They died, devastated, in another part of the country. I spoke to people whose education and dreams for the future were shattered, whose families were separated and whose husbands were killed. The country suffers that deep trauma still.

I will never forget standing in a village with some returning refugees when my translator froze in terror as he recognised the voice of someone who had been a sniper, firing into the town night after night, during the siege of Bihać. Despite those deep traumas and differences, I pay tribute to everyone in Bosnia who has worked hard to rebuild their beautiful country and who looked atrocities and killing in the face and did not let it define their community forever—to everyone who has consistently chosen peace over hate for many years.

This month is the 26th anniversary of the Dayton agreement, to which the UK is a signatory. We need to reassert our support for the agreement and for the integrity of the national borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The trigger for the current crisis has been genocide denial. We stand together to condemn that genocide denial and the rise of divisive identity-based politics. The UK and international response to the increasingly divisive politics of the leader of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, has been quiet for too long, but I sense a turning of that tide, and I hope this debate will hasten it.

We must learn from what happened in the 1990s and in Srebrenica. When we say “never again,” we must mean it. A return to violence in Bosnia is not inevitable, and I will focus on two things. First, civil society has an important role. We have talked about troops on the ground, which I hope not to see. If we work well with civil society now, we can stop it.

We have learned lessons about peacebuilding in Northern Ireland, and that peace was built not just through diplomatic agreements or military action but through community groups, brave individuals, women’s groups, teachers and young people. It was supported by other countries, too. For example, a stream of parliamentarians from South Africa repeatedly went to Northern Ireland and lent influential encouragement and expertise during the peace process. Let us learn from that.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I emphasise the hon. Lady’s point about the role of women and the empowerment of women in conflict prevention, which has also been raised by my hon. Friends the Members for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns) and for Meon Valley (Mrs Drummond). The women’s peace movement in Northern Ireland was instrumental in helping to end that conflict, and men should be supporting women’s peace movements.

[Fleur Anderson]

I absolutely agree. There are voices of peace, especially women’s voices, within Republika Srpska, but it is not easy to work with them. Earlier we heard from the High Representative that it is difficult to be in civil society, to be those voices and to be those women who speak out. We need to seek out those groups and find where they are. I have been asking about this for quite a long time, and I do not know the groups with which we should be working. We in the UK face a challenge in what we can do not only to prevent genocide and conflict now—that is clearly value for money—but to build a lasting peace for the future. That has to be done in conjunction with civil society.

Secondly, we need an atrocity prevention strategy. The United States has one. The Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocity Prevention Act 2018 commits the US Government to pursuing a Government-wide strategy to identify, prevent and respond to atrocity risk. We need that across all the countries in which we work, but we need it in Bosnia right now. Such a strategy would include improved communication between desk officers and London and proper training on spotting the signs early and on what to do, and it would put in place a better early warning system to spot the signs of genocide. According to the UN framework, we can see 21 of 80 warning signs right now. What is happening in other countries? Do we spot them? Are we ready? Without a genocide prevention strategy across all our work, we will not be ready in Bosnia or elsewhere.

Finally, what can the UK do now? I echo many earlier points. I welcome today’s announcement of a special envoy to the Balkans. Will the Minister join me in condemning genocide denial and remembering the 8,000 people who died in the Srebrenica genocide? Will she work with the US, NATO and the EU to impose sanctions on countries that undermine the Dayton peace agreement and to assert the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Will she provide unequivocal support for the UN High Representative, Christian Schmidt? And will she look into the peacebuilding and civil society support we need to give to groups, communities and individuals in Republika Srpska now?

A co-ordinated, coherent and well-implemented atrocity prevention strategy can save countless lives, stop the need for military intervention and complement diplomatic support.

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[Catherine West (Hornsey and Wood Green) (Lab)]

This really is Parliament at its best, when we are united and speaking with one voice on the importance of saving lives, because this is where we could end up with this very grave debate and the situation in Bosnia Herzegovina. I thank the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns), who clearly has intimate knowledge of the subject and a real passion to deter what could be a terrible outcome if we do not get moving, as the international community, in preventing further conflict, in-fighting and hatred, which so many humanitarians around the Chamber have mentioned. I also want to mention my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion), who in this House has a history of stopping violence against women and girls, both domestically and internationally, and the hon. Member for Glasgow South (Stewart Malcolm McDonald). I thank them for securing the debate.

Parliaments have a real role in sparking these debates and in galvanising Governments. We have seen that today. This morning we had the meeting and the briefing from Christian Schmidt, who has a background not just in the defence brief in the German Parliament but in the friendship group with the UK. It is fantastic that he made it such a priority to be here—at the invitation of the FCDO, the Minister, the influential Back Bencher, the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton, and all those who were there, including my hon. Friends the Members for Caerphilly (Wayne David), for Putney (Fleur Anderson) and for Rochdale (Tony Lloyd), who all have a strong history in this area—to counter the beat of nationalism, as my hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale said. Mr Schmidt warned of a potential return to violence and fragmentation. We had a long discussion about the importance of keeping Dayton alive and going, but also of refreshing it, as it was 20-odd years ago.

I briefly want to put on record my background as a visitor to asylum seekers and refugees from the area, mainly young Kosovans, in the late 1990s. That is how I met my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) and then came into politics myself—visiting youngsters in bed and breakfasts in London boroughs. When we visit children in our own constituency, we might have helped their parents as asylum seekers and refugees in the late 1990s.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

Nationalism can be toxic, but there is another crucial ingredient in this potential catastrophe: the interference by other sovereign states, such as Russia and China, and the benign neglect by states that should know better. That is what creates the catastrophe. Will the hon. Lady address that a little in her remarks?

[Catherine West]

I thank the hon. Member for making that point, because the role of the US has come up in the debate. We call the agreement the Dayton peace accords for a reason. I hope that the US will join us and put on record its commitment to maintaining the Dayton legacy.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

What about Russia?

[Catherine West]

I was coming to this, but I am happy to bring forward my bullet points for the Minister. Will she condemn the sale of arms to the Serbian police forces, which has been discussed? Will she condemn the role that Russia is playing in the wider picture, given that it was around the table originally for the Dayton peace talks? Can she give us her current assessment of the danger Russia poses in this situation?

We know that widespread bigotry and hatred can snowball into violence, destruction and ethnic cleansing. Through the international actions that we can all take now, rather than waiting for things to worsen, we can have a real impact, because we know that 26 years ago is but a blink of the eye when the feelings still run high. I was particularly moved by the comment of the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) that he had changed his position during the debates on the Irish question we had here in the 1990s and into the 2000s. He said that he had changed, and I wanted to emphasise our own experience of that conflict—I know that the right hon. and gallant Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) has experience of that conflict, too. We can change and we can hope to be the conveners of change.

My second challenge to the Minister is to ask what is the UK’s role? As the hon. Member for Totnes (Anthony Mangnall), who is no longer in his place, asked, what will Sir Stuart Peach’s remit be when he arrives in Bosnia? How will he support the work of Christian Schmidt, so that we can lead with the UN High Representative and not be undermined by players such as Russia? Will she respond to the question on sanctions? Are sanctions being considered in the effort to use every single tool available to us?

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[Wendy Morton]

The most important thing to recognise is that we have renewed the mandate and we welcome the ongoing work that EUFOR can continue. We recognise that it is an important tool and an important deterrent against those with malign intent.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

As I mentioned, I sat through those debates and questions in the 1990s, and I am not prepared to sit through more months and years of prevarication. My right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) proposed that we should simply make an offer of British armed forces to pump prime the whole of NATO to make a considerable enlargement to the force, because that is what is necessary. The force needs to be moved into the Brčko corridor, which is the main enclave that we need to protect, and to deter the detachment of Republika Srpska armed forces. Otherwise, it will happen—it is happening. It is being encouraged by Russia and we are not doing enough to deter it. We just want a deterrent force; we do not want to start a war.

[Wendy Morton]

Okay. As I explained, I believe EUFOR is an important deterrent, but I recognise that Members of both sides of the House are keen to understand and learn more about what the UK is doing, so let me make some progress.

On the position of the High Representative, we are fully committed to supporting the High Representative as he works with people in-country to implement the civilian aspects of the peace agreement. We support the use of his executive powers, should the situation require it. As Members are aware, he is in London today and I know that he spoke with many Members this morning. I also met him, as will the Foreign Secretary, and our embassy team in Sarajevo remain in close contact with him. That visible and vocal support for the High Representative is essential. We will not allow those who wish harm on that country to undermine his authority.

Many right hon. and hon. Members raised NATO and asked about the meeting in Riga this week. NATO must play an enhanced role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the western Balkans. At the NATO foreign ministerial meeting in Riga, the Foreign Secretary focused attention on Bosnia and Herzegovina and encouraged greater engagement from the alliance. She called on allies to contribute personnel to the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo and to support work to counter disinformation and strengthen defence reform. The UK will do its part. The UK also offers defence assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s armed forces in support of capacity building efforts and their partnership for peace goals.

On Russia and disinformation, we are seeing a worrying pattern of Russian behaviour aimed at stopping Bosnia and Herzegovina moving closer to Europe and NATO. The UK takes that extremely seriously and will continue to call out aggression. We are also backing projects to counter disinformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider region, including giving support to independent media organisations.