All 15 Chi Onwurah contributions to the National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21

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Tue 17th Nov 2020
National Security and Investment Bill
Commons Chamber

2nd reading & 2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & 2nd reading
Tue 24th Nov 2020
National Security and Investment Bill (First sitting)
Public Bill Committees

Committee stage: 1st sitting & Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tue 24th Nov 2020
National Security and Investment Bill (Second sitting)
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Committee stage: 2nd sitting & Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Thu 26th Nov 2020
National Security and Investment Bill (Third sitting)
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Committee stage: 3rd sitting & Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Thu 26th Nov 2020
National Security and Investment Bill (Fourth sitting)
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Committee stage: 4th sitting & Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Tue 1st Dec 2020
National Security and Investment Bill (Fifth sitting)
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Committee stage: 5th sitting & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tue 1st Dec 2020
National Security and Investment Bill (Sixth sitting)
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Committee stage: 6th sitting & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Thu 3rd Dec 2020
National Security and Investment Bill (Seventh sitting)
Public Bill Committees

Committee stage: 7th sitting & Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Thu 3rd Dec 2020
National Security and Investment Bill (Eighth sitting)
Public Bill Committees

Committee stage: 8th sitting & Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Tue 8th Dec 2020
National Security and Investment Bill (Ninth sitting)
Public Bill Committees

Committee stage: 9th sitting & Committee Debate: 9th sitting: House of Commons
Thu 10th Dec 2020
National Security and Investment Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Public Bill Committees

Committee stage: 11th sitting & Committee Debate: 11th sitting: House of Commons
Wed 20th Jan 2021
National Security and Investment Bill
Commons Chamber

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage & Report stage: House of Commons & Report stage & 3rd reading
Mon 26th Apr 2021
National Security and Investment Bill
Commons Chamber

Consideration of Lords amendments & Consideration of Lords amendments & Consideration of Lords Amendments

National Security and Investment Bill

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Tuesday 17th November 2020

(3 years, 4 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
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As my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) set out very well in opening the debate, we support the Bill. Inward investment is crucial for businesses across the UK and our economy, but it is also crucial that the UK has the powers in place to scrutinise and intervene in business transactions that could have implications for our national security.

In fact, we would have welcomed this Bill a long time ago. It is clear that the Government have failed to keep pace with other countries, including the United States, France and Germany, that have already taken steps to update the legislation in line with evolving security threats. From serious questions about Huawei’s dominant role in the UK’s 5G network, as raised many times by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), to the takeover of Imagination Technologies by Canyon Bridge, it is inarguable that the Government have been slow off the mark on foreign acquisitions and the possible implications for national security.

Right hon. and hon. Members from all sides agreed on that, including, I think, the Chairs of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, the Science and Technology Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee, and all five—I think it was five—members of the Intelligence and Security Committee who spoke. I thank colleagues from across the House for their contributions and apologise in advance if I cannot do justice to all of them.

This has been an excellent debate, one that I think showed the House at its best; we heard informed and considered speeches and, where there was disagreement, it was reasoned and open. There is strong agreement across the House that new legislation is necessary to combat changing security threats and to balance those considerations against the ambition to ensure that the UK remains an attractive country in which to invest.

Companies in fast-developing fields, from quantum computing to telecommunications to artificial intelligence to cryptography, are no longer just companies; they are strategic assets that are fundamental to our nation’s security. Until now, Ministers have failed to modernise the takeover regime to keep up with this changing landscape, the pace of technological development and what that means for security. Instead, they have continued to operate within a legal framework that, as we have heard, was created almost two decades ago, before Facebook or Twitter were even invented. My hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols) explained the impact of that uncertainty on the nuclear industry and investment in her constituency.

That is why we strongly welcome the Bill now and agree that it is necessary. It is essential that we get the specific provisions of the Bill right, in order not to deter foreign direct investment while also balancing the need to protect our national security. First, there is the definition of national security, which was raised by many, particularly the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely). The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Depths (Sir John Hayes)—[Interruption.] The Deepings, sorry.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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As deep as you want!

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Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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The right hon. Gentleman is always very deep in his responses. He suggested it was deliberately left undefined in the Bill. The sectors that will be subject to mandatory notification are also not defined in the Bill and, we are told, will be set out in secondary legislation. I thank the hon. Member for Bolton North East (Mark Logan) for his provisional mnemonic and wish him well in updating it.

Definitions, and the lack of them, are important because the proposed powers are not limited by size of turnover or share of supply threshold. They could apply to almost every business transaction within the sectors, and the definition of national security therefore must be set out to help provide clarity for businesses and investors, but it is unclear—perhaps the Minister could provide some of that clarity—whether the takeover of the UK artificial intelligence company DeepMind by Google would have been called in on national security grounds under the scope of this Bill.

In Committee, Labour will seek further details on how the retrospective powers to render acquisitions void would be applied and whether an assessment has been made of the economic and legal consequences for businesses and their employees of acquisitions being rendered void after the fact. The hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) highlighted the Government’s capacity, or lack of it, to process the sheer volume of estimated notifications that the Bill will provoke. We need also to look at how businesses, small businesses in particular, will be supported to cope with the new regulations, which may prove difficult to navigate. We will ask also whether an assessment has been made by Government of the impact the changes could have on investment in small businesses—a chilling effect—including university start-ups, particularly those in the 17 key sectors, which was a point made by the hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard).

Labour will also seek assurances about transparency and oversight and how the powers are applied—a worry of the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart)—including calling on the Government to explore giving the Intelligence and Security Committee a role in scrutinising the use of powers under this legislation. My right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) was right to emphasise the importance of the involvement of and access for the intelligence services.

We hope to work with the Government to ensure that we establish a robust, transparent and fair regime that protects national security, while allowing the UK to continue to enjoy the opportunities that overseas investment affords businesses across our country and economy, but the Bill is also a missed opportunity. It is a missed opportunity to demonstrate what the Government mean by “industrial strategy” and to show that it is more than a slogan. It is a missed opportunity to help UK businesses in key sectors to flourish and grow here in the UK, sustaining and creating jobs—a point on which my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) was particularly eloquent.

Time and again, we see vibrant, growing UK companies sadly lost overseas. While we recognise that foreign acquisition can breathe new life into a company, supporting jobs and growth in the UK, far too often we see UK companies pawned off or stripped for parts. Far too often we see UK companies bought out and wound down to eliminate the competition, with the consequent loss of high-skilled jobs. Nowhere is that more evident than in the technology sector, which must be a key part of any 21st century industrial strategy.

We have lost far too many businesses to Silicon Valley, weakening our technological sovereignty. The takeover of leading UK technological company Arm by the US company Nvidia was announced recently, and while Ministers claim to have scrutinised the deal, they have not been forthcoming with the details. When Arm was previously taken over by SoftBank, legal assurances were extracted about the future of the company’s Cambridge headquarters and the UK workforce. Have Ministers extracted the same legal assurances at this time? Will the Minister come clean today?

The Business Secretary said himself that the UK should be open for business but not for exploitation. However, key companies have been cherry picked by companies in San Jose, with the UK consequently losing out. It is therefore not clear that the current takeover regime is fit for purpose.

The weaknesses in the current regime are about not just national security but industrial strategy. Under the current regime, the Secretary of State has the power to intervene in qualifying businesses on four public interest grounds: media plurality, national security, stability of the UK finance system, and the capability to combat and mitigate the effect on public health emergencies.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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The coincidence, as I described it, between national interests and national security is profound and is proven. When a company is taken over and technology transfer takes place, it is possible for a nation that is hostile to our interests to gain a sufficient understanding to develop systems that endanger this country, including, in some cases, weapons systems.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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The right hon. Member is talking to a chartered engineer who strongly believes that our capability in engineering and the kind of key technologies of which he talks is a basis for our national security, and that national security, without some degree of important technological sovereignty, is difficult to wholly achieve. I look forward to debating that in Committee.

It is worth pointing out that the Government’s powers have been used only sporadically in previous interventions, and they are seemingly not underpinned by any real strategy. The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) made a similar point.

Many Conservative Members are vehemently opposed to extending the remit of the Bill to cover industrial strategy, including, but not limited to, the hon. Members for Totnes (Anthony Mangnall), for North West Norfolk (James Wild), for Cities of London and Westminster (Nickie Aiken), for North East Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller), for Wantage (David Johnston), for Rother Valley (Alexander Stafford), for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Aaron Bell) and for South Dorset (Richard Drax). Labour believes, however, that the Government should be able to intervene in the takeover of a critical business on industrial strategy grounds. That power should be paired with defined criteria and transaction thresholds to give businesses and foreign investors clarity and confidence, and to truly make it clear that we are open for business and not exploitation—to coin a phrase.

Why did the Government not bring forward legislation to ensure that technology firms remain in the UK and to end the current ad hoc approach to industrial strategy being pursued by Ministers? That has seen binding commitments often negotiated at the last minute, companies lost, and no clarity as to the rhyme or reason why the Government choose to intervene or not. I urge the Secretary of State and the Minister to continue to approach the Bill in the spirit of collaboration, to address the undefined areas and issues that we have raised, and to shed some light on their long-term industrial strategy, including their plans to keep high-growth technological companies flourishing in the UK.

National Security and Investment Bill (First sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 24th November 2020

(3 years, 4 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
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None Portrait The Chair
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Thank you very much. I call first Chi Onwurah.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
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Q It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship in this Committee, Mr Twigg. Thank you very much for joining us, with your extensive background, Mr Parton. As you know, we have an investment screening regime under the Enterprise Act 2002 that has led to 12 interventions on national security grounds since the Act came in. Which security threats do you feel are not covered by those existing public interest powers? While we have been waiting for the Government to act on this front, are there specific instances where you think the Government should have acted but did not exercise their powers, or did not have the relevant powers to exercise?

Charles Parton: I would not profess to be an expert on individual cases, but I would like to make some general response to your excellent question. The first point to make is that the Government have not really been attending to the problem with the attention that they should, given the nature of the threat, particularly from the Chinese, although others may be relevant too. I do not think that there is the structure for actually assessing the degree of the threats; I think that 12 cases since 2002 is very few indeed, when you look worldwide at the Chinese programme for technology acquisition, both under and over the table. That in itself shows that there has been insufficient attention paid to the issue.

The delay in the Bill is also regrettable, because the threat has been fairly clear for some time. I would urge the Government, first, to research the question, which is the one you asked, of to what degree in the past have the Chinese in particular bought up technology companies, the acquisition of which was greatly against our interests? That work could and should be done.

I am an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, which has a team that has been looking through technology at a number of questions, but it could quite easily divert that team to look at this question, which needs China expertise and the ability to search through a lot of open data, which it has. I am not a member of the Government, but I am not aware that the Government have done that sort of research to establish the full degree of the problem.

From the point of view of the threat—if you will excuse me, as this is the first question, for putting a little bit of context to it in terms of the China thing—it is undoubted that there is nothing wrong with investment. In fact, that is extremely good. We want as much investment and good relations with China as with everyone else, but we need to recognise that there is a values war going on. I have written an article about that, which came out in the Conservatives’ China Research Group report a week or so ago.

This is not a cold war, because China is very important to us for trade, investment and many global goods, and it is a science and technology power, but we should not underestimate the degree to which Xi Jinping and the Communist party intend, as Xi said to the first politburo meeting, to get the upper hand against western democracies. He talks about us being hostile forces and about a big struggle all the time. When you add that to his policy of civil-military fusion—using civil in the military context—and the fact that he has set up a party organisation specifically to push that forward, and the change in investment policy away from things such as property, football clubs and other things, very much towards benefitting China and its technology, we have to be a lot more careful than we have been in the past.

The first step for that is to do the research. I am not aware of a really good assessment of just how much technology has been bought, the targets and so on. Maybe the Government have one—I don’t know—but I do not think that they do.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Q Thank you very much for that response. I certainly agree with you on the delay in addressing this critical issue. I appreciate your experience, particularly with China, which obviously, as you say, has made a number of technology acquisitions.

I was particularly interested in the civil-military fusion, if you like, of China’s technology ambitions. Could you say a little more about how the Chinese see nascent technologies that are indirectly critical to downstream industries that supply our national security? I am trying to understand how, if you like, we differentiate between industrial strategy and technology to ensure that we have leading defence and national security capabilities. Is there a distinction that we can make there? Do we need to do further research, as you suggest? Do the Chinese make that kind of distinction? Do we need to address some elements of our industrial capability when we consider national security?

Charles Parton: We should widen this not only to companies, but to academia, if I could come back to your question from this angle. We have the phenomenon at the moment of Chinese companies, one might say, hiring our academics, in one way or other, to do scientific research on their behalf. Some of that is probably something that our defence establishment and security establishment would be pretty upset about if they were aware of it.

It is quite difficult to distinguish some of these and to know about them all, but a few weeks ago The Daily Telegraph did a story on, I think, Oxford University and Huawei’s commissioning of research. I think there were 17 projects. I looked at those, and I am not a technologist by any means, but some of them rang certain alarm bells. If you are researching, on behalf of the Chinese, drone technology, cryptography, gaits— Gait is very important for gait recognition. We have facial recognition and voice recognition, but in circumstances where people are wearing masks or there is bad weather, gait is an absolute identifier. Again, are these bad technologies? Well, there are perfectly good civilian uses for them, no doubt, but there also military and surveillance uses. I think we need to be very clear on what our academics, as well as our companies, are doing.

To give you another example, if you go on the website of one of the top Oxford mathematician professors, he has now retired and set up a company with a base in Shenzhen. He is an absolutely top mathematician and does the most abstruse things in cryptography. Should one of our top mathematicians be helping the Chinese in cryptography? Well, there are perfectly good and innocent uses of cryptography, I presume, for things such as banking and e-commerce, and there are perfectly not good uses of it, in military and surveillance and other things. I have no idea whether that is something we should be concerned about. On the face of it, it strikes me that we should be.

I think we need to broaden the scope—forgive me if this is outside the Committee’s scope; you are only looking at the Bill—because the whole question of defence of technology needs to be looked at, in terms of whether we are strengthening a hostile foreign power, but also let us not forget the reputation of British companies and universities. If you look at what is going on in Xinjiang, for instance, with the concentration camps there—activities that quite definitely meet the definition of crimes against humanity under article 7 of the International Criminal Court’s Rome statute, or article 2 of the UN genocide convention—should our companies and universities be helping with technologies that can be used to strengthen that surveillance and that repressive regime? What is the difference between that and South African apartheid or some of the other things that we have seen in the past? Increasingly, the excuse of, “Well, we didn’t really know what was going on,” has gone, and companies and academia will have to be much more careful of their reputation. I have slightly moved away from the nub of your question. Perhaps you could just push the tiller a bit and put but me back to the centre of it again.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Q I think you addressed the core of my question. I really like your phrase “defence of technology”, rather than the technology of defence, because the question was around how you distinguish in the industrial strategy between specific security concerns and the development of technologies that give us capability in those sectors. Can we identify at what point that becomes a national security concern?

Charles Parton: That is sort of way outside my technical expertise, but I would certainly say that one major criticism I have of the Bill is that you have to set up the right structure to be able to do that. I am not sure that the Bill’s putting everything in the hands of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and its Secretary of State is the right answer.

Let us take Huawei and the debate we had over the last couple of years, as well as the various flip-flops that have gone on. One might add flaps, as well as flip-flops, actually. There has been a big a division between the so-called economic and security Ministries. It is right that both have a say in the decision. Economic interests are very much at stake, but so are security interests. If you put everything into the hands of BEIS, which probably does not have the expertise on China—certainly not in the defence, security and surveillance realms, although not unnaturally, since its job is to encourage investment—you will perhaps find that the security and repression elements are not given sufficient weight, and more to the point, the perception will be that they are not given sufficient weight. We might therefore go back to this sort of business with Huawei, where there is a fight back and another fight back and so on.

What we actually need is an organisation that is made up of people on all sides of the debate and that has some real experts who actually understand what the technology means. One specific example I came across a year or so ago was a very interesting computer game. Fine. What is wrong with that? Well, I understand that it was then bought up by the Chinese and used to train fighter pilots. You cannot defend against everything, but you at least need some unbiased experts—a sort of, if I can use the words, Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies—who would be there to advise, and then decisions would actually be accepted by all sides, not questioned.

On occasion, I am sure that questions would be put up to the National Security Council and the Prime Minister for decision if they were really important. However, the issue is often about very small companies with some very interesting technologies that have not been established. The Chinese are extremely efficient at hoovering around, finding them and buying them up early. I am not convinced that the structure and decision making of the whole process are right.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
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Q Good morning, Mr Parton, it is great to see you. Without going further on your last point, I want to reassure you that the Bill is designed to deliver a quasi-judicial role for the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. The team’s infrastructure will be pulling in all parts of Government expertise. My question is this: how do you think the current challenge of covid has exposed national security threats through investment? What are you seeing? How do you see the behaviour of malign actors anywhere in the world at a time of covid?

Charles Parton: I think what covid has done is expose the nature of the Chinese Communist party, in answer to your question. I hope that it has brought home to people the nature of the beast. Looking at what happened, China did not do so well to start with, and its people were pretty upset with it. China then used its external propaganda machine to right its domestic problem, pushing forward the line, “Look how badly the foreigners have done, and look how well we are helping the foreigners out of the mess,” while hiding the fact that it had allowed the virus to propagate so fast in the first place. To many people in democracies, that brought home the fact that the Communist party of China is prepared to use that against us.

Where the Chinese Communist party was unhappy with how countries were acting, it started to put them under pressure and made threats about the delivery of personal protective equipment or whatever. Australia is really taking it in the neck at the moment because it had the temerity to ask—perfectly reasonably—for an investigation of the origins of the virus, which is essential for scientific and preventive purposes. Look at the political pressure on Australia. There is absolutely no doubt that where the Communist party sees an opportunity to use whatever is going on at the moment, it will do so.

The question that I have continuously asked is this: to what degree is investment threatened by a country such as the UK, Australia or Canada standing up for its own interest? We are not actually attacking China, but we are saying, “Sorry, but we have our own interests and our own security. You wouldn’t allow the equivalent in your country, possibly rightly, and we are not allowing it here because we are defending our security, in this case.” To what degree is the tool of depriving someone of investment a real threat? I have urged in a number of papers that the Government look at that in dispassionate terms. The China-Britain Business Council recently put out a paper, but I would not describe it as dispassionate. That is for the Government to do. My own feeling is that the likely conclusion is that, on the whole, the threats are pretty hollow. Chinese investment is not done for charitable reasons.

Since 2017—the high point was 2016—China has cut back on investment. Beijing was getting pretty annoyed at the way money was seeping out not in line with its policies, but investment is now more tightly controlled and aimed at the acquisition of science and technology. To what degree are we vulnerable? This is not charity. Money is very cheap at the moment; it can be got at negative interest rates. It is not as though China is the sole source of money. It invests because it wants technology. Surely we have to look at that carefully and ask where is the mutual benefit. If it is mutually beneficial, fantastic, let us go ahead. Let us not be too brow-beaten by this thing—that if you do not do x or y, or if you do not take Huawei, we will hit your investment. I think, in practice, if you look at that and then look at some of the other threats that China has made over the years, including to your exports, all those have grown for all countries, although they had been in the diplomatic doghouse historically—certainly in the past; we will see about the future—but I think it is greatly exaggerated.

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Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
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Q Thank you very much, Chair, for giving me another bite at the cherry. Mr Parton, as a final point, I thought it might be useful to remind the Committee of the symbiotic nature of the relationship between the Chinese Communist party and the Chinese business community. Based on your extensive experience in China, could you briefly outline how the Chinese Communist party in essence runs the business community; the role that it plays in ensuring executives are appointed who are sympathetic to the party; and the whole way in which the nomenklatura works? That will help us to understand the extent to which Chinese business interests in this country are, in essence, the same as the interests of the Chinese Communist party.

Charles Parton: That is a very good question.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Could I just add to that? That is an excellent point, but could you also say a little bit on how China responds to proposed takeovers that might implicate its national security, if those takeovers are allowed? How does it respond to that investment into its companies?

Charles Parton: Those are both good points. First of all, divide it into the state-owned sector and the private sector. In terms of the state-owned sector, the top executives of the big state-owned companies are appointed by the central organisation department of the party. That is the organisation that is, as Mr Kinnock has said, in charge of the nomenklatura: the top 3,000 to 4,000 party officials. Of course, a lot of state-owned companies are also owned at the provincial and lower levels, and there, too, the top executives are party members and beholden to the party. Let us not forget that most foreign investment by the Chinese is state owned, so it is not just a fair bet but a fair certainty that any state-owned enterprise investing is fully politically controlled.

When it comes to the private sector, Huawei has spent a large amount of its time insisting that it is a private company—I really do not care. And I do not really care that the national security law says that any individual or organisation must help the party or security organs when called upon. The brute fact is that, in the way the system is run in China, if the party tells you to do something, the only response from private business to an order is to say, “Certainly, Sir. How high do you want me to jump?” so this debate is entirely irrelevant. The party is now pushing committees into all private enterprises—foreign and local—and it would be a very unwise head of a private company who said, “No, Mr Xi Jinping. I don’t think so.” If nothing else has been shown by what has happened with Jack Ma, China’s second-richest person, and the Ant Group finance company in the last few weeks—there are, of course, financial risk reasons they might want to control Jack Ma’s Ant Group—it is, “Sorry, you are beholden to the Communist party.” That was a very fierce reminder of it.

In terms of this debate, I do not think we should be under any illusion that if a party says to a company about its technology or whatever, “Well okay, it’s all very well that you’ve got that, but we want it fed into our People’s Liberation Army organisations and science and technology system,” no company is going to say, “Oh no, that’s not right. We won’t do that.” For instance, when Huawei says, “If we were asked to do something against our commitments, in terms of what we do abroad, that would threaten security, we would not do that,” it is rubbish. They know that.

None Portrait The Chair
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I am afraid that brings us to the end of this part of the session. Mr Parton, I thank you on behalf of the Committee for your evidence and the clear, concise answers you gave. We must now move on to the next session. If Members want to take a comfort break for a couple of minutes, I am happy to do that.

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None Portrait The Chair
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Thank you so much for being a witness.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Q Thank you very much, Sir Richard, for bringing your expertise to the Committee. The existing powers for intervening in transactions on national security grounds came in when you were chief of MI6. How have security threats evolved since then? Specifically, which security threats do you consider are not covered by existing public interest powers? It would be helpful to hear whether you think the Government have missed specific threats, or types of threat, by relying only on historical powers, and by not bringing in new legislation until now?

Sir Richard Dearlove: Wow. That is a massive question. Bear in mind that a large part of my career related to the cold war. In that period, our main concern was the Soviet Union and the members of the Warsaw Pact. It was characteristic of that period that there were heavy controls, mainly exercised through NATO structures, to prevent strategic material from leaching, as it were, into the economies of the Warsaw pact. I will not go into all the mechanisms. Historically, one does not need to worry about those now, but it was very much an issue that was at the forefront of people’s minds during that period of the cold war. Bear in mind also—I think this is important in looking at the broader context of what you are interested in—that the Soviet Union had hugely sophisticated what’s called S and T operations: science and technology. A whole line of Soviet intelligence of the KGB was devoted to obtaining strategic material that would help the Soviet economy, particularly in the military industrial complex.

This is now in the public domain: in the mid-1980s, there was a major intelligence success, which, interestingly, was conducted by the French, but in which the UK had an important role. We completely dismantled, or learned, exactly what the Soviet Union and its allies were up to on a global basis. We knew before, but we did not know the detail to that extent, and what we learned was pretty shocking. That case has not been greatly publicised, but it was probably one of the most important intelligence cases of the cold war.

With the break-up of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Soviet empire, particularly the economic structures that bound the Warsaw pact countries together, in the West our attitudes towards those issues changed very significantly. There was a much more laissez-faire situation and, as countries broke away from the Soviet empire, an enthusiasm to trade with them without the same degree of control.

During that period, you had the emergence of China, which was still very much a regional power but with aspirations to become a global power. To short cut, we have now transferred to China the concerns we had about the Soviet Union and its allies, but the problem with China in some respects is much more serious than the problem with the Soviet Union, although that was bad enough. Charlie Parton, who was talking to you before, is an expert on China specifically. I am not, and my view is maybe more strategic, although I had a lot to do with China when I was head of MI6.

If you look back at the emergence of China as a regional power, from the very start—when Mao was still alive and was then succeeded by Deng Xiaoping—its intelligence community focused on China’s economic growth. It was not particularly interested in what we would see as strategic or political intelligence. There is a famous passage in Kissinger’s book on China in which he is talking to Mao and Mao says to him, “We’re not interested in your politics because we have our own ideological view of the world, and I don’t really care what our intelligence service reports about what’s going on in the west.” What he did not say, but what was quite clear because it became evident subsequently, particularly under Deng Xiaoping, was that the primary purpose of the Chinese intelligence machine outside China was to contribute to the economic rebuilding of China.

We in the West have been, over a longish period of time, pretty naive and had forgotten the fundamental dangers of having a close relationship with China. I am not anti-Chinese or a cold warrior. I understand—and this is the complexity that lies at the heart of this legislation—that our economies in the West are tied to China’s. They are intertwined in a manner that did not exist during the cold war between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Of course there were economic links with the Soviets but essentially the relationship was one of separation. But that is not the case any longer. We are intimately engaged with the Chinese economy. Our enthusiasm––I am using “our” in the broadest sense of the West’s enthusiasm––to trade with China and to have a close relationship and to build that relationship is thoroughly understandable, but in the process we have let down our guard and we have been extremely laissez-faire, as it were, in our attitude towards the commercial threat from China.

I remember very well on one of my visits to the far east, when I was coming out of China through Hong Kong, talking to a British lawyer who had been head of a legal office in Shanghai for a long time. He said, “Richard, you have got to understand one thing about the Chinese attitude to us: they don’t understand win-win. All they understand is ‘We win, you lose.’” However intimate and successful your relations with China may be economically, if you are too successful, you can absolutely guarantee that the Chinese will transfer that success to themselves in their own economic structures, having allowed you to run successfully for a period of time.

What we now know and understand is that the Chinese are highly organised and strategic in their attitude towards the West and towards us. For example, some of the thousands of Chinese students who are being educated in Western universities, particularly in the UK and the United States, are unquestionably organised and targeted in terms of subjects––I am thinking more about graduates, PhDs and post-docs––looking at areas of strategic interest to the Chinese economy, and they are organised by Chinese intelligence.

We need to conduct our relationship with China with much more wisdom and care. The Chinese understand us incredibly well. They have put their leadership through our universities for 20 or 30 years. We in comparison hardly know anything about China because we just do not have that depth of knowledge and experience. You have people such as Charlie Parton and many wonderful Chinese scholars who understand intimately, in particular, the workings of the Chinese state, but they are rare individuals who are now massively in demand in trying to educate people about the problem that we have on our hands.

I am not one who is saying that we have to hold China at arm’s length. It is impossible to do that because they are so intimately involved in our economy, but we have to understand where we restrict their access, where we control their access and where we do not allow them to build strategic positions at our expense and literally take us for a ride. If you go back a little way, we were incredibly naive about this, which accounts for the position we got into with Huawei. It was completely ridiculous that we should even have been considering Huawei to build our 5G. That is probably why you called me. I was heavily involved in lobbying MPs through these various structures. I am delighted that the Government have now taken a grip on this issue.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Thank you. I have no leeway to go past 11.25 am, so please can we keep questions as succinct as possible.

Sir Richard Dearlove: Sorry. That was a long answer, but it is precisely the question one should be considering.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q Absolutely. I appreciate the response and I would like details of the Soviet case of the military-industrial complex that was dismantled, which you mentioned. That would be interesting to compare.

You have talked about the relationship between the military-industrial complex, in the case of Russia, and economic development, specifically in the case of China. We have essential industries that are critical to our economy and there has been concern that BEIS is going to be overseeing the security implications. Where we have industries and technologies that are critical for national security, they are also critical for our economic security, so our national and economic security end up being linked. You have talked about some of those links in the case of Russia and China. How can we reflect those links effectively in the Bill? Do we need structures within BEIS, or outside BEIS, to identify and reflect the overlap between economic and national security?

Sir Richard Dearlove: This is a really difficult question. I am expressing the problem, not the solutions. You have to bear in mind that I spent my life as a poacher, not a gamekeeper, so my view of these problems is mirror imaging. I was an offensive intelligence officer, not a defensive one. I spent my life trying to penetrate Chinese intelligence, if you see what I mean.

The problem is much bigger than just national security; that is one of the difficulties. It leaches into the whole future of our economic competition with China. I do not like to talk about it, but some people use the phrase “a new cold war”. I do not subscribe to that. We have to find some other way of talking about this. They are very serious competitors who are beginning to edge along the path of enmity in the way they treat us on some issues—witness Hong Kong at the moment—so you have to have some sort of flexible scrutiny arrangement.

The reason this is so difficult to comprehend is that areas like climate change and energy policy, which are national security issues but not right on the frontline, are so big that, I think, China has a pretty disturbing agenda for us. They will encourage us to follow policies that they think are disadvantageous to our economy.

If you take their statements on things like climate change, which is relevant to what we are talking about, China is going to go on increasing its carbon emissions up until 2030, if we look at the figures and understand its policies. China is going to completely miss out renewables. When it has generated enough wealth and success in its economy, it is going to jump from carbon energy straight to nuclear and hydrogen. It will have the wealth and the means to do that. Renewables for the Chinese are going to be rather peripheral, because they will not generate the energy intensity that the Chinese economy requires. China has a road map in its head that is really rather different from ours and there is no question but that, competitively, our green agenda is going to put us at an even greater disadvantage to China, if you take a 30-year view of that.

There are some very worrying aspects of this. That means that if we are gaily allowing the Chinese to walk off with all sorts of bits of our economy, we are going to pay possibly a pretty high price for that over a long period. We need to take a strategic view of this. China certainly has a strategy, and at the moment we do not really have a strategy. We are beginning to realise that we have to have one, and maybe this Bill is a healthy first step in that direction.

You will need sub-committees of some sort, with flexible thinking and experts to advise on where these problems lie. The difficulty is also that we do not want to ruin our economic relationship completely with China. We still need to partner with it in areas that are advantageous to us and our economy as well.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q The Bill provides for an annual report to Parliament, Sir Richard. What is your view on balancing transparency and ensuring Government can take national security decisions sensitively? Where does that balance lie in terms of our ability to be as transparent as we can without harming sensitivities around these decisions?

Sir Richard Dearlove: My view would be that the annual report has as much transparency as possible, but you are probably going to require a secret annexe from time to time. It is a bit like the reports of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I dealt with frequently as chief. They and we were keen that they should publish their reports, but there comes a point where it is not in our national interest that some of this stuff is put in the public domain. I would be pretty clear cut on that.

National Security and Investment Bill (Second sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 24th November 2020

(3 years, 4 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 24 November 2020 - (24 Nov 2020)
None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Thank you very much.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
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Q Thank you very much, Dr Lenihan, for putting your expertise at the disposal of the Committee. I am particularly interested in your expertise in the international aspects of the debate. As you are aware—the Bill responds to this—a number of the UK’s allies have national security and investment screening regimes, and almost all of them have updated their regimes in the light of the changing geopolitical and technological contexts. From your comparative work, what governance and decision-making structures have you found others adopting to ensure that all relevant Government expertise shapes national security and investment decisions? Are they appropriately reflected or considered in the Bill?

Dr Lenihan: That is an excellent question. To answer it, I will first step back for a second and say that the Bill is a very important step in the UK’s alignment with its closest allies on this issue, and especially the Five Eyes, because there is clear evidence that states are trying to use the market and companies over which they have control and influence to gain economic, technological and even military power in foreign investment. During times of economic downturn and crisis when asset prices are low, the opportunities for that type of behaviour increase. Hence, we have seen these modifications to regimes not only in the West, but outside the West as well.

I think one of the most important elements of regimes as they have evolved—especially among the Five Eyes, but among our NATO allies and even in Russia and China—is the move to ensure that review mechanisms have the institutional capacity and resources that they really need behind them. Part of this institutional capacity usually involves a multi-agency review body of some type.

There is always a lead organisation, and in the West—especially in the US, Germany and France—these tend to be in Treasury or in business or trade Ministries, and that lead body, like the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in the Bill, receives the information and handles the day-to-day activity. However, in the US with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, the idea behind having a multi-agency review body with multiple agencies and Departments across vast areas of Government is that you have the ability for regularised monitoring and feed-in from these agencies across the spectrum of possible threats, and you have dedicated staff within those agencies who have the necessary security clearances, training and specialised knowledge over time to keep an eye on potentially risky transactions and bring them to the awareness of the lead agency.

One of the key elements of CFIUS that has been very positive is that, as it has evolved, it has brought in more agencies, not less, so you have multiple opinions on the same potential transaction being brought to light and discussed before any decision needs to be taken by a Secretary or Head of State, depending on the question. In CFIUS, that responsibility ultimately lies with the President, but the idea is that you have had a multiplicity of views and, under the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernisation Act—the most recent update of US legislation—you have an ensured national security risk assessment made by the head of intelligence on detailed investigations of certain transactions.

The idea behind this is that—hopefully—any decision made will be viewed by the public as one that is truly based on national security concerns because of the debate that had to take place behind the scenes. That lowers the risk of politicisation and intervention, and again heightens the possibility of actually catching risky transactions in a way that otherwise can be difficult.

One of the great examples of transactions in the US caught not originally in the regularised monitoring process, but by a CFIUS employee in one of the agencies, was the unwinding in 2011 of Huawei’s purchase of 3Leaf, which was a US-based cloud computing technology company that had gone bankrupt. The assets, employees and patents had been purchased by Huawei—bankruptcy assets were not consistently monitored by the regime at that time. The purchase was caught by a Government staffer who happened to notice on his LinkedIn account that somebody whom he knew, who had partially run 3Leaf, was now listed as a consultant for Huawei. That transaction had to be reviewed and retroactively unwound. At that point, of course, one must assume that the bulk of the damage had been done, but it goes to show the importance of having not just one agency looking at these cases and being responsible; a multiplicity is needed across the piece. If I have any concerns with the Bill, my primary concern would be that the institutional capacity and resources behind the review regime are not made clear.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Q Thank you, Dr Lenihan. That is absolutely fascinating. The need for different agencies to be involved needs to be recognised.

In terms of your work on investments, and the investment regime, is there not a risk that it ends up capturing a host of investment transactions? I am particularly thinking of the burden and impact on our innovative tech start-ups. The likely definitions of the sectors to be involved include artificial intelligence and data infrastructure. Based on your experience of other countries’ introduction of new investment screening rules, have you found patterns in how similar changes have affected foreign direct investment, and potential trade deals, which is a topical subject? Do you have any thoughts on ways to mitigate the burden and impact, particularly on start-ups?

Dr Lenihan: The Bill is arguably broader in scope on call-in powers than some other foreign direct investment regimes—I would argue that these perhaps even include the US regime—because it does leave wide latitude for call-in powers. The Bill also covers trigger events that are initiated by all investors, both domestic and foreign, and that is truly rare among Western FDI review regimes that are focused on national security. Usually, the concern is to focus the regime on investments from foreign-owned, controlled or influenced entities. Domestic entities and acquirers that have, for example, ultimate foreign ownership or influence in some ways should be able to be caught by any well-institutionalised and resourced regime. I am not sure why it is that we do not actually see the word “foreign” in the Bill, even though it is supposed to be based on foreign direct investment. Perhaps that is a concern about potential domestic threats down the road, but either way, it will lead to a much larger volume of mandatory notifications than most other national security FDI regimes—the US, Germany, Australia and other countries. Almost 17 have made changes in the past couple of years, and these have increased and been modified since the covid pandemic.

I understand that the legislation may be written as it is to include domestic investors, perhaps to avoid appearing to discriminate against foreign investors. I would suggest that that is probably too broad a formulation for focusing on and identifying real risk. The EU framework for FDI screening encourages its EU members to adopt mechanisms that do not discriminate between third-party countries, but that does not mean that it takes the word “foreign” out of its legislation to target foreign investments as opposed to domestic ones. Part of that is about the volume of transactions.

One thing I would highlight is that FIRRMA expanded the scope of covered transactions to include non-controlling investments of potential concern, as well as any other transaction or arrangement intended to circumvent CFIUS’s jurisdiction. But because it has had more cases to review on a detailed level in the past two or three years than in its history, since 1975, a major element of that Act is, again, around staffing and resources. There is a specific provision in FIRRMA, which is very clear that each of its agencies needs to hire under-secretaries in each agency just to be dedicated to this task.

There are two elements. An inter-agency review team is needed. You need enough staff to actually handle and catch all the risks. You the need the proper resources to do so—the right access to the databases, the right security clearances, the right training. On top of that, the volume of mandatory notifications will be increased by the fact that this is not just focused on foreign investment. I do not think there is much you can do about the foreign cases that you will get. There will be a high volume of those, and you need to be ready for them, but it is an important national security risk that needs to be dealt with.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham. Dr Ashley, considering your experience of other countries—we talked about the US at length in the first couple of questions—such as Japan and Germany, what are your views on the retrospective powers under our Bill?

Dr Lenihan: Personally, I think they are fine. I know that might not be a popular answer with some. Germany, France and even parts of the EU framework set up this five-year retroactive for cases. I think that that is at minimum important. Other countries, such as China, Russia and the US, do not place any limit on retroactivity. I would have to check up on Australia and Canada, but there have been cases that have gone beyond a year there. Under the original Government White Paper, the idea of having only a six-month period, whether or not you have been notified, is quite dangerous, because there have been cases that were well known where they have been caught after that point.

Some of my examples are from the US. The reason for that is that it is one of the longest-standing and most institutionalised regimes. It is also one of the most transparent, from which we know most about the cases that have gone through it. I have looked at over 200 cases of this type of investment over a seven-year period in the US, UK, Europe, China and Russia. One case that stands out in the US is the 3Leaf acquisition by Huawei, which was caught almost at the year mark. Another good example that went over the one-year mark would be the review in 2005 retroactively of Smartmatic, which was a Venezuelan software company, and its purchase of Sequoia Voting Systems, which was a US voting machines firm. Smartmatic was believed to have ties to Chavez. However, that acquisition completed without knowledge of CFIUS and it was not actually able to be unwound until 2007. At that point, you worry about what has happened, but at least you do not have the ongoing concern.

You do need flexibility. With the volume of notifications and the learning curve that the investment security unit will have to undergo, or whatever the final regime truly looks like, it will take time to get the team in place and get the knowledge and systems down, to accurately catch even the most obvious investments that are of concern. Dealing with the kind of evolving and emerging threats we see in terms of novel investments from countries such as China, Russia and Venezuela needs the flexibility to look at retroactively and potentially unwind transactions that the Secretary of State and the investment security unit were not even aware of.

One thing is that for mergers and acquisitions transactions, which are historically what have been covered under these regimes, across Europe, Australia, Canada, Russia, China and the US, all the systems that have been used—the M and A databases: Thomson ONE, Zephyr, Orbis—take training, but they only cover certain types of transaction. They do not cover asset transactions; they do not cover real estate transactions, which are of increasing concern, especially for espionage purposes.

It is going to take time, and I believe that flexibility really needs to be there. It can always be reviewed in the future, but I do not think that so far foreign investment has been deterred in any way in countries that have that retroactive capability. To limit the UK’s capacity to protect itself for some kind of strange feeling that we need to be perceived as being even more open than everybody else when under threat is not really wise at this time.

--- Later in debate ---
None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

We come to our fourth panel of witnesses. We will hear oral evidence from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom LLP and Affiliates. For this panel we have until 3.30 pm. Mr Leiter, I welcome you, and ask you to introduce yourself for the record.

Michael Leiter: Good afternoon. My name is Michael Leiter, and I head the national security and Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States practice at Skadden Arps. It is a pleasure to be with you this afternoon.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q Thank you, Mr Leiter, for joining us and sharing your extensive expertise with the Committee. I wanted to look at strategic and critical industry. There are a series of cases where nascent or strategically important industries might become critical to national security in the future, but they are important to industrial and economic strategy now. For example, it was not clear that there was a direct national security threat from Deep Mind’s artificial intelligence algorithms in 2014, but it is clear that the company was important for the UK then, and it is clear that artificial intelligence is important for national security now. That is reflected in the Bill. Based on other countries, how do you think the Bill can capture these forward-looking public interest or industrial strategy concerns within national security grounds for acting?

Michael Leiter: Thank you for the question; it is quite a good one. It is one that the United States has struggled with, as have other countries and their regimes. We suggest a couple of approaches. First, one piece that I think the Bill does quite well—although there is a countervailing concern that has to be addressed—is not having a de minimis threshold, in terms of dollars. The Bill is quite strong in that regard, because as you note in your question, just because someone acquires a start-up company for a relatively modest amount—a few million pounds—it does not mean that that company and that technology does not have, or will not have, very significant national security implications.

The flipside of that is, of course, that without the de minimis threshold, it becomes a far more difficult regime to manage. The volume can be much higher. It can potentially poison venture capital innovation. This is best balanced by not having a threshold for dollars, as you do with the no de minimis threshold, but then making sure that regulators have the ability to review these matters extremely quickly. The pace of investment in emerging technologies requires a very short timeframe. It is not like a large public company transaction, which has extended timelines. As long as one implements a very rapid review process and has the officials in Government to keep up with that potential backlog, I think those two interests can be effectively balanced.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Q To follow up on your point about notifications, the Government impact assessment for the Bill suggests that up to 1,830 notifications might come in each year under this new regime. I am concerned that they look at the impact on the acquirer, and they do not capture the fact that almost every start-up seeks capital investment at some point. What impact do you foresee on the overall UK investment climate, and what might FIRRMA and CFIUS changes lead us to expect in our case?

Michael Leiter: This is very important. I was rather taken aback by two things about the Bill. The first is the projection of over 1,000 matters, going from the very, very few that the UK has traditionally had; this is an explosive increase in matters. I am concerned that no Government are ready for that rate of change. Even in CFIUS under FIRRMA, although there is not an increase in the overall number of long-form notices, in the short-form declaration process, there was an increase. That was relatively modest, an increase of about one third, so the US now reviews approximately 240 full cases, and about another 100 short-form.

When you talk about going from a few dozen to 1,000, you have to be very sure that you have both the resources and the expertise to process that. I would be concerned by that. Another case where your Bill goes much farther than anything I have seen, and certainly much farther than anything in the United States, is in encompassing not just acquisition and investment in businesses but acquisition and investment in supplies, goods, trade secrets, databases, source code and algorithms, so it is tangible and intangible objects, rather than businesses. That scale is very difficult to predict, and if one is more in the mood for incremental change, so as to see how a Government can handle change, including those elements poses some real risk for management.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Thank you, Mr Leiter. That is really good feedback. Building on the point made by my colleague the shadow Minister, the CFIUS regime in the US obviously operates successfully, in the sense that the US remains an incredibly attractive place for inward investment. How have the US regulators balanced those two things? Does the Bill as drafted provide us with a similar opportunity to strike that balance?

Michael Leiter: I am honoured to have worked with the UK Government for 20-plus years on security issues, and over the past 10 years on economic issues. I certainly think you have the potential to strike that balance. In the US, traditionally, the CFIUS structure was a balance between the security agencies, which tended to want to restrict investment, and the economic and commerce agencies, which tended to want to encourage that investment. Certainly, in the case of China, we have seen massive decline in direct investment because of both Chinese controls and US controls: a tenfold decrease from 2016 to 2018. But as you said, the scale and strength of the US economy mean that global investors look to the United States no matter what.

I do not mean to make less of the UK in any way but, from a UK perspective, one has to be a bit more careful, because you simply do not have the scale that inevitably will attract investment. The US could be a rather poor place to invest, with lots of regulation, but people would still come because of the scale of the market. You don’t have quite that luxury. That is not to say that the UK has not for generations been an incredibly attractive magnet for investment, but whereas the US can err on the side of security, from my perspective, admittedly an American one, the UK might want to be a bit more careful about restrictive measures, because the size of the market is not in and of itself so inherently attractive that companies and investors must be in it. We have a bit of an advantage over you on this one.

--- Later in debate ---
Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Q Welcome, Mr Petrie, and thank you very much for placing your expertise at the disposal of the Committee. You have experience of mergers and acquisitions, and I am sure you will be aware that we have seen several transactions in this country—I will name GKN and Melrose, SoftBank and Arm, and indeed I will include the failed Pfizer-AstraZeneca case—where it appeared that the Government had no legal powers to secure jobs, pensions, research and development and key UK industries, relying instead on behind-the-scenes soft power. That created uncertainty and lack of clarity for investors. Do you think that is a problem for both Government and investors, and how do you think we could effectively tackle that gap?

David Petrie: The Government have been very clear that the purpose of this legislation is to focus on protection of national security. The guidance notes they have issued, which accompany the Bill and are intended for market participants, are very clear on that aspect. I would suggest that probably all the factors you listed in your question extend beyond a simple matter of national security—if national security can be a simple matter; no doubt that this Committee has heard this afternoon about the difficulties associated with defining national security. Many of the factors that you set out there, important elements though they are to all stakeholders in a company, are not necessarily matters of national security.

I would also say that that for some of the companies that you mentioned there, while certain of their activities might well be included within the scope of this new Bill, it would be very difficult in certain instances to suggest that they had a direct impact on our national security. Of course, that would be up to the new investment security unit to determine, based on a full representation of the facts. If that unit was at all concerned, a procedure is set out in the Bill whereby it would be able to call for as much evidence as it felt was necessary in order to be able to reach a balanced determination on whether investment by an overseas entity did indeed constitute a real threat to our national security. I think that is the point here.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q Thank you for your response. If we look at GKN-Melrose and, indeed, even SoftBank-Arm, we could consider that they had national security implications. I suppose the point is that there are essential industries that are directly critical for our economy, but that at first may not seem directly critical for national security because they are evolving technologies, as in the case of Arm and the ongoing takeover by Nvidia, or because they are indirectly critical as suppliers to downstream industries that support national security. Indeed, in the response to the Government’s consultation for this Bill, an example is given of the undermining of the functioning of an airport by a software manufacturer, which would be within the transport sector but would not necessarily immediately appear to be directly concerned with national security. Economic security and national security end up being linked. Do you think that should be reflected in the Bill, and how do you think it can be reflected?

David Petrie: I have read the impact assessment, which included that example. It is a difficult situation, as described in the example. In accordance with the way that this new legislation is drafted and the number and extent of the sectors that are regarded as mandatory—the sectors in scope such that their operating activities would require a notification of the unit—the example set out in the impact statement would indeed require screening by the investment security unit. The Government would likely have the opportunity to review a potential acquisition in that software company.

I was struck by that example, in that it suggested that service had failed, or a malign actor had decided not to provide the necessary services to the airport. I think a broader question here is what might happen in reality. Those services would be procured through a commercial contract, which in turn would, presumably, be backed by insurance. If it were an absolutely critical service, I would expect that the airport would have a back-up system, whether power supplies or a parallel running system, as they do for air traffic control. There are commercial protections for the actual operating activities of critical infrastructure, which should work. It is difficult to protect against the actions of malign actors, but critical infrastructure already has systems and processes, and invests heavily in capital equipment, to ensure that there is not an interruption of supply. The question would be the extent to which ownership of that asset physically gave the owners of the shares the ability to get in and interrupt supply. That almost implies mechanical breakdown or some deliberate and malign disconnection. Again, companies have cyber-security systems in place to ensure that critical infrastructure does not fail.

The point you made was about whether suppliers of that sort of service to our critical infrastructure and their ownership should be subject to review. As the Bill is set out and as the sectors in scope are drafted—of course, the Government will consult over the next month or so on those definitions and whether they should be adjusted or whether they are as wide-reaching as they should be—a business like that would be captured. The investment security unit and, presumably, the security services would have an opportunity to review whether or not to allow that to go ahead.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Mr Petrie, you will understand better than most that businesses will want to ensure information is being treated sensitively in any transaction. I want to capture your view of the closed material procedure for judicial review under the Bill and what you think of it in terms of that sensitivity of information.

David Petrie: I think a quasi-judicial review is really important and a part of the process, and then, if necessary, there is judicial review. I think the question cuts back to how many times that is likely to happen. We have to step back a little bit and recognise that that would be a situation where the parties to the transaction are challenging the Secretary of State’s decision as to whether or not this is in the interests of national security.

I would assume that if the sellers are British companies, they will probably have received what they feel are adequate assurances that it is okay to sell to an overseas acquirer, but the Secretary of State takes a different view, presumably based on evidence provided by our national security services. Ultimately, if there is a compelling body of evidence to suggest that a transaction should be modified or adjusted or, in extremis, blocked, it would be quite an unreasonable group of shareholders to disagree with that if the if the Secretary of State was applying the test as set out in the Bill, and indeed in the guidance note, that intervention is to be limited only to matters where the national security of this country is at threat.

That is quite different from the national interest. It is tempting—or possible, rather—in this debate to get sucked into questions about what we should and should not be doing in this country. That is not what this is about. The Government have been very clear to the investment community, and to British business more generally, about the purpose of this legislation. That is why, although markets and investors recognise that it will take a certain amount of time and effort to comply with a mandatory regime—the Government have been very clear about their purpose in introducing that—the market is generally favourably disposed towards it. We can see that it is unfortunately necessary in these modern times.

--- Later in debate ---
None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

We welcome Chris Cummings, the chief executive of the Investment Association. Mr Cummings, would you be so kind as to introduce yourself for the record?

Chris Cummings: Thank you for the opportunity to appear in front of you. My name is Chris Cummings, and I am the chief executive of the Investment Association. We represent UK-based fund managers, an industry of some £8.5 trillion used by three quarters of UK households today. We own roughly a third of the FTSE.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q Thank you, Mr Cummings, for sharing your expertise with us. We all recognise the importance of inward investment, and indeed of the Investment Association, to our economy. The impact assessment for the Bill estimates that up to 1,830 notifications might come in each year under the new national security and investment regime, but those numbers do not capture the fact that almost every start-up seeks capital investment at some point. The requirements to notify are put on the acquirer, but I would like your thoughts on the impact that may have on start-up companies. As part of that, I imagine it will be especially hard to hold merger and acquisition auctions while checking on the outcome of these processes. What do you foresee will be the overall impact on the UK investment climate, and in particular on the ability of our most innovative start-ups to raise capital? I am often told that access to finance is the key barrier to start-ups growing, and staying in the UK as they grow.

Chris Cummings: Thank you; that is such a pertinent question. Before I address the substance of it, I want to try to describe the work of many of my members, which is broadly portfolio investments. They seek not to acquire a company but to invest, taking a very small stake—a fraction of a percent—of those companies. That provides an opportunity for those companies to receive the investment they are looking for, and enables us as investors to invest in a company, an industry or a whole sector in order to generate a return for the investors whose money we are managing. They tend to be pension funds and insurance companies—institutional investors.

Of that £8.5 trillion I mentioned that we manage, about 80% to 85% comes from institutional investors; the other 15% or so comes from retail: people on the high street saving in individual savings accounts and so on. Our view on the Bill is about how we can continue to do our work to help finance companies in the UK and internationally with the investment collateral that we can bring to bear. We do that in the two major parts of the market: listed companies and unlisted companies.

Perhaps I can address the point you made about small and medium-sized enterprises. We make investments in unlisted companies—of course, small and medium-sized enterprises are not listed organisations—by developing an understanding of sectors and industries. We look for individual institutions that we regard as high-performing—that is, high-performing over a long period of time, because we are patient investors, tending to take a long-term view, unlike colleagues in other parts of the industry, who are more high-frequency, or looking at a two to three-year earn-out period. To help us do that, we need two things. The first is legal certainty around the investment climate here in the UK, so that we understand the rules of the game, so to speak. This particular Bill is helpful in establishing greater clarity about the rules of the game; we do have one or two caveats, but it is helpful. The other is publicly available information, such as analysts’ reports—the type of thing that we as investors would look to receive and interrogate, and on the back of which we would then make an investment decision.

We are really looking for whether the Bill helps make the UK more attractive; whether it helps us funnel savings into productive investment that can help companies grow, create jobs and so on; and whether it is adding to the legal certainty of our investments. You are right to ask about SMEs; our members who invest in higher-growth companies are really keen to make sure that the process is as friction-free as possible, and that there are no surprises. Being very clear about a pre-notification regime is especially important to us, as is something like the five-year review period that could come after a deal has ended. Certainty about those 17 sectors is particularly important as well. That is why we have wanted to maintain a really close dialogue with the officials—the team that has sponsored this Bill—to make sure that no inadvertent barriers have been erected to us deploying that investment in the right way.

One of the suggestions we would like to commend to this Committee is something we have seen work particularly well in Japan, which considered a similar raft of legislation: a blanket exclusion for investment—not for takeovers, obviously, but for portfolio investment, where the investment industry wants to support unlisted or listed companies, and it is clear that there is not a desire to take them over, involve ourselves in the management of those firms, seek a position on the board or secure the intellectual property, but where we are just performing the role of long-term investor. That has been judged as being outside the scope of the legislation, but we commend that to the Committee as a practical step that takes forward the principles of the Bill and secures the “investability” of the UK’s investment landscape.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q Thank you very much. I note your suggestion regarding the blanket exception for investment funds. I had two quick follow-up points: first, could you say how they would be defined in such a way that would exclude, for example, foreign sovereign investment funds and so on, which might give cause for concern? Also, you said you had a couple of caveats. I take it that is one; what is your other caveat?

Chris Cummings: Forgive me: I noticed that I missed the point about mergers and acquisitions. We regard the pre-approval facility that officials have mentioned—I believe the last witness mentioned it, as well—which is a way in which the team responsible could be approached ahead of a deal being put together, as a very sensible, practical step forward, as long as confidentiality was absolutely rigorously maintained.

In terms of definitions, we find the Japanese definition quite attractive, and again we commend it to the Committee. It clearly differentiates out investors such as the ones we represent, who are looking to provide capital for a company and share in its success for the benefit of the investors whose money we manage, but are not seeking to take an active role in the management of those companies. We are not looking to put somebody on the board; we are not looking to intervene directly in day-to-day management decisions. Our relationship is with the board chairman and so on, in order to engage in a constructive and strategic discussion, but we stop short of securing assets or taking an active role in management. That is a system that works well.

Turning to our caveats, I mentioned the five-year review period. We undoubtedly recognise the spirit in which this legislation is drafted, but Governments change, as does public opinion. The strength of this Bill is that it is focused around national security. Perhaps a definition of national security may go a little further in helping investors as well, because we could not really strike upon a catchy, well-turned phrase that defined national security, and have a reluctance to move away from national security; we would hate to see the Bill being widened into more public interest ability.

A final point to note would be the interplay between this legislation and the Takeover Panel, which has a different and distinct role to play. The notification percentages are slightly different: it is 25% in the Bill, and 30% in the Takeover Panel, so ensuring that there was no accidental misalignment would be most useful.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Welcome, Mr Cummings. You mentioned the feedback from your members about keeping the Bill focused very much on national security. The message that we want to get out there is that Britain remains very much open for business, and that we want to maintain our place in the premier league of foreign direct investment. How has that statement of policy intent, which we published alongside the Bill, landed with your membership?

Chris Cummings: When it comes to a clarification point around national security, this is similar policy-intent-driven legislation to what we have seen in other emerged markets, such as the US, Germany, France and so on. We do not find that it is out of step with other developed markets. In other jurisdictions—I will take the US as an example—the legislation has started small and then grown as people have become familiar with it. The UK, perhaps because we feel we are playing catch-up—that is not for me to say—has started on a larger scale first. That is why there are queries around scope and around the durations. We look forward to engaging with the definition of the 17 sectors to ensure it is as specific as possible, and to ensure that we understand the operation. We would like to hear from officials and colleagues in ministerial positions on how they see it working in practice, so that the investment community is really clear that the rules of the game have not changed, and that the UK really is as attractive as we want it to be for incoming investment.

As I mentioned, we represent UK-based investment managers, but of course, those organisations are headquartered not only across Europe, but in other parts of the world, particularly the US. We are managing pension scheme money not only for UK savers and pensioners, but from other parts of Europe and places as far-flung as Brazil. If we as investors were looking to make an investment in UK plc, we would need to be clear about where head office was, and where the money was coming from. All those things could be either pre-approved or ruled in court as quickly as possible to ensure that there is not a missed beat in attracting the investment that we all want to see.

National Security and Investment Bill (Third sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 26th November 2020

(3 years, 4 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 November 2020 - (26 Nov 2020)
None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Q80 Before calling the first Member to ask a question, I should like to remind all Members that questions should be limited to matters within the scope of the Bill and that we must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. For this session, we have until 12.15 pm.

I welcome the two witnesses from Slaughter and May. Can I ask you to introduce yourselves for the record, please?

Lisa Wright: Hi, my name is Lisa Wright and I am a partner in the competition group at Slaughter and May.

Christian Boney: Good morning. I am Christian Boney and I am a partner in the corporate mergers and acquisitions group at Slaughter and May.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
- Hansard - -

Q Thank you very much, Ms Wright and Mr Boney, for sharing your expertise and time with the Committee. It is indeed extensive experience of mergers and acquisitions.

I am sure you are aware that many countries—the US and Canada are just two—give some sense of the factors that might be considered under a national security assessment. Do you think it would be helpful for market participants to have greater clarity about the types of factors that would be considered? How could we give that clarity while retaining the sensitivity and discretion that are needed on those matters?

Joined to that, there are cases such as Arm and DeepMind where economic security became national security over time. When considering what national security is, what links do you see between national security and economic security or sovereign capability? Can they better be reflected in the Bill?

Christian Boney: Lisa, shall I have a go at that first?

Lisa Wright: Yes, go for it.

Christian Boney: Starting with the need for factors to help inform market participants’ decisions about whether, for example, their potential transaction presents risks, yes—in short, the more guidance that can be given about the kinds of factors that the Government will consider in determining whether a transaction presents a national security concern, the better. The statement of policy intent is very helpful in framing that, but clearly the more detail that can be included, the better.

The other thing that will be important in giving people a sense of whether their transaction should be notified or whether it falls within a mandatory notification sector is the interaction that will take place through informal engagement through the investment security unit. It is very important that the process for getting informal guidance from that unit is as streamlined, interactive and responsive as it can be. That will go some way to giving practitioners realtime guidance on potential concerns.

Lisa Wright: Can I just add a point to the idea of the desire for more certainty around what national security means? I think it is worth recognising that that is particularly important if you look at where we have come from. With the existing regime under the Enterprise Act 2002, there have only ever been a dozen or so interventions on national security grounds. There is not a widespread understanding of what it means and the circumstances in which the Government would intervene. That is the historical position, but we all know that this is constantly evolving.

When you take that and add to it the fact that the prediction now is that there will be, as it says in the papers, between 70 and 90 call-ins a year, that is obviously a huge increase against the 12 since the Enterprise Act. Any greater clarity that can be given around the circumstances in which the Government would be looking to, for instance, exercise the call-in powers would be beneficial, particularly at the beginning of the regime when everybody is trying to learn the ropes.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Q You mentioned, and I think it is absolutely right, the issue about going from a standing start to such an increase in the number of callings but also in the number of notifications—the impact assessment estimates 1,830 notifications. That is on the acquirer and does not take into account the fact that almost every start-up seeks capital investment at some point and I imagine would, therefore, as a consequence have to think about this regime. What impact do you foresee on the UK’s investment climate and especially on capital sources for small and medium-sized enterprises? How could that impact be mitigated or encouraged to be as positive as possible?

Christian Boney: I think this question really divides into two. In terms of larger corporates, investment by, and in, larger corporates is very likely to be unimpacted in any meaningful way by this legislation, because large corporates and their advisers are very used to going through regulatory clearance processes. This will just be another thing that needs to be added to the list.

I think you make a very valid point in the context of start-up and early-stage companies. The concern I would have principally is with those companies that are in that phase of their corporate life and fall within the mandatory notification sectors. Given the kinds of companies that this country is trying to encourage to flourish—those that are active in areas like artificial intelligence, advanced robotics and quantum technologies—a reasonable number of start-ups, I would expect, would fall within those mandatory notification sectors. For them, this regime is going to make the process of getting investment more time-consuming and more complex.

Anything that can be done in the process of consulting on the mandatory sectors, and anything that can be done to pair back the regime to make it more workable for companies in that stage of life, the better. An example might be some form of de minimis threshold, which is included, such that really early-stage companies do not fall within the mandatory notification regime, but the Government can nevertheless rely on their call-in power down the track, should that early-stage company becomes successful and more strategically important within the UK. Those are my principal thoughts. Lisa, do you have anything to add?

Lisa Wright: Not on that point, no

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q May I return to the national security issue—as opposed to the wider public interest test, which is an important question—and get your view as to the Bill’s scope, which is very much focused on national security, versus the wider public interest, to which I think my colleague’s first question alluded?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

To clarify, my question was this: how would you distinguish between national and economic security?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My question is more about your reflections on the Bill being narrow in its purpose to deal with national security versus the wider public interest.

Lisa Wright: It is already a very broad regime; it catches a lot of transactions, as we have just discussed. I therefore think it is important and right that it is limited, in terms of the substantive concerns that it is catching, to national security. That is already a necessarily, I think, uncertain or undefined concept. Corporates and investors can make it work as long as other aspects of the regime work efficiently. That may be subject to some of the points that Christian just made about the impact on start-ups.

I think that once you broaden the regime out from national security into other considerations, you do risk introducing quite a degree of unpredictability, which possibly would impact on people’s assessment of the investment climate in the UK. My understanding is that the existing intervention regime under the Enterprise Act is planned to remain in force, so the national security considerations will come out of that and will be dealt with under this new regime. But there will still be the ability for—[Inaudible.]

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None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Q Would you mind, Professor Martin, just introducing yourself for the record and for the benefit of the Committee?

Professor Martin: Thank you. My name is Ciaran Martin. I am currently a professor of practice at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford, but until August of this year I was the founding chief executive of the National Cyber Security Centre and a member of the executive board of GCHQ, within the Government. I should also declare for these purposes, although I am not sure it is relevant, that I serve on the advisory board of a US venture capital company called Paladin.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q Welcome, Ciaran; it is great to see you here. Thank you so much for sharing your expertise: as the founder of the National Cyber Security Centre, you have a great deal of expertise. I want to ask you to talk about a question that I have raised a number of times and that your expertise should be able to give us a real view on, which is about understanding the distinction, if there is a distinction, between national security and economic security concerns. You will be familiar with a number of cases, such as Arm and DeepMind, to name just two, that involved an economic security issue, you could argue—in terms of sovereign capability in artificial intelligence in the case of DeepMind, and of mobile silicon in the case of Arm—but that pretty swiftly turned into national security concerns. This Bill identifies a number of different sectors or areas—up to 17, I think— where a notification will be mandatory. How can we look at understanding or reflecting a distinction between evolving economic security and, ultimately, our national security?

Professor Martin: Thank you for your comments, Ms Onwurah; it is nice to see you again. I speak as someone who thinks that the Government have broadly got this issue correct, in terms of their proposals in this Bill. That is not to underestimate the sheer complexity of dealing with the core, fundamental question that you rightly identify of balancing economic security and national security and of where one stops and the other begins. That is a very complicated and difficult thing to do. I think one starts with an attempt to define a core principle, which is essentially around the freedom to act. I think that if you look at something such as Arm—I would say this probably more in the case of Arm than DeepMind—and its potential ultimate sale to Nvidia, you see that the UK has less freedom of choice in a key strategic technology, which undermines its own ability.

I think there is an analogy with the little known but quite long-standing—for more than a century—work on sovereign cryptography. That is one of the areas that has long been covered by national sovereignty requirements. There are things in information security, as we used to call it, cyber-security, as we do call it, that have always needed to be fully sovereign, entirely British-made—they are not very many areas. The problem has been that as technology and communications have changed, it has been quite hard to keep up, and there are always pressures to expand that in a way that is economically harmful to competition and so on. So it needs a clever buyer within Government to identify what will be the strategic areas and what will not be.

In the area of sovereign cryptography, we end up trying to keep, depending on the era, around half a dozen or a dozen companies viable, because it is not a lucrative market. You can see the problem, but the key issue is whether there is enough, first, sovereign, but if not sovereign, friendly capability that allows us the freedom of choice to adopt key technologies. That means identifying the key technologies in the first place, evolving them over time and then having a very difficult to achieve but necessary intelligent function within Government that can evaluate the notifications that it gets. Of course, at the moment we do not have the power to do that, and that is what this Bill correctly seeks to remedy.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Q Thank you. I am very taken by your definition of sovereign and friendly capability. Indeed, that is exactly what we do not have in our 5G networks, hence the mess with Huawei.

Moving on slightly, a comment made numerous times on Second Reading was about the role of the intelligence services. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) asked for more intelligence in the process. How can the Bill better ensure that the intelligence services, including the National Cyber Security Centre, have input and scrutiny and, indeed, provide their expertise as part of the process so that the appropriate decisions are taken?

Professor Martin: I think the essential, principal requirement is not the intelligence services’ involvement—although that is important and I will come to that in a minute—but the understanding of technology and technological developments within Government. These are fundamentally economic issues as well. Apart from anything else, if you look at some of the reasons why the Bill has come about, you will see that, in strategically important technologies, the Government have invested heavily in university-sponsored research and in private sector research, only to see the fruits of that research sold off. Even if that did not impact on national security, which in most cases it does, it is not a good return for the taxpayer in terms of long-term UK involvement if the intellectual property ends up being monetised elsewhere.

I have enormous respect for Mr Jones and I think he is on to something in terms of involving the national security and intelligence services, but I do not think this should be intelligence-led. In my experience—obviously, I cannot go into detail on this particular aspect of it—secret intelligence adds relatively little to your knowledge of intent. If we take Russia and China, the two big strategic threats to the UK, Russia does not have a strategy in this space. We have to worry about Russia and cyber-security because it attacks us, but it attacks us on the internet that the west has built.

China is very different. China has a technological, strategic dominance aim, but it is not a secret. It is published and has been translated into English in the Made in China 2025 strategy, as you know. Our knowledge about the precise, intricate details of how that is implemented gains relatively little from secret intelligence.

What secret intelligence does have, particularly in GCHQ and the NCSC within it, is a knowledge of how technology works in terms of the national security threat space. I think the UK has a head start on other countries, because the National Security Council innovations of the 2010s gave the intelligence services a much bigger voice at the table, and that is reflected in the structures that we have now. The UK should be well placed to be able to listen to the intelligence services, but I would encourage—not least to make sure that in this very delicate balance of trying to show that we still have an open economy and are not shutting the doors to investment—as much transparency as possible on the decision taking. It will not always be possible because GCHQ technologists will know about things—exploitations of particular bits of technology—that they cannot reveal. They will be able to tell that to secret forums within Government for consideration—I am quite confident about that: there will be a seat at the table for them.

My recommendation would be that, as far as can safely be done, the Government should be relatively open about why they make the judgements they make about strategic areas of technology and the interventions they will make once this Bill is passed—assuming that both Houses wish to pass it.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Professor, that was excellent and I am very grateful for it. I will follow on from that thought and ask about the proposed powers within the regime for the Secretary of State to gather that information, which, as you quite rightly remind us, is not necessarily secret but about understanding the technology, or a particular piece of the technology, within the sector. What are your thoughts on the regime for the Secretary of State to be able to gather that information to inform a decision or to call in witnesses, so that they are able to really understand that particular issue and therefore make a decision on it?

Professor Martin: I suppose the mantra, if I had one, would be, “Broad powers, sparingly used, with accountability mechanisms”. It is incredibly hard to be specific about this, for two reasons: one is that new areas of technology crop up, as they invariably do, and the other is that sweeping categorisations are needed on the face of legislation.

I am not a deep technical expert—although others are available from my former organisation—but if you take sweeping, umbrella titles like “quantum” or “artificial intelligence”, there are huge swathes of that where, actually, not a lot of these powers in the Bill will be used. There will be companies that will be doing very interesting things—10 interesting things—of which only one would be caught by this Bill.

If you take areas like specialist quantum computing and so forth, I think the community of interest and expertise is actually relatively small and has relatively good relations with Government—not least because, again, while it is not perfect, the whole system of research council funding and Government investment in funding technological research is pretty good, by international standards—so you end up knowing these people. One of the reasons that this sort of policy evolution came about, which has led to the publication of the Bill before you—I remember this from discussions within Government—is that people were volunteering to come to us. World-leading experts, people who had been funded by the Government—I will not go into individual cases because it is commercially sensitive and possibly security sensitive—would come to Government and say, “Look, we’ve had this inquiry from a Chinese behemoth,” or even, “We’ve had this inquiry from a US company,” and so forth: “What do you guys think about this?” and, invariably, we would have to have an informal influencing discussion.

I do not think that some of the businesses to which this will apply will be screaming that this is horrible Government regulation and intervention in areas where that should not be made. There was already a dialogue; there was just no legislative framework. Of course, that meant that companies that felt a loyalty to the UK and so forth but that also had to look after their commercial interests were sometimes in a real bind.

To try to answer your question, I think that the powers should be fairly broad. I think there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms, so that there is assurance that they are being fairly and sparingly applied.

--- Later in debate ---
Peter Grant Portrait Peter Grant
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

To be fair, there is nothing to stop MPs from asking questions about international security, but the chances of us ever getting an answer may be somewhat less.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q You have placed a lot of emphasis on the right technological skills and said that they should be forward looking, for a number of reasons, including identifying new technologies, but also giving clarity and certainty to businesses. Where do you see those tech skills being located? How can the Bill ensure adequate appropriate access to them?

Professor Martin: I am not sure if the Bill will get in the way or help, one way or the other. I think Government technological nous across the civil service needs to be invested in properly. There is a deep, fairly sizeable reservoir in GCHQ. Again, without going into too much detail, more and more people are being transferred and seconded from there into other areas. That is a good thing, and we should welcome that rather than cast aspersions on this being all secret state stuff. It should be permeating normal Government activity.

There will be issues about how to pay for some of the specialists that are needed. I do not think we will ever compete with the big tech companies, but there may be scope for paying some specialists a bit more and bringing them in here. There is something about creating a career path for technologists in Government. There are big issues for the heads of the civil service and the permanent secretaries. If I were heading it, I would want an immediate infusion of seconded talent and private sector buy-ins relatively quickly. Government can do that quite well some- times, and sometimes not so well. There also needs to be a long-term strategy for technologists in Government.

National Security and Investment Bill (Fourth sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 26th November 2020

(3 years, 4 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 November 2020 - (26 Nov 2020)
None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

We now come to our third panel. We will hear oral evidence from Mr James Palmer, senior partner from Herbert Smith Freehills. This will last until 2.30 pm. Mr Palmer, welcome; thank you for joining us. Would you be so kind as to introduce yourself for the record?

James Palmer: Thank you very much, Chair. I am James Palmer, a corporate mergers and acquisitions, and investments, partner at Herbert Smith Freehills. I have been doing that work for 34 years. I have worked with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy on business regulation for over 25 years. I also chair our global board; we are an international firm.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
- Hansard - -

Q107 Thank you very much, Mr Palmer, for sharing your expertise with us today. I see that you were on the takeover panel for SoftBank’s £24 billion takeover of Arm. Did you consider at the time that that might raise concerns for economic security and national security? More generally in your experience of takeovers and mergers, how would you—or would you—distinguish between economic security and national security on a current and forward-looking basis, if I can put it like that?

James Palmer: I was advising the takeover panel and the regulator, not one of the parties, so our thoughts were more about their role in ensuring appropriate regulation of that takeover—not from a foreign investment perspective, obviously, but there was a foreign investment angle to it. I am not a technical expert. My read of that—nothing to do with the work I did, but obviously I followed it and all the other transactions that have been looked at—is that it was more about economic security and positioning than necessarily about national security per se, but I am not the expert on it.

I think the point that you are drawing out—I heard your question earlier today—is a really fundamental one, which is that there is a spectrum of things that can be regarded as matters of national security. Indeed, the Bill papers draw this out. On the one hand, you have things that are clearly national security, like the risk of infiltration of systems that the country’s security depends on or that the country’s systems depend on—critical infrastructure being an example—but I do think that there are aspects of the Bill that are touching on things that stray more into economic influence and stability.

Again, I am not the expert on this, but I think we all know that in the debate about what is a matter of national security, there is a question of economic dependence, supply chain dependence and so on. That is one of the most difficult areas for this legislation, because where you have a straight, obvious national security real risk of some cyber-infiltration or whatever, nobody is going to argue about that. The grey into issues of supply chain dependency and more economic security starts to raise some of the more difficult areas, which I am sure we can come to.

I do not think that there is a simple binary distinction, and I am not here to give you the answer as to what the right approach is for dependency on China for supply chains. All I would say, having worked out in Asia many years ago, is that the interconnectedness of the world is not going to reduce and we are going to need to find ways of navigating that.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q Thank you, Mr Palmer; those are very interesting and important points. In your answer to my next question, I would like you to reflect on how this could be better. You make points about the spectrum, and particularly about the need for expertise and wide-ranging consideration in this process. Do you have concerns or suggestions about how they could be better reflected in the Bill?

Also, we have heard a number of times today that under the Bill—this will be reflected in your experience—we are going from 12 call-ins to a much bigger number: 90 or 100. And the impact assessment estimates that, I think, 1,870 notifications might come in under the new regime. Could you consider how best to reflect that or to put in place the skills and the resources for the Bill, and say a little about what impact you think it might have on the attractiveness of investing in UK companies and, in particular, small and medium-sized enterprises?

James Palmer: I have focused on the same numbers as you. I hope the Minister will excuse my saying so, because I think the team have genuinely done a superb job of looking at a lot of granularity on a swathe of issues, but there is one data point I did not agree with: the suggestion that there will be an 18% increase in the reviews; it was framed quite narrowly. In my maths, 12 reviews in nearly 20 years going to nearly 2,000 a year is well over a 10,000% increase. I think that that is a very important context in which to look at this—as the world outside looks at this, it is potentially looked at as pretty seismic change by the UK. Again, there is lots that we can go on to as to the ways in which the detailed thinking around this has tried to mitigate that, and I know the Department has worked very, very hard in trying to mitigate it, but I think that we just need to be realistic.

In terms of the skills, there is a fundamental question, which the Bill papers have started to try to set out, which is this: how do we focus the debate so that it is not all-encompassing? Again, the Minister is aware of my views on this. I am extremely pleased—I know that some may not share this view—that the Bill does not catch a broader public interest test. The reason for that is what happens every time we introduce a power for the Government, for very sensible reasons—these things are always about competing tensions with sensible reasons —to seek to interfere, review something and decide who should own it, or whether they want to impose conditions on that.

Let me give you an analogy. Let us say that I invite someone to come and invest in this country to build a house. At the moment, if I invite them to come to this country to build a house—or a business or a small technology business—they know they can build that house, live in it and sell it to whoever they want. If I invite them in and say, “Come and live in this country and build your house, but I reserve the right to decide who you sell it to and what conditions I impose on who you sell it to,” that is a very different prism—a new prism.

The Bill team have done a really good job of trying to narrow that so that everybody does not think, “Help! If I come to the UK, there is a Government discretion,” but there is an innate tension between, on one hand, the desire to have a broad power to interfere in circumstances that we have not all thought about to protect something as important as national security and, on the other hand, a desire to give investors certainty. My unhelpful view is that there is not a simple route through that, and I do worry about, in particular, small technology businesses.

Again, the team have done a good job of trying to narrow the sectors. This is a very different proposition, in terms of granularity, from what we saw in 2017 and 2018. But I think a lot of further work may be needed. The Government have been clear that they want to receive further feedback on how to narrow the remit. One example is the breadth of the communications sector, which has no de minimis. Artificial intelligence is not a thing done by four clever businesses anymore; it is a thing done by thousands of businesses. I think an awful lot of businesses are going to get caught that are not actually what the ministerial team are worried about.

The second bit is that, even outside the mandatory regime, other transactions may be judged with hindsight to be a matter of national security. Under the regime, a Minister—maybe not the current Minister, but whoever it is in the future—may decide that it is a matter of national security. As you have already highlighted, there is a spectrum of where economics becomes national security. People are going to worry about the predictability of investing in this country.

I am thinking particularly about smaller businesses. Obviously, there will be huge attractions to investing in the UK for technology. We have skills and expertise that can only be exploited here. The UK has had a very distinctive position as one of the few countries in the world where businesses without a particular nexus to a country have chosen to go as a destination of choice. Those businesses are the ones I am most worried about.

There is also the cost and risk for small businesses. If I was a European venture capitalist, how comfortable would I be in investing in a technology business in the UK that I will be able to sell it to an American or Danish buyer—not the Chinese—in five years’ time, or at least to do so simply? In terms of the call-in power, why would boards take a 1% risk that in five years’ time somebody will judge your transaction as being one that should have been notified? Why would I take even a 1% risk of my transaction being unravelled? I think that the Department has worked very hard—this is not just ritual politeness; I really think it has—to try to narrow it, but I do not think it has done so enough, because I think that there will be a lot more than 1,800 notifications.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q Thank you. You made it clear that you are praising the Department for the work it has done, and I accept your reluctance to criticise it; I think you are right—there is a lot of work, and this is a very complex area. Do you have any direct recommendations you would make to the Department in terms of what might need to change and in particular the preparations it should make for dealing with this large number of notifications?

James Palmer: My partner, Veronica Roberts, appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday, and she and I will be submitting a list to this Committee. I am afraid we do not have time to go through it today, but I will draw out a couple. Some of the mandatory filing sectors are very broad, such as communications. Again, the Government have said that they welcome narrowing those. There are not de minimises in a number of those sectors. It is true that there are other jurisdictions that do not have de minimises, but they are not jurisdictions with as large a proportion of their GDP linked to trade, and they are not jurisdictions that are as much seen as international business headquarters as well as centres of international business; there is a difference.

There is a de minimis for transport, for example, and it is very focused on ports over a certain threshold and on airports over certain levels of traffic. That is excellent, because those are the kinds of business that it makes sense that you would want to catch. The same layering has not been applied elsewhere. In particular, I worry about catching the sale or the licensing of intellectual property in relation to any of the technology areas. I think that that will catch an awful lot of things that people have not thought about yet, and I think that it will create a big burden for those small businesses.

I can conceive that in one or two very narrow areas—in some of the material science and so on, I am told—there may be low-value things that need to be caught. I am personally very sceptical that low-value things need to be caught in many other areas, because how can they be that important to the economy if they have a value that is below £1 million?

One of our concerns is that, although we know that the Government are very committed to a free trade agenda here and trying to make this work, I have worked with new regulators as they have developed for a very long time, and—forgive my saying so—I have never seen a regulator whose remit was only at the level that was predicted when it was set up. All remits expand exponentially, and that is one of the fears we have.

I would certainly advocate ensuring that the factors that the Secretary of State has to have regard to include, for example, impact on trade. The cost-benefit analysis sets out a sensible attempt—again, it is a much more developed piece of work than the, frankly, not-that-great cost-benefit analysis done in 2017-18; this one is a good and credible attempt—to work out what the actual cash costs are. But it does not address, as the Regulatory Policy Committee drew out, the real economic costs. It may all be okay, but the risks there are not hundreds of millions, but absolutely billions, and the UK’s competitive positioning there.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q I was going to ask you about whether the Bill is proportionate between being very focused on national security—albeit, as you quite rightly point out, there is a spectrum of that—versus public interest, but I think that you have answered that issue in saying that you would very much guard against expanding it.

James Palmer: I will just explain why. I remember working when the public interest regime still applied. The move away from the public interest regime started in the 1980s. Pre the 1980s, this country was not an international investment destination; it really was not. We have earned that position. Whatever one’s politics—I am not party political—this is something that the UK has earned. We have done that by moving to being pretty open-minded in foreign investment. We have actually not worried that much about national security considerations being controlled through ownership, because again this debate has been—sorry, let me first come back to the Minister’s point.

I am very nervous that if you open it up to public interest, you vest that authority in a politician; forgive me, but that is what leads to lobbying, to short-termism, and to completely inconsistent decision taking. I am afraid that whatever Ministers at the time may say about these decisions, there is no external credibility on the predictability of those. It does not matter whether Ministers think they are doing it in good faith or on security grounds. It does not come over that way.

On broadening it to public interest, I completely agree. I am very grateful—because I know that there was a debate about this—that it has been rightly focused just on national security, albeit with a broad ability to intervene to protect the national interest.

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None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

That’s all right. Thank you very much. Shadow Minister, Chi Onwurah.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q Thank you very much, Sir Graham. Welcome, David, and thank you so much for sharing your expertise and experience with us and for giving me an opening, which I cannot resist: what are your suggestions for improving this Bill?

David Offenbach: Well, there are three categories. First, are the 17 subjects that are referred to in the paper sufficient? Sir John Redwood, in the debate last week, said that food should be included, because there is nothing more important than food security. Mr Tim Loughton said that pharma and biotechnology should be included. There is not really very much on energy in the 17 subject matters. So I would like to see those included.

The next is the definition. National security is not defined in the Bill, which I actually approve of, because once it becomes too closely indicated, then it is not easy to decide what should be in it, or what should not be in it. I would like to see a definition that includes what Lord Heseltine said when Melrose took over GKN, that research and development should be a subject of importance; it should be included.

The other thing I would like to see included, contrary to the last speaker, is a general definition of public interest. The reason for that is that when you look at recent examples, you see that it is very easy for things to slip through the net that actually might be both in the national interest and in the interests of national security as a specific point.

Some of these examples have already been mentioned: SoftBank’s purchase of Arm. Now, that was world-beating British technology. It is in every computer, it is in every telephone and it came from Cambridge. It is now the subject of a bid by an American company owned by a Japanese bank. Do we really want to try and hang on to the research and development—as someone said in the House of Commons debate last week, the Crown jewels, or as Harold Macmillan said many years ago, the family silver? At this economic time, is it not desirable that we try and hang on to these important assets that are homegrown? Is self-reliance something that we should bear in mind?

Similarly, in 2014, Google bought DeepMind—world-beating British technology in artificial intelligence. Should that have been the subject of consideration? Recently, Lady Cobham was bemoaning the fact that Cobham had been sold to private equity for £4 billion. She said she only wished that the Act had already been in existence, and then perhaps the nine divisions that have now been reduced to four and the sell-off that started would not have happened. Of course, one of the problems is that the post-offer undertakings that can now legally be provided by companies to the takeover panel are fairly feeble and do not really deal with the issues to protect the necessary research and development and public interest.

At Immarsat, as those of you who drive around Old Street roundabout in the middle of London’s tech city will know, there was a £4 billion takeover of world-beating satellite technology. It started as a United Nations organisation, then became private and was quoted on the London stock exchange and has now gone to private equity.

Nvidia is buying Arm. When they bought Icera in 2011 in Bristol, they closed it down, 300 people lost their jobs and the technology went abroad. One that might now cause a bit of embarrassment is the case of Huawei, which bought from the East of England Development Agency the Centre for Integrated Photonics in 2012. Another piece of world-beating technology owned by the British Government has now gone abroad.

Those are just some of the numerable examples of assets that, at this difficult time, we really ought to try and hang on to. I do not want to decry the argument that Britain is open for business and that we believe in free trade. We do. There is twice as much foreign direct investment into Britain as there is into France and Germany. Several hundred thousand French people live in London. It is the fourth largest French city for French citizens. Why? Ask anybody. It is much easier to do business in London that it is in Paris.

As for the other argument—that if we do not make the business climate easy, people will start up their businesses elsewhere—the answer is that they will not, because in the other places where they want to open their businesses the regimes are tougher than here, so that argument does not wash. France has just passed its recent new law. They use a slightly different test that is strategic. Their test is not quite as wide as public interest. Of course, a right to intervene on strategic grounds is what Mr Tim Loughton and Mr Bob Seely suggested in the House of Commons debate last week, and Mr Tugendhat was very sad about the fact that Google had bought DeepMind and that SoftBank had managed to acquire Arm. For all those reasons, I think we do need to add to the definitions. That is the position.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Q I have a quick follow-up question. Should we consider a separate test of public or strategic interest, or are you saying that our economic and security interests are intertwined, so it is the definition of security interests that needs to be expanded? What are your views on that?

David Offenbach: It is very difficult to separate these. When you look at GKN, for example, 50,000 people—even now, after covid—are headquartered in Redditch, near the Minister’s constituency. It is one of the largest industrial companies worldwide, 250 years old, and a defence contractor to the Ministry of Defence, but the question is whether the amount of defence work it does, apart from its other engineering, is sufficient for it to be called in under the existing legislation. Clearly, the decision was made that it was not appropriate, and it is the same with Cobham. Cobham clearly had a national security element, but it was not sufficient for it to be called in and blocked by the Minister, so I think it is very difficult to separate the economic from the national interest, because these companies are multi-layered; they operate in different markets; some of their work is sensitive, and some of it is not sensitive.

That is why I think it is better to try and improve this Bill than deal with it under a separate Bill. The problem is that it has taken three years to get to where we are with this Bill. If we are just going to say, “Let’s deal with it another time”, it might take another three or four years before we get to consider that, so while it is here, while it is on the table, let’s try to improve it now and make it really work for Britain, so that we can build back better—to use a phrase—going forward.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Welcome, Mr Offenbach; thank you very much for making the time. I wanted to get your view on how you think the Bill deals with the range of sanctions available to the Secretary of State in order to protect national security. How do you see that?

David Offenbach: I am very pleased with it. It is much better than the previous regime, because now, rather than just having post-offer undertakings that are subject only to contempt of court criteria if they are breached, we have a proper statutory framework that will enable the Minister to impose orders so that for non-compliance, there is a breach of statutory duty, not merely a breach of an undertaking. Of course, one of the problems with the takeover code is that the object of a takeover code is to protect shareholders and to encourage fair dealing in takeovers. It is not there—and this has never been its job—to protect the public interest; it is there to protect the shareholders who are in receipt of an offer, so that they have been given fair treatment. For example, if you take SoftBank and Arm at the moment, we do not know whether or not they will have complied with their post-offer undertakings when the five years is up, because the price that is being paid now is more than was paid in 2016. There is no complaint. Public interest is irrelevant to the job of the takeover panel, which is why this new regime is a very welcome improvement on the old regime.

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None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

We will now hear oral evidence from our fifth panel. We welcome Mr Creon Butler from Chatham House. We have until 4 o’clock for this session. Mr Butler, may I welcome you to the Committee? Please will you introduce yourself for the record?

Creon Butler: I am Creon Butler, the director of the global economy and finance programme at Chatham House. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to give evidence.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Q Welcome, Mr Butler, and thank you for sharing your expertise with the Committee. Your expertise is considerable, given that you have advised on policy issues such as climate change, national resource security, global health security and economic security. There are clearly many aspects of security. Are both the distinction and the links between national security and economic security appropriately reflected in the Bill, or could they be better reflected?

Creon Butler: You get right to the heart of the matter and, indeed, to one of the points I wanted to make. Yesterday I looked at how national security is defined, and the “Collins English Dictionary” defines it as preventing a country from being attacked by hostile powers. One very important thing in relation to this Bill is that, first, while there is a good justification for having a broad range of powers to intervene, given the breadth of those powers to intervene and collect information, it is important that the Government define more clearly than they have hitherto exactly what those powers will be used for and, in those terms, use them in relation to national security. Specifically, I mean investments that could lead a hostile power to have technology that would enable it to make better weapons to attack us or would enable it to intervene in our critical national infrastructure.

There are other aspects of economic security, such as having a major industry in AI, renewable energy or something of that kind, that could be relevant to broader security in the future. You may well want to have a strategic intervention to ensure that the UK has that kind of industry, but I do not think this is the Bill for doing that. I think there are other tools you would want to use, including competition policy, strategic investments, contracting, R&D and so forth. That is one of the points I wanted to make.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q Are the other tools or powers needed to make interventions with regard to strategic capability in place under the Enterprise Act 2002, such as for the Arm takeover? I am not sure that they are. Given your experience, will you say a bit about the level of resourcing and expertise the unit would need to make such assessments?

Creon Butler: On your first question, I do not think we have that yet as a country. Actually, with the previous Prime Minister we had a clear definition of a number of sectors that were felt to be very important, but it is a continuing story in terms of exactly how we are going to intervene to ensure that those sectors are strong. We have some powers, but there are a range of tools. I previously mentioned public contracting, where we do our research and development, and competition policy specifically to make it impossible for British companies to develop in those sectors, and so on. There is a broad range of policies for ensuring we have those sectors, and I think they are continuing to evolve.

Your second question is a really crucial one. I guess a key point is that this is not an absolute thing: you cannot protect the country from all possible national security risks through this route. The only way you could do that, potentially, is by having every single investment notified and examined. That would create an enormous bureaucratic monster, which would really not be what we want.

The further point is that when you are looking at the right cases, you want to be sure that the judgments that are made trade off with the national security risk, as I have defined it, but also with the potential economic benefit of having an investment in that area. To do that, you need expertise among the people who are making such judgments, which spans security expertise but also economic, investment and commercial expertise. It is very important, first, that there enough people to do the judgments properly, and secondly, that you have a breadth of expertise. Certainly in the past, we may have swung from one side to the other. Sometimes you have had what people would describe as a securocrat approach: “There is a possible risk here. Let’s go for it—let’s eliminate it, whatever the economic cost.” Sometimes, on the other hand, you have had the alternative situation: “Let’s encourage investment, whatever the risk might be.” I think it is important that we get a balance between those two.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Welcome, Mr Butler, and thank you very much for your attendance. Reflecting on the changing nature of the national security threats that we are now facing, which you alluded to in your answer to my colleague, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, how do you think the Bill builds on the Enterprise Act 2002? It has been 18 years since that legislation was introduced, so it would be great to get your take on that. Given your CV, it is worth getting your reflection on that while we have you here.

Creon Butler: I think—I am sure many people have said this—it is very clear that the previous legislation needed updating and was not fit for purpose, given both the way in which the global economy as a whole has evolved and the way in which the threats have evolved. It is both necessary and urgent to update that, and the way the Bill has done that, in terms of this first phase of creating the powers both to collect information and to intervene, makes a lot of sense. We have to fine-tune it and make sure it works properly, but this is a good first step. As I said, though, it is really important, if you are going to have such broad powers, to define exactly how you will use them—and much more precisely than the Government has done hitherto.

The further point is that this piece of legislation does not do everything. Alongside it, we need to strengthen our ability to collect the information we need about those threats. There are a number of elements. One that I have some experience of and that is really important is the question of who actually owns and controls companies that are operating in the UK—the question of beneficial ownership transparency. If you do not know that a hostile power is influencing a company that might be registered in an overseas territory or something of that kind, you will not be able to take the steps that you need to take.

A further area—it is a step in the right direction, because it gives us the powers to engage with this issue —is through international co-operation. Looking forwards, we need to strengthen and enhance our international co-operation with like-minded partners by going beyond the Five Eyes and including other really key partners, such as Japan, the EU and so on. That will enable us to do two things. First, it will enable us to share information about the things that can happen, such as the techniques that hostile powers are using. You may see it come up first in one country, and if we can share that information, we know that we can be prepared for that. Even more importantly, you may have a hostile power that does a number of things in different parts of the world, and it is only when you see the entire picture that you can see what the threat is.

Having that kind of international co-operation to do that is really important. These powers are necessary to get us in the same place as some of our key allies, in terms of what we can do. I do not think we are ever going to be able to standardise the areas of intervention or the nature of powers, but we should push very hard to enhance the sharing of information in the way I described.

--- Later in debate ---
None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

We have until 4.30 pm at the latest for this session. Mr Jackson-Moore, will you introduce yourself for the record?

Will Jackson-Moore: I am a partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers. I am responsible for our relationships with private equity, infrastructure, real estate and sovereign funds on a global basis. I started working in our Sheffield office, predominantly with small and medium-sized industrial organisations, before moving into our deals practice, where I spent the majority of my career working with corporates and private equity houses, undertaking transactions here in the UK and abroad. I then relocated with my family, while still at PWC to the middle east, where I spent a number of years —I got quite a lot of exposure to the sovereign funds there—before moving back to the UK and into my current role.

My areas of expertise are flows of international capital and the deals market. I am not a specialist in national security matters.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Thank you for sharing your expertise with us, Mr Jackson-Moore. What impact do you expect the measures in the Bill to have on the sovereign funds and others you represent—the investors and potential acquirers of UK assets? You said clearly that you were not an expert in national security—why should you be? —but how will you identify those acquirers who may be considered to pose a national security threat? What kind of engagement would you expect to have with the Department for Business in order to make that sort of call?

Will Jackson-Moore: That is a two-part question. On how the proposed Bill will impact the flow of capital into the UK, generally these are sophisticated investors who operate across the globe, investing in territories that already have equivalent legislation, so the actual legislation itself will not come as a surprise or a barrier. It is in the application of it that there will be concerns, in that, quite rightly, the definitions are drawn quite broadly and we believe that a significant number of transactions and inbound investments will be brought into this—in many cases, voluntarily, so people can get guidance. That will be an area of concern, in terms of whether it will create a barrier, either through publicity or with the timing of bringing capital into the UK. That is probably one of the main concerns right now.

In terms of sovereign funds, I am not in a position to say whether an individual investor or fund is a threat to national security. That is not something I would be looking to comment on.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q Would you be expecting to advise your clients as to whether the proposals in the Bill might impact on them? Would you expect to be able to engage with the Department in order to establish that? Have you made, for example, predictions of the number of transactions in which you are involved that might be subject to the proposals in this Bill?

Will Jackson-Moore: In terms of how we might engage with organisations on the applicability of the Bill, I think we would be asked questions about the industries that are covered, the definitions of an industry and what a business actually does. Whether an organisation is drawn into the legislation—whether it is considered a national security threat—is not something we would be involved in. I would be pointing organisations in the direction of their legal advisers on that.

As I said, there are something in the order of 6,000 investments into venture capital in the UK each year. There are approaching 10,000 mergers and acquisitions transactions a year in the UK, plus a number of infrastructure investments, and many of those will fall into the definitions within the Bill. I do not think it is entirely clear to buyers yet whether they would be caught. A traditional private equity house or a venture capitalist looking to invest in a start-up in the UK, may well be owned by Britons, with a management team who are British, but they may have structures that include overseas entities, and many of their investors will be overseas investors. I think that many of those organisations will be wanting guidance as to whether they will be considered an overseas acquirer, even though on the face of it they appear relatively British.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q Specifically on whether they meet the definition of an overseas acquirer, I was also interested in this. I think one of the assumptions has been that there will be a large number of self-notifications in order to get guidance early on, but you seem to be implying that that might be considered to be declaring yourself as a threat to national security, and that might be a barrier.

Will Jackson-Moore: No. The way traditional fundraising for a start-up or a transaction takes place is that a business is either put up for sale or seeks investment from a number of parties; the entrepreneur wants to raise finance and have a competitive situation in which the providers of capital are making the most attractive offers possible to reduce the cost of capital for the organisation. I think there would be an incentive for them to be able to say to potential investors, “We are not going to be considered as an asset that is important to national security”. The definitions are quite broad and many organisations will have technologies that right now appear relatively benign and are used for purely civilian purposes but are cutting-edge and on a trajectory whereby in two years’ time they may have military applications or other things that could be a threat to national security.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Q What that says to me is that, while the impact assessment looks at the cost to the acquirer, there will actually be a cost to the acquired party in terms of clearing themselves in advance or clarifying what their situation is, and I do not think that is covered in the impact assessment as it stands.

Will Jackson-Moore: Yes, in many cases it is a raising of finance for a partial stake. It is an entrepreneur looking to attract capital to expand their business, seeking to bring in an investor to provide maybe 25% of additional equity capital. They want to have a competitive situation where people are offering the most beneficial terms possible. Many of those investors will be overseas investors.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Q Following on that, Mr Jackson-Moore, the current regime under the Enterprise Act 2002 stipulates that the assessment of transactions is dealt with on a case-by-case basis by the Government. This legislation effectively puts into law the timeline by which assessments are made. Do you think that and other provisions in this Bill will send a message to the industry and to the investment community of a slicker, more efficient way of dealing with assessment of transactions?

Will Jackson-Moore: For the vast majority of existing transactions, the existing legislation was not really a major factor; it only addressed a handful of transactions each year, whereas this is much more in the mainstream of the M and A market and therefore it will be much more on people’s agenda. We already have a number of organisations reaching out to us to understand the potential implications for ongoing transactions.

I do not think the timeframe in itself represents a barrier, since it is not that dissimilar to other jurisdictions, but again it is the application. If you look at Australia, for example, buyers have the ability to pre-clear themselves, and that type of amendment would be very helpful to ensure the free flowing of capital.

National Security and Investment Bill (Fifth sitting) Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Department of Health and Social Care

National Security and Investment Bill (Fifth sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 1st December 2020

(3 years, 3 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 1 December 2020 - (1 Dec 2020)
None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

I have a few preliminary points to make. I ask Members to switch electronic devices to silent and remind them of the importance of social distancing—spaces are clearly marked. Members who are not able to fit into the body of the room—the Opposition Benches are full—will have to sit in the Public Gallery. I will suspend the sitting if I think that anyone is in breach of social distancing guidelines. Hansard will be grateful if Members e-mail electronic copies of speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.

Today we begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list is available at the back of the room, showing how the selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or similar issues. Decisions on amendments are made not in the order in which they are debated, but in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper.

The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause that the amendment affects. I will use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on schedules and clauses following debates on amendments.

Clause 1

Call-in notice for national security purposes

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
- Hansard - -

I beg to move amendment 3, in page 1, line 6, after “Secretary of State” insert “upon the assessment of a multi-agency review or recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Committee”.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to assess a multi-agency review prior to issuing a call-in notice.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 4, in clause 4, page 3, line 21, at end insert—

“(aa) at least one week before the statement is made, consult with the Intelligence and Security Committee in respect of the contents of the statement; and

(ab) amend such legislation as may be necessary to allow such consultation to take place;”.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult with the Intelligence and Security Committee before publishing a statement under section 3.

Amendment 5, in clause 6, page 5, line 3, at end insert—

“(10) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must—

(a) provide the Intelligence and Security Committee with one week’s advance notice of his/her intention to bring forward such regulations; and

(b) make any necessary amendments to legislation to allow the Intelligence and Security Committee to respond with recommendations.”.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to notify the Intelligence and Security Committee before making regulations under this section, and would provide a mechanism for the Committee to respond with recommendations.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

May I begin by saying what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg, and what a pleasure and, indeed, honour it is to discuss this important Bill with the rest of the Committee?

This issue is important to Members on both sides of the Committee, and as we scrutinise the Bill line by line over the next two weeks I am sure we will get closer—or as close as social distancing allows. Labour Members look forward to a constructive and collegiate debate and recognise that Members on both sides of the Committee share the objective of making well-informed contributions. It was clear from speeches made last night on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, the interests and ambitions of which overlap those of this Bill, that all Members share a belief in the critical importance of national security, and I am sure that will be reflected in our deliberations.

We agree on the importance of securing our national security, for which line-by-line scrutiny is vital. The Government’s impact assessment notes the need for change and says that national security is an area of “market failure” requiring some Government action. I found that statement somewhat shocking, and a marked difference between the views of Labour and Conservative Members. It is an astonishing claim, because national security is not a private concern first, and a Government after-thought second. There is no market in national security, which is the first duty of a Government and not a failed responsibility of the private sector. It ought to be the first priority of any Government to address it. It is not under-supplied by the market; it is outside the market altogether.

Although that claim is astonishing, it is unsurprising from this Government and the party that leads them. The impact assessment is a marker of a Government who have outsourced significant responsibility for national security; a Government who let Kraft take over Cadbury in 2012 because the market promised good behaviour by the acquirer, only for them to be embarrassed when the acquirer broke all its promises—national responsibility outsourced and British jobs and national interests handed over to the market.

James Wild Portrait James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Could the shadow Minister explain the national security issues with the Kraft takeover?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I meant to say that national responsibility was outsourced—and British jobs—and the national interest handed over to the market. That was the concern with the Kraft takeover. If he wishes, I shall follow up with further examples, but the national interest and the responsibility of this Conservative Government for economic security have clearly been lacking. This is the Government who let the Centre for Integrated Photonics, a prized research and development centre, be taken over by Huawei in 2012—an event that our head of the National Cyber Security Centre said that in hindsight we would not wish to happen. National security was outsourced and the British interest again relinquished to the market.

Matt Western Portrait Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend makes a point about the market failure that we have experienced over the past decade and its relevance to or inappropriateness for national security. The Government actively encouraged inward investment from China and let the market be totally open, without any control whatsoever, which is one of the driving factors in the challenges we face today, especially with Huawei, as outlined in last night’s debate.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. He is absolutely right. This is particularly relevant to amendment 3, as we shall see. This Government, and previous Conservative Governments of the past 10 years, have maintained an ideological position that bypasses the question of national security and leaves Government responsibility much curtailed and focused purely on our defence capabilities and requirements without considering the impact of our technology and R&D. As the debate on the telecoms Bill showed, the Government are not considering the impact of the telecoms sector on our short-term and long-term security.

On the specifics of amendment 3—these principles guide the reason for the amendment—the Secretary of State would have to draw up a multi-agency review or act on the recommendation of Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee prior to issuing a call-in notice.

The Bill marks the total transformation of the UK’s existing merger control process and the provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002. It would move us away from 12 reviews in 18 years to a potential 1,830 notifications a year. It would shift the locus of merger control from the experienced Competition and Markets Authority to a novel unit of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. As we heard in our expert evidence, the world is looking at the UK and seeing a pretty seismic change. We recognise the need for such a change, but we do not accept that the skills and knowledge to implement and monitor such a change reside wholly in BEIS.

The Minister is a modest man, and he may not want to share with the Committee the fact that he has recently been made the tzar for vaccine acquisition and delivery across the nation, but that is one of the many responsibilities of his Department. I hope he will agree that is a considerable responsibility, but the responsibility of identifying and understanding the national security implications of 1,830 notifications a year is a particularly great challenge. As someone who champions the importance of trade and economic growth, he will agree that there is potentially a conflict of interest—we have seen this for many years, as my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington suggested—between the trading implications of foreign direct investment and access to finance and the national security implications. This is such a huge shift that we cannot rely on discretionary judgments made potentially to suit political ends alone. We cannot rely on BEIS alone because the Department may have a conflict of interest in its separate role of boosting UK investments.

This is a critical point, and I hope to hear from the Minister how he or the Secretary of State will prioritise the role of the Department in boosting investment in the UK and in scrutinising these 1,830 notifications. We need to ensure a robust contribution from across Government and the agencies in guiding these decisions.

Andrew Bowie Portrait Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Is not the entire purpose of calling in a decision to then instigate an investigation into whether that investment would be contrary to national security? It is after the Secretary of State has called it in that the agencies and Departments can look into the investment or takeover to see whether it is contrary to national security. That investigation does not take place before the call-in notice has been issued.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

The hon. Member makes an interesting point. We will examine the skills of those involved in the examination once a transaction has been called in. There was a clear contradiction in what he said, because if it is not called in those skills and expertise will not be brought to the table. There is obviously a need for the expertise before the call-in, or there would not be a call-in.

Andrew Bowie Portrait Andrew Bowie
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If it is not the calling in by a Minister, what would trigger the multi-agency investigation into the investment or takeover that has caused the problem in the first place?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

The hon. Member makes an important point that goes to the heart of our concerns. I do not wish to detain the Committee for too long on this, but it is important to discuss the way in which the skills and resources of our national security services, who do so much to keep us safe and secure, will be used to work with the Department to identify potential triggers for a call-in. Some guidance will be given in the statement issued by the Secretary of State, and we will debate that shortly, but what was mentioned many times yesterday during the debate on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill was the capacity and the need for institutions such as our Intelligence and Security Committee to have a more concrete role. Not all of their expertise and knowledge can be in the public domain. As we heard yesterday, the Committee first issued concerns about Huawei back in 2013. If, back in 2013, the business Department had been able to benefit from that expertise, knowledge and insight the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport would be in a different position today.

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

As my hon. Friend rightly says, the fundamental purpose of our amendment is to ensure that the screening process takes place upstream so that the multi-agency and highly technical capability of intelligence agencies and the Ministry of Defence can be deployed in advance of the Secretary of State—who otherwise may be in a state of isolation—making an initial decision about whether there is a trigger event or whether action is required. The amendment would ensure that the screening process is done by multiple agencies that can then give the Secretary of State advice that is well informed and rooted in an understanding of the risk that we face.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank my hon. Friend for putting it so clearly, and I hope that addresses the concerns of the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine. We want the screening process to benefit from the knowledge of our intelligence agencies and others before the Secretary of State calls it in. Our national security depends on having those robust contributions from across Government and the agencies in guiding decisions. In some cases, this may rely on the established sensitive channels of information and access and communications that have marked the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee. That is the best way to guard our national security, relying on our world-leading intelligence agencies, diplomatic service and our civil service expertise across Departments and not just on a single Secretary of State.

During the evidence sessions last week, we heard from an academic expert witness that institutional capacity in this area usually involves a multi-agency review body. We heard from the former head of MI6 that

“the co-ordination of Government Departments is one of the really big challenges”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 23, Q25.]

I am sure everyone who heard Sir Richard Dearlove’s evidence was struck that his years at MI6 had clearly taught him that this is a big challenge and that it is important to have co-ordinated and organised multi-agency input. We heard from the recent head of the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre that the new body

“needs to be broadly based and multidisciplinary.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 85, Q103.]

The consensus of academic and intelligence service experience is that we need an approach that includes different agencies upstream of the calling decision.

Matt Western Portrait Matt Western
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend is making incredibly important points. There are really two issues. One is the volume that will be coming through, as she articulated earlier, but there is also the multiplicity of the challenges and where they may come from. This is not simply about the most obvious security challenges or risks. It is not necessarily about defence contracts or telecoms; it could come from all sorts of areas. It is the soft areas that are perhaps the most vulnerable. That is where the expertise of the different Departments will come into play, and that is why a multi-agency approach is so important.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Perhaps I should have emphasised that point more.

When we look at the examples of Huawei or DeepMind, which was allowed to be sold to Google in 2014, we are looking backwards. We now recognise the security implications. Artificial intelligence is a key security capability, as I think the Minister will agree, given that it is one of the 17 sectors for which notification will be mandatory. At that time, it was difficult and I take it—perhaps the Minister will contradict this—that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills did not recognise the security implications of the acquisition.

The key question is, what are the acquisitions now that will have security implications in five or 10 years’ time? That is what the Secretary of State needs to know in order to make the decisions we are discussing. It is no injustice to the Secretary of State and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to say that alone, they are not in a position to know that. Deciding from where in the world the great threats to our security may come is not purely technological, although it requires technological expertise, and it is not even purely geopolitical. Last night we heard a lot about China and Russia. In future, we may be looking at other emerging threats. This is an attempt to improve the Bill by ensuring that there is a multi-agency approach.

Simon Baynes Portrait Simon Baynes (Clwyd South) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Could you list the agencies that you have in mind under the term “multi-agency”?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I do not think it would be appropriate to be prescriptive at this point. Some of the agencies I have in mind are the Intelligence and Security Committee, the National Cyber Security Centre and our security services—MI5 and MI6. I am very happy to hear from the hon. Gentleman what agencies should be involved, but the key point is that we need multiple agencies.

Matt Western Portrait Matt Western
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If the University of Cambridge were approached by a Chinese academic institution with an offer of funding to collaborate on some project, for example, surely that would need the intervention of the Department for Education. It is obviously not just about the intelligence services; it would need the engagement of the DFE and not just BEIS.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank my hon. Friend for that important point. I am reluctant to continuously mention China, because this is not an anti-China Bill per se, but we heard in oral evidence of the real concerns about Chinese influence in our higher education institutions. He is right that the Department for Education may have an important input to make about securing our future national security.

In defining the agencies that need to be involved in this multidisciplinary approach, we could look at the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which has nine voting departments, two non-voting agencies and additional White House representation on its decision-making committee. I know that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has done some work on comparisons with other countries, in particular our Five Eyes allies. There are models to take.

Andrew Griffith Portrait Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

In the same vein as my hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd South, to expand a little on what multi-agency would mean, would the hon. Lady rule out the Low Pay Commission, for example?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I welcome this debate. If by that the hon. Member is asking whether I think human rights have a relationship to national security, that was very well debated yesterday in relation to the Telecommunications (Security) Bill. A number of his colleagues strongly made the point that there is a relationship between modern-day slavery and our national interest and national security. I do not have the expertise to identify what the agency should be. The Low Pay Commission is not an organisation that I had considered, but I am happy to take his advocacy for its being part of this multidisciplinary approach.

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend is being incredibly generous. Not wishing to second-guess some of the scepticism that we may be picking up from the Government Benches—[Interruption.]

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Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Thank you, Mr Twigg. As I was saying, not wishing to second-guess the scepticism that I may be picking up from Government Members, one reason I support the amendment is that I think it brings additional focus to the process. Without a clear definition of what national security is in the Bill, and a clear institutional capacity for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State will be left with an open-ended process. By having a multi-agency, strong institutional capacity we will streamline the process. Our amendment is about cutting bureaucracy out of the process, and streamlining and focusing it. I hope that hon. Members will consider that when they take their sceptical approach.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

As always, I am immensely grateful to my hon. Friend, who does well to remind us that part of the underlying issue, which we will debate later, is the lack of any definition of national security. Rather than just considering the scepticism, let me focus on what we are trying to do. Given the lack of any definition of national security, is it not right that it should not be left to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to decide what the key issues are on national security? Fundamentally, I think that is the question that Committee members must consider.

The amendment seeks to fill the gap that expert advice and international precedence highlight. It enshrines credible decision making in law and, in doing so, protects our security and gives businesses confidence that the decision to call in has been grounded in evidence and expertise, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, who will find certain provisions of the legislation most burdensome and who may have the most to lose from lengthy processes once the call-in procedure happens—the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine referred to those processes. It grounds a mechanism for effective accountability for the call-in decisions of the Secretary of State.

Amendment 4, which would amend clause 4, has a similar aim. It would require the Secretary of State to consult with the Intelligence and Security Committee before publishing a statement under section 3, which sets out the scope and nature of how the Secretary of State would exercise the call-in powers. That statement would include details of sectors that might especially pose risks, details of trigger events and details of factors that the Secretary of State would consider in deciding whether to act. It would also include details of the BEIS unit’s resourcing, if amendment 9 were agreed to.

The measures are a seismic shift in terms of the UK’s approach to mergers and acquisitions and it gives significant powers and discretion to the Secretary of State. It suggests that the Government may publish a statement setting out the scope of the call-in powers. As part of our discussion this morning, we have talked about the way in which security threats evolve over time in the light of technological change—for example, security threats that we did not recognise in the past led to the Huawei debacle—and also, importantly, in the light of political changes, so it is understandable that our understanding of some of those changes will be imperfect and will rely on sensitive information. However, the critical point is that the fact that there will be change and its sensitivity should not preclude the need for accountability.

In other areas of national security, the Intelligence and Security Committee holds Government to account through proper scrutiny and with access to sensitive information. I refer again to the debates on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill and the Second Reading of this Bill, where members of the Intelligence and Security Committee demonstrated their understanding of the key issues around national security and their ability to make a contribution—I think it is fair to say that they are very willing to make a contribution. It is only right that we bring the same level of scrutiny to measures in this Bill, on matters of critical national security. The amendment would bring the scrutiny of the Intelligence and Security Committee to changes in the Secretary of State’s call-in powers, ensuring that these major powers consistently act to protect our national security.

Scrutiny is especially needed in this area. We have had the Enterprise Act since 2002, but there have been only 12 national security cases under it. That speaks very clearly to the lack of experience and an acute need for scrutiny as we now move up to almost 2,000 annual cases. Several witnesses in our evidence sessions emphasised that we were going from effectively zero—a standing start—to Formula 1 performance levels, and that as such, we needed to ensure that we put in place the resources, the expertise and the support to enable that to be effective and not unnecessarily impede our business, our economy and our foreign investment.

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Andrew Bowie Portrait Andrew Bowie
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am listening intently to what the hon. Lady is saying and I understand the point she is trying to make, but surely it is already within the power of the ISC to call in anything that it thinks is a threat to national security. Therefore, it can investigate anything that it thinks it will be detrimental to the national interest. If we read further down, clause 4(2) states:

“Either House of Parliament may at any time before the expiry of the 40-day period resolve not to approve the statement.”

There is already capacity in the Bill as it stands, and the procedures that we already have in Parliament, to ensure scrutiny of any procedures that the Secretary of State might decide to take forward.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I recognise that at the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, and I agreed with him until he said that there are already powers to “ensure scrutiny”. The powers that he describes might enable scrutiny, but I do not think they would ensure scrutiny. We are trying to ensure the scrutiny of the Intelligence and Security Committee by writing it into the Bill. I see him nodding, and I appreciate that we understand each other here.

Matt Western Portrait Matt Western
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

This is about putting it on a different footing; it is as simple as that. As was said by Sir Richard Dearlove and others in the evidence sessions last week, with the sort of agenda that a Government of any political colour may have, we have seen particularly over the past decade an embrace of, say, China, and the investment in our nuclear power stations provision as well as in other areas. Now, that could have been Russia, and if it had been Russia, what would the advice have been? What would the agenda of the Government of the day have been? Would it have been as embracing? That is why it is really important to understand from the ISC what its views are and to put this in a different setting, as my hon. Friend has said.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Another excellent contribution from my hon. Friend, who raises a delicate, nuanced, important point. Governments of all colours may have trade and geopolitical agendas that lead to, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) described it, a “hug a panda” approach, whereas the ISC, which we have seen mark its independence of thought both as a Committee and in its contributions in parliamentary debates, has a duty, a responsibility and an understanding to see beyond short or even medium-term political ambitions and to focus wholeheartedly on the security of our nation. That is where its support is invaluable.

I will finish my comments on the amendment by quoting some of our parliamentary colleagues with regard to the Intelligence and Security Committee. On Second Reading, the Chair of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), said that

“there is a real role for Committees of this House in such processes and that the ability to subpoena both witnesses and papers would add not only depth to the Government’s investigation but protection to the Business Secretary who was forced to take the decision”.—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 238.]

I think that is powerful advocacy for the amendment. A member of the ISC, the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), said that

“we need mechanisms in place to ensure that that flexibility does not allow the Government too much scope. That is why—this point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) and I emphasise it on behalf of the ISC—Committees in this place missioned to do just that need to play an important role.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 244.]

We had support in the evidence sessions, support across the House and, most importantly, we have the support of the ISC itself, or at least its agreement that the amendment would be a constructive improvement to the Bill.

Finally, I will say a few words on amendment 5, which would require the Secretary of State to notify the Intelligence and Security Committee before making regulations under clause 6 and would provide a mechanism for the Committee to respond with recommendations. Regulations made under clause 6 would likely define the sectors that pose the greatest national security risk and would come under mandatory notification requirements. With the amendment, the ISC would be able would to provide both scrutiny and challenge to these sector definitions. The Committee will understand that the driving reasons behind the amendment are similar to those behind amendments 3 and 4, which is of course why the amendments have been grouped together, and would seek to improve the Bill through putting in place a requirement for parliamentary scrutiny specifically on the definitions.

As we have said, the Bill gives the Secretary of State major powers, and it demands mandatory notification of investments in large parts of the economy, with 17 proposed sector definitions already. I really cannot emphasise enough how broad those definitions currently seem. I know it is the intention that the definitions should be tightly drawn. However, I speak as a chartered engineer with many years’ experience in technology. Three or four decades ago, we might have talked about digital parts of the economy, but now the economy is digital. Similarly, in the future, parts of the economy not using artificial intelligence—from agriculture to leisure to retail to education—will be looking to use it.

Katherine Fletcher Portrait Katherine Fletcher (South Ribble) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am a scientist myself, so I share a passion from a technology perspective. I am listening to the hon. Lady’s view of the breadth of opportunities, but amendment 5 would bring the Intelligence and Security Committee into the process, and I wonder whether we would be creating a bottleneck. The hon. Lady talked earlier about breadth and said that time is critical for SMEs and larger companies that need a decision. I think she would accept that Government is perhaps not the most effective and efficient vehicle, so why does she seek to put additional steps into something that is time critical and based on national security?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I welcome the hon. Lady’s intervention. It is great to have scientific knowledge in Committee and in the House. I welcome the contributions and scrutiny that a scientific background can bring. She is right that there is a tension. The technological environment is fantastic and innovative, with its start-up and enterprise culture. We have great centres of development and innovation, from Cambridge to Newcastle. I am sure hon. Members can mention other centres of great technological development that lead to lots of local start-ups in different areas. All or many of them may be caught by the provisions of the Bill, and that is a concern, but our amendments have been tabled to put in place parliamentary scrutiny.

Parliamentary scrutiny of the call-in process should be, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon said, upstream of the actual call-in notification. This is about the definitions of the sectors to ensure upstream scrutiny. Small businesses, particularly start-ups, seek finance, often foreign investment. There are enough barriers in their way and we do not want to create more unnecessarily, but our amendments are about clarifying and ensuring the robustness of the definitions before they hit the coalface of our small businesses and start-ups, whose interests I want to protect. The Opposition are champions of small businesses, are we not?

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Indeed we are. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I reiterate that what we propose is, through consultation, removing bottlenecks—the key word in the intervention from hon. Member for South Ribble. By improving consultation and ensuring that we have the best possible expertise, we will make the Secretary of State’s life easier, not more difficult. It is about removing bottlenecks, not adding them.

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Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank my hon. Friend for his eloquence. I reiterate that we are looking to make the Secretary of State’s life easier. We hope that, in the not-too-distant future, a Labour Member will be in that position. Our guiding principle is that we want every clause to be as effective as possible and our amendments are designed to make the Bill work as effectively as possible.

Andrew Bowie Portrait Andrew Bowie
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I suggest that, in seeking to make the Secretary of State’s life easier, the Opposition are making the life of the Intelligence and Security Committee much more difficult. On current projections, there could be more than 1,000 call-in notices a year. That would make the ISC’s job almost impossible to do alongside all its other important work throughout the rest of the year.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I think the hon. Member and I have the same aims, and we are looking to make the process work as effectively as possible. The Intelligence and Security Committee has clearly said that this is an area in which it can make an important contribution. Further, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon so eloquently said, this is about putting in additional security upstream. I do not envisage—I think I am right in saying this—that these measures would result in the Intelligence and Security Committee reviewing 1,800 call-in notifications; this is about putting in place the ISC’s expertise and scrutiny upstream.

Mark Garnier Portrait Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am listening, or trying to—perhaps it would be helpful if we turned the volume up a bit. The hon. Lady is asking Parliament to form part of the process of being the Government, when surely the purpose of Parliament is to scrutinise the Government’s work, rather than doing their work for them. That is why I am finding her arguments quite troubling. Will she explain why she thinks Parliament should be doing the work of the Government, not just scrutinising the Government?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

That is a really interesting point, and we could debate for some time the nature of the Government—the Executive—and the role of Parliament. So as not to exhaust your patience, Mr Twigg, I will just say that the role of Parliament is to scrutinise Government, but our proposal is actually about scrutinising decisions that the Government are taking—for example, the definition of the 17 sectors in the amendment that we are considering. I do not want to put words in the hon. Gentleman’s mouth, but I think his argument is that that parliamentary scrutiny should take place only after myriad companies have complained that the definitions are far too broad. We are trying constructively to find a balance on this important question, but I want to draw that balance in the interests of national security, small businesses and our business community who have to work with these definitions.

Mark Garnier Portrait Mark Garnier
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Some of the work of the International Trade Committee carries across to this argument. That Committee’s job is to scrutinise on behalf of Parliament the trade deals that are going through; we have just had the first example of that in the Japanese trade deal. The work of a Select Committee, which is what the hon. Lady is talking about, is to help to inform Parliament and to enable it to scrutinise the Government properly. I am worried that with this amendment, she is asking Parliament to be part of the process of the work of the Government. That is where the amendments become rather confusing. It is important that Parliament scrutinises thoroughly what is done, but it must be independent. What it must not do is to participate in the Government’s work by doing some of that work in its scrutiny.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Perhaps I do not quite understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, because we propose that the Intelligence and Security Committee should provide that scrutiny. The scrutiny that the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee provides is necessarily limited to business. At the centre of this is the fact that we are putting in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy a key issue of national security. Is it not right that those who have expertise and experience in security, as opposed to international trade or business, should be part of that?

Mark Garnier Portrait Mark Garnier
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Lady is being very kind in giving me a chance to come back on this. Surely we should not be putting a duty of Parliament in a Bill. It is up to parliamentarians to decide what we do on scrutiny, and we should not have that in a Bill or enact it in law; we should be doing it anyway.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I am struggling to see how that would happen. How would Parliament, after the Bill becomes law, decide that the Intelligence and Security Committee, as opposed to or in addition to the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, should have a role. How would that happen in practice?

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

There are plenty of examples of Select Committees getting involved in the upstream work of Government—for example, giving feedback on White Papers. Parliament and its Select Committees consistently get involved in the work of Government in that context.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I am happy to give way again.

Mark Garnier Portrait Mark Garnier
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The point is that that is not on the face of legislation. All the Select Committees do this work incredibly well, but they do not have to be told on the face of a Bill to do it. Parliament does it anyway, so I wonder why the amendment is necessary.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, because I think we are getting to the nub of it. The amendment is necessary because, as I outlined, there is an inherent conflict of interest within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy with regard to foreign investment and national security. In addition, there is a need for security-cleared knowledge. I do not know the security clearance of the current members of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, but I doubt it is at the same level as the members of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

Katherine Fletcher Portrait Katherine Fletcher
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Will the hon. Lady give way?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I will.

Katherine Fletcher Portrait Katherine Fletcher
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Sorry, I nearly put my hand in the air then—I am still new. Listening to the debate, I was reflecting on the efficiency of the process. We must make sure we do not put Parliament within an operational procedure. Does that not also apply to amendment 3 and the idea of a pre-emptory notification? Is the hon. Lady not seeking to put together some kind of ethereal multi-agency association, when all that is really needed is a phone call to a team of people who are security cleared within BEIS? Does she accept that point?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

The hon. Lady makes a good point, in that much would be solved by the appropriate phone call at the appropriate time. Had Sir Richard Dearlove been phoned by the right person when the Huawei acquisition was going through, that issue would have been solved. Whichever Government are in power, we are continuously looking for ways to ensure a more joined-up approach to government.

Given the importance of national security—I think we can all agree that national security is the first duty of Government—and given the reality of the conflicting pressures on Departments, I think these proposals to improve scrutiny by involving a multi-agency approach are necessary. I also point the hon. Lady to the approach of the US Government, who have found this to be necessary, as have others of our allies. With that, I will make some progress.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Order. I think it is important that we stick to the amendments we are discussing.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I will follow your guidance, Mr Twigg.

Under the amendments, the Government would have to publish notifiable acquisition regulations to define sectors and notification rules in greater detail. From time to time, those sectors and rules will need to change, with new regulations made to keep up with changing technological, security and geopolitical risks, as we have discussed. To guard our security, not all those risks should be discussed in public, but the need for change and for sensitivity does not preclude the need for accountability—a point I have made a number of times. In other areas of national security, the ISC holds the Government to account through proper scrutiny and with access to sensitive information. It is only right that we bring the same scrutiny to bear here, on matters of critical national security.

The amendment would bring ISC scrutiny to notifiable acquisition regulations specifically up-front of any decision to call in or notify, so ensuring that these major powers consistently act to protect our national security. Again, that is an important point. Significant powers are being given to the Secretary of State to protect our national security. It is right that we should have security input into the definition of these sectors.

In his oral evidence, Professor Martin, the former head of our National Cyber Security Centre, said:

“I think that the powers should be fairly broad”,

but

“there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 81, Q96.]

We need to ensure that flexibility does not allow the Government too much scope, so flexibility must go hand in hand with accountability and transparency. The ISC, critically, has the skills, security clearance and expertise to provide that scrutiny and accountability.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg, and to speak on this important Bill. I am grateful for the congratulations—or perhaps commiserations!—of the shadow Minister and all colleagues on my new role as the vaccines delivery Minister. I am obviously focused on the NSI Bill now, but I am also conscious of my responsibility for delivery, and I had a very good conversation with the devolved Administrations last night.

I hope that the Committee agrees that the Second Reading debate and the evidence sessions last week demonstrated the importance both of this legislation and of getting it right. I again place on record my thanks to the Opposition parties for the constructive way in which they have approached the Bill thus far, and I look forward to discussing the amendments that they have tabled to this part of the Bill.

Amendment 3 requires the Secretary of State to assess a multi-agency review or recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Committee before issuing a call-in notice. I remind hon. Members that it is vital for the Government to have the necessary powers fully to scrutinise acquisitions of control over entities and assets that may pose national security risks. To enable this, clause 1 gives the Secretary of State power to issue a call-in notice when he or she reasonably suspects that a trigger event has taken place, or is in progress or contemplation, and that that has given rise to, or may give rise to, a national security risk. It is entirely reasonable, as Committee Members have said, to want the Secretary of State to make full use of expertise across Government and Parliament to run the most effective and proportionate regime that he or she can. The amendment aims to recognise that.

To explain why the amendment would not achieve that noble aim, it would be helpful briefly to summarise the overall screening process. First, businesses and investors can notify the Secretary of State of trigger events of potential national security concern. In certain parts of some sectors, notification by the acquirer will be mandatory. Following a notification, the Secretary of State will have a maximum of 30 working days to decide whether to call in a trigger event to scrutinise it for national security concerns. For non-notified acquisitions, the Secretary of State may call in a completed trigger event within six months of becoming aware of it, both on a case-by-case basis and when developing his overall approach. The Secretary of State intends to draw on a wide variety of expertise from across, and potentially beyond, Government as is appropriate.

If the Secretary of State calls in a trigger event, there will be a detailed review. At the end of the review, the Secretary of State may impose any remedies that he reasonably considers necessary and proportionate to address any national security risk that has been identified. The Bill gives the Secretary of State 30 working days to conduct an assessment, but this may be extended for a further 45 working days if a legal test is met, and then for a further period or periods with the agreement of the acquirer. The purpose of the initial assessment of whether a trigger event should be called in is not to conduct a detailed review of the entire case, or to determine whether the trigger event in question gives rise, or would give rise, to a risk to national security. That comes later. It is simply a preliminary assessment of whether the trigger event warrants a full assessment. Prohibiting the Secretary of State from calling in a trigger event until a multi-agency review has taken place, or the Intelligence and Security Committee has provided a recommendation, could severely upset the process – as we heard eloquently from my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I thank the Minister for giving way and again congratulate him on his new role. I also thank him for his constructive tone. I sense a contradiction in the point he is making. He is saying that the Business Secretary will call on a wide range of advice and expertise, but that if he is required to call on a wide range of advice and expertise, it will upset the process.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
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What I am trying to get at is the point made so eloquently by my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble—the bottleneck issue. It is unlikely that adding this review, or requirement for a recommendation at the stage where the Secretary of State is assessing whether to issue a call-in notice, would be feasible within the 30-day window following the notification.

I remind the Committee that the Government’s impact assessment estimates that there will be at least 1,000 notifications every year. As my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble said, under this amendment, every single one would need a multi-agency review or an Intelligence and Security Committee recommendation, which would be a truly massive and, in my view, unfeasible undertaking.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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The review would be required before issuing a call-in notice. The impact assessment mentioned about 1,830 notifications, but only 90 call-in notices. It is not accurate to say that the amendment would require about 1,800 reviews. It is only for those that would lead to a call-in notice, which is a much lower number.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
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We can debate the number, but the issue is one of delay and bottlenecks. It could mean that the Secretary of State was timed out of calling in potentially harmful acquisitions and of imposing any national security remedies. Alternatively, if the initial assessment period following a notification was extended beyond 30 working days, which is not currently possible under the Bill, that could reduce certainty for businesses, which I know the hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Aberavon were also concerned about. Any delay to remedies addressing national security risks would be a problem. However, I assure hon. Members that the Secretary of State will eagerly seek expertise and advice from a wide range of sources, and we will work together to safeguard our national security. Having a slick and efficient call-in process is vital to that.

Amendment 4 seeks to require the Secretary of State to consult the Intelligence and Security Committee prior to publishing a statement on the exercise of the call-in power, known as the statement of policy intent. Clause 4 requires the Secretary of State to carry out such a consultation on a draft of the statement as he thinks appropriate, and to take into account the response to any such consultation during the drafting process. That process could include engagement with interested parties across the House, and I am delighted to learn that such esteemed colleagues as members of the ISC might wish to discuss the statement in detail. Parliament has been provided with the first draft of the statement, and we would welcome its view on its content.

I draw attention to the fact that clause 4 requires the Secretary of State to lay the statement before Parliament, as my brilliant hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine rightly pointed out. If either House resolves not to approve the statement within 40 sitting days, the Secretary of State must withdraw it. That provides Parliament, including members of the ISC, with plenty of opportunity to influence and scrutinise the contents of the statement, which I believe is the aim of the amendment and which I am therefore not able to accept.

Amendment 5 would require the Secretary of State to notify the Intelligence and Security Committee prior to making regulations under clause 6 and to enable the Committee to respond with recommendations. I welcome the contributions made by many members of the ISC on Second Reading, and I have since written to the Committee Chair, who unfortunately was unable to attend, to follow up on a number of the recommendations made by his colleagues.

Clause 6 defines the circumstances covered by mandatory notification. The Bill calls them “notifiable acquisitions” on the basis that they must be notified and cleared by the Secretary of State before they can take place.

Members are aware that any modern investment screening regime must provide sufficient flexibility for the Government to examine a broad range of circumstances, bearing in mind the increasingly novel way in which acquisitions are being constructed and hostile actors are pursuing their ends. The regime needs to be able to respond and adapt quickly. Regulations made under the clause will be subject to parliamentary approval through the draft affirmative procedure, giving Members ample opportunity to ensure that mandatory notification and clearance regimes work effectively.

The draft affirmative procedure means that regulations may not be made unless a draft has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House. I am pleased to advise esteemed members of the ISC that in developing the regulations the Secretary of State will take the greatest care, and will consult as widely as is judged appropriate, while ensuring he is able to act as quickly as needed. I see no need for a formal consultation mechanism. Indeed, such a mechanism between the Committee and the Secretary of State would be unprecedented.

For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept the amendments, and I hope that the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central will not press them.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I thank the Minister for his response and the generally constructive tone with which he laid out the aims of the amendments and the reasons he did not feel able to accept them.

There is, however, as I suggested in an intervention, a sense of the Minister playing both sides at once. He says that the scrutiny proposed in the amendments, by the ISC and through the multi-agency approach, should take place, but that it would be wrong to require it because it will take place. The hon. Member for South Ribble said that the challenges and the need for input scrutiny could be addressed by the right phone call at the right time. That is true, but there are many reasons why that might not happen. For example, the Minister might be looking at vaccine delivery at the time the phone call was being made. We therefore propose the amendments to ensure that that input, scrutiny and expertise are in the Bill.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
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It is vital that the Government have the powers necessary fully to scrutinise acquisitions and control over entities and assets that might pose national security risks. The Bill refers to such acquisitions as trigger events.

The clause therefore gives the Secretary of State the power to issue a call-in notice when he or she reasonably suspects that such a trigger event has taken place or is in progress or contemplation and it has given rise to, or may give rise to, a national security risk.

The parameters of the call-in powers will give the Secretary of State sufficient flexibility to examine potentially sensitive acquisitions connected to the United Kingdom while ensuring they may be used only for national security reasons. The Committee will note that in the acquisition of or control over businesses, unlike in the Enterprise Act, there are no minimum thresholds for market share or turnover.

Why is that necessary? It is necessary because acquisitions of small businesses at the start of their ascendancy can harm our national security, particularly if they involve the kind of cutting edge, world-leading technology for which this country is known. Although there is a broad range of scenarios in which the power may be used, of course, most trigger events will not be called in, as they will not raise national security concerns.

Examples of those that may be more likely to be called in include a person acquiring control over an entity that operates part of our critical national infrastructure; a person acquiring the right to use sensitive, cutting-edge intellectual property; and boardroom changes that mean that a person acquires material influence over the policy of a key Government supplier. Clauses 5 to 12 and schedule 1 set that out in detail.

Call-in notices may be issued in relation to trigger events that are in contemplation or in progress, as well as those that have already taken place. That will ensure that potential national security risks can be examined at any stage of the process rather than, for example, waiting until a transaction has taken place or is nearing completion, when it is more difficult for the parties involved to make any changes that may be required. It is envisaged that, in most circumstances, call-in notices will be issued after the Secretary of State has received a notification about a trigger event from an involved party, but it is also important that the Secretary of State retains the ability to call in trigger events where no such notification has been received. The limits for issuing a call-in notice are set out in clause 2.

The Government are committed to ensuring that businesses have as much clarity as possible when it comes to the use of this power. We heard in the evidence session about the need for real clarity for businesses, so the Bill is proportionate. The Secretary of State may not, therefore, exercise the power until he publishes a statement for the purposes of clause 3, setting out how he expects to use the power. The Secretary of State must have regard to the statement before giving a call-in notice. A draft of the statement was published when the Bill was introduced. I do not intend to anticipate our discussions in respect of the statement when we move on to clauses 3 and 4, but I am confident that it will provide reassurance that the Secretary of State intends to exercise the call-in powers in a measured and considered way.

Hon. Members will appreciate, though, that it would not be responsible, given that national security may be at stake, for the Secretary of State to be restricted to exercising the power only in the circumstances envisaged in the statement. The purpose of the statement is, after all, to set out how the Secretary of State expects to exercise the call-in power, not to give binding assurances. That is why clause 1 specifies that nothing in the statement limits the power of the Secretary of State to give a call-in notice, though I reiterate that I expect the vast majority of call-in notices to be issued in accordance with the expectations set out in the statement.

I hope that hon. Members will agree that clause 1, alongside clauses 2, 3 and 4, enables the Government to carry out a vital assessment of relevant trigger events in a measured and effective way.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I thank the Minister for his remarks on clause 1 stand part and for setting out the Bill’s aims and ambitions. We largely agree with those aims and ambitions, and in that spirit I will give further clarity on the Opposition’s overall position. We stand in support of the need for the Bill, and indeed we sought it years ago. We support the need for the new powers to protect our national security, as set out by the Minister, and the need for those new powers in the context of changing technological, commercial and geopolitical realities. Our approach to the Bill is therefore one of constructive challenge and is guided by three principles, the first being the security of our citizens. We do not want narrow legal definitions. Our proposed amendment to clause 1 would have ensured broad input into the considerations, such that our national security was not threatened as a result of insufficient expert advice or by the pure, ministerial market ideology of recent record. Our group of amendments sought to bring legal powers, multi-agency expertise and proper decision making to bear in putting British security first.

There has already been significant discussion of the right national security powers, both on Second Reading and in the Committee evidence sessions. An essential part of that discussion has been focused on the merits of giving the Government powers to protect our national security by using a public interest test. There are understandable concerns that too broad a test might result in a drop in investment for the UK’s start-ups and businesses, and these concerns note an economic challenge in expanding our national security powers. At the same time, however, there is widespread agreement that national security and economic security are not entirely separate. They are deeply linked. A national security expert told us that a narrow focus on direct technologies of defence, for example, was mistaken, and that we should look at the defence of technologies that seem economically strategic today and might become more strategic in future.

Our concern is that we have a Government who are years behind our allies in even contemplating the new national security investment regime. We have seen only 12 national security screenings in 18 years, and not a single instance of the Government acting decisively to block a takeover and guard our national security. In the context of what other countries are doing and how rapidly technologies progress from being economically strategic to becoming security threats, we must not just consider a narrow national security test, but pursue a road to sovereign technological capability and much more ambitious and robust routes to protecting national security and strategic interests. The Opposition will therefore put the security of our citizens first. We will not shy away from regaining national sovereign capability, and we assure our citizens that Britain will have the technology and the capability to protect its national security.

In scrutinising the Bill and this clause, we will champion clarity and support for our prized SMEs and innovative start-ups—the engine of British jobs and British prosperity. We have already heard from market participants that the Government’s belated rush with this Bill has created huge uncertainty and concern over the ability of BEIS to operate the new investment screening regime that the Minister set out. The Government’s impact assessment notes that 80% of transactions in the scope of mandatory notification will be by SMEs. We heard from our expert witnesses that the impact assessment fails to account for the costs faced by the acquired companies, and for the overall impact on funding for our start-ups. The Opposition will not turn a blind eye to those costs for our small and medium-sized enterprises. At each step, the Opposition will plug gaps left by the Government in coherent policy making, to champion British creativity and innovation. It is the least our small and medium-sized enterprises deserve.

Finally, we will stand for effective scrutiny of the Government of the day. That is why we tabled the amendment, which has unfortunately not been accepted by the Committee. However, we will find proportionate, robust and democratically legitimate means of seeking accountable action to protect our national security. Our amendments will stand up for British security, and for competent and coherent decision making. Clearly, we regret the Committee’s decision on our amendment, but we will not oppose the clause standing part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Further provision about call-in notices

National Security and Investment Bill (Sixth sitting) Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Department of Health and Social Care

National Security and Investment Bill (Sixth sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 1st December 2020

(3 years, 3 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 1 December 2020 - (1 Dec 2020)
Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
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Our amendment was genuinely intended to be helpful, to try to ensure that what we see as a loophole is closed. The Minister has indicated that, in his view, that loophole would be closed at the expense of uncertainty in company land, as it were—uncertainty for those companies that might be subject to this procedure.

The circumstances that would see this amendment put into action—I have outlined some possible circumstances—would be very rare; only circumstances in which things had changed very substantially, in terms of global interest in particular areas of our economy, or circumstances in which information that could have been supplied was not supplied, and not because there was an intention to be malicious or misleading, but because people did not get to the bottom of something first time around. In those circumstances, companies would perhaps anticipate that that change might happen, and certainly if there were substantial global changes in who was interested in what, then companies would also anticipate that to a considerable extent. I do not share the Minister’s view that the amendment would place companies in general in a state of uncertainty.

The additional assistance that the amendment would provide to make the process watertight should be taken seriously. However, I hear what the Minister has said and appreciate that a balance has to be achieved between different arrangements so that they are satisfactory both for national security and for company wellbeing and development—I am sorry that he has perhaps come down slightly further on one side than on the other in his appraisal of amendment 10. However, I appreciate what he has said and therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Statement about exercise of call-in power

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
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I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 3, page 3, line 1, leave out “may” and insert “shall”.

This amendment would make it obligatory for the Secretary of State to include certain matters in a statement about his/her exercise of the call-in power.

None Portrait The Chair
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With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 2, in clause 3, page 3, line 9, at end insert—

“(d) the Secretary of State’s definition of the scope of what constitutes national security.”

This amendment provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of a call-in power may include his/her definition of national security.

Amendment 9, in clause 3, page 3, line 9, at end insert—

“(d) details of the resource allocated annually to reviews of national security assessments guiding call-in decisions, including specific headcount, skillsets and review caseload figures.”

This amendment provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of a call-in power may include details of the resources allocated to reviews of national security assessments within BEIS.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again, Sir Graham. Amendment 1 would make it obligatory for the Secretary of State to include certain matters in the statement about his or her exercise of the call-in power. As we have said on a number of occasions, the Bill gives major powers to the Secretary of State and marks a significant shift in the UK’s merger control process. It is worth emphasising that. It is important to make sure that that shift is done in a transparent and accountable way. The Bill is critical for our national economy and our national security. There is a great deal of uncertainty and there is no definition of national security, and I will come to that point later.

There is a great deal of latitude in the powers, but the Bill attempts to mitigate that by indicating that the Government may publish a statement setting out the scope of their call-in powers. That statement would include details of which sectors are especially under focus, details of trigger events, and details of factors that may be considered by the Secretary of State as part of an intervention. That transparency is welcome, as far as it goes, but we believe that it should go further. As Professor Martin said of the powers, in his expert evidence,

“there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms, so that there is assurance that they are being fairly and sparingly applied.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 81, Q96.]

The Government consultation responses list some detail on the scope of call-in powers but not on a clear final statement of scope. There is no detail on sectors, trigger events and, critically, factors considered under national security. The statutory statement of policy intent—in its current draft version—is woefully lacking in detail. Amendments 1 and 2 are designed to ensure that greater clarity is given about the Secretary of State’s intent. In particular, amendment 2 includes a definition of national security.

There was a good deal of debate during the evidence sessions—I see the Minister nodding—about defining national security. Certainly, I found it a very good and informative debate, hearing from a wide range of experts with different levels of experience in different aspects of national security, from Sir Richard Dearlove to academics, and their views on the importance of and the concerns with defining national security.

Sir Richard Dearlove said that he would certainly see a definition of national security as

“advantageous, because it defines a clear area where you start and from which you can make judgments about the involvement of foreign firms being given space or activity in those areas. That is not a bad idea at all, actually.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 25, Q31.]

David Offenbach said:

“National security is not defined in the Bill, which I actually approve of, because once it becomes too closely indicated, then it is not easy to decide what should be in it, or what should not be in it. I would like to see a definition that includes what Lord Heseltine said when Melrose took over GKN, that research and development should be a subject of importance; it should be included.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 99, Q106.]

He also said:

“The only way to make sure that something does not slip through the net is to have a slightly wider definition. There is no definition of national security itself in the Bill, which is perhaps why strategic, research and development, innovation or other issues should be brought in. Then one can be quite sure one has not accidentally lost an asset where there are national security issues.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 105, Q130.]

As I have referred to on a number of occasions, I think the loss of DeepMind to Google and of the Centre for Integrated Photonics to Huawei show that we can lose strategic assets through a lack of clarity about what might constitute a national security threat. Amendment 2

“provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of a call-in power may”—

not “must”—

“include his/her definition of national security.”

We are trying very hard to reflect the advice from certain experts that too closely defining national security would limit the powers of the Secretary of State, would not allow it to evolve with the threats and would give indications that could in some respects be gamed, but at the same time we are trying to address the vacuum that no definition creates. That vacuum risks creating major uncertainty for businesses and arbitrary powers for politicians to intervene without appropriate scope for that intervention.

We discussed earlier the conflict of interests between the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy welcoming foreign investment and the national security interests perhaps saying that there should not be foreign investment. That is especially challenging in the light of the major increases in interventions expected—as we have heard, we expect to go from 12 interventions to 1,830.

We believe strongly that we owe our citizens and businesses clarity on what will guide this increased intervention, but it is also right for the Government to retain flexibility for action and not to have their hands tied with a precise, narrow definition of national security, as security risks change due to technological, economic and geopolitical changes. Indeed, that is why we have needed this legislation for some years now, and why Labour has been calling for it.

The amendment again seeks to make the Secretary of State’s life easier, by encouraging him—or her, in the future—to provide guidance on the factors that might form part of national security assessments. That would not tie the Government’s hands by ruling anything out; it simply asks them to guide businesses with clarity on the sort of factors that might matter, giving flexibility to the Government and clarity to our small and medium-sized enterprises in particular.

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Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
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Just to add to the argument that my hon. Friend is making in her very eloquent manner, this is also about having a smart approach to regulation, whereby we do not take a one-size-fits-all approach but recognise that there is a hierarchy of risks. By pointing out in the definition of national security what key factors make up that definition, we will point both the business community and the Secretary of State to that hierarchy of risks and make sure that there is additional screening, monitoring and assessment of those risks where they are considered to be higher because they contain the factors in the definition.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. As a past employee of a regulator, Ofcom, he really appeals to my sense of regulatory best practice in speaking as he does about the importance of smart regulation that is not tied to narrowly defined legalistic definitions of national security but allows, as he says, a hierarchy of assessment of the different interests. We all need to take responsibility for doing everything we can to ensure that kind of smart judgment can be made by small businesses. We encourage giving as much guidance as possible—I see the Minister nodding, so I hope that he will be receptive to the amendment.

Finally, amendment 9 would mandate Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy unit resourcing updates. I will speak briefly to amendment 9, because I know that other hon. Members wish to speak to it. This amendment provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of call-in power may include details of the resources allocated to reviews of national security within BEIS.

The driving thought behind this, again, is to ensure that the Secretary of State’s life is made as easy as possible by consistently looking at the resources available to do this very complex and difficult job, particularly given that we are transitioning, as one witness put it, from a standing start to potentially thousands of notifications.

Sam Tarry Portrait Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship so soon again, Sir Graham. Following on from the eloquent exposition of those last two amendments by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, I would like to focus on amendment 9. The amendment is simple. It tries to help the Government help themselves.

Amendment 9 provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of a call-in power may include details of the resources allocated through reviews of national security within BEIS. We know that this is a significant and large change that the Department will have to absorb. For that to be effective—in whatever state the Bill ends up passing through Parliament—there will clearly be a need for proper resource allocation and for Parliament to scrutinise that process.

The Bill transforms the UK’s merger control processes. It locates the merger control processes away from the Competition and Markets Authority, which is a new development. The CMA had a history of experience of overseeing those sorts of processes. At the moment, there is no such expertise in BEIS.

While massively expanding the scope of the intervention, as my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said, moving from only 12 national security interventions in 18 years to potentially over 1,800 is such a significant step change, so it will be important for Parliament to have the ability to monitor that. It is unprecedented. The Government have neither a precedent nor a plan—none has come forward with the notes to this Bill—to assure the House of how the shift will be managed. That is why we felt it was important to put forward this amendment.

I believe this amendment has support on both sides of the House. Crucially, hon. Members across the House have raised legitimate concerns about the capacity and capability that will be required to manage this major shift. My colleague from the Transport Committee, Greg Clark, said,

“It is an enormous challenge for the Department to set up a new unit, especially since the current regime…has dealt with a very small number of transactions each year.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 228.]

Similarly, James Wild said,

“It is crucial that the structures and resources are put in place to ensure that the timetables for review and assessment in the Bill are actually met.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 266.]

I think both of those points are extremely pertinent.

I do not see this as a controversial amendment. I think it is important to allow the Bill, once passed, to function effectively and with proper oversight. It also provides the appropriate scrutiny, ensuring that this critical part of our national and economic security functions effectively and efficiently. I am sure that in amendments to come we will debate where the balance should be between economic freedoms and our responsibility to safeguard our citizens. But clearly, on the simple idea put forward in this amendment, the Government will have to be transparent about the capability and capacity of BEIS on investment security, as many other countries around the world do.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful for the hon. Member’s contribution. Of course, no Government can tie the hands of future Governments, if that is his argument.

Moving on, I commend hon. Members for their interest in the process and function of the regime, made clear through amendment 9, which provides for additions to the statement about the exercise of the call-in power. It aims to ensure that the regime created by the Bill is properly resourced with the right numbers of skilled staff. The hon. Member for Ilford South was thoughtful in his concern about that. However, I would say to him and other Members that the purpose of the statement is to set out how the Secretary of State expects to exercise the power to give a call-in notice. It will provide information on the types of scenarios where the Secretary of State may consider there to be a national security risk. It would not be appropriate to add details about how the regime will be staffed.

Furthermore, internal arrangements on resource and skills are a matter for the Secretary of State and, of course, the permanent secretary at BEIS. I reassure hon. Members, however, that the Bill compels—this is the lever for Parliament, in my view—the Secretary of State to publish an annual report, which will provide information on the number of mandatory notices accepted and rejected, the number of voluntary notifications accepted and rejected, and the number of call-in notices and final orders made. That review is incredibly important in measuring performance. The exact details and requirements for the annual report are set out in clause 61. I will not go through all of them.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendments and hope that Opposition Members feel able to withdraw them.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for his response. I particularly thank my hon. Friends for the points that they have raised. My hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South set out the importance of reporting on resourcing. I am disappointed that the Minister could not accept that amendment. He said that it was not appropriate to include details of resourcing and staffing. I point him in the direction of the Government’s misinformation unit, which was set up to grand acclaim in order to address that important issue. As the Minister for vaccines, he will have a strong interest in the effectiveness of misinformation, which could harm our wellbeing and future return to normality.

That unit was set up. Written parliamentary questions that I tabled revealed that it had no full-time staff or full-time equivalents, and we see a resultant lack of action on misinformation. I make that point to counter the Minister’s assertion that it is not important to have details on resourcing reported. On the contrary, our experience in Parliament and the civil service suggests that it is what is resourced that will get done, with the appropriate skill and care. With such a great number of cases, and such a great change in the scope of takeover and acquisition legislation that the Bill represents, reporting on resourcing is very important.

I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South for such intriguing and at times amusing oratory on the importance of a single word in the right place.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Southampton, Test.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I am sorry. Southampton, Test.

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I quite like it.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

My hon. Friend intends to stay where he is. I thank him for his oratory on the importance of the single word “may”. Something has been lost in translation between ourselves and the Clerks, in that there was originally an intention to address the first “may” with regard to publishing the statement. The Minister says that we do not need that to become a “shall” because it will be published but rejects the notion of it becoming “shall” despite the fact that it will be published. I leave it to the Committee to decide on the holes in that logic.

I am sure that the Minister was not deliberately trying to misinterpret what we were saying, but we made it clear that we are not looking for a precise and narrow definition of national security; we are looking for broad indications or guidance. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon said in citing how the US does it, we are looking for a sense of what is taken into consideration with regard to national security. I would only plead with the Minister to recognise the circumstances of so many small businesses, start-ups and investors in trying to understand what the Secretary of State will take into account. This is intended not to define it narrowly, but to give a sense of what will be taken into account as we move into this new regime that is so vastly different. Because these amendments are important and significant, I intend to press them.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

We must now deal formally with amendments 2 and 9, which can either be pressed to a Division or withdrawn.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I would like to press amendment 2 but withdraw amendment 9. I would like to hear the Committee specifically on national security.

Amendment proposed: 2, in clause 3, page 3, line 9, at end insert—

“(d) the Secretary of State’s definition of the scope of what constitutes national security.”—(Chi Onwurah.)

This amendment provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of a call-in power may include his/her definition of national security.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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In our current climate, that certainty would allow the Bill to serve its purpose in safeguarding our national security while at the same time maintaining Britain as an attractive destination to invest in and to do business.
Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South for moving the amendment. The Committee must support the aims of the amendment and the implementation of the requirement to publish guidance for potential acquirers and other interested parties separate from the policy intent statement. My hon. Friend set out the importance of avoiding uncertainty and of providing certainty for companies and businesses that might come into the scope of this Bill.

Now is perhaps the time to highlight a failing of the Bill and the impact statement, in that the focus is on the acquirers—those who will acquire companies or shares through transactions. The explanatory notes explain why that is the case: because a trigger event might take two or three separate transactions to complete, such as acquiring a 25% interest, so it has to be on the acquirers to make the notification. I understand that, but I think the impact statement dramatically underestimates—in fact, it does not make an estimate—the impact that will have on those being acquired.

By that, I think particularly of small start-ups—our small, innovative new ventures and new enterprises, perhaps spun out from universities or other institutions. As they seek finance to grow and to thrive and to make further discoveries and innovations, they will have to give a lot of consideration to the provisions in the Bill. To be frank, as all of us who have worked in small businesses know, time is at a premium, as is access to legal advice. Small start-ups need this kind of guidance easily and readily available. I fail to understand why the Minister would not want the Department to provide this guidance specifically to companies, separate from the policy intent statement. I support my hon. Friend’s amendment.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Amendment 11 would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance in relation to the Bill and regulations made under it within six months of Royal Assent. The hon. Member for Ilford South raised an important issue and I welcome the opportunity to discuss the Government’s plan for communicating the application of the proposed new regime, including the requirements that would or might be imposed on persons. It is important that appropriate steps are taken to make such persons aware of the requirements that would or might be placed on them. I have used “persons” here deliberately as it is the correct term, but I wish to make it clear that that includes acquirers.

First, the Government have published factsheets on the digital platform .gov that make clear what the measures in the proposed legislation are and who they apply to. The factsheet “Process for Business” sets out step by step what steps persons must or may need to take to ensure compliance with the regime. Secondly, we have set up the email address investment.screening@beis.gov.uk specifically for the purpose of providing advice on what may be in scope of the NSI regime for persons to contact to ensure that they properly understand the proposed regime. Of course, the Government believe that the Bill does not require any adjustment but should adjustments happen as it passes the scrutiny of this House and the other place, then any adjustments that affect persons would be reflected in the factsheets.

Thirdly, the Government have published and will continue to publish guidance alongside key documents in the Bill. Hon. Members will, for example, be able to review the information likely to be required for notifications online, as well as draft guidance. It is our intention to complete similar such guidance wherever it would be beneficial to parties. I hope that that provides sufficient reassurance for the hon. Member for Ilford, South and the shadow Minister that the Government are thinking carefully, and will continue to think carefully, about how to ensure that all parties who need to understand the measure are able to. For the reasons that I have set out, I cannot accept the amendment and I hope that the hon. Member for Ilford, South will withdraw it.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I hope that hon. Members will recognise that the Government are committed to providing as much clarity and predictability as possible for business on the use of the new investment screening regime provided for in the Bill. Clause 3 is the third clause related to the call-in power, and concerns the statement of policy intent. Colleagues will remember that clause 1 requires that, prior to the use of the call-in power provided for in that clause, the Secretary of State must publish and not withdraw a statement that sets out how they expect to use the call-in power.

The Secretary of State was pleased to publish a draft of that statement alongside the Bill to enable hon. Members, businesses and, indeed, the general public to review the approach he expects to take. As hon. Members will no doubt have seen, the draft statement contains details of what the Secretary of State is likely to be interested in when it comes to national security risks. It includes certain sectors of the economy and the types of entities, assets and acquisitions that may raise concerns.

Although it is crucial for investors to have confidence that there is as much transparency in the regime as possible, there is self-evidently a limit to how much the Government can disclose in that regard given that the regime deals explicitly with national security matters. Nevertheless, the draft statement goes into some detail about the factors that the Secretary of State expects to take into account when making a decision on whether to call in a trigger event. The statement will also be required to be reviewed at least every five years to reflect the changing national security landscape, although in practice it may be reviewed and updated more frequently.

Taken together, I hope that hon. Members will agree that the requirement for the Secretary of State to publish a statement of policy intent prior to use of the call-in power and the requirement to review it regularly provide a good level of transparency and guidance to businesses, while not disclosing our national security vulnerabilities, which of course hostile actors would be grateful to receive. The statement will provide valuable information for businesses and investors and help them, we believe, to determine whether they should submit a notification about their trigger event. I hope that hon. Members feel that I have sufficiently explained and justified the clause and its place in the Bill.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Clause 3 is critical, as it sets out the context in which the Secretary of State will exercise the important power to call in transactions. We have sought in our amendments to improve it. I accept the Minister’s response to and rejection of our amendments, and his belief that the clause provides for the guidance and clarity that businesses need. I would just say to him that it was the clear conclusion of just about every witness in the evidence sessions that greater clarity and understanding were required, and that to make this change was an immense mountain to climb.

In some respects, the Government could not give too much support and guidance, within the bounds of national security, to the many companies and persons who will be caught up in the measures. Having said that, given that it is an essential part of the Bill, which we support, we accept that the clause stand part.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Consultation and parliamentary procedure

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I turn now to clauses 5 and 10, alongside schedule 1, which set out much of the detail on the circumstances covered by the Bill. Clause 5 begins to set the scope of what may be called in by the Secretary of State by providing the overarching definitions of “trigger event” and “acquirer”. The Government are clear that these new powers should be sufficiently broad to cover potential risks to national security. Clause 5 sets out that the new regime is focused on the acquisition of control over both qualifying entities and assets. These acquisitions are collectively known as trigger events. I do not intend now to explore what does and does not qualify as an asset or entity. Instead, I would direct hon. Members to clause 7, which provides such definitions.

Following on logically, the person gaining such control is the acquirer, and to address a query raised on Second Reading by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), I should make clear that “person” includes both a body and an individual. Subsequent clauses explain the specific ways that control can be acquired for the purpose of the Bill, but this is a necessary clause to set the broad parameters of the regime. The trigger events within scope of the call-in power are defined in clauses 8 and 9 as acquisitions of control over qualifying entities and assets, but the Government consider that the Bill must supplement that by providing for interests or rights to be treated as held or acquired, and therefore for control to be acquired in certain circumstances, such as acquisitions involving indirect holdings or connected persons.

That is why clause 10, in combination with schedule 1, sets out various ways in which rights or interests are to be treated for the purposes of the Bill as being held or acquired, including, for example, joint arrangements with other parties. These edge cases are critical to ensuring that determined hostile actors cannot deliberately structure acquisitions in certain ways to avoid being covered by the regime. While many trigger events may be straightforward, direct acquisitions by a party without any connection to other persons involved in the target entity or asset, there may be broader factors that need to be taken into account when considering how control over an entity or asset may be held.

It may be that the ability to control the entity or asset is acquired, for example, as a result of arrangements between the acquirer and other shareholders or their relationship to other shareholders. The approach taken in schedule 1 broadly mirrors the concept of holding an interest in a company, already familiar in UK company law through the persons with significant control register, introduced in 2016.

Taking each in turn, paragraph 1 of schedule 1 defines joint interests, whereby two or more people holding an interest or right jointly are each treated as holding it. That means that any joint holdings of the acquirer will be taken into account when assessing whether control has been acquired over a qualifying entity or asset.

Paragraph 2 defines joint arrangements so that parties who arrange to exercise their rights jointly in a predetermined way—for example, to always vote together in a particular way—are each treated as holding the combined rights and interests of all the parties involved in such an arrangement. That is important to prevent hostile actors from being able to co-ordinate the acquisition and exercise of rights that might otherwise fall below the threshold of a trigger event.

Paragraph 3 defines indirect holdings, whereby a person holds an interest or right indirectly through a chain of entities, where each entity in the chain has a majority stake in the entity below it, the last of which holds the interest or right. We know that determined hostile actors are likely to seek to obscure their acquisitions through complex corporate structures, so it is vital that the Secretary of State can intervene in such circumstances.

Paragraph 4 simply stipulates that interests held by nominees for another are to be treated as held by the other, rather than the nominee. Paragraph 5 defines the circumstances in which rights are to be treated as held by a person who controls their exercise; this would cover, for example, instances where a person acquired a stake in an entity, but it was evident that they had an arrangement with a third party about how to exercise the rights that came with that stake.

Paragraphs 6 and 7 provide for the circumstances in which rights that are exercisable only in certain circumstances and rights attached to shares held by way of security are respectively to be treated as held, and mirror corresponding provisions in schedule 1A to the Companies Act 2006.

Paragraphs 8 to 10 define connected persons; as set out, connected persons are each to be treated as holding the combined rights or interests of both or all of them. That would cover, for example, shares in a company separately by a husband and wife or a brother and sister. Finally, paragraph 11 sets out that two or more persons sharing a common purpose are to be treated as holding the combined interests or rights for both or all. That would include two or more persons who co-ordinate their influence in relation to an entity or an asset, similar to joint arrangements. This will ensure that the Secretary of State is able to assess the impact of co-ordinated acquisitions.

Taken together, the concepts detailed in schedule 1 are a crucial part of ensuring that the new regime is flexible enough to deal with the complex reality of some acquisitions of control over entities and assets. Without these provisions, hostile actors could seek to take advantage of the gaps by structuring acquisitions in a way that would be out of scope of the regime, despite the very real risks that that might present. I trust that colleagues on both sides of the Committee want to ensure that the regime covers such cases suitably.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for his comments on clauses 5 and 10 and schedule 1, which are quite technical provisions designed to allow for the different ways in which control may be acquired over a qualifying entity or asset or a trigger event may occur. I shall not repeat what the Minister so ably set out, but simply say that we recognise the need to set out ways to mitigate the impact of hostile actors, as he put it, going to complex lengths to hide their interest in a qualifying asset or entity. However, having the powers and these definitions is not the same as actually using them. There have been several instances in which hostile actors have behaved in entirely transparent ways that we have not identified and prevented. While these provisions are necessary, we need to see the ways in which the Secretary of State will actively identify evolving risks even as they hide behind complex financial organisations.

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Will the Minister expand on some of the provisions in schedule 1, particularly as they relate to what might be a UK version of the case that I mentioned earlier concerning the US company that Dr Lenihan mentioned in his evidence? A company that had gone bankrupt had its assets, patents and employees bought up by what might have been conceived to be a hostile company in the US, in this case Huawei. If we imagine that happening in the UK, some questions arise about how schedule 1 is worded.

That sort of action might happen in a number of ways. It could be that a potentially hostile company buys up a failed, bankrupt company with the intention of making that company work again but so that it has control of its activities thereafter. Alternatively, the hostile company or organisation might want to buy up elements of the company not to make it work but to make off with the things that it wanted and then push the company further into liquidation. The company would not work but its assets and intellectual property would have passed into the hands of the other organisation.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest addressed the issue of the administrator’s acting on behalf of the creditors. The important point to focus on—I will happily write to the hon. Member for Southampton, Test after the sitting—is that ultimately, it is the acquirer. If a malign actor were come to acquire those assets, and it is notifiable as part of the 17 sectors, then the transaction is made void. That is the remedy, effectively, because the acquirer would have to come forward and make representations to the investment unit about why they are acquiring and get clearance.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test for the points that he is making. I wish to put to him, and effectively the Minister as well, an example which was raised yesterday in debate on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, with which I am intimately familiar as the collaboration is between Nortel, an equipment vendor for whom I worked in the past, and Huawei, on a project to develop new technology. When two entities come together and collaborate, which I do not think will meet any of the trigger events described here, but instead create something which has IP in it which is of value, how does that come under the provisions of the clauses and the schedule?

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

I have let everyone speak. I do not know whether there are any more answers that the Minister wants to offer.

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There is also an added element of urgency: the covid crisis will leave many British businesses distressed and vulnerable. They will be vulnerable to more hostile foreign takeovers, including those backed by state-owned enterprises and state-backed investment vehicles. When we talk about China, there is, of course, no difference between business and the state—business is the state. The Chinese Communist party has a membership of 90 million people. It is absolutely clear that any time a business takes a decision, regardless of whether it is ostensibly or nominally in the private sector, it is the CCP that makes the call. We are dealing with a situation in which our business community—distressed, vulnerable and potentially with huge cash-flow issues—is going to be susceptible to those kinds of hostile foreign takeovers.
Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

My hon. Friend is making an excellent point. In addition to the critical issue of the state of many small businesses after covid, there is Brexit. The low value of the pound means that our distressed assets will be cheaper on the global market.

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend makes a crucial point. As we have constantly said, this is about risk and the hierarchy of risks we face. Risk is always sensitive to what is happening in terms of the global economic outlook. As she rightly points out, Brexit and leaving the transition period will be a seismic event for our country. It will have a massive impact on our currency and the strength of the pound. Combining that with the covid situation means that we have to be careful. We have to be vigilant and ensure that we defend our national interest. That is why it is important that our mindset involves taking a holistic view of our national interest, particularly in the turbulent times in which we find ourselves. This is fundamentally about saying that our national security is not for sale. Our national security does not have a price tag, and it has to be the primary consideration.

With those contextual comments in mind, I move on to amendment 6, which considers a particular aspect of our economy. It focuses on the asset side of the ledger in terms of this Bill—namely, critical national infrastructure. Our amendment would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making notifiable acquisition regulations. Going back to China, it is remarkable how much of our critical national infrastructure is in the hands of Chinese enterprises or state-backed investment vehicles. This is happening now, right under our noses, and needs to be taken into account in discussing this amendment.

In essence, our amendment offers a way to ensure that critical national infrastructure is given particular and extra consideration in the national security and investment assessments within the regime. Given that the Bill fails to define national security, it does not, by definition, reference critical national infrastructure.

To drill down further, the Government’s consultation on the Bill lists the 17 sectors that might come under the regime’s mandatory notification process, but it does not explicitly list the UK’s critical national infrastructure. In fact, there is not a direct overlap. Five sectors are not included in the 17 that are in the consultation, but they are in our critical national infrastructure. The 17 range from advanced materials, advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, civil nuclear, communications, computing hardware, critical suppliers to Government, critical suppliers to the emergency services, cryptographic authentication, data infrastructure, data infrastructure, defence, energy, engineering biology, military and dual use, quantum technology, satellite and space technologies, to transport. However, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure defines 13 areas as critical national infrastructure, including several sectors that are not included in the 17: food, Government more broadly––not just critical suppliers––health, space and water.

If we look at the impact of the pandemic and think about what critical national infrastructure means, we see that the 17 sectors are already out of date. Given our experience with covid and the concerns about food supply, that is clearly an issue we need to examine closely. Water is crucial to our wellbeing as a nation, yet it is not included in the 17. Our amendment argues that critical national infrastructure should be taken as an asset class. If defined as an asset class, the landscape moves and the definitions of sectors move, but there is clarity about critical national infrastructure always being within the scope of the Bill.

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That is the approach of a Government intent on getting the right balance, both now and in future, between protecting our national security and keeping the UK a premier investment destination. I hope that sentiment is shared on both sides of the Committee.
Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I will be brief because I know that we have to make progress, but I will say a few words on clause 6, which is in some ways the heart of the Bill, defining as it does what a “notifiable acquisition” is.

I regret that despite the Minister’s repeated assurances, I am not entirely convinced that he has come to the Committee ready to make changes in response to our very constructive proposals. He has repeated on a number of occasions that the Bill is the best and most proportionate means, despite our constructive suggestions to the contrary. I remind him that—as we see in this clause in particular—the Bill gives significant powers to the Secretary of State, and particularly significant additional powers on delegated legislation. It is possible that not every clause is as perfect as it could be or as he seems to think it is. In particular, the amendment set out by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon was a really important contribution to bringing critical national infrastructure directly and clearly into the remit of the Bill. If the Minister is so opposed to including them directly, what elements of critical national infrastructure does he think do not form part of our national security?

My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test made an excellent point with the example of our nuclear capability. Only five years ago, the then Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer were happy to hand not only the financing but the technological development, innovation and reputational consequences to China. Does the Minister agree that if we had had this Bill 10 years ago, as we wished, having critical national infrastructure in it would have made that impossible?

There is also the case of Huawei. When that was debated last night, it was clear that if we had been writing this Bill five or 10 years ago, I doubt whether the then Government would have included telecommunications, given their lack of interest in many acquisitions and procurements in that area. We now see the impact of having a high-risk vendor in our 5G and fibre network on our national security. We will not oppose clause stand part but we hope to encourage the Minister to accept our most constructive and supportive amendments.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Before I put the question formally, for the benefit of Members––particularly new Members who have not been able to be here as much in the last year as would otherwise have been the case––let me say that a good way of thinking of the rules of order in Committee is to think of them as being pretty much the same as in the Chamber. Similarly, above and below the bar applies in Committee as well as in the Chamber.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Qualifying entities and assets

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

This group of amendments would provide for certain cases to count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity. The amendments are to clause 8, which defines the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity for the purpose of the Bill.

Amendment 7 would ensure, as the hon. Member for Aberavon mentioned, that any acquisition involving state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security and creating a change of influence would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity for the purposes of the Bill. I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s intention to ensure that national security is comprehensively protected. I reassure him that the Bill provides no carve-out or special treatment for state-owned entities or overseas investors where they acquire control of a qualifying entity or asset. They will be subject to the mandatory notification requirements in the same way as any other acquirer, and the Secretary of State will have the power to scrutinise any acquisition of control by such parties where the legal test for call-in is met. That includes the acquisition of material influence over the policy of the entity.

However, the Government have been clear that the regime is nationally agnostic, and that each acquisition will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The draft statement of policy published alongside the Bill simply states that the regime will not

“regard state-owned entities, sovereign wealth funds—or other entities affiliated with foreign states—as being inherently more likely to pose a national security risk.”

I strongly believe that this is the right approach. We must recognise that many such organisations have full operational independence in pursuing long-term investment strategies with the objective of economic return, raising no national security risks.

Moreover, the clause already sets out the circumstances that constitute control of an entity based on levels of shareholding and voting rights and material influence. Amendments such as this could, for example, capture increases of equity stakes at any level, even though many could not realistically be expected to give rise to a national security risk. Developing a list of countries of risk would likely be a moving feast that would quickly become out of date in response to changing geopolitics and would most likely harm Britain’s diplomatic relations and place in the world, giving rise to a chilling effect on investment in these shores.

Amendment 8 would create a new case of a person gaining control of a qualifying entity for “changes to material influence” in industries critical to the UK’s capability and capacity to maintain national security, including economic security. Once more, I welcome the emerging cross-party consensus that the Bill must capture more subjective acquisitions of control, rather than solely levels of shares and voting rights. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that acquisitions of material influence over the policy of an entity are very much in the scope of the Bill. That applies within the 17 sectors but also to the wider economy. Parties can notify the Secretary of State of a trigger event concerning the acquisition of a material influence, and he will have the power to proactively call in such a case if the legal test is met.

I should clarify that material influence is not a scale. It is the lowest level of control that can be acquired over a qualifying entity, which captures acquisitions of smaller stakes or other rights or interests in entities, such as board representation rights. As such, it is not immediately clear to me what circumstances such an amendment would bring into the scope of the Bill, given that it would capture changes to material influence. None the less, I admire the ingenuity of the hon. Gentleman’s seeking, at least in part, to define national security through the amendment and its explicit reference to economic security. As he will know, the Bill does not define national security, and, as I said on Second Reading, I think that is a real strength, not a weakness.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

The Minister says that this Bill is not country specific. I know he does not want to define national security in the Bill, but does he think that our national security can be country specific?

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 8 sets out for the purpose of the Bill the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity as defined in clause 7. More specifically, the clause sets out the four ways in which control can be gained.

The first two cases are where certain shareholdings or voting rights are acquired. The clause stipulates that acquisitions increasing a person’s holding in a qualifying entity above 25%, 50%, 75% or more all constitute trigger events. The thresholds have been chosen because of their significance under UK company law.

Under the Companies Act 2006, a number of key decisions relating to shareholders’ rights in relation to the decision making of a company require a special resolution. Special resolutions require a majority of 75% of votes to be passed. This means that a holding of more than 25% allows one person to, by themselves, block a special resolution. Similarly, a holding of 75% or more allows one person to, by themselves, pass a special resolution.

Under the Companies Act, ordinary resolutions, which apply to more routine shareholder decisions, require a simple majority. This means that a holding of more than 50% allows one person to, by themselves, make decisions affecting the governance of a company.

The Government believe these thresholds represent reasonable proxies for various levels of control over entities. The clause deliberately includes references to both shares and votes to prevent the artificial construction of acquisitions to avoid meeting one of these thresholds—for example, a 40% stake with 51% of voting rights. In most cases, ordinary shares carry the equivalent amount of voting rights: one vote per share.

Recognising that the regime also concerns entities other than companies established under the Companies Act, the third case explicitly extends the same principles on voting rights enabling the passage of a resolution to other entities. That means that any acquisition of voting rights that allows a person to secure or prevent the passage of any resolution governing the affairs of the entity is a trigger event. This is important because other types of entities are not subject to the Companies Act and may have different thresholds for the passing of resolutions.

Finally, the fourth case that constitutes control of an entity is the acquisition of material influence over its policy. This reflects that no single shares or votes threshold is appropriate in every case.

Material influence is an existing concept under the Enterprise Act 2002, which denotes the lowest level of control that might give rise to a relevant merger situation that may be considered for competition or public interest reasons. Material influence captures acquisitions of smaller stakes or other rights or interests in entities, such as board representation and rights, which nonetheless enable a person materially to influence the policy of the entity.

Other factors, such as the status and expertise of the acquirer or a relationship of financial dependence, may be relevant. Clearly, determining whether material influence has been or is to be acquired will require an assessment of all the circumstances of the case by the Secretary of State. It is not possible, therefore, to provide any hard and fast rules that will be applicable in all cases.

The Competition and Markets Authority has published guidance about what it considers to constitute a material influence. The Secretary of State intends to apply that in so far as is possible in the context of this new regime, for the purposes of determining whether control has been or is to be gained over a qualifying entity.

For the avoidance of doubt, the Government have no plans to publish their own separate guidance on material influence. Collectively, these four cases represent the ways in which control of entities can be acquired for the purpose of the Bill. It is vital that they stand part of the Bill so that the Secretary of State may scrutinise acquisitions of control over entities in whatever form that takes. I hope that hon. Members will agree that this approach has been carefully considered to reflect the complexity of the make-up of modern entities.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

As we are over time, I shall not detain the Committee long, but I want to say a few words on this important clause. Our debate has again highlighted the Minister’s apparent determination and conviction that the Bill cannot be improved on, even as we all acknowledge––and as the Telecommunications (Security) Bill makes absolutely clear––that the Government’s record on national security in this context can very much be improved on. I noted his celebration of the innovators and entrepreneurs, and his concerns about the chilling effect on them of bringing debt holders into the Bill’s remit as proposed in the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South.

The entrepreneurs and innovators seeking investment, particularly foreign investment, are unfortunately to have no such protection from the Minister. We want a consistent and robust approach, given the breadth of powers that the Bill gives to the Secretary of State. I was concerned that, even with the wise intervention of the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, the Minister did not make a proposal to take these constructive amendments away to consider and perhaps return with Government amendments that reflect them later in the Bill’s passage. We will not oppose stand part, but I hope that the Minister will continue to consider our suggestions for the improvement of this and other clauses.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Control of assets

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 9 sets out, for the purposes of the Bill, the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying asset, as defined in clause 7. A person gains control of a qualifying asset where they acquire a right or interest in, or in relation to, the asset, and as a result they can do at least one of the following.

First, they can use the asset or use it to a greater extent than prior to the acquisition. This would allow the Secretary of State to intervene, for instance, when an individual purchases a sensitive site and can therefore access and use the site. Secondly, they can direct or control how the asset is used, or direct or control its use to a greater extent than prior to the acquisition. This second mechanism by which a person can gain control over a qualifying asset is particularly important as it brings into the scope of the regime those who may not have complete control over the asset, but who can nevertheless still direct or control its operation. Without that, there would be a control loophole that hostile actors may seek to exploit.

It is worth noting the relationship between this clause and clause 11, which provides an exception for control of assets in circumstances where the acquisition is made for purposes wholly or mainly outside the individual’s trade, business or craft. That is intended to put acquisitions such as consumer purchases firmly out of scope of this regime. I reassure hon. Members that the Secretary of State does not routinely expect to call in trigger events relating to assets. However, I hope that the Committee will agree that it is nevertheless important for the Secretary of State to retain this power to guard against hostile actors who seek to acquire control over sensitive assets as an alternative to acquiring the business which owns them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. ––(Michael Tomlinson.)

National Security and Investment Bill (Seventh sitting) Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Department of Health and Social Care

National Security and Investment Bill (Seventh sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 3rd December 2020

(3 years, 3 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 3 December 2020 - (3 Dec 2020)
Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman on that detail.

Question put and agree to.

Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

TRIGGER EVENTS: SUPPLEMENTARY

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
- Hansard - -

I beg to move amendment 16, in clause 12, page 8, line 4, leave out from “does” to end of line 11 and insert

“establishes that arrangements are in progress or contemplation which, if carried into effect, would result in a trigger event taking place.”

This amendment would expand the scope of events to be considered trigger events.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg, and to see the Committee reconvened to debate this important Bill. On Tuesday, we had a lively, informative and generally collegiate debate in which we learned a significant amount about the Bill and each other. We learned, for example, that the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs has an interest in low pay, the hon. Member for South Ribble is a scientist, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has a great interest in defending business investment, and my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test knows well the difference between “may” and “shall”, and entered Parliament at the same time as yourself, Mr Twigg. We learnt that my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South has a great interest in defending our national security through supply chains. We learnt that I have a tendency to mispronounce and misplace my hon. colleagues’ constituencies—something that I am working on. We also learnt that the Minister feels this Bill is perfect in every way, clause and subsection, such was his reluctance to accept the most constructive and helpful amendments—I would say—put forward by the Opposition. As we look at our amendments today, I gently point out to the Minister that that is not a view held by everyone across the House, even by Government Members. I note the letter sent yesterday by the Intelligence and Security Committee pointing out several aspects that we have raised, requiring clarification and significantly indicating its intention—or desire—to be a greater part of both the scrutiny of this Bill and its implementation. I hope that in today’s deliberations we will meet with more support from the Minister.

We had lively debates on Tuesday and some votes, which as I have indicated that we did not win. Amendment 16, in my name and those of my hon. Friends, is a probing amendment. We seek to understand that the Minister fully understands the provisions of his Bill. That is an absolutely appropriate thing to do, as hundreds of thousands of business and individuals will be impacted by it and will have to seek to understand it. It is appropriate that we test the impact of the Bill now, particularly as the Minister has many competing duties, and, as we understand, is taking on more onerous ones.

Clause 12 contains supplementary provisions in relation to determining when a trigger event that takes place over more than one day is to be treated as taking place, and determining whether a trigger event is in progress or contemplation in circumstances where a person has entered into an agreement or arrangement that enables them to do something in the future that would result in a trigger event taking place. The amendment, as we have framed it, would considerably expand the scope of events that could be considered trigger events. In effect, it would give the Secretary of State power to call in events under contemplation, by leaving out from “does” to the end of line 11 and inserting:

“establishes that arrangements are in progress or contemplation which, if carried into effect, would result in a trigger event taking place”.

As we have discussed, the Bill gives significant powers to the Secretary of State and the amendment would significantly expand notification volumes. There are many minor transactions where parties agree that someone might have the right to buy more shares in the future, and, in themselves, these transactions do not create direct influence and are unlikely to create a threat to national security. We recognise that the amendment would require all such minor transactions to be notified; it would seek to reflect the potential intention that these minor transactions may be part of a greater contemplation of something which would lead to a trigger event.

We recognise that Government would already have the power to intervene, through notification, once a trigger event takes place, so this amendment brings all possible future trigger events into scope, not just actual, or likely, future events.

Matt Western Portrait Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. On the point on these disguised elements, does my hon. Friend agree that the issue is about not simply shareholding, but, as we heard in the evidence sessions, membership of boards, and how voting rights might not necessarily be in line with shareholding percentages, and that they can be distorted at a future date?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. He makes a good point, which reflects why we are proposing this amendment to test the Bill. As he says, influence can be exercised in a wide range of ways.

I will elaborate on this later, but we must recognise that hostile parties will not sit back and see the Bill, then say “Oh well, that’s fine; we won’t try anything against the United Kingdom’s security,” as a consequence. They will seek ways to game and effect an influence regardless. Changes to the relationships between voting rights and shareholdings, for example, might be one way where they could seek to bypass the Bill.

I recognise that this is a wide-ranging amendment, but I seek to understand how the Minister feels that the Bill, as it stands, can address the kinds of concerns that my hon. Friend has just raised. This also reflects—I emphasise this again—the approach that we are taking, as the Opposition, on the Bill. The first priority and central plank of that approach is to put our national security first, and to do everything that we can to secure the strategic and economic resources on which our security relies; that focus on putting national security first motivates this probing amendment.

As my hon. Friend indicated, there can be a number of contingent investment transactions where parties agree to future events that transfer controls or influence. For example, a buyer might buy a low share of a company today, but might acquire with it the right to influence its shareholding in the future to levels of material influence.

I think the Minister will agree that we must watch out for these disguised transactions. They can start with innocuous levels of shareholdings, but set the ground for harder-to-notice increases in influence. At the moment, the Bill leaves out these transactions from the scope of notification, so the Government could not intervene. The amendment is therefore intended to probe the Government’s approach.

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Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for his comments. I want to make it clear that we are not in any way indicating any criticism of the civil servants who have worked hard, in extremely difficult conditions in the midst of a pandemic, to bring the Bill before us. I think we can all agree—we had some discussion on Tuesday about the nature of parliamentary scrutiny—that the objective of the process is that the Bill benefits.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Hear, hear—I agree with every word.

For the benefit of the Committee, I will begin with clause stand part, before turning to the amendment. The Secretary of State’s power to call in trigger events that have taken place is limited to a maximum of five years after the trigger event takes place and six months after the Secretary of State becomes aware of the trigger event. It is important to bear that in mind when discussing the amendment. That means that the issue of timing as to when a trigger event actually takes place is incredibly important. Many trigger events will have a self-evident completion date, as supported by contractual or other legal agreements. However, some trigger events may be less clearcut. There could be terms agreed formally by the parties, followed by further documentation, leading to a formal completion, all spread out over a period of time.

The clause ensures that where a trigger event takes place over a period of more than one day, or if it is unclear when during a period of more than one day the event has taken place, the last day of that period is treated as the date the trigger event takes place. In addition, the clause seeks to provide clarity about when a trigger event may be considered to be in progress or contemplation, where a person enters into an agreement or arrangement enabling them to do something in the future that would result in a trigger event taking place. It makes clear that entering into such agreements or arrangements, including contingent ones, does not necessarily mean that a trigger event is in progress or contemplation at the time the agreement or arrangement is entered into.

Amendment 16 would ensure that a person entering into any agreement or arrangement that enables the person, contingently or not, to do something in the future that would result in a trigger event taking place would be deemed a trigger event in progress or contemplation for the purposes of the Bill. I welcome the intention to ensure that the Secretary of State can be notified about acquisitions before they take place and I understand the motivation behind that. That is very much the Government’s policy. Indeed, the inclusion of mandatory notification and clear requirements within the proposed 17 sectors illustrates that approach in the most sensitive parts of the economy.

The timing of any notification is clearly very important. It must contain sufficient information for the Secretary of State to decide whether to give a call-in notice. That means that a proposed acquisition must be at an advanced enough stage that all the key details are known: for example, the names of all the parties involved, the size of any equity stake in the entity or asset, and the specifics of any other rights—such as any board appointment rights, which the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington cited in his intervention—being provided to the acquirer.

In some cases, however, such details may be known, but the likelihood of a trigger event actually taking place may still be low because the acquisition is conditional. For example, the striking of a futures contract or an options agreement may stipulate conditions that must be met before the acquirer is required to, or has the right to, acquire a holding in an entity or an asset. Such arrangements are common in the marketplace where, for example, a company’s future share price might be the basis of a conditional acquisition. Equally, lenders provide finance to many UK businesses on the basis of conditional agreements, often with collateral put up by the business as security in return for the loan. Those terms may, subject to certain conditions being met, allow the lender to seize collateral if repayments are not made as agreed.

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I trust the hon. Lady can support this justification, and I ask her to withdraw the amendment.
Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for his response. I listened carefully to what he laid out. I have some considerations, which I do not feel he fully addressed.

In broad terms, he raised many points that I have raised about why the amendment is broad in scope and could lead to a huge increase in the number of potential trigger events. However, I think he said that hundreds of thousands of actions or contemplations would be considered trigger events. I think it is truer to say that they could be considered trigger events and that the power to consider them as trigger events or not, as in the wording of our amendment, would lie with the Secretary of State. It is a broadening of the Secretary of State’s powers to consider the contemplation of future acts as a trigger event. That is the aim, rather than necessarily bringing them all into scope.

I will not debate with the Minister whether we can trust the Secretary of State to exercise those powers in a proportionate way, but I think he is effectively saying that the concern is that the Secretary of State would not have the resources to do that. I still did not hear him address the gaming point—the idea that transactions would be deliberately set up in a way that escapes the remit of the Bill. The increased powers for the Secretary of State would address that.

I was also concerned that the Minister said that if an event was called in at this stage, it could not be called in again, even if there was material new information. Surely if a trigger event occurred in future, such as shareholding going above 25%, it could be called in, regardless of whether it had been called in earlier under the amendment. Would he like to respond to that question, particularly as to how this increases the powers of the Secretary of State, rather than necessarily significantly increasing the number of trigger events?

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Order. To be clear, you are asking the Minister to intervene, because he cannot come back afterwards.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Yes, I am asking whether the Minister would like to intervene.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I do not think I need to.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I am disappointed that the Minister chose not to address the genuine concern about the provisions in the Bill being gamed by hostile actors.

I share his concerns about increasing the powers of the Secretary of State at a time when, as we understand, there are many more calls on the Department’s responsibilities and it may not have the resources. We have already noted the conflict of interest that can occur between national security and the Department’s focus on increased investment.

As I said, this is a probing amendment, so I will not press it to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Approval of notifiable acquisition

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I beg to move amendment 17, in clause 13, page 8, line 22, at end insert—

“(4) The Secretary of State must publish guidance that covers—

(a) consideration of the impact of a notifiable acquisition being deemed void under subsections (1) and (3), with particular regard to the impact on consequential obligations, liabilities and rights in completed events;

(b) who constitutes a “materially affected” person under Clause 16(1); and

(c) the informational and evidential standards that would underpin the requirement for completion “in accordance with the final order” at subsection (3).

(5) Guidance as set out under subsection (4) must be published within 3 months of this Bill becoming an Act and the Secretary of State shall review the guidance once every 12 months thereafter.”

This amendment would mandate the Secretary of State to publish guidance on the approval process of notifiable acquisitions.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

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Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Amendment 17 addresses the unwinding of void transactions. Clause 13, which is the start of chapter 3 of the Bill, is concerned with the approval of notifiable acquisitions. It provides that:

“A notifiable acquisition that is completed without the approval of the Secretary of State is void.”

It is a short clause with only three subsections, of which that is the first. Subsection (2) says that the Secretary of State may approve a notifiable acquisition by giving a notification, making a final order, or giving a final notification under various clauses. Subsection (3) says:

“A notifiable acquisition, in relation to which a final order has been made, that is completed otherwise than in accordance with the final order, is void.”

I want to emphasise the consequences and impact of such a short clause. Our amendment adds a new subsection that says that the Secretary of State must publish guidance that covers

“consideration of the impact of a notifiable acquisition being deemed void…with particular regard to…consequential obligations, liabilities and rights in completed events;…who constitutes a ‘materially affected’ person…and…the informational and evidential standards that would underpin the requirement for completion ‘in accordance with the final order’ at subsection (3).”

The amendment effectively mandates the Secretary of State to publish guidance on how the mechanism of deeming non-compliant transactions void would work in practice. Once again, we tabled it genuinely in the spirit of improving the Bill, because this issue is potentially a hugely significant part of it. The two words “is void” have a huge impact, which needs to be unpacked. This is a constructive amendment; we want to ensure that there is clarity for small and medium-sized enterprises, and accountability to Parliament, on how the new powers will be exercised.

I know that the Minister rejected further new powers in the last amendment, but even without them these new powers are significant. We welcome the expanded powers to tackle national security concerns, but we need to ensure that they come with accountability and guidance. The ability for transactions to be deemed legally void where they have not been approved by the Secretary of State, or where they have not complied with the Secretary of State’s final order, has potentially huge repercussions. Again, it marks a radical shift from today’s regime under the Enterprise Act 2002 and from the Government’s White Paper.

Under the “legally void” provision, transactions that took place three to five years ago could now be immediately deemed void. If the first transaction in a chain were deemed void, that would leave the legal rights and entitlements of all subsequent transaction parties in total uncertainty. That is not just a theoretical concern that we are raising to test or probe the Bill, but a truly practical one. A number of investment transactions involve a change of shareholder parties over a three to five-year period. The automatic default of non-compliant transactions becoming void would mean an impossible series of rights, entitlements and changes having to be unwound. It may well be practically unworkable and legally uncertain.

Katherine Fletcher Portrait Katherine Fletcher (South Ribble) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I appreciate the point that the hon. Lady is making, in that transactions over a period of three to five years could become complex, but surely if something is called in and deemed void in the overriding interest of national security there will be an extremely good reason for it. Although the complexity of downstream transactions is regrettable, we would be acting in the British interest if we had to trigger these powers.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, which by and large I agree with. That is why we are not seeking to remove the power, but to ensure that the Government and the Secretary of State explain how it would work in practice. She is right that if a bad or hostile actor has deliberately gone behind our national security framework, or the legislation as set out in the Bill, to undertake a transaction, the consequences will be on their head. However, there might be a series of other transactions as a consequence that were not made by bad or hostile actors—I will give some examples—and the impact on them should be set out, as far as possible, to give some clarity, because this is a huge area of uncertainty.

As has been stated on a number of occasions, we attract more foreign investment than any European Union country, and one reason why the UK is such an attractive location for foreign investment is that we have a robust legal framework that is trusted globally, but by giving rise to uncertainty the clause might impact that. We are not seeking to remove this power, but to have it properly explained, as far as possible.

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Conversely, subsection (1) places beyond doubt that notifiable acquisitions that take place without the approval of the Secretary of State are void. I am very pleased to hear that the hon. Lady thinks that is an excellent deterrent. That means that the acquisition has no legal effect.
Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for eloquently setting out the clause. I have to suggest that he not place words into my mouth—certainly as we have such excellent reporting. Although I did not say that I thought it was an excellent deterrent, I did indicate that it could be an effective deterrent, were it considered workable.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful for that clarification. I wrote down the hon. Lady’s words. She did say that it is an excellent deterrent, and went on to make her argument for the amendment.

To return to the substance, the provision means that the acquisition has no legal effect if it is void. It is not recognised by the law as having taken place. Clearly, voiding is a situation that it is in the interests of all parties to avoid, which should act as a powerful compliance incentive, if I can describe it as such. The Government’s view is that voiding is the logical result of a regime based on mandatory notification and clearance for acquisitions in the most sensitive sectors before they take place.

Although the Secretary of State, or the courts, may be in a position to punish non-compliance with criminal or civil sanctions, voiding is necessary to limit or prevent risks to national security that may otherwise arise where such acquisitions take place without approval. For example, there may be day one risks whereby hostile actors acquire control of an entity and seek to extract its intellectual property and other assets immediately. This is a reasonable and proportionate approach, and in arriving at this position we have carefully considered the precedent of other investment screening regimes. For example, France, Germany and Italy all have voiding provisions.

Amendment 17 would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance within three months of Royal Assent and then review it annually in relation to the approval process for notifiable acquisitions. I have listened carefully to the hon. Lady’s case for the amendment, and I hope that I can begin on common ground by saying that clearly voiding an acquisition is something that it is in the interests of all parties to avoid. That is why we are consulting on the sector definitions covered by mandatory notification and clearance, rather than simply presenting them to Parliament and external stakeholders like a fait accompli in the Bill.

That approach will allow experts from the sectors and the legal profession, and businesses and investors, to help us to refine the final definitions and tighten them up to ensure that the regime is targeted and provides legal certainty. Equally, mandatory notification applies only to the clearest acquisitions, focused on objective thresholds of shares and voting rights. Together, that will help acquirers to determine whether their acquisitions are in scope of mandatory notification, and therefore allow them to comply with their statutory obligation and avoid any voiding scenarios altogether.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. As I was laying out, there is precedent from other screening legislation in Germany, France and elsewhere. Of course, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central is concerned about the hundreds of thousands of people who may be shareholders in a company. If the acquisition was a notifiable acquisition and completed without approval, it is void, regardless of the number of shareholders.

I return to the point I was making before the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. Together, this will help the acquirers determine whether their acquisitions are in scope of mandatory notification. None the less, the Bill sets out the various ways in which an acquisition may be retrospectively validated, both proactively by the Secretary of State and in response to a validation application, where non-compliance occurs. I believe the guidance that the amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish is well meaning but fraught with difficulties.

There are a number of reasons why the Government must reject the suggested approach. First, the amendment is an invitation to the Secretary of State to, in effect, legislate through guidance to set out the legal implications of acquisitions being voided pursuant to clause 13. In our view, it would not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to do so, as it is for Parliament to legislate, but ultimately for the courts to interpret and apply that legislation.

The hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central will be aware of the much-quoted report from the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, which has emphasised the importance of avoiding guidance being used as a substitute for legislation. We have no intention to do so in respect of voiding.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I confess that I am somewhat surprised by the Minister’s comments. Does he feel that all guidance is an invitation to the Secretary of State to effectively legislate through guidance? Is that something that the Minister feels is the case for all guidance? If that is the case, we will not be getting very much guidance for businesses at all. Does he not feel that, in terms of regulatory clarity, there should be effective help and guidance that is not legislation? He is right to say that it is for the legal system to interpret, but it is also right that we have clear laws to be interpreted. As the hon. Member for Glenrothes said, there is currently nothing in the Bill about what “voiding” means and what it could mean.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Order. I remind Members to keep interventions as brief as possible.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Of course, not all guidance is guidance that the Lords Constitution Committee would have effectively considered to be a substitute for legislation. I will make some more headway, as I am conscious of the time.

Furthermore, the legal implications of voiding will depend on the particular facts of each case. It will ultimately be for the courts, as I said earlier, to resolve any disputes between parties.

Secondly, and for the same reasons, it would not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to publish guidance on who constitutes a “materially affected” person under clause 16(1). If it will assist the Committee, I will say that we consider these to be ordinary words of the English language and that whether a person has been materially affected by voiding will depend on the particular facts of each case. Ultimately, it will be for the courts to interpret this provision and to resolve any disputes between parties.

Thirdly, we do not consider guidance under paragraph (c) in the amendment to be necessary or appropriate. Final orders issued by the Secretary of State will need to be clear, and it is expected that in most instances they will follow extensive discussions with the parties so that all understand the conditions being imposed on the trigger event. That is equally true in relation to voided acquisitions scrutinised by the Secretary of State retrospectively. Where remedies imposed by the Secretary of State include restrictions on completion, it will be an objective question of fact, dependent on the circumstances of each case, whether the acquisition proceeds contrary to those conditions. This does not involve any determination by the Secretary of State, and it would ultimately be for the courts to resolve any disputes between parties, so it would not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to issue guidance setting out the “informational and evidential standards” that would apply. More generally, the value of any guidance would be limited, given that it would necessarily reflect the fact that retrospective validation will be dependent on the facts of an individual case.

The new regime understandably covers a broader range of acquisitions than is the case now. That is absolutely correct, as the hon. Lady stated. The combination of that fact with the reality that some voided acquisitions will come to light months or years after they take place and any number of events, involving numerous parties, may have occurred since then means that the Secretary of State must consider any validation application on a case-by-case basis. That is the right approach to keep this country safe, and this takes us back to the central issue that voiding is the logical result of a regime based on mandatory notification and clearance for acquisitions in the most sensitive sectors before they take place.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I sense that the Minister’s speech is coming to a close. He makes the point that voiding is the logical consequence of the new regime, based on mandatory notification. I have said that we recognise that, but, further to the intervention by the hon. Member for Glenrothes, if it is the necessary consequence, why is it not included in the impact assessment?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Glenrothes for their questions. It would be nigh on impossible to have an impact assessment as to what happened to a deal that should have been notified under the 17 sectors and then was voided. I believe that is something the Opposition should understand, in terms of the proportionality of the new regime, and I hope that it is something the hon. Lady and her colleagues can support. I hope that she will withdraw her amendment.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for his remarks. As I set out, we recognise the importance of this power. We were not seeking to remove the power to void—for transactions to be deemed void. But as I also set out, the two words “is void” have a huge impact, and it is of concern that neither the Bill nor the impact assessment addresses that. The Minister said that it would be impossible to assess the impact of voiding, but the impact assessment, where it looks at the number of affected businesses, estimates the number of investment decisions, notifications, security assessments and remedies. It makes estimates of all those, but has nothing to say on the number of potential voidings. That is a significant gap in the Bill and the impact assessment and, as a consequence, in the level of certainty and understanding about the Bill.

I have said a number of times that we are going from a standing start of 12 notifications in 18 years under the Enterprise Act 2002, which the Minister cited as having robust powers, to the almost 2,000 that we are expecting. Given his response, however, on which we see no likelihood of him moving, and given that we acknowledge the importance of the powers, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14

Mandatory notification procedure

--- Later in debate ---
Sam Tarry Portrait Sam Tarry
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. These two amendments are simply about giving more direction. One issue that we have debated on every day of the Committee’s scrutiny so far is how the Bill will radically transform the merger control process and create an entirely new centre for that process within BEIS.

Small and medium-sized enterprises across the country will look at these changes with great interest and understanding that national security is important and imperative, but also with uncertainty as they consider the need to seek investment to grow and create jobs. We owe those businesses clarity, confidence and certainty in the new regime, which is why the amendment simply seeks to make the Secretary of State’s prescription of regulation of the form and content of a mandatory notice mandatory by deleting “may” and inserting “shall”.

The Bill gives some clarity on the assessment period and the review period under the new regime, but there is still major uncertainty about the first stage of the regime. It is unclear how long the Secretary of State can take to decide on rejecting a mandatory or voluntary notice. The Government’s consultation suggested that it would be as soon as reasonably practicable, but unfortunately that is of no assurance. For a new unit with major resourcing challenges, as soon as reasonably practicable could be far from soon.

My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test spoke earlier in the week about his experience and the bad practice that could occur if the Secretary of State was left with so much discretion, rather than a little more compulsion. There are a number of examples, including the Energy Act 2013, where having “may” rather than “shall” meant that, in real terms, what was determined by the Bill never came into being.

Clause 66 of the Bill says that some clauses will immediately come into force, but it later says “may”. The Secretary of State could—hopefully he would not—wait for years or not do it at all. In both clauses referred to by the amendments, the regulations must be laid by the Secretary of State, and the term “may” creates some degree of uncertainty. It would be far better to take a more direct approach by inserting “shall”.

It is also unclear what specific form of content and information could be required in the mandatory or voluntary notices that firms and investors would have to provide. We could end that uncertainty. It is already an incredibly challenging time for firms to engage with a major new control process in the midst of a pandemic and, of course, while waiting to hear what our new relationship with the European Union will be.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank my hon. Friend for the excellent remarks he is making. Is his experience of small and medium enterprises in Ilford South the same as mine in Newcastle, in that they generally do not have the time to fill out the multiple forms required to receive grants or to apply for support? To expect them not only to respond, but to design the form and decide what should go into it is really taking our small and medium enterprises for granted.

Sam Tarry Portrait Sam Tarry
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I agree. It is Small Business Saturday this weekend, and I imagine that many SMEs will be telling us when we are back in our constituencies about exactly these kinds of issues: the uncertainty, and the decisions they want to take about investment in staff, in technology and, of course, in equipment.

With this amendment we are trying to focus on ensuring that businesses have as much clarity as possible, so that they can begin to plan. If that uncertainty is ended, as we come out of the covid crisis and move forward from the debacle of Brexit, it will be better for businesses to have clarity, so that they can begin to take the positive decisions that will hopefully create jobs.

It is already challenging for firms to engage in such a tricky process. Remember that small and medium enterprises will not have the vast resources that are perhaps available to the multinationals or mergers-and-acquisitions-type companies from which we heard evidence. It will be far more frightening for SMEs to face such things given everything else they are dealing with at the moment.

The amendment would go a long way towards ending uncertainty for SMEs and ensuring that the Government act with clarity and, of course, with competence. It would require the Government to publish guidance on the form and content of the notices that firms will have to fill out. There will always be a degree of paperwork for businesses, but this is about ensuring that it can be filled in as quickly as possible. The recommendation is that guidance should create efficient forms and content requirements, and that it contains some indication of how long the Government will take to accept or reject a mandatory or voluntary notice,

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Sam Tarry Portrait Sam Tarry
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend makes a good point. Businesses are feeling huge pressure. SMEs will often experience a degree of fear at the moment about potentially having to grapple with a whole series of new regulations—not just under this important Bill, but under the spin-outs that come out of our ongoing negotiations with the European Union. Many businesses are, I think, holding back on investment and investment decisions—even inward investment into their own company—simply because of the uncertainty. It is incredibly important to remove those barriers and to get people back investing in both staff and technology and feeling that they have the ability to see forward far enough to keep staff on the books through such a difficult crisis.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

My hon. Friend is making an excellent point about Brexit, but I will not test the Committee’s patience on that. As for the changing forms and the requirements on SMEs, does my hon. Friend understand why the Minister is putting the onus for deciding what information is required on to small businesses, rather than on to his Department and the civil service, which could do that?

Sam Tarry Portrait Sam Tarry
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

One of the things that we have probed a number of times, when taking evidence from witnesses and in our debates in Committee, is the idea that we need to give businesses clarity, because many are feeling uncertain. If they cannot make decisions about forward planning, clearly that will be detrimental as we move through the crisis.

Perhaps I should refer to some of the expert evidence we heard last week. Michael Leiter, who represents a very large, global limited liability partnership, told us:

“I think this is a rather seismic shift in the UK’s approach to review of investment… having some opportunity to make sure that both the private sector and the public sector are ready for that and understand the rules…is particularly important”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 46, Q52.]

That was in our discussion about resourcing, and one of the questions that I and colleagues on both sides of the Committee raised was on the resourcing of BEIS. As my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central suggested, rather than the burden falling on small and medium-sized enterprises, there should be a fully resourced and expanding new unit within BEIS. Given that the number of call-ins could rise from 12 to 1,800, as we have heard, we need a huge scaling up of BEIS’s ability to look at these, and obviously it does not have the same experience that the Competition and Markets Authority had previously.

I humbly point out that the Minister assured the House on Second Reading that:

“The investment security unit will ensure that clear guidance is available to support all businesses engaging with investment screening”.—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 277.]

The amendment is intended to secure that assurance in substance; not to tie the hands of the Secretary of State, but to give clarity to businesses by shifting from something that may happen to something that shall happen.

National Security and Investment Bill (Eighth sitting) Debate

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Department: Department of Health and Social Care

National Security and Investment Bill (Eighth sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 3rd December 2020

(3 years, 3 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 3 December 2020 - (3 Dec 2020)
Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will not take up too much of the Committee’s time, but I wish to say a few words about the excellent contribution that my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South has made to our continuing discussions about “may” and “must”. It is a particularly egregious case that he has highlighted. If we look at the number of “musts” that appear in clause 14—this point has been made by other Members—we see that the subsequent “musts” would fall immediately if the Secretary of State may not prescribe by regulation the form and content of a mandatory notice—so the “must” in subsection (5) is relevant only if the Secretary of State does that in the first place, as are the “musts” in subsections (7) and (8), as my hon. Friend pointed out earlier.

There is also an interesting “must” at the beginning of the clause, which relates to the mandatory notification procedure itself. Subsection (1) states that

“a person must give notice to the Secretary of State before the person, pursuant to a notifiable acquisition…gains control in circumstances”

and so on. So subsection (1) appears to stand whether or not, in subsection (4), the Secretary of State decides to prescribe by regulation the form and content of a mandatory notice. That means that a person must provide a mandatory notice, even if the Secretary of State has not prescribed any form or content of that notice. The person may therefore have no idea what is to be in that mandatory notice, because the Secretary of State has not put it in regulations, but still they must give notice because this subsection says “must”.

That does not seem to be particularly proportionate. It appears to be constructed in such a way that, regardless of whether the concept is completely unknown to the person giving the notice, it is entirely up to the Secretary of State whether he or she makes the mandatory notice in any way comprehensible. I think that is quite an odd juxtaposition in this instance of “mays” and “musts”.

The “may” in subsection (6) is perfectly acceptable, in as much as its states that:

“The Secretary of State may reject the mandatory notice on one or more of the following grounds”.

That “may” is absolutely appropriate. However, the positioning of “must” right at the beginning of the clause, and the positioning of “may” in subsection (4), does not look reasonable to me. That could easily be solved by using the word “shall”, so that the situation is proportionate between those circumstances. That is the essence of the amendment 18, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South outlined earlier.

I accept that there have been a number of occasions when, although I have not particularly liked “may” going into a Bill, it has had some justification. However, the particular juxtaposition that we see here causes me to think that it is a rather important issue, as far as “may” and “shall” are concerned. I am interested to hear whether the Minister thinks that the wording could give rise to the sorts of problems that I have suggested, in the event that another Minister—not himself, of course—might be tempted not to produce such regulations when defining the form and content, because I think that could cause potential problems for reasonableness, as far as this clause is concerned.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
- Hansard - -

I rise to give some thoughts on clause 14 stand part, but will also refer to the amendment proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South. Clause 14 is a critical part of this process, because it sets out the mandatory notification procedure. In some respects, it is the mandatory notification which places the greatest burden on those falling, or who might consider themselves to fall, within its remit. This is because it requires the person who is to make a notifiable acquisition to give a mandatory notice to the Secretary of State prior to the acquisition taking place.

The clause goes on to give the Secretary of State the option to set out the form and content of the mandatory notice. I shall come back to that. It then sets out the process by which the Secretary of State “must” decide whether to reject or accept that notice. If a mandatory notice is rejected, the Secretary of State must provide reasons in writing for that decision to be made. It also sets out the timescale elements and the persons to be notified. We recognise that mandatory notifications are an important part of making the Bill have the desired impact on our national security. It is absolutely right that in key areas the onus should be on those who will be aware that the transaction is taking place to notify the Secretary of State.

However, the amendment set out by hon. Friend is all about protecting and supporting the interests of small businesses. I am concerned that the Minister does not seem to be as vigilant about reducing the burden on and setting out the guidance for small businesses as we would like. All our constituencies have small businesses—it is often said that they are the lifeblood of the economy—yet in the Bill, and particularly in the clause, the Minister is not setting out the minimum support that they might require.

My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test got to the nub of the matter in one of his very informative discussions about the difference between “must” and “may”. He observed that the “must” falls on the person who has to do the notifying. For example, it could be a small artificial intelligence start-up with a few members of staff, none of whom is a lawyer—remember that there are no de minimis provisions in the Bill for the size of the acquisition that must be notified—that is seeking investment from a foreign party. That start-up would be asked to indicate whether that investment would involve making a notification. Not only that, it must decide itself the form that the notification should take.

I really cannot understand why the Bill apparently seeks to give discretion to the Secretary of State to lighten his load, but not to our fantastic small businesses or to business generally. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South said, why should a small business, the notifier, also have to set out the format in which its notification takes place? Given that the clause sets out,

“The Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe the form”,

why can we not simply turn that into “shall by regulation prescribe the form and content of a mandatory notice”?

Equally, when voluntary notices are considered, I hope the Minister has some ideas about what should be in the notification. If he does, is it not simple and desirable for him to share his ideas with our business community, which in less than a month’s time is facing a huge change in how it trades and does business with the European Union, our largest trading partner by value? That involves countless new forms to be filled out, as we have discussed in the Chamber, some of which are not yet designed. At the same time that that is happening, to require that they should decide for themselves what is involved in a notification seems wholly unacceptable.

On that basis, I ask the Minister to set out whether he intends to accept the amendment. If not, will he tell us what work has gone on in the Department to look at the kind of information might be required? How will the impact assessment assess the likely level of familiarisation required for this legislation—there is a phrase that says that there is not expected to be a huge amount of familiarisation required in it—while at the same time there is no guidance, assessment or inkling about the kind of information that will be required to be included in that notification?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the hon. Members for Ilford South, for Southampton, Test, and for Glenrothes, as well as to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, for their contributions on this set of amendments and clause 14. With the agreement of the Committee, I will begin with clause 14 stand part and then turn to the amendments.

Clause 14 provides a mechanism for proposed acquirers to notify the Secretary of State of notifiable acquisitions, which are those circumstances covered by clause 6. Contrary to what the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said, we on this side of the House really do care about small business; indeed, we will be celebrating Small Business Saturday by highlighting the great small businesses that are trying to recover from covid-19. To avoid duplication or unnecessary burden for businesses and investors, if the Secretary of State has already given a call-in notice in relation to the proposed notifiable acquisition, no notification is required. Otherwise the proposed acquirer must submit a mandatory notice containing the necessary information for the Secretary of State to make a decision about whether to exercise the call-in power.

The Government carefully considered which parties should be legally responsible for this notification. In many cases we expect this to be a collaborative process between parties that have an aligned aim for the acquisition to take place. However, there may be instances where an acquirer who is purchasing shares from a number of individual sellers is the only party aware that, in totality, they are carrying out a notifiable acquisition. For example, if an acquirer buys 10% equity in an entity specified under the mandatory regime from two separate sellers—20% in total—each seller may be operating under the assumption their transaction does not meet the threshold of a notifiable acquisition. Equally, the entity itself may be unaware of these acquisitions until after they have taken place. As such, only the acquirer can reasonably be expected to know that their activities constitute a notifiable acquisition and the responsibility to notify therefore rests with them.

The precise information that will be required and the form of the mandatory notice will be set out in regulations by the Secretary of State in accordance with subsection (4). For the convenience of the House, the Government have recently published a draft of the information that is likely to be required in a mandatory notice. As hon. Members might expect, this is likely to include all the pertinent details about the acquisition, including the target entity, the nature of its business, the assets it owns, the parties involved, the details of the equity stake and any other rights that form part of the acquisition—for example, any board appointment rights.

Following acceptance of a satisfactory notification—for example, conforming to the format and content prescribed —the Secretary of State then has up to 30 working days to decide whether to exercise the call-in power, or to take no further action under the Bill. The Secretary of State will be entitled to reject a mandatory notice where it does not meet the specified requirements, or where it does not contain sufficient information for him to decide whether to give a call-in notice.

The nature of the information required should mean that such instances are rare, but it is crucial that the requirements of the notice are met in order for the 30-working-day clock to start only at the point the Secretary of State is in a position to make an informed decision. By the end of the 30-working-days review period, the Secretary of State must either give a call-in notice or notify each relevant person that no further action will be taken under the Bill. In effect, the latter clears the acquisitions to take place unconditionally.

The power to specify in regulations the content and form of the mandatory notice is an important one, as the Secretary of State may need to change this over time in response to the operation of the regime in practice, and in response to the volume and quality of such notices given and rejected. I certainly believe that this approach ensures that Parliament can scrutinise any such changes. This clause is a procedural necessity to give effect to the mandatory notification regime once notifiable acquisition regulations have been made, and I trust that it will be supported by both sides of the Committee.

Amendments 18 and 19 are designed to require the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying the form and content of a mandatory or voluntary notice, ensuring that the parties have clarity on what information they need to provide in order to have properly notified. That is undeniably important—I share the focus of the hon. Member for Ilford South on that point—so this is an entirely sensible proposition. I suggest, however, that the amendments are unnecessary because the Bill as drafted already achieves that aim.

In practice, in order for the notification regime to operate, the Secretary of State will first need to make regulations specifying the form and content of a notification, regardless of whether clauses 14 and 18 say that he “may” or “shall”. I pay homage to the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for introducing that experience to the Committee. Regardless of whether clauses 14 and 18 say that the Secretary of State “may” or “shall” make such regulations, the notification regimes cannot operate without the notification forms being prescribed in the regulations.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I am somewhat confused. The Minister is saying that clause 14(4) in its entirety is unnecessary, because those things are already prescribed. Will he set out in more detail where they are already prescribed? He argues that they are already prescribed, but where are they prescribed?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Let me make clear to the hon. Lady what I actually said, which was that whether clauses 14 and 18 say that the Secretary of State “may” or “shall” make such regulations, the notification regimes cannot operate without the notification forms being prescribed in regulations. My point is that whether the clauses say “may” or “shall”, it makes no difference. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Ilford South will withdraw the amendment.

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Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for his promise to write to my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test. The Minister mentioned on a number of occasions that a transaction is no longer void when a validation notice has been given. However, the transaction was void when completed, because it was completed without approval, so there will have been a period when it was void. What are the legal implications of that period?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Is the hon. Lady is talking about a period when the Secretary of State was not aware of the transaction being void? If he is unaware of it, he is unable to act. It is only once he becomes aware, through a screening process or notification—

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I want to explain myself better. The question is not about what the Secretary of State can do, because I clearly understand that he cannot act on what he is not aware of. The fact of the transaction being deemed legally void for a period, which it will have been, may have some legal implications for the owners or the customers or whoever.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Again, I am happy to write to the hon. Lady on that. Clearly, only when the Secretary of State is aware that a transaction is clearly in breach of the Bill is it then void. I am not clear as to what she is saying. Is she asking about before he is able to act?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Let me clarify. Clause 13(1) states:

“A notifiable acquisition that is completed without the approval of the Secretary of State is void.”

It is void at the time it is completed, not at the time the Secretary of State becomes aware of it. Sometime later, the Secretary of State becomes aware of it and gives a retrospective clearing of it, but there will regardless have been a period where that transaction was void. What are the legal implications for the owners? It seems to me that having a transaction being void for a period would have some legal implications, regardless of whether the Secretary of State has cleared it.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Again, I am happy to write to the hon. Lady on that point. Maybe I am being thick here, but the transaction only becomes void once the information is available to the Secretary of State. Is she talking about before that period?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

My understanding is that it becomes void at the point when the transaction is completed. At some point after that, the Secretary of State gives a retrospective validation, but there is nevertheless a period of one year, or however long it takes, when the transaction was void. Does that not have legal implications?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am happy to write to the hon. Lady on that point. What I think she is talking about is about the gap between the Secretary of State being aware and when the transaction actually took place, because the date where it is void is the date of the closing of that transaction, but I am very happy to write to her about that.

It is not in the interests of either the Government or the parties for the Secretary of State to have an unfettered ability to issue a call-in notice, perhaps long after he becomes aware of the notifiable acquisition. This approach provides a sensible mechanism for resolving the effects of automatic voiding arising from failures to receive clearance. I reassert my view that such situations should be rare, but it is only proper that the Bill provides such a mechanism for the Secretary of State to resolve them satisfactorily, should they arise. I hope hon. Members agree with that position.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank all the hon. Members for their contributions, and the Minister for his remarks and his good humoured response to the interrogation on certain parts of this important clause. I recognise the importance of the clause and the importance of considering retrospective validations without application giving the all-consuming power through the voiding of notifiable acquisition without the approval of the Secretary of State. This debate has illustrated the need for greater clarity.

In the absence of the additional guidance that we were looking for in our earlier amendment, this has the possibility of becoming a legal goldmine for lawyers who are requested to give advice on what would or would not constitute a void transaction at what time. I raise that in the context of the requests of my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test and myself for greater clarity about the period, which may represent some sort of legal limbo, between when a transaction takes place but before it is given retrospective approval. However, we do not oppose the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Application for retrospective validation of notifiable acquisition

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 16 provides a mechanism for any person materially affected by a notifiable acquisition being void to make an application to the Secretary of State to retrospectively validate the acquisition. Although there is a duty in clause 15 for the Secretary of State to give a validation notice or a call-in notice within six months of becoming aware of the acquisition, we recognise that in practice that is often likely to be a process driven by the parties themselves. It may be, for example, that a party realises that their transaction was a notifiable acquisition only after the event, and wishes to take proactive steps to resolve the situation. The clause allows them to make a formal application for retrospective validation, following a similar process to the conventional mandatory notification route.

Subsection (3) enables the Secretary of State to make regulations prescribing the form and the content of a validation application. It is likely that that will closely resemble the mandatory notification form, given all of that information remains pertinent to the Secretary of State’s decision on whether to give a call-in notice. The Secretary of State will be entitled to reject the application where it does not meet the specified requirements, or contain sufficient information for him to decide whether to give a call-in notice.

If the validation application is accepted, all relevant parties must be notified and a 30 working-day review period begins. By the end of the review period, the Secretary of State must issue either a call-in notice or a validation notice. Once again, if a validation notice is issued, the acquisition is no longer void and the Secretary of State must confirm that no further action under the Bill will be taken in relation to that acquisition. As is the case with clause 15, retrospective validation through that route does not provide immunity against criminal or civil sanctions being pursued.

Validation does not change the fact that a notifiable acquisition did not have the Secretary of State’s approval prior to taking place. This is simply about how the acquisition itself should be treated, following the screening of all pertinent details relating to the acquisition. I hope that hon. Members will be supportive of parties being able to apply to the Secretary of State for a validation notice, and that they will see clause 16 as part of our business-friendly approach to the investment screening regime.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Government are committed to providing as much certainty as possible for business. The clause therefore provides parties with a mechanism to require the Secretary of State to decide whether a trigger event outside the mandatory notification regime will be called in. If parties wish, they may notify the Secretary of State of such a trigger event when it is in progress or contemplation or, alternatively, after it has taken place. Any early notification will allow businesses to plan for, and mitigate, any issues that may subsequently arise.

Following the acceptance of a satisfactory notification—one that conforms to the prescribed format and content, for example—the Secretary of State has up to 30 working days to decide whether to exercise the call-in power or to take no further action under the Bill. Businesses can rest assured that where the Secretary of State decides to take no further action following assessment of a notification, that decision may not be revisited further down the line. The only exception is if the Secretary of State has been given false or misleading information in relation to the decision not to issue a call-in notice, but I expect such instances to be few and far between. On those rare occasions where the notified trigger event does require further action, early notification means that parties can also factor in a security assessment following a formal call-in early on in their commercial timelines.

I hope that the Committee will agree that that is a pragmatic approach that provides the Secretary of State with the time he requires to properly screen trigger events, while giving businesses as much certainty as possible about when they can expect decisions. I would go further and say that the Government would welcome informal discussions with parties before the notification stage begins. That would allow parties to prepare for a potential assessment, while also allowing the Secretary of State to better understand the trigger event.

This is part of our commitment to working with investors and businesses in as transparent a manner as possible while protecting national security. However, I stress that a formal notification procedure is still required to enable the Secretary of State to make an informed assessment of the trigger event based on a full suite of information. I hope that hon. Members recognise the length the Government are going to to put in place a robust regime that both protects national security and retains business and investor confidence. The voluntary notification procedure, alongside the mandatory notification part of the regime, helps to strike that balance and will, I believe, work in the interests of all parties.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for his remarks. He is aware of the Opposition’s concerns about the voluntary notification procedure. I shall not repeat what he has said, and we recognise the importance of the clause and of having such a procedure. As with the mandatory notification procedure, the Minister has rejected our request for a requirement to set out the form of that notification. I would like to press him on this and to ask whether he would perhaps write to me to set out formally where it is that the pre-existing requirement that he said exists says that the Secretary of State “must”, rather than “may”, set out the form for the voluntary notification. I am also not clear whether the voluntary notification form format and information requirements are the same as those for the mandatory notification, given the difference in one being voluntary and one mandatory. Clarification on that would be helpful.

We agree considerably that we want to minimise the burden on businesses and the chilling effect on investment, while securing national security. The clause is an important part of that, so we will not oppose it.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am very happy to write to the hon. Lady; I thought that I had touched on that in my earlier remarks. The forms should be very similar, because ultimately the decision-making process of the Secretary of State, whether the notification is voluntary or mandatory, will pretty much be the same thing. I am happy to clarify that in writing.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for that intervention, and we will not oppose clause stand part.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19

Power to require information

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 19, page 12, leave out lines 24 to 27.

This amendment seeks to broaden the Secretary of State’s powers to require information.

National Security and Investment Bill (Ninth sitting) Debate

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National Security and Investment Bill (Ninth sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 9th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 8th December 2020

(3 years, 3 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 December 2020 - (8 Dec 2020)
Nadhim Zahawi Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 22 makes provision for circumstances in which false or misleading information is provided to the Secretary of State. Hon. Members will agree that a regime that protects our national security must take appropriate account of those who would wish to mislead us. It is not often that hostile actors offer up honest answers to difficult questions. In addition to the penalties that are provided for in clause 40 and elsewhere, the clause ensures that any decision that is taken on the basis of false or misleading information, and which is materially affected by the false or misleading information, may be reconsidered by the Secretary of State. Following reconsideration, the Secretary of State is then free to affirm, vary or revoke any such decision.

That may, for example, involve calling in a trigger event after an initial decision not to do so, if, for instance, it is discovered that false or misleading information was provided in the notification form. That might ultimately lead to remedies being imposed on the trigger event, including blocking or unwinding it where that is necessary and proportionate for the purpose of safeguarding national security. The Secretary of State is required under subsection (5) to give any call-in notice within six months of discovering that the information was false or misleading.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for his comments on clause 22. This possibly shows a lack of understanding on my part, but could he say a little about how the Secretary of State will ascertain, decide or judge that information has been false or misleading?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s question. The Secretary of State has a number of tools available to him, including our security and intelligence services. Of course, if the information is deemed to be false or misleading, he will be able to take appropriate action.

There is otherwise no time limit to revising a decision. The time limits under subsections (2) and (4) of clause 2 for calling in trigger events that have already taken place do not apply. We judge that this is an important signal to send. If people provide us with false or misleading information in relation to a trigger event, the Secretary of State may still call in the event for consideration whenever the false or misleading information comes to light, even if the event has long since completed. If truthful information is provided, the time limits in subsections (2) and (4) of clause 2 apply. If people provide us with the right information, they will have certainty. If they provide us with false or misleading information, we may revisit the trigger event whenever the false or misleading information comes to light.

Without the clause, parties could, in theory, deliberately provide false information to ease the passage of their trigger event. The Secretary of State would then be powerless to reopen the investigation into the event and impose national security remedies on it. I stress that I expect cases involving the provision of false or misleading information to be few and far between, but the Government must take steps to mitigate such risks.

Hon. Members may have some concern that the Secretary of State’s ability to reconsider previous decisions chips away at businesses’ confidence to invest. To those hon. Members, I say that the provision applies only to materially false or misleading information, and even if such information is provided unintentionally, it is essential that the Secretary of State has the power to consider the case one more. Moreover, it may be the case that false or misleading information is provided deliberately by a hostile actor. I hope hon. Members will agree that as well as providing slick and efficient processes for business, the Bill must not leave any loophole to be exploited.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Meaning of “assessment period”

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 23, page 15, line 15, leave out from “as” until end of line 16 and insert

“as agreed by the Secretary of State in accordance with subsection (9)”.

This amendment seeks to limit the flexibility of extending the assessment period to the conditions set out in subsection (9), and to remove the need for the approval of the acquirer.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

New Clause 4—Complaints procedure

‘(1) The Secretary of State shall by regulations set up a formal complaints procedure through which acquirers may raise complaints about the procedures followed during the course of an assessment under this Act.

(2) Complaints as set out in subsection (1) may be made to a Procedural Officer, who—

(a) must not have been involved in the assessment and who is to consider significant procedural complaints relating to this section or another part of this Act; and

(b) may determine or settle complaints in accordance with regulations to be published by the Secretary of State within 3 months of this Bill becoming an Act.’

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a formal complaints procedure for acquirers.

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Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I rise to speak to amendment 22, which is in my name and that of my hon. Friends, and to new clause 4. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once more, Mr Twigg, and to find the Committee reconvened for the perusal of the rest of this important Bill. I thank the Minister for the letters that he has sent to me and my hon. Friends, and to the Intelligence and Security Committee, to address some of the questions that arose in previous sittings.

I am glad that, with this amendment, we move on to part 2 of the Bill, which deals with the process of addressing our national security concerns as part of the Bill’s implementation. In clause 23, we are particularly looking at the assessment period. As I have indicated, we support the intention and, indeed, the objectives of the Bill, and we would have welcomed such a Bill some years ago. Our intention, as we have shown, is to be a constructive Opposition and to make constructive proposals, so I will say at the outset that amendment 22 is a probing amendment that seeks to clarify how the Minister thinks the clause will work in practice. The amendment seeks to limit the significant flexibility of extending the assessment period to the conditions set out in subsection (9), and to remove the need for the approval of the acquirer.

As we have said, the Bill marks a radical shift in our nation’s approach to takeovers and investments. It has been labelled a “seismic shift” and a “total transformation”. We want that radical shift to give the Government the powers they need to protect our national security, as we have made clear. To be effective in doing that, the Bill needs to ensure clarity, certainty and competence—competence is a key word—for our businesses. As we have said on a number of occasions, we are particularly concerned about the impact on our small and medium-sized enterprises, which will bear the bulk of the compliance requirements and which do not have the resources that are at the disposal of many of our larger companies.

We want the Minister to provide clarity on the parts of the assessment period that we find uncertain. Specifically, the Government have set out an assessment period timeline of up to 15 weeks, which is 30 working days for an initial period and 45 working days for an additional period. Clause 23 sets out that the initial period may be extended by the Secretary of State for a further 45 working days if he

“ reasonably believes that…a risk to national security has arisen from the trigger event or would arise from the trigger event if carried into effect, and…reasonably considers that the additional period is required to assess the trigger event further.”

An extension beyond 75 working days—the initial 30-day period plus 45 days—may be agreed between the acquirer and the Secretary of State, if the Secretary of State

“is satisfied…a risk to national security has arisen from the trigger event or would arise from the trigger event if carried into effect, and…reasonably considers that the period is required to consider whether to make a final order”.

That is described as the “voluntary period”.

Our concern is that the clause offers the potential for unlimited expansion of the timeline—currently labelled, as I said, a “voluntary period” extension. That creates uncertainty for businesses and, indeed, for Government. Subsection (3)(c) suggests that a voluntary period extension

“may be agreed in writing between the Secretary of State and the acquirer”,

and yet subsection (9) sets out the ways in which the Secretary of State might agree a voluntary period where they are satisfied of the need for it. Is it a voluntary period for both parties? Will the voluntary period truly be voluntary for businesses?

According to subsection (9), the decision seems to be for the Secretary of State. Subsection (9) sets out a number of considerations

“on the balance of probabilities”,

but subsection (3)(c) implies that the period is at the agreement of the acquirer. What is the process by which an acquirer can deny the extension and what, if any, is the limit on voluntary period extensions? Businesses up and down the country and international investors in Britain’s high-value start-ups will be looking to the Government for greater clarity. We heard numerous calls for greater clarity during the evidence sessions.

The Bill presents uncertainty for not just businesses but the Government. If a business can deny agreement to extensions under subsection (3)(c), where do the Government go then? The Bill creates a 15-week assessment period, but our existing merger control process can last for 32 weeks with a full phase 1 and phase 2 review. Does the Minister concede that it is possible, especially given the likely resourcing clashes—we have already talked about potential conflicts of interest—that the voluntary period extensions will soon become default period extensions? Have the Government given themselves sufficient powers to trigger extensions, or is the current situation uncertain for businesses and for Government?

That concern is especially important because of the evidential thresholds that are required for the voluntary period extension. The Government have set a bar of reasonable suspicion—that is quite common—for a trigger event to be called in, in clause 1(1). Then there is a separate bar of reasonable belief for the Secretary of State to order an additional period, in clause 23(8), and a third bar of being

“satisfied, on the balance of probabilities”

to get a voluntary period extension. What is the difference between the three standards of reasonable suspicion, reasonable belief, and being satisfied on the balance of probabilities? I am sure that there were specific reasons for drafting those three separate standards. Could the Minister share them with us? Is he confident that this tighter approach for each step will allow the Government sufficient room to ensure that there are robust reviews and to protect our national security, especially given that the regime will be an entirely new one, with an entirely new investment security unit interpreting those three separate bars?

I note that the Government’s impact assessment contains no estimate of how many transactions are expected to require additional and voluntary period extensions. We are about to embark on a vast shift in merger control, with far more engagement and intervention by the Government in our mergers and acquisitions landscape. We seek clarity with this amendment, to give confidence to our small and medium-sized enterprises and to ensure that there is confidence in our national security. We seek to ensure that the Government have a plan and a detailed understanding of it will work to deliver on the Bill’s proposals.

As I mentioned earlier, during our evidence sessions, there was significant demand from experts to ensure the Bill delivers greater certainty. Will Jackson-Moore of PwC said,

“it is about the application of the legislation, in particular the process, the ability to pre-clear and the timelines actually being met. To understand some of these technologies is not going to be straightforward.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 115-116, Q152.]

Lisa Wright from Slaughter and May said that

“for people doing deals around the world who have already experienced those other regimes, it ought not to have any real negative impact at all, provided that BEIS can deliver on the aspiration set out of a slick and efficient regime, turning around notifications within sensible deal timeframes and providing the kind of informal advice and early engagement promised. That will be critical, particularly in the early stages of the regime.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 76, Q91.]

I ask the Minister to consider whether the clause provides that. This amendment, which sets out to limit the flexibility of extending the assessment period to the condition set out in subsection (9) and to remove the need for the approval of the inquirer, is intended to probe and highlight that.

The intention behind new clause 4 is to ensure greater clarity about the apparent omission of any formal complaints procedure for acquirers. We are concerned that it seems as though the Government have not reflected on the scale of the change that our mergers and acquisitions regime is going through in their appreciation of the operational shift needed to deliver on it.

In a sort of a mathematical trick that I fail to follow, the Government’s impact assessment talks only of an additional 18% of cases relative to the regime under the Enterprise Act 2002, but also states that there will be an increase from 12 reviews in 20 years—that is the figure under the current regime—to nearly 2,000 under this regime.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
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I absolutely hear what the hon. Gentleman says. The issue then becomes one of national security. As we heard in the evidence sessions, most founders and directors know exactly what they are inventing and what their intellectual property is, and therefore whether there is a national security risk, however nascent the business may be.

I briefly turn to amendment 22. I am grateful for the Opposition’s continued, and in some ways unexpected, push for ever greater powers for the Secretary of State, who I am certain will be most delighted. The amendment would remove the requirement for the Secretary of State to agree the use of a voluntary period or a further voluntary period with the acquirer to consider whether to make a final order or what provision that final order should contain. I do not believe that would be the right approach.

We have set much store in the statutory timescales provided for in the Bill. It is vital for the businesses and investors that we all care about that they have confidence in when they can expect decisions so that they can plan accordingly, which goes back to the point of the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington about planning for an investment or fundraising event. That is why any extension of the assessment period, beyond the collective 75 maximum working days of the initial period and the additional period combined, requires agreement from the acquirer in recognition of the fact that the process is being lengthened beyond the customary timeline. Enabling the Secretary of State to do that unilaterally would be a matter of concern for business and investment communities alike.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I thank the Minister for his concern about our encouragement, in our probing amendment, of the Secretary of State having greater powers. When the Minister looks at other organisations, such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States or, even closer to home, the CMA in the UK, which do not have voluntary period extensions, can he understand why there are concerns about how that process would work? What international comparisons has he made?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We talk to our Five Eyes allies and other nations. As the Secretary of State and I set out on Second Reading, we have worked collaboratively with many nations to try to get the balance right so that the Bill does what it does and is proportionate.

I accept that the amendment also attempts to provide some mitigation against that by directly referencing subsection (9). That existing subsection limits the Secretary of State to being able to agree a voluntary period only where he

“is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that…a trigger event has taken place”

or is “in progress or contemplation”, and that

“a risk to national security has arisen…or would arise.”

He may do so only for the purpose of considering

“whether to make a final order or what provision a final order should contain.”

As such, I gently point out to the hon. Lady that the limitations that she seeks to impose on the Secretary of State through the amendment are already provided for by the clause as drafted. Subsection (3) does not provide a parallel or broader power for the Secretary of State to agree a voluntary period or further voluntary periods for other reasons. It is already subject to the limitations set out in subsection (9). I hope that addresses the hon. Lady’s principal concern. I assure her that, as with so many areas in the Bill, we are singing from the same hymn sheet. For those reasons, I cannot accept the amendment, and I respectfully ask her to withdraw it.

I will turn very briefly to new clause 4. I am grateful to hon. Members for contributing to the debate by suggesting a new clause to allow acquirers to lodge complaints. Under the current drafting of the Bill, the Government can already be held to account on their performance on screening investments. First, the Government can be held to account through the annual report that they are required to publish, as provided for in clause 61. That provision requires the Government to report on the number of notifications that they have accepted and rejected, the sectors of the economy in relation to which call-in notices were given, the financial assistance provided and the number of final notifications given.

Secondly, the Government can be held to account through the judicial review process under clause 49. Acquirers, or indeed any party to the transaction, can claim for judicial review of a relevant decision. Furthermore, throughout the review process, the parties to an acquisition can contact the investment security unit for a discussion about their case and can request to speak to a senior official if needed. Creating a formal complaints procedure would be unnecessarily bureaucratic when acquirers already have better routes available to them if they are unhappy with the decision-making process.

Members from across the House have commented that it is important—the hon. Lady mentioned this earlier—that the appropriate resources are allocated to the investment screening unit. The Government are absolutely committed to ensuring that that happens. It would be unwise to divert some of those staff from undertaking scrutiny of issues of national security to staff a complaints procedure, particularly where JR is available for any serious concern regarding the process of assessment.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I hear the Minister repeatedly referencing the judicial review process without, I am afraid, addressing our point: judicial review is not an option that will give relief to a small, nimble start-up.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I mentioned judicial review as the second way in which the Government can be held to account. The first is the requirement for the Government to report to Parliament annually. Colleagues and Committees will therefore be able scrutinise the work of the unit. Although I understand the hon. Lady’s objective with new clause 4, I am not able to accept it for the reasons that I have set out, and I hope that she will agree to withdraw it.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I thank the Committee for considering our amendment and new clause, I thank the Minister for his response and I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington for his able interventions.

I am somewhat disappointed by the Minister’s response. I think it is absolutely true, as he said, that as with so much, we are on the same page when it comes to what we are trying to achieve. There are significant issues with the clause as it stands, however, and I do not feel that the Minister has addressed them in his response. He did not, for example—I am happy to take interventions on these points—address the issue of voluntary extensions. We do not see that in the US process, which has a number of stages. It allows 45 days for a national security review, including a 30-day limit for the director of national intelligence to submit intelligence analysis and an option of a 15-day presidential determination if needed, but it does not have a voluntary period for extensions. The CMA in this country does not have a voluntary period for extensions. The Government are introducing a voluntary period.

I thank the Minister for clarifying that as well as having the acquirer’s approval, the Secretary of State has to meet the conditions in subsection (9), and that both the approval and the conditions in that subsection are satisfied on the balance of probabilities. That does not, however, address the issue that my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington raised about whether the acquirer is likely to agree to a voluntary period. Without clarity on that point, the clause allows voluntary extensions that, in practical terms, may not prove to be of use to either the acquirer or the Secretary of State.

On the new clause, I do not want to appear cynical, but I am sure that the Minister and those on the Committee who have worked in and with small businesses—particularly in our tech sector and in some of the 17 areas identified for mandatory notification, such as artificial intelligence and data infrastructure—will agree with me when I say that I do think that any small business would see an annual report to Parliament or a judicial review as a relief, given the ever-present desire for investment finance or for progress and innovation at breakneck speed. The Minister has not made a case against the need for a process to address procedural disputes.

I said that amendment 22 was a probing amendment, but I want to test the will of the Committee on supporting greater clarity and understanding for our small and medium-sized enterprises. I will seek to press the amendment to a vote, as I will for new clause 4.

None Portrait The Chair
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The decision on new clause 4 will be taken at the end of the Bill Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
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The amendment follows on from a number of concerns that have been raised about small businesses, their role in the production of information and attendance notices, and the effect on those small businesses; and about the potential development of a regime that is far more onerous than those in other parts of the world as we pursue the proper purpose of dealing with information and attendance, and shining a light on the activities of companies that may need to declare what they are doing in a reasonably timely way.

I am reminded of the question of reasonable speed and efficiency, as far as notification and evidence are concerned, as our expert witnesses mentioned earlier in our proceedings. Michael Leiter from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom LLP stated:

“I think it will be an issue unless you are confident that small-scale, early-stage investors can have their transactions quickly reviewed within roughly 30 to 45 days. If it is longer than that, that will make the investment climate, I think, worse than other competing markets. I think that could have an impact.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 24 November 2020; c. 47, Q53.]

The question in front of us is how we ensure that that happens, or at least shine a light on the process and monitor it. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish each year the aggregate number of days included under subsection (4), the number of called-in events for which such days are included, and the number of times information notices are given for each called-in event in the report required in clause 61.

We have not debated clause 61 yet, but it requires the Secretary of State to produce an annual report of quite extensive proportions on proceedings generally under the Act, as it will be. Hon. Members will note that clause 61 provides for what one might call a quantity report. It will record expenditure, the number of mandatory notices accepted and rejected, the number of voluntary notices accepted and rejected, the number of call-in notices, and the number of final notifications. It is an annual numbers report. The amendment would add quality to that quantity.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I thank my hon. Friend for giving way and for his excellent comments on the amendment. Does he also recognise that the report under clause 61 is the one that the Minister just described as providing accountability to small businesses regarding their concerns about procedure or how they might be affected by the Bill? Does my hon. Friend therefore agree that adding quality to quantity as a function of that report would be a truly important step?

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend makes an important point about the overall effect that shining a light on proceedings, and accounting for them, will have. She emphasises that it will be important for small businesses—I will come to the mechanisms by which this might be done—to see how effectively things are run and organised, ideally in their own interest when it comes to the question of turnaround in proceedings. I quoted one expert witness, but a number of them emphasised the point about turnaround and the problems that might arise for small businesses as a result of lengthy periods of consideration.

My hon. Friend emphasises what I want to emphasise, which is that the report under clause 61 does not enable anyone to assess efficiency and effectiveness. A reader of that report could look at what has occurred and what numbers have gone out, but it would not allow them to consider the efficiency with which those numbers have been arrived at. Our amendment would make that possible. The report under clause 61 would be on the numbers, but the amendment would make it much easier for a reader of the report to interrogate the numbers, and it would therefore add quality to quantity.

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Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
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It is the way I tell them.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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It is important that the Committee recognises the momentous occasion of the first use of the vaccine in this country and congratulates the Minister. It is also important that we reflect on the fact that our fantastic NHS and key workers, rather than the Minister himself, made it possible.

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Indeed. I was about to reflect on the appointment a long while ago—in another time and another Administration, when there was a severe and prolonged drought—of a Minister for drought, the right hon. Denis Howell. The Minister’s success was amazing: within about three days of his appointment, it poured with rain.

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One could argue that giving out multiple notices due to operational necessity, because the unit is having difficulty going about its business—either because it is not properly resourced or because it has other difficulties in terms of its practice—might needlessly delay companies looking at business-critical investments and going about their business. The cause of that may be that the unit does not have sufficient resources to carry out its work efficiently.
Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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My hon. Friend is making a really important point, because we all know that what is measured throws a light on the process behind it. If these orders are not measured, I am concerned that they will effectively be a way for a hard-pressed department to gain more time. We have all seen during this pandemic—I refer not least to responses to parliamentary questions—how pressure on resources has increased timescales in the operation of Government Departments. This amendment would shine a light on that and prevent such misuse.

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend makes an important point on the amendment about how we undertake the difficult job of making sure something is efficiently and effectively carried out, while not taking the wheels from under the organisation as it does its job. That is a difficult process to undertake, because information notices are clearly important, as are attendance notices, and we should have no mechanisms in the Bill that prevent or undermine the ability of the organisation charged with giving notices out to do that properly. That is a given as far as the process is concerned.

However, it is equally important that substantial light is shed on how that process works in practice and whether, over a period of time, that process might be seen not to be working as well as it should be in combining the necessities of those notices with a reasonably fair approach, particularly as far as small businesses are concerned. Managing that metric properly while enabling the unit to carry out its job properly is quite a task.

The amendment would enable us to undertake that task by requiring the recording of quality—that is, the numbers of notices given out, the “aggregate amount of days” that those notices have consumed and the

“number of called-in events for which such days are included”.

By enumerating those numbers and putting them together in each report, we can see whether the unit is doing its job well overall, could improve or could undertake activities to make sure that there was a balance between efficiency, effectiveness and fairness in the whole process.

Indeed, it is not just small businesses that might welcome having a light shone on what is being done to them; it would also be a potentially important tool to allow the Secretary of State to see what the unit, which is essentially carrying out the Secretary of State’s work, would be doing over each period of the year. The Secretary of State could use that reporting mechanism as a way of ensuring that the unit is doing what it should and that the principles we have set out in the Bill for the good expedition of information and attendance notices continue to operate in the best possible way over a period of time.

Adding quality to the quantity in the report is good news all around. It enhances the Secretary of State’s ability to manage his or her own Department. It shines a light for those bodies that ought to be co-operators in the process, but that may sometimes feel themselves as victims in the process. It shines a ray of light on the operation of the organisation itself—the unit carrying out these activities—and is therefore a welcome addition to its activities. That will keep it considering the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations in the knowledge that the information will be stuck in a report each year and will be scrutinised in terms of the unit’s activities in carrying out the wishes behind what will be the Act.

The amendment would be a constructive and careful addition to the reporting process, and one that would considerably enhance the effectiveness of the Bill. I hope the Secretary of State can consider it in the light in which it is intended, which is as an addition to the Bill, and not as seeking to undermine the effectiveness of the process or the activities of the unit itself.

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Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Given that, as my hon. Friend sets out, this information should be of use to the unit’s internal workings and that it would, I hope, be readily available in the Department, as part of the workflow in modern-day information management systems, can he think of any reason why the Secretary of State would not want to make it available?

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I cannot immediately, because as I mentioned, having that information available in some way or other—we suggest it should be in the report—is a win, win, win all round. It is useful for everybody and potentially important for some.

I do not suggest for a moment that there might be anything untoward about hiding that information away, and I am sure that the Minister absolutely would not want that to happen. However, under the mechanism he has set out and his argument for why this amendment is unnecessary, that is precisely what could happen, which is not something that we should feel very happy about. I hope that, as a minimum, the Minister will address that point, along with the intervention by the hon. Member for Aberdeen South about this information being freely available one way or another, whether in a report or not. An overwhelmingly better idea would be simply and unobtrusively to add it to the report, so that we knew it would come out and could refer to it.

I am not sure whether we would seek to divide the Committee on this—[Interruption]—but I think we might. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, I am slightly at a loss as to why this provision would not be acknowledged and put in the Bill, or something close to it, one way or another. I invite the Minister to intervene to say whether the disclosure of this information on a regular basis would happen in the report or whether he will give an undertaking to ensure that happens in passing this legislation.

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Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

To be precise, I said that I was not sure whether we should divide, because we are a little bemused as to why, one way or another, that information should not be within the report or the Minister could not make a firm statement that it will be regularly available, and the Minister has not said either in his response.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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My hon. Friend is making an excellent point. Does he agree that it would be helpful if we could be sure that the Minister’s accuracy were not as low when reporting my hon. Friend’s words as when reporting on the functioning of the clause?

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

To be kind, I think the Minister was reflecting on what the motives for our brief discussion about dividing might have been, rather than attempting in any way to put words in people’s mouths that were not there.

I will put Committee members out of their misery. I do not think there was sufficient reassurance in the responses that have been given, and I think we ought to record that we would like the amendment to be in the Bill. Therefore, we will divide the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I see where the hon. Gentleman is coming from. The House has many levers at its disposal, including the Select Committee process, to probe the effectiveness of the new regime.

I shall now make some headway. The provision is designed to ensure that orders reflect changing circumstances and do not remain in force for perpetuity without further consideration. Parties subject to orders may themselves request that the Secretary of State vary or revoke their order. This is another mechanism to ensure that orders remain appropriate. The Secretary of State must consider such requests unless the request relates to a final order and, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, there has been no material change in circumstances since the order was made or last varied, or if the party concerned has previously made a request to vary or revoke the order since that request.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I thank the Minister for the progress he is making in reading out the provisions of these clauses, but I am trying to understand the length of time that an interim order can be in force. What is the maximum time an interim order can be in force?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is time limited, but that does not specify what the time needs to be. I will happily write to the hon. Lady.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I am not sure that it is time limited, because of the number of additional voluntary periods that the Secretary of State can invoke.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am happy to come back to the hon. Lady on that point.

Clause 28 requires that orders made under this Bill be served on anyone required to comply with them and anyone with whom the call-in notice was served. The clause also places certain requirements on the contents of orders or accompanying explanatory material as well as giving the Secretary of State the power to exclude sensitive information. The clause sets out the process that the Secretary of State must follow after making an interim order or final order. This provides the clarity and predictability that we all want for businesses and investors.

First, clause 25 requires the Secretary of State to serve the order on everyone who needs to be aware of it, including anyone who is required to comply with it as well as anyone on whom the call-in notice was served. That will provide clarity for affected parties. The Secretary of State is also required to serve the order on such other persons as he considers appropriate—for example, a regulator who is considering the trigger event might need to be aware of the terms of an order.

Secondly, the clause sets out the information that must be contained within an order or its accompanying explanatory material, including the reasons for making the order, the trigger event to which the order relates, the date on which the order comes into force, and the possible consequences of not complying with the order. That will help to ensure that parties are clear about why the Secretary of State has made the order and what they must now do as a result.

Thirdly, the clause enables the Secretary of State to exclude information from a copy of an order or its accompanying explanatory material that he considers commercially sensitive or national security sensitive. That will help to ensure that the process of serving orders does not negatively impact on parties’ commercial interest or on our national security interest. The clause makes provision for notifying those affected by variations and revocations of orders, with a view to ensuring that they are properly communicated in a timely manner.

I hope that hon. Members feel reassured that clauses 25 to 28 will frustrate hostile actors and enable the Government to work with business in executing this regime, that there are safeguards to ensure that orders do not stay in place longer than is necessary or proportionate, and that all relevant parties will have the information they need in relation to orders. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Let me start my thanking the Minister for setting out the purpose and details of clauses 25 to 28, which set out the remedies and the process of the timelines that we discussed in relation to clause 23. As he has suggested, and as the Opposition recognise, many of our amendments and arguments have been focused on trying to ensure that the process of assessment, interim orders and final orders works not just as effectively as possible, but as clearly as possible. It should be as clear as possible to the many businesses that will come under the remit of the Bill, particularly the small and medium-sized enterprises that the Opposition seek to champion.

On the requirements for interim orders, which are set out in clause 25, the Minister is absolutely right to say that we have to have regard to the actions of hostile actors. Indeed, we will be looking for greater clarity on who those hostile actors might be, but we have to recognise that hostile actors might seek to circumvent the provisions of the Bill in order to make off with important intellectual property or to otherwise influence the companies’ assets that they are seeking to acquire. We therefore recognise the importance of interim orders, as set out in clause 25. As I have told the Minister, I am not clear about the maximum timeline that the interim orders can be in place. Regardless of that, it is clearly necessary for them to be put in place and to be defined. They need to be reviewed and rewritten, and other provisions in clause 25 set that out.

My understanding is that interim orders give way to final orders and the final notifications. Although we have some concerns about how those notifications are to be made, which we shall consider later, a final order, made as effectively and quickly as possible, is clearly important.

I am not sure that the Minister made it clear in clause 26(4):

“Before making a final order the Secretary of State must consider any representations made to the Secretary of State”.

This seems to me to be a very broad statement, yet here we see—as I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test will observe—that it does not say “may”, but “must”. I am not clear what that is seeking to address, as I would have thought that it was normal practice for the Secretary of State to consider representations made to them.

I wonder whether this is setting up the potential for a future judicial—or other—review, should any representation be made that was not considered to have been considered. Perhaps the Minister will write to me to give his view on that, or to set out what part of the process that statement is trying to address or give accountability on.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If the hon. Lady’s question is about how broad clause 26 is—

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Clause 26(4).

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The reason for that is to enable the Secretary of State to tailor remedies accordingly, as a limited list of remedies could result in risks being ineffectively addressed. I am happy to write to her on anything else she requires.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

My question is not about the broadness of the orders, or even the discretion that the Secretary of State has, because, as the Minister has observed, we have sought to probe that level of discretion in these powers; it is about the broadness of the provision that:

“Before making a final order the Secretary of State must consider any representations made to the Secretary of State”.

What is meant by “consider”? How would a failure to do so be identified and reported on, and how would the Secretary of State be held to account? I seek further clarity on that. Perhaps it is obvious to the Minister, and perhaps it is just to me that it is not obvious.

I would say, in agreeing to the provisions set out in clauses 25 to 27, that there are concerns that they will not be part of the general reporting, certainly in the provisions of clause 25, and interim reports are not mentioned in clause 61. I share the concerns of my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test about a lack of reporting on the provisions of the Bill, but we recognise the importance of the clauses and will not be opposing them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 26 to 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Mark Garnier Portrait Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

On a point of order, Mr Twigg. Is it possible to turn up the heating in here? It is incredibly cold.

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Sam Tarry Portrait Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg to move amendment 27, in clause 29, page 19, line 39, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

“(a) would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any person and where the publication would not be in the public interest, or”.

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from redacting notices of final order (and information within them) on commercial grounds if redacting is contrary to the public interest.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on this frosty morning, Mr Twigg. The amendment is on the public interest for disclosure. It is really about preventing the Secretary of State from redacting notices of final order and the information with them. The Opposition believe that commercial grounds for redacting are contrary to the public interest. It is about putting as much information as possible into the public realm about stuff that is particularly controversial but is really about clear protection of our national security.

Our strong belief is that the fundamental task of any Government, and the reason for the Bill overall, is the protection of our national security. A critical driver of that security is the wider public understanding of the rapidly changing threats that we face, and the different sources of those threats. We have heard from various expert witnesses over the past few weeks that other countries understand, perhaps far better than we do, what some of those threats are, and that our public understanding of threats is even more limited.

When Sir Richard Dearlove gave evidence, with vast experience spanning decades, he said:

“What is important about the Bill is that it raises parliamentary and public awareness of the issue.”—[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 24, Q30.]

Everyone on both sides of the House would like to see that. He also said, talking about China specifically:

“We need to conduct our relationship with China with much more wisdom and care. The Chinese understand us incredibly well. They have put their leadership through our universities for 20 or 30 years. We in comparison hardly know anything about China”—[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 20, Q21.]

The wider point in his evidence was that for too long our business priorities and the desire to be an attractive investment destination had overridden some of the security concerns, across a number of different Governments, perhaps creating a pattern of not taking the threats posed by China as seriously as possible.

The Bill requires the Secretary of State to publish notices of final order, setting out the details of persons and events involving national security that meant the notices were made. Those details are critical to our security and to our understanding of the threats. They must be made public. The amendment would put into the public domain the accurate information that will create public confidence on what the clause seeks to achieve.

As drafted, the clause prevents the publication of information that is critical to our security if it prejudices commercial interest. The Opposition believe that is the wrong judgment. The whole point of the Bill is to take a more strategic view, as indicated by Sir Richard Dearlove. The focus should be on long-term security, but the Bill is a way to protect not only security but our long-term commercial interests. The approach in the amendment might mean some short-term commercial challenges, but it is absolutely right for our national security and our longer-term prosperity.

The amendment would require the Government to publish all details of a final order notice where it is in the interests of national security and the public interest, even when commercial interest could be prejudiced. Where a hostile actor acts against our security interests, it is crucial for the British public to know about it and that we have some appropriate conversations in the public domain. Not to disclose such threats or events for the sake of protecting imminent profits in the short term would be the wrong judgment.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank my hon. Friend for the amendment and for the excellent point that he is making. Does he think that if a company was being acquired by a hostile actor, and the Secretary of State thought that knowledge of the acquisition would be detrimental to the commercial interests of the company, the clause would allow the Secretary of State to redact that information? It would be in the general public’s interest to know that such an acquisition was taking place.

Sam Tarry Portrait Sam Tarry
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. It is our belief that national security must be the overriding priority when threats emerge in an ever-changing world. We have heard evidence that threats that should have been seen were not dealt with in the correct way. Bringing that into the public domain through the amendment is incredibly important. That would override the short-term commercial pain if it guaranteed that security was paramount.

If we did not disclose such threats or events, and the focus was just on the short-term protection of swift profits, that would be the wrong judgment, because it would downgrade the overarching purpose of the Bill, which is to use all its mechanisms to enhance our security and ensure that we are on top of it at all times. The amendment would correct the focal point of this area of the Bill, by requiring before any redaction on commercial grounds an assessment of whether publishing would be in the public interest. That puts the onus on, and gives power to, the Secretary of State to make those crucial judgments.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I rise to say a few words in support of my hon. Friend’s amendment. The excellent points that he has made have highlighted a theme of the Committee’s discussions: the potential conflict between the Department’s focus on supporting business and investment into the UK, and our national security. As he set out, the public interest might be in knowing that a hostile acquisition was taking place and in being better informed generally about national security. In addition, I can think of many examples in which the knowledge that a company had come into the purview of the Bill could have a detrimental impact on its stock valuation or reputation.

When the Minister responds, I hope that he will set out what he expects the Secretary of State to do when there is a conflict of interest between public knowledge of hostile actors and specific measures in the Bill to ensure that companies related to potential hostile actors, or those for whom our national security is not in their interests—through chains of influence or company holdings, for example—should not be beyond the reach of the Bill. The clause, by enabling the Secretary of State to leave out details that prejudice the commercial interests of any person, seems to put the focus back on commercial interests rather than national security. The amendment would put the focus back on national security and the public interest.

National Security and Investment Bill (Tenth sitting) Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Department of Health and Social Care

National Security and Investment Bill (Tenth sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

Before we adjourned, the Committee was considering amendment 27 to clause 29, and I believe that Chi Onwurah was in the process of concluding her remarks.

Clause 29

Publication of notice of final order

Amendment proposed this day: 27, in clause 29, page 19, line 39, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

“(a) would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any person and where the publication would not be in the public interest, or”—(Sam Tarry.)

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from redacting notices of final order (and information within them) on commercial grounds if redacting is contrary to the public interest.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
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I had been just about to conclude by saying that a key reason for the amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South is that it asserts and requires the supremacy of the public interest over commercial interest in the Secretary of State’s actions in reporting on final notices. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

With your permission, Sir Graham, I will speak to clause 29 stand part before turning to the amendment. The Committee has heard about the careful balance that the Government are striking in this regime by allowing for a discreet and commercially sensitive screening process wherever possible, while requiring transparency at key junctures where not to do so could disadvantage third parties.

Clause 29 is a key clause, the purpose of which is to deliver that essential but carefully chosen transparency. It places a duty on the Secretary of State to publish a notice of the fact that a final order has been made, varied or revoked. The main purpose of publishing notice of those facts is to ensure that third parties who may have a financial interest in a trigger event are not disadvantaged by the provision of information only to the parties involved. Examples of relevant third parties might include shareholders, suppliers or customers of the target entity, and other investors who may be considering investing.

The clause will provide important reassurance to the business community and the wider public about the circumstances in which final orders are made, varied and revoked. It specifies what information must appear in a notice, including, crucially, a summary of the order, revocation or variation, its effect, and the reasons for it. Similarly to the approach on orders, subsection (3) allows the Secretary of State to exclude information from the notice when he considers it commercially sensitive or national security sensitive. The clause is complemented by the requirement in clause 61 for the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the use of the powers in the Bill. Clause 61(2) sets out an extensive list of the aggregate data that the annual report must include. Together, those provisions will help investors and businesses to understand the regime, and will ensure that Parliament can hold the Government to account on their operation at both individual and aggregate levels.

I will now turn to amendment 27 to clause 29. I remind the Committee that the clause requires the Secretary of State to publish a notice when a final order has been made, varied or revoked. As drafted, subsection (3)(a) provides that the Secretary of State may exclude from that public notice anything that he considers likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any person. The amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from excluding such information, unless he considers that publishing it would not be in the public interest.

The Committee has heard about the careful balance that the Government are seeking to strike in this regime, to allow, as I mentioned earlier, for a discreet and commercially sensitive screening process wherever possible, while requiring transparency at key junctures when not to do so may disadvantage third parties. As I set out, this is a key clause, the purpose of which is to deliver that carefully balanced transparency. Inherent in the clause is the degree of flexibility afforded to the Secretary of State to redact information when he judges that to be appropriate, whether for commercial or national security reasons. I hesitate slightly to return to a somewhat recurring theme—the difference between “may” and “shall”—but the fact that the Secretary of State “may” redact information provides him with the flexibility to decide case by case whether that is the right thing to do.

The hon. Member for Ilford South seeks to ensure with this amendment that the Secretary of State will not disregard the public interest when using the flexibility on deciding whether to redact information. The hon. Gentleman need not worry; that is my message to him. The Secretary of State will always seek to serve the public interest in this Bill and in all that he does. I can therefore assure the hon. Gentleman that the Secretary of State will carefully consider any redactions made and that he will not take the decision to exclude information lightly.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

rose

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I suspect that the hon. Member for Ilford South may wonder why, if it makes so little difference, we do not include his amendment and formalise the importance of considering the public interest. I suspect that that is also the point on which the hon. Lady wishes to intervene.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

The Committee recognises the importance of giving the powers in the Bill to the Secretary of State in the interests of national security. The powers of redaction are, or could be, in the interests of commercial sensitivity. Does the Minister agree that national security and the public interest should be supreme over commercial sensitivity? Why will he not make that clear?

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Sam Tarry Portrait Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham, in these temperatures, which are positively balmy compared with the Siberian ones that we experienced this morning.

I thank the Minister for his comments, but I would say that there is no stretch too far on national security. It is positive to hear that the Minister agrees that the focus on national security is crucial, and that we are driving at the interests of national security in our amendment.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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Was my hon. Friend as confused as I was when the Minister spoke about this Bill not being the place to introduce public interest? The Government, however, have introduced commercial sensitivity. We are not seeking to modify national security; it is the introduction of commercial sensitivity that requires the introduction of public interest. We are talking about modifying the importance of commercial sensitivity, not national security. Will my hon. Friend join me in rejecting the Minister’s assertion?

Sam Tarry Portrait Sam Tarry
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I agree wholeheartedly with my hon. Friend. We have been clear that the amendment is simply about preventing the Secretary of State from redacting notices of final order on commercial grounds, if redaction is contrary to the public interest. The whole point of this Bill is to together public interest, national security and commercial interest because they are one and the same. National security is our highest priority, but in the post-Brexit scenario we want to be a country that is as open and positive as possible towards investment from international partners if they share our values and our objectives of supporting and building Britain. It feels as though the Minister is agreeing with us in part, but he is not prepared to accept this amendment. For that reason, I will press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Financial assistance
Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 30, page 19, line 44, leave out

“making of a final order”

and insert

“making of an interim or a final order”.

This amendment would enable the Secretary of State to give financial assistance in consequence of the making of an interim order.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 28, in clause 30, page 20, line 3, after “period” insert “or any calendar year,”.

This amendment would make it mandatory for the Government to inform Parliament if financial assistance given in any financial year, or in any calendar year, exceeds £100 million.

Clause stand part.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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My hon. Friends and I have set out how we are seeking to provide constructive support and improvement for this Bill. I am disappointed that the Minister seems to feel that no improvement is possible, but I hope to persuade him otherwise with amendment 24. It is not a probing amendment; it brings a much-needed improvement to what I consider to be an incomprehensible omission in clause 30.

Clause 30 provides that the Secretary of State may, with the consent of the Treasury, give financial assistance to, or in respect of, an entity through a loan guarantee or indemnity, or any other form of financial assistance. The financial assistance must be given as a consequence of him making a final order. That is a key point that I will return to.

Clause 30 further states that during any financial year, if the amount given under the clause totals £100 million or more, the Secretary of State must lay a report of the amount before the House of Commons. It states that during any financial year in which a report has been laid before Parliament, if the Secretary of State provides any further financial assistance under this clause, he must lay before the House a report of the amount.

I set that out to indicate that, as I understand it, the amount of financial assistance that can be provided is not limited. A report must be provided when the amount given under this clause totals £100 million or more, but there is no limit on the amount which can be provided. One would expect the Treasury to provide a limit in any year, but the Bill does not set any limit on the amount of financial assistance that the Secretary of State can make available. It does not, however, provide for any financial assistance in the case of an interim order. The provision applies only to a final order, specifically in clause 30, on page 19, in line 44. That is why we seek simply to change that to include interim orders under the scope of the financial assistance clause.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

For the benefit of the Committee, I will begin with clause 30 stand part, which makes provision for financial assistance. I will then turn to amendment 24, and amendment 28 from the hon. Member for Aberdeen South.

The Government recognise that final orders, in exceptional cases—and I have to stress in exceptional cases, when we are administering taxpayers’ money—may bring about financial difficulty for the affected parties. This clause therefore gives the Secretary of State the legal authority to provide financial assistance to, or in relation to, entities in consequence of the making of a final order, to mitigate the impacts of a final order, for example. It might also be used where the consequence of a final order in itself might otherwise impact the country’s national security interests.

Hon. Members will know that such clauses are required to provide parliamentary authority for spending by Government in pursuit of policy objectives where no existing statutory authority for such expenditure already exists.   I am confident that such assistance would be given only in exceptional circumstances when no alternative was available. For example, the Secretary of State could impose a final order blocking an acquisition of an entity that is an irreplaceable supplier to Government, subsequently putting the financial viability of the entity in doubt. In such a situation, the Secretary of State could provide financial assistance to the entity to ensure that the supplier could continue operating while an alternative buyer was found.

Such spending would of course be subject to the existing duty of managing public money—the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central asked what checks and balances are in place—and compliant with any other legal obligations concerning the use of Government funds. To provide further explicit reassurance regarding the use of the power, subsection (1) specifies that any financial assistance may be given only with the consent of the Treasury.

The clause also covers reporting to the House when financial assistance is given under the clause. I will speak to that further when I turn to the amendments. I am sure that hon. Members will see the clause as necessary and appropriate, and have confidence that our Government, and future Governments, will have only limited, but sufficient, freedom to provide financial support under the regime as a result.

Amendment 24 would permit the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance in consequence of making an interim order, which was the hon. Lady’s point. As she will know, the Government take the management of our country’s finances very seriously, and such a power naturally requires appropriate safeguards to ensure that public money is spent appropriately. Restricting the power to final orders ensures that the Secretary of State may use it only to assist entities once a national security assessment has been completed and final remedies have been imposed—for example, to mitigate the impact of a final order on a company. It would not be appropriate to use the power to provide aid to an entity that is only temporarily affected by an interim order, which will last only for a period of review, likely to take 30 working days and, at most, 75.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for his comments. When he says that an interim order can be in place for at most 75 days, I think he is adding 30 days, which is the initial period, to 45 days, which is the additional period. I am afraid that he is forgetting the voluntary periods.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Yes, but the point remains that no final order has been made, and public money will be spent only in very limited circumstances, as I mentioned, in consequence of a final order. Any expenditure will be subject to appropriate safeguards.

Amendment 28, tabled by the hon. Member for Aberdeen South, would require the Secretary of State to inform Parliament if financial assistance given under clause 30 in any financial year, or any calendar year, exceeds £100 million. If during any financial year the assistance given under the clause totals £100 million or more, subsection (3) as drafted requires the Secretary of State to lay a report of the amount before the House.

If, during any financial year in which such a report has been laid, the Secretary of State provides any further financial assistance under the clause, subsection (4) requires that he lay a further report of the amount, so if he makes a report before the end of the year and then spends more money, which was the hon. Gentleman’s point, the Secretary of State will need to update the report. As I am sure the hon. Gentleman appreciates, the Government are committed to providing as much transparency as is reasonably possible when it comes to the use of the new investment screening regime provided for in the Bill.

The amendment would effectively mean that the Secretary of State must stand before Parliament twice—likely, once at the end of the calendar year and again at the end of the financial year, a few months later—to lay what is likely to be a rather similar report of the amount given in financial assistance grants under the clause. Although the Secretary of State would be flattered by his popularity, I am sure the hon. Member for Aberdeen South would agree that seeing him for that purpose twice in such a short time would be a case of duplication, and the Secretary of State would not want to take up his valuable time unnecessarily. I can assure him that the Secretary of State is fully committed to transparency and will ensure that Parliament has the information that it needs to track the use of the powers in the regime.

For those reasons, I am unable to accept the amendments, and I hope that hon. Members will not press them.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for his comments, but I am disappointed that he seems determined merely to respond from his notes, regardless of the validity of the points put to him. On why it is inappropriate for financial assistance to be provided in the case of interim orders, his reason—as far as I can understand it—was purely that interim orders were too short to make any difference. Although he cannot say how long an interim order will last—he can say how long he thinks it may last—it could go on indefinitely, because I cannot see in clause 26 a limit on the number or length of voluntary periods that may be agreed for the assessment. On that basis, the assessment could last a significant time.

In any case, I hope that he, as the Minister for Business and Industry, is aware of how fast-paced the technology sector, in particular, can be. The inability to raise finance at a critical moment or to sell to a particular customer, for example, may cause significant financial and commercial damage to a small business or a start-up. I did not hear the Minister reject that point, yet he has rejected the need for any support during the period of an interim order. As I have shown, that is a mistake, and that is why we will press the amendment to a vote.

The Minister also made no response to my question about equity.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I apologise—I should have responded to that, and it was remiss of me not to. We will consider all forms of financial assistance, including equity.

To respond to the point the hon. Lady has just made about companies that may have IP or a product in its early, nascent stage of growth, that are struggling and that are fast-moving in terms of raising funds, we at BEIS talk to many companies like that, outside the remit of the Bill, and we look to support them in a variety of ways.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I genuinely thank the Minister for the clarification that equity investments will be included in this bit of the Bill.

Matt Western Portrait Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

We are focusing greatly on small and medium-sized businesses, but this can also happen to slightly larger organisations, which might be outside the commonly used definition of an SME. When a larger business is distressed because it has lost a major customer and finds itself in financial difficulty, it needs that cash injection, so that sort of assurance is important.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

As always, my hon. Friend makes a really important point, and one that I had not thought of. The point about this being applicable to medium-sized businesses is absolutely right. In some ways, medium-sized businesses can often be at a critical point; cash flow is so important, and they could suddenly become very distressed, but with the right cash flow or the right injection of capital, they could expand greatly.

Will the Minister consider this? During the pandemic, when certain innovations have become incredibly important, and cash and support are needed to significantly increase the volume of production—of a vaccine, shall we say, with which the Minister is intimately concerned—a delay of 30, 70 or whatever days will create a huge problem for a medium-sized or growing business, as well as for small businesses.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

In response to a point made by the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington about a company being in distress because it has lost a client, irrespective of the national security and investment regime we talk to such companies all the time. Whether they are small, nascent, medium-sized or large, we have other avenues of assistance to help those companies. That is the point I was making.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for that, which brings me to the point that I wanted to make in response to him. I discerned that that seemed to be his point—that the Bill may cause harm to companies, but that rather than seeking redress under the Bill, or this clause in particular, they should seek redress or some kind of compensation through the well-oiled machinery of Government that provides support for small and growing businesses. I am afraid that that response will be met with undiluted cynicism among the many small and medium-sized businesses that have dealt with Government.

Again, we are talking about a fast-moving situation. Perhaps the Minister will provide examples of where, on such timescales, support has been provided. More importantly, if that is a consequence of the Bill, why would it not be addressed in the Bill, especially as we have a clause that seeks to address this issue in the case of notices of final order. I gave the example of OneWeb satellites, which was a major investment that took some time to come about, and we were not clear whether it was a strategic asset or national security. Clarity is critical.

Matt Western Portrait Matt Western
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

This is important. I take on board exactly what the Minister is saying, but I am sure he can assure me on this. To give one specific example, Imagination Technologies is a fantastic company, which lost its major customer, which was Apple. Chinese-backed investment—private equity—then came in. The US refused the company the chance to buy into a US business in 2017. I would love to think that whoever was in BEIS in 2017 looked at it closely and offered support. This might be beyond our remit, but it is important that such businesses are reached out to. Will someone in the Minister’s team confirm that the Government tried to support Imagination Technologies?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I very much hope that the Minister or his Department will respond to that. My hon. Friend gave an example of an innovative company in need of support from the Department. Presumably it was similar to the cases we are discussing now, and that support was offered. If confirmation is not forthcoming, we should perhaps look for it via a parliamentary question, which might help us.

I want to say one word about amendment 28, which seeks to ensure that the term of the reporting does not undermine what is reported or its effectiveness. The Minister said that if the £100 million barrier was crossed, another report would have to be made on any further expenditure. However, the amendment concerns a small amount of expenditure in a given period, followed by a larger amount, and whether the periods in which the expenditure was made might mean that a report did not have to be made. The Minister also did not address the question of why £100 million was the right threshold for making a report. On that basis, I wish to press the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Ilford South would require the Secretary of State, when publishing a direction given to the CMA under the clause, to set out the reasons for the direction and provide an assessment of its impact on any grounds for action by the CMA in relation to the merger. Let me reassure the Committee that I expect the use of such directions to be rare. Most mergers are unlikely to trigger both competition and national security concerns, and for those that do, the separate processes of the CMA and the Secretary of State will be able to take place smoothly in parallel with each other.
Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

The Minister says that it is unlikely that investigations would trigger concerns on both national security and competition grounds. However, the position that we are in right now with regard to Huawei is one in which the desire for more competition in our telecoms supply chain—that is, to have three vendors as opposed to two—led to a national security impact, which is why we are now in the process of ripping Huawei out of our network. Does he recognise that such examples may happen?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the hon. Lady, but the difference is that I was referring to mergers. Such mergers would be rare. I do not think that anyone is merging with Huawei, or will in the future.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

It is quite clear that the acquisition of a vendor in our telecoms network by another country would have almost exactly the same outcome, so it may well apply.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I was merely pointing out that there was no merger. The hon. Lady will forgive me: she is correct, but I did say that it is a rare occurrence. That is the point that I was making to the Committee.

The amendment seeks to impose a requirement to publish the reasons for giving a direction. We do not think that that is necessary. The clause already requires the Secretary of State to publish a direction in the manner that he considers appropriate. I do not think that I would be disclosing too many state secrets were I to speculate that that would be published on gov.uk. That is a reasonable bet. In many cases, I envisage that it is likely to be accompanied by a high-level explanation, but it is right that the Secretary of State should be able to decide what is appropriate on a case-by-case basis.

The amendment also seeks to require publication of an assessment of the direction’s impact on any grounds for action under part 3 of the Enterprise Act 2002. I have two points to make to the hon. Member for Ilford South. First, such a duty would not be appropriate in all cases—for example, where a direction simply required the CMA not to make a decision on competition remedies until a national security assessment had been concluded. The amendment as drafted would still require an assessment to be published in those circumstances.

Secondly, the predominant impact on grounds for action will of course relate to competition. The CMA is the independent expert competition authority, and nothing in the clause as drafted would prevent it from publishing its own assessment of the impact of a Secretary of State direction on the possible competition issues of a case. The clause also requires the Secretary of State to consult the CMA before giving a direction, so it will be able to inform him of the likely impact and he can factor that into his decision whether to give the direction. I believe that is the right approach and while I understand the hon. Member’s motivations in tabling the amendment, I urge him to withdraw it.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clauses 40 to 47 cover the civil sanctions under the Bill. I will cover them fairly briefly but I am happy to discuss them in more detail if it would be of interest to the Committee.

It is vital that the Secretary of State has appropriate powers to punish and deter non-compliance with the regime. Should a person breach an order under the regime or fail to provide information or evidence where required, it is vital that the Secretary of State has the power to bring the offender into compliance as quickly as possible to ensure the efficacy of the regime.

Clause 40 provides the Secretary of State with the powers to impose monetary penalties on a person where he is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person has committed an offence under clauses 32 to 34. Clause 40(6) requires the Secretary of State to consider the amount of a monetary penalty to be appropriate before imposing it and it must not exceed the relevant maximum set out in clause 41. The power to impose monetary penalties instead of pursuing criminal proceedings will contribute to ensuring that the Secretary of State has a number of enforcement options to tailor to the situation.

The Secretary of State will not take the power to impose monetary penalties lightly and is required by clause 40(7) to take into account a number of factors, including the seriousness of the offence and any steps taken by the person to remedy the offence in question. I am confident that hon. Members will agree that the clause is valuable in ensuring that the Secretary of State has the appropriate enforcement mechanism to secure compliance with the new regime.

Clause 41 sets out the maximum fixed penalty and, where applicable, the maximum daily rate penalty that may be imposed. The penalties set out here are substantive, and I recognise that they may seem draconian, but they may have to be issued against companies that have significant financial incentive to disregard legal requirements under the regime and put national security at risk by going ahead with an acquisition, so the penalties need to be an effective incentive to comply. I also remind Members that these are maximum penalties; the Secretary of State will have a duty to ensure that any penalty imposed is reasonable and proportionate.

The clause also enables the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying how the maximum penalties applicable to businesses should be calculated and to amend the maximum penalty amounts or percentage rates. It is important that we can adjust any penalties over time, to ensure that they are a sufficient deterrent against non-compliance.

Clause 42 requires the Secretary of State to keep all monetary penalties imposed under review. It also provides a power to vary or revoke penalty notices as appropriate in the light of changing circumstances. Importantly, under the clause, where new evidence comes to light about a breach, it can be taken into account by the Secretary of State, and the penalty notice can be increased, decreased or revoked as appropriate. In all variations, there is, of course, a right of appeal, which is provided for by clause 50.

It is important that both criminal and civil sanctions should be available against offences committed under the Bill, but it would not be appropriate for them to be used in tandem. Clause 43 ensures that parties cannot be subject to both criminal and civil sanctions for the same offence. The clause is vital in giving businesses and other parties certainty and assurance that they will not be penalised in two separate ways for the same offence, which would clearly be unfair.

Clause 44 gives the Secretary of State the power to enforce monetary penalties by making unpaid penalties recoverable, as if they were payable under a court. Failure to comply with a penalty notice would be enforced in the same way as a court order to recover unpaid debts. It also provides for interest to be charged on unpaid penalties that are due.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for setting out the provisions of these clauses. Perhaps this is my ignorance, but what will happen to the moneys recouped through the penalties?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am very happy to write to the hon. Lady on that, but I suppose the money goes back to the Treasury.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

That was my assumption, but I know that in certain cases penalties can be used to offset the expenses incurred in creating the regulatory regime, or in supporting companies that are adversely affected, as we discussed earlier.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am very happy to come back to the hon. Lady on that point.

Clause 45 ensures that the Government are not unduly burdened with costs relating to the imposition of monetary penalties, which can be expensive. The clause enables the Secretary of State to recover the associated costs from those who are issued with a penalty notice. The amount demanded will depend on the circumstances of each case, but the Secretary of State will need to comply with public law duties in imposing the requirements and in fixing the amount. In particular, the amount will need to be proportionate.

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Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank my hon. Friend for the excellent points that he is making, which give cause for concern and thought. Given the Minister’s earlier assertion that there was no need for a complaints procedure with regard to the provisions of the Bill, does my hon. Friend agree that neither the reporting requirement, which we have identified will not mean reporting on everything, nor the judicial review provisions, which we have now identified are not reviewable in the normal timescales for everything, will be sufficient to address the concerns of small and medium-sized enterprises? Does he also agree that that will clearly not be the case given the complexities that he has outlined?

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend makes an important point about the extent to which justice in such circumstances might be like the Ritz: open to everybody, but not necessarily quite as open to some as to others.

Certainly, that is the case with the time reduction applied to those particular things in the clause. Nevertheless, that reduction has to fit in with judicial review rules for everything else. That is, no new procedure is set out in the Bill, which is otherwise reliant on the standard judicial review procedures.

Hon. Members will see that elsewhere the civil procedure rules refer to the provision of skeleton arguments before a judicial review can be heard. Under those rules, such arguments must be undertaken within 21 working days of a hearing, which in practice means close to the 28 days in the clause, which are not as working days. Given the adherence to the rest of the judicial review rules, therefore, the 28 days can conceivably reduce to virtually nothing the period in which a person may apply for a claim to judicial review under the Bill.

Furthermore—this is what I think my hon. Friend was alluding to—given that brief timescale, it is important and I would say necessary to have a clear idea of when the event that caused the 28-day timescale to come in took place. I turned up an interesting article, one of Weightmans’ “Insights”, from October 2013, entitled “Is the clock ticking? The importance of time limits in judicial review”. The point made in that article is that getting the point at which the clock started ticking absolutely right is important.

I am not certain whether all the events specified in the clause have identical starting points. That is, is the starting point a trigger mechanism? Is the starting point the issuing of a notice? Is the starting point the receipt of a notice? If the receipt of a notice is delayed—and the judicial review procedure very much hinges on the actions of the Secretary of State in issuing notices—my hon. Friend can imagine that, for a small business, that could be very confusing and possibly difficult to adhere to. If it turns out that the point at which the 28-day clock starts to tick varies according to different provisions of the clause, descibed as the particular provisions that the Secretary of State has reserved for the 28-day reduction in judicial review, that will be pretty difficult for people to adhere to properly.

Judicial review is a very important part of the process; not that it would often be used, but it is important that it is there in the Bill. It is also important that the people affected by the arrangements have access to the judicial review process. The Government obviously recognise that by putting it into legislation. I am concerned not about the fact that it is in the legislation—it should be—but about whether placing certain areas of concern in the Bill under that 28-day heading has been completely thought out. If it has been completely thought out, why has it been thought out in that particular way? What is it about those things that requires the normal rules of judicial review to be reduced from three months to 28 days?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I am sorry to interrupt my hon. Friend while he is in full flow, and I am immensely grateful for what I am learning about the intricacies of the judicial review process and the importance of understanding the initial timing and what the trigger event was. He mentioned that skeleton hearings must take place within 21 working days. Can he say a little bit more, for my understanding, about how those skeleton hearings affect the following timetables in the process?

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend somehow suggests that I have knowledge and expertise beyond my calling. I should say that I am not a lawyer, so I have only limited guidance to give her on this. However, from my reading of civil procedure rules, there are certainly elements, which I think relate to working days in some instances and to simple time in others, that are sub-time limits within the overall limit for judicial review. Civil procedure rules give those sub-limits as working practices for the operation of judicial review overall. The skeleton argument rule requires skeleton arguments to be put to the court within a certain period before the hearing takes place. If the hearing is delayed for a long time after the initial event, the 21 days apply before the court hearing. However, if the court hearing is close to the event, those sub-rules within the overall judicial review rules could affect quite substantially an individual’s remaining time to get their case together prior to the hearing.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his reasoned and thoughtful remarks. As I said in my intervention, all decisions in the Bill are subject to judicial review. Clause 49 does not apply to information sharing post screening or enforcement decisions. The exception to JR is monetary penalties and cost recovery, which have a bespoke appeals process, as he probably knows.

Clause 49 concerns the procedure for judicial review of certain decisions. The clause provides that any claim for judicial review of certain decisions, which are set out in the clause, must be no more than 28 days after the day on which the grounds for the claim first arose, unless the court considers that there are exceptional circumstances. That period is shorter than the usual period in which a judicial review may be sought, as we have heard from the hon. Member for Southampton, Test. Generally, judicial reviews must be sought within three months, and in England and Wales, but not in Scotland or Northern Ireland, they must also be sought “promptly”.

I will set out why that is the case shortly when I turn to amendment 26, but I believe that the shortened time limit strikes the right balance for the regime, enabling sufficient time for a claim to be lodged while providing for timely certainty about the effect of relevant decisions made under the Bill. I should also note that the court may entertain proceedings that are sought after the 28-day limit if it considers that exceptional circumstances apply. The usual route to challenge a decision made by the Secretary of State is via judicial review, and this is entirely appropriate for decisions made under the Bill. However, it is vital that this route does not result in prolonged uncertainty over decisions relating to screening.

I now turn to amendment 26, which seeks to extend the period within which applications for judicial review may be made from 28 days to three months. As I have set out, the Bill’s 28-day period in which claims for judicial review of certain decisions made under the Bill generally must be filed is shorter than the usual period in which judicial review may be sought. Again, it is entirely right that the hon. Gentleman wishes to probe us on why that is the case as judicial review plays a key role, which he clearly agrees with, in ensuring that the Government, and the Secretary of State in the case of this regime, act within the limits of the law. We have thought carefully about that while developing the Bill, and I welcome this discussion.

Why the shorter period? It is undeniably important that the Secretary of State is held independently accountable for his decisions under the regime. That must, however, be balanced—this is the important thing—against the need to avoid prolonged uncertainty over the status of screened acquisitions or the general functioning of the screening regime, which may have a chilling effect on investment, leaving the types of questions that a judicial review would answer, such as whether a decision to clear a transaction was unlawful, potentially still open for three months before it is clear that a judicial review is not going to be sought, which could make it extremely difficult for the various parties affected to plan and adjust following such a decision. Any party with a sufficient interest could seek a judicial review and all parties affected could be impacted. That is why we have come to this decision.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for the points he is making, which I am seeking to understand. Clause 49(2) mentions “relevant decisions”. Why would “section 19”, “section 20” and “section 21” that deal with the powers to require information and so on cause uncertainty, and not other provisions in the Bill?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The point I was trying to make is that the uncertainty in any of those sections means that any party to a transaction can, if they feel they could frustrate the process because the outcome might not be advantageous to them, use the judicial review process to add to the uncertainty of a transaction. In addition, there is also a public interest in timely certainty and finality about decisions made under the regime that are, after all, imposed for the purpose of safeguarding national security. The 28-day limit is also in line with the current merger screening regime that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test asked about, where applications for the competitions appeal tribunal made under the Enterprise Act 2002 to review a merger decision must be made within four weeks, a time period chosen after public consultation. There may be some situations where, for legitimate reasons, 28 days is simply not enough. It is therefore important to remember that this Bill provides that the court may “entertain proceedings” that are sought after the 28-day limit, if it is considered that exceptional circumstances apply.

This shortened time limit and flexibility is for the courts to deal with exceptional circumstances. It strikes the right balance for this regime, in my view. It allows sufficient time for parties to obtain legal advice and mount a challenge, while also providing timely certainty about the effect of the relevant decision made under the Bill. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test will withdraw the amendment.

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I have to be honest, I did not think that was very good. Let us start with who is shortening and who is not shortening. The Minister said that the Opposition seek to lengthen the period; no, the Opposition are not seeking to lengthen the period. The Government are seeking to shorten the period that is standard in the UK justice system as far as judicial reviews overall are concerned.

That is a very important point, because the Opposition are not trying to do something that is not an ordinary principle of British justice; the Government are trying to that. The Minister’s remarks could have applied to a lot of other areas, where it might be a bit inconvenient to have a judicial review being tenable for a three-month period after an event had occurred. However, it is not a question of inconvenience. Is a matter so important to national security that the 28 days can be justified under those terms?

The Minister has sought to justify the 28 days under the terms that there may be some uncertainty if there is a longer period for judicial review to be undertaken. He is potentially right about that, but not right as far as this Bill is concerned. He is right potentially as far as any application for judicial review is concerned, in all sorts of areas in this country. That is the problem of judicial review for the Administration, under any circumstances. When someone comes along and says, “I’m going to JR this,” a lot of people clap their hands and say, “That’s very inconvenient. It really does foul things up, because we would like to do this, that and next thing, but because we have been judicially reviewed, we have to carry out the procedure that is there.”

As several people have said in a number of different circumstances, the fact that the JR procedure is there and that often ordinary people have a reasonable amount of time to get their case together to undertake the JR process, is an important principle of the British justice system. The Minister has made no serious case for why these things should be so special under these circumstances. Interestingly, the consultation document did not make any case at all for the 28 days, other than to note that it was a shorter period. I am sorry to say that this appears to be a shortened period simply for administrative convenience.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Does my hon. Friend think that shortening the JR period for administrative reasons is especially contentious, given that the judicial review process would be the only option for small and medium enterprises to complain about the way in which they are being treated under this process? The Minister says that their only option to make a complaint is effectively to JR it, yet they are given less time to JR it.

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head. In many circumstances, we are not talking about the sort of JRs that we hear about in the press, where a big corporation has been judicially reviewed on some subject by another large corporation, or some big body has judicially reviewed someone else about a planning decision.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

With permission, Sir Graham, I will speak to clauses 50, 51 and 52 together. Clause 50 concerns appeals against penalty notices or variation notices. It is only right that parties have the opportunity to appeal decisions made by the Secretary of State in relation to monetary penalties imposed. Clause 50 provides a person who has received a penalty notice or a variation notice with the right to appeal to the court within 28 days, starting from the day after the notice is served.

On an appeal against a penalty notice, the clause provides that the court may confirm or quash the decision to impose a monetary penalty, confirm or reduce the amount of a penalty, and confirm or vary the period in which the penalty must be paid. It may not increase the amount of the monetary penalty. Where the appeal is against a variation notice, the court may confirm, vary or quash the variation, but again it may not increase the amount of the monetary penalty.

Clause 51 provides a right of appeal against decisions made by the Secretary of State related to requirements to pay costs associated with monetary penalties. Clause 52 concerns extraterritorial application and jurisdiction to try offences under the regime. Let me briefly turn back to clauses 32 to 35, which create the offences of the regime. We would normally expect that if those offences occurred, they would happen in the UK. That will not, however, always be the case, and offences will not always involve UK nationals or bodies.

As befits a regime that concerns the actions of international actors in relation to the United Kingdom, the Bill has some application beyond the shores of the UK. For example, the Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to issue final orders on conduct outside the UK by certain categories of person with a connection to the UK, including UK nationals and companies incorporated here. Therefore, clause 52 provides for the offences in clauses 32 to 35 to have extraterritorial effect, including in relation to non-UK nationals and bodies. That means that conduct abroad that amounts to an offence can be prosecuted and it also enables the Secretary of State to impose monetary penalties in relation to offences committed outside the UK. That ensures that regime obligations are not unenforceable simply because they concern conduct abroad. I hope that hon. Members will agree that, in a globalised world where transactions routinely take place across borders, it is important for enforcement to be able to react with equal agility. I therefore submit that the appeals process set out in the clauses should be adopted and that, in a globalised world, it is necessary for extraterritorial regime breaches to be enforceable.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

It is a pleasure to respond in this debate and observe how quickly we have galloped throughs parts 2 and 3. I wonder if that may in part relate to the descending temperatures that we are enjoying. While I know that the Committee shares my fascination with the various procedural and judicial issues with which we were wrestling, the temperature gave no scope for anyone to get comfortable enough to fail to pay attention. I recognise that we on this side of the Committee are in an advantageous position in that we are furthest from the open windows.

We recognise the importance of clauses 50 to 52 in terms of appeals against monetary penalties, of appeals against costs and of having extraterritorial application and jurisdiction to try offences. The Minister set out the reasons for that. To return to an intervention from the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, I am concerned about whether the provisions will be enforceable and useable in having extraterritorial application and jurisdiction over those who are not British and where the offence does not take place in the UK. Do the Government envisage––the impact assessment is, once again, remarkably silent on this––issuing international warrants to get access to those thought to have committed offences but who are not in the UK? Will the measures be pursued and enforced actively or are they there to deal with exceptional circumstances? I would be happy for the Minister to intervene.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I think that the hon. Lady’s question is whether the Government will genuinely be able to punish offences committed overseas. Clearly, in a globalised world where transactions routinely take place across borders, it is important that we have the ability to punish offences and be as agile as those who wish to do us harm. It is therefore right that these offences have extraterritorial reach. We will work with overseas public authorities to ensure that offenders face justice where appropriate.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for that intervention. I am reluctant to test his tolerance by bringing Brexit into this, but I hope that we will continue to have the means to engage with overseas jurisdictions in order to pursue those who break UK law, here or abroad. We will not oppose the clauses, and I congratulate the Committee on making such speedy progress.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 51 and 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill,.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. ––(Michael Tomlinson.)

National Security and Investment Bill (Eleventh sitting) Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Department of Health and Social Care

National Security and Investment Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee Debate: 11th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 10th December 2020

(3 years, 3 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 10 December 2020 - (10 Dec 2020)
Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I think we can agree that it was brief. Bills would come to Ministers, fresh from the wells of construction and the pushing of pens to get them into good shape. I wonder whether there is a style guide, deep in the bowels of a building somewhere in Whitehall, that says, “Whenever the Minister is supposed to do something, write ‘may’ in small print.” It is such a long-serving style guide that people have forgotten why the word was ever put in the Bill in the first place.

The Minister would do a great service to the writing of Bills if he were able to say, “I don’t want to go along with the style guide. If someone is supposed to do something, I want to have that written in the Bill.” I appreciate that if the Minister were to say that when sitting around with a number of people who had a freshly minted copy of the proto-Bill in front of them, there would be much stroking of chins and suggestions of, “That is a rather brave method of proceeding, Minister.” But the Minister has the opportunity today, entirely divorced from all those influences, simply to say, “Yes, we will accept this amendment as a stake in the ground for the uprating of the style guide, wherever it happens to be.” That would be a great service to the Committee and to the nation, by getting us into a position where Bills are written to mean what they say and say what they mean.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
- Hansard - -

I do not want to anticipate what the Minister will say, but he has said, with regards to similar amendments, that stating that the Secretary of State will do something does not mean that he definitely must do it. Does my hon. Friend agree that for the sake of clarity—for us in Parliament but also for businesses, particularly those affected by this—changing that one word would greatly improve the understanding of how the Bill will work?

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. If I went to my bank manager, who had called me in about my overdraft, and I said, “I don’t need to say anything other than, ‘I may pay it back,’ but don’t worry, because I will pay it back,” my bank manager might be a little upset and might have something to say about it.

It is curious that we have locutions in the putting together of Bills that fly in the face of common-sense parlance. I agree with my hon. Friend that it really is no great defence to say, “Don’t worry. We don’t need to change this, because we are going to do it.” It would be far better all round if we were straightforward, accurate and clear and put this wording in the legislation, so that everybody knows what we are doing for the future. If, by so doing, the Minister can banish that style guide from the bowels of the building forever, that would be a great service.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg you indulgence, Mr Twigg: I intend to speak first to clause stand part and then to amendment 29, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test. Clause 53 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations that set out the procedure that the Secretary of State must follow when giving a notice of, or serving, an order once the Bill becomes an Act. The level of detail that these provisions will involve is most appropriately dealt with in delegated legislation. That will also allow the provisions to be modified more easily if changes are deemed appropriate—in the light of operational experience, for example. I know all colleagues will share with me the wish for the unit’s operations to be as efficient and as slick as we can make them.

Examples of notices and orders include information notices, attendance notices, interim orders, final orders or penalty notices issued by the Secretary of State for non-compliance. The clause sets out what may be included in the regulations. For example, they may include the manner in which a document must be given or served and whether it is allowed to be served electronically—for example, by email.

Amendment 29 would require the Secretary of State to make these regulations, which returns, if I may say so, to the recurring theme raised by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, about the difference between “may” and “shall”. At the risk of becoming predictable, my thoughts here carry certain echoes of our previous discussions.

As hon. Members will know, clause 53 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations that will set out the procedure that must the Secretary of State must follow when giving a notice or serving an order once the Bill becomes an Act. It is an entirely laudable objective to ensure that the Secretary of State provides those affected by this regime with the right information on the operation of the regime, and it is one that I shall always support. In practice, though, the amendment is unnecessary.

Although the Secretary of State may make regulations to that effect, in practice, for the regime to function effectively, he must do so. I assure hon. Members that the Secretary of State certainly does not propose to commence the regime without first making these procedural regulations. I therefore assure the hon. Member that the amendment is not required, as he and the Government seem to be in hearty agreement on the importance of such regulation. I ask him to do the honourable thing and withdraw the amendment.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

It is an honour to serve under your chairship again, Mr Twigg. I detect a slight rise in temperature, at least on this side of the Committee Room. I do not know whether that is due to the heated exchanges over “may” and “should”—

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Passionate exchanges.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Warm exchanges. It is certainly something to be welcomed.

I would like to say a few words to clause 53 stand part. As my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test observed, this is another example of a “may” rather than a “will”. The clause exists purely to enable the Secretary of State to make regulations—that is its function—and yet it places no requirement on the Secretary of State to do so.

While the Minister gave a warm response, saying that he and my hon. Friend are on exactly the same page and so on in our desires, I remind him that the Bill is not about our desires; it is about a legislative framework that protects our national security and gives, as much as possible, clarity and certainty to those impacted by it. It is because we recognise the importance of the clause that we wish it to have some effect in law, as opposed to being the gentle suggestion it seems to be at the moment.

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister has used a bank manager defence. If my bank manager wrote to me to say, “You have an overdraft that you must pay,” and I wrote back and said, “Dear Bank Manager, I may repay my overdraft,” and then the bank manager called me in and said, “What is the meaning of this letter?” and I said, “Don’t worry, I will pay the overdraft soon. No problem. That letter stands,” that would be a problem for me, but apparently not as far as legislation is concerned. The Minister has effectively said, “Don’t worry. This is definitely going to happen. We are all agreed it will happen,” so why not write it in legislation?

I will not pursue this matter to a Division, because we have exhausted this mine in Committee. The Minister knows that this is not the first time I have raised this issue during the passage of Bills, and I will continue to do so because it is an important principle that legislation should say what it will actually do. Perhaps that is a bit basic, but that is what I think is important. I will indeed withdraw the amendment. I thank the Minister for his reply this morning, although it does not dent my crusading zeal for this particular change to be made in legislation generally. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 54

Disclosure of information

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 54, page 34, line 9, leave out

“which appears to the Secretary of State”

and insert

“which, on a reasonable enquiry, appears to the Secretary of State”.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to only share information, acquired in the course of national security reviews, if the Secretary of State has first undertaken reasonable enquiry.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clause 55 stand part.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

In clauses 54 and 55, we consider the disclosure of information by the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, and, in clause 55, information held by HMRC.

Clause 54 specifies the circumstances in which information may be disclosed. Subsection (1) provides an information gateway for public authorities to disclose information to the Secretary of State for the purpose of facilitating the exercise of his function under the Bill. Subsection (2) permits the Secretary of State to disclose information received under the Bill to any UK or overseas public authority for specified purposes. Subsection (9) states:

“‘overseas public authority’ means a person in any country or territory outside the United Kingdom which appears to the Secretary of State to exercise functions of a public nature”.

The amendment seeks to address the wide definition of the overseas public authorities to which the Secretary of State might disclose information.



The Minister has previously asserted that Labour Members are looking to give more and more powers to the Secretary of State, but here we wish to help the Secretary of State, which is the motive behind all our amendments. We wish to aid the Secretary of State by somewhat subscribing the persons or organisations with which he—in this case, at the moment, the relevant Minister is a “he”—is allowed to share information, by inserting in clause 54 the words

“which, on a reasonable enquiry, appears to the Secretary of State”.

Therefore, the amendment would not simply leave the process open, as it were, to appearances only, without any inquiry.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

indicated assent.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I hope the Minister also agrees that we are moving to a much expanded national security screening regime. In 2002, Facebook was a year old or just being born. We are no longer in the place we were in 2002 when it comes to the issues of importance, volume, security and privacy associated with data and data sharing. I hope he will not rely on the 2002 Act as a justification, particularly as we are moving to an expanded national security screening issue and we are in a different data environment.

The strategy says that data is the economic engine, and we must be much better in assuring businesses and investors of their data protection. Instead of relying on appearances, the amendment holds up the standard of reason. Under it, the Secretary of State would have all the relevant powers of data sharing with relevant persons so long as the Secretary of State had reason, based “on a reasonable enquiry”, to think the person to be a relevant public authority.

It is critical that the UK has a national security regime that is grounded in national, competent exercise of state power to protect our security. The amendment would help to build success in that direction by removing a reliance on the use of appearance and instinct, by successive Secretaries of State, and grounding decisions in “reasonable enquiry” instead.

The expert evidence sessions provided support for that view. For example, Chris Cummings from the Investment Association said:

“There is so much around any investment process and the acquisition process that has to remain entirely confidential, that investors would require and would be looking for reassurance that these conversations could be held in the strictest of confidence and that nothing would appear until the right time.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 66, Q78.]

I ask the Committee to consider whether sharing data on the basis of appearances gives that reassurance.

The clause will give information-sharing powers to the Secretary of State. We recognise the importance of that, and we do not want to hinder it unduly, but we expect that the Secretary of State should, and importantly, should be seen to, exercise those powers on the basis of evidence. It is only right that we have clear evidential requirements. Although the 2002 Act uses similar language, it is right that we in this Committee clean up that language based on 19 further years of experience.

Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I wonder whether my hon. Friend might be tempted to use a bank manager comparison here as well. If I was summoned by my bank manager to the bank, and he or she said, “It appears you’re overdrawn,” and I said, “Why do you think I’m overdrawn?” and he or she said, “I don’t know. It just appears to me that you’re overdrawn,” I might say, “Could you pursue reasonable inquiries to find out whether my account is actually overdrawn or not?” Does she agree that that is an example of the appropriate use of ordinary language, and that the Bill could be put into that state?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I commend my hon. Friend on the extent to which he has used engagement with a bank manager to illuminate much of our discussion. He is absolutely right. To be honest, if any bank invited you to consider an overdraft on such a flimsy pretext, you would, I hope, change your bank, because you could not feel confident in it.

The serious point is that small and medium businesses and start-ups—our great innovation ecosystem in this country—can move, but we do not want them to move. We want them to stay in this country within the legislative framework. We want the new Bill to provide them with the reassurance and confidence that they need to help to implement the Bill effectively and to protect national security. My hon. Friend’s elegant example highlights the failings of the clause.

I anticipate that the Minister will talk about the language in the Enterprise Act. Not only is that 18 or 19 years old, which is one reason that this Bill has been needed for so long, but the person exercising the functions and powers in the Competition and Markets Authority is not a political appointee or political figure. The Bill refers to a political figure, the Secretary of State, so it is all the more important that he or she should be seen to act on the basis of evidence, not on the basis of appearance or instinct.

None Portrait The Chair
- Hansard -

I gently remind hon. Members to address the Chair when speaking. Thank you very much.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful. If the drive of the hon. Member’s probing is to ensure that the Secretary of State, when he considers disclosing information to a foreign country, takes into account protecting people being caught in the regime who come from that country, I think I have just made it clear that the clause provides protection against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings corresponding to the protection provided in the United Kingdom. I hope that the hon. Member will be satisfied with that.

Finally, the disclosure is subject to data protection legislation, which provides additional safeguards in relation to the disclosure of personal data. I hope that the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central will feel reassured that the Secretary of State may request only the information that he requires in order to exercise his function under the Bill, and that such information will be treated securely.

Amendment 30 aims to increase the scrutiny that the Secretary of State undertakes in deciding whether a person constitutes an overseas public authority for the purposes of disclosing information under clause 54. It is of course important to ensure that any person believed to be a public authority for the purposes of seeking information from, or disclosing information to, is a public authority. I am therefore pleased to reassure the hon. Lady that the Bill does that as it stands. The approach that we have taken mirrors that—I know that she does not like this—in section 243(11) of the Enterprise Act 2002, which includes a similar definition of an overseas public authority for the purposes of disclosure of specified information to overseas public authorities under the Act.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

The Minister is generous in giving way. On his rebuttal of my argument on the CMA, it is not about whether I like it. The whole point of the amendment is to take it away from likes, preferences or appearances, and base it on evidence, and the evidence is that the environment has changed dramatically since 2002 in terms of data. Also, the Secretary of State is a political figure.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the hon. Lady. I remind her that the legislation requires the Secretary of State to act in a quasi-judicial way, not as a political figure. I appreciate that by a normal reading, “appears” may appear unduly casual, but that is merely a question of the form of legislative drafting, which is consistent, I remind her, with previous relevant legislation.

In addition, I reassure the hon. Lady that the principles of public law apply in any case. The Secretary of State therefore needs to act reasonably in fulfilling his functions under the Bill. That includes having a reasonable basis, supported by sufficient evidence, for coming to the conclusion that a person appears to be an overseas public authority prior to disclosing information. I hope I have provided the Committee with sufficient reassurances, and I therefore hope that the Opposition will withdraw the amendment.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is not a strange concept that a Minister acts in a quasi-judicial way in making such decisions.

I will now briefly turn to clause 55, which makes provision for specific restrictions in respect of information received under clause 54 from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. For the regime to function effectively, the Secretary of State needs access to the right information at the right time in order to make decisions with the fullest range of evidence available. One such source of information that might be invaluable to the Secretary of State is HMRC. Although the Government expect that the Secretary of State would seek first to secure the information he needs from the parties, it is important that such information can also be provided from elsewhere in Government, if it is held there.

Clause 55 provides that where information is received by the Secretary of State from HMRC or an onward recipient pursuant to clause 54, it may not be used for purposes other than the Secretary of State’s function under the Bill, and nor may it be further disclosed without HMRC’s consent. Clause 35 provides that disclosing information in contravention of clause 55(1) is an offence, as is appropriate.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Will the Minister give way?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am just finishing my point.

I hope that hon. Members will agree that clause 55 provides appropriately robust safeguards for the onward sharing or use of information received from HMRC for the purposes of the regime. I recommend that clauses 54 and 55 stand part of the Bill.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I would like to address a question to the Minister. In his remarks on these clauses, he has highlighted a concern. I might have missed it, but I do not see where the Bill sets out the information gateway through which the Secretary of State will receive information from HMRC in order to exercise his functions under the Bill. Clauses 54 and 55 are grouped together under the title of “Information gateways”. They discuss information gateways from the Secretary of State to public authorities and others, but I would really appreciate it if the Minister could write to me to set out how HMRC will disclose information to BEIS for the functions of the Bill. I am sure I do not need to remind the Committee that information held by HMRC is generally considered very sensitive by businesses and individuals alike, and there are generally clear restrictions on its sharing.

To return to the clauses and amendment more generally, part of the Minister’s argument missed what our argument was. We recognise the importance of disclosing some information, and we also recognise that clause 55 sets out tests with regard to the purposes of disclosing the information, and even to how the information can be shared onwards and to what information should be disclosed. What it does not do is test the nature of the public authority. Although we have had an interesting and, indeed, lively debate about the difference between legal language and casual language, I think we can all agree that it is in the interests of our democracy that our legislation can be read and understood by ordinary people. If the term “appears” is to be understood as it is commonly understood, the clause requires the support of our amendment.

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Matt Western Portrait Matt Western
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test has stolen my thunder—had I known that he was going to stand up, I perhaps would not have done so. It is interesting that paragraph (a) says “must” but paragraph (b) says “may”. Another valid point, beyond the semantics, is about the substance and the resource of the CMA, and whether there should be provision for that in the Bill. Can the Minister comment on the capacity of the CMA to support the demands and obligations set out in the clause?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I will say a few words to the clause—reflecting the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test, in particular—because there seems to be a theme in the Bill. I know that the Minister believes that the Bill is beyond improvement, and that he is reluctant even to contemplate any changes, as he said in response to the hon. Member for Glenrothes, but he must recognise that a consistent theme seems to be that requirements, or “musts”, are placed on others and the discretion—the “may”, if you like—is with the Business Secretary. The Minister himself observed that we are keen to allow the Business Secretary the necessary discretion to fully protect our national security, but does he see not that that would better achieved by clearly circumscribing the Business Secretary’s actions?

I also support my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington in his recent contribution. Throughout this Bill, we need to ensure that the resources are there when placing requirements on bodies. I hope that the Minister can give such reassurances. On that basis, we recognise that the clause should stand part.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 56 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 57

Data Protection

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 57 provides that the provisions in parts 1 to 4 of the Bill containing a duty or power to disclose or use information do not authorise a contravention of data protection legislation, as set out in the Data Protection Act 2018. In addition, the clause provides that that information may be used or disclosed only if it does not contravene parts 1 to 7, or chapter 1 of part 9, of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which contains provisions about conducting interception, including restrictions on use and disclosure of intercepted information. These standard provisions are included where legislation concerns the use or disclosure of information. I hope that hon. Members will therefore be content to support this standard clause as part of the legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 57 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58

Minor and Consequential Amendments and Revocations

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 59 removes a restriction on the ability of the Competition and Markets Authority to co-operate with its international partners on merger cases. At the end of the transition period, the UK will no longer be part of the European Union’s competition system. The CMA will become responsible for investigating the effects on competition of larger international mergers, which were previously investigated by the European Commission. In a globalised economy, effective cross-border enforcement of competition law, which protects UK markets and consumers, relies increasingly on close international co-operation. The ability to disclose confidential information to assist an overseas authority with this enforcement activity, including in circumstances where parties have not provided their consent for the information to be disclosed, is a crucial ingredient of strong co-operation.

Moreover, the willingness of an overseas authority to disclose confidential information will often depend on whether the receiving authority can reciprocate. Any restrictions on the CMA’s ability to disclose such information could therefore inhibit the effectiveness of its international co-operation. The overseas disclosure gateway, which is set out in section 243 of the Enterprise Act 2002, provides an important mechanism for the CMA to disclose information to its overseas counterparts when consent has not been provided by relevant parties. The gateway permits disclosure for the purpose of helping an overseas authority’s enforcement activities.

However, the CMA is currently unable to use the overseas disclosure gateway to disclose information that comes to it in connection with a merger investigation. This means that the CMA is restricted from sharing certain information with its overseas counterparts that might be crucial to their investigation of a merger. This restriction presents two challenges for the UK’s competition authorities. First, it weakens the control of mergers with an international dimension that might adversely affect UK markets and consumers. Secondly, it inhibits the CMA’s ability to receive information that might be critical to its own merger investigations, because it has no ability to reciprocate. That, in turn, could also weaken its protection of UK markets and consumers. Clause 59 rectifies this by removing the restriction in the overseas disclosure gateway and allowing the CMA to use the gateway to disclose merger information to overseas public authorities.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I thank the Minister for setting out clause 59, because I had thought that it was inconsequential. I listened to what he said carefully, as I always do, but I did not hear him use the term “national security” once. The function of the Bill is national security. Although we have not defined it, we have debated that the Bill should be narrowly circumscribed to concerns of national security. Having listened carefully to the Minister, I get the impression that the clause has been added, and for very good reasons, to facilitate and enable the CMA’s competition and mergers powers.

We are putting the national security interest relating to mergers and acquisitions firmly here in the Bill, so the CMA is no longer concerned with and involved in that, yet this clause facilitates the CMA’s sharing of information with overseas public authorities. That information, by definition, will not be with regard to national security, because national security investigations will take place under the powers in the Bill that lie with the Secretary of State. I am somewhat confused as to what this clause is doing in the Bill. Would the Minister like to intervene to illuminate and clarify that the clause has something to do with national security?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Lady is quite right that it is to help the CMA.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I find it somewhat worrying, given our debates about keeping the Bill focused narrowly on national security, that the Government have added a clause to help the CMA in its functions. My hon. Friends and I have been thinking of a number of ways in which we would like to help the CMA in its functions and to improve the Enterprise Act, but we have been resolute in focusing on national security, because that is the matter before the Committee. Yet it seems that the clause, although very well meaning, is designed for an entirely different function.

You are not stopping the debate, Mr Twigg, so I presume it is in order to debate the functions of the CMA in relation to competitions and mergers generally, rather than to national security specifically.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is worth respectfully reminding the hon. Lady and the Committee that this is a separate topic in the Bill that is unrelated to the NSI regime, as set out in the explanatory notes.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I have the explanatory notes, and they do not state that the clause deals with a separate topic. Paragraph 173 states:

“Clause 59 amends the overseas disclosure gateway in section 243 of the Enterprise Act 2002, removing the restriction on UK public authorities disclosing information that comes to them in connection with a merger investigation under that gateway.”

The explanatory notes do not state that the functions of the CMA are separate from national security as clearly as the Minister just has. I do not want to detain the Committee, but I register the Labour party’s concern—

Peter Grant Portrait Peter Grant
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Does the hon. Lady share my understanding that the definitive statement on what the Bill is about is the long title of the Bill, not the explanatory notes? Does she agree that the long title makes no mention whatsoever of helping the CMA in the general exercise of its purpose?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, because he is absolutely right that, rather than having a debate on the contents of the explanatory notes, line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill should focus on what the Bill says, and it does not mention general improvements to our competition and mergers regime, much as we feel that improvements could be made. Although we will not oppose the clause, I register our disappointment that we were not better informed of the Bill’s additional scope.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I think that is slightly unfair; it is included in page 4 of the explanatory notes.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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The Minister’s argument is to look at page 4 of the explanatory notes, but it does not say that the CMA’s functions are separate from national security.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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It says “interaction with” the CMA. but it does not say that that is separate from national security. In this afternoon’s sitting, when we discuss the additions that we would like to the remit and definition of “national security”, I hope that the Minister will recognise that the Bill is broader than national security, as was simply understood from his previous responses.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 59 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 60

Defamation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Clause 60 provides the Secretary of State and the CMA with absolute privilege against action for defamation as a result of the exercise of functions under or by virtue of the Bill. The clause has been included to ensure that the Secretary of State and the CMA have absolute privilege from defamation claims, on the basis that the function of the regime to protect national security is too important to be at risk or in any way curtailed by claims of defamation. It is, of course, not the Government’s intention to defame anyone through the regime or more widely. I hope that hon. Members will agree that this is an appropriate protection, supported by a well-reasoned regime that seeks to protect national security while supporting businesses and investors.

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Thirdly, the amendment seeks the inclusion of the average headcount of the investment security unit in the annual report. I refer the hon. Member for Ilford South to my response to amendment 9. Arrangements on resourcing are an internal matter for the BEIS permanent secretary. As the Committee will know, it takes only a small group of exceptionally gifted people to improve our nation’s security, as we are doing here in the scrutiny of this Bill. Look around you, Mr Twigg: everybody here is incredibly talented and therefore doing an incredible job in refining the Bill. There will, of course, be sufficient resourcing allocated to the unit in any case.
Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I wholeheartedly endorse the Minister’s words on the skill and talents in this Committee Room. He said we were improving the Bill, but he is yet to accept any changes, so I am intrigued to understand what improvements he feels we have made.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is the challenge the hon. Lady offers that allows a Minister as junior as the one standing before hon. Members to be able to make the argument.

Finally, the report will also give a sense of the sectors of the economy where the greatest activity of national security concern is occurring. The Secretary of State may include additional information in relation to SMEs if he considers that to be appropriate. For those reasons, I am unable to accept the amendment, and I hope that the hon. Member for Ilford South can withdraw it.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I will say a few words in support of the amendment and on the clause, and will respond to the Minister’s comments. I think we all recognise the importance of reporting annually on the seismic shift in our national security, and of scrutiny of mergers and acquisitions. Yet it has to be said that the Bill does not say what the report’s objective is. Neither did the Minister, in listing what was included, give an understanding of the reasons the items have been included, even as he rejected the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South, which seeks to add points of particular interest to small and medium-sized enterprises.

I note, for example, that the number of final notifications is given but not the number of interim notifications or interim orders made. It is hard to see whether the objective of the report is to give greater confidence, to enable us to fully understand the working, or to enable us to see whether the limited contents of the impact assessment prove to be accurate. The kind of information in the report, and in my hon. Friend’s amendment, is the information that a well-run Department should wish to have. Although we are unclear on the objective of the report, which is not set out, reporting on those items as fully as possible would certainly improve the workings of the Bill, as my hon. Friend has said he seeks to do.

Sam Tarry Portrait Sam Tarry
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I listened to the Minister’s assessment. We want to tackle a number of other substantial issues this afternoon, so on that basis I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 61 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 62

Transitional and saving provision in relation to the Enterprise Act 2002

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I now turn to the Bill’s final provisions. Clause 62 sets out the transitional provisions for cases that may qualify for intervention under both the Bill and the Enterprise Act 2002. The starting point for the transition arrangement is that the 2002 Act continues to apply in relation to national security until the new regime is commenced. That means that qualifying mergers can continue to be scrutinised under the Act where the statutory requirements are met.

However, the Government do not wish to expose to some form of double jeopardy qualifying mergers that take place after the introduction of the Bill but before commencement. The clause means that, in effect, the Secretary of State must use one Act or the other. Not doing so would create significant uncertainty for business and investors and could, at least theoretically, lead to the perverse position of the Secretary of State, following commencement of the Bill, re-examining decisions that they themselves made merely weeks ago under the 2002 Act.

Clause 63 makes provision in relation to the regulations that may be made under the Bill, setting out how they must be made and what they may contain. All the regulations that may be made under the Bill are subject to the negative resolution procedure, except regulations made under clause 6, “Notifiable acquisitions”, clause 11, “Exceptions relating to control of assets”. and clause 41, “Permitted maximum penalties”, where the draft affirmative procedure will apply. Given their nature and effect, the Government consider that regulations under those three powers should be subject to the approval of Parliament.

Clause 64 provides that any expenditure incurred by the Secretary of State under the Bill is to be paid out of money provided by Parliament. Clause 65 is purely a technical one to provide for definitions of the key terms used in the Bill. I do not intend to explore individual meanings of key terms now; I will instead direct hon. Members to lunch and to the relevant clauses that provide them. Finally, hon. Members will appreciate that clause 66 is purely a technical one to set out the Bill’s short title and provide details about the commencement of the Bill’s clauses and the extent of the Bill.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for setting out the provisions of the clauses and for moving us onwards to lunch and to the end of the Bill. I will not detain the Committee with a detailed consideration of the technical provisions in the clauses and the interpretation of the various terms. However, the Bill as a whole would benefit from greater clarity, as my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test has so well set out, particularly in his reference to the use of language by bank managers.

We will not oppose the final clauses. We congratulate the Committee and particularly the Clerks and all those who have supported us in enabling us to reach the final clauses.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 63 to 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Michael Tomlinson Portrait Michael Tomlinson
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

On this occasion I will, without rudely interrupting anyone, beg to move that the Committee do now adjourn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Michael Tomlinson.)

National Security and Investment Bill (Twelfth sitting) Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Department of Health and Social Care

National Security and Investment Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
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I beg to move, that the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Sir Graham. I am also pleased that the Committee is now moving to the new expanses of new clauses. I see that Committee members have come fully prepared to deal with the environment in which we find ourselves. I should say, Sir Graham, that the previous Chair said that we should be able to put on as many coats as we liked. I think that that is much to be desired. Unfortunately, I left my office in a rush and forgot to bring my coat, as well as the Houses of Parliament Christmas jumper in which I invested only yesterday, in anticipation that it might be needed today. We shall have to take the temperature as an encouragement to press on.

Had we known that, regardless of the title of the Bill, it was actually the National and Security and Investment, and any improvements to the Enterprise Act 2002 we feel it is necessary to make, Bill, we might have ranged somewhat broader in our new clauses. We chose instead to focus on what we felt was absolutely critical to the good functioning of our national security framework. New clause 1 seeks to set out some of the factors that the Secretary of State may have regard to when making assessments under the provisions of the Bill. We recognise some of the implications of including a definition of national security. The Bill is called the National Security and Investment Bill, even if it does go somewhat beyond that title.

James Wild Portrait James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I note that the hon. Lady uses the word “may” not “shall” in the new clause. Can she explain why she opted for “may” in this instance?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I am grateful for that intervention. First, it shows that the hon. Gentleman is paying attention, which in itself is something to be welcomed. If I may say so, it also shows that he is taking lessons from my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test. We have considered the matter and this is the correct use of the term “may”. I shall go into more detail later, but this is not about prescribing what the Secretary of State must look at; it is about giving greater clarity, particularly to those who will come under the Bill’s remit. One of the expert witnesses put it very well. Those who will come under the Bill’s remit need to get a sense of what the Government mean by national security, not in a specific and detailed definition.

Simon Baynes Portrait Simon Baynes (Clwyd South) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Would the hon. Lady not agree that there is danger that the new clause would start to try to define in a prescriptive way what a national security risk is, whereas the point of the Bill is that it enables the Government, the Secretary of State and the relevant parties to judge what is a risk? That goes back to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk made about “may” and “shall”. As far as I can see, the new clause should use “shall”, given what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve, but I accept the point about how such legislation is worded. There is a danger that, by listing all these clauses, we imply that other aspects of danger to national security are not included. I am not sure that it would achieve anything. In many ways, it might obfuscate rather than clarify, although I fully accept that her intention is to clarify.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention, which I think was made in the proper spirit of the Committee, by seeking to improve the Bill, help the Secretary of State, and help those who will be affected by the Bill to understand it. The hon. Gentleman is quite right that there is a trade-off.

During the expert evidence sessions, we heard both from those who felt that there should be a definition of national security and from those who felt that there should not. However, if my memory serves me, they all tended to agree that there should be greater clarity about what national security could include. For example, Dr Ashley Lenihan of the London School of Economics said:

“What you do see in regulations is guidance as to how national security risk might be assessed or examples of what could be considered a threat to national security.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 38, Q42.]

We also heard that in the US the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 2018 provides for a “sense of Congress” on six factors that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the President may consider—the term “may” is used well here—in assessing national security: countries of specific concern; critical infrastructure, energy assets and critical material; a history of compliance with US law; control of US industries that affect US capacity to meet national security requirements, which is very important; personally identifiable information; and potential new cyber-security vulnerabilities.

My argument is that if we look at examples from elsewhere, we see indications of what can be included in national security without having a prescriptive definition. That is exactly what the new clause tries to set out. It states:

“When assessing a risk to national security, the Secretary of State may have regard to factors including”,

and then it gives a list of factors, which I shall detail shortly.

The question, “What is national security?” is entirely unanswered, for Parliament, for businesses looking for clarity, for citizens looking for reassurance, and if hostile actors are seeking to take advantage of any loopholes in how the Secretary of State construes national security. I do have sympathy with the argument that we should not be prescriptive and limit the Secretary of State’s flexibility to act by setting down a rigid definition of national security that rules things out. That is the spirit of the new clause. It does not rule out the Secretary of State’s flexibility or set a rigid definition; it simply does what other countries have done well, as our experts witnesses have said, by giving a guide on some factors that the Government might consider, while allowing many more to be included in national security assessments. This is critical in order to give greater clarity to businesses puzzled by the Government’s very high-level definitions of espionage, disruption or inappropriate leverage.

Andrew Griffith Portrait Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Lady appears to be advancing two arguments simultaneously. On the one hand, I understand the argument about clarity, which is indeed something that many people would look for in this Bill. However, she also talks about flexibility and that we should not seek to tie the Secretary of State down to a particular, prescriptive definition at any point in time, which I think members on both sides of the Committee would agree on. Given that, I am genuinely confused as to why she would seek to advance this new clause, although I find its actual wording wholly unobjectionable. Perhaps the Minister will reply on this topic, because I think the record of these proceedings could provide that clarity without needing to press the amendment to a vote.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, which I found very helpful. If he believes me to be presenting both sides of the argument at once, perhaps that is because the Minister has been doing the very same thing so often during the past few sittings. As the Minister has often said, there is a balance to be sought between flexibility for the Secretary of State and clarity for the business community and other communities. This new clause goes exactly to the point made by the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs, and strikes that balance. That is why—I will say it again—the new clause does not prescribe what national security is, but it does not leave a vacuum into which supposition, uncertainty and confusion can move.

The new clause gives greater clarity to citizens worried about whether Government will act to protect critical data transfers or our critical national infrastructure. Are those areas part of our national security, even though they are not covered by the Government’s proposed 17 sectors? The new clause provides assurance in that case and—this is important—sends a message to hostile actors that we will act to protect British security through broad powers applied with accountability. It should be clear that we also need to consider how this Bill will be read by the hostile actors against whom we are seeking to protect our nation, and this new clause will send a clearer message as to what may be included in that.

The factors highlighted in this new clause are comparable to guidance provided in other affected national security legislation, most notably the US’s Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 2018. Paragraph (a) would protect our supply chains and sensitive sites, in addition to acting against the disruption, espionage and inappropriate leverage highlighted in the Government’s statement of policy intent. We have heard from experts, and have also seen from very recent history—namely, that of our 5G network—that our strategic security depends not only on businesses immediately relevant to national security, but on the full set of capabilities and supply chains that feed into those security-relevant businesses. We cannot let another unforeseen disruption, whether pandemic or otherwise, disrupt our access to critical supply.

Paragraphs (b) and (c) look strategically at our national security, not with a short-term eye. We have heard consistently from experts that national security and economic security are not altogether separate. Indeed, they cannot be separated; they are deeply linked. A national security expert told us that a narrow focus on direct technologies of defence was mistaken and that instead we should look to the “defence of technology”. That was a very appropriate phrase, meaning not specific technologies of defence, but defence of technologies that seem economically strategic today and might become strategic for national security tomorrow.

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Andrew Bowie Portrait Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Lady mentions Sir Richard Dearlove’s evidence to the Committee a couple of weeks ago. He made very clear that his opinion, as a former head of MI6, was that having a statutory definition of national security would be very prohibitive and do damage to what we are trying to achieve by getting this Bill on the statute book.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

Absolutely. That is why we are not seeking a statutory definition of national security. That is why we are seeking to include and to set out points that the Secretary of State may take into account. The hon. Member should recognise that the Government’s statement of intent is designed to give guidance as to how the Bill will work and be used in practice, and what might be taken into account. The guidance is there. It is just that it is very limited.

We are deliberately not seeking a prescriptive definition of national security. We recognise, as Sir Richard Dearlove did, that it can and must evolve over time. We are seeking to give greater guidance and to promote a better understanding of the remit of the Bill, so that it can be better interpreted and better implemented and so that all those who come under its remit can share that understanding. That is what other nations do. The new clause takes our security context seriously, and signals to hostile actors that we will act with seriousness, not superficiality.

Paragraph (f) bridges the gap between the Government’s defined sectors and focus and the critical national infrastructure that we already define and focus on in our wider intelligence and security work. It brings us in line with allies. Canadian guidelines list the security of Canada’s national infrastructure as an explicit factor in national security assessments. In Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States cases, Congress lists critical infrastructure among the six factors that the President and CFIUS may access.

The provision also acts on the agreement of the ex MI6 chief. In relation to having a critical national infrastructure definition in the Bill, he said:

“I would certainly see that as advantageous, because it defines a clear area where you start and from which you can make judgments”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 24 November 2020; c. 24, Q31.]

Some of the interventions have been about whether the new clause hits the right spot between prescribing and defining what national security is and giving greater clarity and focus. We would argue that the evidence that I have just set out shows that it does.

Paragraphs (g), (h) and (i) recognise that national security is about more than a narrow view of military security; it is about human security, clamping down on persistent abuses of law—as other countries do—and recognising that a party that consistently abuses human rights abroad cannot be trusted to do otherwise at home. It is about knowing that the single greatest collective threat we face, at home and across the world, lies in climate risk. It is about acting on illicit activities and money-laundering threats that underpin direct threats to national security in the form of global terror.

I recognise that many Government Members have recently raised the importance of human rights, illicit activities, money laundering and climate change in our security. In the statement on Hong Kong this week, the Minister for Asia acknowledged that human rights should be part of our considerations when it comes to trade and security but said that he did not feel that the Trade Bill was the right place for such provisions. I argue that today’s Bill is the right place for them because it deals with our national security.

The new clause would show the world that the UK is serious about national security. We must protect our national security against threats at home and abroad, and build our sovereign capability in industries that are the most strategically significant for security. We must view security in the light of modern technologies, climate and geopolitical threats. None of those constrain the Government’s ability to act; they simply sharpen the clarity of that action, and its signal to the world.

When we began line-by-line scrutiny, I spoke of my astonishment that the Government’s impact assessment referred to national security as an area of market failure that therefore required Government action. I hope that the Minister can confirm that he does not believe that national security is an area of market failure, but that it is the first responsibility of Government. The new clause sets out to give bones to that assertion and to demonstrate to the world that we understand our national security and the interests at play in promoting and securing it, and that we will act decisively in the interest of national security, taking into account this range of factors to protect our citizens, our national interest and our economic sovereignty, now and in the future.

Peter Grant Portrait Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central although I confess I was not quite able to pay attention to the early part of her remarks, because I was still reeling from the revelation that a born and bred Geordie is capable of feeling cold. I just hope that her constituents do not get to hear of it, or she might be in trouble at the next election.

Perhaps the aspect of the new clause that I am least comfortable about is the title. I think that is what is causing the problem. The title is “National security definition”, but what follows, thankfully, is not a definition of national security. Like a lot of people, I would love to be able to come up with a definition of national security that worked and was robust, but no one has been able to do that. The new clause, however, does not seek to prescribe what national security is, and despite what was said in some of the interventions, it certainly does not attempt to prescribe what it is not. It gives explicit statutory authority to the Secretary of State to take certain factors into account in determining whether and how, in his judgment, a particular acquisition is a threat to national security.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I can only ascribe my lack of the usual Geordie central heating to being so far from home at the moment. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point about the new clause seriously, and I think he is right. The title misleads to the extent that we are not looking to define national security.

Peter Grant Portrait Peter Grant
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If the hon. Lady thinks she is a long way from home—tell me about it.

There was discussion, and quite a lot of questions to some of the early witnesses, about whether we needed to give some kind of guidance on what national security is not. Some of us vividly remember—I think that the hon. Lady’s constituents will vividly remember—that there was a time when someone was a threat to national security if they were a coal miner who went on strike, or if they had a trade union membership card in their pocket and worked in the wrong places, such as in Government establishments that officially did not exist then. When we look at the honours that are still bestowed on the person responsible for those two abuses of the claim of national security, it can be understood why some of us are always concerned about giving any Government powers to act in the interest of national security unless clear safeguards are built in.

The other side of the coin is that I can foresee times when the Secretary of State might be grateful for the fact that the clause has been incorporated in the Bill. Let us suppose that someone wanted to take control of or influence a software company. I know that software is itself an area we would want to look at. We all know what can happen when the software that helps to control major transport systems goes wrong. We have all been affected by Heathrow terminal 5 effectively shutting down for hours at a time. When there is a major signalling fault caused by a software malfunction at one of the main London stations, the whole of the south-east can be clogged up for hours or even days.

Can that become a threat to our national security? I think there are circumstances in which it could. I can certainly foresee circumstances in which someone who wanted to damage the United Kingdom—for no other reason than wanting to damage its interests—might seek to do so by getting a way in that enables them to interfere with the code controlling software of the transport or financial services infrastructure, for example. It is not in the interest of any of us, at the point when a Secretary of State intervenes to stop such an acquisition, if the matter can be taken to court and it becomes necessary to argue that deliberately causing the national transport infrastructure to freeze is an attack on our national security. I cannot understand why anyone would want not to add a clause to the Bill to allow such an interpretation to be made if the Secretary of State saw fit.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

The hon. Gentleman reminds me that I should have mentioned either the impact assessment or the consultation response. I think the consultation response gives the deliberately induced software failure at Heathrow as an example of a failure of national security that the Bill would be able to circumvent by preventing hostile parties from owning that software company, without setting out how that would be part of the definition of national security that the Bill is seeking.

Peter Grant Portrait Peter Grant
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful again for those comments. The hon. Lady has referred again to what is in the explanatory notes. Unless somebody has changed the rules, the explanatory notes are not part of the eventual Act of Parliament. In borderline cases, they may be used by a court to help to interpret what the intention of Parliament was when it passed a Bill, but as a general rule, the intention of Parliament is stated by the words in the Act as it is passed. If it does not say in the Act that a Secretary of State can take those factors into account, there will be an argument that will have to be heard and tried in court, if need be, that a Secretary of State should not have taken those factors into account.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to Opposition speakers, the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Glenrothes, for their contributions and to my hon. Friends the Members for Arundel and South Downs, for North West Norfolk, for Clwyd South and for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine for their excellent interventions.

On new clause 1, it will not surprise the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central that the Government’s position remains consistent with that of 1 December, when amendments relating to the new clause were discussed. Such amendments included, among others, proposals for the inclusion of a definition of national security in the statement made by the Secretary of State. The new clause seeks to create a new, exhaustive list of factors that the Secretary of State may take into account when considering whether something is a risk to national security.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I am listening intently to the Minister’s response—given the great skills of the Committee he is taking the new clause in the right spirit—but it is not appropriate to say that we are presenting an exhaustive list when we specifically say, “this and other things”. It meant to be not an exhaustive list but a guide and a sense.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I apologise. I will say instead that the clause seeks to create a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Secretary of State may take into account when considering whether something is a risk to national security for the purposes of the Bill.

The Bill as drafted does not seek to define national security. It also does not include factors that the Secretary of State will take into account in coming to a national security assessment. Instead, factors that the Secretary of State expects to take into account in exercising the call-in powers are proposed to be set out, as the hon. Lady rightly said, in the statement provided for in clause 3. A draft of the statement was published on introduction of the Bill to aid the Committee’s scrutiny efforts. The draft statement includes details of what the Secretary of State is likely to be interested in when it comes to national security risks. That includes certain sectors of the economy and the types of acquisition that may raise concern.

While it is crucial for investors’ confidence that there is as much transparency in the regime as possible, there is self-evidently a limit to how much the Government can and should disclose in that regard given that the regime deals explicitly with national security matters. Nevertheless, the draft statement goes into some detail about the factors that the Secretary of State expects to take into account when making a decision on whether to call in a trigger event.

The new clause would instead place in the Bill, alongside the statement, a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Secretary of State may have regard to when assessing a risk to national security. That raises a number of issues. First, it is unclear what the benefit is of including a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Secretary of State may have regard to directly in the legislation as opposed to in the statement.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

rose

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I will happily take the hon. Lady’s intervention once I have gone through these points.

Secondly, the new clause would not replace the statement; instead, it would appear to sit alongside it. The Government think that would probably cause confusion rather than clarity, although I have no doubt that the hon. Lady and the Opposition agree that clarity for all parties will be crucial to the regime’s success.

Thirdly, by stating what may be taken into account when assessing a risk to national security under the Bill, the new clause indirectly sets out what can be a national security risk for the purposes of the Bill, and therefore what comes within the scope of national security—many colleagues pointed out some of the evidence suggesting that we should do exactly the opposite of that—which could clearly have unintended consequences for other pieces of legislation that refer to national security. The Bill requires that the statement from the Secretary of State be reviewed at least every five years to reflect the changing national security landscape. Indeed, in practice, it is likely that it will be reviewed and updated more frequently. We think that this is the right approach, rather than binding ourselves in primary legislation.

Fourthly, but perhaps most importantly, I note in this list that the Secretary of State may have regard to an ever-broadening set of suggestions that Opposition Members wish to be taken into account as part of national security. On Second Reading, the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband), requested that an industrial strategy test be included in the Bill alongside national security assessments. I am afraid that an industrial strategy test is not the purpose of this legislation.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I was referring to the shadow Secretary of State’s request on Second Reading that an industrial strategy test be included in the Bill.

As I was saying, factors that the Secretary of State may have regard to through the new clause are wide ranging. This is an important Bill about national security and national security alone. We do not wish to see an ever-growing list of factors for the Secretary of State to take into consideration. That would risk the careful balance that has been struck in this regime between protecting national security and ensuring that the UK remains one of the best places in the world to invest. The Government consider that the Secretary of State should be required to assess national security as strictly about the security of our nation. That is what the Bill requires. These powers cannot and will not be used for economic, political or any other reasons.

While I understand the objectives of the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, for the reasons I have set out I am not able to accept the new clause. I hope the hon. Member will agree to withdraw it.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank the Minister for his response, not all of which was entirely unexpected. I also thank the hon. Member for Glenrothes for his speech and his interventions, which were very much to the point.

I feel that the Minister was, to a certain extent, doing what the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs accused me of doing—I did say that I had learned so much from the Minister—which was arguing both sides of the question at once. He seems to be saying that there should not be any definition, but that if there needs to be a definition, it is already there in the statement that the Secretary of State has set out. Indeed, I have been looking for that statement, because I did not recognise it from the way the Minister described it when talking about giving detail on the types of national security questions that might arise.

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Peter Grant Portrait Peter Grant
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is a valid point, but I do not think it is. The difficulty with the case-by-case basis is that it creates uncertainty and worry for the small business concerned. We are talking about a period of only six months. I do not really think that hostile overseas investors are waiting to pounce during those six months to gobble up small businesses in a way that will damage our national security. Let us face it: if they were going to do that in the first six months, they would be doing it now or they would have done it in the last six months.

I hear what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but the new clause is deliberately worded to explicitly recognise the importance of small businesses, particularly during this period. The Bill is likely to come into force at the exact time that small businesses will be trying to get back on their feet. They need all the help they can get. There is a danger that the way that the Bill could be implemented and enforced will be an unintentional barrier to their growth.

All that we are asking is that, for a short period, until smaller businesses get used to the new legislation, it does not allow them to go ahead with transactions that are otherwise prohibited and would otherwise be blocked by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State will still have the full power to block those transactions or to impose conditions on them. It does not mean that an acquisition is legally valid if it would otherwise be void under the terms of the legislation. The only difference it makes is that it removes the danger of small businesses or their directors spending time defending themselves in court when they should be developing their business and helping to get the economy back on its feet. On that basis, I commend both new clauses to the Committee.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I rise to speak briefly in support of additional support for SMEs. The hon. Member for Glenrothes is a champion of small businesses, which is a pleasure to hear. As he set out, and as has been set out in a number of the amendments that we have tabled in Committee, we are concerned to make sure that the seismic shift in our national security assessment with regard to mergers and acquisitions does not stifle our innovative but often under-resourced small businesses, which are such an important driver of our economy. New clause 2 reflects our intentions, particularly in amendments 1 and 11, to support and give further guidance to small businesses. I hope that the Minister and Conservative Members recognise the importance of supporting small businesses at this time through direct measures in the Bill.

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the hon. Member for Glenrothes and the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central for setting out the arguments in support of new clauses 2 and 3, which both relate to the treatment of small and medium-sized enterprises in the regime.

On new clause 2, the Government are a strong supporter of SMEs and have sought to provide a slick and easily navigable regime for businesses of all sizes to interact with. We are creating a digital portal and a simple notification process to allow all businesses to interact with the regime without the need for extensive support from law firms, which is a particular burden for small businesses. Furthermore, there is no fee for filling a notification, unlike many of our allies’ regimes, which in some cases charge hundreds of thousands of pounds for a notification. Consequently, we do not expect this regime to disproportionately affect SMEs.

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Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I thank my hon. Friend for his points on the new clause. The hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs may say that there is no reference to geography, but is it not the case that requiring a list of hostile actors might reflect geography as appropriate, and as the geography of hostile actors changes? Does the number of times that we have mentioned one country in particular—China—not indicate that geographical location can be an indicator of the likelihood of hostile actors?

Sam Tarry Portrait Sam Tarry
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Absolutely. This is not about being particularly anti-China, but it is the strongest example of where we have heard evidence of things that are under way. I will continue with a few more examples. I think this is important, because we are trying to draw back the curtain on exactly what is going on.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My hon. Friend raises an incredibly important point, because, as he rightly says, factors other than the risk profile of the acquirer may determine whether an acquisition is subjected to greater or lesser scrutiny. It is also likely that any list would quickly go out of date. Entities in this space can change and emerge rapidly, especially if parties are attempting to evade the regime and the Secretary of State’s scrutiny. In addition, such lists being intentionally published or otherwise disclosed publicly could have significant ramifications for this country’s diplomatic relations and our place in the world, in respect of both those on one of the lists and those who are not on the list. Publishing the list may also give hostile actors information about gaming the system, to the UK’s detriment.

I would suggest that what the hon. Member for Ilford South describes would essentially be an internal and highly sensitive part of a national security assessment. While I appreciate the sentiment behind the new clause, I do not believe that it would be appropriate to set out such details in writing. It is, however, entirely reasonable for the hon. Gentleman to seek to reduce the burden on business where possible, in particular if the acquisition presents little risk and can be cleared quickly. I have an enormous amount of sympathy with that aim.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I do not intend to make a speech, but I wanted to intervene on this particular point. A part of the source of the new clause is the Minister’s own comments. He said that national security was not dependent on a particular country. He is giving a lot of reasons why there cannot be a list, because of different actors, but does he recognise that national security may relate to a specific country? Has he woken up to the risks that particular countries may pose?

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I assure the hon. Lady that Her Majesty’s Government do exactly that, but the Bill is deliberately country-agnostic. Indeed, to give parties predictability on small business and to provide for rapid decisions where possible, the regime has clear and strict timelines, as we have heard throughout the debate. Additionally, clause 6 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations to exempt acquirers from the mandatory notification regime on the basis of their characteristics. Arguably, this places the strongest requirement on acquirers, such as where acquisitions by certain types of party are routinely notified but very rarely remedied or even called in. Taken together, these provisions are already a highly adaptable and comprehensive set of tools, so the list and its proposed use would be unnecessary and potentially harmful.

I shall touch briefly on national interests, which the new clause once again references. I have said before that the regime is intentionally and carefully focused on national security. That is specifically the security of the nation, rather than necessarily its broadest interests. This is therefore not the right place to introduce the concept of national interest, which would substantially and, we strongly believe, unhelpfully expand the scope of the regime.

In conclusion, with the strength provided by clauses 1, 3 and 6 already in the Bill, I am of the very strong opinion that the Bill already achieves its objectives. I therefore cannot accept the new clause and ask that the hon. Member for Ilford South withdraw it.

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Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I respectfully ask the Minister to reflect carefully on what I and the hon. Member for Glenrothes have said this afternoon. Whether or not the Minister thinks the new clause is one he can reasonably adopt, he has already accepted, in terms of what he says may be in the scope of the Bill, that this is a real issue. This is something that we have to think very carefully about and that, by its nature, is fairly difficult to pin down, because it relates to a series of actions that do not easily fit into the box of control or company takeover. It is much more subtle and potentially wide-ranging, but nevertheless it is something that we know is real. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South said, it is happening in silicon valley, Germany and this country. It is happening in a number of places. Interests are being bought up not because of altruistic concern for the health and welfare of that particular start-up, but for other, much more worrying reasons than simply influence as a limited partner in a company.

I am pleased that the Minister put on record that he thought that the extension of this activity might be in the scope of the Bill already, although I think it is stretching what the Bill has to say to take that line. I hope he will not regret that. When he looks at what he has said about what he thinks is in the Bill, he may find, on reflection, that the new clause would have been more use to him than he thought. However, I am not going to press the issue to a vote this afternoon.

I hope the Minister will reflect carefully. He has already said on the record that he thinks that a number of these measures can be squeezed into the Bill. I hope he will not find that there are circumstances where he needs this method of operation but that it can, after all, not be squeezed into the Bill as well as he thinks it can be. I hear what he says and wish him the best of luck with squeezing things into legislation that perhaps were not quite there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 7

Annual report to the Intelligence and Security Committee

“(1) The Secretary of State must, in relation to each relevant period –

(a) prepare a report in accordance with this section, and

(b) provide a copy of it to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament as soon as is practicable after the end of that period.

(2) Each report must provide, in respect of mandatory and voluntary notifications, trigger events called-in, and final orders given, details of—

(c) the jurisdiction of the acquirer and its incorporation;

(d) the number of state-owned entities and details of states of such entities;

(e) the nature of national security risks posed in transactions for which there were final orders;

(f) details of particular technological or sectoral expertise that were being targeted; and

(g) any other information the Secretary of State may deem instructive on the nature of national security threats uncovered through reviews undertaken under this Act.”.—(Chi Onwurah.)

This new clause would provide the Intelligence and Security Committee with information about powers exercised under this Act, allowing closer scrutiny and monitoring.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is with some regret that I rise to move new clause 7, because it is the last new clause we propose to the Bill. It is a Christmas present to the Minister. Things have certainly been interesting since we began our line-by-line scrutiny. With your leave, Sir Graham, I will take this opportunity to thank all those involved in drafting the Bill, as well as the Clerks, who have worked so hard and played such an important role in helping to draft amendments and provide support to all members of the Committee. I also thank you, Sir Graham, for chairing it so admirably.

We have learned a great deal over the last couple of weeks. I have learned just about everybody’s constituency—

Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Would the hon. Lady like a test?

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

I will not take up the opportunity of a test. We have all learned a lot about air flows—in this room, at any rate—as we seek to maintain some heat. What we have not learned, though, is how the Minister believes the Bill can be improved. All our line-by-line scrutiny has yielded many assurances, compliments on our intention and, indeed, some letters, for which I am grateful, but no acceptance and not even the commitment to go and think about some of our constructive proposals, amendments and new clauses. I urge him to consider this new clause as an opportunity to show that he truly believes, as he said earlier, in the skills, experience and expertise of the Committee by reflecting on the potential for improvement.

The new clause returns to an earlier theme and would require—the Minister will be pleased to note that that is a “must”, not a “may”—an annual report to be prepared by the Secretary of State

“in accordance with this section”

and a copy of it to be provided

“to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament as soon as is practicable after the end of that period.”

It sets out what should be in that report, such as the events, the number of entities, the nature of the risks and

“details of particular technological or sectoral expertise”

and so on. It would provide the Intelligence and Security Committee with information about the powers exercised under the Bill and allow closer scrutiny and monitoring.

The new clause reflects how we have consistently supported the need for the Bill. Our approach to the security threats we face is to push for change specifically to allow broad powers of intervention, but for those using those broad powers to be held to account by Parliament and through transparency. Our international allies do exactly that. The US requires CFIUS to produce a non-classified annual report for the public, alongside a classified report for certain members of Congress, to provide security detail to them, allowing congressional scrutiny while retaining sensitivity of information.

As I think the Minister acknowledges, the Government have been late in following where international allies and the Opposition have led with calls to better protect our national security, so he must not fall behind in following our calls for accountability and transparency. That is critical not just to ensure our security and wider parliamentary understanding of the nature of the threats we face but for accountability.

The Secretary of State is to be given sweeping powers. For the last time, I should say that we will go from 12 reviews in 18 years—less than one a year—to 1,830 notifications a year, which is more than five every single day. The Secretary of State will be able to intervene in every single such private transaction. It will be hard to bring claims against national security concerns in court, where the judiciary will understandably find it difficult to define national security against the Government’s definition. In that context, it is important to bring expert parliamentary scrutiny to the Government’s decisions. I do hope the Minister will reflect on that. Alongside a public report, the new clause would require the Government to publish an annual security report to the Intelligence and Security Committee so that we have greater accountability without compromising security.

I will say a few words about the evidence base and the reason for tabling the amendment. Professor Ciaran Martin said:

“I think that the powers should be fairly broad. I think there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms, so that there is assurance that they are being fairly and sparingly applied.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 81, Q96.]

My understanding is that the only accountability and transparency mechanism is the public report, which may be published, and the prospect of judicial review, neither of which provide for expert scrutiny on the security issues.

I also ask the Minister to reflect on Second Reading, where member after member of the Intelligence and Security Committee stood up to say that they felt that their expertise would be useful and helpful in the working of the Bill.

James Wild Portrait James Wild
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The hon. Lady said that the annual report “may” be published, but in clause 61 it “must” be laid before the House, so there is no question that the annual report will be published.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
- Hansard - -

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It must be published, but the details that it sets out are limited. The reporting on other information, as I think the Minister has said, is something that is intended but is not required. We have requested that several other pieces of information be published, but the Minister has said that they may be.

The hon. Member for North West Norfolk is absolutely right that there will be an annual report, but that is a public report that will provide only the limited information set out in clause 61(2). Obviously, it will not provide anything that might have an impact on national security. With regard to what is published in the final notifications, for example, that can be redacted to take out anything of commercial interest as well as of national security interest. There is no requirement to report on any aspect to do with national security. Given that the only report is a public report, that is understandable. That is why we are proposing that a secure sensitive report should also be published and shared with the Intelligence and Security Committee.

The hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee said that

“there is a real role for Committees of this House in such processes and…the ability to subpoena both witnesses and papers would add not only depth to the Government’s investigation but protection to the Business Secretary who was forced to take the decision”.—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 238.]

A member of the Intelligence and Security Committee also said that

“we need mechanisms in place to ensure that that flexibility does not allow the Government too much scope.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 244.]

As I have already noted, CFIUS has an annual reporting requirement.

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Nadhim Zahawi Portrait Nadhim Zahawi
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her contribution on new clause 7, which seeks to require the Secretary of State to provide an annual report to the Intelligence and Security Committee, including detailed information relating to mandatory and voluntary notifications, trigger events that were called in and final orders made. In particular, it seeks to require the Secretary of State to provide details of factors relevant to the assessment made by the regime, including the jurisdiction of the acquirer; the nature of national security risks posed in transactions where there were final orders; details of particular technological or sectoral expertise that were targeted; and other national security threats uncovered through reviews undertaken under the Bill.

I am pleased that esteemed members of the ISC are taking a continued and consistent interest, including in relation to their role in scrutinising the regime provided for by the Bill. The Committee will be aware that clause 61 requires the Secretary of State to prepare an annual report and to lay a copy before each House of Parliament. That clause provides for full parliamentary and public scrutiny of the detail of the regime, which we judge to be appropriate and which does not give rise to national security issues when published at an aggregate level. I reassure hon. Members that that annual report will include information on the sectors of the economy in which voluntary, mandatory and call-in notices were given. It will also give a sense of the areas of the economy where the greatest activity of national security concern is occurring.

We intend to follow the existing, appropriate Government procedures for reporting back to Parliament, including through responding to the Select Committee on Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. The ISC’s remit is clearly defined by the Justice and Security Act 2013, together with the statutory memorandum of understanding. That remit does not extend to oversight of BEIS work. I am sure that the BEIS Committee will continue to do a sterling job of overseeing and scrutinising the Department’s overall work. I welcome and encourage the ISC’s security-specific expertise, which the hon. Lady referred to, and its review of the annual report when it is laid before Parliament.

For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept the new clause. I hope that hon. Lady will agree to withdraw it.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I thank the Minister for his response, but he did not address the issue scrutiny of sensitive aspects of how the Bill will work. I recognise that the ISC’s remit does not cover BEIS—that is the exact point of requiring such a report. As I think was discussed on Second Reading, the BEIS Committee will not scrutinise any sensitive information or information that is directly relevant to our national security. I am afraid that I cannot accept the Minister’s reasoning for his rejection of the new clause—namely, that it is effectively already covered by clause 61—so I will put it to a Division.

National Security and Investment Bill

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th January 2021

(3 years, 2 months ago)

Commons Chamber
Read Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 20 January 2021 - (large version) - (20 Jan 2021)
Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
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On Second Reading both of this Bill and of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, it was mentioned that in 2013, the Intelligence and Security Committee first recommended measures to prevent high-risk vendors such as Huawei from penetrating our critical national infrastructure in future. It is always the way: you wait seven years for a Bill to protect against infiltration and takeover, then two come along together.

Given that background, the ISC naturally welcomed the introduction of this legislation, and we greatly appreciated the contact that we have had with the Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi). Not only did he keep his promise to write to us about the points made by Committee members on Second Reading, during my period of self-isolation, but he dealt with ISC concerns at the Committee stage and reached out before today’s debates as well. That is precisely the type of constructive engagement that we should like to have with the Government. If I do not secure the concessions that I want after all of that, I shall be very disappointed!

The issue on which I shall focus is parliamentary oversight. Normally, that would be straightforward. As the future arrangements laid down by the Bill will depend on the input of the new investment security unit, and as that unit will be housed in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, one would normally expect that general scrutiny could be conducted by Parliament as a whole and specialised scrutiny by the Select Committee on Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Unfortunately, that does not work in this case: much of the work of the investment security unit will depend on input from intelligence and security agencies and similar sensitive sources that cannot and must not be made public.

Furthermore, on Second Reading, the then Business Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Reading West (Alok Sharma), made crystal clear how central secret material would be to the practical application of the provisions of this legislation. He stated that

“the whole point of the Bill is for it to be narrow on national security grounds”.

He also said:

“These powers are narrowly defined and will be exclusively used on national security grounds. The Government will not be able to use these powers to intervene in business transactions for broader economic or public interest reasons”.—[Official Report, 1 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 206-210.]

It follows that the very areas in which the BEIS Committee would be perfectly qualified to scrutinise policy are specifically excluded from the application of the powers conferred by the National Security and Investment Bill.

That scrutiny gap was addressed, also on Second Reading, by the shadow Business Secretary, the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband), who said:

“Given the sensitive nature of the issues involved in this Bill, I do think there needs to be a way…for this House to monitor how this is working in practice.

I do not speak for it, but we have a special Committee of the House—the Intelligence and Security Committee—that can look at these issues. I would like to raise the question with the Secretary of State whether it could play a role in scrutinising the working of the regime and some of the decisions being made, because there are real restrictions on the kind of transparency there can be on these issues…The ISC is in a sense purpose-built for some of these issues.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 214.]

It is hard to disagree with that, although I hasten to add that the Committee has not the slightest wish gratuitously to add to its workload, overburdened as we are due to our delayed reconstitution and the fact that we cannot operate virtually, where sensitive material is concerned, during periods of lockdown. Nevertheless, Parliament should be enabled to scrutinise the implementation of the powers given to Government by this legislation, which explicitly puts national security material at the heart of future decision making. It is obvious that there will be potential conflicts between encouraging business on the one hand and safeguarding national security on the other. In 1994, the ISC was established specifically for circumstances such as these—namely, to examine matters that Parliament could not because they were too sensitive for public disclosure and debate.

It has been suggested that the ISC cannot undertake this role this time because the organisation concerned, the new investment and security unit, is based in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, rather than Departments like the Home Office or the Cabinet Office, which traditionally handle national security matters. Yet this is fundamentally to misunderstand the legal basis under which the ISC functions.

There are two interlinked documents: the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the ISC for which that Act provides. The long title of the JSA makes it quite clear that it provides not only for scrutiny of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, but for

“oversight of…other activities relating to intelligence or security matters…and for connected purposes.”

Section 2(1) of the Act refers to those three intelligence agencies specifically, but section 2(2) spells out our Committee’s wider remit:

“The ISC may examine or otherwise oversee such other activities of Her Majesty’s Government in relation to intelligence or security matters as are set out in a memorandum of understanding.”

Section 2(5) explains that that MOU can be altered by agreement between the ISC and the Prime Minister. All that is required, therefore, for a Government activity in relation to intelligence or security matters to be added to the existing list in the memorandum of understanding is a simple exchange of letters between the ISC and the Prime Minister agreeing to do so.

In other words, the 2013 Act and associated memorandum were designed exactly for circumstances such as these, where evolving intelligence and security arrangements create sensitive new functions and/or new units which need Parliamentary scrutiny to be within the same circle of secrecy as the long-established Agencies. To put the matter beyond all doubt, consider finally this extract from paragraph 8 of the MOU about our remit:

“The ISC is the only committee of Parliament that has regular access to protectively marked information that is sensitive for national security reasons: this means that only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of the Agencies and of those parts of departments whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters.”

Inserted at the end of this sentence is a notation for the following footnote which explains:

“This will not affect the wider scrutiny of departments such as the Home Office, FCO and MOD by other parliamentary committees. The ISC will aim to avoid any unnecessary duplication with the work of those Committees.”

Indeed, having chaired the Commons Defence Committee in the previous two Parliaments, I can confirm there was never the slightest friction, overlap or intrusion from the then ISC into the work of the Defence Committee. The ISC looked at defence intelligence and offensive cyber, as set out in its MOU, and the Defence Committee continued to scrutinise everything else.

It really should not be necessary, every time a new unit is set up inside a Department not normally associated with national security or intelligence issues, to spell out in black and white, as I have done today, how and why the framers of the 2013 Act deliberately created the flexible memorandum of understanding arrangement that incorporated its role on the face of that legislation. It was, of course, to deal with exactly the sort of situation facing us today, where the intelligence and security battle in what is increasingly known as the grey zone of conflict mutates and moves into areas of responsibility far beyond traditional boundaries, as Deborah Haynes’ admirable new podcast illustrates so convincingly. That is why Business Ministers, rather than Defence or Security Ministers, are having to grapple with today’s legislation.

Following a constructive discussion with my hon. Friend the Minister yesterday, I was cautiously optimistic that the Government would recognise that the 2013 arrangements provide the correct basis for scrutiny on which to proceed. Of the 14 amendments tabled for today, there is one—new clause 7—that recognises the scrutiny gap in this legislation and proposes that a special report containing the relevant classified national security material should be prepared for, and provided to, the Intelligence and Security Committee. This Opposition amendment has much to commend it, and, as ISC Chairman, I would be minded to support it if it were the only available option. However, an undertaking by the Minister today that the Government will bring forward their own amendment in the upper House to close the scrutiny gap satisfactorily in a more streamlined way would be even better.

In his appearance before the Public Bill Committee, former chief of MI6 Sir Richard Dearlove had the following exchange with the Minister, who referred to the annual report to be prepared for Parliament as a requirement of this legislation. The Minister asked:

“What is your view on balancing transparency and ensuring Government can take national security decisions sensitively? Where does that balance lie in terms of our ability to be as transparent as we can without harming sensitivities around these decisions?”

Sir Richard replied:

“My view would be that the annual report has as much transparency as possible, but you are probably going to require a secret annexe from time to time.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 21.]

Whether we go down that route of a classified unpublished annexe to send to our Committee or follow the model used in the ISC’s own reports, which are prepared in full with subsequent redactions made and marked in the main body of the text, such an approach would be the least burdensome for the Department to prepare and for the ISC to scrutinise. Either method would effectively close the scrutiny gap and get this valuable and necessary legislation off to the best possible start.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
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It is a great pleasure, as always, to follow the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), and I support many of his remarks.

Let me start by saying that the Opposition’s approach to this Bill is one of constructive support. That should not surprise the Minister: already at Committee stage we tabled nearly 30 targeted amendments and half a dozen new clauses to strengthen protections of our national security, although, regrettably, the Minister did not choose to accept any of them. As the Minister is also responsible for vaccine roll-out, he may have been distracted. I want to thank everybody—all the members of the Committee and the House staff involved in the Committee stage of the Bill—and confirm that we intend to continue that constructive support.

We support the Bill, because it is a Bill demanded by Labour. The problems it tackles are ones that have been highlighted by Labour, and the Government’s action, only after years of delay, seems to be a result of being constantly reminded by Labour. Reminded this Government have been, not least by their failures again and again. They were reminded in 2012, when they let the Centre for Integrated Photonics, a prize British research and development centre, be taken over by Huawei, an event that our recent head of the National Cyber Security Centre said we would not want to happen with hindsight: national security outsourced and British interests relinquished to the market.

The Government were reminded again in 2014 when they let our foremost artificial intelligence firm, DeepMind, be acquired prematurely by Google: national security interests outsourced again on account of blind market faith. They were reminded twice this time when the Government let our world-leading semiconductor firm Arm be taken over first by SoftBank and now by Nvidia. Again, an intelligence expert told our Committee that the UK had limited freedom of choice in this key strategic technology and that the deal undermined our own ability: our national interest outsourced yet again by Ministers prioritising market zeal over British security.

National Security and Investment Bill

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Paul Scully Portrait Paul Scully
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I look forward to hearing my right hon. Friend’s explanation.

I believe that the Bill as amended by the other place through amendments 11 and 15 would require the Secretary of State to provide a confidential annexe, to be provided to the ISC. I am advised by my noble Friends Lord Callanan and Lord Grimstone that there is considerable strength of feeling in the other place about ensuring that the operation of the regime receives appropriate parliamentary scrutiny, and I welcome the passionate and expert debate that this question has already received. It has been proposed that the ISC is better placed than the BEIS Committee to scrutinise the Investment and Security Unit, despite the Secretary of State for BEIS having responsibility for the unit. The implication of the amendments is that the Select Committee responsible for holding the Secretary of State to account across their responsibilities is insufficient in that regard. It is also suggested that the ISC would have inadequate access to information to carry out its duties.

In essence, the amendments would require sensitive details to be provided to the ISC regarding the Secretary of State’s decision on final notifications given and final orders made, varied or revoked, but the ISC is already able to request such information as soon as is appropriate from the security services where it forms part of its long-established scrutiny responsibilities under the Justice and Security Act 2013 and, as I hope I have made clear, its accompanying memorandum of understanding. In addition, the Bill provides that the Secretary of State must publish details of each final order made, varied or revoked, and clause 61 already requires the annual report to include the number of final orders made, together with a number of other details. Indeed, that clause was amended in the other place to include further such information in the annual report.

We do not disagree that further information may be required for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. Where that is the case, the Government will follow existing procedures for reporting back to Parliament, but that should be done primarily through responding to the BEIS Committee as it goes about its work of ably scrutinising the work of the Department. We will ensure that the BEIS Committee is able to access the material it needs.

It is of course right that the ISC continues its excellent scrutiny of the work of the security services. The work of the security services on investment security in support of the ISU clearly falls within the remit of the ISC. That does not require any statutory change to be made. As I said, the memorandum of understanding pertains to the continuing work of the ISC, and I look forward to working with colleagues on that Committee. As such, and with the BEIS Committee having appropriate assurance that it will be provided with the information necessary, there is no need for these changes made to the Bill by the other place to stand.

In summary, with the exception of amendments 11 and 15, I believe that this House is today presented with an improved set of measures to safeguard our national security. The ISC will not have its powers—existing powers —diluted through the discussion of the memorandum of understanding, as we have already said. Therefore, I commend the amendments, with the exception of amendments 11 and 15, to the House.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab) [V]
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Let me start by welcoming the Minister to the National Security and Investment Bill, and I would like to wish his predecessor well in his work on the vaccine roll-out. I would also like to thank colleagues in the other place who have worked so hard to improve this Bill, and the Members of both Houses who scrutinised its important provisions.

Labour is the party of national security, and has long called for a new regime to deal with evolving national security threats in corporate transactions. A robust takeover regime is also essential if we want firms in our key sectors to grow and provide good jobs here in the UK. So we support this Bill, which allows the Government to intervene when mergers and acquisitions could threaten national security. Unfortunately, the Bill in its original form lacked certain provisions, and particularly the oversight necessary to ensure it was successful in protecting our national security and national interest. So we have sought to improve the Bill along the way, and we are pleased that the Government have adopted some of our suggestions.

Members across party lines raised concerns over the capacity and capability of the new Investment Security Unit to deliver on the Bill’s ambition. We are pleased that the Government have acted on this, and Lords amendments 12 to 14 to clause 61 are based on Labour’s original amendment 31 during the House of Commons Committee stage, and a later amendment tabled by Labour at Lords Committee. Reporting the aggregate time taken for decisions will help to ensure that the new regime works more efficiently for small and medium-sized enterprises, and I was pleased to hear the Minister quoting my remarks to that effect.

We are also pleased to see that the Government have taken steps to address concerns regarding the 15% threshold for a notifiable acquisition. This follows Labour’s probing amendment 16 during Lords Committee stage and Cross-Bench concern. The Wellcome Trust labelled the 15% threshold as a

“regulatory burden for those that may not be able to afford it”.

With Lords amendment 3, the Secretary of State will still be able to call in acquisitions across the economy at or below 25%—and, if necessary, below 15%—where they reasonably suspect that material influence has been or will be acquired. But this amendment will bring the notifiable acquisition threshold in line with our allies in France, Australia and Canada. We are pleased the Government have listened to Labour and made a change that will be beneficial to small and medium-sized enterprises.

It is also welcome to see that the Government have now committed to issue public guidance, which Labour called for with our amendment 17 at the Commons Committee stage. This is good news for transparency. Our approach has been to ensure that our small and medium-sized enterprises have clarity, and that those investing in the UK understand what the rules are and how they will work. The publication of guidance will boost confidence in the new regime for national security screening.

But we are here today because of Lords amendments 11 and 15, and to vote on the Government motion to disagree. Labour believes that the Intelligence and Security Committee scrutiny is essential to provide the robust and sensitive oversight and accountability that matters of national security require. The Bill gives significant new powers to BEIS, a Department traditional lacking in national security experience. The BEIS Committee does not have the security clearance necessary to provide scrutiny, and the confidential briefings to the Chair described by the Minister will not change that.