Support for Ukraine and Countering Threats from Russia Debate

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Department: Ministry of Defence

Support for Ukraine and Countering Threats from Russia

Chi Onwurah Excerpts
Wednesday 2nd March 2022

(2 years, 2 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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John Healey Portrait John Healey
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Then the hon. Gentleman has answered his own question; I am delighted he was able to answer it with an emphatic yes.

I turn now to the fifth dimension, where the Government will have Labour’s full support if they act as they should. It is one thing to confront Russian aggression abroad, but we must also strengthen our defences at home. We know that the UK is not immune to Russia’s aggression. We have had chemical weapons used on our soil to kill people. We have had dissidents murdered on British soil. We have had cyber-attacks against UK Government Departments, our defence agencies and even the organisations trying to develop our covid vaccines.

I say to the Minister that for too long that has been the poor relation of our national security and our national resilience. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia report in 2020 said:

“Russia’s cyber capability…poses an immediate and urgent threat to our national security.”

The recommendations of that report have still not been implemented in full. The Government’s integrated review, almost a year ago, promised a national resilience strategy, but that has not yet been published. Our armed forces are essential to both our national defence and our national resilience. With the Army already cut to its smallest size for 300 years, in the light of the circumstances and the threats we now face, Ministers’ plans to cut a further 10,000 troops from Army numbers over the next three years must now be halted.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
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I thank my right hon. Friend for the excellent speech he is making. I asked the Prime Minister about Russian cyber-activity last week, particularly with the well-known history of bot farms and misinformation, and he did not have a response in terms of taking action. Bot farm activity has reduced in recent days because Russia has limited access to the internet. Is it not the case that we as a sovereign nation should be looking to take action to limit the influence of Russia’s bot farms and misinformation on our economy and society, rather than leaving it to the Russians?

John Healey Portrait John Healey
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Indeed, we have been slow to appreciate the scale of the disinformation driven by the Russian state directly and by its proxies. We have been slow to realise the extent to which it is corrupting our public discourse and in some cases interfering with our elections. Once again, the steps the Government could be taking, but that they seem very slow to take, have been set out in this House by my hon. Friend and others who are experts in that area.

Finally, on the sixth dimension, talking is always better than fighting. Even in these circumstances, President Zelensky in Ukraine has displayed outstanding leadership. Even as Russia continued to intensify its attacks, he was willing to hold talks, saying that there was

“still a chance, however small”.

He is also right to say:

“It’s necessary to at least stop bombing people…and then sit down at the negotiating table.”

I see as a significant development today’s confirmation that China is ready to play a role, saying that it is

“looking forward to China playing a role in realising a ceasefire”.

--- Later in debate ---
James Heappey Portrait James Heappey
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My right hon. Friend is absolutely right, and I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend the Minister for Asia and the Middle East will want to talk about China in her concluding remarks. Right now there is an opportunity to work with Beijing to bring about an outcome that is right for Euro-Atlantic security in the short term, but I do not think that that automatically means we close our eyes to our wider concerns about China and our competition with that country over the decades ahead.

Finally, I want to update the House on NATO defence and security activities. In addition to HMS Trent, HMS Diamond has now sailed for the eastern Mediterranean. We are doubling the number of UK troops in Estonia, with the Royal Tank Regiment and the Royal Welsh battlegroups now complete in Tapa. We have increased our fast air presence from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, from where those jets are now engaged in NATO air policing activity over Poland and Romania.

In his excellent speech, the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne asked two questions of the MOD about capability. The first was on cyber-resilience, and he will not be surprised to know, I hope, that there has been a series of Cobra meetings on homeland resilience and that the cyber-threat to the homeland has been an important part of those discussions. It is a capability that the UK has invested in through the National Cyber Security Centre. I would never go so far as to say we are well prepared because, frankly, we cannot know fully what is thrown at us, but the right discussions have been had and the right investments have been made, and I think what we have as a defensive cyber-capability is one of the best in the world.

The right hon. Gentleman also asked me a question about the shape and size of the Army, and he knows from his many clashes over the Dispatch Boxes with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State that it is subject to some debate, but the Secretary of State, to his credit, has always said he is a threat-based policy maker. It may well be that we learn something new from what is going on in Ukraine at the moment, but my reflections in the immediate term, from the operational analysis I am seeing, is that precision deep fires and armed drones are doing exactly what we saw in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria, on which we based the integrated review. For those in massed armour in a modern battlespace, that is a pretty dangerous and difficult place to be. We may yet see something different when we get into the close fight that will cause us to reconsider. Right now, however, the lessons we are learning from what is going on are exactly the same as those from Nagorno-Karabakh and northern Syria, and the IR was based on that operational analysis, with the Army rightly observing what it would call a deprioritisation of the close fight.

Chi Onwurah Portrait Chi Onwurah
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I thank the Minister for giving way and for his update. He is right to emphasise the unanimity of the international consensus on the invasion of Ukraine and on sanctions. He may be aware of reports that Russian oil producers are not able to find purchasers for some of their oil production; however, there are purchasers and movements of oil shipments in the gulf of Finland. What is our position and the international position on Russian oil shipments and starving Russia of the foreign currency that delivers?

James Heappey Portrait James Heappey
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I do not feel entirely qualified to answer in the detail I would want, but my analysis of the geostrategic situation in eastern and southern Europe is that we certainly need to have our eyes wide open to who else beyond the obvious western European countries are customers for Russian oil and gas. We need to be having a discussion within the international community about how some very vulnerable countries, perversely including Ukraine, but also Serbia and others in the Balkans, are still drawing on Russian gas, and how we get them off that without causing a situation that completely cripples their economies. But I am somewhat out of lane and dare say the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy would be concerned to have heard me offer even those thoughts.