Northern Ireland (Ministers, Elections and Petitions of Concern) Bill

Claire Hanna Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 22nd June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Claire Hanna (Belfast South) (SDLP)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson). We served together as Belfast city councillors and his voice and his views are always worth hearing. I believe that if they were the values and views projected by his party we would be in a much better position. While not seeking to put him on the spot, I think that was a very important point to make about the fact that if we, as five parties, went to the Government—if I am hearing him correctly—and spoke about how much a veterinary agreement would solve many of the problems facing us in Northern Ireland, he believes the Government would listen. I hope that that is the case, because he, like me, will know that there is progress to be made and fixes to be done on medicines. He will know that there is not a person in Northern Ireland who has been denied cancer drugs as a result of Brexit or anything else, but that constructive spirit would take us very far indeed and I would like to endorse the proposal.

January 2020, before covid and Brexit, might feel like a completely different place and time politically, but the politics of the past fortnight have been a reminder of the culture of crisis, stand-off, side deal and repeat that dogged devolution and the operation of the Good Friday institutions, and preceded the 2017 to 2020 collapse and the New Decade, New Approach deal that followed it. That came after three years in which Northern Ireland was a governance black hole. While the whole world was talking about the Good Friday agreement, its institutions were lying empty. Because of that, the agreement spans very many issues, including waiting lists, support for victims of the troubles, third-level education and childcare. Those were the preoccupations of the SDLP during the negotiations and I think they better reflect the preoccupations of the electorate as well.

It is worth reminding Members that it was not the deep desire of the power parties that restored Stormont, but the message sent by the electorate in December 2019—my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Colum Eastwood) and the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) were elected in that election—and the message sent by striking healthcare workers. Credit for getting power back to the Good Friday institutions goes to them, along with, it must be said, the former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith), who by all accounts and all regards is the best Northern Ireland Secretary we have had in a generation. His commitment was matched by the then Tánaiste Simon Coveney. They, and particularly the healthcare workers and the striking nurses in Northern Ireland, deserve credit. They and other people voted for a break in the stalemate, but they expect and need a lot more than just the absence of stalemate. They want delivery on all the policy commitments in New Decade, New Approach and in terms of change to the governing culture.

There is no doubt that covid has been an immense drain on political and legislative time, and there is no doubt that Brexit has been a drain on good will and political energy, but neither of those explains or excuses the paralysis that has beset many of the commitments in New Decade, New Approach. Culture and language fall into that category. They are not, in fact, among the most complex and challenging issues. The New Decade, New Approach commitment endorses a three-dimensional legislative compact that was drawn up by the Office of the Legislative Counsel in Northern Ireland, so it was not one-sided or maximalist. It means that many of those who for many years and in good faith campaigned strongly and honourably for an Irish language Act will see that the legislative guarantees are not as free-standing or as far-reaching as they wished to see.

That should have meant that those who opposed the Act would be encouraged to recognise that its nature, balance and thrust were not in one direction and not out of proportion in terms of purported cost or unwanted impact on anybody. Edwin Poots himself, as he was departing, said that one of Unionism’s faults is that it plays up the wins of others and plays down its own achievements. This is a very good example of that. This was an opportunity for the DUP to agree to a balanced package and I regret that it seems to be rejecting it. The Assembly has passed other legislation since its resumption last January, so there is no reason it could not pass this “Blue Peter” “Here’s one we made earlier” Bill. The only reason it has not passed it is resistance and reluctance. The former First Minister Arlene Foster waited until her resignation statement to commend the package, but that was a proportionate perspective that could have been used, in partnership with her fellow First Minister, to bring forward the Bill that would have been a significant part of an honourable legacy for her, a meaningful gesture towards a shared future and a signal that the DUP is willing and able to share power.

Like the hon. Member for North Down, the King George V speech has caught my attention today as well. There is a lot in it that is worth quoting. I am not usually given to quoting monarchs, but perhaps some of my DUP colleagues will take it more from a former king than they will from their neighbours. As well as the points that the hon. Member outlined, he talked about a Parliament for Northern Ireland being

“an instrument of happiness and good government for all parts of the community”.

He talked about

“moderation, with fairness and due regard to every faith and interest”

and about bringing forward

“a new era of peace, contentment, and good will”

upon

“sure foundations of mutual justice and respect.”

I say, 100 years on: please can we have another crack at doing that? The words ring very true.

If the issue is the UK Government legislating over your head on the Irish language, the opportunity still exists to send a signal to your neighbours that you are prepared to do it on their behalf. Withholding legislation on language as a worn-down bargaining chip is not a basis for meaningful sharing—neither, though, is Sinn Féin’s tactic of withholding the whole of devolution to achieve it. Sinn Féin criticised the DUP for withholding its nomination and the DUP criticised Sinn Féin the week before for withholding its nomination, with each party righteously condemning the mirror-image tactic from the other and each instalment draining away belief and faith in power sharing among the general population.

Over recent weeks, against the backdrop of no movement on bringing forward these legislative terms, the SDLP, as an honourable party to New Decade, New Approach, explored with the Secretary of State whether those pre-published legislative terms could be included by amendment to this Bill, which is, of course, a vehicle for advancing those aspects. Although he rested the onus us to design the relevant amendments that might be scoped, we established that the Government were not opposed in principle or practice to Westminster legislating for that, on the basis that it had been signed off by all five parties. We are grateful for the assistance of Clerks and drafters in navigating those possibilities.

We had proposed to table specifically and faithfully the legislative drafts that were agreed by all those parties and drafted by the Office of the Legislative Counsel—no more and no less were we going to do—and, in draft format, those amendments run to only 23 pages, so they would be even fewer in Bill form. Now that the Government have declared in public what they had agreed in private, the obvious question occurs: why not now with the means available to us with this Bill? There is a real argument, we believe, that it would be better to incorporate this package into this miscellaneous approach to New Decade, New Approach rather than leaving it until October when other factors might be at play. We have seen slippiness and slipperiness when it comes to previous commitments. As others have outlined, we are grossly overdue legislation relating to victims and New Decade, New Approach, so we do not and cannot have blind faith in how the Government will discharge that commitment, or what concession or other factor they will read into it in the autumn. We hope that the people of Northern Ireland and the Gaeilgeoirs of Northern Ireland do not look back in a few months on this as a missed opportunity.

This tale of the last few weeks of bad faith and foot dragging are the last 14 years of stop-start governance in microcosm. For all that the letter and spirit of the agreement are used as an amulet for people for or against Brexit, the spirit of power sharing and working the common ground, and of building trust through mutual endeavour, are quite absent from the Assembly. Watching that daily in the media drains away those feelings in the public. We are now very far off the vision that in 1998 created infrastructure and architecture to manage differences and to be able to realise a better future in Northern Ireland.

There are other issues on which we will table amendments, and we will not resile from New Decade, New Approach, but we will put forward ways that would strengthen the provisions in that and correct some of the divergence from the concepts of the Good Friday agreement—on, for example, restoring the joint nature of the First Minister’s office, which has been distorted by St Andrews. That was a centrepiece of strand 1, and although we hear a lot of waxing about parallel consent, that was the part of the Good Friday agreement that spoke about parallel consent and about the Assembly collectively nominating the First Ministers who would then be accountable to it. That foundation that would embed those concepts in the Assembly as an act of leadership from the top down was stripped out by the DUP and Sinn Féin at St Andrews.

Similar corrections to the petitions of concern are sensible and valid. It was, as my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle outlined, a mechanism designed to protect minorities, but instead it is used to thwart them. In fact, it is now thought of as a byword for veto, and that extends to the vetoholic tendencies of the DUP in the Executive and other corruptions of the agreement inserted at St Andrews. The three-Minister provision is causing absolute logjam in the Executive office and prevents Ministers from bringing forward progressive and productive legislation because they know that it will be thwarted at the Executive.

There are a number of other good points to be made and discussed around the issue of designation, which runs the risk, when it is wielded as it is by the larger parties, of locking in and embedding some of the sectarianism that the Good Friday agreement was designed to phase out. We look forward to discussing some of those issues.

Stability and sustainability ultimately will not come from rules and procedures; they will come from people believing, understanding and accepting that sharing power with their neighbours is the right thing to do, and not just sharing that power because the law tells them that they cannot make decisions without it. The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) made a number of good points about how devolution is not just about preventing conflict, because if we look at Scotland and Wales, it is of course about local power being in local hands, and about people being able to realise opportunities that those elected close to the ground will understand.

The hon. Member for Belfast East about spoke about common grounds and shared values. They are what we all want; they unite people of all backgrounds in south Belfast and in Northern Ireland as a whole, but they are currently absent from the top the Assembly. They would be displayed if the DUP were willing to advance all the aspects of the New Decade, New Approach deal, and if they were, legislation would not be required from this House.

Northern Ireland (Ministers, Elections and Petitions of Concern) Bill (Second sitting)

Claire Hanna Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th June 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q Finally, what key measures do you believe need to be implemented that are currently absent from the Bill?

Mark Durkan: I think we need progress in relation to the Bill of Rights. We need to try to clarify exactly what damage may have been done to the standing of the European convention on human rights and the reliance that citizens can place on it. A very direct promise was made to citizens in Northern Ireland about the European convention on human rights, but several of the Acts on the foot of Brexit have diluted that quite significantly, so I think that needs to be improved. While this Bill makes some improvements to the petition of concern—it weeds out some of the abuses in terms of how quickly or easily people table a petition of concern, so it is more qualified—it does not actually fix the problem with the petition of concern, which goes right back to the original 1998 legislation.

This is not a criticism of Mo Mowlam or of Paul Murphy, who brought that Bill through at the time, but that Bill translated the Good Friday agreement into statute in pretty short order, and the fact is that it did not properly translate what was intended in terms of the petition of concern. As I said earlier, the petition of concern was never to be a petition of veto, or even a petition of objection. It was to be there to trigger a special procedure, which the Assembly would then use and which would also call in the Equality Commission and the Human Rights Commission. It was to be joined-up scrutiny for rights and equality.

Of course, that has not happened and instead we have had the petition of concern being abused as essentially a dead-end veto, played almost as wild, as a joker at times, even against censure motions on Ministers. It was never intended to be so used. Some of the provisions in the Bill weed some of those bad habits out, but they do not correct the basic architectural mistake that the 1998 legislation never properly provided for paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of strand 1 of the Good Friday agreement to be put into statute.

[Claire Hanna (Belfast South) (SDLP)]

Q It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. Thanks for your evidence, Mark. You commented briefly on the original intent of the Good Friday agreement versus how it has latterly been used as a way to, I suppose, thwart minority rights rather than protect them. Could you give an assessment of what Daniel Holder this morning called the St Andrews veto, deployed at the Executive, and the extent to which it is being used as a pre-emptive veto that prevents proposals and legislation from even reaching the floor of the Assembly?

Mark Durkan: Thank you for that question, Clare. First of all, there is a problem with what you describe as a pre-emptive veto—in the past, I have used the phrase “predictive veto”. That certainly stems from, first, the petition of concern itself, because once parties start to moot the possibility that a proposal or a part of a Bill might be the subject of a petition of concern, that very much helps to stop a lot of the preparation and a lot of the thinking.

Even at the prelegislative stage, issues end up staying inside Government Departments, or on the Executive table even, and not going to the Assembly because people sense that there will be a petition of concern, so we end up with a bit of a stand-off, or gridlock. Issues that should be the subject of clear, concrete proposals often find themselves remaining in hidden contemplation at Departments because people are afraid of triggering the petition of concern process. In that sense, it has ended up being like a predictive veto. The petition of concern was meant to be there so that issues could be properly considered and perused because of their equality and human rights implications. It was not there to stop proposals being tabled in the first place, but it has had that effect.

In terms of what Daniel seems to have said this morning about the St Andrews veto, that refers to the fact that, as part of the St Andrews agreement, an additional point of veto ended up being created explicitly at the Executive, whereby three Ministers could call in any measure—even one being dealt with by another Minister—to the Executive. They could also then subject that to a cross-community voting requirement at the Executive itself. Again, in this provision, there was no reference to equality, rights or any grounds on which such a veto or call-in power had to be selectively used. It was not there; it was just wide open and free range. At the time of the St Andrews negotiations, I referred to it as a “drive-by veto” that would be used on top of the difficulties that we already had with the petition of concern. Of course, again, this has meant that rather than giving due consideration to legitimate and much-needed proposals—often those that have been directed or requested by the courts—the Executive are not able to do that simply owing to this additional veto, which was created as part of the St Andrews negotiation.

[Claire Hanna]

Q I want to pick up on another change to the Good Friday agreement at St Andrews that is also covered, in part, in the Bill, which is the change from jointly electing First Ministers to the arrangement that we currently have. What was the point in principle of that change? Do you think it has been a factor in the recurring instability that we have seen over the last number of mandates and years?

Mark Durkan: I do not think there was a point in principle in that change as such. The reason why it was an imperative for the DUP to seek that change was because the DUP did not want to be in the voting lobby along with Sinn Féin to elect the First and Deputy First Ministers. The Good Friday agreement very deliberately provided for the joint election of the First and Deputy First Ministers by the Assembly on an open-nomination basis. Any two Members of the Assembly could have been proposed by any Member of the Assembly to be First Minister and Deputy First Minister, or, as we would have preferred to have the wording, joint First Ministers.

The DUP were afraid that if they were going to vote for Ian Paisley, they would have to vote for Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness together, and they would be in the yes Lobby in the Assembly, possibly on their own. The first move that the DUP and the two Governments made to try to resolve that momentary issue—it would have been the 10 or 15 minutes of a Division—was to say, “Well, we will force all the other parties into the Lobby with you.” From December 2004, the whole way up until St Andrews, it was the position of Sinn Féin, the DUP and the two Governments that the agreement was going to be changed so that no other party would get to be nominating Ministers under the d’Hondt rules if they had not also voted for the First and Deputy First Minister. This was an attempt to oblige the SDLP and the UUP to be in the lobbies with the DUP voting for Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness, as the price of being included in ministerial office.

We as a party were very clear. We had negotiated elective inclusion into the Good Friday agreement. We had negotiated it there for everybody. Nobody had to even support the agreement to be eligible for elective inclusion; nobody had to vote for the First and Deputy First Ministers to be eligible for inclusion. When Seamus Mallon and David Trimble were elected, the DUP voted against and Sinn Féin abstained but they still got appointed Ministers. The plan was to change the rules to force the SDLP and the UUP to vote for them.

Whenever the DUP realised that neither the SDLP nor the UUP would comply with those terms, and therefore they were going to be in the Lobby on their own, they came up with this other device instead, that said, “Well, we will pre-assign, on an exclusive basis, the nomination of First Minister to the biggest party of the biggest designation. We will also privatise the nomination of the Deputy First Minister to the biggest party of the second biggest designation.” It was purely to remove that 15 minutes of discomfort for the DUP on one day.

What has happened since then has been that that change has meant that the Assembly elections have been tribalised even more deeply than they would have been, because they have been turned into a first-past-the-post race for First Minister, with the DUP saying, “You have to back us to make sure we are the biggest Unionist party and the biggest party, otherwise you could have a Sinn Féin First Minister.” Similarly, Sinn Féin are using it on the other side, saying, “Rub the DUP’s nose in it. We can take First Minister off them if everybody piles in behind us.” That is not what having proportional representation elections for the Assembly was designed to produce.

It has also meant that the office has had less of an air of jointery around it. Remember, they are nominated separately; they are not nominated or elected jointly. More fundamentally, there has been a weakening of the sense of accountability of the First and Deputy First Ministers. When the First and Deputy First Ministers are not appointed by the Assembly, they may feel less accountable to the Assembly. We have seen that with changes in previous years in relation to levels of Budget scrutiny. We also saw it at other times. For instance, there was a motion by the leader of the SDLP in the Assembly back at the end of 2016 around the renewable heat incentive. It was a motion calling Arlene Foster to account.

Arlene Foster’s attitude as First Minister was that she resented being called into the Assembly and she just parroted that she had a mandate from the people of Northern Ireland. She did not have a mandate from the Assembly. Her only mandate was to those who voted for the DUP. The DUP, in that previous Assembly election, got a smaller share of the vote than the Labour party, then in opposition in Great Britain, had done. The idea that this was a mandate from the people of Northern Ireland, not from the Assembly, created some of the tensions and some of what I would say—maybe unfairly—was evidence of arrogance on the part of the holders of that office. It all stemmed back to those St Andrews changes, which essentially privatised those two appointments simply to two parties and gave other parties no say in the appointment of Ministers.

I would contrast that with my own experience. To be elected as First Minister and joint First Minister, David Trimble and I had to have the support of not just members of our own parties but members of other parties. Indeed, some members of other parties had to even stretch to redesignate themselves to so elect us. You were always conscious that you owed your election and your level of accountability to all parties—not just to be obsessed with your own party’s mandate.

[Claire Hanna]

Q I do not want to hog all the time, but I want to ask what your assessment is of the Government impact of the potential period of caretaker Ministers. The phrase that has been in my head all day is the former First Minister’s phrase “rogues and renegades”. I am thinking of the issues around powers and scrutiny. What is your assessment of that?

Mark Durkan: As I understand it, the New Decade, New Approach negotiations involved a push by some parties to say that there was a need to lock in stability or sustainability, and that the way in which the Executive had fallen after the resignation of Martin McGuinness was something that needed to be corrected or avoided. I am not sure that the scheme provided for in this legislation really does lock in stability. In some cases, it may lock in what might be a pretty untenable situation of a caretaker set of Ministers limping on in office.

In fairness, we have to accept that every time we have tried to solve some of the conundrums that come up with the agreement, we find ourselves coming up against the same basic problem. It is a bit like, “There’s a hole in the bucket, dear Liza”. Every time we try to solve one procedural or structural problem, we find ourselves coming up against another one, and in many cases we find ourselves coming up against the same basic question: is there really the will and commitment to truly honour and uphold disparate power sharing, both in the joint office of First Minister and in a power-sharing Executive? I am not sure that the proposals adequately answer that.

You can see, I think, that there is planning permission in the proposals for roll-over periods of every six weeks, potentially, where you have caretaker Ministers. No doubt kites will be flown that there are proposals to break through the impasse, and then we will find that that does not work, and there are more recriminations and still more roll-over of caretaker Ministers. How credible that will be, I am not sure. Whether the public will regard that as sustainability in the way that the parties that wanted the changes in NDNA talked about, I am not sure.

Then, of course, there is the issue about what is called representation—that the Secretary of State may step in, notwithstanding provisions elsewhere in the Bill, to call an election because he thinks that there is not sufficient representation among the Ministers who are in office to enjoy cross-community support in the Assembly. I think that was the phrase used in NDNA, but it is not used in this legislation. I assume that that is to address the possibility that one of the First Ministers could resign, other Ministers might resign, and in essence a shell of an Executive would continue, but it does not seem to me that the issue is properly dealt with. It seems to me that we are looking at planning permission for new brinks to be brought to teeter on, which is what happened even with some of the St Andrews changes, and some of the other procedural adjustments that have been made.

There is the question of what powers the Ministers will have. The suggestion is that their powers will be qualified and limited—NDNA said, of course, nothing significant or controversial. The question then arises of how many weeks you can really go on for on that basis, and who is to judge what is controversial. Do you have an Executive Committee that is able to operate? If we are talking about a period of either 24 weeks or even, as the Bill provides for, up to 48 weeks, where you have this kind of zombie Executive, what happens to the North South Ministerial Council? The Good Friday agreement provided very clearly that the Assembly and the North South Ministerial Council are so interdependent and so interlinked that one cannot function without the other. It seems to me that we have come up with a scenario of a period, possibly of up to a year, where you could have an Assembly functioning in some sort of quasi-status form and Ministers in a shell of an Executive, but without a basis for NSMC meetings to take place. That is not the institutional, interdependent, interlinked balance that the Good Friday agreement specified. The Good Friday agreement is explicit on the interdependence of the strand 1 and strand 2 institutions, but NDNA seems to have come up with a way of sustaining strand 1 in a way that could not actually sustain strand 2 at the same time.

[James Sunderland (Bracknell) (Con)]

Q Mark, thank you for appearing before the Committee. Politicians generally agree that the Good Friday agreement was a good bit of work. It was successful, it has endured to the present day, and there is lots of confidence in it for the future as well. We know there are some relative threats to it at the moment, not least the Northern Ireland protocol and possibly the forthcoming statute of limitations on legacy—the list goes on. Can you assure the Committee that the Bill does not pose any threat to the Good Friday agreement? If there is a threat, can you explain what it is?

Mark Durkan: In terms of the agreement, the Bill is meant to uphold and follow through on understandings that were reached by five parties and the two Governments in the NDNA, and that was the price of getting devolution restored. I look at the Bill not as something that is going to directly damage the Good Friday agreement. I would say it is something that does not go far enough to restore and repair the Good Friday agreement, to correct its standing. What is missing is the true correction correcting the original architectural flaw in the original 1998 legislation around the petition of concern. What is in the Bill about qualifying the use of the petition of concern is helpful and good, but it does not go far enough to correct the basic architectural flaw about the absence of the special procedure and the focus on equality and human rights, so that is something that could be improved.

Likewise, in terms of the appointment of First Ministers, I would prefer legislation that restored the factory setting of the Good Friday agreement and allowed for the joint election by the Assembly of joint First Ministers. That is going to be particularly important coming up to the next Assembly election when there will be all sorts of speculation about the possible permutations of numerical strengths of different parties. The terms that were fixed at St Andrews say that the biggest party in the biggest designation gets one nomination, and the next nomination goes to the biggest party in the next biggest designation, but they also provide for the fact that if the biggest party is not in the biggest designation, it will get to appoint the First Minister, and then the Deputy First Minister will go to the biggest party in the biggest designation. So, you can see areas where parties will speculate that they might score very highly in the election in terms of seats but end up, because of St Andrews, being disqualified from the exclusive nominating rights that are fixed. It would be much better if the whole Assembly, as elected at the next Assembly election, had the responsibility of jointly electing First and Deputy First Ministers, and if all parties had responsibilities for making the Government work, rather than being able to say, “It’s the problem of those two parties,” which are preassigned those two nominating positions by the random results of the election. Nobody else can be nominated to anything without the First and Deputy First Ministers being nominated.

The repair work that could be done and the prevention of some pretty serious anomalies or absurdities that could potentially arise after the next election have not been achieved by the Bill. I do not think that we should be precluded from thinking that through further, in order to avoid an impasse after the next election.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q Do you think it would be wiser for the definition of “cross-community confidence” to be outlined in clause 213 in relation to a caretaker Executive?

Alex Maskey: For me, as Speaker and as someone who will remain impartial on this, I am trying to draw out, as are our officials, what areas are not as clear as we might like, but we support the legislation, and we will support what the Assembly decides. At the end of the day, it is not for us to make specific proposals. We are certainly very happy for our officials to continue to liaise with the NIO on some of these matters, but for us, in our role, to put specific proposals probably would not help, and would be inadvisable.

[Claire Hanna]

Q A previous speaker addressed some my questions around the code of conduct. By the way, it is very good to see you all, if only virtually. On the provisions on enforcement of the code of conduct, do you think the Bill needs to specify who should be the arbiter of those provisions?

Alex Maskey: Again, Claire, it would not be for me to put a proposal on the table on that, because as you know, people guard very jealously—I certainly do—the professional requirement to be independent and impartial. While I fully accept and appreciate that our Assembly is predicated and reconstituted on the basis of New Decade, New Approach and all its contents, I want to see them all delivered as a matter of integrity and public confidence-building. By the same token, the substance of each of those provisions is really a matter for all the parties and the Governments to work out, and we will service those diligently.

[Claire Hanna]

Q Lesley or Gareth, would you have any suggestions on that? Should there perhaps be more power, or more definition of the scope of the Northern Ireland Assembly Commissioner for Standards?

Lesley Hogg: Obviously, the ministerial code will now be monitored, and complaints against the ministerial code will be taken up by the Commissioner for Standards, but I think that is really as far as I would like to comment at this stage. As the Speaker says, we will obviously implement whatever decisions are taken. The code of conduct is embedded in the ministerial code and would therefore come under the remit of the Commissioner for Standards.

Dr McGrath: It has always been the case that the Speaker has no role in the code of conduct for Ministers.

[Claire Hanna]

Q I want to pick up on an issue that has been discussed today by a number of witnesses: the processes that were envisaged originally regarding the use of the petition of concern, but that have not been regularly used, such as this Ad Hoc Committee on Conformity with Equality Requirements. I remember, from my time in the Assembly, a previous committee being in place for the POCs on welfare reform. What has been the thinking around those? There was a difference in opinion on whether they were required or discretionary. What is your analysis?

Again, I suppose this is relatively moot in your term, Alex, because the POC has not been deployed while you have been in post, but what is your understanding of the requirement for those Committees to be established under the current framework?

Alex Maskey: You know that as part of the Good Friday agreement, that framework was agreed, but it was never, if you like, replicated in the Assembly. Speaking as someone involved in the Good Friday agreement, that was one of key areas people were focusing on to make sure we built the new instructions on a proper framework. However, it is a statement of fact that they are not there, not used and not in place at the moment. I spend every other week in the Chamber, busily telling people, “I have no role over that,” in terms of the code of conduct, for example.

On what you are requesting, Claire, I would have liked the provisions in the Good Friday agreement to have been faithfully implemented across the board, and that would have applied to these provisions as well. The fact they are not means that I have to deal with what is in place within the framework, the Northern Ireland Act, and our own Standing Orders, and I will faithfully deliver on those.

[Gavin Robinson]

Q Good afternoon to all three of you. Alex, you mentioned that you did not want to engage in suggesting solutions, or do not see that as your role. You highlighted the issue of the 14-day consideration period for a petition of concern. Those are really issues that may arise in extreme circumstances where there is a legislative deadline, or there is some urgency to matters proceeding. From what you say, the frailty in the legislation is that there is no indication that the petition can be rescinded if a resolution is found, say, two, three, four, five or 13 days into that 14-day period. Would that option to withdraw the petition satisfy the concerns that have been raised either through your officials or the Office of the Legislative Counsel?

Alex Maskey: On one level, it could possibly help, because it would remove the issue. If you were to remove it, then you do not need to deal with any consequences. Gareth said earlier that we have identified a number of issues that could be impacted, such as the LCMs, but there are others we may not have detected yet. I suppose it could go some way towards solving it.

Northern Ireland (Ministers, Elections and Petitions of Concern) Bill (Third sitting)

Claire Hanna Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 6th July 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I make it clear to the Committee, before I call Members to speak, that the Minister spoke to the first three clauses of the Bill. We will vote on clauses 1 to 3 separately at the end of the debate.

[Claire Hanna (Belfast South) (SDLP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. Apologies for my lateness. I was outside the Boothroyd Room, uncharacteristically on time, and am new to this process.

On the ministerial code, we welcome clause 4—

[Louise Haigh]

We are just doing clause 1 to 3 at the moment. We are not on to the amendments yet.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Before I call Claire Hanna, just to be helpful, once you have proposed the amendment, I will call members of the Committee, the Minister will then reply and then you can have a chance to respond. Please indicate to me and to the Committee whether you wish to withdraw or push the amendment to a vote.

[Claire Hanna]

I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 4, page 5, line 22, after

“be accountable to the Assembly”

insert “users of services,”.

This amendment would ensure that Ministers and Departments are accountable and responsible to users of services, as well as to the Assembly and the public.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 14, in clause 4, page 5, line 25, at end insert—

“(ba) ensure all reasonable requests for information from the Assembly, users of services and individual citizens are complied with; and that Departments and their staff conduct their dealings with the public in an open and responsible way;”.

This amendment would ensure that the principles of transparency and openness, as well as a duty to comply with requests for information, as outlined in Strand One, Annex A of the Good Friday Agreement, are maintained within the Ministerial Code of Conduct.

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[Claire Hanna]

Thank you very much, Mr Stringer. I appreciate your guidance. We welcome the strengthening of parts of the ministerial code, which we think will protect, enhance or potentially and eventually deliver good governance in Northern Ireland. Indeed, we think it could have wider purchase. Amendments 13 and 14 refer to our concern that parts of the ministerial code that were in the Good Friday agreement in the 1998 Act have been diluted or omitted here, purposefully or otherwise, and our amendments seek to restore those.

Amendment 13 specifically mentions accountability to users of services. That is topical, as there is much discussion at the moment about the awarding of contracts for the processing of social security payments and the potential processing of the victims’ payment. Amendment 13 would restore the accountability of Ministers for the services they deliver, including the services their Departments may be delivering through a third party.

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[Mr Walker]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her presentation of the amendments. We are legislating to update the ministerial code of conduct in accordance with a request made by the then First Minister and Deputy First Minister, following agreement of the revised code by the Executive Committee. The changes have not come from the UK Government; they come directly from the Executive themselves.

It is important to note that the ministerial code of conduct will continue to require that Ministers uphold the seven principles of public life, known as the Nolan principles. Some of the changes to the code that we are making will make that a little more explicit. The principles include selflessness, integrity, objectivity and—crucial to the amendment—accountability, openness, honesty and leadership.

The changes strengthen the code of conduct, as we heard from witnesses last week. We are legislating to strengthen the code to reflect the request that we received from the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, agreed by the Executive. That forms part of the wider package outlined in NDNA, which the Executive were committed to, but it will strengthen the codes governing ministerial accountability and conduct.

I gently propose that it is not for us here as Members of Parliament in Westminster to suggest amendments to a ministerial code of conduct that affects Members of a separate legislature. I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment. I assure her that the principles of openness and accountability are reflected in the original code and are strengthened in the changes we are making to the ministerial code here.

[Claire Hanna]

I thank the Minister. We appreciate that this flows from NDNA, but I am unclear whether there was a specific request for those particular provisions to be withdrawn. They existed before the New Decade, New Approach deal. Other aspects have been enhanced, and this one has been diluted. It is not clear to me why that would be the case—why it would have been weakened.

I will keep my powder dry, in order to perhaps push subsequent amendments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Louise Haigh]

I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 4, page 5, line 23, at end insert

“in accordance with the current Programme for Government drawn up in accordance with section 20(3) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and paragraph 20 of Strand One of the Belfast Agreement,”.

This amendment requires Ministers to pay regard to the statutory duty under the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement for the Executive Committee to seek to agree each year, and review as necessary, a programme incorporating an agreed budget linked to policies and programmes, subject to approval by the Assembly, after scrutiny in Assembly Committees, on a cross-community basis.

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[The Chair]

There was no debate on amendments 17, 18, 19, 6 and 3. I probably should have explained this at the beginning. We were debating amendment 4. I said at the beginning that it would be convenient to debate the other amendments at the same time. I think the hon. Member for Belfast South probably did not understand that. With the Committee’s indulgence, I will listen to the points that she wishes to make.

[Claire Hanna]

Once again, Mr Stringer, I appreciate your indulgence. I promise that we will be expert going forward, and I will be very brief about amendments 17, 18 and 19.

As the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley outlined, the amendments are about compelling and encouraging Ministers to implement the programme for government. Notwithstanding the fact that one is not currently agreed, a programme of work has been laid out. Amendment 18 is a pre-emptive amendment that is designed with the sustainability of the Executive in mind. It would require Ministers to implement future programmes for government. By my count we are, since 1998, yet to make it through a full mandate without at least one period of crisis talks and a refreshing of the programme for government, so it would appear to make sense to have that future-proofing amendment.

Amendment 19 would require a strengthening of the code of conduct. We have some concerns around enforceability. Members who were at the evidence sessions the other day may recall that the Speaker and staff of the Assembly were not particularly expansive in terms of how they thought that enforcement should take place. We have emerged from a period of explicit poor governance in the Assembly, with the likes of the renewable heat incentive debacle, where the ministerial code was perhaps not sufficiently powerful to curb the powers of Ministers. Amendment 19 is designed to strengthen it.

[Stephen Farry (North Down) (Alliance)]

rose—

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[The Chair]

I ask Claire Hanna whether she wishes to press amendments 17, 18 or 19.

[Claire Hanna]

I am happy to let them fall.

[The Chair]

I ask Stephen Farry whether he wishes to press amendment 6.

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[The Chair]

We can now go back to the correct order.

[Claire Hanna]

I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 4, page 6, line 11, at end insert—

“(3) If an investigation by the Commissioner for Standards finds that a Minister has breached the Ministerial Code of Conduct by engaging in harassment, bullying or inappropriate or discriminatory behaviour, then the Minister shall be deemed to have resigned their ministerial post at midnight on the day of the report’s official publication, unless they have resigned before this time.”

This amendment would ensure that if the Commissioner for Standards found that a Minister had engaged in harassment, bullying or inappropriate or discriminatory behaviour, in breach of the Ministerial Code of Conduct, then the Minister would be deemed to have resigned.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 16, in clause 4, page 6, line 11, at end insert—

“(3) Ministers shall cooperate with any relevant investigation by the Commissioner for Standards, give due respect to the findings of any report by the Commissioner in respect of themselves or their Special Advisers and responsibly reflect on the findings of other reports by the Commissioner in order to enable them to duly comply with the obligations of their Pledge of Office, the Ministerial Code of Conduct and/or related rules or codes.”

This amendment would ensure that Ministers cooperate with any investigation and give due regard to existing standards including reports from the Commissioner for Standards.

[Claire Hanna]

These amendments are part of the same package. Essentially, amendment 15 would ensure that if the Commissioner for Standards found that a Minister had engaged in harassment, bullying or inappropriate or discriminatory behaviour—

[The Chair]

Order. May I ask the hon. Lady to take off her mask?

[Claire Hanna]

Certainly, Mr Stringer. In that case, the Minister would be deemed to have resigned. Amendment 16 would ensure that Ministers co-operated with any investigation and gave due regard to existing standards, including reports from the Commissioner for Standards. The Minister has made an argument, about legislating for the ministerial code of conduct within the Assembly, that I think has the broad support of this Committee, so I will be happy to withdraw the amendment.

[Mr Walker]

I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s indication that she is prepared to withdraw the amendment. I will just offer a little further explanation. I understand the intent behind the amendment and agree that there should be a fair system of checks and balances through which to hold Ministers accountable. Provision for that already exists in section 30 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998: if the Assembly resolves that a Minister or junior Minister no longer enjoys the confidence of the Assembly, or the Secretary of State is of the opinion that such a resolution should be considered, the Minister can be excluded from holding office for a period of not less than three months and not more than 12 months. As that provision already exists, I ask the hon. Lady, in addition to making the points that she has made, to withdraw the amendment.

[Claire Hanna]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Petitions of concern

[Stephen Farry]

I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 5, page 7, line 12, leave out from “or” to end of subsection.

If appropriate, I will also address the other amendments in my name to this clause in relation to the petition of concern. The petition of concern is something that my party and, indeed, many others have been—

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[Stephen Farry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Claire Hanna]

I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 5, page 7, line 12, at end insert—

‘(5A) When a petition of concern is lodged and confirmed against a measure, proposal or a decision by a Minister, Department or the Executive (“the matter”), the Assembly shall appoint a special committee to examine and report on whether the matter is in conformity with equality and human rights requirements, including the European Convention on Human Rights and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.

(5B) Consistent with paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of Strand One of the Belfast Agreement, a committee as provided for under Section 13(3) may also be appointed at the request of the Executive Committee, a Northern Ireland Minister or relevant Assembly Committee.

(5C) A committee appointed under this section—

(a) shall have the powers to call people and papers to assist in its consideration; and

(b) shall take evidence from the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.

(5D) A committee appointed under this section shall—

(a) report in terms that reflect evidence regarding human rights and equality assessments relating to the matter; and

(b) identify relevant clarification, adjustments and amendments (in the case of legislation) and/or other assurances which would address the stated concerns.

(5E) The Assembly shall consider the report of any committee appointed under this section and determine the matter in accordance with the requirements for cross-community support.

(5F) In relation to any specific petition of concern or request under subsection (5B), the Assembly may decide, with cross-community support, that the procedure in subsections (5A) and (5C) shall not apply.”

This amendment provides for a petition of concern to lead to a special procedure, described in paragraphs 11-13 of Strand One of the Belfast Agreement, whereby a special committee shall consider the stated concern(s) relating to equality requirements and/or human rights. Such a special committee could also be appointed at the request of the Executive Committee, a Northern Ireland Minister or relevant Assembly Committee.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 12 in clause 5, page 7, line 27, at end insert—

“(ca) specify the size, timescale and terms of reference for such a committee;

(cb) specify procedure(s) to allow for subsection (5E).”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 11 and would further clarify how standing orders should make due provision for the working terms for the sort of special committee/procedure in respect of stated human rights or equality concerns as outlined in paragraphs 11-13 of Strand One of the Good Friday Agreement.

[Claire Hanna]

While we welcome minor amendments to the petition of concern to make it a little more difficult to table one, that does not improve how the POC works or restore it to its intended purposes. Amendments 11 and 12 seek to do that by restoring some of the Belfast agreement’s factory settings, as it were, and reinserting the special procedure described in paragraphs 11 to 13 of strand one, whereby a special committee should examine the rationale and viability of a petition of concern so that it is used as a mechanism to protect minority rights and not, as has been practised during the previous mandate, to thwart them. Amendment 11 would restore that original intent, which has not been adequately used. Amendment 12 enables that by specifying how such a committee could be established at the request of either the Assembly Executive Committee, a Minister or a relevant Committee.

[Gavin Robinson]

I am not doing very well on my commitment at the start. I want to push back politely on the notion of factory reset, and that we are getting back to the original intent of the provision. That is not agreed. Going through last week’s evidence, it is fair to say that there are those who were involved in the process in 1998 who are now trying to retrofit and read into the 1998 agreement what they hoped to attain or achieve at that stage, and did not.

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[Mr Walker]

I was very interested to hear the hon. Member for Belfast South use the term “restore factory settings”. It is a good technological phrase with which we are all familiar. The issue is that the factory settings lie under what is there and are available to return to at all times. In this case, there is already such a provision for a committee in section 13(3)(a) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. The Bill requires the Assembly to implement Standing Orders to make provisions for referral to that committee, in the same terms as exist in section 42 of the Northern Ireland 1998.

This is a matter for the Assembly’s Procedure Committee to implement through changes to Standing Orders. The parties did not reach agreement on this in New Decade, New Approach; the hon. Member for Belfast East made that point as well. I urge the hon. Member for Belfast South to understand that her party colleagues in the Assembly can take forward the issue of those changes to Standing Orders, but on the basis that the provision that she is calling for already exists in law, I ask that she withdraw the amendment and consequential amendments.

[Claire Hanna]

I acknowledge that they exist, but they are not enacted and, when I questioned the Speaker at the evidence session last week, it was not clear why they have not been established. While I understand where the hon. Member for Belfast East is coming from, there is a creeping narrative that the attempt to thwart the vetoholic nature of some Ministers is somehow pulling up a ladder as demographic change happens in Northern Ireland and in the Assembly. That is not the case. It is due to public concerns about the use of that veto on issues that have nothing to do with the in-built traditional divisions, for example around equality for lesbian and gay people, which is the most prominent use of that provision.

I acknowledge the Minister’s comments about the provisions already being there, but they are not being used. I agree with the hon. Member for Belfast East when he said that if these provisions have to be used it is because power sharing is not working, but I would argue that unfortunately the last few years would indicate that in many cases that is not working.

Sir Jonathan Stephens told us last week that no amount of regulation will push parties to power share if that is not what they want to do. Until we have parties that share power appropriately and use power in the interest of everybody, because they think it is in everybody’s interest and not because the law tells them to do so, then unfortunately we need these amendments. On the basis that the Committee is in agreement with the Minister in terms of the Assembly’s legislative ability, then I am happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mr Walker]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 5, page 7, line 16, leave out “including” and insert “which may include”.

This amendment means that the standing orders need not specify the minimum period of notice for a petition of concern.

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[Stephen Farry]

The issue is essentially about being proactive and the Government and Parliament recognising changes in Northern Ireland, recognising where problems may well arise in the near future and acting to get ahead of those, as opposed to responding to what may well become a crisis in the future.

At present, there is a lot of concern about the precise approach to the determination of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland, which has been through quite a number of changes over the years. Obviously, new clause 3, tabled in the names of my friends in the SDLP, potentially takes us back to the original wording of the Good Friday agreement and the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which was of course changed by the St Andrews agreement and the subsequent legislation.

We now have a situation where, under law, the determination of First Minister and Deputy First Minister is closely linked to designations. In effect, at present, the largest party in the largest designation chooses the First Minister and the largest party in the second largest designation chooses the Deputy First Minister, with the proviso—slipped into the legislation in 2007—that when that does not apply to the largest party overall, that largest party takes the First Minister role.

This has become, shall we say, the focal point for a lot of polarisation—even more polarisation in what is already a polarised society—and has led to elections becoming focused around who will become the largest party, rather than recognising First Minister and Deputy First Minister as a joint office, and that in practice it does not matter terribly much which party has the First Minister and which has the Deputy First Minister. None the less, this is part of the narrative of our politics and acts to squeeze out the consideration of other issues during election time.

Beyond that, there is a specific issue. The system of appointing the First Minister and Deputy First Minister is very much linked to the designation system in the Assembly. We do not believe that that was ever legitimate, but it was put in in 1998. Not everyone in Northern Ireland is a Unionist or a nationalist, and not every elected representative is a Unionist or nationalist; people wanted to see themselves in a different light. The situation has changed dramatically over the past 20 years, both in terms of the number of elected representatives who do not identify as Unionist or nationalist, and—perhaps even more significantly—within the wider public. Our people, particularly our young people, have moved away from traditional labels.

It is important that our institutions keep up with the changes and evolution in society. We could see a situation in the near future where a party—I cannot think of one that springs to mind at present—may well emerge as one of the largest two political parties in Northern Ireland, but the current formation of the rules around the appointment of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, and in particular the link to designations, would act to prevent that from happening. I think that would create a crisis of legitimacy, in terms of the political institutions.

New clause 2 is designed to reflect the changing demographics within Northern Ireland, to move away from the 1998 situation, in which perhaps only a small number of MLAs were neither Unionist nor nationalist, to what may be a very different situation after the next Assembly election. It would also avoid, therefore, what could become a major political crisis of legitimacy, in which the Government would have to intervene to rectify in due course—perhaps with some period of the institutions not being operational. That is why it is important that the Government are proactive: not in a massively speculative way, of course, but by dealing with realistic changes that may be just around the corner in Northern Ireland’s society.

[Claire Hanna]

The previous amendments to the Bill tabled by SDLP Members were probably probing amendments, but we believe that new clause 3 is fundamental and fairly existential for the Assembly. It is worth saying that for the last 20 years the SDLP has advocated adherence to the Good Friday agreement and the mechanisms and safeguards designed in good faith during that process.

The reason why we have protected some of the changes that happened at St Andrews is that the agreement was designed in good faith and endorsed by a very large number of the people north and south. Subsequent changes have been made by politicians and for politicians in their own interests, frankly—and, we believe, over the heads and to the detriment of the electorate.

The joint election of First Ministers was a centrepiece of strand 1. In recent months, we have heard much debate about the concept of parallel consent, but this is really the clearest example of parallel consent as designed in the Good Friday agreement. In theory and in practice, in those early years the First Ministers would have been jointly elected by all the Assembly Members and in practice by a majority in total and a majority of each designation at the time.

The current distorted process, arrived at at St Andrews, has essentially privatised the election to the two larger parties. That was done to spare the blushes of those parties so that they did not have to endorse one another in the voting lobbies, but that has had knock-on effects on the joint character of the office. Leadership comes from the top, and that has an effect on the character of the Assembly and of political conversation more widely. The current process has also undermined the accountability mechanisms that had been designed for the Assembly and removed the primacy of the Assembly as an authority to hold Ministers to account.

The flaws in that approach become very clear in December 2016, when the Assembly was limited in its ability to hold to account Ministers who had presided over a substantial and fairly catastrophic example of poor governance. Restoring that joint election, as we have outlined in new clause 3, would restore some primacy to the Assembly as the key source of devolved authority. It would also facilitate the cross-party working and cross-party mandates, allegiances and alliances envisaged in 1998.

The St Andrews in this Bill is about sustainability and the new clause is very much in that spirit. The St Andrews change has also facilitated the ransom tactics that we saw most acutely in the 2017-to-2020 stand-off, but that we have also seen in recent weeks as well. The fact that the nominations are private decisions for those parties allows them to withhold a First Minister and therefore to withhold an Assembly. That prevents any potential emergence of a coalition of the willing, as might have come forward in the last three-year stand-off of MLAs from all parties. They wanted to get on with the job to which they were elected but, because of the privatisation of the First Minister’s nomination, had essentially been relegated to being bystanders and commentators with no power to implement a different mandate.

That change at St Andrews also has a ground-level impact, in that it has allowed parties to make every Assembly election a first-past-the-post race to be top dog. It effectively makes Assembly elections into many border polls; we have to race to become them’uns or us’uns as the biggest party and get the top job. That has sucked oxygen away from every other issue and prevented the emergence of a politics and discourse more about the everyday issues that affect people here.

Our new clause seeks to address those issues and would also formalise the joint and coequal nature of the offices in removing the word “Deputy”; the reality is that one First Minister cannot order paperclips without the say-so of the other First Minister. The “Deputy” and “First” mechanism undermines the joint nature of that office. The new clause is in the wider interests of this Bill, which is about sustainability, and would head off any potential existential crisis following a future election if the few hundred votes that separate those parties were to change and people in one were anxious about being deputy to the other.

The mechanisms that we have outlined would also go some way to address the issues discussed by the hon. Member for North Down and for which the SDLP has much sympathy. The designation system was designed and is in place to manage the traditional divides and the two communities, as was, and as has been spoken about, but it is a fair point that it is entrenching those communities, in which people are separated and divided out on that basis.

The mechanism that we have outlined in our new clause designs in other potential ways to ensure that the First Ministers have the support of sufficient numbers of the Assembly, through either majorities of each designation or, in essence, a form of qualified majority voting that would in practice ensure that those First Ministers were acceptable to different sides of the communities—different potential identities, but without negating the role and the vote of those who designate as others, which is a perfectly rational way to designate, whatever the constitutional outlook.

[Mr Walker]

I turn first to the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for North Down. As I have stated previously, the purpose of the Bill and the reason why we are in Committee today is to legislate for commitments made to support the institutions and to improve sustainability under the New Decade, New Approach deal. I commend the hon. Gentleman on his creativity in seeking to reform the mechanism through which to nominate a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister, but it is not something that I can support because it has not been agreed by the parties.

Of course, I know that the hon. Gentleman’s party may be looking at the polls and at the possibility of making gains in the next election, but it would not be appropriate for the UK Government to alter unilaterally the principles of power sharing so carefully negotiated as part of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement and later by the St Andrews agreement.

The new clause could have an adverse impact on the make-up of the Executive should the First and Deputy First Ministers arise from the same designation. If both the largest and the second largest parties were from the same designation, the Executive could not command cross-community support within the Assembly, which would lead to the instability of the political institutions in Northern Ireland. That is precisely what the Bill aims to avoid. I recognise that the hon. Gentleman might wish the issue to be addressed at another time. As our previous Speaker used to say regularly, that is a bridge that we might have to cross when we come to it, but we do not have any mandate to address it in this particular piece of legislation.

The hon. Member for Belfast South is looking to return the situation to how it stood before the St Andrews agreement. Her party has championed that position consistently. It is worthwhile for her to consider what power sharing should look like in the future, in particular as the political landscape in Northern Ireland evolves. That conversation might need to be had, but it would not be right for this Parliament to reverse unilaterally the approach agreed at St Andrews.

To reiterate a point that I have made previously, the purpose of the Bill is to legislate for commitments made under the NDNA deal. The Belfast/Good Friday agreement has continued to be built on since its historic agreement in 1998 through periods of political difficulty, resulting in the deal that we legislate for today—itself built on agreements such as St Andrews, which the hon. Lady is looking to reverse with her new clause.

The history of devolution in Northern Ireland has shown that the communities and politics are changing continually. Shortly after the Good Friday agreement was reached, there was a prolonged suspension of the institutions between 2002 and 2007. The period of suspension was longer than the institutions had been functioning following the Belfast/Good Friday agreement.

Devolution was restored in 2007, following the St Andrews agreement, which the hon. Lady wishes to reverse. That historic agreement led to a 10-year period of political continuity, between 2007 and 2017. As I stated, it would not be right for this Parliament to reverse unilaterally the approach agreed at St Andrews. I therefore urge that both the motions be withdrawn.

Northern Ireland (Ministers, Elections and Petitions of Concern) Bill

Claire Hanna Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Commons Chamber

[Claire Hanna (Belfast South) (SDLP)]

When we last debated this Bill in June, the context was that Sinn Féin had just threatened the collapse of the institutions. Fast forward back to groundhog day, and we are here again with the DUP dangling the future of those same institutions before us. The context of both those threats is the same: the pandemic is still rampant, there are issues in the education service, we have the worst health waiting lists in these islands by a mile, and, without a climate change plan, Northern Ireland is a laggard with no binding targets at all. That seesaw of instability and stop-start governance is the last decade and a half in microcosm, with each of the two lead parties replicating the same tactics and threats, and criticising each other for doing the same, with each particular episode draining away the confidence and belief of the people of Northern Ireland in power sharing.

I fear that, with this Bill, we have missed some of the opportunities to improve governance, cohesion and the sense of possibility that the institutions were based on. For all that the letter and spirit of the Good Friday agreement have been invoked in recent years, either for or against Brexit and the protocol, that spirit of power sharing and genuinely working the common ground in the interests of people in Northern Ireland through mutual endeavour are quite absent from today’s Assembly. In our amendments in Committee and today, the SDLP brought forward practical suggestions to try to improve the atmosphere and improve governance. We have been very clear—this was echoed by a number of witnesses in Committee—that no amount of rules and regulations will force the parties to share power properly unless they truly believe that it is the right thing to do, but it is appropriate that we should try to improve the mechanisms involved. The Good Friday agreement always allowed for that level of evolution, and that is something the SDLP has supported before—for example, in the introduction of opposition provisions.

It is a fact that the Good Friday agreement was negotiated by the widest possible range of political voices, that it was put to the people and that the people in the north and south of Ireland endorsed it. The St Andrews changes, which include a lot of the flaws, were not endorsed in that way. They were negotiated by, and for, the two large parties and imposed without recourse to the people of the island, and that shows. The flaws in the election of the First Ministers are illustrative of the rot and the culture of mistrust in the Assembly. There has been much discussion in recent months about the concept of parallel consent, when in fact the election of joint First Ministers, as was, is the centrepiece of parallel consent and the most real example of it in strand 1.

In the early years of the Assembly, the First Ministers were elected from the Floor of the Assembly by a majority of all present and both designations. That allowed for cross-party consensus building and coalition building, which have disappeared in the last decade and a half. That was done to spare the blushes of the larger parties because they did not want to be seen to be endorsing each other in the voting Lobby, but that has had, and continues to have, a knock-on effect on the wider political discourse. We know that leadership in any organisation comes from the top, and it is the same in Northern Ireland. These changes, which we have tried to address through amendments, will allow each Assembly election to be reduced to a first-past-the-post race to become top dog, even though, as others have pointed out, one cannot even order paperclips without the say-so of the other. This will serve to suck all the oxygen out of the political discussion and allow every other issue to drain away.

[Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend that it is beneficial for the good people of Northern Ireland to have a functioning Northern Ireland Assembly rather than getting edicts from here in Westminster. Does she agree that it was even more destabilising for Northern Ireland when the UK Government, as part of the Brexit deal, signed a Northern Ireland protocol that they had no intention of honouring? Is that not even worse for the people of Northern Ireland?

[Claire Hanna]

I agree entirely. Among the many things that we discussed under the Good Friday agreement, the primacy of the rule of law and of trust are contained in that as well. They have gone out of the window in recent months, which is having a knock-on effect in Northern Ireland.

I regret that our amendments were not adopted, but the mechanisms that we tried to insert into the Bill were around that sense of joint purpose and common endeavour, as well as accountability. When the First Ministers were elected by the MLAs, they were accountable to the MLAs. The failures of the current process became very clear when Members of the Assembly tried to hold to account Ministers who had been responsible for terrible governance failures in the renewable heat incentive scheme. It became very clear that the First Minister did not feel that she was accountable to the Assembly, and indeed, due to those changes, she was not.

It is also worth saying that the mechanisms that we proposed would have been compatible with an overdue review of designation. I very much agree with the point raised by, among others, the Chair of the Northern Ireland Committee that, as currently operated, the designation structures for people opting to be nationalist, Unionist or other are locking in sectarianism. They were very well-intentioned; they were designed to manage a traditional conflict between two traditional communities, but Northern Ireland has evolved and it is appropriate that we should look to evolve those structures as well.

The Minister referred to the Bill being New Decade, New Approach, no more and no less. It is a missed opportunity, but it is worth saying that it includes some things that I do not remember from New Decade, New Approach, including the removal of key phrases and mechanisms from the ministerial code of conduct. It is still not clear who had problems with the language on transparency and accountability as it stood in the original agreement and in the 1998 Act, but I use that as an illustrative example that it is not a faithful transcription of the New Decade, New Approach all-party agreement and therefore other mechanisms could have been advanced.

Although we agree with the thrust of the Bill, we are beset and bedevilled by a culture of veto and stand-off, and this would have been an appropriate opportunity to try to fix some of those things. For example, to the best of my knowledge, the Assembly has not delivered a single piece of equality legislation. I listened to hon. Members speaking about why we could not pass equality legislation, in this case in the form of language legislation, because there is so much to do on health and education. There is no doubt about that, but those same parties have been running the show for a decade and a half, and in many cases they hold the specific ministerial briefs about which they speak. Every other region of these islands is able to walk and chew gum at the same time. Equality provisions can be advanced while meaningfully delivering for the people of Northern Ireland.

[Stephen Farry]

Does the hon. Lady agree that if a certain party has a huge issue with the UK Parliament legislating in relation to the language and culture package of New Decade, New Approach, it has the opportunity to expedite the package through the Northern Ireland Assembly?

[Claire Hanna]

I agree entirely, as the Assembly is supposed to be local power in local hands. The culture of telling people that sharing is losing is a big part of the problem that we have today. That opportunity is still on the table, and my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Colum Eastwood) tried in Committee to introduce such legislation through an amendment that faithfully transcribes what was agreed by all parties, including the Democratic Unionist party.

Sustainability and stability will not come from rules and regulations; they will come from people understanding and believing that power sharing is the right thing to do, and not just doing it because the law makes them do it. It will come from London and Dublin operating together again as friends and equals on the basis of transparency and trust, and it will come when the powers of devolution are used meaningfully to change people’s lives and not just as a way of moving from actual conflict to a culture war, as we have had. There are opportunities to improve that governance, and we have not taken them today, but my hon. Friend and I will be ready to have that conversation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Paisley]

Like the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone, we keep coming back to the phrases and mantras mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Upper Bann (Carla Lockhart): “We must support the Belfast agreement, provided it is our interpretation of the Belfast agreement.” The two-faced approach from some hon. Members, who say we must support the Belfast agreement and never change it while tabling amendments to change it, is not lost on anyone back home.

I do not often quote the hon. Member for Belfast South (Claire Hanna), but I agreed with her wholeheartedly when she said that she wishes to support the locked-in sectarianism of the Belfast agreement. Think of it, we are discussing measures that a Member of this Parliament—

[Claire Hanna]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Ian Paisley]

No, I will not. The hon. Lady had a good opportunity to make a speech. It may not have been her finest moment, but she has made a speech and I think I am entitled to take that speech apart, which she has made very easy for me. She wishes to support the locked-in sectarianism of the Belfast agreement, and it is incredible that she is asking this House to do that. That follows closely on the heels of the previous Member for Foyle—

[Claire Hanna]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. If Members are referring to content, they should quote me accurately. I said that the current designation structures, as operated, were locking in sectarianism. Is it appropriate for Members to misquote other Members?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Could the hon. Lady repeat that point of order? I could not hear it properly.

[Claire Hanna]

Is it in order, Madam Deputy Speaker, for Members to misquote other Members? I said in my speech that the current designation mechanisms, as operated, were locking in sectarianism. The hon. Member for North Antrim (Ian Paisley) has accused me of attempting to lock in sectarianism.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I thank the hon. Lady for that point of order. It is important that Members do not misquote other Members; that is very important indeed. The hon. Lady has made her point. I am sure that if the hon. Gentleman feels that he has misinterpreted her words, he will respond, or he may feel that the clarification that she has just given has put what she said on the record.

Northern Ireland (Ministers, Elections and Petitions of Concern) Bill

Claire Hanna Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 7th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeffrey M. Donaldson]

I welcome the opportunity to speak in this brief debate.

The Lords amendments are indeed a matter for the Government, but let me be absolutely clear in response to the right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith): there is absolutely no question of some form of collusion—a popular word in Northern Ireland—between my party and the Government on the timing of the amendments. As far back as last September, I indicated the course of action that I would take if the Government failed to act and to honour their commitments in New Decade, New Approach. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that the timing of our decision was not influenced by any amendment to the Bill.

The amendments will ensure that the Bill’s provisions are retrospective in nature, to a degree that is, as I say, a matter for the Government, but if we do not get a resolution to the issues that have given rise to the current impasse in Northern Ireland and to the decision to withdraw the First Minister, frankly the amendments and the Bill will be irrelevant. If we do not get a resolution within the next six weeks, it matters little whether or not this legislation is retrospective. Personally, I would love to see a resolution in the next six weeks. I can assure the House that if that happens, we will not be found wanting in reinstating the institutions and restoring Ministers to office.

In the short time available, I want to remind the House, as the right hon. Gentleman did, that New Decade, New Approach is a detailed, delicately balanced agreement. I commend him for his work during his time as Secretary of State to help to bring it about, but it is an agreement that has not been fully honoured. I commend the hon. Member for Hove (Peter Kyle) for recognising the frustration felt among DUP Members about the Government’s failure to honour their commitments.

Annex A is titled “UK Government Commitments to Northern Ireland”. Those commitments were made on behalf of the Government by the right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon, who I accept is not in office and therefore cannot directly be held responsible for the failure to deliver them. However, the idea that it is merely for the parties in Northern Ireland to deliver their commitments, and that the Government can sit on their hands and not deliver their side of the agreement, just does not add up.

I am a Unionist. I believe passionately in Northern Ireland’s place within the United Kingdom. At the heart of the Belfast agreement is the principle of consensus. The former leader of the Social Democratic and Labour party, John Hume, told us time after time that the way forward in Northern Ireland was not the politics of one side being in charge of the other and of majority rule; it was about consensus. On a matter as fundamental as Northern Ireland’s relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom and the harm that the protocol is doing to that relationship, there is not a consensus in Northern Ireland. There is not a single Unionist party and not a single Unionist elected representative who supports the protocol.

[Claire Hanna (Belfast South) (SDLP)]

I thank the right hon. Member for giving way; I regret that he was not so comfortable with the words and language of John Hume for many years. Will he agree, then, that there was no consent for the Brexit that he and his party pursued? Does he agree that Brexit was presented, as Mark Durkan has put it,

“as a consent-free mystery tour”?

Does he acknowledge that his party was wrong to oppose the numerous amendments that attempted to write in a role for the Northern Ireland Assembly and for the people of Northern Ireland?