Information between 28th March 2026 - 27th April 2026
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21 Apr 2026 - English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill - View Vote Context Graeme Downie voted Aye - in line with the party majority and in line with the House One of 280 Labour Aye votes vs 0 Labour No votes Tally: Ayes - 284 Noes - 149 |
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21 Apr 2026 - English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill - View Vote Context Graeme Downie voted Aye - in line with the party majority and in line with the House One of 285 Labour Aye votes vs 0 Labour No votes Tally: Ayes - 291 Noes - 144 |
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21 Apr 2026 - English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill - View Vote Context Graeme Downie voted Aye - in line with the party majority and in line with the House One of 284 Labour Aye votes vs 0 Labour No votes Tally: Ayes - 288 Noes - 147 |
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21 Apr 2026 - English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill - View Vote Context Graeme Downie voted Aye - in line with the party majority and in line with the House One of 283 Labour Aye votes vs 0 Labour No votes Tally: Ayes - 287 Noes - 150 |
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21 Apr 2026 - English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill - View Vote Context Graeme Downie voted Aye - in line with the party majority and in line with the House One of 290 Labour Aye votes vs 0 Labour No votes Tally: Ayes - 293 Noes - 155 |
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21 Apr 2026 - English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill - View Vote Context Graeme Downie voted Aye - in line with the party majority and in line with the House One of 282 Labour Aye votes vs 0 Labour No votes Tally: Ayes - 287 Noes - 149 |
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21 Apr 2026 - English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill - View Vote Context Graeme Downie voted Aye - in line with the party majority and in line with the House One of 293 Labour Aye votes vs 0 Labour No votes Tally: Ayes - 297 Noes - 147 |
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21 Apr 2026 - English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill - View Vote Context Graeme Downie voted Aye - in line with the party majority and in line with the House One of 295 Labour Aye votes vs 0 Labour No votes Tally: Ayes - 298 Noes - 152 |
| Written Answers |
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Universities: Foreign Investment in UK
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar) Tuesday 31st March 2026 Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology: To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what assessment her Department has made with the Department for Education of the potential impact of recent instances of Chinese owned companies taking equity stakes in UK university technology research spinout companies on technology security. Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology) The Government recognises the importance of safeguarding the UK’s research and innovation ecosystem, including the university spinout sector, from risks associated with foreign ownership, influence, or investment. The government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security wherever we identify concerns and we have a range of effective measures in place to do so.
The Government is actively protecting the UK’s research and spinout ecosystem from national security risks. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), supports universities and spinouts through the Secure Innovation programme, providing advice on due diligence, investment screening and managing security risks. Targeted Secure Innovation Security Reviews further help early‑stage firms identify and mitigate vulnerabilities linked to foreign engagement.
The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security. The Government also monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest. |
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Universities: China
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar) Tuesday 31st March 2026 Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology: To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what assessment her Department has made of the potential implications for research security of Chinese firms acquiring ownership or influence in university technology commercialisation. Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology) The Government recognises the importance of safeguarding the UK’s research and innovation ecosystem, including the university spinout sector, from risks associated with foreign ownership, influence, or investment. The government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security wherever we identify concerns and we have a range of effective measures in place to do so.
The Government is actively protecting the UK’s research and spinout ecosystem from national security risks. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), supports universities and spinouts through the Secure Innovation programme, providing advice on due diligence, investment screening and managing security risks. Targeted Secure Innovation Security Reviews further help early‑stage firms identify and mitigate vulnerabilities linked to foreign engagement.
The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security. The Government also monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest. |
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Universities: Foreign Investment in UK
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar) Tuesday 31st March 2026 Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology: To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, whether her Department has issued guidance to universities on mitigating foreign investment risks in research-intensive spin‑outs, including investment originating from Chinese companies. Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology) The Government recognises the importance of safeguarding the UK’s research and innovation ecosystem, including the university spinout sector, from risks associated with foreign ownership, influence, or investment. The government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security wherever we identify concerns and we have a range of effective measures in place to do so.
The Government is actively protecting the UK’s research and spinout ecosystem from national security risks. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), supports universities and spinouts through the Secure Innovation programme, providing advice on due diligence, investment screening and managing security risks. Targeted Secure Innovation Security Reviews further help early‑stage firms identify and mitigate vulnerabilities linked to foreign engagement.
The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security. The Government also monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest. |
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Universities: Foreign Investment in UK
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar) Tuesday 31st March 2026 Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology: To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what assessment her Department has made of trends in the level of Chinese investment in university spin‑out companies over the past five years. Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology) The Government recognises the importance of safeguarding the UK’s research and innovation ecosystem, including the university spinout sector, from risks associated with foreign ownership, influence, or investment. The government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security wherever we identify concerns and we have a range of effective measures in place to do so.
The Government is actively protecting the UK’s research and spinout ecosystem from national security risks. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), supports universities and spinouts through the Secure Innovation programme, providing advice on due diligence, investment screening and managing security risks. Targeted Secure Innovation Security Reviews further help early‑stage firms identify and mitigate vulnerabilities linked to foreign engagement.
The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security. The Government also monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest. |
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China: Electric Vehicles
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar) Tuesday 21st April 2026 Question to the Ministry of Defence: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when he last met his counterparts from the USA and Australia to discuss potential national security threats posed by Chinese-made connected vehicles. Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) The Defence Secretary speaks with his US and Australian counterparts regularly on a range of national security topics to ensure coherence and alignment between our nations. The Ministry of Defence is working with other government departments to mitigate any potential threats to national security from connected vehicles. Our policies and procedures take account of the potential threats from all types of vehicle, irrespective of origin, and we keep them under constant review. |
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China: Electric Vehicles
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar) Tuesday 21st April 2026 Question to the Ministry of Defence: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment his Department has made of the potential impact of Chinese manufactured electric vehicles, including potential vulnerabilities such as remote kill switch capabilities, on national security. Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) The Ministry of Defence (MOD) takes the security of defence assets very seriously, and is working with other government departments to understand and mitigate any potential threats to national security from vehicles. Our policies and procedures take account of the potential threats from all types of vehicles, not just electric vehicles or those manufactured in China, and we are working across MOD to ensure risks are appropriately managed in accordance with the needs of different communities. |
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China: Defence Equipment
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar) Wednesday 22nd April 2026 Question to the Ministry of Defence: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment his Department has made of (a) trends in the level of Chinese-manufactured technology used in UK defence procurement and supply chains and (b) the potential impact of that technology on national security. Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) The Ministry of Defence regularly reviews its critical supply chains, to identify and mitigate risks to defence capability. While the department does not routinely comment on the origin of specific components of our planned or in service capabilities, we welcome business with foreign companies as long as it follows our strict procurement regulations and does not put our national security at risk.
Transactions continue to be monitored where there are potential national security concerns from any country, and the Department will investigate and apply appropriate mitigations where required.
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Technology: China
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar) Friday 24th April 2026 Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology: To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what steps her Department is taking to reduce UK reliance on technology manufactured in countries like China that pose a security risk. Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology) The Prime Minister has emphasised that national security is the first duty of our government. Supply chain resilience and security remains a core part of this, and multiple government departments are working closely with international partners to embed resilience into critical UK and global supply chains. We take an actor‑agnostic, risk‑based approach to supply‑chain resilience. Instead of reacting to individual firms or components in isolation, we focus on the structural chokepoints and systemic dependencies that create national‑level vulnerability, regardless of where in the chain they arise. |
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China: Smart Devices
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar) Friday 24th April 2026 Question to the Ministry of Defence: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment his Department has made of the risk of the use of Chinese‑manufactured Cellular IoT Modules in defence‑adjacent supply chains. Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) The Ministry of Defence regularly assesses risks across defence‑adjacent supply chains, including those associated with connectivity‑enabled components. Any use of Cellular IoT technology is subject to proportionate security and assurance arrangements, with risks considered on a case‑by‑case basis in order to safeguard Defence and national security interests. In parallel, the Department supports onshoring and the development of assured supply chains to strengthen the resilience of both defence and wider civilian supply chains. |
| Calendar |
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Wednesday 15th April 2026 8:45 a.m. Energy Security and Net Zero Committee - Oral evidence Subject: Revisiting the nuclear roadmap At 9:15am: Oral evidence Vanessa Jakovich - Partner at Freshfields Leon Flexman - Senior Director, UK Corporate Affairs at X-energy Alastair Evans - Director of Corporate Affairs at Rolls Royce SMR View calendar - Add to calendar |
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Wednesday 22nd April 2026 8:45 a.m. Energy Security and Net Zero Committee - Oral evidence Subject: Revisiting the nuclear roadmap At 9:15am: Oral evidence Andy Mayall - Deputy Director of Nuclear and Radioactive Substances Regulation Strategy at Environment Agency Paul Fyfe - Director of Regulation – Futures at Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Mustafa Latif-Aramesh - Nuclear Taskforce Member at Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce At 10:15am: Oral evidence Simon Bowen - Chair at Great British Energy – Nuclear Dr Gareth Headdock - Chief Science and Technology Officer at United Kingdom National Nuclear Laboratory (UKNNL) View calendar - Add to calendar |
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Monday 27th April 2026 3:30 p.m. Energy Security and Net Zero Committee - Oral evidence Subject: Revisiting the nuclear roadmap At 4:00pm: Oral evidence Lord Vallance - Minister for Science, Innovation, Research and Nuclear at Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Sam White - Deputy Director, Nuclear Power at Department for Energy Security and Net Zero View calendar - Add to calendar |