Trade Bill (Sixth sitting)

Greg Hands Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 23rd June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Fleur Anderson (Putney) (Lab)]

It is four years to the day since the referendum vote to leave the European Union and here we are, hardly oven ready. The stripping out of scrutiny is the most alarming of the many alarming parts of the Bill. A world-leading trade Bill must contain strong parliamentary scrutiny and transparency. The amendments and new clauses would enable debates to be held before, during and after negotiations, and the meaningful involvement of businesses, trade unions and interest groups across the country and around the world to assess the impact of any negotiations and help us make the best decisions.

The coronavirus crisis has shown the importance of proper parliamentary scrutiny. For example, the Chancellor’s economic support package—while I commend and welcome the support on offer—has been flawed in many crucial areas. I do not think that would have happened if there had been time—and there was not, I can see that—for much longer parliamentary scrutiny. That would have allowed self-employed people, people who had new contracts and limited company directors to say where they needed support from the economic support package. That is an example of where there needed to be better parliamentary scrutiny—there should have been more, catching up—and of where there are failings when we do not have time to look at the Bills we pass.

In the post-Brexit world, trade has been catapulted from the margins of public debate into one of the major talking points of political discourse. Trade agreements will have huge implications for our economy and future prosperity, and cut across huge swathes of public policy. They are of interest to all parliamentarians and to all areas of public policy, and are not to be done in secret in smaller areas. Future trade deals should be developed democratically. As such, it is wrong that the Bill does not address the gaping democratic deficit in trade policy. That is what the amendments seek to address.

The system under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 is entirely inadequate and has not kept up with the times. It is no surprise that it has been criticised by no fewer than five parliamentary Committees. As the Minister himself has said:

“Parliamentary scrutiny is crucial for trade agreements, and we have seen the difficulties in recent years with trade agreements that have been insufficiently scrutinised, or where there was a feeling that there had been insufficient scrutiny—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership perhaps being the most important example.”—[Official Report, 17 July 2018; Vol. 645, c. 281.]

Under the current system, MPs will have less say than our counterparts in Brussels and in Washington. In my constituency, 39% of jobs are in sectors identified as being directly and severely impacted by the continuity agreements. I am angry that, as an MP, I will have little say and little opportunity to prevent that. Moreover, given the profound effect that trade deals will have on jobs in Putney and Wandsworth, in London and across the country, it is troubling that under the Bill there will be no formal assessment of the impact of trade deals on different sectors of the economy and different regions of our nation, or consultation with businesses and trade unions.

New clause 6 lists all the different impact assessments: economic, social, human rights, environmental, animal welfare and food standards. Those things are of immediate concern to constituents, and yet we will not have an assessment of the impact of trade deals on them—or, if it does happen, it will happen behind closed doors and will not be open for public debate and scrutiny.

The CBI has noted:

“A trade policy that provides a clear, meaningful way for businesses to feed in all their experience and expertise into government will create the greatest value from the UK’s opportunities across the world—and ultimately support prosperity across the country.”

Surely that is what we want. There are expert groups, of course, but they need parliamentary scrutiny to lock in their feedback.

It is concerning that the Bill only addresses EU roll-over agreements and does nothing to set the parameters of future agreements with non-EU nations such as the United States. The Bill is a huge missed opportunity to establish a framework for future trade negotiations. The scope of the Bill is just too narrow.

For four years, we have been repeatedly told by Trade Ministers that the world is queuing up to do business with the UK. Last year, the then Secretary of State for International Trade declared to the Future of Trade and Export Forum that

“the UK has an untapped potential of £124 billion in the export of goods alone.”

The current Secretary of State has triumphantly announced:

“We are growing wheat more competitively than the Canadian prairies. We’re producing more varieties of cheese than the French. And we are even selling tea to China.”

If the Government are so confident in our attractiveness to prospective trading partners, as they should be, why is there such reticence about codifying the high standards and regulations that have been promised by the Prime Minister? Why are the Government so intent on ensuring the lowest common denominator in trading standards—a rush to get it through without an ambition to get through the best?

There is a constitutional point to be made here as well. The Trade Justice Movement, which represents 60 organisations, noted in its evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee that proper parliamentary scrutiny of trade deals is far more compatible with

“the UK’s traditional constitutional division between executive and legislative powers, where the executive is responsible for foreign policy.”

The crucial point is that, when it comes to trade, it is impossible to distinguish between the international and the domestic. The two are intricately linked, so to take trade out of the hands of Parliament runs contrary to hundreds of years of constitutional precedent. To ensure that Parliament is sovereign over domestic affairs, it is essential that it is given a role in scrutinising trade agreements.

To summarise, the amendments and new clauses that my colleagues and I have tabled would address the democratic deficit and create a stronger trade policy, which would ensure greater prosperity across our country. They would ensure a meaningful vote and debate for MPs on the Government’s negotiating objectives from the start, and a much-needed widening of the scope of a Bill that is silent on too many crucial issues. They would ensure far greater transparency during the negotiations, proper public consultation and meaningful engagement with civil society, businesses and trade unions, and the introduction of much-needed impact assessments that look beyond economic metrics to include the impact on the environment, human rights and developing countries. The Trade Bill would be far better for them.

[The Minister for Trade Policy (Greg Hands)]

May I start by welcoming you again to the Chair this afternoon, Sir Graham? In an oversight, I was not able to welcome Mrs Cummins this morning, because there had yet to be a contribution from the Government Front Bench, thanks to the expansive efforts of the two chief Opposition spokesmen, the hon. Members for Harrow West and for Sefton Central.

Let me start by being in complete accordance with the words the hon. Member for Sefton Central said at the end of our minute’s silence, in paying tribute to the first responders and the emergency services in Reading at the weekend. We owe them all a debt of gratitude for the public response that took place.

Amendment 4 would mean that, before regulations were made under clause 2, the process of parliamentary scrutiny set out by the Opposition in new clause 5 or amendments 6 or 7, as appropriate, would need to be completed. I take this opportunity to remind hon. Members that the power in clause 2 is needed to provide for the continuity of existing trading relationships, not to implement free trade agreements with new trading partners. It will ensure that the UK continues to benefit from the EU-third country agreements to which we were a signatory before exit day.

During the evidence sessions, we heard from a very diverse group of witnesses, ranging as widely as the Institute of Directors, the CBI and ClientEarth, that the Government’s continuity programme was sensible and reasonable. Indeed, Parliament has so far ratified 20 continuity agreements with 48 countries. That accounts for £110 billion-worth of UK trade in 2018, which represents 74% of the trade with countries with which we were seeking continuity before the withdrawal agreement was signed. Those agreements were, of course, subject to extensive scrutiny in their original form as EU agreements. The main purpose of the power in clause 2 is to replicate existing obligations in current agreements. Additional new scrutiny, on top of what we already have in place, would not be a proportionate use of parliamentary time for existing agreements.

To reassure Parliament, we are going further and providing additional measures to constrain the power in clause 2 and provide extra scrutiny for any resulting legislation. All regulations made to implement obligations under these arrangements will be subject to the affirmative procedure, and the power is also subject to a five-year sunset period, which can be extended only with the consent of both Houses. We will discuss the sunset clause under a later group of amendments. Moreover, we have voluntarily published parliamentary reports—alongside continuity agreements—outlining any significant differences between our signed agreements and the underlying EU agreement.

[Gareth Thomas]

The Minister is referring to the voluntary tabling of reports. At Report stage of the last Trade Bill, Ministers were going to put that on the statute book. Why the change this time?

[Greg Hands]

I will come on to that shortly, but in brief, the proof has been in the pudding. For each of those 20 agreements, we have published the report. The reports have been available for Members of both Houses to study. A few of the reports have been made subject to a debate in the Lords. None of those Lords debates resulted in a motion to regret on the ensuing agreements. I would say this: rather than trusting in our word, trust in our deeds. We have published those reports and we will continue to do so.

[Gareth Thomas]

I simply make the point that the most significant of the so-called continuity trade agreements—with the exception of Singapore and what Sam Lowe described as phase 1 of the South Korea agreement—have yet to be rolled over. Locking into law reports on the significance of those agreements would, I suspect, attract substantially more interest than the other reports have attracted so far.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

More than half of the continuity agreements have already been ratified, each with a report. The intention is to carry on producing those reports. I will deal with some of the points that the hon. Gentleman raised earlier, including his quite technical points in relation to the roll-over of the South Korea and Switzerland agreements. I will come back to him on the points he raised about differences between the EU version and the UK version.

The reports have enhanced parliamentary scrutiny, and I can confirm that we will continue to publish reports for the remaining continuity agreements.

[Bill Esterson]

A moment ago, the Minister mentioned that the Lords had held debates on previous agreements that have been subject to these reports. That did not happen in the Commons; that has gone. Given that the Government set the time, will the Minister take this opportunity to promise that the Government will create time in the Commons for debates on the remaining so-called continuity agreements, not least because agreements such as the one with Japan are significantly different to the ones we were party to as members of the EU?

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but there is no way of knowing whether the UK-Japan agreement will be significantly different, because it is yet to be negotiated. We are trying to get an enhanced agreement with Japan, but that negotiation is under way. It is be impossible to speculate in what way, or to what degree, it will be different from the EU agreement. We are hoping for an enhanced FTA, and we believe there is further to go with Japan on that, so I do not think the hon. Gentleman’s request would be appropriate.

[Stewart Hosie]

Taking what the Minister has said at face value, it is true that reports have been published, but the affirmative resolution process that he spoke about is effectively a “take it or leave it” option. There is no ability for Members to amend what the Government have proposed. If the Government were to use clause 2(6)(a) to modify retained legislation, we would be given no more than the opportunity to take or leave something that may look considerably different from the pre-existing arrangement we had through the European Union.

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, and I plan to come to constraints on that power shortly. He rightly said that on the face of it, the power is broad, but there are significant constraints on its use. We must not forget that the continuity agreements are already in effect, and have already been scrutinised through previous processes in both the Commons and the Lords.

I draw the Committee’s attention to our track record. Of the 20 signed continuity agreements passed through CRAG, their lordships have recommended six for the attention of Parliament, most recently the UK-Morocco association agreement on 9 March 2020. As I have said, not a single one of those debates carried a motion of regret. Due to the limited scope of the continuity agreements for which we intend to use the clause 2 power and the existing opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny, the scrutiny procedure set out by the Opposition in new clause 5, to which I will turn in due course, would be disproportionate and unnecessary. That consequently means that amendment 4 is unnecessary.

I will now turn to amendment 5, which would seek to bring new FTAs within the scope of the Bill. The Government are only seeking a power in this Bill to ensure the continuity of trading relations with our existing partners, with whom we previously traded as a member of the EU. The Bill is not, and never was in its previous form, a vehicle to implement agreements with partners, such as the USA, that did not have a trade agreement with the EU before 31 January 2020.

[Gareth Thomas]

In relation to amendment 5, will the Minister confirm that there is no current legislative requirement for the Government to hold either a debate or a vote on any UK-US deal they negotiate?

[Greg Hands]

We have been absolutely clear in the process we have laid out. The publication of the negotiation objectives and the economic impact assessment, the fact that we have reported back at the end of the first round with a written ministerial statement, and the fact that we will publish an impact assessment at the end of the deal all show our commitment to parliamentary scrutiny of deals as we go forward.

Then, of course, there is the procedure under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. I would have thought that the hon. Member for Harrow West would be rather more proud of that procedure, because I had a look around at the members of this Committee and studied their dates of arrival in this place quite carefully. I worked out that two members of this Committee voted for that procedure in 2010: myself and him. The only member of this Committee who was here in 2010 and did not vote in favour of CRAG is the hon. Member for Dundee East. Not only that: the hon. Member for Harrow West was a member of the Government at the time, in an international-facing Department to which CRAG was highly relevant, so he would have been part of the team that put forward CRAG 10 years ago. Miraculously, he is now against it. Perhaps he could explain that.

[Gareth Thomas]

What the Minister’s brief may not have told him was that the provisions that implemented the relevant CRAG power came into force as a result of his Government’s decision in November 2010, but that is by the bye.

The Minister gave a skilful and studious non-answer to the direct question I posed. Let me give him another opportunity to confirm that there is nothing in legislation at the moment that requires a debate or a vote on any future UK-US deal that his Government may negotiate.

[Greg Hands]

Sir Graham, you will know that under CRAG it is up to Parliament to determine whether to have that debate. Parliament’s ability to scrutinise the agreement and its ability to study the economic impact of that agreement are absolutely clear. On top of that, any legislative changes that would need to be made as a result of any future trade agreement would have to go through both Houses of Parliament in the usual way.

It is understandable that colleagues are keen to make their voices heard on new FTAs, and as a result the Government have said repeatedly that we will introduce primary legislation to implement new FTAs where necessary. As I have just said, that primary legislation will be debated and scrutinised by Parliament in the usual way, and I can assure Members that Government will draw on the expertise and experience in Parliament when delivering our trade agenda.

Those are not just warm words; I invite the Committee to look at our track record. If we take the current negotiations with the USA as an example, before negotiations began, we launched a public bundle, including our negotiating mandate and a response to the public consultation that we had conducted as well as an initial scoping assessment. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made a statement in the House, and she and I have engaged with colleagues intensively. During negotiations, we have committed to keeping Parliament updated. Indeed, the Secretary of State provided a statement to Parliament on 18 May with a comprehensive update on progress in the US talks. These updates will continue as the negotiations proceed. We have said that once negotiations conclude, we will introduce implementing legislation, if it is required. Any agreement will also be subject to CRAG, which will provide further opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny.

I must stress that scrutiny of FTAs with new countries is a conversation that must take place separately from consideration of the Bill. Hon. Members such as the hon. Members for Harrow West, for Sefton Central and for Dundee East have expressed valid concerns about what will happen, and my door remains open to discuss such concerns at a future date. Nevertheless, we must not threaten this essential piece of continuity legislation by having discussions about the future.

[Gareth Thomas]

In the spirit of openness about future free trade agreements to which the Minister says he is committed, can he confirm to the Committee, given the concerns that exist about a potential UK-US deal, that there will not be any investor-state dispute settlement provisions in a future UK-US deal?

[Greg Hands]

I was being very generous in saying that my door was open, but it is not open to discuss the content of the current negotiations with the US. That, of course, is a matter—in the proper way—for statements to Parliament, but that is a live negotiation, so what may or may not be in that negotiation is probably a matter for that negotiation.

We laid out our negotiation objectives, in a document that I commend to the hon. Gentleman, on 2 March. It lays out our objectives in the talks, which are live at the moment, so it would be inappropriate for me to go down that road. However, my door remains open to having further discussions with all the Opposition parties about the scrutiny of future free trade agreements.

[Stewart Hosie]

I think the Minister is inadvertently getting to the nub of the concerns of many people both in Parliament and outside. It is all very well him saying, “We have published this, and we have made these statements to Parliament”, but does he not recognise that simply publishing what are no more than heads of terms for negotiations, and then updates that say “Everything’s going swimmingly”, really does not cut the mustard?

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention and I am glad that he made it, because I will take him back five years to a very interesting negotiation that I had with his friend, John Swinney, which was a negotiation between the UK Government and the Scottish Government. It related to the Scottish fiscal framework: how exactly Scotland’s finances and support from Westminster would work in coming years. We—John Swinney and I—agreed that it was a negotiation between two Governments, and it was not appropriate to publish text during the course of the negotiation. We would both provide general updates on the progress of the negotiation, rather than constant updates on text. That approach led to us getting a good agreement between the UK Government and the Scottish Government. I think both Governments were not entirely satisfied with it, but both could live with it. That shows the way forward, rather than publishing after each negotiation round, or mid-negotiation, what the latest text or approach is.

[Matt Western]

I hear that, and it is terrific, whatever happened between Scotland and the UK in that arrangement, but nub of this is essentially: how can it be that the EU informs and updates, providing not just heads of terms and whether things are going okay or badly or whatever, but the detail? That is what the US does and what Australia does. Why is the UK the only nation that will not give that detail to its public?

[Greg Hands]

Sir Graham, I think a comparison of how the UK and European Union do international treaties is a debate for another day. I do not think the two political systems are comparable. The approach proposed by the UK has greater parliamentary scrutiny than that of many Commonwealth counterparts that use the Westminster system—it is more extensive than that of Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

[Gareth Thomas]

The Command Paper that the Minister’s colleagues published last February committed the Government to publishing reports at the end of each negotiating round. Is that still a commitment and practice that the Minister recognises, or has his Department and new Secretary of State gone back on that?

[Greg Hands]

I was going to return to the Command Paper, because the hon. Member for Sefton Central asked me a direct question about it. If the hon. Gentlemen will bear with me, I will return to the status of the Command Paper in due course. I want to make a bit more progress in setting out why we think this approach is not right overall for the Bill.

The Bill focuses on ensuring continuity of trading relationships with existing partners. Businesses and consumers are relying on the consistency that the Bill provides. Amendment 6 would disapply CRAG to international trade agreements and instead seek to apply a super-affirmative procedure to scrutiny of continuity agreements before regulations could be made under clause 2. Like other Opposition amendments, that would undermine the constitutional balance and upset an established, well-functioning system of scrutiny. It would also create a two-tier system of scrutiny for international agreements, whereby trade agreements on the one hand, and other important international agreements on the other, are scrutinised in an entirely inconsistent way. It is worth reminding ourselves that CRAG was designed to cover international treaties of all the types we would expect.

[Bill Esterson]

The Minister has said that many times. CRAG was designed and passed in this place when we were a member of the European Union. It was designed when international treaties were an EU competence, to complement the system in the EU. I read that out earlier; I will not read it out again. He wants this to be a continuity Bill, but what is the equivalent continuity of scrutiny and parliamentary process for what we were party to where CRAG was part of that European process?

[Greg Hands]

It is simply not correct to say that all international treaties are subject to EU competence. Many international treaties are, of course, subject to a UK competence, and CRAG has worked well. It is worth remembering that CRAG was arrived at after an extensive period of consultation—and it may be, Sir Graham, that you voted for CRAG in 2010 as well. It was backed by both the Government party of the day, represented by the hon. Member for Harrow West, and the main Opposition of the day as a sensible way of codifying what he referred to earlier as the 1924 Ponsonby rule. The whole purpose of CRAG was to codify that long-standing rule that has served as well, including over the past 10 years. An extensive change such as this would add significant and unnecessary risk to the Government’s ability—

[Bill Esterson]

Yes, it is an international trade agreement, absolutely correct. Where is the equivalent to the EU process that we have been party to? CRAG was party to that international trade bit of it, and yes, I accept that it applies to other elements of international treaties. Where is the continuity from the EU process to what we have now? That was the other half of my question.

[Greg Hands]

Again, we are talking about continuity agreements that have already gone through a process of scrutiny in the House. I was a member of the European Scrutiny Committee pretty much exactly when the hon. Member for Harrow West was a member of the Government. There was an established process by which treaties were recommended by the European Scrutiny Committee for scrutiny in this House. Most have already been through an established process of European scrutiny.

On future trade policies, I would say that the EU has a fundamentally different constitutional set-up from the United Kingdom. Our most similar constitutional set-ups are in countries such as Canada, Australia or New Zealand, which have very successful independent trade policies, and have done for a number of decades. I am confident that our scrutiny system, as proposed, stacks up well—in fact, it exceeds those, and stacks up very favourably—against those systems in making sure that our Parliament can have its say on future trade agreements.

I stress again, however, that this Bill is not about future trade agreements; it is about the continuity of our existing arrangements. Such an extensive change as proposed in the amendment would add significant and unnecessary risk to the Government’s ability to secure and bring into effect the remaining continuity agreements by the start of 2021. That situation was not advocated by any of the witnesses we heard from. None of them said, “We want to junk all those 40 agreements and pretend that we have never had them”, from ClientEarth right the way across to the Institute of Directors. Only the Opposition seem to want to junk those agreements by voting against Second Reading of the Bill and by not having the continuity agreements in place.

[Gareth Thomas]

I am sure that the Minister would not wish to imply that the majority of witnesses simply supported the existing parliamentary scrutiny processes for trade agreements in general. It was clear that we heard a majority saying that, for new free trade agreements, the current parliamentary scrutiny set-up was not good enough.

[Greg Hands]

I am not saying that; I am clearly saying that the witnesses we heard from were, I think, unanimous in saying that the continuity agreements were important for the UK economy and trade. They would share my surprise at the opposition of the Labour party to rolling over those agreements, many of which were negotiated when Labour was in government, including the hon. Member for Harrow West. He was the Trade Minister when two of the agreements were negotiated by the European Union. I would love him to tell us what he was doing at the time. If he finds the agreements so objectionable in 2020, what on earth was he doing in 2008 or 2009 being party to the negotiations that led to those agreements being put in place in the first place? Perhaps he will tell us, or write to the Committee to explain.

[Gareth Thomas]

What we find objectionable is the lack of proper scrutiny in the process. That is the significant issue. I gently say to the Minister, he has not so far advanced an answer—I am agog to hear it—to the criticisms of a whole series of witnesses, from the business community and the trade union movement to trade exporters, about the failure of the Government to give Parliament a proper debating and voting opportunity on big new free trade agreements, such as a UK-US deal.

[Greg Hands]

We are going slightly around in circles, conflating the continuity arrangements and future free trade agreements. I will happily debate with the hon. Gentleman the merits of our proposals for future free trade agreements. I reiterate that my door remains open to his suggestions as to how we might scrutinise future free trade agreements. However, the Bill is about continuity arrangements for the 40 or more EU agreements that we currently have. Many of the witnesses, whatever they said about future trade agreements, were unanimous in talking about the importance of the continuity agreements.

[Robert Courts]

I am conscious of what the Minister has said about the Bill being a trade continuity Bill and that being its purpose. We have heard a great deal of debate today about scrutiny of future trading relationships. Would the Minister comment on something that seems to me is the case? We have parliamentary government in this country, where a mandate is derived from a general election. We do not have government by Parliament and any such scrutiny proposal needs to be considered very carefully in terms of its constitutional ramifications.

[Greg Hands]

My hon. Friend is absolutely correct. I was going to come on to describe the Opposition’s panoply of amendments taken in their entirety; at the moment, I am still going through the deficiencies in each of the amendments. When we put them all together, they seek fundamentally to rewrite the constitutional balance in this country in terms of international agreements. That is properly a matter for the Executive and for royal prerogative, as scrutinised by Parliament.

Once again, I remind colleagues that continuity agreements have already been subject to significant scrutiny as underlying EU agreements. I say again that we believe that the existing constraints in the Bill are proportionate and provide Parliament with sufficient opportunities to scrutinise agreements. I have drawn Members’ attention to the 33rd report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee on the 2017-2019 Trade Bill, which raised no concerns about the delegated powers of the Bill and welcomed our move to introduce the affirmative procedure for any regulations.

I turn to amendment 7, which seeks to apply the super-affirmative procedure to any regulations made under clause 2 to implement FTAs with new countries, if the other amendments were to be carried. I will not recap why new FTAs are not included in the application of the Bill. However, I reiterate that we will introduce implementing legislation for new FTAs, if required, which would mean the proposals in the amendment are unnecessary.

Amendment 19 would extend the aforementioned procedures to any regulations made jointly with the devolved authorities. I have outlined the reasons why we do not believe those procedures are necessary. I can also assure colleagues that our approach with the devolved Governments is based on regular dialogue and consultation.

I thank Opposition Members for tabling new clause 5, which outlines in some detail the Opposition’s proposal for how current and future trade agreements might be scrutinised. I have already remarked that this is a continuity Bill and therefore not the place for discussing our wider priority FTA programme or our approach hereto. However, I am happy to reiterate to hon. Members the Government’s commitment to appropriate parliamentary involvement.

I believe we share common ground, insofar as we agree that Parliament should be able properly to scrutinise trade agreements and have sufficient information available to it in order to do so. The Government have ensured that that information is provided through sharing negotiating objectives, responses to public consultations and economic assessments. The amendments go beyond what is needed and, as hon. Members will be aware and as my hon. Friend the Member for Witney pointed out, cross the line that separates the powers of Parliament and the Executive.

We must respect that initiating, negotiating and signing international agreements are functions of the Executive, exercised under the royal prerogative. New clause 5 would have serious consequences. It would both undermine that cornerstone of our constitution and limit the Government’s ability to negotiate effectively and in the best interests of UK businesses, consumers and citizens.

To be clear, the prerogative power is not just a historical throwback or a constitutional quirk. It serves an important purpose in enabling the UK to speak with a single voice as a unitary actor under international law. It ensures that our partners can trust in the position presented during negotiations. It is the same principle that applies in similar Westminster-style democracies with sophisticated trade negotiating functions, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Setting aside for a moment the significant constitutional issues that we have just examined, the proposals are also unworkable in a practical sense. First, treaty texts are liable to change significantly right up to point of signature. As they say, “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.” Sharing texts as we go might be a waste of parliamentary time, as they could quickly be made redundant. It is also not in line with the practice of our FTA partners, including the US, let alone Australia or New Zealand. Those countries will have legitimate expectations of confidentiality around key negotiating texts in our trade negotiations with them.

Final texts of agreements—which, after all, are what matters—are already laid in Parliament for 21 days under the CRAG process, and the Commons has an option to restart CRAG, potentially indefinitely. The Government have gone well beyond the requirements of CRAG and its statutory obligations, in line with our commitment to transparency and scrutiny, by providing Parliament with extensive information on negotiations. For the trade talks with the US on a new FTA and with Japan on an enhanced FTA, the Government have set out their negotiating objectives alongside a response to the public consultation, as well as an initial economic assessment prior to the start of the talks. Ministers have also held open briefings for MPs and peers both at the launch of the US talks—I held one myself—and after the conclusion of the first round.

We will continue to keep Parliament updated on negotiations as they progress, including close engagement with the International Trade Committee in the House of Commons and the EU International Agreements Sub-Committee in the other place. We are committed to publishing full impact assessments prior to the implementation of the agreements. That provides Parliament with more than sufficient information to scrutinise the Government’s trade agenda properly.

Turning to new clause 6, I hope that on the issue of consultation, the Opposition will note the Government’s strong record of consulting widely with the public and key stakeholders on our trade agenda. The Government’s consultation on our priority FTA programme attracted 600,000 responses, making it one of the largest consultations ever undertaken by Government.

[Gareth Thomas]

I want to press the Minister on the proposals that were in the Command Paper last year. He has not quite answered us on that. The Command Paper said clearly that the Government would work with a Committee and give it access to sensitive information that is not suitable for wider publication, including private briefings from negotiating teams. On the record, is the Minister willing to confirm that they will do that with the International Trade Committee and the relevant Lords Committee, or not?

[Greg Hands]

I should be clear that the Command Paper was published by a previous Government in a different parliamentary context. However, we have in our approach so far followed what was set out in the Command Paper in relation to publishing negotiation objectives and impact assessments, and reporting back after the first round. I would again ask for confidence in our deeds, in terms of our overall commitment to parliamentary scrutiny.

In line with our commitment, we have published the Government’s response to the consultations on FTAs with the US, Australia and New Zealand, and on an enhanced FTA with Japan. In relation to sustainability impact assessments, as the EU calls them, the Department has published, and will continue to publish, our own scoping assessments for each of our new free trade agreements, prior to negotiations commencing. As with the published UK-US, UK-Japan, UK-Australia and UK-New Zealand scoping assessments, those include preliminary assessment of the potential economic impacts, the implications for UK nations and regions, the impact on small and medium-sized enterprises, the environmental impacts, and the effects on different groups in the labour market, including whether there are any disproportionate impacts on groups with protected characteristics, arising from an FTA with the partner country.

The scoping assessments attracted quite a bit of attention, not least because of all the nations and regions of the UK that would benefit from the US trade agreement, Scotland would benefit the most, followed by the west midlands and then the north-east of England. Those are good things. We are proud of that, and of the fact that we published the assessment.

We are committed to publishing full impact assessments once negotiations have concluded and prior to the implementation of the agreements, when the effects of an agreement can be better understood.

On the point about standards raised in new clause 6, I encourage hon. Members to look at our record on negotiating agreements. We said we would not lower standards, and we have not, as can be seen from the parliamentary reports we published on each of the 20 agreements. None of the 20 agreements that have been signed to date involved any reduction in standards.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gareth Thomas]

In the Command Paper published in February last year, the Government committed during negotiations to publish and lay before Parliament a round report following each substantive round of negotiations. Does that commitment still stand or has it been axed, like the commitment to give sensitive information to a Select Committee of the House of Commons?

[Greg Hands]

Nothing has been axed; all I am saying is that the Command Paper was produced at a different time. What we have done is to follow the Command Paper in publishing, for example, the written ministerial statement at the end of round one of the talks with the US. That has greatly enhanced parliamentary scrutiny, as has publishing the negotiation objectives and the scoping assessment of who would be most likely to benefit from the agreement.

[Gareth Thomas]

Will the Minister give way?

[Greg Hands]

I will make a bit more progress.

As with new clause 5, new clause 8 contains a number of practical flaws in the proposed system. Those flaws would undermine negotiations and disadvantage the UK. I understand that colleagues are keen to remain abreast of negotiations, and the Government are supportive of that endeavour, as I have outlined. I point hon. Members not just towards our commitments to share information but towards our record on the recent US negotiations, which I have mentioned.

Ultimately, this debate boils down to whether we believe that it is right that the UK Government, supported by experts, civil service negotiating teams and advisers, are able to negotiate international agreements on behalf of those who elected them, drawing on the expertise and views of Parliament and of the devolved authorities, via strong scrutiny mechanisms. Or do we believe that Parliament itself should be in control of the negotiations, determining who we negotiate with and how, and within what timeframes?

It seems clear to me that in the national interest, the former scenario must be right. It ensures that when our partners face the UK around the negotiating table, they know that it has a credible single voice—one that is represented by the UK Government alone, after they have consulted with the devolved Administrations and drawn on the extensive expertise in this House and the other place, via close engagement and scrutiny processes, such as those we have here for international agreements.

[Matt Western]

I understand that point. The EU has 27 nations, and yet it manages to achieve that. It has a coherent position from 27 nations, but it can still carry out talks. Surely, it is possible for us to have the involvement of Parliament to scrutinise matters and to be updated about them, and to have its engagement in this process. Can the Minister just answer that one point?

[Greg Hands]

I have already outlined in immense detail, probably three or four times now, the involvement that Parliament will have in future trade agreements. I remind the hon. Gentleman that the Bill is about the continuity of existing trade agreements. I may be the only person in this room—perhaps the hon. Member for Harrow West has done so as well—who has represented the UK at trade Foreign Affairs Council meetings of the European Union. I can reveal to the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington that the EU does not always speak with one voice when it comes to trade. I can tell him of many a fruity row at those meetings involving different member states—rows between the Commission and the European Parliament and so on in relation to EU trade policy. I am afraid that the idea that the EU is one happy whole as it goes into trade agreements, with total uniformity of opinion across the EU27, is for the birds.

I hope that I have provided Members with some assurance that the amendments are unnecessary and impractical, and will unquestionably limit the UK Government’s ability to negotiate in the best interests of UK businesses, consumers and citizens.

On a slightly different topic, new clause 19 seeks to oblige the Government to publish parliamentary reports on continuity agreements, which the hon. Member for Harrow West has already drawn attention to, outlining any significant differences between the signed agreements and the underlying EU agreements. I am aware that, in the last Parliament, the Government introduced an amendment to that effect to the previous Trade Bill. However, Members will be aware that, despite the previous Bill falling, we have committed to publishing such parliamentary reports on a voluntary basis, to assist the House with the scrutiny of agreements.

We have published such a report for each of the 20 continuity agreements we have signed, outlining any significant differences from the underlying EU agreement. That process affords parliamentarians extra transparency on our continuity agreements, above and beyond the statutory framework set out in CRAG. As is demonstrated by the measures we have taken, and by the inclusion of a sunset clause and the affirmative procedure for any secondary legislation, we will ensure that Parliament’s voice is heard when clause 2 powers are exercised. I reiterate the commitment that we will continue to publish parliamentary reports for all remaining continuity agreements.

I suspect the Committee will be glad to hear that I am finally turning to new clause 20, which stipulates that the parliamentary reports must be published at least 10 sitting days before any statutory instruments are made under this power. Members will be aware that trade negotiations, and indeed many other international negotiations, have a habit of going down to the wire. I have only to remind colleagues of the negotiations surrounding the EU withdrawal agreement as evidence of that fact, although that negotiation is not included in the scope of the Bill, perhaps thankfully. As such, it is possible that we will be unable to sign continuity agreements until very shortly before the transition period ends.

I stress that that is possible. We have already signed 20 such agreements, but some may well finally be negotiated and signed in the last days before the UK once again becomes a fully independent trading country. That would make it very difficult to leave a period of 10 sitting days before any SIs are introduced. I assure colleagues that we will leave as much time as possible for essential parliamentary scrutiny. I point again to our record: we have published parliamentary reports alongside all signed agreements entering the CRAG process, meaning that that information has been available for at least the full duration of CRAG. I remind colleagues that CRAG allows a period of 21 sitting days for our agreements to be scrutinised in Parliament before they can be formally ratified. That provides an effective period of time for parliamentarians to scrutinise the agreements.

Turning to a few of the more technical matters that have been raised, the Opposition said that the South Korean and Swiss agreements have not been signed. They have both been signed and have both gone through CRAG. The House of Lords European Union Committee called the Swiss agreement for debate but, as I said earlier, no motion of regret was passed. The hon. Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner) loved to talk about the Ponsonby rule, which is exactly what CRAG sought to codify. The Ponsonby rule, if it exists at all today, is there only through the living embodiment of CRAG.

The Opposition talked about the mutual recognition agreements incorporated within the Swiss agreement. The MRAs that have been signed and are part of the agreement cover 70% of our trade flow. On a technical point, we have in place a memorandum of understanding to continue discussions about trade continuity before the UK-Swiss trade agreement comes into effect on 1 January. We are committed to aiming to put in place mutual recognition of conformity assessment bodies in time for the agreement coming into effect.

The sectors not covered by the MRAs are underpinned by international standards regimes, not by EU standard regimes. There is therefore greater regulatory confidence in conformity assessments within these. On tariffs and the South Korea agreement, the hon. Member for Harrow West effected some kind of melange between tariffs and tariff-rate quotas. A tariff is the rate of tax at which we charge a product coming into the country; a tariff-rate quota is the quantity of that product that would be allowed on either a lower tariff or on no tariff at all.

Tariff-rate quotas have been resized from the original EU agreement. That is an entirely normal and expected part of the process. The TRQ stated that a certain volume of this, that or another product—the example of Cheddar cheese was used—is allowed to enter from the EU into South Korea without a tariff or with a lower tariff being applied. That volume is apportioned in the ensuing agreements: this part of the tariff-rate quota belongs to the European Union, and this part of the tariff-rate quota belongs to the UK.

How do we determine which part goes to which? Generally, the way in which to do this, which the European Union has agreed, is to look at recent trade patterns, take the average of recent years and say that a part should be determined to be the EU’s and another part should be the UK’s? If no UK products have been exported to South Korea under the tariff-rate quota, the effect will be that the tariff-rate quota ends up going to zero in the ensuing UK agreement, but it may well be that we end up with far more than the UK overall trade flow in the ensuing South Korea agreement in other areas. It simply is not the case that we have lost our tariff-free access, if it is a product that the UK does not currently export to South Korea under the tariff-rate quota.

Crucially, the tariff reductions are in the ensuing UK agreement. Whereas the tariff-rate quotas divide up, the agreed tariff reductions carry on. That is particularly relevant to Cheddar cheese. Tariffs on Cheddar cheese entering South Korea under the EU-Korea agreement have been coming down steadily each year since 1 July 2011. From 1 July 2021, UK Cheddar cheese will be free of customs duties entirely as a result of that gradual stepping-down process, which affects Cheddar made in the EU as much as it affects the UK. There has been no change in that and no loss in our preferential tariff treatment in the UK-Korea agreement.

I have talked at length about the Command Paper and one or two other things. I have responded to each of the points made by Labour Members, possibly to their satisfaction. I find various things a little bit rich. I think I heard regrets from the Labour Front Bench that we will not be able to transition the EU-Canada agreement. I remember, because I was doing this job at the time, a large part of the Labour party, including current Front Benchers, voting against the EU-Canada agreement even coming into effect. So Labour was opposed to the agreement three years ago, but now they suddenly complain that we are not being quick enough in transitioning it to a UK agreement. If there was any consistency in the Opposition’s approach, they should be cheering any delay to an agreement that they do not agree with. I find their position typical of the chaos still present on the Opposition Benches. They complain that we have not rolled over an agreement that they did not want to be part of anyway.

The hon. Member for Putney, who started off regretting the vote four years ago today to leave the EU, then made a speech questioning the trade agreements negotiated by the European Union that we are seeking to roll over. There must be more consistency.

I appreciate that the Labour party has had a leadership change. I thought that the whole basis of the new leader’s approach was to bring organisation and method to its opposition, but instead, we have seen continuing chaos. We see a shadow Front-Bench spokesman who now objects to the agreements that they presented when in government, and a shadow Front-Bench team who now want to roll over the Canada agreement that they originally voted against. Those on the shadow Front Bench regret the Brexit vote but now want to vote against our transitioning the very agreements that the EU, with UK participation, negotiated successfully. That is a recipe for chaos and one that the Opposition would do well to reflect on.

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Last Thursday morning, we heard clearly from witnesses, including Mr Lowe from the Centre for European Reform, who expected that a UK-Canada deal would be a very different one from the EU-Canada deal that it would replace. Surely, therefore, it should be properly scrutinised. Our amendment would help to achieve that.

[Greg Hands]

I was intrigued by the amendment, but let us pause for a moment on what it would do. Amendment 9 would stipulate that agreements are in scope of the clause 2 power only if the underlying EU agreement were ratified, rather than signed, by end of the transition period. For the benefit of the Committee it might be useful to explain the difference. Something can be signed—but the dates on which a trade treaty can be signed, come into effect and be fully ratified are three different dates. A trade treaty can come into effect—this is the way the EU does it—when a certain number of EU countries have ratified it. I forget what that number is, but if about half of EU countries have ratified the agreement it comes into effect. Those three things—being signed, coming into effect, and ratification—happen on three different dates. Under the amendment, the clause 2 power that we currently say must relate to an EU agreement signed before 31 January 2020 would relate to an EU agreement ratified before that date.

Opposition Members will realise—I think, to be fair, the hon. Member for Harrow West covered that in his speech—that the amendment would restrict the scope of agreements that we could implement using clause 2. It would make the scope much narrower. However, it would do so in an entirely unreasonable manner. Important agreements such as the Canada one that he has mentioned would be excluded, as CETA has not been fully ratified by each individual member state of the EU, despite having been in effect for some time now.

Development-focused agreements would be similarly affected. The important matter of international development has yet to feature in discussions of the Bill—with the exception of something that the hon. Member for Putney said about it in passing. However, many development-focused agreements—those important economic partnership agreements—have been signed but not yet ratified. One example, involving the countries of the Caribbean, is the CARIFORUM agreement. In 2017 I signed an agreement with the CARIFORUM countries. We all gathered together—17 countries, I think, which was basically CARICOM—plus the Dominican Republic. We gathered together in Brussels to sign a continuity agreement. The nations of the Caribbean recognise the importance of that trade agreement, and one thing that they mentioned was its importance not just to their citizens but to the Caribbean diaspora in this country.

[Bill Esterson]

rose—

[Greg Hands]

No, I am not going to give way.

I think that a Member with quite a big Caribbean community in his constituency has quite a lot of explaining to do about why he is now opposed to the CARIFORUM agreement. It is a great agreement that does major good work for international development in Caribbean countries. I represent a quite substantial Caribbean community. I think its members would be alarmed if they were to learn that the Labour party is opposed to that international development agreement, which does great work among our Caribbean friends.

[Gareth Thomas]

On a point of order, Sir Graham. As the Minister knows full well, we are not opposed to the agreement. We simply want better scrutiny arrangements. What arrangements are there for me to correct the record in that respect?

[Greg Hands]

Sir Graham—

[The Chair]

Order. I think I have to respond to the point of order, in spite of the fact that it was not a point of order. As to what the hon. Gentleman asked about, as he knows, he has just done it.

[Greg Hands]

The point of the amendment is to rule out of scope agreements that have yet to be fully ratified, which includes not only the Canada agreement but the CARIFORUM agreement and important economic partnership agreements. The hon. Member for Harrow West was a DFID Minister, and I think that that might have been when some of those agreements were negotiated —with important countries such as Kenya, Côte D’Ivoire and Ghana. However, the incredibly important beneficial trade arrangements made for those countries could no longer be effective, for lack of the clause 2 power. The Opposition have a lot of explaining to do. Developing countries are as we know sometimes unable to ratify agreements fully before—

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[The Chair]

I think that the hon. Gentleman has been here long enough to know that these things happen.

[Greg Hands]

Truth be told, I was going to allow an intervention when I had fully laid out the case, and mentioned the number of people that the trade stance that the hon. Member for Harrow West is outlining today will irritate. I have only just got started on the agreements, and the apologies that the hon. Gentleman will have to make to his constituents, and, on behalf of the Labour party, to people the length and breadth of the United Kingdom.

Developing countries are sometimes unable to ratify agreements fully before they are brought into effect, often for procedural reasons in those countries, but that should not mean that we deny UK businesses the opportunity to continue trading with them, and I am sure Opposition Members would not wish to deny our world-class trade for development assistance to those states either.

[Bill Esterson]

rose—

[Greg Hands]

I will allow the hon. Gentleman to intervene. Perhaps he can explain and apologise for his position in relation to those countries.

[Bill Esterson]

The party that has just abolished the Department for International Development is not in a good place to be criticising anybody for their approach to international development. The Minister knows full well, as he did with the reasoned amendment, that we fully support international development—in a way that his party, apparently, does not. Perhaps, if this is a problem because of the drafting of our amendment, he will tell us that on Report he will come back with an amendment that deals with the problems that he is taking great pains to explain.

[Greg Hands]

I am certainly not coming back on Report with a drafting correction for the deficiencies in the hon. Gentleman’s amendment; that would be a novel approach to Parliament. The fact is that this amendment rules out of scope all these agreements for roll-overs. I have to say, in fairness to him, that some of these agreements were controversial; some people opposed these EU EPAs in the first place, and I imagined that it was the Labour party’s position that it opposed these EPAs. If we listen to one or two groups, for example, they think that the EPAs have been stacked too heavily in the EU’s favour.

However, I think the hon. Gentleman is now saying that actually that is not his intention, and that his intention was not to prevent their being rolled over. I think he is now saying he is suddenly in support of the continuity of these agreements, despite having voted against the Second Reading of the Bill and despite the fact that virtually every word that we have heard from the Labour Party in this Committee has been against these agreements and against these Bills.

Returning to my point about continuity, these agreements have been subject in this country to the full EU agreement scrutiny process. The delay to ratification is not in this country, but relates to individual country or state delays. There is no scrutiny gap.

[Fleur Anderson]

Returning to the issue of Canada and delayed negotiations, can the Minister confirm that if we do not secure the free trade agreement with Canada before 31 December, we will lose all the benefits of the current EU trade deal with Canada and revert to trading with it on WTO terms?

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, because I thought the Opposition were opposed to the Canada deal, so if we were to fall outside the Canada deal, they should be celebrating that. The Labour Front Bench opposed Canada in 2017, and I think they have opposed it again today. We are in discussions with Canada and we believe that there is time to do a roll-over agreement, but to do that we need the powers in the Bill. Amendment 9, which I think the hon. Lady has co-sponsored, would delete Canada from the list of agreements subject to the power, so if she votes for this amendment—if indeed there is a vote on it—she will effectively be preventing the roll-over of the Canada deal.

I will come to a conclusion. I was very surprised by this amendment. I praised the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Sefton Central, last week for the attention he had given to oral questions earlier that day, but now I am not sure whether he really paid enough attention. He may have missed hearing the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), say from a sedentary position that she is in favour of CETA, the Canada agreement, and that she voted for it at the time.

The right hon. Lady is absolutely right: she did vote for it at the time, and that is obviously the Labour party’s new position. We know that sometimes in political parties, particularly when we are in opposition, there can be a new position and it takes a while for that new position to filter out across the whole party, but I am a little bit surprised that the new position has not filtered down to her own Front-Bench team, let alone the whole party, because they are trying to say they do not want to roll over the Canada agreement for an agreement that their shadow Secretary of State was praising only last Thursday. I find that approach absolutely bizarre.

If amendment 9 were to be accepted, there would be no UK-Canada trade agreement to roll over in the scope of clause 2. Labour said one thing in the Chamber last Thursday, but is saying precisely the opposite in Committee. Our Canadian friends will look on askance, as will our friends from the Caribbean, Kenya, South Africa, Mozambique, Ghana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and so on.

This is a continuity Bill. There is certainly continuity in the Labour party’s confusion on trade. When it came to the original Canada agreement in the vote of February 2017, Labour split three ways: 68 of its members followed the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) in voting for the CT agreement; 86 broke with the right hon. Member for Islington North and voted with the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury in favour of the agreement; and the rest abstained.

I think I heard the hon. Member for Harrow West then say that he regretted the fact that there had not been a debate about the Canada agreement on the Floor of the House. I spent a few years in the Whips Office. One of the first rules of being a Whip in Opposition is never bring a debate on which your own party is divided to the Floor of the House, let alone something where you are divided three ways and your leader is in the minority view. Now he is saying that he regrets that it was not brought to the Floor of the House.

We should vote down amendment 9, because it would rule out of scope Canada, the Caribbean and many other important trade agreements that the EU has negotiated. The UK was part of that negotiating team. They are very important trade agreements. We would like to see the continuity of those trade agreements, as do our constituents and UK businesses. I urge hon. Members to vote against amendment 9. Indeed, I hope the Opposition withdraw the amendment.

[Gareth Thomas]

The Minister has been at his most diversionary with that characteristically chutzpah-led speech. As he knows only too well, constitutionally, the Government are able to sign and ratify international agreements. He went on at some length in his winding-up speech on the previous group of amendments about how wonderful that process was.

The Minister does not need the Trade Bill to sign agreements with CARIFORUM, Canada or Vietnam. The powers are already there for the Government to do so. If Ministers think the provisions in the Bill relating to those clauses are so important, one wonders why they did not bring the Trade Bill back in the last Parliament. It fell because Ministers chose not to bring it back, not because of opposition from the Labour party.

There were genuine concerns about the future of a UK-Canada trade pattern. On this side of the House, we repeat our concern that if Ministers cannot agree to roll over a deal with one of our oldest allies where the Queen is Head of State, it prompts questions about the effectiveness of the Department for International Trade. This was a probing amendment, which we will not push to a vote. The point about scrutiny remains on the record. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

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Trade deals must contain mechanisms that effectively enforce the UN sustainable development goals and international treaties on labour and human rights; otherwise we will inevitably see a race to the bottom for workers and citizens everywhere, leading to more precarious work, substandard workers’ rights, increased gender discrimination and human rights abuses, and an increased threat of the undermining of public services and social welfare systems. As Rosa Crawford saliently noted, a race to the bottom can never be won. The amendment will ensure that such mechanisms exist and will bake in compliance with our global commitments.

[Greg Hands]

As we have heard, amendment 10 intends to prevent the clause 2 power from being used to implement agreements that do not comply with existing international obligations on human rights, the environment and labour rights. Let me be absolutely clear: our continuity programme is coherent with existing international obligations as it seeks to replicate existing EU agreements, which are, of course, fully compliant with such obligations. By transitioning these agreements, we reaffirm the UK’s commitment to those international obligations.

I have said it before, but I am happy to repeat it as often as the Committee would like: we seek to provide certainty and stability in trading relationships for UK businesses and consumers, not to modify or dilute standards. None of the 20 agreements already signed has reduced EU standards in any area. Committee members can consult the parliamentary reports that we publish alongside continuity agreements detailing any changes required to transition the agreement to the UK context. These will confirm precisely what I have said. We will continue to publish these reports for remaining continuity agreements, so that hon. Members can satisfy themselves that we have not defaulted on our commitment not to reduce standards. That includes the agreement with Vietnam.

I am happy to look into the specific complaints that some Opposition Members have made on labour rights, but it would be helpful for me to understand whether they are in favour of the EU-Vietnam agreement. That was not really clear to me. The Opposition keep wanting to have their cake and eat it, saying that they like EU agreements but then trying to pick holes in them and saying that we should not roll them over because of some of the arrangements within them. The EU-Vietnam agreement is scheduled to come into effect on 1 August, so UK businesses will be able to take advantage of that agreement from 1 August.

As the Prime Minister outlined in his Greenwich speech, the UK has a strong history of protecting human rights and promoting our values globally. We will continue to encourage all states to uphold international human rights obligations. The hon. Member for Harrow West asked for examples of primary EU law that will be transitioned as a result of using these powers. To be clear, we intend to use the powers only for a limited number of obligations, most principally in relation to fully implementing conformity assessments and procurement matters in domestic law via secondary legislation.

To be clear, the human rights commitments in the joint statement that we made with South Korea do not enable the suspension of any of those human rights dialogues that are under way. The Colombia agreement, which is part of the EU-Andean agreement that has also been signed, has seen no weakening of labour rights; there have been some technical changes to that agreement, but none relating to labour rights, so far as I am aware. The continuity agreements signed have not changed those in any way.

The hon. Member for Warrington North mentioned action against the far right and other hate groups preaching violence. I can tell her that the Government are wholly united in our approach to making sure that that is exactly the case, but it is worth reminding ourselves that we are talking about existing trade agreements with those counterparts, not a new agreement as such.

The hon. Member for Putney talked about the commitment to the sustainable development goals. The Government are absolutely committed to the SDGs, but again we are talking about existing trade agreements. I will plough on, because we do not have an awful lot of time. The hon. Lady and her colleagues need to work out what it is that they want. On the one hand they seem to strongly support the EU and perhaps want the UK to rejoin, but on the other she seems, by the sound of it, to oppose the detail of virtually every one of the EU’s trade agreements. Opposition Members need to get clear in their minds whether they are pro-EU—in which case they might be in favour of the EU’s trade agreements—or anti-EU. That was not clear to me at all.

The hon. Member for Putney rightly says that human rights clauses in international trade deals are very important. We agree, which is why we are preserving their effects in these roll-over agreements. The Government have been clear that any future trade deals must work for UK consumers and businesses, upholding our high regulatory standards. The UK will remain committed to world-class environmental product and labour standards. We will not weaken these protections after the transition period ends. Our continuity agreements will safeguard, not undermine, our international obligations. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Sefton Central to withdraw his amendment.

[Gareth Thomas]

I had not intended to speak and I will be brief. I wish to amplify and expand on the concern that I raised in an intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Sefton Central regarding the continuity agreements for Kenya and Ghana. If those agreements are got wrong, they threaten the progress that both countries have made, and potentially that of other countries around them, in trying to achieve the sustainable development goals.

The concern is that what is currently being put to those countries by UK negotiators is a continuity agreement that requires them to sign up to something that risks regional integration in east and west Africa. Kenya and Ghana seek to work closely with the least developed countries that surround them as part of the trading blocs. Those LDCs want to continue to be part of a preference scheme, so Kenya and Ghana are caught in a trap between their desire to work very closely with their neighbouring countries and wanting to ensure that they can still trade on very good terms with the UK in, for example, bananas and cocoa.

Why is working with regional blocs so important? Because it is trade at a regional level in Africa that is likely to lead to faster development, more jobs being created, and, crucially, the development of more manufacturing jobs at a local level. When a no deal was about the happen last October, the UK Government proposed a transitional protection mechanism that would have included Ghana, Kenya and others in a similar position.

[Greg Hands]

I should apologise; I had not realised that the hon. Gentleman wanted to intervene on me on this issue. I undertake to write to him about Ghana and Kenya, and to copy in members of the Committee. The situation involving both those counterparts is complicated and would be best served not by a debate about this particular amendment, but more broadly were I to contact the hon. Gentleman.

[Gareth Thomas]

The Minister has made a gracious intervention and offer, which I am happy to accept. On that basis, I am happy to conclude my speech.

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[Fleur Anderson]

Moving on from the sustainable development goals, and looking at the environmental regulations and the environmental issues that are baked into the Bill, we are already committed to climate action. The Minister has affirmed that we are and want to be compliant, and we aspire to see the achievement of the sustainable development goals. That means taking radical action and treating the climate situation as an emergency. To do that we need to add the amendment to the Trade Bill.

In doing so, we will be safeguarding life in water and on land. Earlier this year, the Prime Minister reaffirmed his Government’s commitment to achieving net zero by 2050 and boldly stated that “we will crack” the climate emergency. As a global leader on climate action, the UK must set an example to the rest of the world by honouring its international obligations under the Paris agreement and other multilateral environmental agreements. Trade policy is an integral part of that, so it should not be left out of the Bill.

Trade agreements can foster good climate action, but they can also impede Government implementation of climate commitments. They could threaten to increase fossil fuel use, for example, which we explicitly decided not to do in declaring a climate emergency. They could also hinder the sharing of green technology.

Trade agreements typically include national treatment for trade in gas, thereby locking in dependency on a fossil fuel with high greenhouse gas emissions, while incentivising increased fracking and fossil fuel infrastructure. We would not want continuity agreements that include those. The EU’s own impact assessment of TTIP—the EU-US trade deal—predicts that it would generate an additional 11 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide per year. That is fundamentally at odds with our international climate obligations, so we must bring our trade policies up to date with our environment obligations.

The dangers that trade deals pose to the environment can be clearly seen in the EU-Mercosur trade agreement currently under negotiation. A fortnight ago, the Dutch Parliament rejected the agreement, due to a lack of enforceable agreements on the protection of the Amazon or the prevention of illegal deforestation. Conducting trade negotiations without clear environmental red lines on the statute book—which this amendment would provide—with countries led by individuals such as President Bolsonaro, under whom deforestation of the Amazon has increased by 27% according to the NGO SOS Atlantic Forest Foundation, poses a huge threat to the Government’s international, climate and environmental obligations.

As the WWF has noted, rushing into trade deals with partners that do not share our ambitions could undermine UK leadership on positive environmental outcomes, by allowing imports from industrialised agricultural systems or through supply chains that promote deforestation. “Risky Business”, a report by the WWF and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, demonstrates that the UK is already moving backwards on reducing the UK’s overseas land footprint, which increased by 15% between 2016 and 2018, suggesting that we are increasingly offshoring our environmental impact. We need to do better.

To conclude, the Bill gives us an opportunity to ensure that our trade policy supports our environmental ambitions by explicitly putting them into the Trade Bill, including the target of net zero carbon emissions by 2050. Amendment 11 is a positive step towards that goal and is consistent with the Government’s own commitments and obligations, so everyone should agree to it, to ensure that the UK complies with international law and that we remain a world leader on climate action.

[Greg Hands]

As I have set out, the Government’s continuity programme is coherent with existing international obligations, as it seeks to replicate existing EU agreements to secure continuity for businesses and consumers. As I have made clear, we have no intention of lowering standards—environmental, labour or otherwise. The Prime Minister set out that commitment in his Greenwich speech and I have repeated it on many occasions, including today.

The UK has often led the way and exceeded EU minima on environmental issues, such as greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. I predict that we will continue to do so, thus making the amendment redundant. For example, the UK was the first country to introduce legally binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets through the Climate Change Act 2008. We were also the first major economy to set a legally binding target to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions from across the economy by 2050. We have cut our carbon emissions by nearly twice the EU average since 1990—by 42%.

Put simply, the UK has an extremely strong record on environmental action. I hope that the Committee will agree that the amendment is unnecessary, as we will be safeguarding and promoting, not undermining, our environmental obligations. Consequently, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

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[Bill Esterson]

I have finished.

[Greg Hands]

Amendment 12 would mean that the power in clause 2 could not be used to implement agreements that might restrict the delivery of public services through public monopolies, exclusive rights or nationalisation.

The amendment is not necessary, because this is a continuity Bill. None of the agreements in question restrict our ability to deliver public services in that way. We have always protected our right to choose how we deliver public services in our trade agreements. Indeed, the UK’s public services, including the NHS, are often protected by specific exclusions, exceptions and reservations in the trade agreements to which the UK is a party. No trade agreement has ever affected our ability to keep public services public.

Colleagues will observe from our record of the signed agreements that the continuity programme seeks to preserve current trading relationships and not to alter the way in which our public services are designed or delivered. The amendment is therefore unnecessary, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

[Bill Esterson]

Again, through secondary legislation the Bill enables the Government to do some of the things that we have described. More to the point, however, this issue is important because of the nature of the continuity agreements that will be renegotiated. We have discussed the agreements with Canada, Japan, Mexico and Turkey. I do not know whether any of those agreements would do what I have described, but they could potentially do so because they are not just continuity agreements.

The Bill sets the framework for trade agreements, because the Government are not bringing forward a different framework or alternatives on how trade agreements will be scrutinised and how they will end up. The Government are not challenging what the United States might do. We know the concerns that exist about how the US has expressed in the past its desire to intervene in public services in this country. We should be concerned and we should put this kind of commitment into law as it relates to international trade. I will press the amendment to the vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Charlotte Nichols]

Very quickly, the provisions in the amendment could prove to be some of the most significant debated today, particularly proposed new paragraph (e) regarding antibiotics. We have seen that antibiotic resistance is one of the greatest threats—perhaps even an existential threat—facing humanity. It is as significant as the climate crisis. As we have seen with coronavirus, it would wreak not just a public health impact but an economic impact on our country.

When we discuss the food standards that are laid out in the legislation, it is not only what we eat that is important; the conditions in which animals are kept can often be breeding grounds for diseases that can spread to humans. Ensuring that antibiotics are used appropriately and in line with current regulations is of massive importance.

[Greg Hands]

As the Committee will know, the UK’s food standards for both domestic production and imports are overseen by the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland. Those agencies provide independent advice to the UK and Scottish Governments and will continue to do so to ensure that all food imports comply with the UK’s high safety standards.

Through the work of those independent organisations, consumers are protected from unsafe food that does not meet our high domestic standards. I reassure the Committee that all imports, whether under continuity agreements, most favoured nation terms or new free trade agreements, must comply with our import requirements and food safety standards. Countries seeking access to our markets in future will have to abide by those food standards.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gareth Thomas]

I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 2, page 2, leave out lines 27 and 28.

The amendment is designed to remove the Henry VIII powers from the Bill. In its write up of the Trade Bill, Linklaters noted that constitutionally, the Government are already able to sign and ratify trade agreements with minimal reference to Parliament. The Trade Bill is designed to shortcut this process and to authorise the Government to implement the new agreements directly, by Executive act. To help them to do that, the Government seek to use Henry VIII powers to enable them to amend various bits of EU legislation, as they think appropriate, using regulations.

Liberty and others have argued that that represents a fundamental breach of Parliamentary sovereignty. The Committee has already debated the considerable weaknesses in the Bill in terms of opportunities for scrutiny. It is true that in comparison with the previous Trade Bill, Ministers have made a minor concession and agreed to the use of the affirmative process, but we can see no reason for the scale of the power grab represented by the Henry VIII powers in subsection (6)(a), and our amendment seeks to take them out.

[Greg Hands]

I will now address amendment 14. As the hon. Gentleman has pointed out, the amendment would remove the power to modify direct principal EU legislation, or primary legislation that is retained EU law, in order to implement obligations arising from continuity agreements.

It is important for Members to understand that without this power, we would, unfortunately, be unable to implement our obligations and we would risk being in breach of international law. It would also mean that our agreements were inoperable, adversely impacting upon UK businesses and consumers. I feel reasonably sure, Sir Graham, that that is not something that any Member of this Committee would support.

In addition, not only is this power necessary, but it is proportionate and constrained, because it only allows for the amendment of primary legislation that is retained EU law. Since trade continuity agreements will have been implemented substantially through EU law, the power is necessary to implement any technical changes that keep the agreements operable beyond the end of the transition period.

The Government have constrained the power as much as possible while ensuring that it is still capable of delivering continuity in our current trading relationships, which benefit businesses and consumers in every constituency represented by members of this Committee. To provide reassurance to Parliament, we have added a five-year sunset provision, which we will turn to shortly, and any regulations made under the clause 2 power will be subject to the affirmative procedure.

I ask Members not to take my word for it, but to take the word of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, who raised no issues with the delegated powers in this Bill, gave it a clean bill of health and praised the introduction of the draft affirmative procedure for any regulations made. I hope that, in the light of the explanation that I have given, the Committee is reassured that not only is this power necessary, but it is proportionate and constrained. As such, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Gareth Thomas]

I do not intend to press the matter to a vote, in the interests of time. I am not convinced by the Government’s argument, and we may return to the matter at Report stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

I welcome the opportunity to discuss the important issues raised in the amendments, which I think are fundamentally on different topics from those that we have dealt with for much of today. There is significant common ground between the Government and the Opposition parties. I welcome the hon. Member for Dundee East to the debate, for his first contribution today. It was noticeable that he chose not to take part in the chaos that ensued earlier when the main Opposition party’s Front Benchers struggled with whether they are for or against the Canada agreement and so on. He wisely decided to sit that one out.

Under the UK constitution, the negotiation of international trade agreements is, as I have already made clear, a prerogative power of the UK Government. It is also a reserved matter, where the UK Government act on behalf of the whole UK. When exercising that reserved power, the Government have made clear that they will deliver trade agreements that benefit all parts of the UK—I have already referred to the scoping assessment for the US deal, showing that Scotland would be the nation or region of the UK that benefited most—unleashing the potential of businesses from all four countries of the United Kingdom.

I recognise the important role that the devolved Administrations can and should play in that endeavour, not only as representatives of their respective nations’ interest, but because we know our trade deals will interact with areas of devolved competence. As such, my Department has worked and will continue to work closely with the DAs on our trade policy.

Turning to new clause 16, I will explain why I think it is unnecessary and impractical, although the principle of engagement behind it is one that I share. The new clause seeks to create a statutory role for a joint committee of the UK Government and the devolved Administrations as a forum to discuss trade policy, but such an arrangement is already in place.

During the passage of the Trade Bill 2017-19, the previous Secretary of State for Trade, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), committed to establishing a new bespoke ministerial forum for trade with the devolved Administrations, in recognition of the importance of this relationship. That forum had its inaugural meeting in January and meets regularly to discuss our approach to trade negotiations, including key areas such as our objectives for the US trade agreement.

I am also happy to put on record my commitment to continuing to work closely with the devolved Administrations at all stages of trade negotiations, not only through the ministerial forum for trade, but via bilateral ad hoc engagement to reflect the sometimes fast-paced nature of trade negotiations. Indeed, I spoke about the US free trade agreement with all my counterparts in the devolved Administrations last month and have also recently written about the Trade Bill and other trade policy issues.

My former ministerial colleague, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) travelled to Belfast in February to meet colleagues in the Northern Ireland Executive to discuss trade policy. For the benefit of the hon. Member for Dundee East, I restate the commitments made by my right hon. Friend, when he was a Minister, in his March letter to the Scottish Minister Ivan McKee.

In short, we are already delivering the engagement envisaged by proposed new clause, and we have achieved that while continuing to observe the important constitutional principles enshrined in the devolution settlements. In contrast, this proposed new clause would give the devolved Administrations a statutory role in the reserved area of international trade negotiations, which would be constitutionally inappropriate.

Nor is this proposed new clause practical. It would lock us and the DAs into prescribed ways of working under the existing intergovernmental memorandum of understanding, a document last updated in 2013. It would constrain our ability to develop and adapt bespoke engagement mechanisms as we embark on negotiating our first UK trade agreements for more than a generation.

Turning to amendment 8, the powers created by this legislation will be used for the purpose of transitioning trade agreements with those countries that the UK had agreements with through its membership of the EU. That will ensure certainty, continuity and stability in our trade and investment relationships for businesses, citizens and trading partners in all parts of the UK.

As parts of these agreements touch on devolved matters, this legislation will create concurrent powers. We have sought to put in place concurrent powers to provide greater flexibility in how transitional agreements are implemented, allowing each devolved Administration to implement the agreements independently in some cases, while also allowing the UK Government to legislate on a UK-wide basis where it makes practical sense to do so. This approach permits greater administrative efficiency, reducing the volume of legislation brought through the UK Parliament and through the devolved legislatures.

I recognise that the devolved Administrations and members of this Committee seek reassurance that those powers will be used appropriately. The Government have already made clear that we will not normally use them to legislate within devolved areas without the consent of the relevant devolved Administration or Administrations, and never without consulting them first. I am, of course, happy to restate that commitment here.

It is not appropriate, however, to put that commitment on a statutory footing, as, like new clause 16, it would give the devolved Administrations a statutory role in the reserved area of international trade, undermining the important constitutional principles enshrined in the devolution settlements. We recognise that the technical implementation of international obligations in devolved areas is a devolved matter. However, as I have explained, the decision on which international obligations the UK enters into is a reserved matter and a prerogative power exercisable only by the UK Government. This rightly ensures that the UK Government can speak with a single voice under international law, providing certainty for our negotiating partners and the strongest possible negotiating position for the whole of the UK, for the benefit of all of the UK.

A statutory consent provision in the Bill would in effect give the devolved Administrations a veto over a reserved matter. This would be highly constitutionally inappropriate and could lead to a situation where international agreements applied in some parts of the UK but not others. This would be a fundamental weakening of our Union and the long-established principle that in the matter of international relations the UK Government negotiate for all parts of the UK.

Additionally, placing the commitment on a statutory footing could open us up to convoluted and lengthy procedures in which the courts were asked to determine in minute detail what was reserved and what was devolved. This is disproportionate and would create significant uncertainty for UK businesses, undermining the fundamental purpose of the Bill, which is to maximise certainty and continuity of trading arrangements. Our commitment to not normally legislate in areas of devolved competence without consent, and never without consultation, strikes the proper balance between providing sufficient reassurance to the devolved Administrations while preserving international relations as a reserved matter. It is a sincere commitment that we will honour, as we have honoured the commitments made to the devolved Administrations on the Trade Bill 2017-19.

For example, we committed to seeking suggestions from the devolved Administrations on the optimal way of recruiting non-executive members for the Trade Remedies Authority, which we will discuss on Thursday, with regional knowledge, skills and experience, and we fulfilled that earlier this year.

Our new independent trade policy absolutely calls for engagement with the devolved Administrations and respect for the important role that they can and should play, but it does not call for fundamental shifts in the nature of devolution or the weakening of powers that Parliament agreed should remain reserved to the UK Government. We have worked collaboratively with all the DAs to ensure that the Bill enables us to transition arrangements in a way that delivers for the whole UK. Our existing commitments, which I have restated today, provide sufficient reassurance to the devolved Administrations on the issues covered by the amendments. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Welsh Government have recommended consent to the relevant clauses of the Bill.

I hope I have been able to satisfy hon. Members that we have recognised and met their objectives in this amendment and that the hon. Member for Dundee East will withdraw it.

[Stewart Hosie]

I thank the Minister for reconfirming the non-legislative commitments made by his predecessor in his letter to Ivan McKee. That has genuinely helped. However, the Minister falls back on the argument that bespoke powers are better than a permanent credible structure. I disagree. I think a permanent credible structure provides more stability and certainty than the bespoke ad hoc use of powers and discussions from time to time. However, in the current devolved process, I recognise that international treaties are reserved matters. I absolutely understand and respect that, but he knows as well as anyone who might be listening that the interface of the intersection between an international trade treaty and a devolved competence might be fairly high. That is all the more reason for structured statutory formal engagement rather than an ad hoc bespoke process, which may or may not satisfy one or more parties, or one or more of the nations, in the UK about the Government’s actions over a given international trade agreement.

Although I do not intend to press the matter to a vote, and I thank the Minister sincerely for the commitments he has restated, there is a fundamental difference of opinion on the bespoke ad hoc approach being suggested and a formal statutory structure, and I am sure we will return to that theme on Report. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.— (Maria Caulfield.)