Railways Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Jerome Mayhew and Keir Mather

Thursday 29th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Mather]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. My reading of the amendment is that it would remove the ability to amend the strategy within a 15-year period. Her broader point, about having flexibility to make determinations about the long-term rail strategy and cater for unforeseen events, technological innovations and global events that we cannot predict, strengthens the argument that we made about amendment 134, when we considered whether to set the period in stone and make it exactly 30 years. There has clearly been deliberation between the official Opposition and the Liberal Democrats about whether it should be 15 or 30 years, but we think that not being overly prescriptive is the best way to ensure that the rail strategy gives a long-term perspective and is sufficiently malleable to meet changing operational realities on the railway.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I just want to give the Minister some further clarity about what amendment 25 actually does. He is right that it says,

“The document issued under subsection (1) must be in force for a minimum of three control periods”,

but that should be read in the light of subsection (4), which gives the Secretary of State express power to

“keep the rail strategy under review”,

and paragraph (b), which says that they

“may revise or replace it.”

Does he accept that it is quite clear that the amendment, read in conjunction with subsection (4), does not prevent reacting to new events?

[Keir Mather]

On locking in a 15-year strategy that can be reopened only if the Secretary of State chooses to revise it, it has been said throughout our deliberations that we do not want politicians micromanaging the railway. I therefore presume that the Secretary of State would want to reopen the three control period review envelope only in extremis. Given our deliberations about whether it should be three control periods or 30 years, I think it is better overall to bake that flexibility into the Bill and allow those discussions to take place.

I have to make a lot more progress, and I do not want to detain the Committee for long. In the evidence sessions, several witnesses said that the ability to update and change the strategy in response to unexpected events is critical. No one can accurately predict things such as technological and environmental changes over the next 15 years. For that reason, the Bill has been drafted so that the strategy is not a once and done document, but can be revised when it needs to be.

The next theme in this group of amendments is to ensure that the long-term rail strategy includes specific content. Amendments 137, 207, 224, 135 and 136 all do that. The strategy will not go into specific operational requirements in the way sought by the amendments, which relate to topics such as rural railways, co-operation with local authorities, timetable integration, international rail and electrification. Those are all vital topics—of that there is no doubt—but they are all matters for Great British Railways to consider as it develops its strategic plan for the operation and optimisation of the rail network, informed by the long-term strategy.

Although I agree that co-operation with local authorities is critical to the success of this reform, I do not think that that objective needs to be captured in the long-term rail strategy. Rather, it is already captured in the Bill via GBR’s duty to co-operate with mayoral strategic authorities. That duty is provided for in legislation and will be enduring, so it does not also need to be in the strategy.

The suggestion that the long-term rail strategy should set out obligations relating to the timetable is in opposition to the views of the majority of stakeholders who responded to the Railways Bill consultation. They want Great British Railways to have the autonomy to manage the timetable without Government micromanagement, and I wholly agree with that.

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[Jerome Mayhew]

I am grateful to the Minister, who is doing his job in highlighting some of the practical challenges that the amendment might entail. The important bit is not so much the strategy; I think what my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge is trying to get at is that, when Network Rail or GBR assesses the function of a level crossing, it also needs to take account of the impact on the society in which it is based: for instance, cutting a town in two or stopping vehicular access for multiple periods during a day. Does the Minister not agree that, if GBR did not consider that—it was not in the list of considerations that the Minister mentioned a moment ago—it would not be doing its full job?

[Keir Mather]

I thank the shadow Minister for his intervention. I very much identify with the sentiment identified by the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. This is something that impacts Selby town, much as it affects communities across the country. It is right that GBR has regard to managing the way in which level crossings impact road users as much as it does the way that railway infrastructure and passenger services do.

My question is whether that obligation is best placed in this part of the Bill. Network Rail already has a system for considering the impact of changes on local communities, and that will be mapped over into the way that GBR functions. I believe that the transfer of that process, in a way that is reactive and operationally agile, is probably the best way to ensure that those considerations remain integral to how GBR carries out that work.

On connectivity and multimodal journeys, I am happy to confirm that strategic objectives in the long-term strategy will already include supporting better connectivity between communities. This will provide direction on the long-term trends affecting the railway. However, as with others in this group, amendment 261 would make the strategy a document focused on short to medium-term assessments of passengers’ ability to change between rail services or different modes—things that could change frequently, and are therefore not appropriate for inclusion in a document that sets out long-term strategic aims.

However, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham will be pleased to hear that we will soon be publishing our integrated national transport strategy, which will set out the Government’s vision for domestic transport across England. It will focus on a transport network that works well for people across the country, including improving integration across modes, but I will of course take the sage advice of the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston about my personal role as part of that process.

Amendments 225 and 213 both seek to make the strategy subject to additional procedural requirements. Amendment 225 requires consultation with operators during preparation of the strategy. I can reassure the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham that the Government have already committed to consultative engagement with key stakeholders, including freight and passenger train operating companies, which will be essential for gathering evidence and informing the strategy’s development. Therefore, in our view, this amendment is unnecessary.

Amendment 213, meanwhile, requires regular reporting from the Secretary of State to Parliament on delivery of the strategy. However, as GBR will be the principal organisation responsible for delivering the vision and outcomes that will be set out in the long-term rail strategy, it will be for GBR to report on its progress in delivering it. GBR already must have regard to the strategy, and will respond to it through its business plans, on which it will report regularly. Given that and other existing reporting mechanisms, the amendment would be duplicative.

The new clauses in this group all propose new strategies or reports—for example, on rolling stock, cyber-security and technology, Sunday working arrangements or signalling. Those all naturally cut across the long-term rail strategy and, if accepted, would, in my view, risk GBR being busier completing strategies than actually running the railway. However, I would like to take each new clause in turn to give them due regard.

On new clause 27, the Government absolutely agree with the principle of a long-term rolling stock strategy. In fact, we would go a step further and say that this strategy should cover not just rolling stock, but the related infrastructure as well, in a single integrated strategy. Such a strategy was sadly lacking during the last three decades of privatisation, with decisions about rolling stock and related infrastructure taken to meet short-term and route-specific needs of operators seeking to maximise their profits. It is this Bill, establishing GBR, that will put that right.

However, I do not agree that the Bill needs this as a duty on GBR. Rather than creating a duty for GBR to deliver at some time in the future, we are already working with relevant parties across the industry to develop a rolling stock and infrastructure strategy to be published this summer. GBR will inherit that strategy and act on it to deliver improvements for industry, taxpayers and passengers.

Likewise, there is no need for a reporting requirement relating to cyber-security and technology. Cyber-security remains a priority for my Department; we are committed, through both existing cyber legislation and policy, to ensuring that GBR operates safely and securely. While new clause 28 reflects priorities that the Government share, the measures it proposes, such as on artificial intelligence, digitalisation and innovation, are already being delivered without the need to include them in this Bill.

On new clause 29, relating to Sunday working arrangements, I would first like to say that I have no doubt that creating GBR to improve both the quality and dependability of train services on Sundays will drive up demand and allow more people to benefit from the railway. We want a railway that operates reliably and sustainably, seven days a week, on a lower net subsidy than today, with built-in resilience and a diverse workforce. However, this is not an overnight change, but a long-term one, and not a process that, in my view, needs to be set out in legislation. Rather, we will continue to work with staff, managers and unions across the future railway to deliver this change collaboratively.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The Minister is touching on a key issue that the railway will have to address if he is serious about achieving a reliable Sunday service, and that is operating a seven-day schedule with a six-day roster. Does the Minister intend finally to address the six-day roster issue and to move working practices on to a seven-day roster?

[Keir Mather]

We want GBR to be empowered to address and deal with all these questions relating to personnel and timetabling in a way that is consultative and in partnership with both unions and private sector operators. My point merely remains that it is not appropriate to freeze them in aspic as part of this Bill, in a way that might prevent GBR’s ability to work properly through those considerations with the workforce once it exists. Producing a separate report on the demand for Sunday travel would duplicate the work that GBR already has to undertake through its business plan, which will set out the outcomes and key deliverables for GBR, including train service levels, which will be agreed with the Government and published accordingly.

Finally, new clause 54 relates to a signalling strategy, and again there is no need to place such requirements in this Bill. Network Rail has released its approach to digital signalling for 2024 to 2029, setting out the routes that will be converted to digital signalling. GBR will take over that approach and would be expected to develop it in its future business plans.

To bring the focus of the discussion back to clause 15, the long-term rail strategy will ensure that the railway will always have long-term direction from this Government and future Governments. Such directions are vital for stability and confidence within the rail industry. The strategy will help to prevent the constant short-termism that has been called out by both the industry and its supply chain.

I hope that, following my response to these amendments, the hon. Members will feel able to withdraw them, and I commend clause 15 to the Committee.

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[Keir Mather]

The hon. Lady must have read my mind about that detail being forthcoming. If she will allow me to take away that specific point over the break that we are about to have, I might be able to come back to her when we resume the debate.

For the moment, I will quickly turn specifically to the amendments in the group. The lead amendment would require GBR and the ORR to “seek to achieve” the long-term rail strategy and devolved strategies, rather than to “have regard to” them. The existing wording deliberately reflects the nature of those strategies within the system. The LTRS will take a 30-year perspective and set strategic objectives, rather than define a narrow set of deliverables.

We of course want GBR and the ORR to have regard to the strategies in all decision making, but they must also have the flexibility to balance long-term objectives with the practical business planning processes that operate over fixed periods. To legislate that such a vision should be achieved would not be in line with that principle, or with the overall approach to the general duties that set the conditions for successful decision making, but do not dictate specific outcomes. As I have reminded hon. Members, GBR, not the Government, will be running the railway.

New clause 37 also relates to GBR’s delivery and looks to establish a statutory annual reporting framework. The Bill already provides robust reporting and accountability arrangements. GBR is required to produce an integrated business plan for each funding period, which must be published and kept up to date, and that will give Parliament and stakeholders a clear view of GBR’s objectives, activities and expected outcomes. A separate statutory annual delivery report would in essence duplicate that information. Furthermore, the ORR will have a role in monitoring GBR’s performance against its business plan and will provide independent advice to the Secretary of State. Such oversight ensures that GBR can be held to account without the need for an additional statutory reporting requirement.

New clauses 33 and 36 relate to GBR’s long-term approach to securing rolling stock. The former calls for the Secretary of State to publish a long-term rolling stock leasing framework and sets out a substantial amount of detail on what that should include. Within that detail, there are certainly points on which we can agree, including the benefits of longer leases and the proper consideration of whole-life asset costs, both of which have been made more challenging to achieve under the franchising model. However, I profoundly disagree that the Secretary of State should dictate the detailed approach that GBR should take to rolling stock leasing, and with the specific terms set out in the new clause. It is rightly for experienced industry professionals within GBR, guided by the Secretary of State’s long-term rail strategy, to secure the best value and achieve GBR’s other objectives through commercial arrangements with the rolling stock leasing market. It should not be for the Government to dictate the detail of those arrangements.

On new clause 36, I of course agree that GBR should have a long-term rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, which is why we are already working with parties across the industry to develop one. The strategy will be published this summer, and will remain a live document. GBR will inherit and implement it as soon as it is established. The new clause is therefore unnecessary, as by the time it would take effect, GBR will already be up and running with a long-term rolling stock strategy.

Amendment 218 would require GBR to have regard to the transport strategies of single strategic authorities. We are of course supportive of a more locally focused railway under GBR. The provisions in the Bill are pitched at mayoral strategic authority level, reflecting their growth across England, the vital role that mayors play in convening local partners and the scale and capability required to integrate rail into the wider public transport network. Nevertheless, all tiers of local government will benefit from empowered local GBR business units that are outward facing and actively engage local authorities on their priorities and local transport plans. That engagement will ensure there is sufficient opportunity for local authorities outside the mayoral strategic authority areas to collaborate with GBR on their priories and to consider proposals. I hope the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham therefore feels comfortable withdrawing the amendments.

Clause 16 places duties on GBR to have regard to the long-term rail strategy, devolved transport strategies and local transport plans. Overall, it seeks to ensure that strategic decisions on matters such as future services and infrastructure plans appropriately reflect national, devolved and local priorities. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Jerome Mayhew]

This is now a common refrain in our deliberations. The Minister says, “Don’t worry. All these things will be taken care of at some future date in documents that have not been drafted and certainly haven’t been shared with the Committee.” With the greatest respect to him, I do not take it on trust that the Government are looking carefully and in sufficient detail at these matters, so I will press the amendments to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Railways Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Jerome Mayhew and Keir Mather

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

My hon. Friend is entirely right. That will be a theme of our comments on and challenges to the Bill throughout the progress of our scrutiny: accountability without responsibility is no accountability at all. Time and again, we see an unwillingness from those who drafted the Bill to trust the role of parliamentarians as scrutineers.

As a former businessman, I know—I have not made this one up; it is not unique thinking—that, in any organisation, you get what you measure. That will have been the case in any organisation that hon. and right hon. Members may have worked in in the private or public sector: the NHS has targets because it gets what it measures. At the moment, the Bill measures very little on GBR’s performance, and where it does, that disappears off to the Department for Transport and is reported to other civil servants.

As parliamentarians, we know our value in holding not only GBR to account but the Government of the day, which will not always be a Labour one. That is our important role, which is done through the Select Committee process and more widely. As parliamentarians, we should seek to improve the Bill. I recognise that we will have a number of Divisions during this process and I am unlikely to win a single one, but I urge the Government to listen—perhaps to the private comments of its own Committee members; they do not have to tell me about it—because these are genuine areas of improvement that we as parliamentarians should be encouraging the Government to add to the Bill. On that note, I will stop.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)]

It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Sir Alec. I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, for this group of amendments, which are primarily about the direction powers in the Bill.

Amendments 11 and 12 would each limit the use of the Secretary of State’s direction power, requiring that the power can be used only as a last resort, after dismissing the head of GBR and if GBR has breached its functions. I understand the intention here, which is to ensure that these direction powers are used proportionately. I assure the hon. Member that the Government agree with that aim—we absolutely must empower GBR to be the directing mind of the railway—and I agree that the railway will not work if Ministers are forced to keep meddling in it in the way that they do today. That said, this power is not the problem that he thinks it is.

The new direction power is common in relationships between the Secretary of State and arm’s length bodies. Other examples in the transport sector that are not limited to last resort use include the power in the Infrastructure Act 2015 for the Transport Secretary to direct National Highways. Hon. Members will note that these types of powers are not frequently used. These amendments would create restrictions that undermine the principle that the Secretary of State should retain the ability to respond to persistent, urgent or unforeseen issues where rapid intervention is required.

[Jerome Mayhew]

Where is the reference to persistent, urgent and unforeseen incidents in the Bill?

[Keir Mather]

The Government have made it clear what the provisions within these clauses are designed to implement. I ask the shadow Minister to look at legislation passed under his own Government that contain direction powers that are remarkably consistent with those found in the Bill, and at the directions provided in other pieces of legislation. Does he feel that they represent mission creep when it comes to Secretary of State responsibilities? He will note that these type of powers are not used frequently. We believe that these amendments would create restrictions that undermine the principle that the Secretary of State should retain the ability to respond as required.

Critically, a direction should come before there has been a serious impact. The removal of an executive or the ORR deeming GBR to be in breach of its statutory functions would suggest that a serious failure has already occurred. In the latter case, it is unclear in what situation the hon. Member would consider a breach of a statutory function to have occurred, which would introduce ambiguity into the system.

Restricting the direction powers by limiting their use to only the most serious of instances would mean that any directions were more likely to be more prescriptive and severe. I am sure that the shadow Minister would not wish to see the public or industry seriously impacted before the Secretary of State acted. The new powers also recognise the GBR board as the railway’s directing mind while enabling Ministers to intervene to support GBR to deliver or correct course.

Amendments 13 and 17 would remove the ability for the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers, respectively, to say that GBR can exercise unspecified functions only after consultation or with their consent. I do not think that these amendments are helpful. They would effectively remove the clarity on the directions power, but would not restrict the legal scope of it. They would simply lessen the legal transparency around the use of the direction.

There are circumstances where requiring GBR to consult the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers before taking a specific action would be entirely reasonable, and maybe even desirable for GBR. For example, where GBR needs to address a specific risk or situation as part of a wider national co-ordination or cross-industry response, the Secretary of State may need to ensure that actions are in line with national responses. The ability to revoke a direction allows Ministers to ensure that they operate in a proportionate and rational way in response to time-sensitive issues.

Amendments 15 and 18 would prevent the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers, respectively, from enforcing GBR’s failure to comply with a direction through the civil courts. The Government need to retain the right to independent enforcement with fixed remedies that compel GBR to act across a range of mechanisms, to ensure a pathway to protecting taxpayers’ money and the delivery of the Government’s objectives. I hope the hon. Member would agree that it is completely undesirable to remove any ability for Ministers to hold the executive to account.

I also politely say that the hon. Member cannot have it both ways: either GBR is an organisation that could exercise mission creep and is too independent of scrutiny, whether from Parliament or anywhere else, or the powers in the Bill place too many strictures on it from the perspective of Government. That point of clarity is required in the Opposition’s overall perspective on the Bill.

[Jerome Mayhew]

As I have set out in my series of amendments, the appropriate oversight and control is to remove the chief executive. The Minister must accept that, if the Secretary of State thinks that the organisation is going in the wrong direction, is not listening to guidance or has gone rogue in some way, they have the unfettered power to remove the chief executive officer at any stage. If he does not think that is the case, he should say so now, because if the Secretary of State has the power to remove the chief executive officer and put in place someone who will do his bidding, then none of this is needed, is it?

[Keir Mather]

I will turn in a moment to the specific points that the shadow Minister raises around the chief executive, but I think I share his views on the importance of GBR’s compliance with its fundamental functions and with the law. That is why amendments 15 and 18 are peculiar—they do not recognise GBR needing to be able to have enforcement through that particular route.

Amendments 14 and 16 both relate to the transparency of directions. Amendment 14 would require directions to be laid before Parliament, but we believe that is unnecessary as provisions in the Bill already require directions issued under this power to be published, and Parliament has the power to call the Secretary of State to account should it take the view that more information is required.

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[Keir Mather]

I agree with my hon. Friend’s sentiment that it is unwise to hypothesise about what potential eventualities could befall GBR in specific instances, as the shadow Minister encourages me to do. What is important—my hon. Friend made an important point around consistency, both in our legislative work and the work of the Government more broadly—is to ensure that the bedrock upon which GBR sits is legally sound, and that all eventualities that may arise are catered for through provisions within the legislation that offer sufficient breadth. That is why amendments 15 and 18 do not serve the legal accountability purposes that the shadow Minister seems to want to stress.

[Jerome Mayhew]

rose—

[Keir Mather]

I will give way one final time and then I want to make some progress.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am grateful that the Minister is being very generous. In my opening remarks, I asked him to give me some real-world examples of when injunctive relief might be required. Could he not forget to provide those?

[Keir Mather]

I had not forgotten the shadow Minister’s request for me to provide specific examples. In a sense, though, I do not believe that it would be wise to do so. I do not think that the purpose of this Committee is to speculate about what GBR may or may not do in future; it is important that we develop a suite of measures that create the accountability that is required.

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[Keir Mather]

It puzzles me that with all the other transport bodies that have been set up—National Highways is an interesting example—I do not recall a series of concerns having been outlined that one of the most robust systems of parliamentary democracy in the world was in some way, shape or form incapable of—

[Jerome Mayhew]

Will the Minister give way?

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[Keir Mather]

I will, but very briefly, and this is the final time.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am grateful to the Minister, though I remind him that we do have 14 sessions; we are not cantering to the last fence. He prays in aid National Highways. We are all constituency MPs. We all know how frustrating it is trying to deal with National Highways. I do not want to make a headline unnecessarily, but my personal view, as a constituency MP, is that trying to deal with National Highways in the interests of my constituents is almost impossible. Why would he choose that as the example to follow when designing accountability for GBR?

[Keir Mather]

In a spirit of cross-party contrition, I agree with the shadow Minister’s point; it is a fair one, and perhaps that was a poor example.

In the setting out of the long-term rail strategy, through the Secretary of State, there are myriad means of Parliamentary accountability to ensure that process is done in a way that reflects the long-term interests of the railway and of passengers. There are robust means of scrutiny through this House and other means of which Parliamentarians can avail themselves of, and of which the hon. Member for South West Devon has availed herself multiple times through the passage of this Bill.

I would like to conclude on this grouping and so I want to speak to new clause 4. As the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham will be aware, with bodies of this nature the Government’s long-standing policy is that the Secretary of State of the sponsoring Department has responsibility for appointing the non-executive chair of the board. The executive team is then accountable in the first instance to the organisation’s non-executive board, and it is right that trust is given to the expertise and experience of the executive and that there is appropriate distance between the Secretary of States and those tasked with the day-to-day operational management of the organisation. That is one of the benefits of the GBR model.

Legislating to dictate a process whereby the chief executive is dismissed directly by the Secretary of State for failure to meet a single KPI is not appropriate and it cuts across all guidance and understanding of effective partnership between Government Departments and their arm’s length bodies. For those reasons, I cannot accept these amendments and urge the hon. Members to withdraw them.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am wholly unconvinced by the explanation the Minister has given. On many of the clauses and amendments I have put forward, and those put forward in the names of other Members, one can see both sides of the argument; on this one, I think the Government are entirely wrong. They are setting up a structure using another arm’s length non-governmental body, National Highways, that is a byword among us constituency MPs for a lack of accountability and for being a frustrating body to deal with. That is not the right direction for the Government to be going in and I will push the amendments to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Jerome Mayhew]

The Committee will be pleased to hear that I am not going to reheat my arguments on clause 7, but we have not yet discussed clause 8. The arguments inevitably mirror each other to a degree, because clause 8 in the main seeks to extend the provisions of clause 7 to Scottish Ministers.

Clause 8 will grant Ministers in Scotland the power to issue and publish directions to GBR—so far, so similar—and GBR will be required to comply with those directions. However, the Secretary of State has ensured that they will have the ability to remove a direction of Scottish Ministers where it is inconsistent with her directions. The clause requires the Secretary of State to consult Ministers in Scotland before revoking and must publish any revocations.

The clause suffers from the same issues as clause 7, as I have already intimated: granting the Secretary of State, and then by extension Scottish Ministers, the ability to direct GBR, which is meant to be operationally independent. That is the first confusion. I will not rehash the arguments, but hon. Members should take it as read that I repeat them here.

As the Minister just mentioned, clause 8(7) will allow the Secretary of State to revoke a direction given by Scottish Ministers under that clause. That is confusion No. 2. We anticipate circumstances in which GBR has a direction of travel—that is not meant to be a rail pun—with which the Scottish Minister disagrees; the Scottish Minister issues a direction for GBR to go in a different direction, and then the Secretary of State disagrees with that direction and issues a revocation. What a recipe for confusion, delay and poor governance that creates!

Who is really in charge of the railways in Britain? It is certainly does not sound as though it is GBR, which is being second-guessed on the one hand by the Scottish Ministers and on the other by the Secretary of State. It does not sound as though Scottish Ministers are in charge even in Scotland, because they can suffer a revocation from the Secretary of State. Yet the consultation document tells us, as the Government have told us time and again, that

“GBR will be operationally independent, staffed by experts and professionals from the rail sector…who will be empowered to deliver for passengers and freight customers without government interference in day-to-day decision-making.”

When did that change? Perhaps the Minister can let us in to the secret. Clause 8 not only prevents GBR from being independent—as clause 7 does—but prevents devolved Ministers from acting within their own devolved settlements without being second-guessed by the Secretary of State.

I accept that the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Transport, Fiona Hyslop MSP, when speaking about clause 8 during the Transport Committee evidence session, seemed not to oppose that oversight, as she recognised that certain aspects, such as access and freight, remain reserved. It seems that Scottish Ministers are content to accept the clause as drafted because a further memorandum of understanding will create firebreaks between non-devolved powers, in which the Secretary of State may intervene, and devolved powers. That could be okay, but we as a Committee do not know, because we have not seen the memorandum of understanding, even in draft.

We are going to come back to this issue again and again. There are a plethora of documents designed to support the operation of GBR—to support this skeleton Bill—and yet we have not seen them. How can this Committee do our job of scrutinising this Bill line by line, seeking to improve it and to ensure that it achieves the objectives that the Government say it does, when 19 documents and counting—documents that are crucial to the actual running of the railway both in Scotland and in the United Kingdom as a whole—are absent, even in draft?

Bill Reeve, the director of rail reform for Transport Scotland, when invited to add further to the remarks from the Cabinet Secretary, said:

“An awful lot will rely on the memorandum of understanding to flesh that out and give examples.”

There is a question for the Minister surrounding this memorandum of understanding for Scottish and Welsh Ministers. A lot of the powers in the Bill seemingly rely on a document that is not part of the Bill. Will the Minister provide details of the memorandum of understanding prior to the passage of this Bill? If not, why does he refuse to let us know what the memorandum of understanding is likely to stay? Why does he believe that Parliament should approve a working arrangement between the devolved Governments on which no consultation has been undertaken?

I will speak further in detail on the memorandum of understanding when we reach clauses 23 and 24, but it is important that Ministers note that the current framework of the Bill relies on a document that has little oversight or clearly defined objectives, and which we have not seen.

[Keir Mather]

On memorandums of understanding, I point the shadow Minister to the fact that the heads of terms for the memorandum of understanding with the Welsh Government have already been published. On the overall principle on the development of memorandums of understanding, the stakeholders who gave evidence to the Committee were very clear that the process is being carried out in close consultation with devolved Governments and that it is very common for such operational documents to be developed in consultation in this way.

We are creating an operational framework by which GBR can function as an organisation. It is very important that that platform exists before the devolved settlements that will dictate the operational reality of how the railway works are layered on top.

On the shadow Minister’s point about direction powers, these are the same direction powers that exist, almost like for like, with Great British Energy, Great British Nuclear and the North Sea Transition Authority. They are there to respond to urgent and pressing matters. His points on overreach should have applied to the creation of those organisations as much as to the creation of GBR.

The factual reality of how the direction power has been used in the case of oil is that only one direction has been issued in 10 years. It is the Government’s intent—we have been very clear in saying so—that this direction power must operate in a similar way and only respond to urgent, pressing and persistent matters.

On the issue of direction from Scottish Ministers, the Secretary of State cannot revoke a direction if it pertains purely to a devolved matter, but Scottish Ministers did agree that revocation powers are necessary when there are conflicts in directions. Speaking from my perspective on how this Bill puts the devolved settlement at the centre of how the railway functions, there are sufficient methods to create accountability, mutual working and shared recognition of priorities and ambitions across devolved Governments, the UK Government and GBR, so that I do not envisage a revocation of a direction being used regularly. It is only there to ensure the smooth function of the railway.

Amendment 166 agreed to.

Amendment made: 167, in clause 7, page 5, line 8, leave out

“operation of a GBR-provided Welsh service”

and insert—

“exercise by Great British Railways of functions—

(i) on behalf of the Welsh Ministers in accordance with arrangements made under section 4, or

(ii) under a contract awarded under section 31(4)(b).”.—(Keir Mather.)

This amendment broadens the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must obtain the consent of the Welsh Ministers, where giving directions to GBR.

Amendment proposed: 14, in clause 7, page 5, line 9, after “publish” insert “and lay before Parliament”.—(Jerome Mayhew.)

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay any directions given to Great British Railways before Parliament.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Jerome Mayhew]

It is certainly welcome, but we are still in the position in which an improvement to a line—something as small as the Haughley junction improvement, which costs roughly £15 million to £20 million—still needs ministerial sign-off from the Treasury before it can be authorised. The Government have some way to go to improve the situation.

This will leave us with a stakeholder management culture. My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon is entirely right that many organisations in the 60% of the railway that is not being nationalised as part of GBR will be intimately and hugely impacted by GBR’s decisions—or will they? Will they, too, have to wait for the all clear from the Department for Transport? If GBR gets on the wrong side of Ministers or the Department, its course is going to be corrected to all manner of different ports.

The combination of clauses 7 and 9 removes almost any semblance of operational independence from GBR. Clause 9(5) states that GBR

“must have regard to guidance given under this section.”

That sounds soft, but in practice it creates a standing expectation of compliance and makes it impossible for GBR to make dynamic tactical decisions that are free from day-to-day second guessing by departmental and ministerial intervention.

That brings me to amendments 19 and 21, which would help defend the operational independence of GBR. If the Secretary of State is concerned about an aspect of GBR’s performance, they may instead issue guidance to inform GBR of its failure to meet the key performance indicators. Additionally, under clause 10, the Secretary of State may give guidance only if

“Scottish Ministers have drawn to Great British Railways’ attention that Great British Railways is not meeting a key performance indicator…and…Great British Railways has not taken action to remedy this failing within the period of two months.”

As a result, the amendments would apply to GBR in both England and Scotland.

Finally, amendment 20 repeats the argument made about directions or guidance given by the Secretary of State on the general level and structure of fares, and it would introduce new subsection (5A), which states:

“If the Secretary of State uses the powers in this section to give guidance to Great British Railways about the general level and structure of fares for travel on railway passengers services designated under section 25 or 26, then the Secretary of State must publish the assumptions, criteria, and objectives underpinning any guidance.”

That is self-evidently sensible, and I look forward to the Minister agreeing with me.

[Keir Mather]

May I begin by addressing the point about backseat driving? Following the shadow Minister’s remarks, I identified that this is something that we want to avoid not only in future but because it is the existing scenario that we inherited. Right now, under the old system, the Secretary of State is the only person who is really accountable for driving the system forward, and private operators spent more time employing people to decide who was to blame for failures on the railway than ensuring that the railway actually ran in the interest of passengers.

Interference in access and timetabling is another issue that has been raised. The reason why we have diffuse responsibility and muddled accountability in that space is because Network Rail and the ORR, which are two separate organisations, both have responsibility there but they cannot do it in a unified way, and therefore they cannot serve the interests of passengers. That is exactly what the creation of GBR as a directing mind for the railway seeks to avoid, and guidance within that system plays a very important role in removing one of the shadow Minister’s key concerns: an overbearing Secretary of State issuing direction to GBR. Guidance has been designed to create an iterative process by which GBR can enter into a dialogue with the Secretary of State to talk through and deal with common challenges.

The amendments seek to limit the ability of the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers to issue guidance to GBR under clauses 9 and 10. I am clear that the new system established by the Bill does not intend to involve the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers in ongoing or individual operational decisions. That is for GBR’s board and the thousands of employees working on the railway. Instead, the guidance power provides a mechanism through which Ministers can respond to overarching issues that might emerge. For example, if the ORR identified persistent failures in GBR’s performance against its business plan, it may suggest guidance from the Secretary of State that could help to support GBR to course correct, and to clarify the desired outcome without requiring more stringent action, such as a direction.

Further, it is not all one-directional guidance. Guidance will be a flexible tool designed to support Great British Railways. For example, there may be instances where guidance is requested by GBR and is issued in a collaborative manner to provide clarity on the policy direction or shared objectives. I also remind members of the Committee that GBR must have regard to the guidance—in other words, it must consider the guidance and weigh it against its other duties and obligations. It is not required to blindly follow the guidance in all cases.

Let me turn to the specifics of each amendment. Amendment 143 would limit the issuing of guidance to solely financial or strategic matters. In seeking to establish a hard line between types of decision making, the amendment would create a false dichotomy. Strategic and financial decisions are likely to have operational implications. The amendment could therefore inadvertently prevent the Secretary of State from being able to issue guidance where there is any operational impact at all, which is clearly disproportionate, given the potentially collaborative and helpful nature of the guidance.

Similarly, amendments 19 and 21 seek to prevent the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers from issuing guidance unless GBR is not meeting a key performance indicator under the Opposition’s proposed new clause 2. I have already explained why that proposed new clause is nonsensical. I reiterate that KPIs would be better designed and included as part of GBR’s business plan.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

We have debated these two clauses. We have made clear our concerns about the current drafting and have tried our best to improve the Bill through a number of very sensible amendments, the majority of which were supported by the Liberal Democrats. We in our turn have supported some sensible amendments proposed by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. I recognise that to vote against the clauses would potentially put a difficult hole in the armoury of the Secretary of State for GBR, so it is with a heavy heart that I do not oppose these two clauses.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Licensing

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Keir Mather]

On a point of order, Sir Alec. Before turning to the clause, I would like to correct the record. My Department’s commitment has always been to publish the draft GBR licence during the Bill’s passage, rather than before the Bill leaves the Commons, as I had said in oral evidence on 20 January. Before publication in draft, my Department will undertake engagement with stakeholders to inform the draft. That engagement will start before the Bill leaves the Commons, and I will ensure that hon. Members are involved in it if they would find that beneficial.––[Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 97, Q180.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

I echo all the comments made by my right hon. and hon. Friends. I also thank the Minister for facing up to it with a point of order. It was obvious last week that a point of order was on its way. None of us on the Opposition Benches will hold him to his initial, rather quick, response—no doubt I will do something similar during the passage of the Bill—but that does not let the Government off the hook.

This is not business as usual for a Department bringing through a Bill of this nature. My right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston, an experienced former Minister, gave two examples of primary legislation that also relied on secondary documentation. In those circumstances, the departmental teams did provide skeleton outlines for Parliament, which is what we are, to consider and do our job properly. I do not want the Minister to rush out a quick affirmative like last week, so I ask him to take time to consider, perhaps discuss with his officials, and reply later today on whether he and his officials are able to commit to some form of briefing—some skeleton outline—on the nature of the licence, at a time when we can collectively discuss and debate it, and see whether it points in the right direction.

Clause 11 simply enables GBR’s licensing to be set out in schedule 1, which we will come on to in a moment. That schedule amends part 1 of the Railways Act 1993 and sets out the detailed process by which the GBR licence will be issued and maintained. Both the Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road will retain the ability to grant licences to railway bodies other than GBR—for example, open access operators, freight operators and other infrastructure managers such as the core valley lines in Wales. I know we will discuss the contents of schedule 1 and the detail of the licence extensively.

[Keir Mather]

Although we have had an opportunity to discuss some of the provisions regarding the creation of the licence—it being enforced by the ORR with powers that include giving GBR directions to escalate issues to its board, requiring GBR to create and publish improvement plans and issuing enforcement orders— I have heard Opposition Members’ points that they would like an opportunity to discuss those matters more closely and in further detail.

We believe that developing the licence in this way will ensure that what is published for statutory consultation is informed by the development of a stable legislative framework in which to scrutinise the licence—as we are doing now—and can be meaningfully refined and enhanced by a wide range of views. However, I take the point that the shadow Minister and other right hon. and hon. Members have made, and I am sure that we can have further discussions today. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

Licensing of Great British Railways

[Jerome Mayhew]

I beg to move amendment 109, in schedule 1, page 55, line 10, leave out from “may,” to “grant” and insert—

“at the recommendation of the Office of the Rail and Road in relation to matters related to safety and standards and, after consultation with the Passengers’ Council,”.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to get a formal recommendation from the Office of the Rail and Road that the GBR licence adequately ensures that licence obligations related to safety and standards are not compromised or undermined.

Schedule 1 contains the meat of what we have been talking about. It amends part 1 of the Railways Act 1993 to set out how GBR will be licensed. Paragraph 2 confirms that GBR should never be exempt from holding a licence, and paragraph 3 inserts new section 7B, which will enable the Secretary of State, following consultation, to grant GBR a written licence to operate specified railway assets. The licence must be in writing and will remain in force unless revoked or surrendered. Surrendering the licence will require the Secretary of State’s consent.

Paragraph 3 also sets out the process for granting licences to persons other than GBR. The Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road will continue to be able to grant licences to persons other than GBR to operate railway assets. The ORR may grant such licences only with the Secretary of State’s consent or under a general authority issued by the Secretary of State. Licences must be in writing and will remain in force unless revoked or surrendered. Surrendering the licence will require the ORR’s consent, much in the same way as it previously required the Secretary of State’s consent.

Proposed new section 8A sets out the requirements for the granting of licences by the Secretary of State or the ORR. It provides that a notice must be published outlining the intention to grant a licence, the reasons for doing so, and allowing at least 28 days from the date of publication for interested parties to make representations or objections. There is a duty to consider representations or objections made within the period specified in the notice.

Proposed new section 8B gives the Secretary of State the power to set rules for how licence applications must be made. Among other things, that includes the format of the application, the fee payable—different fees may apply—and the requirements for publishing the application. Before making any regulations, the Secretary of State must consult the ORR. Any fees collected by either the Secretary of State or the ORR in connection with licence applications must be paid to the consolidated fund.

Paragraph 4 clarifies that a licence granted to GBR may specify when the authorisation it provides takes effect. It allows the licence to include a start date or a mechanism for determining it. Paragraph 5 provides that the licence granted to GBR may include a condition requiring it to comply with the provisions set out in separate document that is prepared by the ORR and approved by the Secretary of State. It might be something such as a code of practice—one of these operating documents that we have been talking about so much—and it may relate to the sale of tickets by GBR or third parties, or to services that GBR provides to the rail industry to facilitate railway operations that are of particular interest to the independent retail sector. The paragraph makes it clear that an approved document may be used to regulate GBR’s behaviour in relation to the sale of tickets by parties other than GBR, in the independent retail sector.

Paragraph 6 provides that, before making modifications to a GBR licence, the Secretary of State must publish a notice explaining the proposed modifications and the reasons for them, and must allow the usual period of 28 days for interested parties to make representations. There is a duty on the Secretary of State to consider representations or objections to the notice made within the period specified.

Paragraph 7 clarifies that the ORR must consult the passengers’ council before making any amendments to passenger or station licences that relate to functions of the council. The ORR must also send a copy of the modifications to the council as soon as practicable. Paragraph 9 clarifies that any licence under section 8 of the Railways Act 1993 that was in force immediately before the changes made by the schedule come into force will remain so, per the conditions and periods set out in the licence, unless it is revoked or surrendered.

Here is the mystery of the missing licence: where is it? We have explored this at some length, and the Minister is going to go away and see what he can rustle up in the Department’s cupboard to point us in the right direction, or at least to give us the direction of travel of the missing licence. In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, chief executive officer of the Campaign for Better Transport, said:

“I think the licence will be critical. There are various references in the documents that the Government published to a ‘streamlined licence’, so I would be quite interested to see what that means relative to the current licence that applies to Network Rail. I think the Government are going to consult on the draft licence, so we will all have a chance to look at it.

The other point I would make is one I made earlier, which is that the licence will be one of many documents the Government will produce in the next year to 18 months. There is the long-term rail strategy and GBR will produce its business plan. There will be the access and use policy; the new periodic review process; and MOUs with Ministers in Scotland and Wales. There will be guidance on partnerships with mayoral combined authorities, and guidance on the right to request full rail devolution. There is a huge amount still to come.

Understanding how the licence intersects with those other documents and processes is going to be critical, because between them they will add up to the set of arrangements that determine whether GBR is successful or not for passengers. We have to see the licence in the context of all the other things that will be guiding, directing and shaping what GBR does, how it invests, and what it does operationally.”

That is the experts in the industry repeating what the Opposition have been arguing repeatedly today and last week. More accurately, it is the other way around: we have been listening to the industry in a way that the Government have not, and have been expressing the deep concerns in the sector that the current proposals are half cocked. Huge chunks of the direction, guidance and memorandums are simply missing, including the licence that the schedule is designed to address.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the amendment, which is intended to prevent the Secretary of State from granting a licence to GBR unless the ORR gives a formal recommendation that licence obligations related to safety and standards are not compromised or undermined. The amendment does not specify what the ORR’s recommendations would need to contain or how it would operate in practice. The Government recognise the importance of effective regulation in the rail sector, particularly in relation to safety. The safety of our railways is a priority, and we will ensure that it is central to GBR, so that our railways continue to rank among the safest globally. The Bill makes no changes to the existing safety regime, which has proved to be exemplary.

In practice, amendment 109 would give an approval role to the ORR on matters relating to safety and standards ahead of the GBR licence being granted by the Secretary of State. It would confuse the clear accountabilities that the Bill establishes, which place responsibility for drafting, consulting on and granting the GBR licence with the Secretary of State, with the ORR then enforcing against its provisions. That aligns with the Government’s approach to regulation: Ministers set policy and strategy, and regulators provide validation and reassurance to the industry.

The Bill already requires a consultation on the contents of the GBR licence and specifies that the ORR and the passenger watchdog must be consulted as part of that. That will ensure that any concerns about safety and standards can be raised and considered appropriately ahead of the GBR licence being granted. The amendment would confuse accountabilities and add additional processes where they are not needed. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am grateful for Minister’s explanation, but I am not persuaded by it and seek to put amendment 109 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Railways Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Jerome Mayhew and Keir Mather

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

Thank you, Mr Western, and for agreeing to be in the Chair this afternoon. We are part-way through consideration of the schedule, with a degree of overlap: amendment 109 was selected in a separate group to this one, although its wording is intricately linked to that of amendments 110 to 116. I shall try to minimise the degree of repetition for all concerned.

The amendments in this group seek to constrain the Secretary of State’s ability to modify the licence of Great British Railways without first seeking consent from the Office of Rail and Road and the passengers’ council. The Government’s strategy is for the Bill to be the legislative shell for the creation of GBR. Crucial matters of detail, such as the licence under which GBR will operate, together with important long-term strategies, business plans, targets and so on, which we have mentioned more than once in our deliberations so far, are separate from the Bill.

That detail matters and deserves proper scrutiny by this Committee and elsewhere in the Houses of Parliament. When the Rail Minister and his officials appeared before the Transport Committee on 7 January, Members took several attempts to secure an assurance that the draft licence would be published before Parliament completes scrutiny of the Bill, albeit without a specific date set. It is therefore important to include in the Bill stronger checks and balances than exist now, and that is the purpose of amendments 110 to 115.

At present, the Bill merely requires the Secretary of State to consult the ORR. Legally, that is of course very weak and, after such consultation, the Secretary of State may simply ignore whatever it is that the ORR comes up with. Amendments 110 to 112 therefore require the Secretary of State to obtain the Office of Rail and Road’s agreement for the licence to be issued, and amendments 113 to 115 require the Office of Rail and Road’s agreement for the licence to be modified.

In addition, modification of the licence requirements would need consent from the new passenger watchdog. If the passenger watchdog is to be as powerful in championing the interests of passengers as the Government claim they want it to be, it requires proper powers that go beyond an invitation to be consulted. That leads me to amendment 118, which would leave out line 6 on page 56 of the Bill and would strengthen the right of the ORR to grant a licence to a non-GBR operator.

The schedule contains important powers for the Office of Rail and Road to issue licences to operators other than GBR to operate services on the network. However, proposed new section 8(5)(a) in paragraph 3 of the schedule gives the trump card to the Secretary of State, who must consent to the granting of such a licence. Why is that power of veto required? Perhaps the Minister will explain when he responds.

If the Government wish to reduce their involvement in the day-to-day running of the railways and the Office of Rail and Road deems that an application from a non-GBR operator meets all the requirements and conditions set out in the Bill, why do the Government think it necessary to have that overriding power? It does not appear to make sense. Amendment 118 would remove that power of veto. The group of amendments, together, would require the Secretary of State to obtain a formal recommendation from the Office of Rail and Road, and would require that the GBR licence adequately ensures that licence obligations relating to safety and standards are not compromised or undermined. The amendments would ensure that, as GBR is granted new responsibilities by the licence, it continues to be subject to safety standards obligations that are in the licence issued by the Office of Rail and Road to the current infrastructure manager, Network Rail.

Such licence obligations go beyond obligations under the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006—which are called ROGS for obvious reasons—and would require Great British Railways to participate in the industry’s collaborative structures around collective decision making, managed by the Rail Safety and Standards Board, and comply with safety and interoperability standards set collectively by the sector, including for freight and supply chain.

For those reasons, this group of amendments, taken as a whole, would provide important strengthening of the role of the ORR. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)]

May I begin, Mr Western, by saying what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairship? I thank the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham for tabling this group of amendments. I shall discuss amendment 233 with amendments 110 to 112, which I believe all share the same intent. Provisions to require the agreement of the ORR and the passenger watchdog before the Secretary of State issues the GBR licence would add an additional and unnecessary level of bureaucracy. If the amendments intend to ensure that the ORR and the passenger watchdog can constructively input into the licence, I assure the hon. Member that the Bill already requires the Secretary of State to consult the ORR and the passenger watchdog, and to invite representations more widely, before the licence is issued. If the amendments were accepted, it would no longer be clear who had the right to determine the terms of the licence. It is only appropriate that, following full consultation, the Secretary of State, as the licensing authority, has the sole final sign-off of the licence. The ORR will then, of course, enforce that licence. That is consistent with the clear accountabilities that the Bill establishes. We therefore cannot support the amendments.

On amendments 113 to 116, GBR will not need to apply for a licence, therefore the amendments’ provisions would apply only in relation to non-GBR licences. In any case, the amendments would add unnecessary complexity to the process for making licence application regulations. The amendments also intend to give an approval role to the ORR and the passenger watchdog in relation to modifications of GBR’s licence. The Bill already requires those bodies to be consulted before the Secretary of State modifies GBR’s licence. Again, requiring approval rather than consultation would risk confusing the clear accountabilities that the Bill establishes.

Amendment 118 seeks to strengthen the ORR’s ability to grant non-GBR licences. Under the Railways Act 1993, all licences are granted by the ORR with the consent of the Secretary of State. In practice, that consent is normally given in advance through a general authority, avoiding the need for case-by-case approval. The Bill does not change that aspect of the licensing regime. Removing the provision for specific Secretary of State consent, as the amendment intends, would not meaningfully strengthen the ORR’s ability to grant non-GBR licences. Non-GBR licences could still only be granted within the scope of a general authority approved by the Secretary of State.

In fact, the amendment would remove a useful route that enables the ORR to issue a licence outside the scope of a general authority or in circumstances where amending a general authority would not be practical. Far from strengthening the ORR’s ability to issue non-GBR licences, the amendment would instead likely weaken it.

Finally, amendment 126 would require the ORR to agree to GBR’s business plan before it is approved. I agree that the ORR provides invaluable input as an expert, independent regulator and it must have a robust role in the determination of GBR’s business plans. That is why the Bill gives it an explicit role to run the funding process, provide advice on the business plan and validate the costs within it, and independently publish its advice, whether that advice is supportive or critical of GBR.

However, it is not appropriate for the ORR, an unelected body, to decide how public money is allocated to the railway. Public spending decisions at this level should sit with elected Ministers who are responsible for funding the railway. I hope the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham can see this Government’s commitment to a robust and independent role for the ORR, but it is clear that the ORR can fulfil its role assuring the business plan without needing to be a funding approver to do so.

Further, the ORR will have an expanded monitoring role though the powers in the Bill, being able to monitor all GBR’s activities against its business plan. If GBR does not deliver on its plans, the ORR will be able to publish its findings, as well as escalating the matter to the Secretary of State. The ORR will be a trusted expert adviser to the Secretary of State, combining the strengths of an expert regulator with the need for the Government to control taxpayer money.

I encourage the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham to withdraw the amendment, and not to press the others in this group to a vote.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I listened with interest to the explanation the Minister gave and his request that the amendment be withdrawn. I was particularly interested to hear him describe the role of the ORR as a “trusted expert adviser”. In my submission, when we have GBR as the player and referee in many of the areas it will be active in, with a designed-in conflict of interest, we need more than a trusted expert adviser to hold the Government and GBR to account; we need an independent regulator. That is exactly what the ORR currently is.

I intend to press amendment 233 to a vote and, dependent on the outcome, I will not proceed to press amendments 110, 111, 112, 118, 114 and 115 as they address similar wording in other parts of the Bill. However,but I will seek to press amendment 126 to a vote if we get the opportunity to do so this afternoon.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

Clause 12 establishes a new funding process for GBR that takes what we have learnt from the successes of the periodic review process today and applies them to the new GBR world. That new funding period review will not only provide GBR with five years of funding to carry out its job of operating and maintaining the railway network, but will create a structure through which GBR will develop and own integrated business plans, across track and train, that reflect its role as the directing mind for the railways. That five-year funding certainty will help to drive the best price for Government and the taxpayer, through lower risk and the benefits of economy of scale. It will also generate consistent, longer term work for private partners in the rail supply chain, keeping good, well-paying specialist jobs alive and thriving.

[Jerome Mayhew]

Clause 12 is an enabling clause. It is very short and merely refers to schedule 2, so I make no representations to change it and shall not seek to divide the Committee on it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

I thank the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham for tabling amendment 119, which would require the Government to commit funding for a five-year funding period at least two years before the period starts. I can appreciate and identify with his desire to provide certainty to industry, and agree with the ambition that the amendment presents to generate a stable operating environment for the railway. However, as I said in response to new clause 34, I believe that the desire to require funding to be committed so far in advance is misplaced. There will inevitably be changes to economic circumstances and new projects will surface. If there is no practical discretion, a settlement agreed two years in advance may be redundant before it starts.

I can assure the hon. Member that the Bill already accounts for the need to provide the railway with certainty and ensures that the funding process completes before the start of the next five-year funding period.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I heard what the Minister said, but it flies in the face of the evidence that the industry itself gives him and all of us about the need for certainty towards the end of a control period. All that the amendment seeks is certainty for two years at the start of a control period. How is he going to address that particular issue?

[Keir Mather]

It is of course our obligation as the Government to meet the concerns of stakeholders, whether raised in the oral evidence session or elsewhere. It is also incumbent on me to point out that we want to abolish boom and bust in the rail system. On the fear about cliff edges, as was acknowledged by the ORR in its oral evidence, in reality there is not a cliff edge when funding always tends to run over the five-year period. Five years is the basis for the decision process by which funding allocations must take place. It is important to take the oral evidence in the round. It is also important to note that the ORR, which will be running the process, intends to set deadlines so that funding is committed with time for the industry to prepare. The amendment is therefore unnecessary.

Amendments 129 and 147 both seek to prevent or restrict the Secretary of State’s ability to vary the agreed funding settlement. I assure Members that the intention of providing a five-year funding commitment is that it lasts for five years. The Government are signed up to that principle. I also agree that certainty for GBR and industry is beneficial. More funding will mean we can get the best out of the railway and encourage investment, innovation and value for money.

Putting a hard restriction on all change, as amendment 129 suggests, would not be proportionate, as the shadow Minister acknowledged. As he noted, there may be unforeseen circumstances that require changes to funding, either to provide more or to reduce the amount. For example, GBR may outperform expectations and need less than is awarded, in which case Ministers will need to recoup the costs for the taxpayer, and can choose to do so in whatever way they see fit.

[Keir Mather]

Indeed! The operating environment may also change and GBR may need more funding than is committed. It is right that elected Ministers are able to make decisions on public spending and allocate resources as needed, balanced against the clear benefits of certainty.

Amendment 147 would restrict Ministers’ ability to vary funding by adding a requirement that the ORR must provide written consent. Although the Office of Rail and Road will have an important advisory role, it would not be appropriate for it to entirely determine changes to funding. Responsibility for decisions of public expenditure must remain with the Secretary of State, particularly where changes may be required due to wider fiscal circumstances. The amendment would also result in ORR consent being needed for increases in funding and immaterial changes.

The Bill provides assurances. If the Secretary of State considers that the impact of a funding reduction could be material, the Bill requires her to notify the ORR, giving it an opportunity to comment publicly on the likely effects on the railway. That balances the need for the Government to retain control over Government funding with the opportunity for independent evaluation and, if needed, public pressure, to protect certainty for the railway.

On amendments 215 and 216, I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for so ably setting out, based on his practical experience, and far better than I ever could, the need for a single guiding mind for the railway. His explanation was buttressed by the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston. I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for his amendments, which seek to align passenger service funding within the five-year infrastructure funding cycle. I support that intention. The Government agree that many benefits are derived from integrated funding streams. However, I do not agree that the amendments are necessary.

It is important to note that passenger services are already fully considered under GBR’s statutory duties and through the integrated business plan, in which GBR will plan all its activities on a five-year basis across track and train. The Bill requires GBR to deliver safe, reliable and efficient services, taking passenger needs into account.

[Jerome Mayhew]

GBR may plan on a five year basis, but it is not the same five years, is it?

[Keir Mather]

The shadow Minister is right to point out that allocation of funding for passenger services, as opposed to other GBR activities, initially takes place through the spending review funding process. I am about to address his point, but I should say that the Bill contains the ability for Ministers to extend the five-year funding process to passenger services once GBR is set up and prepared to manage that. It would not be responsible to do that from the outset when GBR is still in the transition and set-up phase. Ministers need to feel confident that GBR is financially mature enough before they can consider integrating funding further. I hope that addresses both the shadow Minister’s point and the contribution from the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

Respectfully, I believe it is more sensible to be prudent and cautious regarding the funding of passenger services, rather than risk creating a situation that a newly created GBR might not be in an immediate position to sufficiently accommodate within its operating structure. Erring on the side of caution, I encourage Members to withdraw their amendments.

[Jerome Mayhew]

As I intimated earlier, amendments 119 and 129 are probing and I will not press them to a vote.

I was interested to hear the Minister’s apparent position that there is no boom and bust, that the current situation for infrastructure funding is fine and that the evidence from the industry appears not to be—

[Keir Mather]

For the record, I said that we shared the aspiration to abolish boom and bust as it exists within the rail system. That applies to our infrastructure as much as it does to any other part of the railway’s operation.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am grateful for that clarification, but although the Minister may share that ambition, he is not choosing to do anything about it. Having said that, I said I was not going to press the amendments to a vote and I will not. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

The Minister wants flexibility, and he says that is why amendments 123 and 206—tabled by myself and the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage respectively—should not be agreed to. Will the Minister set out the circumstances in which he thinks it would not be appropriate for the organisation to focus on

“delivering improved productivity and efficiencies”

or on

“customer experience and satisfaction”?

Why does he need flexibility to ignore those objectives?

[Keir Mather]

No, I am not willing to say that those objectives, in principle, should not be pursued as a result of this legislation. The question is where within the Bill these things reside. If we are talking about short-term objectives relating to GBR’s operational efficiency as an organisation through, say, a key performance indicator, that is best placed within the business plan. If we want legal duties to ensure that we improve passenger experience or the reliability of train services, they are best placed as legal duties. There is a question about where we apportion the responsibilities and accountability mechanisms within the Bill. I do not believe that schedule 2 is the right place to be as prescriptive as the shadow Minister intends with those specific requirements.

On amendment 123, there is already a mandatory requirement in the Bill for the Secretary of State to obtain advice from the ORR on whether the activities that GBR is to undertake represent value for money. Unlike the list of potential objectives, that is mandatory. I also direct the Member to the assurances that are already in the Bill: there is a duty on GBR to make efficient use of public funds when exercising its functions, and a clear role for the ORR to assess the value for money of GBR’s proposed plans and to publish that assessment.

[Keir Mather]

The purpose of issuing advice is so that we can enter into an era for the railways where these discussions happen in a way that is far more commonplace than the broken-down patterns of accountability that currently exist. I therefore envisage the sort of adversarial situation that the right hon. Member suggests occurring less than it does under the existing rail system.

The ORR and the Secretary of State are both required to consider value for money when they advise on and approve the business plan. I hope that the relevant measures will show the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham that we are serious about getting the best out of GBR and provide him with enough reassurances to seek to withdraw his amendment.

Amendment 122 would specify that the Secretary of State’s statement of objectives may include an objective on increasing passenger numbers and freight. It would narrow the wording of the objective in paragraph 2(3)(a) of schedule 2 from relating to passengers and freight to just increasing the numbers of those things. I do not think it would be wise to require ever-increasing passenger numbers as an objective in itself. Different objectives—such as increased reliability, improved passenger experience or references to spare freight paths—might contribute to that overall outcome while being more important in the moment. Again, that should be for the Government of the day, not inflexible legislation, to decide. I urge the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham to withdraw his amendment.

Finally, amendment 206 proposes to expand the list of potential topics that could be covered in the statement of objectives, with the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage suggesting the inclusion of a section on customer experience and satisfaction. The current list in the Bill is purely illustrative, so Secretaries of State may in future add to the list of topics, and include just some of the topics or slightly different ones in their statement of objectives. I invite the Committee to note that the illustrative objectives already included in the Bill contain reference to the carriage of passengers or goods, as well as to fares and accessibility—all matters that are important to passenger experience—so it is unclear what more would be achieved through the amendment, which would simply add a further example to the list.

Furthermore, the Bill contains a duty for the Secretary of State and GBR to exercise the functions in the manner best calculated to promote the interests of the users and potential users of railway passenger services. Unlike the list of potential objectives, that duty is intended to be mandatory. I hope that demonstrates to the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage that we consider passenger experience to be absolutely central to GBR’s objectives, and provides him with enough comfort not to press his amendment.

[Jerome Mayhew]

We have heard with interest what the Minister has to say, but I am wholly unpersuaded that he is adequately reflecting the needs of the industry, so I will seek to press amendment 120 to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

We now turn to paragraph 4 of schedule 2, which deals with the business plan and approval by the Secretary of State.

To receive public funding under paragraph 4, GBR is required to include in its business plan an explanation of how it will meet the objectives set by the Secretary of State. Amendment 124 seeks to strengthen this obligation by requiring GBR to set meaningful KPIs against which its performance and meeting its statutory duties—as set out in clause 18, which we will come to in a bit—can be measured. We had the saga of the missing licence; now we have the saga of the missing KPIs—and 19 other documents. This is important, given the absence of any direction from the Government on KPIs, despite being repeatedly requested on the Floor of the House over a number of months. The only response from the Government as a result of that probing is that they will be “robust”, whatever that means, hence the need for amendment 124.

Amendments 125 to 128 would strengthen GBR’s focus on minimising the cost to the taxpayer and increasing the role of the Office of Rail and Road to make sure that that happens. Amendment 125 would require an express focus on how plans will minimise costs to the taxpayer, which is too often overlooked—the Bill makes hardly any reference to value for money. The taxpayer is ignored entirely. This amendment would make it a legal requirement to address that and would—under the maxim that “you get what you measure”—drive behaviour.

Amendment 127 would require the Office of Rail and Road to provide an assessment of whether GBR’s plans to minimise costs to the taxpayer are, in fact, likely to do so. That would be undertaken before the Office of Rail and Road approves the business plan. Again, this is about driving behaviour through focus and making sure that the taxpayer is not forgotten in the deliberations between nationalised Great British Railways and civil servants at the Department for Transport.

Finally, amendment 128 would require GBR to publish its full business plan, save for commercially sensitive sections, which they should of course have a carve-out from displaying to their potential competitors—although most of their competitors have been designed out under the wording of the Bill. Amendment 128 would welcome transparency, which—given the huge amount of public funding that the organisation currently requires and no doubt will continue to require—is necessary, so that the public can see how their money is being spent, and whether the organisation is focused on driving down the cost to the taxpayer and driving up value for money.

I commend all the amendments to the Minister.

[Keir Mather]

I thank the hon. Member for the amendments, which seek to add requirements to the production of GBR’s business plan and the ORR’s advice on that plan. However, on the subject of the publishing of advice, I briefly return to a question that was put to me by the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston. I feel that I was unnecessarily circumspect in the answer that I gave him, and it did not reflect the incisive nature of his question, which was about a mandatory requirement that exists in the Bill for the Secretary of State to obtain advice from the ORR on whether the activities of GBR represent value for money, and whether or not that advice can be published. I tell him that the ORR must publish a summary of that advice, and it can publish the advice in full. Although I do not wish to predict the future, I expect that it will likely to so, as part of its work in holding the Government to account. I hope that that is a full answer for the right hon. Member.

[Keir Mather]

Committees move in mysterious ways—that is all I will say.

I will take each amendment in the group in turn, starting with amendment 124, which would require GBR to develop key performance indicators for each of its statutory duties. I am sure the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham will agree that KPIs should be realistic and measurable, so they would also need to be grounded in the specific proposals for what GBR intends to deliver over the next five years. They also need to be allowed to evolve over time, to ensure that they are most relevant to GBR’s planned delivery and can be effectively used to track GBR’s progress.

The way an indicator is set out can influence how an organisation behaves, and we should be able to refine them over the course of several funding periods, to get GBR to deliver in the way that it needs to. Therefore, a more flexible process works better than fixing the nature of the indicators in legislation—and I give way to the hon. Member.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The Minister is a mind reader; I was just about to ask him to give way. He says he cannot agree to amendment 124 because we need flexibility in the future, but he will see that it refers to

“measurable performance indicators for each statutory duty listed in Section 18”,

so that flexibility would only run so far as any alteration to the statutory duties set out in his own clause 18, which GBR has no ability to change. The Government do not intend for there to be flexibility, so why does the Minister say he needs it?

[Keir Mather]

I respectfully disagree with the shadow Minister’s interpretation. This is about how GBR discharges those legally binding duties, and whether we should be overly prescriptive about the means by which it does so. It is important to have flexibility. Given the amount of technological change that we have seen in railway processes over recent decades, as well as socioeconomic factors and the need for GBR to balance those duties, we cannot be overly prescriptive about how we ask it to meet them—apart from the fact that it is legally required to do so.

I assure the hon. Member that GBR’s business plan will have not just a robust but a comprehensive set of KPIs against which it will be held to account. Progress against them will be tracked, and GBR will publish updates in line with the requirements in the Bill. The ORR will also monitor GBR and its business plan, and provide advice to the Secretary of State.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

I thank the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston for his contribution. He is right to note that the five-year funding process has a different period from that of the spending review. It is tested in the sense that the funding process for Network Rail works similarly now. As was acknowledged in the oral evidence from the ORR, there is not in reality a cliff edge through the five-year funding settlement, as funding always tends to roll over the five-year boundary, but five years is the envelope through which those decisions take place.

That is my assessment of how the process works; if I have failed to answer any of the right hon. Gentleman’s questions, perhaps he will illuminate me on what they are and I can provide him with a more fulsome response later on.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 2 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 13

Charging and terms and conditions

[Jerome Mayhew]

I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 13, page 7, line 22, leave out “as it thinks fit” and insert “as are reasonable”.

This amendment would ensure Great British Railways only charges what is reasonable for provision of services in circumstances where it is a monopoly supplier.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling amendments 22 and 23 and the hon. Member for South West Devon for speaking in their support. Amendment 22 seeks to require GBR to set reasonable charges for the delivery of its functions, and amendment 23 seeks to require the ORR to provide an appeals role for anyone who considers the charges set by GBR to be unfair.

On amendment 22, we clearly agree that GBR must act reasonably when setting charges and there is no suggestion that it will not do so. In fact, safeguards to ensure that GBR cannot levy unreasonable charges already exist in the Bill. Clause 18 requires GBR to act in the public interest and to ensure that railway service providers, such as devolved operators, freight operators and open access operators, can plan, invest and make decisions about their own businesses. When setting charges, GBR must therefore do so in a manner consistent with those duties, and it must not set charges that undermine operators’ ability to run viable and successful businesses.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The Minister refers to clause 18(2)(e), which states:

“They must exercise the functions… in the manner best calculated to be in the public interest”.

Can the Minister not see that GBR’s assessment of what is in the public interest could very well be what it considers to be in its own interest, because it is a public body? The provision would allow GBR to prioritise its own interests, such as the increased receipt of revenue from third-party operators, at the expense of the competition. That is not the safeguard that the Minister says it is, is it?

[Keir Mather]

I disagree with the shadow Minister’s interpretation of how the duties function in this regard. GBR cannot take a wholly self-interested, cynical interpretation of what constitutes “best use” under clause 60, which we will turn to in due course. GBR has to make a best-use decision that takes into account the needs of open access and freight. Also, under GBR’s duties, it must take account of promoting the interests of users and potential users of the railway, some of whom—even though open access constitutes a small proportion of the railway network usage overall—will be people using open access operators. Further, the duty in clause 18(2)(d) says,

“so as to enable persons providing railway services to plan the future of their businesses with a reasonable degree of assurance”.

Such persons would not be able to do so if they were being levied unreasonable charges.

There are supplementary safeguards that I will turn to. Existing competition legislation will also require GBR to ensure that the charges it sets are fair, non-discriminatory and not anti-competitive. The ORR will retain its enforcement role in consumer and competition law, concurrent with the Competition and Markets Authority, so it will be able to ensure that GBR is treating the private sector fairly. It is also important that, as a public body, GBR must be able to recover appropriate costs from those who benefit from the services that it provides. If it were prevented from doing so, the burden would ultimately fall on taxpayers and passengers. The Government’s ambition is to have a successful rail industry that attracts investment and can support its own costs, rather than unnecessarily relying on the taxpayer.

Amendment 23 would introduce an appeals role for the ORR on these charges. Again, we fully support the principles of fairness and transparency that underpin the amendment. For significant charges, such as charges for access and the use of infrastructure, the Bill already provides an appeals route to the ORR. However, an appeals route to the ORR for every possible charge that GBR may levy in relation to its statutory functions is clearly disproportionate. The amendment would require an appeals route to be provided even when those charges may be small, such as contributions to cover a railcard cost.

Clause 13, in its sum, simply ensures that GBR can recover the costs of managing and delivering services, such as back-office retailing services, by charging those who use GBR services, such as non-GBR operators or retailers. It is essential that GBR should have a clear statutory right to recover costs from users of its services. That supports the sustainability and efficiency of GBR’s operations, and ensures that taxpayers and GBR customers are not subsidising the operations of others. Importantly, it replicates how those cross-industry functions are paid for today. The Bill and existing competition law already provide adequate protections for third parties and a route of redress, should that be required. I urge the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham to withdraw his amendment and commend clause 13 to the Committee.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The Government’s defence is pretty extraordinary. What they are saying is that GBR should be free to charge unreasonable amounts—otherwise there would be no objection to the wording of the amendment, which simply seeks to put the word “reasonable” into the requirement. The Government say that even though this monopoly provider can charge as it thinks fit, there should be no specific right of appeal and that the other operators should rely on the CMA taking an interest or on wider competition law—in other words, after-the-event litigation.

We all know that in a business environment we can argue about the chaos at the end, but a business can already have been destroyed by a decision from a monopoly provider—on which there is no right of appeal and which could not be held back until an appeal has been heard. This is an absolute charter for GBR to run roughshod over independent retail operators, open access operators and even rail freight. It is with no hesitation at all that I seek to push for a vote on both the amendments.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

So here we are: this is the eminently sensible approach to providing funding for the ORR to continue its operations as a safety regulator. Clause 14 allows the Office of Rail and Road to require GBR to pay a levy to the ORR for performing its non-safety railway functions. That provides the ORR with a legally guaranteed funding source independent of the Secretary of State or Government. The provision aims to provide the ORR with a stable and predictable funding stream that will enable it to plan and carry out its activities. Those were remarkably similar words to the ones used by the Minister—I wonder why!

What I have described replaces the current system under which the ORR requires Network Rail to pay a fee for it to perform its non-safety functions via the process set out in the Network Rail licence. The ORR, as we all know, is an independent regulator, so decisions on its funding should be kept separate from organisations that have a vested interest in its decisions, which is why GBR, despite paying the levy, will not determine the amount. The amount is agreed between the ORR and the Treasury and then provided by GBR through this levy.

This is one of the few clauses through which the Bill is not actively diminishing the role of the ORR. Instead, it provides the ORR with a legally guaranteed funding source, independent of the Secretary of State or Government—save, obviously, for its negotiations with the Treasury. The aim of that is to provide the ORR with a stable and predictable funding stream that will allow it to plan and carry out its duties successfully. That duty already exists in the Network Rail obligation, as I have already mentioned.

I am glad to see from the Government’s explanatory notes on the clause that GBR will not determine the amount of the levy, which will be agreed between the Treasury and the ORR. It seems that the Government do understand the concept of partiality and bias, but are prepared to admit that only when it comes to certain clauses in the Bill.

[Keir Mather]

I thank the shadow Minister for his support—slightly barbed support, but support nevertheless. I have nothing further to add. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Rail strategy

Railways Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Jerome Mayhew and Keir Mather

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Hobhouse. May I begin by saying how much I look forward to working with all members of the Committee as we advance the priorities in the Bill and hopefully have a robust debate as we do so?

First, I turn to amendment 257 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Northfield. I also want to reciprocate his warm words about the conversations he has been able to have with me and the Rail Minister Lord Hendy on this provision. Let me reassure him that public ownership of our railways is what the Government are delivering, as set out in our manifesto, and that we are steadfast in our commitment to it. We are already seeing the benefits of bringing train operators into public ownership, with passengers being put back at the heart of the rail network. Passengers can now use their tickets on another public sector operator at no extra cost during disruption.

Through working with Network Rail, Southeastern increased capacity to popular seaside spots in the summer months. Since moving into public ownership, South Western Railway has more than quadrupled the number of new Arterio trains in service, directly benefiting passengers. Public ownership sits at the heart of the Bill, as my hon. Friend notes is the case in other legislation passed by this Government, to ensure that we gradually take our railways back into public ownership in the interests of passengers. However, I take his point that it is important to safeguard the legacy of these essential reforms for generations to come. I will take that thought away. In the meantime I encourage him to withdraw his amendment.

New clause 24 would require the Secretary of State to appoint a Great British Railways board to advise the Secretary of State on decisions taken in respect of Great British Railways, with representation from various industry groups. I feel that is unnecessary and would distort the clear accountability framework established in the Bill. To be clear, a highly skilled board that can hold to account the executive of Great British Railways will be crucial to delivering an improved railway. The GBR board will be made up of experienced people with diverse backgrounds who can be the voice of railway users. Where the Secretary of State is concerned about the performance of GBR, she will be able to raise these matters with the chair of the board. The chair will be able to advise both the Secretary of State and GBR’s chief executive officer on options for resolution and will be expected to ensure they are acted on, all without the need for a direction.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I recognise that improvements are needed for the drafting of the board were it to go ahead. He makes reference, however, to the board of GBR and that it will have a number of directors on it. In normal circumstances that would include a number of non-executive directors outside the main organisation. Will the Minister confirm that that is the intention for this board? If it is the case that external non-executive directors are anticipated for that board, could he go down the list in new clause 24(2)(a) to (f) and describe whether those are the kinds of organisations that might be represented in a non-executive capacity on the GBR board?

[Keir Mather]

It is my understanding that the process of appointing non-executive directors on GBR’s board will be followed in the normal way. I expect departmental processes to find a range of candidates with experience of both the private sector and public institutions, to ensure that GBR is an agile organisation that provides value for money for those who fund the railway and, most importantly, accountability through the Secretary of State, as well as having a mind to furthering the interests of both open access operators and the freight sector within the operation of GBR.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

Amendment 164 will enable the Secretary of State to appoint GBR as an agent to undertake certain activities on her behalf—for example, to manage outstanding contractual arrangements associated with the winding down of the franchising regime while the industry transitions to the new arrangements. It may be appropriate for GBR to do that if transfers of staff from the Department into GBR have already happened, for example. It would also ensure that GBR can effectively co-ordinate the winding down of franchises alongside its new management of services. This is a technical measure that supports a seamless transition of work and resources into GBR.

The amendment also clarifies that Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers can delegate their functions to GBR under clause 4, or enter into agency agreements with GBR if desired. That is already the Bill’s intention, but the amendment ensures that the Bill is clear and readable.

Clause 2 sets out GBR’s relationship to the Crown and the civil service, establishing it as an independent body. It will not be part of the Crown or act as the Crown’s agent or servant and its employees will not be civil servants. Additionally, the clause confirms that the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers will not be considered shadow directors for the purposes of the Companies Acts.

The clause is essential in setting up GBR and laying out how it will operate. I urge the Committee to support the amendment and the clause.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I enjoyed listening to the Minister read out the explanatory notes; we are all under no illusion as to what clause 2 stands for. The Opposition think it is eminently sensible—in fact, it lifted directly from the structure proposed by the previous Conservative Government for the draft Rail Reform Bill. Government amendment 164 appears to be a clarifying amendment to help with the dotting of i’s and crossing of t’s and we have no objection.

[Keir Mather]

I thank the hon. Member for his constructive engagement on the amendment and the clause.

Amendment 164 agreed to.

Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Functions

[Jerome Mayhew]

I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 3, page 2, line 15, after “sale” insert—

“by promoting a thriving competitive market in the retail ticketing market”.

This amendment makes Great British Railways’ duty to promote a competitive retail market explicit and aligns the Bill with the Government’s stated aim of delivering a system where competition drives better outcomes for passengers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

Of course, those independent retailers can continue to operate. GBR also has, as part of its duties—the things that it is required to follow by law—an interest in promoting the efficient use of public funds. We also think that there are significant economic benefits that can be realised through consolidation when it comes to aspects of ticketing.

As has been so ably pointed out, taxpayers and railway passengers are the same people. To that extent, people being taken in different directions by a vast variety of ticketing apps, not being able to realise the potential savings that are in place, does them a disservice economically. We believe that consolidation can offer them a smoother experience of ticketing and, hopefully, access to benefits that otherwise they might not be able to realise.

To return to the code of practice, it will be fully consulted on before its introduction, so it would not be appropriate for the Bill to pre-empt the specific provisions that it will contain. However, I can confirm to the Committee that the principles I have set out today, which I believe are consistent with some of the concerns that amendments 2 and 117 and new clause 3 seek to address, will very much guide ongoing work in this area.

On that point, I turn back to one of the comments made by the Opposition spokesperson about his concern regarding the setting of fares. I would like to make clear to him that it is not for the Secretary of State to interfere in day-to-day fare decisions. The Secretary of State will be limited to setting high-level strategic parameters to ensure that fares remain affordable for passengers and sustainable for taxpayers. GBR will make all of the operational decisions within those parameters and changes to those parameters would occur only to reflect GBR’s financial settlement, or in exceptional circumstances. That is, in my view, a necessary and proportionate safeguard to protect passengers, taxpayers and Government money. Therefore, as we are already taking significant and sufficient steps to deliver what the amendment envisages, so I urge the hon. Member to withdraw it.

I turn now to new clause 9 an amendments 131 and 132, which are dependent on it. New clause 9 would mandate the publication of a report covering various elements of GBR’s fares, ticketing and retail functions. Many of the items that this report would be required to cover relate to affordable and accessible rail travel—causes to which the Government are steadfastly committed. Affordability for passengers will be a key consideration when the Secretary of State sets strategic parameters and guardrails for GBR to follow on fares. As the Committee is by now aware, the Bill ensures continued statutory protection for concessionary discounts for young, older and disabled passengers.

Elsewhere, new clause 9 covers matters such as tap-in, tap-out payment and integrated ticketing, as well as third-party retailers’ access to systems and products. On integrated ticketing, we are already working with local authorities to integrate rail with local transport modes—and to trial or expand pay-as-you-go travel where appropriate. We are also progressing evaluations of how different pay-as-you-go schemes impact passengers, and the final reports will be published in due course. This work, which has not required additional legislation, is consistent with the ambition set out in various parts of new clause 9.

In summary, a legislative requirement to publish the envisaged report is not needed to deliver the outcomes that we want to see going forward. With that reassurance, I hope that the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage will agree not to press new clause 9 to a vote. Amendments 131 and 132 are dependent on new clause 9 and, for the reasons set out, the Government do not believe the report that new clause 9 would require is necessary, so I hope that the hon. Member will also agree not to press these amendments.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I have great respect for the Minister and I hear with interest what he said, but I am not convinced that the sector will receive sufficient reassurance from that, so I intend to push the amendment to a vote. Perhaps others, subsequently, as well, but we will deal with those later.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Railways Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Jerome Mayhew and Keir Mather

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Alec. I thank hon. Members for the amendments and new clauses in the group. Before I turn to amendments 3 and 4, however, I will pick up on a point made by the hon. Member for South West Devon earlier about people across the country having an understanding of GBR and its functions, and knowing how it will impact the railway and their lives. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, has consistently given the statistic that 60% of functions on the railway will still be done by the private sector, once GBR is established—

[Jerome Mayhew]

To clarify, that figure is about not just the private sector, but rail services in Scotland and Wales not being part of GBR. It is the non-GBR parts of the greater rail world: about 60% are nothing to do with GBR.

[Keir Mather]

I thank the shadow Minister for that clarification. I want only to add, as a further clarification, that in the future GBR will account for about two thirds of passenger services in Britain, and GBR infrastructure will make up 90% of station stops. It is quite important to give that level of context, so that people can better understand the impact that these changes in the railway will have on their lives.

Amendments 3 and 4 would limit GBR’s research, advice and standards development functions to only the railway and services managed by GBR. I reassure the shadow Minister that the vast majority of research and innovation carried out by GBR will relate specifically to the services that it provides and the operation and maintenance of its network.

However, research, development and innovation tend to be general in nature and application. It is critical that GBR’s research, development and innovation should be able to support the wider rail network, not just the elements that GBR manages itself. Collaboration between the independent parts of the sector on learning and innovation is, we argue, crucial for the rail network to operate as an integrated whole, and limiting this function could arbitrarily restrain wider adoption of best practice. Various organisations, including Network Rail and train operating companies, currently publish standards adopted on the railway, so this is not a unique or abnormal practice. However, these amendments could arbitrarily constrain it and might even hinder GBR from supporting research that might bring benefits to parts of the network, or services, not managed by GBR.

Amendment 5 seeks to return responsibility for taking access decisions to the ORR. That is one of the fundamental questions sitting at the heart of our debates on the Bill. The amendment is contrary to the Government’s manifesto commitment to establish GBR as the directing mind for the railways. It would reintroduce the fragmentation and conflicting accountabilities that exist in today’s system. At present, there is no single body in charge of taking a whole-system approach to making access work. That leads to conflicting opinions about what services can fit where and when. Differences in view between Network Rail and the ORR cause delays in producing the timetable, hindering efforts to tackle congestion, disruption, cancellations and overcrowding. The current system is not fit for purpose: it lets passengers down every day, and taxpayers are not getting value for money.

In the current system, the absence of a single directing mind, with a single set of objectives, leaves us with ridiculous situations such as the recent 7 am Manchester service that was set to travel with no passengers on it. I do not understand how hon. Members can think that continuing the current system benefits anyone, least of all passengers.

The Government have been clear that for GBR to have the space and authority to take access decisions consistent with the best use of the network, the ORR’s current role must change. GBR must be the decision maker on access; it must have authority and full accountability for what happens on the tracks. The ORR will play a key role as a robust appeals body that ensures that GBR’s decisions are fair. Without one body in charge of taking access decisions, we cannot deliver the performance improvements that we have promised passengers and the public.

Amendment 6 would remove the delegated power for the Secretary of State to confer further statutory functions on GBR in the future. Although clause 3 has been drafted to cover the breadth of activities that we expect GBR to undertake, it is responsible to legislate with proportionate flexibility. For example, in the future there may be new technologies or other responsibilities relating to the railways that GBR would need to take on. We heard in oral evidence on Tuesday that the advent of artificial intelligence and wi-fi are two examples of that type of change, and that witnesses understood the need for this type of flexibility for GBR.

There is precedent for this type of power in legislation. For example, the National Health Service Act 2006 includes a power to add functions to special health authorities specified in regulations. That power is already limited to adding new functions that relate to the railways; any regulations conferring new functions would be subject to the affirmative procedure, which would ensure suitable transparency and parliamentary scrutiny.

Amendment 241 seeks to require GBR to act

“in a fair and non-discriminatory manner”

when carrying out its statutory function in clause 3 —specifically, when GBR is providing back-of-house functions to facilitate railway services run by operators other than GBR, such as a journey planner. The amendment is not needed, because the duties set out in the Bill will govern GBR’s behaviours when carrying out its statutory functions. I assure the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham that the duties will require GBR to act in the interests of the public, taxpayers and passengers. GBR will act fairly and in accordance with its duties, not only when exercising this function but across the full range of its statutory functions.

In addition, competition law will apply in full to GBR. This requires GBR to act in a manner that is fair, non-discriminatory and not anti-competitive. Both the ORR and the Competition and Markets Authority will regulate GBR’s behaviour against its competition law obligations, so I hope that hon. Members will be assured that GBR must always treat all private operators with fairness and in a non-discriminatory manner. Given those safeguards, the addition proposed would be duplicative.

I turn to new clause 15, which seeks to implement a statutory electrification programme. Living near Selby station, I know better than most that rail electrification is important, including to realise the Government’s wider goals of decarbonisation. The hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage ably set out the fact that decarbonisation is not the sole efficiency and aspiration that can be realised through electrification. We fully realise the need to reduce the cost of electrification and accelerate the delivery of committed schemes in comparison with past experiences.

We are currently developing a long-term strategy for rolling stock and associated infrastructure. That will be published in the summer and will consider the future approach to electrification. That being said, a legislative duty to carry out an electrification programme is not the right way to deliver these important upgrades. In the effort towards net zero, electrification may not always be the right solution—although the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage made a well-reasoned case as to how, in many cases, it is. Other opportunities, such as trains powered by batteries, may be more appropriate. It is also hard to predict the pace at which battery technology and other alternative technologies will progress over the next 20 or 30 years, and what that means for the extent of electrification that will be needed as we move towards net zero.

[Keir Mather]

The right hon. Member makes an important point about resilience on the railway; it complements the points made by the hon. Member for West Dorset about the fact that we live in a changing climate. That creates pressing resilience challenges across the breadth of the railway. The right hon. Member makes a good point about not being over-reliant on one technological mode. That being said, I hope that, through an overall transition towards decarbonised rail transport, alongside the other decarbonisation measures that the DFT is taking across the piece, we will be sufficiently resourced, capable and in pursuit of innovative solutions to make sure that electrification can play a prominent part in the future of the railway.

We believe that the way to achieve that is to have something more flexible to future direction and opportunities, such as GBR’s business plan, which is already provided for in the Bill. Of course, the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy might be more appropriate as a way to set out GBR’s plans for electrification rather than their being in the Bill.

We move to new clause 20, which would require GBR to work towards climate change targets. I assure the Committee that the environment will form an important part of GBR’s considerations through various mechanisms already included in the Bill. One of the strategic objectives for the long-term rail strategy will be environmental sustainability. GBR will have a duty to have regard to the Secretary of State’s long-term rail strategy and a general duty to make decisions in the public interest, which includes environmental considerations, when developing its business plan. Finally, it is important to point out that Network Rail is not currently directly obligated to deliver on those targets, but has still published “The Greener Railway Strategy”, which includes targets on net zero, climate adaptation, air quality, biodiversity and other environmental areas.

To conclude, we remain committed to addressing the environmental challenges faced not only by rail, which is already a comparatively green way to travel, but across all transport modes, and GBR will be an important partner in that work. I hope that hon. Members have been reassured and will consider withdrawing their amendments.

[Jerome Mayhew]

It is always a pleasure to hear the Minister explain the Government’s positions, but I remain unconvinced in relation to amendment 241, which I believe is the only one that can be put to a Division at this stage. I would like to press it to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Keir Mather]

That is a very important point. I thank the right hon. Member for his contribution. The passenger watchdog will have the ability to make sure that GBR is compliant with minimum consumer standards on accessibility and information—this will be an independent power to directly monitor the passenger experience—as well as investigation powers, including to demand information by a deadline. It will be fully established within 12 months of Royal Assent of the Bill, so it will be stood up quickly to provide the oversight that it needs to provide.

The Secretary of State will also have the opportunity to prioritise the needs of future passengers through the long-term rail strategy, as well as her statement of objectives, which must be addressed by GBR in its business plan, which itself must be signed off by the Secretary of State under the new funding process. It would therefore be inefficient and duplicative to create yet another document to achieve the same aims.

Let me turn briefly to delay repay. The passenger watchdog can set standards that relate to delay repay. It is namechecked as an example in clause 46, and delay repay will still be available under GBR. The Opposition spokesperson—

[Jerome Mayhew]

Shadow Minister.

[Keir Mather]

Forgive me. The shadow Minister points to the fact that we have, in his view, a dearth of ambition when it comes to what we have set out in clause 18. I would actually argue the inverse—the standards set out in clause 18 relating to reliability of services, avoiding overcrowding and promoting the passenger experience are fundamental to creating the turn-up-and-go railway with a single directing mind that GBR seeks to achieve.

At the heart of it, these are the fundamental building blocks of the passenger experience. Layer on top of that the ways in which GBR will be nimble and dynamic enough under this legislation to lay out the passenger offer over time, and that creates a suite of measures that allow us to enhance, in the whole, the passenger experience. On that basis, I urge the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage to withdraw the amendment.

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[Keir Mather]

I will first address clause 3, and then listen to Members’ comments on the new clauses before responding to them in full.

Clause 3 is fundamental to establishing Great British Railways as the integrated rail body that this country needs. It sets out GBR’s statutory functions, which provide a list of things that GBR is here to do, fulfilling ministerial commitments to set out GBR’s purpose in the Bill. This is not just a technical provision; it is the foundation for a simpler, more accountable railway system.

Currently, responsibilities for managing infrastructure, operating services, setting fares and driving innovation are fragmented across the sector. That fragmentation has led to inefficiencies, duplication, and a lack of clear accountability. The clause addresses that by providing GBR with the statutory basis for bringing those functions together under one roof. It empowers GBR to act as the directing mind for the railway.

GBR will look after railway infrastructure, which includes maintaining it, operating it and making decisions on who can access it. It will provide railway passenger services, set and manage fares, sell tickets or secure that tickets are available for sale. It will provide services that help to run the railway and make it easier for customers to use, even when those railway services are provided by other operators. It will carry out research and development, support innovation, and publish advice and standards to improve the railways. Those functions do not limit GBR, however. The clause also clarifies that GBR can exercise company powers under existing law, so that it can act as a fully commercial organisation, and it provides GBR with appropriate operational flexibility by enabling the statutory functions to be exercised by its subsidiaries.

In short, the clause sets the statutory foundation for a railway that works as one system and is simpler, more efficient and more accountable. Without the clause, it would not be clear to GBR, or to anyone else, what GBR is here to do. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I do not propose to divide the Committee on clause 3. If the Bill is going to progress, then some version of the clause needs to be in it. We are doing our best to improve it; we have not been successful so far, but I have not given up hope—there is more to come.

New clause 1 is a purpose clause. One of the very obvious gaps in the Bill is that there is no clause setting out its purpose. It is based on a number of objectives, which are set out in subsection (1)(a) to (m)—13 paragraphs. Paragraph (a) sets out the mission that the priority in decision making should be the needs of GBR passengers. That builds nicely on the discussion we have just had.

With a nationalised organisation, we need to go the extra mile to clarify exactly what its focus should be, because it is, by design, a top-down command structure of the state. In a functioning—I stress “functioning”—competitive market, the market will force operators to focus on their passengers, because the passengers are also their customers and that is how they grow their profits. When we take the deliberate decision to move away from market competition, something has to replace it, and the only thing that can replace it is the legislative process. That is why the new clause is so necessary. The priority in decision making needs to be GBR passengers; although we can infer this from statements by the Government, enshrining the mission statement would ensure that it remained a beacon for the organisation to follow.

Paragraph (b) states the objective of

“delivering reliable, safe and accessible railway passenger services”.

I do not think that that is controversial for any of us. Paragraph (c) sets the aim of

“providing value for money for passengers and taxpayers, including consideration of the affordability of fare prices”.

With a state service, the public expect value for money to be the driver, to ensure continued investment and reinvestment in our rail network. At the moment, fares remain a key concern of passengers and taxpayers. The affordability of fares must be one of the primary objectives.

Paragraph (d) points to increasing passenger numbers and growing usage of the network. We do not want to see what happened during the nationalisation era, when service quality fell and people consequently turned to other modes of transport when reliability decreased. Keeping people adopting the railways, as we have seen explode under privatisation, is very important. That links nicely with paragraph (e), which would ensure that the network is continually expanded and improved, with constant analysis of service and connectivity improvements as well as restoring and adding routes.

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[Keir Mather]

Let me first pick up on the points made by the hon. Lady as they relate to devolution, which is incredibly important. We will cover it in more extensive detail later, but it has a material impact on the new clauses we are considering. She is right to point to the fact that mayoral strategic authorities are the lens through which GBR intends to play out its devolution work under statute. That is because we believe that mayoral strategic authorities provide the right lens through which to use the transport network—the rail network in particular—as a catalyst for economic and housing growth. That is due to the powers that devolved mayors have in that space.

I also wish to reassure the hon. Lady that GBR’s ability to engage with local authorities will go far beyond just mayoral strategic authorities. That plays into an important consideration about the structure of GBR as an organisation, which we want to be a lot more flat and a lot more concentrated on ensuring that it can make an important regional difference in every part of the United Kingdom. Through the business units of GBR, we will be able to facilitate that work.

What we do not want to do, however—given any future Government aspiration for more places to have mayors—is to freeze a patchwork programme of devolution into legislation in a way that does not allow us to work closely with a range of devolved areas in future. GBR will be able to engage in that work comprehensively with local authorities, irrespective of whether they have a mayor.

On new clause 1, which seeks to add a purpose to the Bill, I am pleased to say that it largely mirrors provisions that already exist. I confirm that the Bill already makes that clear through the combination of GBR’s statutory functions, which set out what we expect GBR to do, and the shared general duties in clause 18, which set out what we expect it to consider and achieve. Taken together, the functions and duties already set out GBR’s fundamental purpose.

In addition, the duties in clause 18 can already cover the breadth of the outcomes that the proposed new clause is driving at. For example, sector bodies including GBR, and the Secretary of State, will be required to make decisions in the public interest, which includes social and economic benefits. The duties in the Bill are those that will endure and should be at the core of any railway. Instead of setting out a clear purpose, new clause 1 would duplicate many of the provisions already in the Bill and actually make GBR’s purpose significantly less clear.

New clauses 2 and 5 would set key performance indicators for GBR and introduce a requirement for GBR to publish an annual report on them. I can certainly support the intention of the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham that GBR should have a comprehensive set of performance objectives against which it is robustly held to account. I disagree with him, however, on where and how those indicators should be implemented. The right place for GBR’s KPIs is in its integrated business plan, alongside the detail of what activity GBR will be carrying out over the five-year funding period.

There are three main reasons for that, and I also point to the fact that the arrangement is mirrored in other public organisations, such as National Highways, set up by the previous Conservative Government in 2015—its KPIs are not included in primary legislation. First, the indicators should be realistic and measurable, meaning they also need to be grounded in GBR’s specific proposals for delivery. Therefore, it is appropriate that the indicators are developed as part of the business plan, rather than in legislation.

Secondly, key performance indicators need to be able to evolve over time as the railway network and customer needs change. The way an indicator is set out can influence how an organisation behaves, and we should be able to refine the indicators over the course of several funding periods to get GBR to deliver in the way it needs to. Therefore, a more flexible process, such as that used for developing the business plan, works much better than fixing the indicators in legislation.

Finally, it is important that the ORR, in its role of scrutinising GBR’s proposed plans and monitoring GBR’s delivery, is able to assess whether commitments made by GBR are ambitious but also realistic. As the independent expert adviser to the Secretary of State, the ORR should have a clear route to influence the formulation of GBR’s key performance indicators. By keeping them within the business plan, the ORR’s involvement is ensured by legislation. Unlike legislation, the integrated business plan will also be updated, likely on an annual basis, and it can only be updated following scrutiny from the ORR and the new passenger watchdog, which in my view provides additional flexibility and accountability.

I hope that the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham can agree that GBR’s business plan is the right place to develop and set GBR’s performance indicators. Given my explanation, I encourage him not to press his new clauses to a vote.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am grateful to the Minister for setting out his defence of the Bill. The problem with his argument is that, because the Government have gone off half-cocked, the Committee is not in a position to assess whether he is right or wrong on the nature of the KPIs, or even on where they should be, because we have not been furnished with any draft copies of the documents to which he refers. In those circumstances, I feel obliged to press the two new clauses to a vote.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

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[Keir Mather]

Clause 4 enables Scottish and Welsh Ministers to delegate their railway functions to Great British Railways, a subsidiary of Great British Railways, or a company jointly owned by Scottish or Welsh Ministers and Great British Railways. That means that, if they wish, those Ministers will be able to take advantage of the benefits of GBR’s joined-up approach of bringing track and train together.

Scottish and Welsh Ministers must consult GBR and the Secretary of State before entering into any delegation arrangement with GBR, and transparently publish the terms of the arrangement. The clause confirms that when GBR delivers functions for Scottish or Welsh Ministers, it continues to comply with its own obligations under the Bill, such as its duties.

The clause provides flexibility and choice for Scottish and Welsh Ministers in how rail services are delivered in Scotland and Wales. It allows for innovative options, such as vertically integrated joint ventures, which can deliver the full cost efficiencies and performance improvements that track and train integration will bring to England, with opportunity for those benefits to extend to Scotland and Wales as well. This approach is in line with our manifesto commitment to deliver the benefits of rail reform to the whole of Great Britain and has the full support of the Scottish and Welsh Ministers. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I thank the Minister for his brief explanation of the clause. Under clause 3, the Committee was able to discuss the principles of the future structure of GBR, but clause 4 is the first instance of one of the open wounds that the Bill might create.

The devolutionary functions of the Bill seemingly reopen aspects of the West Lothian question by failing to provide clear lines of power between the devolved nations, regions and Whitehall. The elephant in the room is the future surrounding England and Wales projects. We know from the evidence we heard that the Welsh railway is very different from, for example, the Scottish railway; 80% of all rail travel in Wales is cross-border, so it includes elements of English travel, as we can tell by Labour’s recent announcement that East West Rail and the Hull to Liverpool lines are being classified as England and Wales projects. Some members of the Minister’s party in Wales might think that is a bit of a stretch at the very least.

The Government’s position has consistently been based on the fact that infrastructure is not subsequent to Barnett consequentials in Wales, and therefore should not be allocated to Cardiff Bay. However, the Minister’s own Labour party colleague in the Senedd, Cabinet Secretary for Economy Rebecca Evans MS, said:

“Wales will have missed out...as a result of the incorrect classification of HS2 as an England-and-Wales project.”

That was Labour’s position when it sat on the Opposition Benches, and it is seemingly still the position of the Labour Government in Cardiff. Is it still the position of the Minister and of Labour?

Clause 4 allows the Scottish and Welsh Governments to maintain their nationalised railway structures within ScotRail and Transport for Wales. It is prudent that the Government maintain their and GBR’s final say in these matters, as set out in subsection (2). However, much of the relationship is predicated on the memorandum of understanding, which is missing in action and is not explicitly established in the clause. It is important to ensure that the Government are thinking clearly about the nature of the relationship they wish to maintain with the devolved nations, as this framework will exist within the future memorandum of understanding—which none of us has seen. That will be particularly important should the Wales Act 2017 be amended at some stage, given that Welsh devolved powers are a live political issue. Will the Minister explain Government’s approach to future transport devolution in Wales, given his party’s comments on rail funding?

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[Keir Mather]

My hon. Friend echoes a theme that we have heard throughout this debate: that those who live closest to the railway and the service it provides know best about its operation, and that includes on a devolved basis. He also rightly points to a number of themes that were brought to light during oral evidence by the representative from Wales, who pointed out that developing operational understandings, as we are with the Scottish and Welsh Governments through the MOU, is an iterative process done on an operational level, and freezing it in aspic is therefore not to be advised. The heads of terms already exist for Members to scrutinise.

The Bill already enhances joint working, improves accountability and safeguards the benefits of an integrated cross border railway. The approach in the Bill will be supported by the memorandum of understanding between UK and Welsh Ministers, which will set out arrangements for co-operation on matters such as cross border services and infrastructure interfaces. This provides a clear and structured basis for engagement with Welsh Ministers without requiring the statutory transfer of reserved rail functions or creating additional legislative complexity and uncertainty.

The new clause would require a separate statement on funding for the Welsh consolidated fund. That is not necessary, as information on funding for Wales is already published through established mechanisms, such as His Majesty’s Treasury’s fiscal documents on spending reviews and block grant transparency publications, which provide clear and routine transparency without creating a rail specific statutory process.

The new clause risks undermining the integrated approach set out in the Bill by requiring changes to reserved matters that could weaken the coherence of the rail network. The Bill as drafted has the full support of the Welsh Government and preserves the existing devolution settlement. I therefore urge hon. Members not to move the new clause and commend clause 4 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Co-operation with relevant local government bodies

[Jerome Mayhew]

I beg to move amendment 232, in clause 5, page 3, line 37, at end insert—

“(2A) Where no arrangement between Great British Railways and a relevant local authority exists, the relevant local authority may appeal a decision made by Great British Railways affecting passenger rail services within its boundary under section 67.”

This amendment is designed to give Mayors the right to appeal GBR decisions to alter passenger services in their area to the ORR in the event of no partnership existing.

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[Keir Mather]

The hon. Lady’s comments speak to the advantage of an integrated railway with a single point of accountability—whether that be at the local level, or through an integrated business unit or GBR’s HQ functions in Derby. The reason for having integration is that accountability is not diffuse, as one single point of contact at the local level can radiate through the system to ensure that local residents get what they need. Beyond that, there are the duties that underpin GBR’s need to promote the interests of passengers as being both a national consideration and something that local businesses should have regard to.

Clause 5 also enables GBR to co-operate with relevant local government bodies, such as MCAs, by entering into formal partnership arrangements with them or by sharing information. The clause does not detail what the co-operation arrangements should be, as every local area is different, but arrangements could include local authorities funding GBR for additional services or enhancements beyond the national baseline. The information-sharing provisions can also allow for more integrated transport planning, for example, so that new bus stations can be located alongside new train stations. This provision enables GBR to co-operate with local authorities, allowing local areas the opportunity to genuinely shape the railway and have greater influence over services.

I have heard from many mayors and MPs that this is how the railway should work, and I know that a lot of members of the Committee have local priorities that the clause can help to deliver. In the future, GBR will be accountable for every part of the railway, and it should be able to do sensible business with every Member of Parliament to get the right outcomes for everyone. I commend clause 5 to the Committee.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I listened carefully to the Minister’s explanation as to why, in his view, amendment 232 should be withdrawn. He said that GBR will agree to co-operation with mayoral combined authorities. He also said that other parts of the Bill contain a duty to consult and a requirement to receive advice from mayors, but there is no requirement to listen to that advice. As a result, the decision-making power remains with GBR, not the regional area that is most affected by the decisions, which the Minister, on a number of occasions today, has already said is best placed to decide the needs for its local community. That is fine—if the Minister wishes to keep the word “may”, it is, of course, his right to do so. However, if the less powerful of the two people in the relationship disagrees with GBR’s decisions, they need to have some form of recourse to an appeal. For that reason, I believe that the appeal process set out in amendment 232 remains important and that the amendment should be put to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Daniel Francis]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Alec. As a Member of Parliament for a London constituency, and as a former member of the London TravelWatch board who understands some of the passenger watchdog issues in London, it is incumbent on me to speak to some of the clauses.

Of course, the GLA Act 1999 originally gave the liaison power to the Strategic Rail Authority, not the Secretary of State, and it was the Railways Act 2005 that amended the words “Strategic Rail Authority” to “Secretary of State”. Clause 6 will in fact put back the relationship that was there in the original 1999 Act, so that the actual rail operator, rather than the Secretary of State, has that liaison right with Transport for London.

Look at how the passenger interacts with some of those services. Some people living in the very northern part of my constituency—I have a very small part of Abbey Wood in my Bexleyheath and Crayford constituency—use Abbey Wood station, where rail usage has trebled since before the pandemic. During that time, we have seen the introduction of the Elizabeth line and the nationalisation of Southeastern, and the station has been transferred from Southeastern’s operation to Transport for London’s. Yet there are three different railway services serving that station: the nationalised Southeastern, the privatised Thameslink and the Elizabeth line, which is operated by Transport for London. There therefore absolutely has to be liaison by the operator, not the Secretary of State. Under this arrangement, Southeastern and Thameslink would come under one ownership, under Great British Railways, and with Transport for London.

Also, if my constituents catch the Bexleyheath or Barnehurst service to London Victoria, or to Denmark Hill, if they are using King’s College hospital, they will use a service that is currently operated by Thameslink but on a line that also has Southern and Southeastern services on it, as well as TFL services on the Windrush line. The liaison power should therefore be with the operators, not the Secretary of State. If we went down the Opposition’s route, we would be saying that that liaison should be between the Secretary of State and the Mayor of London. However, it should rightly be between the rail operators, given that stations such as Denmark Hill or Abbey Wood have Transport for London services, and there will be some stations operated by Transport for London, but some stations, such as Denmark Hill, will be operated by Great British Railways. That is where the liaison powers should lie, and as I say, that will bring us back to the original arrangement under the 1999 Act. For those reasons, I oppose the amendments and support clause 6.

[Keir Mather]

Let me begin by addressing the point made by the shadow Minister about the discrepancies in the system in Greater Manchester as it applies to London. It is not wholly correct to say that we are treating these two things inherently differently. The co-operation clause, which applies to all MCAs including Manchester, is new, but for TfL it is also set out in the GLA Act. To make this work for TfL, we have therefore to tweak the legislative system.

I thank the shadow Minister for his amendments 7 to 10, which together propose including the Secretary of State, alongside Great British Railways, in the clause requiring co-operation with TfL. Clause 6 requires that GBR and TfL co-operate on railway matters. That includes co-ordinating TfL and GBR passenger services and sharing relevant information. It will also enable GBR to work collaboratively with Transport for London to strengthen its local influence over the railways and support integration with other transport modes.

The railway responsibilities included in the clause, such as the co-ordination of passenger services, will be GBR’s, not the Secretary of State’s. Including the Secretary of State here would risk undermining the principle that GBR is the railway’s directing mind, and would widen the scope of the Secretary of State’s role under the new regime.

The shadow Minister will have heard the Government make clear commitments that this will not be a railway run by politicians. Clearly, the Secretary of State does not need to be involved in GBR’s relationship with Transport for London or in its passenger service responsibilities. Those relationships are operational ones and do not need political interference. I therefore urge him not to press his amendments to a vote.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation, and to the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford for giving his lived experience of the TfL area. I am partially convinced. I will not press this amendment to a Division, so I think we can move on.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

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[Jerome Mayhew]

I agree with the Minister’s characterisation that these are largely technical or tidy-up amendments. It is right to include freight in the duty to cooperate with TfL. I am glad that the Government have tabled these three amendments and we have no objection to them.

Amendment 165 agreed to.

Amendments made: 156, in clause 6, page 4, line 26, after “passenger” insert “and goods”.

This amendment and amendment 157 add GBR’s statutory functions in relation to freight services to the functions in relation to which GBR must co-operate with Transport for London.

Amendment 157, in clause 6, page 4, line 26, at end insert—

“(7) In subsection (3A)—

(a) after ‘passenger’ insert ‘or goods’, and

(b) after ‘passengers’, in both places it occurs, insert ‘or goods’.”—(Keir Mather.)

See the explanatory statement for amendment 156.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Keir Mather]

Clause 6 amends the Greater London Authority Act 1999 by updating section 175. This will update the current statutory basis for TfL’s co-operation on railway matters by replacing references to “the Secretary of State” with references to “Great British Railways”. This includes co-ordination regarding TfL and GBR services, and requirements to share relevant information. It also enables GBR to work collaboratively with TfL to strengthen its local influence over the railways and support integration with other transport modes.

These arrangements may include financial contributions from TfL to GBR for additional services or enhancements beyond the national baseline. For example, TfL could commission GBR to increase train frequencies on suburban routes, or to improve station facilities to align with the Mayor of London’s transport strategy. Information-sharing will also enable integrated planning, improving co-ordination between GBR services and TfL’s multi-modal network.

That approach reflects the Government’s commitment to empowering local leaders through statutory roles and supporting integrated transport solutions. This collaborative working will help to deliver better outcomes for passengers and communities by aligning rail services with London’s priorities. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The Minister has set out his views on this clause clearly. We have already explored the difference of opinion about whether or not it should be the Secretary of State and GBR that collaborate with TfL. However, the direction of the clause is an eminently sensible one and we do not wish to stand in its way.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Nesil Caliskan.)

Railways Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Jerome Mayhew and Keir Mather

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

Q You say that it fits with the description of what the Government want GBR to do, but from the drafting of the Bill we can conclude that the Government want GBR to be the final arbiter. There is no appellate course from a decision by GBR, except in an area of law. It is the judge and jury in this.

John Larkinson: That fits again with the idea that things go back to GBR to reconsider; it is all put back in GBR’s court. That is the fundamental design, as I understand it.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)]

Q Thank you very much for being here this morning. Building on the topic of access and charging, which the Opposition spokesperson raised, can you go into a bit more detail on clauses 60 and 63, particularly on best use of the railway and GBR having to have regard for a range of services in deciding best use? Only after that point does the capacity duty in clause 63 come into effect, to make sure that GBR delivers the services needed to run the railway effectively. Alex or Jeremy, perhaps, can you dig into the concerns that have been outlined that this could result in GBR taking more than what it is entitled to within the railway, and the reality of how the clauses ensure that that does not take place?

Jeremy Westlake: I will kick off by bringing us back to the duty that GBR, along with the Secretary of State and the ORR, will have to make best use of the network. Network capacity is constrained, so we have published an access and use consultation document setting out how this would work in practice. First, capacity allocation must be set out so that the market can see what capacity exists and what it might be used for, and to reserve capacity for those uses. Clause 63 then deals with how GBR will prioritise its services. The first duty is to allocate capacity for best use. Clause 63 kicks in later to define how GBR will actually do that. You define best use first.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

Do you think they have the balance right here? How do we drive value for money for taxpayers given those very significant constraints on competition?

Richard Brown: Yes, I do. I think the balance is right. Putting everything together into GBR makes it the single directing mind. It will be up to GBR and its integrated business leaders to strike the balance and deliver better value for money. There is a lot of duplication and friction in the current system, which I think is one of the things that Keith Williams was highlighting in his review.

The accountabilities are very strong with this Bill. GBR is accountable to the Secretary of State, but is also regulated and overseen by the ORR and the passengers’ council, and has a responsibility to mayoral authorities. First and foremost—I think this featured in the previous discussion—the integrated business units and their CEOs, or whatever they are called, will be accountable to their local towns, communities and passengers. There are strong pressures and forces created with this Bill to actually deliver value for money for taxpayers, as well as for passengers.

Keith Williams: Can I add one thing, there? Even in my time on the review, one of the things that started was bringing track and train together again. That allowed cost simplification, but it also enabled GBR to get a full picture of the revenue and costs of running the railway, which previously did not exist. It was surprising to me, on the review, that getting the costs together was an enormous exercise and a bit of guesswork, because the costs were in so many different areas.

[Keir Mather]

Q  I am conscious of time, so I just have one broader question about the devolution settlement, which is devolving services and how the railway works, which is mentioned in the Williams review, and I also want to go to Mr Brown’s point about integrated business units. Mr Williams, could you expand a little bit on what the operational reality of a more decentralised railway working in closer partnerships could look like under GBR? The Bill specifically focuses on mayoral strategic authorities as an appropriate unit to engage with to act as a catalyst for economic growth, house building and those things which are really conjoined with rail growth. Can you give us a glimpse of how you feel that the system might work in practice under the Bill’s framework?

Keith Williams: It is a great question, because that, to me, was fundamental to the better running of an integrated transport system. I was listening to the earlier questions, and the advantages of bringing in the mayors and local authorities are twofold. First, there is deciding what the appropriate mechanism for running transport is in their area. I visited Manchester, where you have light rail, heavy rail and buses, so you need to make a decision as to which you are going to promote. In my opinion, that was better done at a mayoral level than a central level. That is one aspect.

The second aspect is integration. We looked at systems overseas and—guess what?—you find that the bus comes to the station, the train starts and then stops. That did not exist in the UK, and bringing the mayors and local authorities into that decision making was hugely important for running an integrated system.

Railways Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Jerome Mayhew and Keir Mather

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

Q Mr Montgomery, will you say whether you agree with that position, as well as answering this final question? In areas of capacity and access, the Bill anticipates the Secretary of State being granted power to change capacity decisions and access agreements without notice. If that is the case, what impact will that have on the ability of open access operators to build a business case for investment in the future? What impact will it have on future investment?

Steve Montgomery: I agree with everything John and Maggie said. The challenge we see as a private sector operator is how you get anybody to invest in the industry with the lack of clarity in the Bill. As John alluded to, there is reference by the DFT in the memorandum of understanding on the Bill, but nothing in the Bill itself. That makes it very difficult to go to a board and say, “Look, we want to invest in these things.” What certainty do you have for the future?

An awful lot has been made of open access as we have gone through this process. It would take up 1% of overall capacity, but it is held out there, in the commentary, as one of the major plays in the Bill. We think that open access brings the opportunity for competition, which we seem to have lost with some of the wording in the Bill. How do we make sure that there are better services for customers? That is what we all want and what GBR is setting out to do, but how do we make sure that we all have a fair chance when bidding? We have talked about the access situation. GBR can decide not to give access, and the ORR has very limited powers to hear an appeal, so where is the confidence for the private sector investment that the industry continues to cry out for?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)]

Q Thank you all for appearing before the Committee. I will start by asking you a macro question about the provisions in the Bill. There are two fundamental protections for freight within the Bill: the freight target and the freight duty, and not just GBR but the Secretary of State and the ORR will be accountable for them. The consultation response published alongside the Bill mentions freight 100 times. There will be a freight rep on GBR’s board and a specific freight team within the organisation. I understand that you met the Rail Minister and had the opportunity to discuss some of the concerns. In the overall context of the provisions in the Bill, do you think that GBR, as it will be set up through the Bill, will have due consideration of the needs of freight and an interest in promoting it?

Maggie Simpson: We have been very clear that we welcome those provisions. We are grateful to the Rail Minister and his team at the DFT, and to your own team, for their commitment to freight. That is really good but, with respect, I have been around a long time and I have seen circumstances in which Secretaries of State and Rail Ministers have not been as keen on freight, or perhaps have been more keen on road freight and less keen on rail freight. We have seen situations arise through different political times and economic circumstances.

When I am looking at the Bill, I am looking at whether it works today, with a Government who are supportive of and promoting freight, and at whether it would it work in the future, with a Government, of whatever colour, who have a different view. We have to look at it through that lens because we legislate for the long term. It is really difficult, because you are saying to people who are trying to help you, “Actually, I don’t like this.” That is an emotional tension—of course it is.

The duties and provisions in the Bill are great— I would not want to be going into GBR without them, and I think they will be powerful—but they are doing a lot of heavy lifting. We are going into a very different cultural environment. GBR will think about its own trains first; it has to for it to succeed—that is kind of the core. We are going into a very different access arrangement and a very different set of parameters, and it is entirely possible that they could go wrong and that we would need the recourse of the appeal function. They might not, but we need to know that it will work if they do. Having a strong appeal function will help it to work, because GBR will know that if things do go wrong we have that recourse in law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

Q In other similar organisations, such as SNCF in France, the decision was taken to recognise the structural conflict of interest, and set up the retail arm of SNCF as a standalone organisation, presumably to prevent or reassure investors that there would be no cross-subsidising. First, do you think that would be a better solution in the United Kingdom? Secondly, if we got that through, could you explain or provide more details to the Committee on what impact it would have in real life?

I have in mind, for example, LNER currently being able to offer a full refund with one click on its website, and that service and facility not being made available to independent retailers even under the current system. Can you elaborate on quite how important that is for the independent sector? I would then like Catriona Meehan to come in with her views, too.

John Davies: When we talk about the need for the right kinds of protections for retailers, we are pointing at something that is not theoretical—these are risks that are with us today. You point at the example of delay repay, where independent retailers are prevented from supporting customers who have purchased their tickets through them by submitting their claims directly. It also occurs with things such as loyalty schemes, retailer inability to offer customers pay-as-you-go fares, and our ability to offer assisted travel. Independent retailers are not permitted to have access to a very significant amount of propositions around rail travel that are a very meaningful part of the market.

Catriona Meehan: I completely echo all of John’s points. For us, it is a concern that there would not be proper separation, which could lead to a degree of self-preferencing. You mentioned SNCF and the separation there, which is an example that we think works well. It is not perfect, of course; there are things that could be improved, but a colleague on the previous panel from ALLRAIL mentioned that EU markets are moving the other way: they are liberalising rather than nationalising.

It is interesting to look at why it has happened and why there is a need for it. FRAND principles were mentioned. We are also seeing that in other markets. Omio operates across 46 markets globally, so we have a lot of experience in other markets. Obviously, the UK is very important through our partnership with Uber trains, but we should also talk about the wider sector of independent rail retailers. Unless we have proper safeguards and assurances in place, we are not sure exactly how GBR will not self-preference. That is not exactly clear to us right now.

[Keir Mather]

Q Thank you both very much for taking the time to come and speak to us today. I suppose the existing system is that retailers rely on what is often quite a complicated web of contracts with the Rail Delivery Group operators and Network Rail to get access to the data and the systems that they need to operate. When things go wrong at the moment, your backstop is litigation, which can be incredibly costly and time-intensive for your organisations. In that context, would having a straightforward code of practice backed up by the ORR with an enforcement power be a simpler, more streamlined and predictable and less costly way to do business than the existing system?

John Davies: Yes, it would represent a streamlining of the system, but that is only true in so far as the GBR online retail function itself is subject to that code of practice equally. It is not clear to us that that is what is intended yet. That is something that we are working through with the Department and the ORR to set out exactly what that means. To the point that was made earlier about the parts of the customer proposition in the rail market that are not available to independent retailers currently, the surety of a code of practice would provide for what we characterise as parity of market access, which is not just fares— “Can we all sell the same fares?”—but features such as delay repay, services such as passenger assistance, and products such as loyalty. We should be able to have all those things on an equal basis across the industry: if they are good for one retailer to offer in support of rail travel, they should be good for everybody. In the work that we are contemplating on the code of practice, we aim to get to a place where no independent retailer or customer of an independent retailer is ever at a disadvantage in comparison with buying a ticket through what will be the future GBR online retail function.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

That is quite a significant risk, isn’t it?

[Keir Mather]

Q Thank you both so much for coming to give evidence. Mr Reeve, would you be able to speak to the overall level of working that has taken place between DFT, yourself and the Scottish Government? The most unlikely of advocates for the way in which this process has been developed is the SNP Member of Parliament, the hon. Member for Angus and Perthshire Glens (Dave Doogan), who said that

“the way that the Bill has been discussed with Scottish Government partners is the exemplar that other Government Departments in Whitehall may wish to follow”.—[Official Report, 9 December 2025; Vol. 777, c. 210.]

That is impressive, isn’t it? Do you have any reflections on how this process has been worked out in consultation with yourself and the Scottish Government and whether it might provide instructive lessons for how GBR might seek to engage on a four-nations basis once it is established?

Bill Reeve: It would be churlish of me to disagree with that quote, frankly. In all seriousness, the level of engagement both between officials, and between our Cabinet Secretary, the Secretary of State and the Rail Minister, has been, in my experience, the best I have ever known when it comes to inter-Government exchange. It has been a constructive discussion and a sometimes forthright debate, which is reflected in where we have come to agreement now.

You will be aware that it is the Scottish Government’s position to support the Bill as it goes through the legislative consent motion process in the Scottish Parliament—pending any amendments that might change that; I do not want to fetter the will of our parliamentarians. We have been encouraged by the level of constructive engagement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

Thank you. I rest my case.

[Keir Mather]

Q Thank you all very much for giving evidence today. Mr Morris, I will begin with you for the Siemens perspective. I have had the opportunity to visit your fantastic production plant in Goole, and your local skills work is also commendable. I take the point about the need for long-term certainty in the rail industry, not only on rolling stock, but on those infrastructure improvements. On what Mr Brown referred to as the “building blocks” that sit throughout the legislation, the long-term rail strategy will provide a vision over 30 years—longer than 10 or 15 years—about the direction of the railways, and the rolling stock strategy is being developed in tandem with the Bill’s progress through Parliament, on which I believe stakeholders will be thoroughly consulted.

Duties for GBR also exist in the Bill. One of those duties is

“to enable persons providing railway services to plan the future of their business with a reasonable degree of assurance”.

In a five-year business plan you may have fluctuations in spending to reflect fiscal reality, but would you say that through those building blocks, long-term certainty is offered to the industry, and GBR has to reflect industry needs and build a railway that is coherent in serving their interests over the long term?

Rob Morris: The short answer to that is yes, absolutely. The other elements that we have just discussed—on enhancements, and on rolling stock and the maintenance and funding thereof—are absolutely fundamental to that. I also think that the ambitions for the railway need to be included in that. Witnesses on previous panels have talked about freight and the target there. What we seem to be missing in the Bill at the moment is the ambition for passenger growth, how that will improve the railway and the levels of investment that need to go with it.

A good example of that is last week’s announcement on Northern Powerhouse Rail, where rail and investment in it will create opportunity for increased productivity— I think £40 billion per annum was mentioned. It seems to me that there needs to be a connection in the Bill between what the Bill seeks to achieve, and generating that ambition, not just for freight growth, but for passenger growth.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

Q Where is the incentive to carry on and accelerate that process in this Bill? Where is the incentive for GBR?

Malcolm Brown: I cannot comment. I presume it is going to be in one of the building blocks. My concern is that we have a group of people who are trying to design trains for a hobby, when we have manufacturers such as Siemens in the UK, which have global platforms for trains. Yes, we adapt and customise them for the UK, but we get all the benefits of the manufacturing experience of a global manufacturer with the economies of scale that that provides as well. We do not need bespoke custom-built trains in the UK.

[Keir Mather]

Q To conclude with a broad-brush question, if we set up GBR with the ability to have an integrated view of the entire rail network, especially on a passenger basis, as an organisation that has real buying power and long-term certainty about the requirements it needs, and that sits alongside a rolling stock strategy that has been developed in consultation with industry for the long term, specific duties on GBR to provide certainty to those who provide railway services and a duty to promote the needs of future passengers, which I believe inherently means having a rolling stock pipeline which improves that experience, does that not offer quite a positive departure from a franchising system that, to an extent, was the definition of boom and bust in its short-term thinking and the unforeseen consequences that could often arise in the system?

Malcolm Brown: To my mind, there is the potential there—there is no question of it—but without having visibility, at the risk of repeating my previous answers. You talk about consulting with the industry; there is a vast amount of experience in the UK rail industry. I am totally agnostic about whether that is in the private or public sector. I would compel GBR to use that experience to inform the decisions and the forward planning.

I have an organisation that is not as large as Siemens. It is about 170 people and I think about 60% of them are qualified engineers. We have more than 30 years’ experience of acquiring rolling stock and structuring it. I think we are reasonably good at it. I would say utilise the experience and expertise that is there. I am not saying private or public; I am saying use the experience that is there to, frankly, avoid reinventing the wheel.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

Q It has become very command-and-control, hasn’t it? It is top-down, but you are saying that it should be more bottom-up.

Andy Burnham: Yes, I think if you end up with a very top-down railway, it is a bit like the phrase I used to hear in the Department of Health: “You can hit the target and miss the point.” Is that not that the risk with the railways, if they become too much like monolithic structures? It has to be a bit of both. If you go back to the old British Rail days, I remember a thing called Regional Railways, which was very separate to InterCity, so that split has always been there in the railways.

What we are arguing for in front of the Committee today is to think of the railways in a more place-based context. Railways serve growth in local areas, and there are things that we can bring to the table to support the health and growth of the railways in the future. It points to a different partnership, but it is a partnership. We want the right to specify timetables, as it is legitimate for us to make those requests, and we want a stronger role over station access. Actually, we think there should be a presumption in favour of devolution. Rather than a right to request, the onus should be the other way around; there should be the right to refuse, which presumes that it should be devolved, if that is possible, but there is still a callback if it cannot be devolved.

There is a relevant recent example: the Access for All funding. The Rail North Committee has asked the Department to devolve the Access for All funding, so we do not get the situation that Tracy described a moment ago. Currently, that is not being supported by the Department. We submit lists of stations to the Department as part of our Access for All bid on a regular basis, but we have often had the experience that it comes back with a different prioritisation to the one we sent in. This is really granular, local stuff, and it is mind-boggling to us that you have an infrastructure programme for the railways, and then an Access for All programme at the highest level that is dealing with very local schemes at stations. It is a meaningful partnership, and we are calling for a devolved role, where there can be one.

Tracy Brabin: I totally agree with what Andy has said; it is about accountability. I do not think you could expect the Secretary of State to be accountable for the whole of the network. How on earth would they understand the challenges? At Denby Dale, all they need is a ramp, and those sorts of decisions should be made locally.

We are building three stations in the next year. Why are they so expensive? In Germany, I think it is £5 million a station, but here they are £50 million. In the ’80s, it was £500,000 a station in today’s money. Surely, if we are working together as a collective for the good of the nation, we could find a way that makes it easier—one where we are more agile in building stations, and where we are part of that conversation around services. Also, it is about where we get then get the revenue from, so that we have a circular pound—the one that goes into the washing machine and comes back out again on the other side—and can build more accessibility on more stations.

[Keir Mather]

Q I have a few more questions—and, Jason, these include you as well.

[Jerome Mayhew]

My apologies.

[Keir Mather]

No, mine did not either—it is important that we also get to hear your perspective, Jason. One of the things I want to hit on is accountability. One of the benefits of the Bill that Lord Hendy stressed in his evidence to the Transport Committee is that by having a unified, guiding mind for the railway, you will have hard-working people at GBR who will wake up every day and know that they are responsible for making sure that the railway runs in the interests of the British public, in partnership with people like yourselves. Could you take us through the current challenges in engaging with an array of different private sector operators and DFTO-managed train companies? What does it look like for the people you represent who are trying to navigate this bewildering system, and for you guys who are trying to drive high standards, passenger satisfaction and, ultimately, better economic opportunity for your local areas?

Tracy Brabin: It has been very difficult to navigate who is responsible for what. There is a lot of finger pointing with, “It’s them,” or “It’s them,” and trying to get a decision about who actually owns a project has been difficult. That is why I really welcome the leadership that Lord Hendy has shown in bringing together track and train and having that simplicity.

In West Yorkshire, the partnership piece of work was published last week. We have been seen as an exemplar in our strategic place partnership, where we brought together Network Rail, DFT, the TOCs, the shadow GBR, ourselves and all the partners to identify how we can cut through roadblocks. It has been incredibly effective. When the Mayor of South Yorkshire, the Mayor of York and North Yorkshire and I were working with David Blunkett on the White Rose rail plan, it was helpful to look together at how we could phase the delivery of the plan, how we could make it affordable and what was the structure of delivery. You can do that only when you are all in the room and all have skin in the game, and you are not blaming each other. I want to reflect on the relationship held locally by our organisations and myself. I think that is the way forward.

We also need resources, and I speak for other mayoral strategic authorities as well. I am blessed to have some very talented people—some of them are sat behind me—who help me with our rail plan, but not every MSA has that talent. Although people might be waking up to deliver better outcomes, they are not all sat in the regions. Having people with timetabling and infrastructure experience actually in the regions would also be a huge benefit.

Andy Burnham: The job of getting the railway to be more accountable has been the devil’s own job in my time as mayor. I am not talking so much about recent times, but certainly in the early days when we had the 2018 timetable collapse. It was only Transport for the North and the Rail North Committee that got underneath what was going on inside Northern and TransPennine. If we had not been there, I do not think the travelling public would have seen the change.

We were the ones who challenged Northern, when it was run by Arriva, to keep guards on the trains. We were the ones who fought to keep ticket offices open—the railway would have closed them if it had not heard our voice. We had to challenge Avanti West Coast when it was collapsing and cutting the timetable between Manchester and London—two major cities in this country—damaging our growth. It just took that decision without any reference to us. Recently, the Office of Rail and Road has done something relating to a ghost train. We constantly have to challenge these things. Without us, I do not think we would have a railway that has moved towards more public ownership and more accountability.

I think major culture change is needed. I come back to this point. My observation is that it is still not responsive enough to what local areas need. As people may know, I support Everton. I go to Everton’s new ground on a regular basis. So many more people are travelling there by train, but to the railways, it is like it has not happened. It is as though they are oblivious to it. They are not in the place with us, managing it and putting extra people on. The railway seems to be too dislocated from what happens on the ground. For example, Sunday services are not put on during the Manchester Christmas markets. That is the thing: you need a railway that is knitted in to supporting growth.

Finally, look at the evidence where we have more locally accountable railways. Transport for Wales is a strong operator, in my experience—it serves Greater Manchester as well. Merseyrail is accountable to the Mayor of Liverpool. It has higher levels of performance, I believe, although all railways have their issues. That is evidence that if you have more local accountability, you generally have a higher performing railway that is more responsive to what people are saying.

Tracy Brabin: Andy and the Rail North Committee have been holding operators’ feet to the fire not just for northern transport but also for the east coast main line where it goes through other mayoralties. So on accountability, I think coming from a mayoral strategic authority or a mayoral combined authority where all mayors across the country can hold rail to account—you are doing a brilliant job, Andy, but currently where else in the country is there that group that will hold operators to account? At the moment, it is only the Rail North Committee, but surely that has to be across the whole country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

Q It is not really the directing mind I am focusing on; it is having a level playing field where, for the first time, we are going to have GBR being the directing mind but also an operator. There is a direct structural conflict of interest in the design of GBR as set out in the Bill—that has been the evidence of many people to the Committee today—combined with essentially no right of appeal other than on matters of law. First of all, do you recognise that as a proper concern? Secondly, if so, do you think a partial solution would be to have a mechanism for appeal on the merits to an independent regulator—let us call it something like the ORR?

Richard Bowker: On the first point, yes, I recognise the concern. Secondly, personally I would look at clause 18(4) and ask whether we really need to have the capacity duty able to override other duties. As far as the appeals process is concerned, I can see why being able to look at a case on the merits rather than on a strictly legal basis would help enormously. If GBR believes that its access and use policy, its capacity planning and its final decisions constitute a good process, it should not fear that.

[Keir Mather]

Q Thank you, Mr Bowker, for coming to give evidence. Just the other day, a group of DFT civil servants were recommending your podcast to me, so you will be pleased to know that you have friends on the inside, at the heart of Government.

I was pleased to hear that you agree with the concept of a guiding mind for the railway—a unified body able to direct services in the interests of passengers. I want to point to the specific provisions in the Bill that relate specifically to passenger experience. One of GBR’s duties is to promote the interests of users and potential users of the railway, including those with disabilities, and clause 18(3) talks about having reliable services, and the avoidance and mitigation of passenger overcrowding. Does what is contained within the legally binding duties on GBR reflect the overall aspiration to have a unified railway with the passenger at its heart?

Richard Bowker: Yes, I think it does. There is a danger in being overly prescriptive about how you do those things, but the duties are fairly widely drafted, and they probably do do that. Much of this will depend not so much on what the Bill says GBR’s duties are; they are pretty clear and comprehensive. It is about how it is then structured to go on and do these things. Previous panel members talked about culture and behaviour, and those are really important. So, yes, I think the duties are broadly fine.

Airport Drop-off Charges

Debate between Jerome Mayhew and Keir Mather

Tuesday 13th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Keir Mather]

I thank my hon. Friend for that contribution.

In the time remaining, I want to turn to the actual operating model of these parking charges. Most UK airports are privately operated and have the commercial freedom to set their own fees for the services they provide, but the Government expect fees to be set in a way that is both fair and proportionate. Well-designed parking facilities help to manage traffic flows and improve accessibility and local air quality. At the same time, airports must encourage passengers to use public transport options where possible.

Although all that is being considered, I am sure that some hon. Members in the Chamber will be disappointed to hear that the Government do not believe that it is their role to dictate parking prices from Whitehall. Airports must retain the ability to manage their own infrastructure; the Government’s role is to ensure that competition and consumer laws are protected. Ultimately, each airport operator must justify the charges they levy and show that they are fair, transparent and carried out with proper accountability.

We support the continued success of our world-leading aviation sector, but we must do so in a way that delivers a green, more sustainable future. Airports should use their surface access strategies to set clear targets for sustainable travel and offer positive and practical incentives so that people do not drive to airports, but instead to use public transportation. When airports develop those strategies, they must clearly set out their approaches to parking and drop-off charges, and they must use their airport transport forums to plan future transport options in consultation with local people. My hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip made that point powerfully.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden said, many airports, including Manchester, offer a range of parking options, including free drop-off zones for passengers and public transport, but it is important that everyone who needs to can access our airports. Some parking options and public transport alternatives may not always work for passengers with accessibility needs. Although airports such as Manchester offer exemptions for blue badge holders, I want to push that further.

More than anything, today’s debate has highlighted the importance of fairness and transparency. It is essential that passengers can easily find information about parking and drop-off options so that they can plan their journeys and make the right, informed choice. We expect airport parking and drop-off charges to be clear and accessible, both online and at the airport itself. Airports must also make it easy for their customers to pay the relevant fee in a timely manner before proceeding to issue penalty charges for failure to do so. I was disappointed to hear Members across the House give examples of where that has not been the case for their constituents. I undertake to remind airports, including Manchester airport, of their obligations.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The hon. Member for Oldham West, Chadderton and Royton (Jim McMahon) made the very good point that the notice of the charge was situated beyond the point at which someone could reverse out. Will the Minister undertake to remind Manchester airport that any notice of a charge has to be at a place where people can decide not to accept the charge?

[Keir Mather]

It should be incumbent on all airports, including Manchester airport, to provide transparency, clarity and ease of access to information about parking charges, so I will happily raise that when I next meet Manchester airport representatives. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden needs no support in being a champion for her constituents in this space.

Importantly, airport users are protected by consumer law. Most airports have contracts with private parking operators, which must belong to a trade association and follow the sector’s new code of practice and appeals procedure. If drivers feel that signage is inadequate or that they have been treated unfairly, they can appeal through those services.

More widely, we recognise concerns about poor practices among some private parking operators. That is why the Government have consulted on proposals to raise standards, in preparation for a new code of practice and compliance framework. Responses are now being analysed, and we will publish our response in due course. I am cognisant of the pressure that this creates on local communities, as the hon. Member for Surrey Heath mentioned. He also mentioned ghost plates, which we are taking real action to tackle through the road safety strategy.

I again congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden on securing the debate, and I thank all Members who have contributed. The debate has shone a light on drop-off and parking charges at airports, and reinforced the Government’s expectation that airports manage the arrangements with fairness and respect. We will continue to work to ensure that they do so, and I encourage Members across the House to join us in those efforts.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Jerome Mayhew and Keir Mather

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)]

Rumours are swirling around the northern mayoralties that the Government are about to row back on Northern Powerhouse Rail. Is this going to be another U-turn from the Government, or can the Minister take this opportunity to put those rumours to rest by saying from the Dispatch Box that the scope, funding and timeframe for Northern Powerhouse Rail are not going to be changed?

[Keir Mather]

I am perplexed at the Opposition’s new-found support for passengers on the rail network. Fares in our system rose by 60% from 2010 to 2014 under the last Government, including for residents in the north of England. This Government are committed to levelling up our railway across the United Kingdom, including in the north of England. We will put passenger experience and affordable fares for those passengers at the very heart of what Great British Railways seeks to do.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Jerome Mayhew and Keir Mather

Thursday 20th November 2025 Commons Chamber

[Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)]

This summer, the Department for Transport wrote to the rail regulator that the Government firmly believe that

“the arrival of competition will benefit users of rail services by expanding the number of stations served (including new markets), encouraging greater differentiation in service provision and promoting competitive prices.”

That was for international rail. Why do the Government believe that competition is good when travelling abroad but should be replaced with nationalisation here in Britain?

[Keir Mather]

On no subject is the hypocrisy of the Conservative party laid out more clearly than that of rail. We did not have a competitive rail system when the Conservatives were in charge; we had a fragmented and broken rail service that did not offer passengers the service that they deserved. By having Great British Railways, we can integrate track and rail services together to ensure that these services are run in the interests of passengers. Competition can of course continue through open access, but we want to centralise the service being provided in the interests of passengers right across the United Kingdom.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am very interested to hear that mention of open access, because there is a risk with nationalisation that the organisation focuses on its own union-led interests, rather than the interests of passengers. That leads to bureaucratic inefficiency, delay and increased costs, and we may be seeing that already. South Western Rail was nationalised in May; since then, cancellations have been up by 50%, and delays have been up by 29%. c2c was nationalised in July; in September, it cancelled its online advance discount, making journeys more expensive, not less. Now, at TransPennine Express—the Secretary of State’s poster child for nationalisation—workers have voted for strike action. Is the Minister concerned that this Government do not have the backbone needed to face down demands from their union paymasters and put passengers first?

[Keir Mather]

The hon. Gentleman should know that, through the Railways Bill, we are building a system that will ensure that passenger accountability sits at the very heart of how this railway operates. I would be grateful if he could illuminate to me how constituents of his and constituents across the country are served by the previous system, under which people could not get a train where they needed to go, were plagued by strikes and had ticketing systems that did not work. We are setting up, through Great British Railways, a tough passenger watchdog that can have minimum standards and statutory advice for the Secretary of State and put passengers back at the heart of our railways.

Draft Merchant Shipping (Marine Equipment) Regulation 2025

Debate between Jerome Mayhew and Keir Mather

Tuesday 11th November 2025 General Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Merchant Shipping (Marine Equipment) Regulations 2025.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. The draft regulations were laid before the House on 14 October, and their purpose is to simplify marine equipment legislation by consolidating and combining regulatory changes into one piece of legislation, providing greater clarity for industry. The regulations also bring the standards and requirements for ballast water management systems within their scope, introducing a new equivalents provision and removing Government ships from the scope of the legislative regime.

In line with international requirements for ships to carry safety and counter-pollution equipment—collectively referred to as “marine equipment”—that has been approved by the ship’s flag administration, the United Kingdom implemented the Merchant Shipping (Marine Equipment) Regulations 2016, which gave effect to the EU directive on marine equipment. Following the UK’s exit from the European Union, the 2016 regulations were amended in 2019 to ensure that they would continue to operate effectively. Amendments were also made by the Merchant Shipping (Marine Equipment) (UK and US Mutual Recognition Agreement) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, which gave effect to the UK-USA mutual recognition agreement on marine equipment by providing for the mutual recognition of certificates of conformity for designated marine equipment, thereby opening up the large US market to UK manufacturers.

The draft regulations will revoke and replace the 2016 regulations and both sets of 2019 amending regulations, and will make three changes to the UK’s marine equipment regime. First, they will bring the type approval of ballast water management systems into the scope of the regulations. In 2022, the UK implemented new International Maritime Organisation requirements and standards for ballast water management systems through the Merchant Shipping (Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments) Regulations 2022. Those regulations included the type approval requirements for those systems. Bringing ballast water management systems within the scope of the marine equipment regulations will make it easier for industry to find and adhere to the relevant requirements. It will also prevent divergence in the approval processes between these systems and other items of marine equipment.

Secondly, the regulations introduce an equivalents provision to allow, subject to certain conditions, non-UK approved marine equipment to be placed on board UK vessels in situations where UK-approved items are unavailable or unsuitable. The conditions ensure that the equipment, when placed on board, will provide an equivalent level of safety.

Thirdly, the regulations will remove Government ships from scope of the marine equipment regime. That is due to the broader change in approach to Government ships, triggered in part by the limited legislative powers available post-EU exit. Following the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972, and in the absence of appropriate powers in the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, that is being done using the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023. That will facilitate the amendment of the regulations in future if required.

Since the UK’s departure from the EU, numerous engagements have been undertaken with stakeholders, including UK-approved bodies that are responsible for the approval of marine equipment, manufacturers, other Departments and maritime trade organisations. That provided an opportunity to influence the direction that the policy has taken. Once the policy direction had been developed, a six-week public consultation was carried out, during which respondents expressed support for the implementation of the proposed regulations. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency published a consultation report including responses to comments received.

[Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)]

The Minister is describing a really good example of draft regulations being shaped by responses to a UK consultation. Is that a Brexit benefit?

[Keir Mather]

Throughout the legislative process, both before and since Brexit, we have always worked hard on a departmental basis to engage with a broad range of stakeholders. We do so through this process as with any other, but if the hon. Member wishes to designate this as a Brexit success, I certainly will not stand in his way.

The MCA issues industry guidance through marine notices to assist the industry in understanding the requirements of the regulations, and new notices will be published alongside the regulations.

I have set out the purpose and scope of the regulations, which consolidate and simplify the UK’s marine equipment regime, thereby bringing clarity and confidence to the industry. The regulations reflect our continued commitment to uphold international standards while tailoring our legislative framework to the UK’s post-EU-exit context. I therefore commend the statutory instrument to the Committee.

International Rail Services: Ashford

Debate between Jerome Mayhew and Keir Mather

Tuesday 14th October 2025 Westminster Hall

[Keir Mather]

My hon. Friend’s point is very well made. What has struck me throughout this debate is the access opportunities for the constituents of every Member in the room. Members have also pointed to the importance of modal shift and the impact on freight and our decarbonisation ambitions. We have also heard about the impact on our international resilience and our ability to respond to the challenges in the channel with nimbleness and agility. These can all be enhanced by the prospect of increasing our international rail capacity, and those points have been very well made.

The hon. Member for Dartford (Jim Dickson) gave us the welcome perspective of the case for Ebbsfleet, and he pointed ably to the unity of advocacy from Members of Parliament, businesses and local people. It would be remiss of us to forget Ebbsfleet’s role in this important debate.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Tony Vaughan) usefully outlined how, in this country, international rail thrived in the 1990s, and he provided a reasonable and ambitious perspective on how Ashford could facilitate its ability to thrive again.

The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage (Olly Glover), encouraged me to explore different opportunities to revitalise Kent’s economic connections to the economies of northern France. I would suggest that encouraging competitiveness between different potential providers in this space is exactly what will allow us to explore those opportunities, and to push and work constructively with them. That is why the DFT has been working hard to convene Kent county council, private providers and local residents to explore where those opportunities lie.

I am pleased to hear that the Conservative spokesman, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, has a personal stake in this debate as a proud Kent man—

[Jerome Mayhew]

Kentish.

[Keir Mather]

Please forgive me. I learn something new every day in this role.

The hon. Gentleman is right to mention how many debates have landed on some of these themes over the years as we have wrangled with these questions. It is earnestly hoped, from the Government’s perspective, that facilitating competition and greater access in this space will allow us to solve what have formerly been incredibly knotty and intangible problems.

[Jerome Mayhew]

A good Conservative approach.

[Keir Mather]

Well, I think it is important to note that this Government are not fixated on ideological dogmatism in this space. Where competition works and can offer tangible benefits to local people in Kent and across the United Kingdom, we will of course proceed with it.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I am very grateful and encouraged to hear that point made from the Dispatch Box. If that is the case, can the Minister explain why the Government have written to the ORR advocating against every single open access application since coming into power? After all, open access is bringing additional competition to the wider network.

[Keir Mather]

Of course there is open access ability through these international rail links, which is an important thing to point to. What I find challenging about the assertions that the hon. Member made in his winding-up speech is the notion that some sort of perfect free market competition existed in our rail system prior to the Labour Government taking office. There was enormous dysfunction, which arose from an overly deregulated system.