(3 days, 10 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)
I appreciate what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but we have to consider the new clauses before us as drafted. Does he accept that almost no railways in the world run without subsidy on a net basis and that, where they do, there are unique geographical circumstances? The railways in Great Britain have operated with subsidies under all models since the early 1950s, and the effect of the hon. Gentleman’s new clauses, if they were to be implemented as written, would be Beeching on steroids.
I agreed with the hon. Gentleman until that last sentence, because new clause 40, which I will come to in a moment, would require not the removal of subsidy but looking towards it—it is aspirational. It would set GBR’s sights on minimising its costs to the taxpayer, not through penny pinching if that would be the wrong decision, but through growth in its revenue by becoming efficient and doing more for less. Those are all good incentives that a private business inevitably has because of the challenge of competition.
New clause 39 would require Great British Railways to focus on other opportunities for funding and on minimising operational costs, just like any other business. The areas of focus under subsection (7) are the revenue opportunities.
New clause 40, on non-reliance on taxpayer funding, would make the direction of travel for GBR clearer. It may be—in fact it is almost certain—that it will never achieve it, but it is a noble objective. It should be clear that GBR should aspire to reduce the need for the taxpayer to support the rail sector by making it as efficient and attractive to passengers as possible, thereby attracting more passengers and freight on to the railways. That would create a virtuous circle, rather than the opposite. We should start thinking about that, which is what new clause 40 is intended to achieve.
New clause 41, also tabled in my name, would require Great British Railways to publish an annual statement of its financial performance. The new clause builds on the theme, forcing Great British Railways to focus on its financial performance and reduce its reliance on the taxpayer. It may be the skimmed-milk version of new clause 40 that the hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield might find more palatable.
It is important that we do everything we can to design into a nationalised structure, where there is no competitive tension, incentives for GBR naturally to seek to achieve efficiency and productivity enhancements. There is a very real need for that, because the taxpayer’s pound can only be spent once, and funds are needed in many areas of Government. Apart from anything else, we need to reduce the tax burden, which this Government have raised to the highest on record, so anything we can do to build a structure that incentivises GBR to reduce its dependence on the taxpayer is a good thing. It also forces public accountability.
Finally, new clause 44 would require the Secretary of State to give GBR an annual savings target. Taking all the new clauses together, the intention is to allow GBR to focus on providing genuine value for money for the taxpayer, not just in abstract terms, and to cut away some of the existing inefficiencies in the infrastructure commissioning and decommissioning process, to provide a longer period of certainty for the supply chain so that it can pass on the resultant efficiencies to the taxpayer. That money can be either reinvested in accelerated infrastructure roll-out, rather like the ability of ScotRail electrification to do more for less, or—heaven forbid—used to produce tax cuts for the hard-pressed taxpayer. I hope the Minister will be bowled over by those suggestions, and look forward to hearing his response.
Laurence Turner
On amendments 125 and 127, I have full sympathy with the ambition of reducing costs to the taxpayer wherever possible. However, the word “minimise” is important here, because a natural reading would be to bring that cost to a minimum.
Each Government have recognised that there is a balance to be struck between the charges raised against the taxpayer, fare payers and other users of the railway. We heard evidence from Richard Bowker, the former chief executive of the Strategic Rail Authority, who has contributed what is sometimes known as Bowker’s law—there are only two sources of income to a railways: passengers and taxpayers.
I fear that if these amendments were incorporated into the Bill, the natural outcome would be that fares would rise, as indeed may charges levied upon freight users of the railway. For that reason, I hope they are not supported.
Mr Western, you get what you measure. We on this side of the Committee are very keen that we measure the level of involvement for the taxpayer and that we do our best to look after the taxpayer in the design of this structure, so I intend to press all the amendments.
(3 days, 10 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI completely agree with my hon. Friend. When one’s children come and ask for something, the wise answer is always to ask first, “What did your mother say?” If we were able to apply that common sense to this situation, I would not be so concerned. What we have instead is stakeholder management culture seeping into the core aspects of GBR functions.
Laurence Turner
Will the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that progress has been made on the cultural issues and the micro-management that he describes? I note in passing that he dates that culture from 2012 onwards, which was, of course, entirely under the Government of which he was part. In the Transport Committee, we heard that until the election, Network Rail had to seek Treasury permission to do as much as put up a passenger footbridge. Is it not welcome that that has now come to an end?
It is certainly welcome, but we are still in the position in which an improvement to a line—something as small as the Haughley junction improvement, which costs roughly £15 million to £20 million—still needs ministerial sign-off from the Treasury before it can be authorised. The Government have some way to go to improve the situation.
This will leave us with a stakeholder management culture. My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon is entirely right that many organisations in the 60% of the railway that is not being nationalised as part of GBR will be intimately and hugely impacted by GBR’s decisions—or will they? Will they, too, have to wait for the all clear from the Department for Transport? If GBR gets on the wrong side of Ministers or the Department, its course is going to be corrected to all manner of different ports.
The combination of clauses 7 and 9 removes almost any semblance of operational independence from GBR. Clause 9(5) states that GBR
“must have regard to guidance given under this section.”
That sounds soft, but in practice it creates a standing expectation of compliance and makes it impossible for GBR to make dynamic tactical decisions that are free from day-to-day second guessing by departmental and ministerial intervention.
That brings me to amendments 19 and 21, which would help defend the operational independence of GBR. If the Secretary of State is concerned about an aspect of GBR’s performance, they may instead issue guidance to inform GBR of its failure to meet the key performance indicators. Additionally, under clause 10, the Secretary of State may give guidance only if
“Scottish Ministers have drawn to Great British Railways’ attention that Great British Railways is not meeting a key performance indicator…and…Great British Railways has not taken action to remedy this failing within the period of two months.”
As a result, the amendments would apply to GBR in both England and Scotland.
Finally, amendment 20 repeats the argument made about directions or guidance given by the Secretary of State on the general level and structure of fares, and it would introduce new subsection (5A), which states:
“If the Secretary of State uses the powers in this section to give guidance to Great British Railways about the general level and structure of fares for travel on railway passengers services designated under section 25 or 26, then the Secretary of State must publish the assumptions, criteria, and objectives underpinning any guidance.”
That is self-evidently sensible, and I look forward to the Minister agreeing with me.
(1 week, 1 day ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe official Opposition, strongly support this amendment because it seeks to increase passenger traffic on the railways, in addition to the welcomed inclusion of an objective to increase freight. We agree with it so strongly because it is almost identical to our amendment 35, which I shall also speak to. Amendment 35 would add a specific requirement to subsection (2) paragraph (b) of clause 18—the duties clause—for GBR Ministers and the Office of Rail and Road,
“to increase the number of passenger journeys”.
This directly addresses the concern raised by the Campaign for Better Transport in the evidence received by the Committee. It is an essential amendment to ensure that GBR has a key focus and aim to increase passenger numbers—something that is essential for a railway. It would ensure that the dominant culture of GBR is not one where passengers are seen as creators of damage to infrastructure.
That is not a loose accusation that I have made; I have been listening to the industry for over a year now. The core structure of GBR is Network Rail. I know that I am bound to be corrected if I get this even a couple out, but I believe that Network Rail has about 41,000 members of staff. Network Rail is the central body to which train operating companies have been added at a rate of about one every six weeks or two months over the last period. An oft-repeated criticism of the culture of Network Rail has been that it sees passengers as a necessary irritation in the correct functioning of the railway. Sir Alec, if your organisation is engineer focused, the condition of the infrastructure is what is most important to you. Passengers demand lots and lots of trains, but lots and lots of trains damage the infrastructure. There is a concern in the wider sector— I am merely passing it on—that the culture of Network Rail has historically been one in which it wants to limit the number of trains to what it considers to be acceptable, so that it has a nice steady state of repair of the infrastructure. If that is the dominant culture that pervades GBR, now that it is bringing everything together, that will be a disaster for passenger services, because there would not be an automatic incentive to focus on an increase in passenger journeys, which is why amendments 133 and 35 are so important.
New clause 42—to go into the detail a little—would require the Secretary of State to set, publish and keep under review a passenger growth target. It would also require GBR to have regard to that target when exercising its statutory functions. In oral evidence to this Committee, Ben Plowden, chief executive of the Campaign for Better Transport, said:
“It is welcome that there is a duty to promote the interests of passengers and disabled people in the Bill. We think there is a case for strengthening that duty so that it aligns with the duty in relation to freight, which is to promote the use of the network for passengers and disabled passengers. There should also be an equivalent duty on the Secretary of State to set a passenger growth target, as she is required to do in relation to freight, so that, as we picked up on a minute ago, GBR does not end up being incentivised not to grow the network in order to meet its crowding and reliability duties, for example. It seems to us that giving it a statutory incentive to increase passenger use over time would be very helpful to build on the existing duty in the Bill.”––[Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 24, Q49.]
That organisation was not alone, because John Thomas from ALLRAIL said:
“I think a passenger growth target is really important. At the moment, the duties for GBR only include improving performance. You can improve performance, as we saw during covid, by cutting the number of services, but that is not necessarily in the best interest of customers. We think a balance between a performance target and a passenger growth target is really important.”––[Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 47, Q78.]
Finally, we heard from Rob Morris of Siemens. He said:
“What we seem to be missing in the Bill at the moment is the ambition for passenger growth, how that will improve the railway and the levels of investment that need to go with it.”––[Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 64, Q122.]
It is unclear to me why, if the Bill can require a target to increase use of the railway network for freight, the same obligation is not applied to passenger services. The inconsistency suggests a deliberate choice not to mandate passenger growth. And why would GBR care about passenger growth? After all, if it will be dominated by Network Rail, there is at least a risk that its culture will be one of avoiding damage to infrastructure, in excess of looking after growing the number of passengers.
In written evidence to the Transport Committee, Rail Forum said:
“From Rail Forum’s perspective there is nothing specific in the Bill that will guarantee improved travel for passengers. Improvement is predicated on the goodwill of GBR and others driving things in the ‘right direction’. In our view the key to improvement is culture change within those organisations coming together to form GBR. Creating GBR from Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd…will not signal the need for change and creates a risk that the current Network Rail culture will be seen as the norm and hence the status quo will prevail.”
These are not arguments made up by a cunning Opposition to wrongfoot the Government. This is the Opposition doing our job properly and reflecting the concerns of the wider sector—not just from one organisation but from multiple organisations, right across the sector. They identify the drafting as a problem and the culture as potentially a problem unless the legislation makes it clear that it is a duty of GBR to increase passenger numbers.
Laurence Turner
As in this morning’s sitting, I draw attention to the fact that I am a member of Unite. I did not intend to speak in this particular debate, but I wish to respond briefly to some of the things that have been said and to mount a perhaps limited defence of Network Rail and the importance of engineering in such organisations. The comparator, of course, was Railtrack, which outsourced its engineering functions, had only a single engineer on its board of directors and had only one non-executive director from an engineering background, with deadly consequences, which are well understood and do not need repeating. If there is sometimes caution in the organisation, I suggest that the long shadow cast by the events of the late 1990s and early 2000s is why.
There is good and sound logic behind not running too many trains across congested track. The real reason why we do not run as many trains as is theoretically possible is that lack of capacity on the network. Birmingham New Street, for example, will be exhausted once the Camp Hill services start in the spring—any more services simply cannot be safely got in or out on the network. When path allocators have to make decisions on which services to prioritise, freight tends to be squeezed out. That is a long-standing problem.
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It is right partially to defend Network Rail. It is an issue of balance and of the culture going forward. He also talked about capacity—this is not a party political point—but that is determined by not just the number of trains, but the length of trains, which makes an enormous difference. Just increasing carriage numbers—in particular on the Northern rail network where the majority of trains are just two carriages—by a couple of extra carriages does not require significantly increased capacity on the line, but it does increase capacity enormously for passengers. That would allow a target for increased passenger numbers to be fulfilled, without an increase in line capacity.
Laurence Turner
I thank the shadow Minister for the constructive spirit of his intervention. Indeed, in the days of cross-party consensus on High Speed 2, I worked with members of his party exactly to address some of the capacity challenges on the network. I just say to him that the two are linked. As he was alluding to, the length of the trains is related to the signalling blocks and the safe distance between trains, so that they can be run together. If he is right, we should be looking to put on more carriages. When waiting for a CrossCountry train, I can certainly remember the collective groan on the platform when another short formation appeared. There is a hard limit, however, to what can be applied without providing more caps on the network. That is where the passenger versus freight dilemma comes in, because sometimes hard choices just have to be made. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point that this is not always either/or, but sometimes it is. Sometimes one has to be prioritised over the other, and freight has historically been the loser.
My hon. Friend makes a very interesting point. One of the stand-out moments from Tuesday’s oral evidence was that given by the mayors, Andy Burnham and Tracy Brabin. What it highlighted, apart from their articulate defence of their regions’ interests, was how different things will be, under the current proposals, in mayoral combined authorities: there will be the right to ask or be consulted on the devolution of aspects of rail to those authorities. That is great as far as it goes—they said that it did not go far enough, but it goes some distance in that direction.
However, what if an area is not a mayoral combined authority? I believe that is the point that my hon. Friend is making: without the direct relationship that the Government are anticipating for mayoral combined authorities, at the expense of other parts of the country, the “purpose” clause becomes more important. That is another reason why paragraphs (e) and (f) and others are helpful.
Many Members and constituents across the country were enthused by the restoring your railway fund and the new stations fund, which have unfortunately now been scrapped by this Government. They were set up in the last Parliament and led to a renaissance of interest in local railway investment and a focus on modernising working practices and innovating to improve productivity, efficiency and passenger experience.
Working practices are not really spoken about in the Bill as it is currently drafted. This is not a new start-up—we have to be quite clear about that: it is building a new organisation out of some very old organisations, including Network Rail. The aim of modernisation is to do more for less. That is a good thing because it means that there is more money left over for further investment in improving infrastructure and improving or increasing passenger services and more left in the kitty to reduce subsidies—the taxpayer support—and by extension reduce the tax burden on our hard-pressed constituents. Doing more for less by modernising working practices and innovating to improve productivity efficiency is an unalloyed good. It should be very important and at the heart of any organisation—yet the Bill is silent on it.
Although I can hear the subtext, but the new clause is not intended to be a union-bashing measure. It is intended to make a dynamic organisation that has its passengers—its users—at the heart of its interests and that there is a focus on ensuring that GBR continues to have growth as part of its objectives. That aligns with the Government’s decision to put growth at the heart of their mission.
Laurence Turner
The hon. Member particularly mentioned workforce productivity.
Laurence Turner
Okay, perhaps we will come back to that. However, the hon. Member also mentioned the restoring the your railway fund, which he talked about as a success. When the last Conservative Rail Minister, Huw Merriman, appeared before the Transport Committee he said, of that programme, that
“The challenge was that a lot of people had their expectations dashed. A lot of business cases were, “Let’s move it to this stage so we can keep the dream alive.” That just wastes money and expertise because you know that scheme is not going to get a return. I have mixed feelings on it as a result.”
Does the hon. Gentleman share some sympathy with that perspective?
Yes, I do, but then democracy is really messy, isn’t it? If we listen to passengers and our constituents, we hear all sorts of desires that may not be sufficiently persuasive to obtain Government funding, but the process of asking people for their views should not be shied away from. It sounds as though, in the experience of our former colleague Huw Merriman, some rather weak political decisions—or decisions of expediency—were taken. That does not mean that we should move away from the democratic process; we should listen to people. I do not say that the restoring your railway fund was a failure, because we listened and we heard.
I will pick up on the other point because I was sitting down when I barracked the hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield: modernisation is not just about working practice. I want to make that really clear: modernising is about productivity enhancement of at-times-sclerotic organisations. I am a former entrepreneur. I ran a business for well over a decade on a much smaller scale than this. At the end, I employed about 1,000 people; I took it from start-up to about that stage.
Even a fast-growth, highly entrepreneurial and—in the views of other people—highly dynamic business such as the one that I was lucky enough to lead had all sorts of internal inconsistencies and inefficiencies, and needed to focus relentlessly on improving working processes and practices. That was right at the sharp end of the private sector. If it was true for my organisation then, think how true it is for a very large organisation such as Network Rail, which has 40,000-plus staff, and will be much bigger still when it becomes Great British Railways.
Paragraph (h) of new clause 1 states the need to improve and consider
“the experience of disabled and vulnerable passengers”.
Key terminus stations have good systems in place but that could be expanded with investment such as in the cross-party Access for All fund, which did huge work to improve disabled access in stations.
Paragraphs (i) and (j) are on a key theme that we have explored throughout our consideration of the Bill: open access and freight. They would ensure
“fair and transparent treatment of open access, freight and devolved operators”
At times it feels like we speak too much about open access in relation to this Bill. If we look at the capacity—the number of passengers covered by open access operators—we see that in percentage terms it is very small.
I was going to say 1.5%, but maybe it is 2%. Let us call it approximately 2%; I leave rail freight in a separate category. But open access operators have a disproportionate impact on driving competitive challenge.
One of the very significant concerns of the sector, which I share, is that if the very dominant GBR is created and the operator and open access operators are not supported, even though they represent just 2% of passenger transit what will be lost is the competitive comparator for what good operating processes and customer-focused activities for train operations look like. It is disproportionately important that GBR should be held to account practically by the operations of open access operators, so such operators must receive fair and transparent treatment. That is what paragraphs (i) and (j) set out. They would ensure that the system is transparent where we believe that the legislation as drafted is currently vague.
Paragraph (j) enshrines the growth freight targets that we all agree on and that the Government have outlined. Paragraph (k) states the need to strengthen
“the financial sustainability of the railways”
to reduce reliance on subsidy. That should be an objective, and a purpose, of GBR. The taxpayer has lots of things that his or her money needs to be spent on. If we can reduce, over time, the need for subsidy on the railways, that money is freed up either for tax cuts, which make everyone richer, or to be spent on other important priorities of Government.
Meanwhile, paragraphs (l) and (m) speak to another key aim—integration, both of track and train, and of the mayors, with their local transport integration beyond rail, which are important to have. The lack of explicit inclusion in the Bill feels like an oversight that we are more than happy to shed light on for the Government.
Sir Alec, you will be pleased to know that that is it as far as new clause 1 is concerned, but I do have new clause 2 to entertain you with, which is about key performance indicators. The Government have been asked multiple times over the last few months to provide, even in draft, the KPIs that they intend Great British Rail to operate under. This clause is a first attempt to fill the gap that the Government have left by refusing time and again even to discuss what the KPIs will be, other than to say, using their go-to phrase, that they will be “robust”. What does that mean? We do not know.
The new clause would set a statutory key performance indicator framework, which must include targets for a number of areas, such as reliability, safety, cleanliness, affordability, passenger growth, financial efficiency, freight and others. It is necessary because of the failure of the Government. I would be delighted to withdraw it if the Minister were to stand up and say, “These are the KPIs that the Government have in mind—let’s debate them.”
At the moment, we have draft legislation in front of us—we are a scrutinising Committee and we are here for a month to go line-by-line through the Bill to improve it and understand how GBR will be operated—and yet we have no idea what the Government are even thinking on KPIs, which are a central set of objectives. This new clause seeks not to bind GBR or the Secretary of State to rigid targets, but instead to provide an overall remit for where the Secretary of State and GBR must report within.
Accountability is at the core of public trust in nationally run services, and setting targets in statute ensures there is a positive feedback loop for officials—very importantly—and GBR agents to work against. It helps frame discussions and engagement between the Departments and GBR, and allows a number of different datasets and parameters to be considered. The new clause would also require the Secretary of State to publish these indicators and lay them before Parliament.
The KPIs work as a strong starting position by which GBR can judge itself, and how it in turn can be judged by passengers and the public. Again, the Opposition are having to do the Government’s work for them. We should not be in that position. The Government should have brought forward this Bill with the accompanying documentation, which, as we have heard, is missing— 19 important documents and counting.
Finally, I turn to new clause 5. You will be pleased to hear that it is much shorter, Sir Alec. The new clause would give reporting requirements to GBR, continuing the theme of accountability, which new clauses 1 and 2 also have at their core. The layout of the new clause is self-explanatory. Subsections (2) and (3) link to new clause 2 on key performance indicators, and the clause would enhance accountability further, not just by having targets in place, but by having a clear reporting criterion.
In the same way that a Secretary of State is expected to appear in front of Parliament on a rotating basis in urgent questions, in Committees and through written ministerial questions, it is reasonable to expect that GBR should publish an annual report in which it reports on the targets set by the Secretary of State. Given the eminently sensible and logical outcome of the new clauses, I urge the Government to consider seriously on what basis it would not want to create greater transparency.
(1 week, 1 day ago)
Public Bill Committees
Laurence Turner
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. At the outset, I wish to declare that I am a member of Unite.
It is a privilege to speak at the start of these proceedings. I do so as a believer in public ownership of the railways not as an end, but as the best means of realising greater economies for taxpayers and improvements for all those who rely on the railways for livelihood and leisure. I am conscious that the Committee has much work ahead of it, so I will keep my explanation of the amendment brief.
Public ownership is the ballast of the Bill, but its clauses make only limited reference to ownership, although the drafting logic for that may be good—the Bill must, after all, be read alongside the previous enabling legislation passed by Parliament, the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024 and the now much amended Railways Act 1993. In 2024, Parliament’s decision and intent were clear: passenger services are to come under public ownership as franchises expire. I must admit, however, that I start our proceedings under the shadow of a doubt. On my reading, there is a risk that the requirements of public ownership that sit outside this Bill may be time-bound, designed for the specific circumstances of transition, and dependent on definitions in statutory instruments that are themselves at risk of amendment or repeal without full parliamentary scrutiny.
I freely acknowledge that some members of the Committee may take a different view of the merits of the ownership question, and I am sure that we will have good and respectful debate on the Bill’s provisions in the weeks ahead, but surely we can all agree on one point: such an important decision as public or private ownership should be taken only through primary legislation. To put it another way, were a future Government to seek to return to a privatised model, they should be obliged to seek majority consent in the full House. That is what the amendment seeks to achieve.
The amendment would require Great British Railways to be a wholly and nationally owned public sector entity. Indeed, it would cease to be GBR if it were sold in whole or in part. The amendment would also, I think, prevent a future Secretary of State from taking the extremely perverse step of removing GBR’s designation as a public sector body and transferring it to a private or semi-private entity.
If the wording of the amendment seems familiar to hon. Members, it will be because they have been paying close attention to other legislation. Clause 1 of the Bill is effectively identical to section 1(1) of the Great British Energy Act 2025. The amendment is a near carbon copy—I am sorry to all members of the Committee, but we are only at the start of our descent; I cannot promise that the puns will improve as we go on—of the subsections that follow in section 1 of that Act. I note that in the equivalent Committee debate for that Act, the sponsoring Minister, the hon. Member for Rutherglen (Michael Shanks), said:
“The clause protects the principle of public ownership by making explicit that the company would terminate if it ceased to be wholly owned by the Crown.”––[Official Report, Great British Energy Public Bill Committee, 10 October 2024; c. 91.]
I accept that we are seeking to build on a complex body of legislation; the railways are the accumulation of two centuries of history, and so are the laws that govern them. If—I emphasise that word—a drafting issue has been identified, we also need to identify the right solution for this specific legislation. I am grateful to the Minister in the Commons and to the Minister of State, the noble Lord Hendy, for their thoughtful conversations on this matter. I am also grateful to the officials who have worked hard to prepare this commendable Bill. My motivation in tabling the amendment is to establish beyond doubt that the Bill will achieve its aim: that Great British Railways will be run by and for the nation. If we can assure ourselves of that, I believe that this legislation will set out a permanent way for reform. I will listen carefully when the Minister responds.
It is very nice to have you in the Chair, Mrs Hobhouse. I think this a conversation among Labour Members, and I do not want to get in the way of a private dispute. I might just sit down and listen to what the Minister has to say.
Thank you.
We have this generational change in the organisation of the railways; the Government, with their majority, have taken a political decision to nationalise the sector. We know that nationalisation of the railways has been tried before. They were nationalised in 1950 or 1951—
The hon. Gentleman is quite right. From 1950, we had the high point of post-war passenger numbers on the railways—about 1 billion passengers. From that period of nationalisation, the number of passengers choosing—I use that word advisedly—to use the railways started a long and seemingly unstoppable decline. It went from 1 billion in the early 1950s all the way down to about 735 million in the period of privatisation—1993. It seemed like that was due to the public changing the way in which they chose to live their lives. The Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Nottingham South, suggested from her seat on Second Reading that it was obvious that people did not want to use the train so much, even during a period of increasing population, because they were increasingly affluent and they bought more cars. That is a possible explanation.
But then something very odd happened. In 1993, the then Conservative Government legislated to privatise the railways. Now, we can debate—and I am sure we will multiple times over the coming days—whether that was a good or a bad thing in principle and whether the way the privatisation was done, through the Railways Act 1993, and subsequently amended was perfect or whether it could have been improved upon, but if we consider that the primary objective of a railway—leaving freight to one side for a moment—is to carry passengers, the data shows that the privatisation of the railways in the United Kingdom was an unqualified success. The seemingly inevitable decline in passenger numbers changed direction immediately. It was not just a slow bottoming out; that long-term decline immediately turned in the other direction, and then continued to grow until covid meant that all bets were off from 2019. Those numbers did not just grow to recover all the lost work of the previous 40 years—they did not go back up to 1 billion customers; they increased to 1.75 billion. That was a period of increased affluence, when the number of cars available to passengers increased enormously. The only explanation for the absolute reversal in passenger numbers is the decisions taken through privatisation—the profit motive and the incentive to focus on passengers rather than on the organisation.
In which case, I will speak first to amendment 2, as that is first in the grouping, and then proceed to the others.
Amendment 2 would make explicit the duty of Great British Railways to promote a thriving, competitive retail market, and align the Bill with the Government’s stated aim of delivering a system in which competition drives better outcomes for passengers. The retail market in the UK is currently one of thriving competition, as we can all recognise, and shows UK tech at its best. Trainline is—I think I am right in saying—a FTSE 250 company, and a tech growth story for the United Kingdom, being Europe’s leading train and coach app. The amendment is therefore key to ensuring that the landscape continues to thrive and that we do not drive Trainline and its competitors out of the country.
Members will remember that in written evidence to the Transport Committee, Trainline asked that Committee
“to recommend that the Bill be amended to require structural separation of GBR online retail from the rest of the GBR organisation and to publish information that enables the ORR, CMA and other regulators to assess compliance with competition law, subsidy control rules and non-discrimination duties. This should not be left to the Code of Practice alone”—
and, by the way, we have not seen the code of practice.
Trainline also said:
“We ask that the Committee recommend that the Bill include a statutory duty that all retail market participants—including GBR online retail—are treated fairly, equally and non-discriminatorily, and that GBR online retail be subject to the same Code of Practice as all other retailers…We ask the Committee to recommend that these economic parity safeguards, including structural separation of GBR’s online retail business, be written into the legislation and the forthcoming Code of Practice…We therefore ask that the Committee recommends…An explicit ORR power to impose binding orders or financial sanctions if GBR breaches its licence or the Code. ORR’s competition duty should explicitly apply in respect of these functions and GBR’s licence…Provision for an appeal body (for example the CMA or the Competition Appeal Tribunal) to hear merits of disputes…The Code development process must be led by ORR, independent of DfT and GBR. It must ensure full stakeholder consultation, clear timetable, transparent publication of decisions and mechanisms for future amendment.”
Members may say, “Well, they’ve got skin in the game, haven’t they? They’re a commercial organisation trying to compete with the future GBR, so it will be in their interest to try to fix the corporate structure in a way that gives them an unfair advantage.” But if we look at what Trainline is asking for, we see it is not seeking to gain an unfair advantage. It is merely asking GBR to create a level playing field. Trainline is not the only organisation making that argument; it is joined by others.
Laurence Turner
The hon. Gentleman said a few moments ago that Trainline and other online retailers are not seeking to make ill use of their market position, but the Advertising Standards Authority has ordered Trainline to amend its adverts, and the ORR ordered it to amend its practice of not showing booking fees at the start of the booking process. In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Trainline accepted that its market share was significantly above the 25% test that the Competition and Markets Authority applies for a potential monopoly position. Does that concern the hon. Gentleman at all?
That demonstrates that the current system is working to hold Trainline to account, and that where there are abuses—if what the hon. Gentleman outlined amounted to abuses—effective systems are in position and they have been corrected.
The hon. Gentleman’s intervention did not speak to the overriding point: what do the Government want when they are applying this new structure to retail? Do they want a level playing field? Is that their intention, or do they want a systemically biased system in which GBR retail is given an unfair advantage over independent competition? Both answers are credible—it is possible for the Government to form one decision—but they should not pay lip service to a level playing field but, in design, achieve the opposite, which appears to be the case at the moment.
In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, the chief executive of the Campaign for Better Transport, essentially agreed with Trainline’s position. He said:
“We think that because the independent retail market has produced significant benefits for customers in the time that it has been in existence. It is heavily used by rail passengers. The critical question in relation to the Bill, and the other mechanisms that will be in place once the Bill has been passed, is how we ensure that there is genuine fair and open competition between GBR ticket retailing and the independent retailers currently or potentially in the market.”
This is a key point: the Government need to stop and think about what their intention is. If it is to have a fair market, the evidence, and all the feedback they are getting from the sector, is that they have not yet achieved that objective. They need to put their money where their mouth is and decide what their objective is. I hope the Minister will be clear in his response as to the Government’s thinking on that.
A second concern is that the sector is nervous about the apparent lack of hierarchy and detail in the functions. GBR is assigned multiple duties under the clause, but with no hierarchy, so it paves the way for potential confusion—or, worse, it gives GBR the ability to pick and choose which function it thinks is important in relation to any decision. It can quietly demote the importance of others so that it can serve itself and thereby reduce the power of the clause.
Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said in oral evidence to the Transport Committee:
“To lead from your further question: with the very broad powers for the Secretary of State and a certain lack of specificity on what will happen, what we are looking for is more key performance indicators, like in business. I realise it is a governmental entity, but the quantitative KPIs are not really there.”
I would go further than that: they are not there at all.
As well as amendment 2, which I have spoken to, we have also tabled new clause 3, which sets out GBR retail requirements. As I have said previously, this is a critical issue given the evidence that the Select Committee received, and the oral evidence that we heard on Tuesday, that the Government have built a structural conflict of interest into the Bill as currently drafted.
We also heard on Tuesday about international examples where a similar concern has been addressed in a different manner. SNCF is a state-owned railway in France that has unification of track and train. It also has a retail function, through which is competes with the wider market. SNCF, or, I presume, the French Government—I do not want to claim greater in-depth knowledge that I actually possess—have taken the decision to have a structural separation between SNCF retail and SNCF operations, the equivalent to GBR. The very obvious reason why they did that was for fairness and to have a level playing field. We are not talking about SNCF, but an improvement on the current position, which I fully accept is not perfect.
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberThis has been a very popular debate with a lot of contributions; I congratulate all those who managed to make their points in just three minutes. I will do my best to summarise the debate, starting by noting the excellent contributions from Opposition Members.
My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson) brilliantly managed to discuss a Railways Bill by referring to ferries, but he did make the serious point that we want pragmatism, not ideology, to reform the railways. My hon. Friend the Member for Brigg and Immingham (Martin Vickers) made the good point that, through nationalisation, the taxpayer now has to replace private investment.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton) made three important points: that the reforms simply advance the sprawling centralisation of powers; that, again, they involve practicality giving way to ideology; and that their drafting puts open access concessions at risk.
My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), who is a member of the Transport Committee, was concerned that this was ideological time travel that takes us back to the 1970s. My hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer) said that, post nationalisation, cancellations of South Western trains had increased on his Chertsey-Addlestone loop.
There were also many thoughtful contributions from the Liberal Democrats. It is telling that the Government’s insistence on nationalisation as the only answer has united the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives. It is worth noting that we have heard nothing from Members of the fag packet party, who, I think, still support nationalisation. Then again, however, they would not recognise a transport policy if it slapped them in the face.
Then there was Labour, with speech after speech welcoming the nationalisation of the railways—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] Bring it on. In speech after speech, they showed deep suspicion of the profit motive. The tone was set by the Transport Secretary, who said that the current system benefits companies over passenger services—as though the two things are mutually exclusive—and taken up by the hon. Members for Wrexham (Andrew Ranger), for Stockport (Navendu Mishra) and for Salford (Rebecca Long Bailey), with claims of profit prioritised over customer experience, large-scale profiteering on the railways and dividends prioritised over people. I could go on.
This is the authentic voice of Labour: the private sector is not good—not good in the way that the state is good. The private sector invests to make a return, not to create unionised jobs. It innovates to make a return, not to satisfy a Government productivity goal. It innovates to beat the competition and make a return, not to satisfy a ministerial target. However, it does invest, it does innovate and it does improve to compete. Nevertheless, Labour clings on to its ideological faith in the efficiency of the state, despite all the evidence to the contrary—and there is evidence. After all, we have tried this experiment before.
Laurence Turner
When the hon. Member for Orpington (Gareth Bacon) was the shadow Transport Secretary, he was recorded saying that his party would likely not reverse nationalisation because the public would be unlikely to think it was a good idea. If this Bill passes, will it be the policy of the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham (Jerome Mayhew) to privatise the railways all over again?
Let us wait to see if Labour actually nationalises it first; but the Conservatives are here to lead, not to follow.
There is plenty of evidence because we have tried the nationalisation experiment before. The railways were nationalised in 1948. [Interruption.] If Labour Members listen, they might learn something. When the railways were nationalised in 1948, there were a billion passenger journeys a year. Thereafter, the impact of nationalisation was immediate: year after year, fewer customers chose to use the trains; year after year, they voted with their feet because the service did not give them what they wanted and was not focused on them and their needs. There was low investment because the railways were competing with schools and hospitals, followed by poor industrial relations with an organisation more focused on itself than its customers—[Interruption.] The Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Nottingham South (Lilian Greenwood), says from a sedentary position that it was because there were more cars—let us just hold that in our minds.
By the 1990s, just 735 million passenger journeys were taking place a year, instead of a billion. In 1993, the system was privatised by the Conservative Government. The unions hated it, and Labour therefore hated it, too. However, every year, more and more passengers were attracted to use the trains—not just a few more, but vastly more. By 2019, 1.75 billion people were using the railways each year—and there were many more cars. Labour cannot explain it; it should not have happened, but it did.
If the purpose of the railway is to carry passengers, any rational observer must conclude that privatisation beat nationalisation hands down. Why? Profit is made only by attracting customers. Train operating companies focused on new and more trains, more services, innovative ticketing and customer service, and people voted with their feet.
The railways are a complex system where capacity is limited and costs are high. It is absolutely crucial to drive efficiency, maximise the scarce resources of track access and drive value for money with dynamic management. Can hon. Members think of a nationalised organisation that is a byword for management dynamism and efficiency anywhere, in any country at any time? I cannot either. If poor railway management is the problem, nationalisation cannot be the solution. Why is it that socialists and the fag packet party are such bad learners?
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons Chamber
Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)
Opposition motions are usually detailed—as, indeed, is the next motion on the Order Paper, relating to energy—so the brevity of this motion deserves comment. The most important line is, I think, the first:
“That this House calls on the Government to control public expenditure”.
In the hands of this Opposition, that short and seemingly innocuous phrase is a euphemism for cuts to essential services, and a return to the austerity agenda that the public rejected so decisively a year ago. All that follows in the motion hangs on that intent. After all, the Opposition accept that were the positions reversed, they themselves would probably be putting up taxes.
Earlier in the debate the shadow Chancellor, who is not in the Chamber at the moment, said that he had been quoted out of context. According to the longer transcript, as reported by City AM, he said:
“If I was in exactly her position”
—the Chancellor’s, that is—
“and I had to deal with tax, and I was down the end of the spectrum where the black hole was really big, I would probably go for income tax…I wouldn’t want to be in that position but that’s the cleanest thing to do.”
As we are looking for clarity, what the shadow Chancellor was saying was that if he was in the Chancellor’s position, that is, if he could not cut spending and had to raise tax, perhaps that is what he would do, but that is not what his intention is. His intention, very properly, is to control spending, as any responsible Government would. Why will the hon. Gentleman’s Government not do the same?
Laurence Turner
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, because it brings me to my next point. The Opposition have come to the House today stating that all these difficult matters have been resolved and there is no need for tax increases at all. They say that they have a plan for cutting £47 billion of public expenditure. I have a copy of that plan with me, but it is not much of a boast, because it is a very sparse document. The right hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Holden) said, “Further detail will follow,” but a month has passed and we are still waiting. Perhaps the shadow Minister who winds up the debate can let us know whether the Opposition will be publishing a more detailed document.
(4 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman’s intervention gives me the opportunity to raise the proverbial eyebrow at his claiming credit for securing £200 million for the Thickthorn roundabout when that has been in process for many years before he was elected. As for the £50 million he mentions, I think he means the western link road, which would be a huge improvement. At the moment we have the equivalent of the M25 for Norwich, but it is missing one section of 3.9 miles. The Conservatives are squarely behind finishing it: I am surprised to hear that Labour does not support the residents of Norwich in a similar way.
I will move on to what Labour has done. It has cancelled the further improvements on the A47, particularly at the other end towards Peterborough. That is just another example of where East Anglia has been ignored by Labour. Buses are the most popular form of public transport and the most important one in areas of high deprivation. They are particularly important for poorer members of society, the young, elderly and disabled. The Conservatives recognise that—we recognise that price matters—so the last Government introduced the £2 bus fare cap, and our manifesto commitment at the last election was to maintain it throughout the course of this Parliament because we recognised how popular and useful it was in increasing bus ridership. When Labour came to power, it had a choice: it could back passengers or it could back the unions. One of its first—shameful—acts in government was to give a 15% pay rise to ASLEF train drivers, who are already the best paid in Europe, paid for by a 50% increase in bus fares for passengers around the country. That speaks to a wider truth: when it comes to it, Labour is the party of the unions and not of the people.
Laurence Turner
Does the shadow Minister agree with his predecessor—the last Conservative Rail Minister, Huw Merriman—who said this:
“Whilst it’s legitimate to debate the terms of the deal, the demonisation of train drivers and those onboard and at stations, who carry out a difficult and skilled job for the safety of passengers, is completely unfair. These people work hard and should be shown more respect.”?
I have no problem with the unions making demands—after all, they are representing the interests of their members. What I complain about is the Government giving way to them at the expense of the general public.
On trains, we have got the cancelled projects as well. The midland main line electrification has been cancelled, which has led to lay-offs and the loss of expertise. It is also causing problems for the procurement of new bi-mode trains, because we no longer have any certainty as to whether the line will be electrified. At Dawlish, the Conservative Government completed phases 1 to 4 of the improvements and reinforcement of the line. Phase 5 is all that remains. What have the Government done? They have kicked it into the long grass, as was mentioned by the hon. Member for Newton Abbot (Martin Wrigley) for which I give him credit.
Back in East Anglia, the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) highlighted the need for the Ely junction and Haughley junction projects in Cambridgeshire and Suffolk to be advanced, yet they have been ignored by the Government.
(9 months, 4 weeks ago)
Commons Chamber
Laurence Turner
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, although I do not agree with his characterisation of the speeches we have heard today. I think hon. Members have brought a wide range of perspectives, and that even though there has been some disagreement across the House—and, on occasion, on the same Benches—all Members have made their points sincerely.
I have read the reports the right hon. Gentleman references and the Minister’s evidence. My reading of that report is that the Committee held a very strong view on the principle of skeleton delegated legislation, but the point it made is that the case must be made for the use of such powers. My view is that the case has been made in this instance because of the seriousness of the matters we are discussing.
I refer the hon. Gentleman to the conclusions of the fourth report by the expert Committee, which states:
“We remain of the view…that the Government have failed to provide a convincing justification for the inclusion of skeleton clauses in this Bill that give Ministers such wide powers to re-write in regulations the substance of the regulatory regimes for products and metrology.”
He is wrong in his assessment, is he not?
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberI will in a moment.
Here we have it: a clause of direct financial interest to Labour Members. We have so far had two speakers who have both received very significant sums from the unions, to which they did not directly refer. The first was the hon. Member for Blyth and Ashington (Ian Lavery), who has received £20,000 from the unions, according to his entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. The second is the hon. Member for Cumbernauld and Kirkintilloch (Katrina Murray), who has received £14,000 directly from the unions. This is germane to this debate.
Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)
As has been said already in this debate, trade union donations have been declared, but donations from employers who have a direct private interest in particular sectors that we have debated in this place have not been declared. If any of the hon. Member’s colleagues have not drawn attention to such an interest, will he encourage them to do so? Does he agree with us on the Labour Benches that they were wrong not to make such a declaration?
Order. There were two points of order on declarations earlier, and I think I made the situation quite clear. I just wish to let Mr Mayhew know that, if he is referring to Members directly with any form of criticism, he is meant to give them prior warning, so he should be mindful of that for what comes next in his speech.