John Baron
Main Page: John Baron (Conservative - Basildon and Billericay)Department Debates - View all John Baron's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(10 years, 6 months ago)
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Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
I beg to move,
That this House notes concerns about the Government’s defence reforms in relation to whether its proposals for the reserve forces will deliver either the anticipated cost savings or defence capability; and urges the Government to delay the disbandment of regular units until it is established that the Army Reserve plan is viable and cost-effective.
Let me first express my gratitude to the Backbench Business Committee for granting this debate. Many of us on both sides of the House believe this to be an important topic for discussion.
I suggest that Government plans to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists are on the rocks. Territorial Army numbers are at a low ebb; reserve recruitment targets are being missed; costs are rising; and there are delays and disorganisation. The plans will produce neither the anticipated cost-savings nor the capability envisaged. The time has come to say “Halt”—to halt the axing of the regular battalions and units until we are sure that the reservist plans are both viable and cost-effective. We run the risk of wasting taxpayers’ money on the back of false economies and unrealistic expectations.
Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
Were we not promised by the previous Secretary of State that the cuts to the regular forces would happen only if it were clear that we could increase the reserves? Yet that is not going to happen, so what happened to the original promise?
Mr Baron
My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the original plan, which was to allow the build-up of the reserves before we axed regular battalions because it was deemed that deployability was terribly important. Exchanges took place on the Floor of the House in 2011 between the then Defence Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), and my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), which clearly confirm that the plan was to get the balance right—to build up the reservists before winding down the regulars.
My first questions, then, to the Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, who is replying to the debate, are: why and when did the plan change? To make this debate as productive as possible, I would be delighted to take interventions from my right hon. Friend if he wishes to answer the questions we pose as the debate proceeds. I think that the questions why and when the plan changed are wholly legitimate ones, because the plan has changed and the House should be in no doubt whatever about that. Just two years ago, the plan was to say, “We will not wind down the regular troops until we know that the reservists are up to strength”. That plan has changed.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and the plan also changed in respect of the original strategic defence and security review. It initially planned for a reduction of 7,000 troops, but it suddenly increased to 13,000 and if recent press reports are to be believed, it might be even higher.
Mr Baron
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. A number of changes to the plan have occurred, but to my knowledge, at no time have we had any explanation from the Dispatch Box of why the plans have changed, of the cost implications or indeed of when they changed.
The entire Army reforms depend on the successful recruitment of reserves. Let us examine that for a moment, and let us remember that without such recruitment up to 30,000, the Army reform plans fall apart. What do we know about recruitment so far? We know that TA numbers have been falling, not rising, since 2009 and are now at their lowest ebb since 2007. We know today that new reservist recruitment targets are being missed. The front page of The Daily Telegraph, under the heading “Reforms have left the Army in chaos” refers to documents clearly showing that reservist recruitment targets both for this and next year are being missed—and not just by a small margin, but by a massive margin—thus bringing the whole plan into doubt. Various reasons are put forward, including criticism of the Ministry of Defence for closing down local recruitment offices, and there is talk about privatisation and Capita, but I think that is somewhat overplayed. What we know is that there has been a lack of communication in the IT systems in the MOD as between Capita and Atlas. There are all sorts of reasons, but the bottom line is that key reserve recruitment targets are being missed.
Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)
I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. The issue of recruitment targets within the reserve forces and the TA cannot be helped when it can take several months to get from someone signing up to join to turning up for their first night’s training. That is too long for people to be delayed along their way.
Mr Baron
My hon. Friend, who has experience of these matters, makes a valid point. [Interruption.] Yes, he is my hon. and gallant Friend.
Other reasons include the draw-down in Afghanistan, which is perhaps not encouraging reservists to sign up, and the fact that employers are reluctant to let key employees go. There is a host of reasons, but as I say, the bottom line is that the key reserve recruitment targets are being missed. Another key concern is that costs may be rising faster than anticipated, yet the Government have not presented to Parliament a fully costed plan, despite numerous requests for them to do so.
Sir Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD)
On that point, would the hon. Gentleman care to comment on an observation in the current issue of the Army Reserve Quarterly to the effect that it is all to do with
“rebalancing Her Majesty’s Forces in light of the country’s needs and resources in the years ahead”?
Mr James Clappison (Hertsmere) (Con)
I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this timely debate. Before he deals further with the question of cost, may I as a layman suggest to him that, if the reservists cannot make up their membership in time for the disbandment of the regular battalions, there is bound to be a gap in capability?
Mr Baron
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I shall be dealing with the capability gap—very briefly, if my hon. Friend will forgive me—because I think that it is an important issue, but may I test the patience of the House and stick to the cost issue for the time being? There is a real risk that, if costs rise faster than anticipated, we shall create false economies that will bring the whole project into doubt. That is terribly important, and we are right to ask questions about it on behalf of the taxpayer.
The Government have not come here to present a fully costed plan, but the pieces of the jigsaw that we can see do not reveal a rosy picture. We know from the Green Paper—and the Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces has confirmed this—that it costs more to train a reservist than to train a regular. We know that those who leave the regular forces to join the reserves will be given a £5,000 bounty, payable over four years. We have some questions about the reservist award, which is the difference between reservists’ pay and what they earn in civilian life. We are told that the potential cost has been accounted for, but the assumptions have not been made clear. We also know that, because employers are reluctant to let key employees go for extended periods, the Government have come up with an incentive for prospective employers amounting to £500 per reservist per month. Those are all added costs, but we still do not know what the fully costed plan is.
Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)
My hon. Friend referred to the Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces. I serve on the commission, and I do not accept his statistic. Broadly speaking, the cost of a reservist is about a fifth of the cost of his regular counterpart. In America, it is about a quarter, and my guess is that following the changes that we are making, it will be something between a quarter and a fifth.
Mr Baron
I must say to my hon. Friend, with the greatest respect, that he has confused training with deployment. There is no argument in the House about the fact that reservists will be cheaper; the question is, how much cheaper will they be? When costs are rising, do we enter the terrain of false economies—which brings into doubt the whole question of value for money and whether the plan should have been instigated in the first place? I was talking about training. There has been a dispute about whether it costs more to train a regular, but my hon. Friend should know from the Green Paper that it costs more to train a reservist.
However, this is not just about the bits of the jigsaw that we have seen. We know that there are hidden costs further down the line. According to a recent report by the charity Combat Stress, reservists are twice as likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder as regular troops. We may be storing up a ticking time bomb for ourselves. The necessary support structures for reservists are not in place, and I should be interested to know whether there are any proposals in that regard.
May I ask the Minister how much of the £1.8 billion—spread over 10 years—has been set aside for the Government’s plans? We are told that that money has been set aside and all is well, but there are various reports that some of it has already been eaten into. Has any of it been spent, and if so, how much?
While I am on the subject of costs, may I question the Minister about the impact assessment, which attempts to take an overall view of the costs? Again, we are dealing with assumptions and projected usage rates, and not all the figures are on the table, but I think we can all agree that the assessment is very dependent on projected usage rates. The way in which the reserve forces are used will depend on assumptions about future costs.
Artificially low rates can create false economies. The central case in the document seems to be based on an assumption of 3,000 annual deployments. I must ask the Minister whether that projection is realistic, given the original rationale of the reserve reforms. We are meant to be replacing 20,000 regular troops with 30,000 reservists. If the central projected use is 3,000, something is not adding up on the terrain. We need to examine the facts very carefully, because, again, we may be creating false economies and the taxpayer may be presented with a much larger bill than was originally envisaged.
Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)
As my hon. Friend knows, I strongly support those who are concerned about a capability gap, but I am slightly worried about some of the figures that he has given. For example, the figure relating to the higher cost of training a reservist is correct on a per-day basis, but it is not correct overall. What worries me is that, if Members give incorrect figures, the Government will very quickly knock them back. Let us stick to the main thrust, which is our fear that there will not be enough soldiers to fight in any future deployments that may take place.
Mr Baron
I am indeed very worried about the possibility that we shall not have enough troops to deploy. I refer my hon. Friend to the Green Paper, which states that it costs more to train a reservist than to train a regular. However, he has made a valid point about the manpower gap, which I think is a central issue of concern. Will 30,000 reservists be enough, even if they can be recruited? According to figures from the Ministry of Defence, the present TA mobilisation rate is 40%. In other words, for every 100 TA soldiers on paper, 40 are deemed to be deployable at any one time. That suggests that if we are plugging a gap left by 20,000 regulars, we shall need 50,000 reservists, not 30,000.
In response to a letter sent to him a while ago by 25 Conservative Members, the Secretary of State suggested a mobilisation rate of 80%. He said:
“The total strength target for the Army Reserve in 2020 is 38,000, in order to deliver 30,000 trained reservists.
May I ask the Minister what research, what study, what evidence justifies the claim that the MOD’s budgets will double the mobilisation rate? It is one thing to recruit 30,000 reservists, but doubling the mobilisation rate as well would require an extremely large investment. Many of us would be interested to know what evidence supports the claim that the £1.8 billion that has been put aside will achieve both those objectives. It is a very, very tall order.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) raised the issue of the capability gap, and he was right to do so, because there is a fear that the Government plans risk creating such a gap. The Army reforms were put together before the strategic defence and security review, and since then a string of events have changed the international strategic dynamic. The nature of conflict is changing. Previously, it was thought of very much in binary terms—there would be one bloc against another bloc—but more fluid geopolitical forces are now at play, both state and non-state. War is becoming more asymmetrical, and we need well trained, agile, regular forces at high readiness if we are to meet the challenges that lie ahead. There is no disguising among the military their frustration about the fact that they could not have been more supportive to the French in Mali. The penny may have dropped on that side of the channel, but it has not yet dropped on this side.
I must ask the Minister whether 40 days’ training is really enough. Let us be absolutely clear about this: the Government’s plans represent a step-change in our approach. We are proposing to deploy whole units of reservists into the field. We have got to ask serious questions about this. Some would say, “Well, it happens in the US with the National Guard,” but it is, perhaps, not fully appreciated that the US National Guard has its own bases and its own equipment and training programmes. They take it very seriously in the US; they throw a lot of money at it, and even then the National Guard units are not infantry units. That is the interesting thing: the National Guard units are not infantry units, despite the investment the US puts into it.
Mr Brazier
My last visit to a National Guard infantry unit was in Kabul about a year and a half ago. It was doing an excellent security job, and it also had detached platoons along the Pakistani border. Some 60% of the American infantry is in the National Guard and 40% is in its regular army.
Mr Baron
All I would say to my hon. Friend is that there is a general view that the National Guard is very much focused on supporting roles, and the Americans treat their National Guard very differently from what I think is being proposed here. For example, I do not know of there being any details about separate training programmes, operational programmes or equipment programmes in the Government’s plans, which we have yet to see. All we are asking is to see those plans, because £1.8 billion may sound like a lot of money but it is spread over 10 years, and we must consider the scale of what we are asking—not just raising 30,000 reservists, or, to be more accurate, adding another 12,000 or 13,000 reservists, but doubling the mobilisation rate. That is a very big ask indeed.
What research has been undertaken to ensure that the money earmarked is sufficient to bring reservist units up to the same standard as regulars upon deployment? That is especially important given that it appears that human rights legislation will require equal training and equipment. That has not been raised much in the debate thus far, but human rights legislation is a concern in the sense that it is going to say, “Any troops put into the field, reservist or regular, have to have equal training and equipment.” I would be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on that.
There is a concern that these plans are having a distorting effect on the ground. I come back to the fact that well-recruited battalions are being axed, including my own battalion, the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, yet more poorly recruited, and therefore more expensive, battalions are being saved. Such a policy reinforces failure. Can the Minister justify the decision for 2RRF to replace on the list one of the more poorly recruited battalions when it was not on the original list of five battalions to be scrapped? We know, because we have seen it in writing from the MOD, that five battalions were originally due to be axed as they had poor recruitment figures. One of those was replaced. They had to go looking for another battalion and they fell upon 2RRF, which happened to be the best-recruited battalion in the British Army. Many fusiliers and their families in swathes of constituencies across the north and the midlands of England would like an answer to that question.
Ian Mearns (Gateshead) (Lab)
Both 2RRF and the 1st Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers are very close to my heart, my dad having been a member of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers before and during the second world war. I wonder what the MOD wants out of our defence forces. One of the battalions to be axed, 2RRF, is referred to as “Daring in all”, and it is said:
“Where ever the Fusiliers have deployed to they have proved capable of meeting every challenge with courage, determination and a will to win.”
That is on the Army website.
Mr Baron
That goes without saying. I sympathise with what the hon. Gentleman says. We have still not yet had a straightforward answer to a straightforward question: 2RRF was not in the original five; those five were chosen because of their poor recruitment and retention figures; one was removed and they had to go looking for another battalion to take its place; and they just happened to fall upon the best-recruited battalion in the British Army, and one with a very proud recruiting history. We recruit from across the major cities of Lancashire, Warwickshire and Northumberland—Newcastle, Coventry, Birmingham, Manchester—as well as from London, yet we were told we were having trouble with our recruitment, and that is simply not the case.
No wonder ex-military chiefs are critical. Many are pointing out that strategic thought has been abandoned at a time when many other countries, not necessarily friendly to the west, are increasing their defence budgets. They are asking all politicians to think again.
There comes a stage with any struggling project when common sense and evidence dictate a revaluation and I believe we have reached that point now. There is no doubt—let us be clear about this—that reservists are cheaper than regulars, but rising costs threaten the anticipated cost savings and raise the very real prospect of false economies, and that is before we consider the issue of capability gaps, yet the Government seem determined to plough on with this misguided plan and play down concerns.
That is evidenced today by this important debate having been downgraded, I believe, to a one-line Whip. That does not surprise me, but, all the same, I think it speaks volumes about the Government’s approach. This is a very important issue and the debate has been very well-subscribed to, yet we drop it down to a one-line Whip at a time when the Government have still not produced fully costed plans and there are very real concerns about whether 30,000 reservists can plug a gap left by 20,000 regulars.
I intend to test the will of the House on this motion. The time has come to say “Halt”—halt to the axing of the regular battalions until we know that the reservist plan is both viable and cost-effective; otherwise the taxpayer could bear the brunt of many false economies to come.
Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)
I welcome this debate and I congratulate my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing it. It is also a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Coventry South (Mr Cunningham).
I understand my hon. and gallant Friend’s loyal defence of his fine former regiment. As the 100th anniversary of the start of the first world war is almost upon us, it is time to remember six Lancashire and Warwickshire Fusiliers who won Victoria Crosses in that war. Sir John French made the famous remark that without the Territorial units available at the very beginning of the fighting we would have lost in France before the war had really begun.
The reality is that we have a good plan that is being unevenly implemented. America’s land forces are almost exactly split 50:50 between regulars and volunteer reserves. Canada has 44% regulars and Australia has 36% regulars; in all countries there are more reserve infantry than regulars. Uniquely, Britain has a target that is much less ambitious. It is broadly the case that a reservist costs a fifth of the price of a regular. All of us who are keen on defence would like more resources to be allocated to defence. Indeed, more than 20 years ago, I stepped down from my post in government as a Cabinet Parliamentary Private Secretary over that issue. However, the reality is that we have to work within these very difficult economic times, and the alternative to 30,000 reservists is not 20,000 regulars, but somewhere between 6,000 and 7,500, and that would be if we got rid of all the specialist medics, cyber-people and so on whom the Regular Army does not have.
I therefore strongly support this plan; I have seen the work of American and Australian reservists, and I am proud that 20% of the British division that captured southern Iraq was made up of reservists. However, I am concerned about some of the details of how the plan is being implemented. From the beginning, Ministers and the Chief of the General Staff have made a strong commitment to it. Ministers have secured the support of every employers’ organisation in the country. The CGS, starting with his own pitch to employers in his excellent article in the Financial Times, immediately spotted the governance issue by appointing, for the first time since the second world war, a TA two-star—a major-general—to play a pivotal role in it. The problems largely lie within the recruiting group. At a time when the proposition has improved immeasurably as a result of changes the Army Board is making, it is deeply depressing that this department is failing to deliver.
I have before me the monthly recruiting statistics for one unit—I will not disclose which, for obvious reasons. In the 12 months before the first push on TA recruiting in autumn 2011, the unit had enlisted between three and 12 people a month. The figures after that push are: 15 for November 2011, 21 for December 2011 and 19 for January 2012. Then, for a reason not understood by anyone, the recruiting group introduced its new system for medicals and common selection, without any market testing and without talking to units, and within three or four months the figures had dropped to one or two a month. That muddle was sorted—it had nothing to do with Capita. Second time around, the arrangements with Capita—I do not blame Capita—were introduced without any market testing or discussion with units. I am sure we have all dealt with cases of soldiers who have waited six or nine months with their documents repeatedly lost in the system.
Time is extremely short, so I want to suggest three things that the Government need to do turn this around. The units I talk to tell me again and again that there is more interest in joining the reserves and that the figures for the two groups that are not under control of the recruiting group—officer applicants and ex-regulars—are both improving. So, first, we need to get more of the control over the enlistment process back with the units again.
Mr Baron
May I suggest that this is a clear example of where the plan is driven by costs, rather than by strategic design? The cost for Capita to take on the recruitment was derived in large part by scaling down, if not selling up completely, local recruitment offices. So to start opening those offices, although a sensible proposition, would require additional cost if we are going to reverse that recruitment loss.
Mr Brazier
My hon. and gallant Friend makes an interesting point. That is not what I am arguing for, although I would strongly argue that it is ridiculous that the offices we still retain are open 9 am to 5 pm Monday to Friday instead of, for example, 9 am to 9 pm Tuesday to Thursday, which would allow the people there to do both jobs rather than only regulars. I am calling for more emphasis on the units. A temporary measure has been adopted in that area, which I suggest should be more permanent—it need not be expensive.
The second major change we need is to have a senior reservist officer in the recruiting group who is tasked with talking to units and who has real power in the way in which decisions in that area are made. We have done it at Land Command at the senior level, where two highly effective successive deputy commanders at Land in that position have worked well, and the improvements in the proposition have stemmed in no small part from that. The same needs to be done in the recruiting group.
The third change we need is on a relatively small scale, as seven or eight changes among the 400-odd decisions that had to be made to the location of the reserves are not right. Seven or eight really well-recruited sub-units have been wrongly selected for disbandment, including the best-recruited squadron in the yeomanry, which is going down to troop level, the best-recruited battery in the TA gunners and three or four well-recruited infantry sub-units.
I believe that this plan is achievable and it is moving us in the direction of the allies we fight alongside. It is a good plan; it just needs an improvement in implementation.
Sarah Newton (Truro and Falmouth) (Con)
It is a privilege to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I would like to associate myself with the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), who sadly is no longer in the Chamber. Like him, I think that the whole plan for the Army Reserve is a good one. I know a great many serving reservists in my constituency who are excited and enthused about their role in a fully manned, 30,000-strong force that will ensure that they and others in future can make their contribution to the British Army. I note with interest that the south-west has been given an important role to play in this expansion, with the equivalent of 940 new posts being created for the region. However, like my hon. Friend, I have some concerns about the proposals as they stand.
Mr Baron
What is in no doubt is that one has great respect for the TA and, in many respects, wants the reserve plan to work. What one is arguing here is that, given the shortfalls in recruitment and the rising costs, surely it would be wise and prudent to stop the axing of the regular battalions until we know that the reserve plan is viable and cost-effective, because we in this House must not forget that defence is the first priority of Government.
Sarah Newton
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. I have certainly never forgotten my personal responsibility or the fact that the defence of our nation is, collectively, our first responsibility in this Chamber, and I do not think for one moment that the Ministers on the Front Bench have forgotten their responsibilities either. We have not yet had an opportunity to hear the Minister respond to the debate or explain the current situation with regard to reservist recruitment. I have some concerns about recruitment, which is why I am speaking in this debate.
The Green Paper published in July contained some proposals that concern me. One, in particular, is for the reconfiguration of D company of 6th Battalion The Rifles. I believe that the proposal, as it stands, will frustrate the delivery of the Army Reserve plan in Cornwall, particularly the aim of maximising its local potential now and in years to come. D company is an important part of 6 Rifles. It is currently based and headquartered in Truro and Plymouth, which allows riflemen from across Cornwall to play a full role in the life of the regiment. The Green Paper proposes a reconfiguration that would see the majority of the company, including its headquarters, based in Plymouth by 2016 and one platoon housed at a new facility in Barnstable.
The move from Truro would cause real problems for serving riflemen living in west and central Cornwall and impact on future recruitment from those areas. Cornwall, as Members will know, is a large and rural county, and it can take a considerable time to travel to Plymouth. A rifleman taking the train from Falmouth in my constituency to an evening training session in Plymouth would face a four-hour round trip. Those travelling further west would face even longer journey times. Is it reasonable or, with a view to future recruitment, wise to add such an inconvenience to the many other sacrifices required of our reservists?
Mr Francois
I am afraid I really do not have time.
For some employers, there will be directly transferrable qualifications, skills and experience between reserve service and civilian employment, which can be very valuable. To come to the heart of this matter, I believe that as parliamentarians we should get behind the reserves and the Army to support them in their endeavours. It is true that there have been some administrative issues in the process—it is too bureaucratic, as some of my hon. Friends have pointed out. However, we are working with our recruiting partner, Capita, and the senior Army leadership to actively address those issues.
Mr Francois
I believe we can work through those issues, simplify the system and meet the objective. We should remember that the key target is 30,000 trained to phase two by 2018. We start with around 19,000 or so trained. That is not a cold start: we are two thirds of the way there, and we need to achieve the other third over four years. My hon. Friend the Member for South West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous) summed it up brilliantly: we need, on average, an additional 20 reservists from each parliamentary constituency across the country in order to do that. I believe we certainly can do that. As the Chief of the General Staff reminded us at a successful reception in Parliament for the Royal Engineers reserves only yesterday, that is a challenging proposition, but a workable one. I agree with CGS: we can do this; let us get on with it.
Mr Baron
I would like to add my warm welcome to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, in your new post.
I am afraid that I listened to my right hon. Friend the Minister, but found that key questions remained unanswered. In fact, I do not think he answered one of the questions I put to him. In a debate of this nature and importance, it is a shame that he is not willing to take an intervention from the Member who sponsored it. The bottom line is that questions such as “When did the plan change from back in 2011?” and “How much of the £1.8 billion has already been spent?”, questions about the impact assessment, about the costs involved in doubling the mobilisation rate and so on and so forth have not been answered in detail—all we have had is a sense of direction.
No one doubts for one moment the courage and service of past reservists or indeed of future reservists. One is not critical of that—
Mr Francois
I do not normally comment on leaked documents, and I am not about to start now. What I will say to my hon. Friend on the point of costs—in fairness, I had only about seven minutes—is that he knows that he wrote to the Secretary of State about this in detail and he knows that the Secretary of State replied to him in detail and rebutted every point that he made. For the benefit of the House, I will ensure that a copy of that letter is placed in the Library this afternoon.
Mr Baron
I am pleased that the Minister is going to do that because all the points made by the Secretary of State have, in turn, themselves been rebutted; many of them were based on false assumptions.
Given how little time is left, let me clarify this. One is not saying “Scrap the reservist plans”. In many respects, one wants them to work. What one is saying is that there comes a point in any project whereby if extra costs keep being thrown into a plan—because it is failing or because recruitment targets cannot be met or because costs are rising and TA numbers are at a low ebb or because of disorganisation—there comes a point when one has to ask “Is this project creating false economies, therefore costing the taxpayer dear?” The motion says simply that we should “delay” the axing of the regular battalions until we know that the reservist plan is both “viable and cost-effective”; otherwise, because of false economies and unrealistic expectations, the taxpayer could pay dearly. That is not unreasonable, but I am afraid that my right hon. Friend has failed to answer that central point in the motion. I thus have no hesitation whatever in pressing the motion and calling for a Division.
Question put.