Online Safety

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 8th September 2026 Commons Chamber

[Lisa Nandy]

I would be very happy to meet my hon. Friend. We have talked a lot about the tech companies in relation to this, and it is right to do so because there are obligations that must be met, but there is also traditional law enforcement, and we need to ensure that we do not let the individuals causing harm to children off the hook. The Home Secretary has been incredibly supportive of working hand in glove to ensure we deal with this from every angle.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I also welcome the statement. I would be grateful if the Secretary of State shared with the House a little bit about how the highly efficient age assurance system actually works. In particular, I confess to the fact that over 60 years ago my parents, recognising that my sister and I were rather precocious readers, lent us their tickets to the senior library, rather than the junior library where we were confined. What would there be to prevent a parent choosing to allow a child to use their phone under their identity, and would there be a penalty for doing so?

[Lisa Nandy]

We are not envisaging imposing penalties on parents. However, the right hon. Member is right that, as we are already anticipating, with any system we introduce there will be people who find ways to get around the safeguards we put in place. That is one lesson we have learned from the pioneering approach taken in Australia. When I say to the House that we intend to move more quickly and more decisively, it is precisely for those reasons. We will have to keep revisiting the safeguards for children in this space to ensure we close loopholes.

On the highly effective age assurance, companies are already rolling this out, including through iOS 26. This requires someone to have a form of ID to prove their age. At the moment, as all parents will know, most of the apps and sites that children use just require them to either tick a box to say that they are over the age of 18, or to put in a birth date. They do not require them to show a form of ID—a credit card or some other form of ID. The new systems are requiring that, and one lesson we have learned from looking at what happened in Australia is that unless we do that, most children will find a way around.

Media Green Paper

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 24th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Lisa Nandy]

I am confident, having heard my hon. Friend championing his constituents in this House, that he would never allow that to happen, and neither will we. I am happy to offer him a meeting with the relevant Minister.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

On a similar theme, undoubtedly near the top of the Secretary of State’s to-do list today is to answer written question No. 11584, which is due for answer tomorrow. The question is about the threat posed by the BBC World Service apparently discontinuing its longwave transmitters at Droitwich, Burghead and Westerglen. What we want to know is: how will closed societies like Russia be able to receive news information when they are subject to the suppression of all the internet-based routes?

[Lisa Nandy]

I will, of course, ensure that the right hon. Member gets the answer to his written question in a timely fashion—by tomorrow. I am also more than happy to follow up and discuss it with him.

Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 6th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Ian Murray]

Cyber-security is the responsibility of the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, but the Cabinet Office has a clear resilience issue as well, as we heard from the right hon. Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden), who was in the Cabinet Office previously. The DSIT Secretary of State will make those regulations, but a plethora of regulators are involved in this process—energy, water and data centres all have different regulators. The regulators that regulate those sectors are being empowered through the expanded number of sectors being brought into the legislation to take the responsibility.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am extremely grateful to the Minister for giving way. On the point about regulators, the industry has issued a brief, which points out, quite sensibly, that these regulators are going to have a lot of extra duties to perform and they will therefore need extra resources to be able to perform those duties, but the extra resources they require will only be unlocked when the Bill has passed. Is there not a danger of a transition period where duties will be laid on regulators to fulfil their role before they have the resources to carry it out?

[Ian Murray]

We have to pass the legislation first. It may be amended during its passage through both Houses. Therefore, the regulators will not know what they are regulating until the Bill has passed. However, as I mentioned at the start of my contribution, we have been working with regulators, businesses, organisations and cyber-security experts in the run-up to producing the Bill to make sure that it is in the right place—that it is proportionate on businesses and regulators—and that it is effective, which is the most important thing. I am sure that we will have debates on those kinds of issues as we go through Committee and on to Third Reading, but I very much acknowledge what the right hon. Gentleman said.

The Bill will strengthen the powers of the NIS regulators, ranging from Ofgem to the Civil Aviation Authority, which work together to uphold the UK’s cyber rules across those different sectors—I may have taken the previous intervention 10 seconds too early! We are raising the maximum fine that they can impose, for example, while simplifying the penalty bands to make them clearer. The key driving force for this measure is not to punish rulebreakers or raise revenue, but to incentivise firms to be vigilant. Our goal is 100% compliance and zero fines.

We will also ask regulated organisations to change the way they report attacks and expand both the types of instance they have to report and the timeframe in which they have to report them. This is a small but crucial change. Under the current rules, regulators get notified about a breach only once it has already caused significant disruption—when traffic lights have failed or the heating has shut off. The system does not include cases with the potential to cause a crisis much later, like a hospital’s computer system quietly being spied on as hackers wait for their moment to strike. Under the Bill, if an organisation is within scope, it will have to tell its regulator and the National Cyber Security Centre about these types of breaches within 24 hours and provide a full report within three days. Pace and speed are of the essence. This will not only give us better information, but help agencies to warn others, should they need to, before they become the next targets.

The Bill will also allow the Government to set clear and consistent outcomes for regulations to work towards. One of the virtues of having a regime enforced by different agencies is that each has sector-specific expertise—Ofgem understands the complex digital systems that underpin the national grid, and the Civil Aviation Authority knows the precise threats to air traffic control, for example—but that approach has sometimes led to inconsistencies in how the regime is applied. Some bodies interpret the rules differently from others. The Bill aims to fix that with a single set of objectives issued by central Government and applied across the board. That will send the message that no sector is an easy target in the UK.

We will also improve the way in which regulators, intelligence agencies and law enforcement share information with each other by providing greater clarity on what regulators can share and receive. It is important that regulators have the resources to do their job, as the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) said. The Bill will also give them new powers to cover the full costs associated with their regulatory duties. To ensure transparency, regulators will consult on how fees are calculated and publish a statement each year to show how the funds are being used. Together, the measures add up to a much more consistent and effective regime with better reporting and much clearer guidance for all involved.

The Bill ensures that the UK’s cyber-security regime is not only fit for today but flexible enough to head off future threats as well. I have mentioned a few things that have changed in the past eight years—shifts in technology and the nature of cyber-attacks, artificial intelligence, data centres and the economy—but one of the biggest changes was, of course, Brexit. Since our exit from the European Union in January 2020, we have been unable to amend the NIS regulations without primary legislation, because the rules were originally part of European Union law. That has slowed the process and made it difficult for us to keep pace with new emerging threats and technology. Meanwhile, Brussels is pressing ahead with NIS2—its forward-looking update—while we lag behind.

That procedural quirk has left essential UK services more exposed, which perhaps tells us something about why the UK has such appalling figures compared with some of our EU counterparts, as hackers and cyber criminals exploit gaps in our dated laws. That is an unacceptable risk, so the Bill includes new powers for the Government to update the NIS regime via secondary legislation, to make it quicker and more agile for dealing with evolving technologies—we might need to respond quickly to a new type of cyber-threat, for example. That is not in order to override Parliament; in almost all cases, the Government will still be required to consult on any changes, and Parliament will have the final say on any legislation made under the power. However, delegated powers are essential for keeping us as responsive as possible. When national security is on the line, we need the ability to act fast and decisively.

In fact, in extreme cases some threats emerge so rapidly that even secondary legislation is too slow; if an ally were to be invaded by a hostile state, for example, the cyber risk to the UK would suddenly escalate. The Government will therefore also be given powers to direct regulators or regulated entities where national security is threatened—to issue specific cyber-security guidance in a crisis, for example. Those powers are intended as a last resort to protect our national security, and safeguards will go into the Bill to ensure that they are used accordingly.

The UK’s cyber sector is the third largest in the world, as we heard from our friend from Northern Ireland, the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon). It achieves double-digit growth year on year. We have fast-growing clusters of expertise in Cheltenham and Manchester. This legislation will supercharge that success, doubling down on one of our nation’s greatest assets. At its core, the Bill is about protecting the essential services that we all rely on, so that the lights always stay switched on, clean water always runs in our taps, and hospitals are always safe and secure. Those are the real life community issues that we and our constituents all encounter every single day.

This is more than a technical upgrade; it is a bold commitment from the Government to protect one of our biggest economic strengths and keep the UK safe in a rapidly evolving digital world. Together, we are working towards a future in which security is not a hope but a guarantee. I commend the Bill to the House.

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[Julia Lopez]

The whistleblowers continue to raise serious concerns about the structures upon which the Government’s digital identity platform will be built. The hon. Member looks absolutely outraged that I might suggest there are some concerns about the cyber-security risk of a national, mandated digital identity platform. I find it extraordinary that he suggests that I am expressing concerns that a system might be tested. Of course every system must be robustly tested—that is not the point I am trying to make, and the hon. Member is being wilfully ludicrous in suggesting otherwise. This Prime Minister cannot run an economy, keep promises or control his Back Benchers, or his Front Benchers, so how on earth does anybody think he can run a secure digital identity system?

At the same time as risking technological lock-in by friendly allies, we are creating new vulnerabilities for adversaries to attack. Just before Christmas, UK intelligence agencies warned about increasing, large-scale cyber-espionage from China, targeting commercial and political information. We discovered from Ministers that the Foreign Office itself was the subject of a major cyber-attack in October, which officials believe was carried out by Chinese hackers, and this came in the midst of a major row between the Government and the Crown Prosecution Service about the prosecution of spies operating here in Parliament.

We will be looking closely at this legislation to identify where the Government should be addressing this cyber-reality with much greater force. An approach to cyber-resilience that looks only at introducing new regulations and compliance burdens without thinking through risks such as a mandated identity scheme, dependence on non-sovereign suppliers, the malign intent of other nations, and a failure to build up our own workforce and skills is one that will fail.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I do not think I heard the Minister mention anything about the risk of cyber-attacks on local government. Does my hon. Friend agree that that is another potentially juicy target for people who wish to cause major mischief?

[Julia Lopez]

As my right hon. Friend is aware, local government is outside of the scope of the Bill, but it is a very juicy target—much of the public sector remains a very juicy target. In acknowledgment of that, the Government whipped out a strategy very quickly this morning that is meant to give us assurances about the public sector’s cyber-resilience. I am not sure that that strategy will provide much reassurance, which is why it is important to understand that this Bill can only be one part of a much wider arsenal to tighten gaps where they exist, in both the private and public sectors.

BBC Leadership

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 11th November 2025 Commons Chamber

[Lisa Nandy]

I am happy to give my hon. Friend that assurance. We are looking both at the charter process and at how we can help to support and defend local news through the BBC’s work. She will also know that this Government are developing a local news strategy to help our local newspapers to survive and thrive in an era in which they face significant pressure. She is absolutely right to say that local news is not just about reflecting the whole nation, although it does play that essential role; it is also often the training ground for some of our most talented journalists, who would otherwise not get those opportunities, so we are determined to strengthen and protect it.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I would fight in the last ditch to prevent the BBC from ceasing to be a public service broadcaster and from being broken up. Any large organisation can have bad actors who behave unethically, and that has happened on this occasion, but it does the BBC no service when people parrot the line that the person responsible for this crisis is not the idiot who tampered with Donald Trump’s quote but a former Tory spin doctor, one of 13 members of the board, who allegedly influenced other members of the board to somehow provoke the present crisis. The crisis has nothing to do with Robbie Gibb; it has something to do with a mindset that, on the front page of today’s Guardian, has the whole thing about Robbie Gibb and relegates the fact that a $1 billion lawsuit may be taken out by Donald Trump against the BBC to a tiny paragraph at the end of the article on page 2. If you wants to know what is wrong with some bits of the BBC, read The Guardian today.

[Lisa Nandy]

I am not entirely sure how to respond to that, but the right hon. Member’s views are now on the record.

Maccabi Tel Aviv FC: Away Fans Ban

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 20th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Lisa Nandy]

On the right hon. Member’s last statement —that everybody must be safe to walk the streets of this country—I agree with him. Perhaps he might make that point to the people he now associates with on his left and right, because that is not what we have heard from them in the last few weeks.

Can I just clear this up? I have heard a lot of hot takes on social media about the evidence on which the police relied to come to their decision. It is right to say that the police, as we would expect, took into account in particular the game in Amsterdam at which Maccabi Tel Aviv fans were present and where a small element caused the most appalling disorder, but they also took into account the real risks presented to Maccabi Tel Aviv fans on the basis that Maccabi Tel Aviv are an Israeli team and many of the fans who would attend are Jewish. I hope that the right hon. Member will be as exercised about that as he is about the behaviour of those fans.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Hopefully we can rely on the police to arrest any hooligans who break the law, whichever team they are supporting. Will the Government take into account the fact that—knowing the way in which terrorist minds work—as there will be such a concentration of police resources on this particular location, Jewish establishments in that part of the country need to be extra careful on that day, such that advantage is not sought to be taken by people who mean them harm?

Victory in Europe and Victory over Japan: 80th Anniversary

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 6th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

What an excellent speech to have the privilege of following.

It is always so impressive when people do their duty right up to the very end, and so I ask the House to salute the passing of Normandy veteran Cecil Newton, who as recently as last year came back to Lepe beach in New Forest East and read out the names of more than a hundred of his comrades in the Royal Dragoon Guards who were killed in the D-day landings and beyond. He was one of 6,000 troops who landed on Gold beach, having departed from Lepe beach. He was in an amphibious Sherman tank that made it to shore—not all of them did—and he survived being wounded in combat too, passing at the great age of 101.

We have heard from many speakers about the connections between their constituencies and the military history of the second world war. That was a theme on which I expatiated back in May 1997 in my very first speech in this House. I will repeat just one reference from that oration, about when I discovered a small plot of RAF graves in Fawley churchyard in my constituency. I could not help but be moved by the inscription on the headstone of a young airman, John Burrow, whose parents had written the following:

“Into the mosaic of victory we lay this priceless piece—our son”.

I thought that that was such a wonderful thing to do in the depths of their loss: to say, nevertheless, that this is what we are doing for the victory of our country over Nazi Germany. I salute them and their memory too.

How does one do justice to the second world war in a few minutes? I will pick out one key factor without which everything else would have been different: the existence of the English channel. There can be no doubt that if we had been contiguous with the continent of Europe, we would have suffered the same fate as all our allies there. There is no way in which we could have resisted being overrun. When we think about how difficult it was to reinvade and retake the continent for democracy in 1944, even with Britain as the launch area for that invasion, we realise how virtually impossible it would have been without the United Kingdom remaining outside Nazi German control.

We can also look at the areas covered by a simple listing of the campaign stars that were awarded: the Atlantic Star, the Africa Star, the Italy Star, the Burma Star, the Pacific Star, the France and Germany Star and, much belatedly, the Arctic Star for the brave men of the merchant navy and the Royal Navy, who risked everything to get supplies to Russia.

Let us not forget one last thing. When the war ended, the country for which we went to war, Poland, remained under occupation by the Soviet Union, and it took another 44 years of determined deterrence, coupled with the nuclear balance of terror, to ensure the eventual emergence of democracy in that country too.

Victory in Europe and Japan: 80th Anniversaries

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 13th March 2025 Commons Chamber

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for her question. Once again, I met the Royal British Legion this week to talk about how veterans can take part. The Royal British Legion has put a call out to all second world war veterans, who can express an interest. There will be activity, not just in London but in our devolved nations and across the country, and we want to ensure that we support veterans to get involved in whatever way they want .

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I congratulate all three Front- Bench spokesmen on their excellent contributions. Does the Minister know whether the BBC will be broadcasting some of the films—not jingoistic, but thoughtful and realistic—that were made and broadcast in cinemas during the war years? Will there be any reminder of the fact that the end of the war, though joyous for the liberated nations, did not mean the same thing for those countries in central and eastern Europe—including Poland, for which we went to war—that were left occupied by the Soviet Union, and that at the start of the cold war, only our alliance with America prevented a further conflict following? I hope some of those lessons will be carried forward in the commemorations that the Minister has outlined.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his kind words, and he makes an important point about taking lessons forward. That is something I will take away. He has asked about the BBC; as I mentioned in my statement, the BBC is working with us to deliver the concert on 8 May. Although it will be a commercial decision that I do not want to anticipate, I understand that there will be old films. I also mentioned the augmented reality experience, which will bring to life four well known VE Day photographs so that people can see them in colour and listen to an audio history that will go with them.

Telegraph Media Group: Proposed Sale to RedBird IMI

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 30th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Julia Lopez]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising an issue of principle, which I perfectly understand, as something that I speak about in relation to the BBC, and how it must have editorial independence from the Government. As a principle, I would be concerned about Government ownership of any media institution, but as he will be aware, I can speak only of principles.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

When the wonderful Taylor Swift discovered that her back catalogue had been bought by a purchaser of whom she disapproved, she began to render it worthless by re-recording all her previous hits. Is that an example that journalists at The Spectator and The Telegraph might do well to follow?

[Julia Lopez]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his mischievous suggestion. I could not possibly comment on it, but I am sure that it has been heard.

Three and Vodafone: Potential Merger

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 14th December 2023 Commons Chamber

[Liam Byrne]

Along with the police. To cap it all, we now have a Minister warning that our investment security regime is out of date with the threats as we now understand them.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for bringing this debate before the House. I am here primarily to listen, rather than contribute, but it is overwhelmingly clear that the relatively new Investment Security Unit is tailor-made to consider a merger proposal such as this one.

However, does the right hon. Gentleman realise that, if he gets his wish and the Investment Security Unit does consider the merger proposal, the Intelligence and Security Committee would be blocked from scrutinising the work of that unit? The Government originally said that all its work should have been overseen and scrutinised by what was the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee. The unit is now in the Cabinet Office, but even now, we are still not being allowed to scrutinise it. There is something very strange, if not sinister, going on. We have demanded the right to look at the classified elements of that unit’s work.

Finally, if the right hon. Gentleman were allowed into a secure room to look at the documentation that will come before the Investment Security Unit, if it is ever allowed to look at this deal, does he believe that his looking at that documentation without cleared staff, without being able to take notes and without being able to go away and discuss it with anybody else—as we on the Intelligence and Security Committee can do under our special regime—would amount to effective scrutiny of something with such clear security implications?

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[Chris Loder]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind intervention. The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill made a lot of those points, along with my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), and I agreed with them earlier in my speech. This area needs much greater scrutiny. I remember not long after first coming to this House a few years ago, we had considerable concern about the behaviour of companies that was taking place, or could take place, that would put our national security at risk. That is why I support the comments made earlier by both right hon. Gentlemen.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

On that point, I recall that in 2021, while the National Security and Investment Bill was going through the House, the Government repeatedly said from the Dispatch Box that in any conflict between economic interest and national security their policy was that national security would come first. That was the whole point of bringing in the legislation. Now it appears that there is even a question mark on whether the structures set up in the legislation will examine this proposed questionable deal, let alone allow it to be effectively scrutinised by Parliament once they have done that examination.

[Chris Loder]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. He makes a very valid point. I recall the debates we had in the House several years ago and I think they were very meaningful. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Minister will respond to some of the genuine concerns that a number of us in this House have.

In its first line, the Vodafone and Three brief states that the current UK telecoms market—their own industry—is dysfunctional, and that consolidation is needed to remedy that. I regret to say to the House that, having gone through that and some of the excellent briefings received from other organisations, I am not convinced that the merger is the right thing to do. A number of points have been made on national security, competition and the consumer that indicate to me that it is not necessarily in the interests of the country or the consumer. The brief confirms that, talking about billions of pounds—or euros, on the website—which appear to be the only thing they are interested in. It is of huge concern to me that we are going from four operators to three, given the situation we face. I hope my right hon. Friend the Minister will consider what action to take so that the regulator not only has proper teeth to sort out the issues I have mentioned but that in any future decisions genuine consideration is given to whether a potential merger is in the interests of the country and our constituents. I am afraid that at the moment I am not convinced that it is the right thing to do.

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[Sir John Whittingdale]

The overall question of the efficacy of the investment security process is for the Cabinet Office. The right hon. Gentleman may well wish to pursue his inquiry with the Minister responsible. I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend, who chairs the Intelligence and Security Committee, will also have views about the process that the Government have put in place. All I can say to both Select Committee Chairs is that, in relation to this specific merger, we cannot comment on whether it is currently undergoing scrutiny through that process, but we believe that the process that is available for the examination of mergers of this kind on national security grounds is robust. Beyond that, I cannot really go.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I am not asking my right hon. Friend to say whether this particular proposed merger is being investigated. What I am asking him to say is whether the Government accept that there is a significant national security dimension to any proposal for a merger involving a major shareholding by a Chinese subservient company.

[Sir John Whittingdale]

I hope that my right hon. Friend will forgive me; I am not sure that I can even go so far as to say that. It is on the record that the Government believe that foreign ownership of major critical infrastructure raises security concerns, which is precisely why the process was put in place and the Investment Security Unit was set up. We believe that we now have the ability to determine whether there are serious national security concerns, and if it is determined that there are, powers are available to the Government to take action to protect our national security. I think the answer is yes, but I do not want to be drawn into particular countries or companies. If he will forgive me, I will leave it at that.

Several Members raised wider questions. My hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Chris Loder) is right that we need to look at the context in which the merger is possibly being considered. His test of whether it is good for his constituents is a perfectly valid one. As he observed, this is the third time we have debated connectivity in 24 hours. That is a measure of how important it is to people. It is the Government’s very firm view that the roll-out of 5G connectivity has huge potential for such things as public services, industry, transport and education. There will be enormous benefits to obtaining the widespread adoption of 5G—benefits that might amount to £159 billion by 2035.

That is why the Prime Minister’s commitment to the UK becoming a science and technology superpower will deliver benefits for everybody in this country. Connectivity, and the availability of mobile telephony, lies at the heart of that. We are already beginning to see benefits from 5G, but the Government are clear that we wish to move beyond the current basic, or non-stand-alone 5G, towards stand-alone 5G. Considerable investment is taking place: something like nearly £2 billion is being invested by the mobile operators in enhancing and improving their networks, and 5G is now available from at least one operator outside 85% of premises.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 8th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Flynn]

I am delighted to follow the hon. Member for Solihull (Julian Knight), although now I am really interested to know whether he prefers a curry or a pizza. When I came into the debate, I did not expect that to be the topic of discussion.

I am very conscious of time, and I know that a number of people on the Back Benches would like to make contributions to this incredibly important debate. However, I will take the opportunity to set out the SNP’s views on Lords amendments 4 and 5 and, importantly, briefly to reflect on why we are in the situation that we are in. Actually, that kind of ties in to Lords amendment 5: it is because of the mess that the Government have created in relation to Huawei.

When I first came into the House—pre-pandemic, of course—one of the biggest issues being discussed was the situation with Huawei and the flip-flopping that the Government were doing. I respectfully suggest that, in relation to Lords amendment 5, it is almost akin to the fact that they have learned nothing. There is an opportunity before them to ensure that they work with key intelligence partners, as the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) said, to ascertain where the biggest threat sits. But rather than take cognisance of what has been said in the other place, they are simply saying that the plan, as they have it at this moment in time, is good enough. That, from my perspective, simply does not cut it, especially, as we have heard, when some £2 billion has already been wasted on this debacle, notwithstanding the economic impact of being so many years behind in the roll-out of 5G itself. That, in many senses, covers Lords amendment 5.

On Lords amendment 4 and diversification, I will not repeat the exact detail of the amendment because that was done so eloquently by the shadow Minister, but I was a little bit surprised at what the Minister said. If I got the scope of it correctly, she was saying that Lords amendment 4 is far too narrow and would make the Government’s life too difficult. However, the amendment did not seem to suggest that when I cast my eyes on it. In fact, if I read it correctly, in the other place the Government’s position was that the framework was already sufficient, so the Government do not even seem to have clarity between the other place and this place on their actual position. I do not think that that is necessarily a surprise, because they are just looking for a reason not to back an incredibly helpful amendment.

Those are the views of the SNP on the two more contentious amendments. I look forward to the Minister perhaps providing the clarity that the Government have not been able to provide so far. I also look forward to hearing what our esteemed Back Benchers have to say on these matters.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow all the Back-Bench speeches so far.

I would like to blaze in capital letters what the Minister said:

“This is, first and foremost, a national security Bill.”

Something very similar was said when the National Security and Investment Bill—now the National Security and Investment Act 2021—was going through this House and the other place earlier this year. The Intelligence and Security Committee is, as it always has been, a non-partisan organisation. I will therefore be saying some things to please and, probably, to annoy both sides.

The Committee considered the five amendments at a recent meeting. We agreed that the entirety of Lords amendments 1 to 3 was broadly beneficial. We looked at Lords amendment 5 and we understood the temptation to flag up the importance of the Five Eyes relationship. We agreed—it is interesting how closely our deliberations, without consultation, conformed to the views of the Chairman of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull (Julian Knight)—that it was, as he put it, a case of gilding the lily, because whenever a serious objection is raised on security grounds by one of the Five Eyes partners, we take that with the utmost seriousness. That leaves us with Lords amendment 4. For the life of us, we cannot understand why the Government are opposing it. We believe it would strengthen parliamentary scrutiny and provide a valuable annual stocktake on the progress being made on the diversification strategy and how it is helping to improve national security. Therefore, like the Chairman of our parallel Committee, I will not be voting against Lords amendment 4 tonight.

Where does that leave us as a Committee in terms of the two Bills and the amendments thereto? You may recall, Mr Deputy Speaker, that there have been intense arguments both in this place and in the upper House about the failure of the Government to accept amendments that would allow the Intelligence and Security Committee to scrutinise closely the secret aspects that are inevitably involved in those two Bills. I will not digress on this both because I lack time and because you, Mr Deputy Speaker, would instantly call me to order. I will simply say, on ensuring that there is ISC scrutiny of the classified elements that follow from this legislation, that arguments have been advanced by the Government in the other place to say, “Well, the face of the Bill isn’t the place to do it.” We agree with that now; we are taking the Government at their word. Therefore, we have written to the National Security Adviser and asked him to take up the issue with the Prime Minister, so that the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the ISC can be brought up to date to cater for the provisions of this Bill and the earlier Bill that should be part of our purview. That is what the Government promised in 2013 when the legislation was originally put through, for our Committee’s powers, and it is a promise that we expect them to keep.