Liam Byrne

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the Government expanded the scope and scale of its sanctions measures against Russia. This resulted in an increase in export licences needing to be revoked because they were not consistent with new sanctions. Consequently, these licences were revoked under Criterion 1.

Export licence applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis against announced policies and the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria (SELC). Given the high volume of decisions taken every week, the vast majority of licensing applications are decided upon by officials within the Export Control Joint Unit acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, using the framework provided by the SELC. These decisions are taken in consultation with officials from other government departments including the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence.

In practice a very small proportion of export licensing decisions are escalated to Ministers. For example, this happens when a decision is finely balanced or when Ministers have asked for certain types of cases to be referred to them for decision. As with any part of Government, ECJU officials would consult Ministers from the three Departments in the normal course of their work, including on some export control applications, as and when necessary. We do not maintain a central record of how many times this has happened in the last 14 years.

Ministers are always consulted on any decisions related to revoking or suspending licences. We report on the volume of revoked and suspended licences in our Quarterly Statistics and Annual Report. These can be accessed here: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data

As part of our commitment to transparency, HM Government publishes data on export licensing decisions on a quarterly basis in the Official Statistics, including data on outcome, end user destination, overall value, type (e.g. military, other) and a summary of the items covered by these licences. This data is available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data.

The Government has been reviewing export controls and their application to sensitive emerging technologies across a range of sectors.

We are looking shortly to publish the results of that review and launch a public consultation on the process for ensuring the controls evolve to meet the challenge of new and emerging technologies.

As part of our commitment to transparency, HM Government publishes data on export licensing decisions on a quarterly basis in the Official Statistics, including data on outcome, end user destination, overall value, type (e.g. military, other) and a summary of the items covered by these licences. This data is available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data.

The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) has in place an established process for responding at pace to changing conditions in a country where the UK has previously granted export licences, and where those licences remain extant.

The FCDO advises DBT on the situation in country and the risks this poses with respect to the UK’s export control responsibilities. The MOD advises DBT on the risks of diversion of exported goods and national security risks arising from hostile state activity. The Department of Business and Trade, with DBT Secretary of State as the decision-making authority, decides whether to amend, suspend or revoke any relevant licences.

We publish comprehensive Official Statistics every quarter about the decisions we make on licence applications, including any decisions to suspend or revoke licences. This data is available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data.

The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) has in place an established process for responding at pace to changing conditions in a country where the UK has previously granted export licences, and where those licences remain extant.

The FCDO advises DBT on the situation in country and the risks this poses with respect to the UK’s export control responsibilities. The MOD advises DBT on the risks of diversion of exported goods and national security risks arising from hostile state activity. The Department of Business and Trade, with DBT Secretary of State as the decision-making authority, decides whether to amend, suspend or revoke any relevant licences.

We publish comprehensive Official Statistics every quarter about the decisions we make on licence applications, including any decisions to suspend or revoke licences. This data is available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data.

All licences are kept under careful and continual review as standard. We are able to amend, suspend or revoke extant licences and refuse new licence applications as circumstances require.

The Government can and does respond quickly and flexibly to changing or fluid international circumstances. ECJU has in place an established process for responding at pace to changing conditions in a country where the UK has previously granted export licences, and where those licences remain extant.

The criteria for initiating this process can include, but are not limited to, protests, coup d’etats, changes to sanctions, or conflict with a neighbouring country.

The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) has in place an established process for responding at pace to changing conditions in a country where the UK has previously granted export licences, and where those licences remain extant.

The FCDO advises DBT on the situation in country and the risks this poses with respect to the UK’s export control responsibilities. The MOD advises DBT on the risks of diversion of exported goods and national security risks arising from hostile state activity. The Department of Business and Trade, with DBT Secretary of State as the decision-making authority, decides whether to amend, suspend or revoke any relevant licences.    We publish comprehensive Official Statistics every quarter about the decisions we make on licence applications. This data is available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data.

Given its diplomatic sensitivity, the Government is unable to disclose the specific number and destination countries of Change in Circumstances Reviews.

The UK is a subscribing state to the 'Code of Conduct for Enhancing Export Controls of Goods and Technology that could be Misused and Lead to Serious Violations or Abuses of Human Rights'. The UK has committed to applying export controls to ensure that relevant goods and technologies are used in compliance with international human rights law.

The Export Control Joint Unit has a regular and ongoing dialogue with the private sector, academics and civil society representatives about all aspects of export control policy and implementation, including human rights.

The UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2023, which is due to be published later this year, will include an update on the creation of the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI) and plans to transition certain functions from the Export Control Joint Unit to OTSI. Once OTSI has been established, we expect it to produce an annual report covering the breadth of OTSI’s activity.

The Government continues to monitor closely the situation in Israel and Gaza.

The Government can and does respond quickly and flexibly to changing international circumstances. All export licences, including Open General Export Licences, are kept under careful and continual review as standard. We are able to amend, suspend or revoke extant licences and refuse new licence applications as circumstances require.

Any changes to Open General Export Licences would be communicated through a Notice to Exporters which would be published on GOV.UK.

The Government continues to monitor closely the situation in Israel and Gaza.

The Government can and does respond quickly and flexibly to changing international circumstances. All export licences, including Open General Export Licences, are kept under careful and continual review as standard. We are able to amend, suspend or revoke extant licences and refuse new licence applications as circumstances require.

Any changes to Open General Export Licences would be communicated through a Notice to Exporters which would be published on GOV.UK.

HM Government publishes data on export licensing decisions on a quarterly basis in the Official Statistics, including data on outcome, end user destination, overall value, type (e.g. military, other) and a summary of the items covered by these licences. This data is available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data.

The most recent Official Statistics cover the period 1 April - 30 June 2023.

Information regarding export licensing decisions made between 1 October – 31 December 2023 will be published after April 2024 and information regarding export licensing decisions made between 1 January – 31 March 2024 will be published later this year.

The Department for Business and Trade works alongside other government departments to regularly assess UK export licences. This includes working with the Ministry of Defence on risks of diversion of exported goods and national security risks arising from hostile state activity.

The Export Control Joint Unit will not issue an export licence to any destination where to do so would be inconsistent with the UK’s Strategic Export Licensing Criteria, including where there is a clear risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of International Humanitarian Law. HMG can and does refuse applications where there is a planned re-export that is inconsistent with the Criteria, or where we assess that the goods may be diverted to an undesirable destination.

The Department for Business and Trade’s Supplementary Estimates Explanatory Memorandum was sent to the chair of the Business and Trade Committee on Friday 15^th March 2024.

There is no fixed allocation of funding for Horizon scandal redress payments. Each redress claim is considered on its merits and the Government is committed to ensuring all necessary funding is available to pay all claims as soon as they are agreed.

Yes, the Secretary of State for Business and Trade will publish an explanatory memorandum in relation to the Department’s Supplementary Estimates for 2023-24.

The £1.09 billion requested by the Department for Post Office related matters as part of Supplementary Estimates for 23/24 is split by £338.4 million Resource Departmental Expenditure Limit (RDEL), and £752.4 million non-cash Annually Managed Expenditure (AME).

The £338.4 million RDEL includes funding for redress to postmasters, investment costs to replace the Horizon IT system, delivery of the Horizon IT Inquiry and compensation schemes, Post Office’s corporation tax liabilities and the Group Litigation Order redress scheme.

The increase of £752.4 million AME budget is due to the expected increase in the provision for likely future costs relating to Post Office redress schemes. The forecast for the outstanding estimated liability is updated and agreed with HM Treasury on an annual basis.

This detail is shortly to be published in the Explanatory Memorandum for the Department.

Funding drawn down by the Department at the Supplementary Estimate relates only to value of expected redress settlements within this Financial Year, as well as other payments outlined above, and not to total amounts paid out to postmasters to date.

We will introduce primary legislation within a few weeks to quash convictions arising from the Horizon scandal.

The final cost of Horizon compensation will depend on the circumstances set out in individual claims. We are promising fair and equal treatment of postmasters, not a set amount of money. The amount we spend will depend on how many people come forward and the claims which are submitted.

The Government has to date committed a maximum of just over £1bn to ensure postmasters are compensated fairly. That is not a forecast: it is an estimate of the maximum Government funding which could be needed for compensation, which we have made in response to our obligation to make subsidies transparent.

The Department for Business and Trade’s resource allocation budget following the Supplementary Estimate for 2023/24 is:

i. The Import of Goods (Control) Order 1954, together with licences made under it, do not make Chinese-origin firms the subject of any restrictions on trade and investment.

ii. Export controls apply to anyone exporting controlled items from the UK, regardless of country of origin. The Government assesses all export licence applications against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria. We will not licence the export of equipment where to do so would be inconsistent with these Criteria.

iii. None. The Procurement Act is not due for commencement until Autumn 2024.

iv. Huawei

v. Eight final orders (which imposed conditions on, or blocked or unwound deals) issued involved acquirers linked to China. All notices of final orders are available on gov.uk.

We do not have this information as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) has not yet entered into force.

The Accession Protocol for the UK’s entry into the CPTPP was signed on 16 July 2023. Entry into force will take place once the UK and the requisite number of CPTPP Parties have finished their legal procedures. We expect this to happen in the second half of 2024.

Joining CPTPP means that over 99% of current UK goods exports to CPTPP will be eligible for tariff-free trade.

This Government is currently in negotiations with eight partners – India, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Canada, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Greenland and the Republic of Korea. We also have plans to start negotiations with Turkey and the Maldives.

With the Machine of Government, Trade Negotiation Group increased its responsibility to cover wider trade policy and FTA implementation. In October 2023, DBT had 722 staff in the Trade Policy, Implementation and Negotiations Group.

This is a matter for the Cabinet Office.

HM Government does not publish data based on products or services, but individual refusals and the items that may have been refused under each one can be reviewed at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data via the Annual Reports, or via the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website at https://www.exportcontroldb.trade.gov.uk/sdb2/fox/sdb/.

The following number of export licences with China listed as the end user destination were refused in each of the last five years:

As per the Atlantic Declaration, the UK and US have a shared objective in preventing our companies’ capital and expertise from fuelling technological advances that will enhance the military and intelligence capabilities of countries of concern. DBT, alongside other relevant departments, is assessing the potential national security risks to the UK posed by Outward Direct Investment, including within subsets of emerging technology. We have engaged with industry and posted guidance on GOV.UK

The Integrated Review 2023 is clear that the UK government supports a positive trade and investment relationship with China, where it is consistent with our interests, values, and national security.

We are reviewing the Presidential Executive Order to consider the impact on the UK and UK businesses and consulting with industry during this time. We understand the US policy remains in a consultative phase following the issuance of the Executive Order. As such, it is still under development.

The Department publishes its support to local government and other bodies as part of the annual report of the application of the Industrial Development Act 1982. This includes details of support to Local Enterprise Partnerships (and relevant Mayoral Combined Authorities) for the delivery of Growth Hubs under sections 11 and 12 of the Act. The budget for 2023/24 is £11.9 million. Future years’ budgets are subject to confirmation under the Department’s normal business planning processes.

As of June 2023, the National Security Strategic Investment Fund (NSSIF) has committed £220m to British Business Bank backed funds, of which £92m has been invested in 217 companies across twelve areas of interest. Private sector investors have invested £718m alongside NSSIF. The sectoral breakdown across the twelve areas of interest is as follows: Audio and Visual Processing £1.1m, Biorisk and Medtech £10.8m, Commercial Space, Platforms and Robotics £1.6m, Computational Behavioural Analysis £1.3m, Cyber Security £14.0m, Data Analytics and AI £28.6m, Financial Technologies £21.7m, Identity Technologies £6.8m, IOT and the Evolving Environment £1.0m, Novel Data Transport £0.1m, Quantum Technologies £2.1m, Sensors, Novel Materials and Power Sources £2.9m

a) The Department for Business and Trade (DBT) and other departments have assessed the high-level strategy published by the EU, which broadly aligns with UK interests. DBT is engaging closely with the EU and Member States across this agenda at ministerial and senior official level, as well as in technical discussions on specific policy areas.

b) Executive Order 14017 instructs heads of US agencies to complete reviews of supply chain resilience. It does not directly impact UK policies. This Government has been proactively working with allies including the US on resilience, including reducing vulnerabilities in critical technologies and on clean energy supply chains through our Atlantic Declaration.

(a) The Import of Goods (Control) Order 1954, together with licences made under it, do not make Chinese-origin firms the subject of any restrictions on trade and investment.

(b) Export controls apply to anyone exporting controlled items from the UK, regardless of country of origin. The Government assesses all export licence applications against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria. We will not licence the export of equipment where to do so would be inconsistent with these Criteria.

(c) None. The Procurement Act is not due for commencement until Autumn 2024.

(d) Huawei

(e) Eight final orders (which imposed conditions on, or blocked or unwound deals) issued involved acquirers linked to China. All notices of final orders are available on gov.uk.

All ministerial meetings with external organisations are published in the quarterly transparency returns.

Steps are being taken by the UK government to protect national security through public procurement including the creation of a permanent National Security Unit for Procurement within the Cabinet Office. As part of the Procurement Act, the Government will introduce new, mandatory debarments for specific types of contracts where the supplier poses an unacceptable risk to national security. The Cabinet Office have committed to publish guidance to assist contracting authorities in assessing national security risk and using their exclusion powers.

Ministers for the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) can control imports into the UK through various means, notably the Open General Import Licence. This permits the importation of all goods into the United Kingdom, subject to various exceptions which include goods such as firearms and nuclear materials. These exceptions are granted under the Import of Goods (Control) Order 1954.

DBT does not have policy responsibility for all import controls — The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is responsible for Government policy on sanctions, although relevant departments work closely together on this.

The UK’s import controls regime is consistent with its domestic and international obligations. Controls can be used for numerous reasons including national security.

The government defines a critical supply chain as one that is vital to the UK’s economy, national security, or essential services. This covers a range of supply chains from critical minerals to essential medicines.

The government does not publish details on which supply chains are critical due to the sensitive nature of this information. My department will shortly be publishing a Critical Imports and Supply Chains Strategy, which will outline the steps that the UK has taken and will be taking to enhance critical imports and supply chain resilience.

The Export Control Act 2002 provides broad powers to control and licence exports, trade, transfers of technology and technical assistance for military goods and technology.

All export licence applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria (SELC). These Criteria provide a thorough risk assessment framework, which requires ECJU to think hard about the possible impact of providing equipment, and the capabilities it could support.

HM Government will not grant an export licence if to do so would be inconsistent with these Criteria, including if there is a risk of diversion to a weapon of mass destruction or military programme of concern, or if the export could present a risk to the UK’s national security.