Draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Code of Practice for Examining Officers and Review Officers) Order 2022

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Monday 13th June 2022 General Committees

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

To echo my Front-Bench colleagues, I think that anything that tries to improve our security should be welcomed, but a few things in this measure do need some clarification. Like the hon. Member for Halifax, I welcome the issue that Jonathan Hall raised about training. And I will give some examples in the code of where I think clarification and record keeping would be important. There is also the fact that there are certain discretions in the measure that give individual officers quite a lot of leeway for interpretation. I accept that no two situations are the same, but in terms of the general piece, once these provisions are enacted, will the Department review their operational effectiveness? Will, for example, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation be allowed to look again at the operational way forward? I think that that would make sure and give us some reassurance that they are actually in effect.

I just want to look at two examples. On the selection criteria for those individuals selected, the code is clear that

“the selection of a person for examination is not conditional upon the examining officer having grounds to suspect that person of being engaged in terrorism, the decision to select a person for examination must not be arbitrary.”

I think we would all agree with that. The code goes on to say that it cannot be

“appropriate for race, ethnic background, religion and/or other “protected characteristics”…to be used as criteria for selection except to the extent that they are used in association with considerations that relate to the threat from terrorism.”

That makes sense. It then lists those considerations, which include

“known and suspected sources of terrorism; persons, organisations or groups whose current or past involvement in acts…; any information on the origins and/or location of terrorist groups; possible current, emerging and future terrorist activity; patterns of travel through specific ports or in the wider vicinity that may be linked to terrorist activity; or appear unusual for the intended destination”.

Those all seem sensible and then, obviously, there is the consideration of intelligence from our security services about named individuals.

However, the last considerations are

“observation of a person’s behaviour”

and/or

“referrals made to examining officers by other security, transport or enforcement bodies”

That seems quite a broad definition.

I accept that when security officials are looking at people coming through points of entry, people acting suspiciously may be a reason for detaining them but, when it comes to training, what are criteria for that? What is the process for record keeping? Somebody may be acting suspiciously, but they may not turn out to be a threat at all. If that is then linked to ethnicity—I accept that that is not an appropriate criterion—that could lead to individuals claiming that they were picked because of their ethnic or religious background. If people are selected in such a way, will records be kept so that we know how many are found to be linked to terrorism and how many are perfectly innocent? That last consideration could be a get-out.

Another operational matter is about the right to legal representation. The code states:

“A person who is being examined at a port, but not detained”—

there is a section later on about the specific legal rights to a solicitor that people if they are detained—

“is not entitled to consult a solicitor. Should the person request to do so, the examining officer may grant this at his or her discretion.”

Again, that leaves a lot of power with the individual to make a decision should legal representation be requested at that point. The code continues:

“When a consultation is allowed, it should be allowed to be conducted in private”—

that is common sense. I also accept this bit:

“The person must be informed that any consultation will not be at public expense.”

However, when it comes to training, what are the grounds for refusal when somebody legitimately wants to consult a solicitor? It may be impractical or unnecessary. As I say, when someone is detained, the conditions for consulting a solicitor are clearly laid out. I would like some clarification around that. Is it about training? Will the examining officer keep records of when people have had requests refused? It may be better to do that in most cases to protect not just the individual but the officer. That is not a criticism of the reasons why this draft order is important.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax said, there are things in the draft order that give discretion, and discretion can sometimes lead to instances of unintended consequences, so I would like some clarification so that we can be sure that these regulations are enacted in the way that was intended, and in a fair and just way.

[Damian Hinds]

I thank all members of the Committee for this important scrutiny sitting and our debate. Several important points were made by the hon. Member for Halifax who speaks for the Opposition, the hon. Member for Falkirk of the SNP and the right hon. Member for North Durham, and I will address them now.

We have to look realistically at the situation we are dealing with: the vast majority of people who arrive on small boats have no documentation with them to indicate who they are or where they are from. Enabling officers to examine those who are being processed for immigration purposes away from the ports, as well as at the ports, means that we can fulfil our duty to safeguard national security, while allowing those individuals to be moved from a port environment to more appropriate facilities.

We do not publish statistics on the results of schedule 7 examinations, because to do so would risk disclosing whether a stop was targeted, and that is an operational matter for the police. I reassure the right hon. Gentleman, however, that there is extensive record keeping and analysis, as he might imagine.

[Mr Jones]

That is reassuring, but does that go to Ministers? It is important for Ministers to have at least oversight of what is going on. If there are blips in statistics, he or she could then at least intervene and ask the questions why.

[Damian Hinds]

I reassure the right hon. Gentleman that such operations have extensive ministerial oversight, and rightly so.

On a number of previous occasions, a well-rehearsed debate on the powers under schedule 7 has been considered in depth, as colleagues know. For now, I reiterate only that those powers have been absolutely integral to the work of the police in detecting and disrupting terrorists for more than two decades. The police do that—I reassure everyone—in a way that is compliant with article 6. Oral answers, as colleagues know, are of course excluded from criminal proceedings.

The hon. Member for Halifax asked specifically about locations and what should be in scope. The key practical operational point here is that people will be in custody or immigration detention, so scope should not arise in general as an issue.

Various colleagues asked about training, and we continue to work closely with the police to ensure that the independent reviewer’s recommendation on training is included. I am grateful to the hon. Lady and others for mentioning the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, because it gives me another opportunity to put on the record my thanks to him for his extremely diligent work.

The code of practice has long been clear that selection of a person based solely on ethnicity or religion is unlawful. It also directs officers to exercise the powers fairly and responsibly, with respect for the people to whom they are applied. All examinees are provided with details of how to make a complaint should they wish to do so, and those detained for more than an hour are entitled to private consultation with a solicitor.

It is important to note that, to date, no independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has suggested that the existing schedule 7 powers are being applied inappropriately. We will continue to work with the reviewer to ensure that the powers are applied proportionately and in the most effective and targeted way, and to minimise disruption to those subject to their use where possible.

I hope that my comments have underscored the importance of the powers and of the code of practice that provides guidance and safeguards on their exercise. I thank all members of the Committee—right hon. and hon. Friends and colleagues from the Opposition parties—for their presence today for this important scrutiny debate. I also thank you, Ms Elliott, and everyone else who has enabled the debate. Keeping the UK safe is the Government’s foremost responsibility, and the provisions within this draft statutory instrument will support that vital endeavour. I commend it to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

National Security Bill

Kevan Jones Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 6th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I am at a bit of a loss to understand why the Government have not brought forward reform of the 1989 Act, because the security services, in evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee, has said it is unfit for purpose—I think even the Government have admitted that, and so has the Law Commission. If we do not amend or substantially change that Act, we will have a situation where someone can get life for foreign espionage under this legislation, but only two years under the Official Secrets Act 1989. Surely this is an opportunity to update all that legislation? I cannot understand why the Government are doing things in this way.

[Priti Patel]

The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that, whether that is the view of the Law Commission or others, reform of the Official Secrets Act is complicated and not straightforward. I can tell colleagues that no one would be happier than I to present a reform agenda in that space, but it is not straightforward—[Interruption.] I appreciate colleagues’ gesturing on the Back Benches, but it is important that on this complex reform we continue to engage with a wide range of interests and give all due consideration to a number of concerns, because there are many, many concerns being raised.

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[Priti Patel]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. He has touched on lobbying, as just one example, but we could expand the list. We have discussed in this House other enablers and facilitators, whether it is through Parliament or other means, to get access to the state, or institutions or arms of the state. I spoke earlier about the lacunas—the areas that we have to close down, or the grey zone, across the board. My hon. Friend has spent a great deal of time on this issue through the Foreign Affairs Committee. He is very much pursuing it and we look forward to working with him on it.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I am listening carefully to what the Home Secretary is saying, but why is there not in the Bill the foreign influence registration scheme that was called for by the Intelligence and Security Committee report on Russia in 2020? She said that the Government are working on it, but the United States have had this legislation since 1939 and the Australians brought in emergency legislation in 2018, so what is so difficult if one country has had it for over 70 years and the other one has brought it in more recently? Why is it not in the Bill? Is it going to be inserted later by an order of the House, which would be unfortunate as we have not had a chance to debate it today?

[Priti Patel]

Our intention is to bring forward foreign agent registration and it will be brought forward in the Commons; let me give that assurance. [Interruption.] The right hon. Gentleman asks what is so difficult about it. There are a number of difficulties. It is not just a case of lifting and shifting what the US and Australia have done. We have been working with our Five Eyes colleagues. There have not just been many debates but we have working with colleagues who have themselves had difficulties in some parts of enforcement. We have had very close links with our Australian counterparts in terms of workability. We want to get it right. There will be an open debate about it in Committee and everywhere else, and we look forward to working with the right hon. Gentleman on that.

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[Priti Patel]

Importantly, this is where we need to join up both ends of the legislation. That is absolutely vital, through this Bill and the wider work on online harms, but there are changes that we certainly want the platforms to be putting in place. We have touched on the accountability of platforms already, but there is just so much more that they need to do and which is their responsibility.

My hon. Friend makes an important point about how, for example, if we look at counter-terrorism offences and platforms’ approaches to footage online, GIFCT—the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism—has led the way on some significant change. That is what we need to see across the board here, and we really need them all to come together.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

On foreign influences, why does the Bill cover someone who “intends” to have a negative impact? Elsewhere, the Bill talks about behaviour that is “reckless” and individuals who “ought reasonably to know” that their behaviour would be damaging. Can I ask why there is this difference between the two? Surely it would strengthen this part of the Bill to have the “reckless” and the “ought reasonably to know” behaviour test.

[Priti Patel]

At the end of the day, we are focused on individuals who are trying to do harm to our country. I will look specifically at that—obviously, I will—but intent is also based on the information and activity that can come together around some of the individuals. Right now, we are only referring to much of this on a case-by-case basis, but as we have learned with recent examples, some of which I might come on to, we can see the intent and the harm in the sequence of activity that has taken place around individuals.

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[Yvette Cooper]

As I have said, these debates will rightly take place through the usual channels to ensure that we have that scrutiny. I am also keen to ensure that the evidence session can take place in plenty of time.



Another issue that Members on both sides of the House have raised is the absence of reforms to the Official Secrets Act 1989, and on that point I am slightly less clear what the Government’s intention is. My understanding from what the Home Secretary has said is that she does not plan to bring forward measures in this Bill but that she is looking at the issue further. The Law Commission has raised important issues about the need to improve prosecutions in certain areas and to have public interest safeguards, both of which are immensely important, as I think the Home Secretary has recognised. Will she and the Security Minister therefore engage at an early stage in discussions on this issue with Members on both sides of the House?

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Like my right hon. Friend, I am not clear what the Home Secretary’s timetable is for reviewing the 1989 Act. However, if the Bill goes through as outlined, some of the penalties in it will be life imprisonment, and some in the 1989 Act will be two years. Having the two Acts working together will create a very difficult process. Surely the obvious thing to do is to get the reforms into the Bill as it goes through Parliament.

[Yvette Cooper]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point, and he obviously speaks with the Intelligence and Security Committee’s insight on this issue. The only other consideration I would raise is that a last-minute proposal from the Government would be a problem, because we would end up not having full scrutiny, and this is an area where it is important to get the legislation right. On the points that the Committee has made about the importance of reforms to the 1989 Act, I encourage the Security Minister and the Home Secretary to have early discussions with members of the Committee, Opposition Front Benchers and Members on both sides of the House who have concerns. We will inevitably need to debate these issues during the passage of the Bill, even if the Government want to propose future legislation on a different timetable. Having those discussions at an early stage to try to get this right would be important.

We are also concerned about areas of the Bill relating to the ability of foreign powers to use misinformation and disinformation online, which the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Damian Collins) mentioned. My understanding of the interaction between this Bill and the Online Safety Bill is that some cases where misinformation or disinformation is repeatedly put online by a foreign state will not be covered and that there will not be a responsibility on social media platforms to remove some of that material, but it would be helpful to have some clarification from Ministers. Obviously that is an area where most of us in the House would want further action to be taken and would want there to be more responsibility on social media companies to take action. We would therefore like to explore whether there are further amendments that we could bring forward to this Bill or the Online Safety Bill. That would be very helpful.

We are also concerned about direct attempts to interfere with our democracy and elections. The Home Secretary has rightly included in the Bill measures to tackle foreign interference in elections but, as the Government will know, offences make little odds if they cannot be detected or measures are rarely enforced. As the Home Secretary will know, we have urged the Government to remove the loophole that allows shell companies to be used to make donations to political parties and to hide foreign donations and donations linked to hostile states. She will also know that the former director general of MI5, Lord Evans, who is now the head of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, has warned about the risks from shell companies, describing the risk from

“powerful forces out there that are trying to bring undue influence, part through parliament and part through money. We made some recommendations to close some of those loopholes but government hasn’t acted on them.”

Since the atrocity that is the illegal invasion of Ukraine, the Government have had to recognise that it has been far too easy for Russian money, built up through illegal activity or state-sponsored corruption, to find its way into the London economy. Again, we have both the follow-up economic crime Bill and this Bill, but I urge the Home Secretary to ensure that the loophole on shell companies is closed and that those weaknesses in our democracy are addressed, because the loophole in itself is a threat to national security.

My hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) raised concerns about MPs being targeted. There are also concerns about Ministers potentially being targeted. The Home Secretary will know that the shadow Security Minister has raised questions about reports that the Prime Minister, when he was Foreign Secretary, met with a former KGB agent soon after the Skripal attack. I have not heard concerns raised that that was a planned or intended meeting, but nevertheless the reports of the meeting show how easy it is for Ministers, as well as MPs, to be targeted by agents of foreign and hostile states. I urge Ministers to provide some clarity about that meeting—whether it took place, whether civil servants were present—and about what protocols should govern how meetings take place for Ministers, what kind of debrief should happen afterwards and what kind of safeguards should be in place, and whether those will be covered by this Bill or we need additional protocols for civil servants, MPs and Ministers.

There are some areas where we will want to question the drafting of the Bill, because it is very broad. For example, there is obviously a difference between someone who is meeting the foreign intelligence agencies of our closest allies—for example an academic who meets with an Australian foreign intelligence service, providing it with useful information that might help with our joint Five Eyes security arrangements and might be in all our interests—and an academic meeting with someone from the Chinese intelligence agencies and handing over intellectual property or research information that undermines British industry.

We are keen to explore in Committee how those differences will be addressed in the Bill and how, for example, it will address some of the issues around co-operation with Ireland over Northern Ireland security issues, which will clearly raise some particular and special cases. We also want to explore what might incidentally benefit a foreign Government and what deliberately benefiting a foreign Government is, and how that is addressed. We also want to address some of the questions around the public interest and national security that hon. Members have raised.

We have already raised directly with the Minister for Security and Borders a series of questions and concerns about the drafting of clause 23, to ensure that it is not too wide and cannot be used to cover individuals committing serious crimes abroad. I welcome the letter we have received from him, but we want to pursue those issues in further detail in Committee.

Perhaps one of the most important issues that the Bill could easily address but does not yet is oversight. Because agencies rightly need to operate behind a veil of secrecy, there needs to be proper oversight to safeguard both those who work within the agencies and the national interest. The Bill rightly introduces an independent reviewer to look at the state threats prevention and investigation measures, and we know that is a parallel arrangement to the independent reviewer arrangements we have for terrorism prevention and investigation measures.

The Home Secretary will know that I have argued previously that it was wrong to replace control orders and that TPIMs were too weak. They have since rightly been strengthened. They are used in only a small number of cases, but it is immensely important that there is oversight of them, and there must be proper oversight of the STPIMs as well. It would not surprise me if they were used even less frequently than TPIMs, but there must be proper safeguards.

There is a gap in the oversight framework. The terrorism independent reviewer looks both at individual TPIMs and at terrorism legislation, so he can look at all of the aspects of terrorism legislation to see where there are gaps and whether it is not working effectively. The scrutiny by David Anderson and by Jonathan Hall has been invaluable. It has been good for Government, good for the agencies, good for Parliament, good for our national security and good for our historic freedoms and having the right safeguards in place.

That scrutiny by the independent reviewer has in the past identified weaknesses in terrorism legislation. Sometimes that has been exactly the point I raised about TPIMs becoming too weak and needing to be strengthened, but the independent reviewer has also identified areas where stronger safeguards were needed, particularly on digital measures, digital infrastructure and digital safeguards. There is a really strong case for having the same kind of independent scrutiny of the operation of these new powers on espionage. The Home Secretary has rightly said that this is important legislation, but also that this is the first time we are drawing up legislation in some of these areas and that some of the legislation has not been updated for many decades, so we should have some humility on this: Parliament will not get all the details right.

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[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), and I congratulate him on his recent inclusion in the Queen’s honours list.

This Bill has been long coming; we have been waiting for several years now. The Government have made some improvements in it, but overall it is disappointing. As my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) said, it is not the comprehensive legislation we were promised and, as has already been mentioned, it does not include the reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989.

The right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I have the privilege of being a member of, said that the Committee has called for nearly the past 20 years for the reform of the 1989 Act. I am one of the two remaining members of the Committee who were on it when we considered our Russia report. We made very clear in the recommendations of the report, published in 2020, that there was an urgent need for reform of that Act, which we described as not being fit for purpose. More importantly, we took evidence from the agencies, which all said that the Act was in need of reform. We recommended that it should be reformed, and said that without any major reform the security services would continue to have their hands tied when trying to tackle the job that we give them.

It is surprising that reform of the 1989 Act has not been brought forward in this Bill, because it has not just been raised by the ISC and the security services; the Government themselves have repeatedly said that the Act needs to be changed and reformed. In a 2020 report, the Law Commission also concluded that the Act was “outdated” and in “urgent need of reform”. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood, I am at a loss as to why this reform is not in the Bill.

The 1911 to 1939 Official Secrets Acts are clearly repealed through the Bill, but if we do not change the 1989 Act, the current problems will persist. As has been mentioned, the requirement to prove damage from unauthorised disclosures is in most cases a real barrier to prosecution, and in some instances leads to more sensitive information having to be produced in court. That is a deterrent; it is a weakness that explains why the Act is not being used. Also, as I mentioned in an intervention on the Home Secretary, the maximum sentence under the 1989 Act is two years. In the Bill, we are introducing life sentences. I do not know what deterrent two years would be, even with the hurdles we have to get over, so I am at a real loss as to why these reforms have not been included in the Bill.

I am not clear from what the Home Secretary said when that reform will be brought forward. We all know how tight legislative time is. I would have thought that once the Government had a large Bill such as this one, they would want to do everything at once. Could it be that there is a lack of time? No, I do not think so, because the changes being put forward have been considered over many years. We need an explanation from the Government as to why this reform is not being done.

[Mr Steve Baker]

The right hon. Gentleman is making some very good points. I rather imagine that the damage that could be caused by an unlawful disclosure could include people losing their lives, and that one problem is that proving that damage could lead to yet further people losing their lives. I do not wish to tempt him where he must not go, but can he give those of us without access to classified information any indication of whether my worst imaginings are in any way accurate? If they are, it seems to me that a life sentence might be appropriate.

[Mr Jones]

I would not want to go anywhere near what is in the hon. Gentleman’s imagination. All I can say is: yes, we are talking about information that will have an impact not only on our general security, but on the security of individual agents and others. That is why I support the Law Commission’s recommendations to introduce a public interest defence and to create an independent statutory commissioner to investigate wrongdoing or criminality where disclosure would otherwise constitute an offence under the 1989 Act.

The absence of reform means that if we pass the Bill as it is now, there will be nothing in it to guard against large, mass disclosures of sensitive information; we will still rely on the 1989 Act. Even if somebody indirectly helped foreign powers, I cannot see how we could bring them to book under this Bill. We should support the introduction of a public interest defence, because it would make it easier to bring prosecutions. I have heard some people say, “This would really give journalists and others an opportunity to throw secrets out there.” No, it would not; it would put the onus on them to argue in court that it is in the public interest that the information is disclosed. It would be welcome, as it would ensure that people thought about what they did.

[Mr David Davis]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the Katharine Gun case is a good demonstration? The prosecution was dropped at the point of trial, probably because the Government could not predict how a jury would interpret her public interest defence rights without any codification.

[Mr Jones]

The right hon. Gentleman raises an interesting point. Without reform, the courts will define public interest anyway. I would sooner have this place define it than leave it to the courts or allow an ad hoc system to build up over time. I do not understand why the Bill does not take that opportunity, because it would help. Some journalists think that it would be a way of stymieing them, but I think it would clarify the position on the information that can be put in the public domain and would actually help to make that defence. I would rather have this House than a court of law setting those parameters.

The Law Commission made another recommendation that I think worthy of consideration, although we need to work out how it would work in practice:

“an independent commissioner to receive and investigate complaints of serious wrongdoing where disclosure of the matters referred to may otherwise constitute an offence under the Official Secrets Act 1989. That commissioner would also be responsible for determining appropriate disclosure of the results of that investigation.”

That would provide another valve in the pressure cooker of the system when people think that wrongdoing needs to be highlighted.

I would love to know why the Government have missed the opportunity to bring all these things forward in the Bill. I hope that as it passes we can insert some of them: that would not only strengthen the Bill, but give our security services the toolkit that they need.

The foreign influence registration scheme, which we called for in the 2020 Russia report and which is supported by the agencies, would make it unlawful to be an undeclared intelligence officer. I accept that there are issues with definition, but the consultation on the Bill described it as a key component of the new regime, yet for some reason it is not in the Bill. I hear the Home Secretary’s promises, but—call me old-fashioned—I think we should have it before us today to debate on Second Reading.

[Bob Seely]

The right hon. Gentleman is making a valuable point. One of the problems that we have to get to grips with is the difference between a paid-up agent—the sort of old-school spy who worked for the KGB and others—and someone who works ostensibly for the United Front and is not technically a spy, but is cultivating a malign and covert form of influence. Arguably, they are both as damaging. This is a genuine question: how does one decide which of the two is more serious? Do we equate them, in this day and age?

[Mr Jones]

I think transparency is the way to do it. That is why Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act, which was introduced very quickly in 2018, requires anyone engaging in lobbying or any kind of communications activity for the purpose of political influence on behalf of a foreign principal to be registered. The US scheme, which has been mentioned, was introduced in 1938 and came into force in 1939. If Australia and the US have such schemes, I am sure we can have one.

Personally, I think transparency is the best way forward. The approach that I understand the Government are looking at—having a list of countries on behalf of which people working have to register—is asking for trouble and will have to be updated over time. The Australian system and the US system are far better because they are all-encompassing.

[Bob Seely]

I disagree slightly with what the right hon. Gentleman is saying, although he is making a very good point. I think there is a very good argument for treating Oleg Deripaska differently from the New Zealand tourism board. For one, there should be a very light level of registration, because clearly the New Zealand tourism board is unlikely to be a front for anything other than New Zealand tourism, whereas Russian oligarchs, the Huaweis of this world and the United Front may hide all sorts of nasties behind them. If the Government have the courage to name China along with Russia, North Korea and Iraq, that is potentially an attractive option, is it not?

[Mr Jones]

It is, but an active list that has to keep being updated is a problem. I would go broad first. If the New Zealand tourism board had to be caught by that—I am not sure we have anything to worry about from the New Zealand tourism board, apart from representing a fantastic country that is a great place for tourism—the important point is that it would be fair across the board. Again, I do not understand why that measure is not being brought forward today.

I will raise one last concern, which is about clause 23 and has been raised by the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam and also my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood. I see no purpose for the clause at all. I want to know from the Government what it is that is not already in legislation that they are trying to get at, or where the clause has come from, because it is certainly something I have never seen raised by the security services at the Intelligence and Security Committee. If we are to have this clause, I would also like to see some kind of oversight of it, whether that is the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or some other networks. Otherwise, the Bill is giving a large degree of latitude to individuals.

We should remember that this has been a hard-fought issue. The shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), raised the important point—let us be honest, it has happened over a period of time—that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has been excellent in improving the oversight and robustness of the regulation around our security services, which are so important, and the confidence that people can have in that.

With that, I welcome that we have a Bill, but is it a Bill that will do what it says on the tin? I am not sure it will. It will need a lot of changing in Committee.

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[Mr Baker]

My hon. Friend makes his point extremely well, but I hope he will not mind if I say that I do not want to be diverted to that subject, not least because I want to foreshorten my speech a little.

My other point about STPIMs relates to the introduction of polygraphs, which is an area that I have not had the chance to research as much as I might have liked. Can my right hon. Friend the Minister let us know whether this is the first time that we have legislated for their use or whether a new principle is being introduced into our law? Polygraphs are not perfectly reliable. I have read the explanatory notes, but I wonder whether their introduction is an innovation.

I am really concerned about the development of certain trends in the rule of law, as evidenced in arguments that I have made. As a result of the Online Safety Bill, we now have the concept that some speech is legal but harmful, which seems to me a fuzzy concept of what is and is not allowed in law. That is not where I want our country to be, but I accept that I am not a learned mind in this place—I am only a humble aerospace and software engineer, and an MSc in computer science does not always cover such difficult matters of fuzzy logic.

The main issue that I want to address is about extraordinary rendition. Schedule 3, “Detention under section 21”, in part 1, “Treatment of persons detained under section 21”, under the cross-heading “Place of detention”, states:

“(1) The Secretary of State may designate places at which persons may be detained under section 21.

(2) In this Schedule a reference to a police station includes a reference to any place which the Secretary of State has designated under sub-paragraph (1) as a place where a person may be detained under section 21.”

Putting it in plain English, the Secretary of State may make provision to detain people other than at police stations, and constables must take those people to those places. Colloquially, when we were looking at extraordinary rendition, those places were known as secret prisons. I would very much like to know from the Minister why we need to nominate other places to detain people. Will they be detained to the same standard as in a police station? I would very much expect so. What are these places? I am aware of some of them, but where are they, and for what reason can people not be detained at a police station?

That point brings me on to extraordinary rendition. Look at what happened to us after 9/11—the wars we waged, the principles of civilisation and freedom that had kept us free and given us something to be proud of and to fight for, and which we undermined. “The Principles relating to the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas and the passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees”—a Government document that is freely available—makes it absolutely clear that the

“UK Government does not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone unlawful killing, the use of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (‘CIDT’), or extraordinary rendition. In no circumstance will UK personnel ever take action amounting to torture, unlawful killing, extraordinary rendition, or CIDT. The UK takes suggested incidents of this kind very seriously: these allegations against UK personnel are investigated and complaints in this context are brought to the attention of authorities in other countries”.

Having bumped into some relevant officials, I am extremely satisfied that we take this very seriously.

Going back to the earlier commissioner’s report that I read out, I am absolutely not casting aspersions on our brave and honourable staff, every one of whom, on the few occasions I have met them, I have been incredibly impressed by. I believe that they are seeking to uphold the very highest standards. That is why I put it to my right hon. Friend the Minister that this Bill would be a great moment to put these principles on a statutory footing. In that way, in future, when there is another panic over terrorism and security under another Government who are perhaps not as strongly principled as this one—perhaps with not quite the same culture at the top of adherence to and compliance with the law—we can all be reassured that we will not allow ourselves to come on to conduct that I will touch on in a moment.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Since the issue of rendition, we have had the consolidated guidance and now we have the principles where the warrants are overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Having reviewed the principles in terms of the ISC, it is clear that they are quite robust not only in the safeguards they give but in training people throughout the organisation to ensure that they adhere to them.

[Mr Baker]

I have read enough of the various documents to know that the right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right, and I am glad to agree with him.

I do not want to open up too many old wounds, but I have read the excellent book, “Account Rendered”, by the now Lord Tyrie, which includes some purportedly declassified top secret documents on how the CIA conducted their interrogation techniques. I very much hope that Ministers responsible have read those documents, because I found it quite nauseating. I am ex-forces. If you are ex-forces, then at some time in your life you are actually committed to killing our enemies, but even so I found it nauseating to see just how degrading authorised American interrogation techniques could be. The list of what they would do includes the attention grasp, or grasp by collars; walling, or slamming people against a false flexible wall; the wall standing stress position; the facial hold; facial slap stress positions; waterboarding—I think we can pretty clearly be disgusted by that—and cramped confinement, including putting insects in a box with a person who you know has a phobia. Imagine combining all these things using nudity, control of diet and restraint, putting them all in sequence deliberately for prolonged periods. That is what the declassified documents in “Account Rendered” give an account of.

I completely agree with the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) that these principles are absolutely robust, and I am 100% certain in my own mind that our brave officials—men and women good and true, noble and decent—would never want, in any sense, however distant, to be complicit in extraordinary rendition for the purpose of degrading treatment. I am absolutely clear about that. But our job in this House is not to simply trust the great and good people that we have today; it is to put in place a law that makes sure that in future everyone can understand that we do not do these things, not least because showing that we are on the right side of the argument will help us to recruit agents overseas.

I am dead serious about this. It is no reflection on my very high estimation of the people who serve us and keep us safe; it is about worries about the future when there is another panic about another terrorist attack. I say to my right hon. Friend the Minister: if public-spirited lawyers draw up clauses that can put these excellent, robust principles on a statutory footing, I will certainly seek to maximise support for it, because in future we must make sure that no Government of any colour can ever discredit our great people by raising even the slightest suspicion that we might have been even distantly complicit in cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment of prisoners.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Hinds]

If my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me, I will not.

The existence of a public interest defence could mean that damage from the original disclosure could be compounded by further disclosures that had to be made to argue against and defeat that use of the public interest defence. That could itself then in turn be misused and mean that in some circumstances, even where there were egregious breaches of the law, in effect they could not be prosecuted. That is why, to respond to the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East, it is important that we look at the safe and proper channels and methods for making disclosures, where that is important, and there are times when it is. We are looking carefully at that.

To come back to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings—this is an important point in general—the defences in part 1 of the Bill provide law enforcement with several options for prosecuting disclosures where the person is acting for or on behalf of a foreign power or where the disclosure would materially assist a foreign intelligence service. That can include bulk disclosures. To be clear, with this Bill, the maximum sentence for an indiscriminate disclosure—a bulk data dump—will be higher than it is today if that act is done for a foreign power or the disclosure would materially assist a foreign intelligence service, even if not procured by that foreign intelligence service itself.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Damian Hinds]

I must ask the right hon. Gentleman to forgive me—

[Mr Jones]

Why?

[Damian Hinds]

Oh go on then, one last time.

[Mr Jones]

I am intrigued by what the Minister has just said. Which Act will we use? Will we use this new Act, or will we use the Official Secrets Act 1989? They are clearly mutually contradictory.

[Damian Hinds]

Prosecuting authorities have to make judgments. The Bill is specifically about national security, but within that it is about countering state threats. It gives us a whole new set of tools and weapons to add to our arsenal, and, notwithstanding the right hon. Gentleman’s body language, I think that that is much to be welcomed.

My hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) asked a specific question about police stations. Because of the new arrest power in the Bill that can last up to 14 days, the Secretary of State may be required to designate specialist sites to meet the operational need, but I want to reassure my hon. Friend that this has nothing to do with extraordinary rendition. The provision mirrors those in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Terrorism Acts to ensure that appropriate facilities are available. However, it is not possible to designate such a place outside the United Kingdom. The Government are clear about the fact that torture, mistreatment and arbitrary detention are contrary to human rights law.

Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Bill

Kevan Jones Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 7th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

I will give way shortly, but first I will make some progress, if I may.

This will be about hurting Putin and his vicious regime, which has robbed the Russian people of their chance for democracy, peace and prosperity—not only that, but even their own wealth has been used and abused by these kleptocrats and oligarchs. The reforms in the Bill will give us greater power and more information to identify and investigate the illicit wealth of Russian criminals, their allies and their proxies. The new property register will have an immediate effect, dissuading those intending to buy UK property with illicit funds. Oligarchs could be slapped with an unexplained wealth order—one of the tools that we will have at our disposal—and the Treasury will be better able to act when financial sanctions are breached. We are implementing the most severe package of sanctions ever imposed on Russia or on any major economy.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

The right hon. Lady spoke about unexplained wealth orders. Does she have a commitment from the Treasury to ensure that the National Crime Agency and other agencies that deal with those orders are well financed?

[Priti Patel]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a very important point; I am pretty certain that he has raised several times in this House the need for legal protections, finance and an approach that gives law enforcement the tools it needs. The Bill is doing that, and we are acting not only through legislation, but through the wider way we help agencies and law enforcement to function, operate and go after those who have been undermining our system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alison Thewliss]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct to point that out. This money has been around the world many times and we may never ever find out where it has come from, but we could take further action to stop it coming through bank accounts in this country, helped by lawyers and accountants in this country, and the Bill does not go far enough to deal with the people who are facilitating this economic crime.

On the register of overseas entities, Members will know that I sat on the Joint Committee with the Lords on the draft Registration of Overseas Entities Bill, because I have mentioned it several times before. I cannot understand why it took so long before we had this legislation coming before us today—and in such haste, I should say. Introducing the registration of overseas entities is intended to shed light on the individuals behind overseas companies that control property in the UK, and that is welcome, but again it is too late. The proposals were discussed in detail in that scrutiny Committee, and I still do not understand—I would like some kind of explanation from the Minister, if he would stop chatting—why the Government twiddled their thumbs for four years instead of getting on with implementing such legislation.

I should note that the Scottish Government have moved on this. The register of persons holding a controlled interest in land in Scotland will come into effect and start operating, by taking names on the register, on 1 April. I seek some information from Ministers about what exactly will be the interaction between this register of property in Scotland, which includes overseas entities, and the provisions they are trying to pass today. It has been remarked by a number of organisations that the Scottish register will actually have transparency at its heart and has better transparency than what Ministers are proposing with their register. I would ask that they go to that higher level, rather than ask Scotland to level down on what we are putting on the register of persons holding a controlled interest in land.

Transparency International has estimated that £6.7 billion of questionable funds has been invested in UK property since 2016, of which at least £1.5 billion-worth has been bought by Russians accused of corruption or links to the Kremlin. When we take into account the secret nature of these transactions and how hard it is to get the actual information, the real figure is likely to be much higher.

The Bill as it stands will give the owners of about 95,000 foreign-owned properties six months to reveal their identities. I am glad that the Government have cut that back from the original 18 months they proposed in the draft Bill, but as things stand six months gives people an awful long time to move their money, down what Oliver Bullough calls the “Moneyland tunnel”, to hide those assets and to spirit them away to where they cannot be seen and cannot be found. Such secret jurisdictions will be used by the people who want to do this.

I would like to know from the Minister whether this register will be to the same standards as the Companies House register just now, because the Companies House register is basically full of guff. I have said this many times, but someone can register a company to “Anytown, Anyplace”. I could register one in the Minister’s name if I wanted to, and if I did not give any indication that I had done that, I would get away with it scot-free. The Minister really needs to tell the House what the standards of registration for these companies will be.

Our new clause 4 suggests that Companies House should be an anti-money laundering body, and it should use the Government’s Verify scheme to make sure that a person is a real person when they register a company at Companies House. I want to know what this register of overseas entities is going to look like and how we can make sure that the data put in will be maintained.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Does the hon. Lady agree that full transparency at Companies House of who owns companies is in everyone’s interests? It was only because of the investigation undertaken by Caroline Wheeler of The Sunday Times that we discovered that Viktor Fedotov was one of the beneficial owners of Aquind, a company that has given huge sums of money to individuals in this House as donations. Does the hon. Lady think it would perhaps have helped some of those individuals decide whether to accept that money if they had known that Fedotov was an owner, especially because of his track record of alleged corruption in the Transneft gas pipeline deal?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I too welcome the Bill, but it angers and saddens me that it has taken the invasion of a European sovereign nation, and the fact that women and children in Ukraine are being bombed as we speak, to bring it forward.

We have heard the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) say that this Bill is about closing “loopholes”. No, it is not. This situation is because of a choice that was made. My right hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) said that action should have been taken earlier, and it should have been. The ISC, the Committee I sit on, said in its annual report of 2019-2021 that

“the extent of Russian influence in the UK is very clear—the previous Committee found it to be ‘the new normal’, as successive Governments have welcomed the Russian oligarchy with open arms. As a result, there are a lot of Russians with very close links to Putin who are well integrated into the UK business, political and social scene… Yet…few, if any, questions have been asked regarding the provenance of their considerable wealth and this ‘open door’ approach provided ideal mechanisms by which illicit finance could be recycled through the London ‘laundromat’”.

This situation has not happened by accident; it has happened because we have had a Government who have turned a blind eye to what is going on. It now comes as a great shock to some people that we are going to have to legislate. The Prime Minister says we are going to bring in the toughest sanctions against oligarchs, and the hon. Member for Meriden (Saqib Bhatti) has repeated that we will have the toughest rules in the world. No, we will not, because this Bill will not do that. We will have another economic crime Bill to bring in further legislation, but this issue has been around for years and this Government have turned a blind eye to it. It is no good crying crocodile tears for the people of Ukraine and saying that we are going to react now, when we could have reacted years ago and this Government took a political choice not to.

As the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran) said, this is also about having the right culture of enforcement, which we do not have. The hon. Member for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills) is correct that it is not just about Russian oligarchs; it is about cleaning up the entire system. For the past 10 years, the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and I have been campaigning on landfill tax fraud—another area that has been completely ignored. This Government have had a light touch on economic crime.

The security implications of the money that is around Putin were well documented in the ISC’s Russia report. All I will say—because I cannot say any more—is that this is further well documented in evidence in the secret annex, which will not be published, quite rightly, for security reasons. The Government say, “We don’t know who to go after; we don’t know what the actual extent is”, but they do.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith (Andy Slaughter) said, as part of the will to have enforcement, we must ensure that any of the measures in the Bill are properly financed. It is no good the National Crime Agency taking a knife to a gunfight when going up against some of these individuals. That is exactly how it has been described to me by some of the individuals who work for the National Crime Agency. When I asked the Home Secretary whether she had extra resources for the NCA to implement these measures, she ducked and weaved around the answer. Without that, these measures will not be effective.

If we want a lasting testimony to do something really good and ensure that the people now suffering in Ukraine know that we are doing everything we possibly can—not the glib words of the Prime Minister, which we know are just soundbites that do not stand up to a great deal of scrutiny—then we need to ensure we bring in this Bill and very quickly bring in any other provisions to stop this illicit finance. That not only will have an effect in this area but—I agree with the hon. Member for Amber Valley on this—will clean up this country, and that is long been overdue.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jonathan Reynolds]

The right hon. Member pre-empts my comments about the timescale for implementation and the worries relating to that, and there have been some very interesting and valid speeches from all sides pointing out such dangers.

However, I want to address the fact—we have not actually heard about it in the debate today, such is the seriousness of the issues—that there is, and we should acknowledge this, an argument against the transparency that all of us are seeking. It is that there are some celebrities or people of high net worth who will cite concerns about privacy in relation to this measure. They would say that they are worried there will be potential risks to them from this register coming into effect.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

On transparency, and I raised this with the Home Secretary when she was here, there is the issue of Companies House. It was only because of Caroline Wheeler from The Sunday Times that we actually found out who the other shareholder is in Aquind, a company that has donated tens of thousands of pounds to individual Members of this House. That was because, strangely enough, the Luxembourg register is more open than ours. Does my hon. Friend think that, if Members wish to accept donations, this would be helpful to them, because at least they could then discover where the money actually came from originally?

[Jonathan Reynolds]

My right hon. Friend’s point about donations is absolutely well made. His earlier point was about how some of the things we are seeking to address with this legislation we know about because of whistleblowers and investigative journalists. It is only because of them that we have been able to get some sense of the scale of the problem, and that is what should worry us, because we have to decide, as British Members of Parliament, about the proportionality of the concerns about this. I would ask those people who have such concerns to understand that the lack of transparency in the UK, as things currently operate, does not just open us up to risks of criminal activity, but is now a threat to our national security.

Like many people, I once believed that, as countries developed and became wealthier, that created an irresistible pressure for political reforms—for strong institutions, independent courts and the rule of law—but the fact is that that has not happened in many parts of the world. We are all too familiar with stories of people who have looted the national wealth of their countries, and then stashed those assets safely here in the west. There are examples from Nigeria, Kenya, Indonesia, China, Afghanistan, Russia and many others, and I would like to thank Transparency International for its campaigning and advocacy on these matters. Ukraine itself was once a major victim of this under the corrupt presidency of Viktor Yanukovych. Such corruption often leaves behind countries that are poor and dysfunctional, where the state is starved of the resources and legitimacy it needs to function properly, and where millions are denied the path to prosperity that they deserve. In that space, extremism and terrorism can thrive, so we simply cannot allow this to go on.

Tackling this properly clearly requires international co-operation, but when it comes to registers of beneficial ownership, that co-operation does now exist. That is why there is clear consensus on this happening in relation to property in the UK. This debate has shown that the principal difference of view between ourselves and the Government, which we will obviously discuss in Committee, is what length of time is reasonable to give people to register the beneficial ownership of the near 100,000 properties that will be affected. I think people know that we want 28 days. The Government originally proposed 18 months, and I do acknowledge that they have moved some way in reducing that to six months. I also acknowledge that this is a significant change for some people in relation to their property rights.

However, I would say that this change was announced in 2016 by David Cameron. The pre-legislative scrutiny took place in 2018, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) outlined some of the history of that. So this change has been a long time coming, and people have known it was coming. It is not really the 28-day implementation period we are seeking, but the six years and 28 days that that adds up to. That is why I believe it is reasonable, proportionate and necessary to ask the Government to act at speed.

The second part of the Bill proposes changes to unexplained wealth orders. I raised the problems with these orders when we had the urgent question. I am pleased to see them included as part of this Bill, and I again acknowledge that the Government have already accepted several Labour amendments on this matter. The problems with these orders relate to issues with implementation that have occurred in the courts, so it is clearly good to see those addressed. However, many Members went further in their speeches because there are concerns, because of the way that Russia operated in the 1990s, that it can be hard to use unexplained wealth orders to take the action required now. Several Members have proposed a new set of powers that could freeze relevant assets while cases are made, and again we can deal with those amendments in Committee, but I am sympathetic to the arguments put forward.

The third part of the Bill relates to sanctions and their application. People are asking us as Members of Parliament why those who have been subject to sanction by the US and the EU are not currently sanctioned by the UK. The debate today recognises that the regime laid out in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 is not sufficient. There is clearly a widespread desire to see this improved, and proposals in this area are welcome. However, I would also say, separate to this, that there are the issues of resources and enforcement. My right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) and the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) made that point in detail. My understanding is that, as a country, we are under-powered in the resources and capacity we devote to this. Just last month, the former Leader of the House—now the Minister for Brexit Opportunities and Government Efficiency —said he wanted to cut 65,000 civil servants over the next three years. However, this is a clear example of an area where we need more capacity, as well as the right legal regime, to do what is required. The seriousness of these matters means that the Government must devote the resources required to do that.

Foreign Interference: Intelligence and Security

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

I return to my earlier comments about vetting and the support that is currently in place. We can work together to close down any issues of concern. For the assurance of not just all right hon. and hon. Members but the British public, who will no doubt be watching this debate and wondering how on earth any malign influence could enter the heart of our democracy, we will continue to work collectively to make sure we put all the protective measures in place.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

In her statement, the Home Secretary said it was a fact that this kind of activity has become more apparent, but the United Front Work Department has been in existence since 1949, it has a budget of £3 billion a year, and for many years it has used useful fools to propagandise its arguments. May I ask the Home Secretary about universities in particular? There is evidence, certainly from Australia and other countries where tough action has been taken, that the Confucius Institutes are backed by money from the United Front Work Department. Is it not about time we closed them down, and is she content that the Department for Education is responsible for monitoring this?

[Priti Patel]

The right hon. Gentleman referred first to the prevalence of the activity that we are seeing. Yes, there is more activity, for a number of reasons. Technology changes, these threats evolve and develop with time, and tradecraft adapts and evolves as well. That brings me to his second point, which was about our academic institutions. This is the subject of an ongoing discussion. I have been in many committees where it has been raised, including the ISC, and it is being discussed across Government. He asks whether the Department for Education is doing enough. We have spent a great deal of time working with the Department.

Let me say something about the legislation that we want to introduce. We are learning from other countries, such as Australia—indeed, I had a bilateral meeting just last week. This is also part of the work of Five Eyes. A lot of work is being done to look at the institutional impacts of hostile state activity, alongside issues such as foreign agent registration. We want to get this right through future legislation, and that is what we are working on.

Channel Crossings in Small Boats

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Monday 22nd November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

It is self-evident. I do not want to enter the confused politics of the Labour party when it comes to migration, ending free movement and all of that, because Labour has resolutely voted against everything that we have done on immigration since the general election. The Nationality and Borders Bill is an end-to-end approach. There is no silver bullet. If there was, clearly we would not be seeing thousands of migrants entering our country illegally; not only that—solutions would have been found by now. Wholescale reform is vital, which is why we have the Bill. I am the first Home Secretary in 20 years to look at end-to-end reform of the system. I have worked on that reform for 18 months and introduced it in February this year. I urge all colleagues, certainly on the Government Benches, to back the Bill and focus on its delivery.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

In response to my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn), the Home Secretary was clearly not a fan of the Dublin regulation, so will she explain what negotiations are taking place to replace it? Will she also explain what we would do with individuals if we moved them to Albania or any other third country, and they failed the asylum system?

[Priti Patel]

First, I apologise to the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn), because he did ask specifically about negotiations. There are a range of negotiations taking place, but he specifically asked about Dublin in relation to the EU. As he has heard me say already, that is an EU competency issue right now. We are having active discussions—this would not keep the Commission happy—with France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Italy, Greece, as of today Poland, and other countries. This is really important. They are having discussions with us because of their own frustration with the lack of progress in tackling wider long-term and long-scale issues around illegal migration, as well as returns and readmissions. All Governments are very much concentrating on these topics right now.

The right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) asked about third country offshoring. We will look at all options right now; it is right and proper that we do so. Not only that—we will look at resettlement routes for people who have entered our country legally and have no legal rights to be here. If they cannot be returned to their own country, it is right that we look at how we can resettle them elsewhere in the long term.

Salisbury Incident 2018: Update

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 21st September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

My hon. Friend is correct in the case he is making. There has to be a fair degree of openness, honesty and transparency on the acts that have taken place; lives have been lost and today’s ruling is significant, so he is absolutely right in the way in which he has been making the case, and I hope he achieves the outcome he is seeking.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I thank the Home Secretary for her statement, and join her in thanking the security services and all those involved. The judgment sends a clear message that even though these individuals are outside our jurisdiction, we are not going to give up pursuing them. Will she share the intelligence behind the latest developments with the Intelligence and Security Committee? I welcome her commitment to implement the recommendations from the Russia report, particularly in respect of the registration of foreign individuals pursuing other states’ interests. Those recommendations are important, but there are existing weapons in her armoury that need to be used, including against the facilitators of these acts—the estate agents, lawyers, accountants in London. If she grasps that, and her new Security Minister grasps it, she could make some great progress and hurt the Russians very hard.

[Priti Patel]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his questions and the points he has made. He is right about the tools or levers that exist across government and across law enforcement—many strong laws are in place. As ever, this is about the application of the law and the levers that could help to denude capability further, so he is absolutely right on the point he makes. On the ISC, we will be in touch directly with the Committee after today’s statement, even on the basis of how information and intelligence is shared.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Committee stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons & Report stage & Report stage: House of Commons
Thursday 15th October 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Carmichael]

With help like that, I am not sure that the Government necessarily need any obstruction. Yes, I am certain that this provision is in the Bill for a reason, but we do need to hear from the Dispatch Box about the relationship between the Human Rights Act and activities that would be carried out overseas. When we hear from the Minister, I hope that he will address that point.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman is making an important point, but the Human Rights Act is not the only protection. There is also the guidance that goes alongside the Bill and that already exists for the operation of CHIS, which is nearly 70 pages long and identifies what can and cannot be authorised.

[Mr Carmichael]

Indeed, and the guidance is important. It is helpful to have that published, but of course, guidance is guidance, and it can be changed much more easily than an Act of Parliament. The concern that I and many Members have is that there is little by way of meaningful limits and protections in the Bill, which is where they really require to be.

I will now address the amendments that I have tabled, and I shall seek to do so as swiftly as possible, because I realise that we are under a degree of time pressure. Amendments 20 and 21 cover the question of civil redress. The Government’s proposition is that, essentially, this is a statutory embodiment of existing practice and guidelines. In fact, the truth of the matter is that the Bill goes much further than the MI5’s current guidelines. The guidelines from 2011 state that

“An authorisation of the use of a participating agent has no legal effect and does not confer on either the agent or those involved in the authorisation process any immunity from prosecution”,

and that authorisation

“may form the basis of representations by the Service to the prosecuting authorities that prosecution is not in the public interest.”

The Bill goes much further than that. It states, in effect, that authorised crimes are lawful for all purposes, which means not only that an agent would be exempt from prosecution but that victims would be barred from seeking redress in the civil courts. Cases where civil claims have arisen from the use of covert activities in relation to the animal rights movement, for example, would not have any legal redress in the courts under the Bill. Essentially, the thinking behind amendments 20, 21 and others is that the independent oversight in the Bill simply is not there. We all know—it is human nature, as much as anything else—that if people are left to mark their own homework, they will always give themselves an A*. Frankly, for matters as important as this, we need something a bit more substantial.

The test for authorising criminal conduct in clause 1 is currently that the person authorising the conduct must believe that it is “necessary” and “proportionate” to do so. Amendment 14 is a very modest amendment that would mean it should be not just believed but “reasonably” believed that it is necessary and proportionate. That is not the most significant bar that will have to be crossed, but the fact that it is not there illustrates just how widely the Bill is drawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Streatham) (Lab)]

As I expect we will not get an opportunity for Third Reading, I start by saying this: another day, and another attempt by the Government to ram through a Bill that puts the Executive and their agents above our laws.

I rise to speak to the amendments and new clauses in my name and those of other hon. Members—amendments that seek to protect our diverse communities, our trade unions and our right to political protest. In doing so, it is important that I correctly frame my contribution and make it clear that I, and others who oppose the Bill, completely understand the need for undercover operations, such as joining a proscribed organisation or selling or possessing drugs as a means to uncover the activities of organised criminals. Ministers have, however, failed to convince us why, unlike other countries, we have decided to legislate for such operations to include authorising criminal actions with no limits—even for the most heinous crimes—with no judicial oversight, and with power so heavily concentrated in the Executive.

Likewise, it is completely bizarre to suggest that the undercover policing inquiry that is due to start next month is irrelevant to this Bill. How can that be so when the inquiry will investigate whether crimes were committed by undercover police officers? The attempt to argue that in the course of such conduct—for example, coercing women into sexual relationships, and infiltrating and sabotaging campaigns and trade unions—no crimes were committed is surprising, to say the least, but to make such assertions before the evidence has begun to be heard, and to introduce legislation that will essentially green-light further such actions, is breathtaking.

Giving the legal go-ahead to such criminal behaviour in the future totally undermines attempts to secure justice for the past. Before I hear anybody say that that is irrelevant, I will point out that it is very relevant to many people and groups, such as the 14 trade unions that recently signed a statement and campaigning organisations including Reprieve, the Pat Finucane Centre, the Hillsborough and Orgreave truth and justice campaigns, the Blacklist Support Group, anti-racist groups and family campaigns for justice. Without question, I stand with them.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I agree with my hon. Friend that some of the things that have gone on in the past, such as the Finucane case in Northern Ireland, are appalling and perhaps were not covered by what is in place now. But she said that there was no limit to what the state can do under this Bill. However, there is. The Human Rights Act and the 70 pages of guidance—I accept that it should be in the Bill—place limits on such action, because it has to be proportionate. As for trade unions and the other organisations that she mentioned, they are not covered by this. I accept that in the past some bad things went on, as she has mentioned, but that is not the case at present. The Bill simply provides oversight of a process that already is going on.

[Bell Ribeiro-Addy]

I will have to respectfully disagree, but I will come to that point.

Let me start with our amendments that deal with trade unions and blacklisting. Amendment 5 and new clause 4 lay out that a criminal conduct authorisation cannot be granted to a covert human intelligence source within a trade union. Similarly, amendment 6 and new clause 5 seek to prevent the powers in the Bill from being used for blacklisting. Although I understand that the Bill is not about the authorisation of surveillance, in both instances I and my hon. Friends believe it is important to explicitly remove trade unions and blacklisting activity from the powers in the Bill. We cannot and will not simply accept the Government’s assurances, because trade unions are absolutely right to be alarmed. As my hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow (Kate Osborne) explained to the House last week, since 1968, over 3,000 trade unionists have been blacklisted, over 1,000 organisations have been spied on by undercover police, and tens of thousands of ordinary citizens have had files held on them by special branch.

Similarly, for the purpose of protecting legitimate political protest, amendments 3 and 4 seek to remove “preventing disorder” and the

“interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.”

as legitimate grounds for the authorisation of criminality. These grounds are ill defined and wide-ranging, not to mention open to outright political abuse. Again, I point to where they have already been abused. We know that using undercover police, allegedly posing as protesters, to commit crimes and provoke violence, including a violent response from the authorities, has been reported as an ongoing tactic and been discussed in the public domain in recent years, including more recently in the past few months, with regard to the Black Lives Matter protests and climate change and G20 demonstrations. All of these necessarily constitute an unlawful interference.

That is also why I have tabled amendment 1, which seeks to ensure that discrimination on the grounds of protected characteristics are taken into account before any such allowance for criminal conduct is given. I point to that because we know that, in the spy cops scandal, women were unfortunately discriminated against through the way in which they were coerced into sexual relationships, and as we know, ethnic minorities are disproportionately the victims of state violence. As my hon. Friend the Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum) said last week, it is not hard to see that this Bill is just another iteration of the expansion of state surveillance of marginalised communities.

I should also point out that Members from across the House routinely disagree on what is in the interests of the economic wellbeing of this country. Could my disagreement with capitalism be perceived to fall under the auspices of the Bill? Before anybody says, “That’s absolutely ridiculous,” I would remind the House that Labour Members have been subject to surveillance, and no doubt vague and wide-reaching arguments were used at the time. Where does this end?

To respond to my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), is it not also the case that Ministers cannot assure members of the public by saying that the Human Rights Act guards against abuses, as it cannot be applied to individuals, only to organisations? This Bill would permit crimes to be committed in contravention of the European convention on human rights and the individual perpetrators could not be prosecuted, although the UK itself might subsequently be found in breach of the ECHR—a theme that is becoming all too common in the Government’s approach to legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman, with whom I worked so closely on the Defence Committee, as always gets to the heart of the matter. He says that, indeed, we have made reference in the context of Northern Ireland to numbers and scale in precisely the way we are seeking to be able to do here. Whether something is then made public is always a matter for debate and negotiation between the ISC and the agency concerned, but where it cannot be made public, that is where the ISC in a sense comes into its own. We exist to be able to see things that for good reasons cannot be made public, but we can then at least give assurance to Parliament that we have seen what cannot be made public and we are reasonably satisfied with it, and that is what this is all about.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

The reason for not giving that figure is clearly that it would give an advantage to those we are working against—for example, in Northern Ireland—through an indication of the scale of the CHIS. Could the right hon. Gentleman clarify the situation and highlight to the Committee that we would look at the numbers, but that we have powers to look at individual cases, as we have done in the past, if we have concerns about them?

[Dr Lewis]

Yes. What it is important to remember and, it must be said, what has not always been remembered in recent times, are the provisions of the Justice and Security Act 2013. That Act, among other things, said that the Committee would have greater powers to “require” the agencies to give certain information. Prior to that, it could only “request” the agencies to do so. The question is: will we have the power to be assured of getting these figures, or are we going to be able only to ask for them and perhaps not get them? The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: if we saw something that we did not like the look of, even if we did not have the power to require that particular piece of information in order to delve further, we could at least request it. For many years, that was the only basis on which the Committee could operate anyway.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones]

There was a time when I used to like the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Dan Carden), when he was a young researcher here. There is nothing sinister happening—it was the fact that the Intelligence and Security Committee sat this morning. I was going to move the amendment because the Committee was still sitting, and that is why it was done. It is nothing against the individual personally, and he knows I have a lot of respect for him.

I support the Bill, and obviously the new clause in the name of the ISC, because it gives a legal framework to cover this area of work. Having been on the ISC for a number of years, I have seen transcripts of some of the evidence from CHIS. Is it information that we could get in any other way? No, it is not. There is a misunderstanding that somehow now with modern technology, telecommunication intercepts and everything else, we can get all the information that we require. We cannot. The best is still from human sources. Certainly, with the cases I have seen and the transcripts for terrorism cases relating to Islamic terrorism and the ones for Northern Ireland, the work that the security services do to protect us all—including all communities, and that includes marginalised communities—could not be done without that CHIS involvement.

There has also been a misunderstanding—I think it gets crossed over in the Bill—between what is happening now and what happened in the past. I am no defender of what happened in the past, in terms of some of the things that were referred to in Northern Ireland or even the spy cops issue. Under this legislation, we will have the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s oversight of the situation, and there is a big difference between police officers, in terms of this authorisation, and civilians. Police officers will come under the Bill, but remember, more importantly, their conduct is also covered by other legislation.

I know that the spy cops case is cited, as though this would legitimise them. It would not because police officers would still have to come under the legislation that covers their conduct. They are more controlled than the civilians or individuals we will recruit both for organised crime or national security issues, who will have to commit crimes on occasions to ensure that their cover is not blown. I have seen the transcripts, and although I cannot refer to individual cases, I have seen one where an individual was part of a proscribed organisation for many years. His actions have not only led to a major disruption of that organisation, but, I think, saved lives. Therefore, is it right that this should be on a legal footing? Yes it can.

My hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) said that this would give carte blanche for the security services and police to do what they want. I am sorry, but it does not. We have to look at the guidance, which many people have not looked at. I know that some Opposition Members have been saying that they will vote against the Bill on principle. Well, I am sorry, but I do not see anything principled in weakening the ability of our security services to protect us or of the police to protect trafficked women and children, or in the fact that it will make the situation worse for some of the most vulnerable people in our society, who are preyed upon not only by organised crime but terrorism groups.

All I say to Members is please read the Bill and read the guidance, because the guidance is important. I have some problems with the Bill in the sense that it could be improved. My right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) made a very good point that this is probably not the way to do it. We should have had more time, and perhaps debated it in Committee upstairs, which would have been far better. It is important that we get this right, but the idea that the security services do not have any oversight is not the case. In fact, they will have more oversight. May I just say this: the individuals who are running CHISs are not just the office boys in MI5; they are senior officials who not only have training on the guidance, but know the difficult situations that are being dealt with on the ground. I say to Members: please do not go for headlines; look at what happens in the Bill. The Bill can be improved, which is why I support the oversight proposed in new clause 3.

I agree with the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) on one point—a point that was also raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) in her contribution in which she made some other very legitimate points. The Bill would be strengthened if the guidance was actually in the Bill. I have no problems with the guidance as it is written at the moment, because it is both strong and robust. The right hon. Gentleman’s point was that if it were in the Bill, it could not be, as he said, tinkered with or changed afterwards.

I also ask Members to look at the present, rather than at what went on in the past. My right hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) is right: we cannot justify what some of the agencies did in the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s without any scrutiny—whether for the police or the security services. As for blacklisting, the Bill will not lead to a situation in which blacklisting is not given a red light. If Members read the guidance, they will see that that would fall out of the scope of that guidance. Likewise, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will be able to look at those individual warrants. Moreover, as a former trade union official, I know that blacklisting existed, but certain members of trade unions do not have a great history in terms of their collusion, on some occasions, with employers in certain industries to blacklist trade unionists. I feel passionate about this in the sense that it is wrong, but it cannot all be necessarily put down to the employers.

May I touch on two other points? The first is the issue around amendment 7 in the names of those on the Labour Front Bench. I have problems with it. I accept that, as the Bill is written, it is looking backwards at these cases. Operationally, from the cases that I have seen, the idea that we could get a judge to cover the scope of potential criminality in certain areas would be difficult. Let us say, as an example, that we have someone who has been authorised to get involved in the drugs trade, but then they are asked to carry out a burglary. A very broad warrant would have to be issued to cover quite large things. I think that it is perhaps better leaving it in the guidance and with the officer. I have seen evidence that there are occasions when the security services will withdraw authorisation from a CHIS, and they do so because people are getting involved in things that are quite clearly not in the public interest and are not followed by the guidance. That does happen.

I have one final point, which again has been raised and which I still struggle with. Why have other organisations been lumped into the Bill? I am quite content for the police and the security services to be covered by this legislation, but I am less at ease with the Food Standards Agency and others being given authorisation. There is a level of expertise now, both in the police and in the security services, in terms of being able to authorise, train and run CHISs, which might not be there in the other organisations when, perhaps, they are dealing with very small numbers of cases over a period.

The Bill is an improvement on what we have at the moment, because it will bring in a legal framework. Can it be improved? I think that it can be, but, again, I urge people to read the Bill and read the guidance and to look at them in terms of what is happening today rather than what has happened historically.

[Dan Carden]

I am delighted to follow my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones)—

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Right hon.

[Dan Carden]

My right hon. Friend. I think that was one of the briefest speeches he has ever made in this House.

This Bill is about the power of the state, and it is also about the rights of citizens. What we have today is a book of amendments, almost each and every one of which would improve the Bill, but unfortunately, it feels to me like a fait accompli by the Government. I am not surprised that the Government are not listening to civil liberties organisations, but I am pretty surprised that they are not even listening to the Intelligence and Security Committee of this House. The way in which the House is being led down the garden path is something worth speaking up against.

I would not be in this House if it was not for my experiences growing up with a dad involved in an industrial dispute for over two years—the experience of workers taking action and the challenges they faced. That was an unofficial dispute, opposing casualisation and insecurity, and it lasted two years. It is relevant because there is a real worry that these powers could be misused. What matters is what is in the Bill. Of course we all want appropriate powers to deal with criminality and the most serious crimes. However, the scope in the Bill for organising criminal conduct by the state is wide open to abuse, and it comes down to a triple-whammy attack on our civil liberties.

First, the Bill permits secret agents of the state to commit any crime to prevent what they consider to be disorder or harm to the economic wellbeing of the UK. Secondly, it does not include the necessary independent judicial oversight, so the agencies concerned will act alone in that decision making. Finally, the Bill does not limit those crimes at all. We have heard that the Human Rights Act will be applied to this legislation, but the Human Rights Act does not create crimes like other legislation does. Rather, it means that a Government can be found in breach of that Act, so the crimes in this Bill are simply not limited.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on the contribution that he is making, and I forgive him his earlier remarks. He says that the scope is unlimited, but it is not, because the guidance that goes alongside the Bill—which I accept should be in the Bill—makes it clear that it will not lead to the free-for-all that he is suggesting.

[Dan Carden]

I think my right hon. Friend has far more trust in the words of the Government and the guidance than I do.

What would stop an agency deciding that an unofficial dispute constituted disorder or harm to the economy that it was worth taking action against? The Bill is written so badly and broadly that it is effectively a licence to criminally disrupt working people taking action to support themselves, their co-workers and their families, and we have seen this all too often in the past. The Bill paves the way for gross abuses of state power against citizens.

In Liverpool, we have a healthy suspicion of state power, because we have felt its damaging force too often in the past. We have experienced the 30-year fight of the Hillsborough families and survivors for truth and justice. We have had striking workers targeted by state violence, and trade unionists blacklisted and spied on for representing their members, and we are not alone. Campaigners fighting miscarriages of justice across our country, such as Orgreave, the Shrewsbury 24 and now Grenfell Tower, oppose this dangerous Bill.

I fear that my own party is being taken for a ride by this Government, because I will tell you what happens. You start with the idea that legislating for something that operates in the shadows must be a good thing. You then engage in good faith with a morally bankrupt Government arguing for vital safeguards, and once that Government finish stringing you along, you end up in the perverse situation of condoning laws that ride a coach and horses through our nation’s civil liberties and could even be used against the labour movement itself.

I am sent here by my constituents to stand up for their rights, freedoms and well-being, and that is what forces me to vote against the Bill tonight.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Kevan Jones Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 5th October 2020 Commons Chamber

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I of course welcome the oversight that has been introduced for our intelligence services; the situation is very different from how it was in decades past. However, that does not detract from the additional safeguards that are needed in this specific Bill.

Under the Bill as it stands—I am quoting, because I want to press the Minister on this point—authorisations for participation in criminal conduct may only be granted

“if it is necessary (a) in the interests of national security; (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder; or (c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.”

The Government need to be clear about what is within the scope of that framework. It cannot and should not encompass any lawful activity, nor should we allow mission creep in the years ahead.

I hope the Minister would agree that a Bill such as this one should have no business whatsoever interfering with the legitimate and lawful work of our trade union movement, which is a cornerstone of our democracy and a bastion of rights. I welcome what the Minister said in answer to an intervention—that trade union activity is legitimate and lawful and therefore is not within the ambit of the Bill—but some concerns have been expressed that the words I quoted referring to economic interests could refer to the legitimate work of trade unions. I would welcome it if the Solicitor General, when he responds to the debate, could repeat the Minister’s assurance that trade unions are not meant to come within the ambit of those words.

In addition to the test of necessity, the authorisation may be granted only where it is

“proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by”

the conduct. I welcome and note the test of necessity and proportionality. Nothing should be authorised in contravention of the European convention on human rights, to which I will return in a moment. But first the Government must justify the need for each and every agency and body listed in the Bill—what powers, what purpose. Nobody expects details on ongoing investigations—of course we do not—but a sense of the type of issues expected to arise is crucial to enable the House to consider that list properly and whether the presence of the organisation on the list is necessary.

In answer to an intervention from the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), who is no longer in his place, the Minister mentioned, with regard to the Food Standards Agency, mislabelling and unsafe food. We need more detail on that and the links to organised and serious crime. Similarly, the Gambling Commission is another example, and it is absolutely clear as to why that is on the list. I do not propose to go through the list one by one; suffice it to say that each and every one needs to be justified.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

As a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I have seen how the security services conduct these activities in detail in some cases. When I saw the Bill and the list of organisations, I was a bit shocked, to be honest. The Minister made the argument for the inclusion of the Food Standards Agency; from my experience—not personal experience, I hasten to add—of a case that involved waste theft and the Environment Agency, the lead was the police, and the Environment Agency worked across agencies. I want some assurance as to why it is necessary for the Food Standards Agency or the Environment Agency, for that matter, to have a lead in these situations.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I was relieved to have the reassurance that my right hon. Friend’s experience did not involve him personally, but he is entirely right about the reassurances that are necessary in terms of each and every case.

As the Minister has said, there is a section 19 certification from the Home Secretary on the face of the Bill regarding its compatibility with convention rights. In addition to that, I note that in clause 1, what will become the new section 29B(7) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 mentions the Human Rights Act 1998 specifically. There is a real need for reassurance on this issue, so that the public and the House know that the most heinous of crimes will not be carried out in the name of this Government or, indeed, any other future Government. I appreciate that the European convention on human rights protects the right to life and is clear about the prohibition of torture or, indeed, subjecting anyone to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and that is important, but the Government need to be crystal clear about their intention for when the courts come to consider this legislation, as they inevitably will. We cannot have any doubts about the Government’s intention or Parliament’s intention.

I accept that it is important that the Human Rights Act is, unusually, mentioned on the face of the Bill, and I notice that the accompanying memorandum sets out the following:

“Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 makes it unlawful for public authorities to act in a way which is incompatible with Convention rights. Nothing in this Bill detracts from that fundamental position. Authorising authorities are not permitted by this Bill to authorise conduct which would constitute or entail a breach of those rights.”

What we cannot have is a position, referred to by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), in which any argument is put on the Government’s behalf in courts or tribunals that this system is not in place covering the activities of covert human intelligence sources, or that this system is somehow free or exempt from Human Rights Act considerations. Nor could we have a situation where there are deliberate attempts to prevent the Human Rights Act from coming into play. That is why we will be pressing the Government on public limits and on their position regarding those limits on criminal activity to be authorised.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

In the fast-moving electronic age that we live in, I think there is a misunderstanding that somehow, the state can beam into everyone’s communications and listen to everything that is going on, and that that is the way in which modern-day intelligence is gathered. As outlined by the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), that could not be further from the truth. The role of human intelligence is of vital importance, not only for our intelligence work in this country but for police work in other areas.

As a member of the ISC, I have seen examples of terrorism cases in which human intelligence has prevented the deaths of our citizens. Is this a pretty area we are dealing with? Honestly, no, it is not. The individuals who the police and other security agencies are engaging with have to interact with people who are not pleasant. That is the nature of the territory we are dealing with, and in order to keep their covers in place, those individuals will have to engage in certain amounts of criminal activity. I have seen some examples of what they do; I am not going to go through them tonight, or refer to any of those cases, because that would be completely wrong. However, as has been referred to by the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson), the obvious one is membership of a proscribed organisation, which would be deemed as breaking the law.

We also need to highlight this idea that somehow, authorisation of these things is a free-for-all. I welcome this legislation, because it will put on to a statutory footing something that is quite a grey area in its legal position, but its opponents seem to think that there is no control of authorisation at all. As the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Theresa Villiers) has just outlined, the authorisations are very clear about what can and cannot be done.

For some unknown reason, a curveball has come into this debate that I had not really expected: the idea that this Bill will affect trade unions. I am not sure how it can do so. Likewise, regarding rape and serious sexual assault, I agree that those safeguards should be there, but I think they are already in the Bill. The individual who did the authorisation would not authorise that, and if a CHIS who was involved in general activities undertook one of those acts, they would not get immunity for doing it. Again, I think a lot of things have been thrown into the debate about this Bill that do not actually apply to it.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

With regard to the appropriate checks and balances and the need for authorisation to be proportionate and necessary, does the right hon. Gentleman agree that it would be wrong to straitjacket our agencies? There needs to be discretion. Our country works with judicial discretion, whereby judges can depart in exceptional circumstances. Without knowing what will come, it would not be appropriate to straitjacket the action that may or may not be taken with regard to what is proportionate and necessary.

[Mr Jones]

The hon. Gentleman raises a good point about proportionality, which is key. Clearly the authorising officer will not authorise something if they know that it is disproportionate to the act, which was covered earlier in the debate. I am also pretty confident about what is proposed in terms of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, but like the hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard), I would like to go one step further. We need more detailed oversight in the ISC. It is not necessarily about seeing individual warrants, but there could perhaps be an annual report listing the categories in which warrants were issued. That would be helpful for us to look at, and if we wanted more information about any of those, we could use the powers we have to request that. We may well table an amendment on that in Committee.

I turn to the issue of the other organisations listed in the Bill. There is a tendency sometimes, when civil servants see a piece of legislation, to jump on to it. The list of organisations weakens the strong case for why we need this legislation. I have not yet heard a good justification for why the Food Standards Agency needs these powers. My concern is that the police and the security services—MI5, MI6 and others—are used to dealing with CHIS and giving authorisation, and they have the training. The danger of extending this to other organisations is that the expertise that comes from regular use is not there, and that concerns me. For example, the Environment Agency usually works in co-operation with the police, and I would be happy for the police to have the lead in terms of CHIS, rather than the Environment Agency. In Committee, we need justification for why all these organisations need to be included and reassurance that this is not a case of civil servants seeing this as a good way to add some powers to a Bill.

I support this Bill. This is a complex area, and some of the things that we are asking individuals to undertake are not pleasant, but it is vital work for keeping us safe. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson), I pay tribute to not only the brave individuals who provide information but the men and women of our security services who work day in, day out to keep us safe.

--- Later in debate ---

[Apsana Begum (Poplar and Limehouse) (Lab)]

Madam Deputy Speaker, thank you for calling me to speak in this important debate. Like many others, I am astounded at the gravity and significance of this Bill. The Government have said that the Bill seeks to place existing practice on a clear and consistent statutory footing and reflect existing practice, but of course many have criticisms of existing practice, and the case law shows that the legalities in this area have not yet been fully considered. This Bill goes way, way beyond the status quo, and it comes just over a week after the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill, which could result in torture and other serious crimes being protected from prosecution.

Barely a week passes without this Government announcing yet another departure from recognised rules of domestic and international law. Just before the summer, the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill passed through Parliament, delaying the long-awaited review of Prevent, which fosters discrimination against Muslims, and introducing significant curtailments of civil liberties, which will disadvantage ethnic minorities. Last week, we debated the Coronavirus Act 2020, about which human rights and anti-racist campaigners have raised concerns that powers are being used in discriminatory ways, particularly against black, Asian and minority ethnic people.

The trajectory is chillingly clear. As Unite the union says, there is much to be concerned about in this Bill in respect of the impact on freedom and justice in the UK. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has expressed concern about the human rights implications of the Bill. Is it not the case that the Human Rights Act cannot be seen as a safeguard against the authorisation of agent criminality because the Government have previously taken the position that the HRA does not apply to crimes committed by their covert agents? Is it not the case that because an individual cannot currently be prosecuted under the HRA or the European convention on human rights, an agency or Government can only be sued after the event for damages, meaning that there would not be any protection for victims nor any disincentive for agents under this Bill? Is it not the case that covert agents would not only be committing crimes, but be inciting crimes to build their cover and undermine the moral authority of protest movements?

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I am sorry, but the hon. Lady obviously does not know the way in which covert agents are working. They are under strict protocols now; there is no legislation covering this issue. Although I accept the need for some more protections in the Bill, it gives authorisation in legal statute, which is not there at the moment.

[Apsana Begum]

I take the point, but I believe that under the HRA a prosecution cannot currently be brought, so that is not a safeguard that is actually in statute. [Interruption.] I will make some progress.

Is it not the case that covert agents would not just be committing crimes, but be inciting crimes to build their cover and undermine the moral authority of protest movements? It is, I suppose, why organisations such as Privacy International, Reprieve and others argue that the Government cannot convincingly claim that the HRA will provide a sufficient safeguard. Perhaps the Minister will say more about that today.

Let me come to what is for many the crux of the Bill. There is a grave and real danger that it could end up providing informers and agents with a licence to kill. Put simply, it is deeply alarming that the proposed law does not explicitly prohibit MI5 and other agencies from authorising crimes such as a torture and killing. This is not an abstract or philosophical question. We have seen the consequences of undercover agents in paramilitary organisations operating with what some believe to be apparent impunity while committing grave human rights abuses, including murder. Independent inquiries have found that, at times, when intelligence units of the security forces were running informants they were acting as though the law did not apply to them. This legislation also cuts across a case that is going through the courts—the third direction case—and does not give Parliament the chance to hear the higher Court’s views about the state of the law.

We have heard much rhetoric today about safety and security. Are there safeguards for potential victims of crime, for our trade unions and for people expressing their hard-won right to protest? Are there protections for ethnic minorities—Muslims, in particular—who we know are disproportionately at risk of state violence?

--- Later in debate ---

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

It is an honour to follow the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes).

I approach the Bill, as I am sure we all do, knowing that what is at stake is trust in our legal system and public consent for those agencies that we empower to protect us all. Given the provisions enabling criminality, sufficient scrutiny is therefore vital. It is right that the Government have sought to remedy the previous murky arrangements and bring clarity through legislation, but the Bill needs to be beyond reproach when it is enacted.

As hon. Members have already identified, the Bill with its ambiguity and its powers gives a legal power to individuals to commit crimes. That is rightly alarming to the public. The phrase

“authorised conduct is rendered ‘lawful for all purposes’”

on page 3 of the explanatory notes must be questioned and clarified. It is not sufficient to state that all public bodies are bound by the Human Rights Act to comply with the European convention on human rights; it must be set out in the Bill, for the sake of public confidence, that the very worst acts of violence, including sexual violence, torture and murder are not permissible. The Bill is looked at by all people, not just those to whom it applies. Confidence in our Government and in our institutions is significant.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I agree that explaining the Bill to the public is very difficult. We therefore need to have the safeguards that the right hon. Lady talks about, but the example that she just gave would not get through the authorisation stage, which is overseen by the commissioner at the moment. Does she think that there is another way of doing it, without having a long list of crimes and of what can and cannot be done?

[Liz Saville Roberts]

That is a very fair point, which we have discussed to a considerable degree. None the less, there is a public revulsion at the prospect of sexual violence, murder and crimes of that nature, which warrant being mentioned in the Bill for that very reason.

Equally profound and disturbing at first appearance is the power to grant authorisations, which will be given to organisations to decide for themselves internally, without judicial oversight and with limited redress for victims. It is quite extraordinary that there is no provision for how innocent victims of authorised criminal conduct might be compensated, which is surely to be expected in the Bill. I also believe—this point has already been well expressed, but I want to add my voice to it—that trade unions have legitimate concerns, given that covert surveillance has been undertaken in the past against entirely legitimate trade union activity in conjunction with criminal blacklisting.

While quick to quote the book of human rights, the Government have failed to quote chapter and verse of what is permissible and what is beyond the pale. Would the use of sensory overload or stress positions by agents constitute torture and be a violation of human rights? Would they then be criminally culpable? What guarantee can the Minister give that a future UK Government, or even this one, might not seek to legislate for derogations from the European convention on human rights? Given the horizon-spanning nature of the criminal conduct covered by the Bill, where is the threshold for authorising acts, such as phone tapping, that rightly concern the public? What does “proportionate” actually mean? If we do not define it, who does? By what algorithm do we assess the range of proportionality? Where is the shift and the mission creep there?

The Government have also empowered a range of organisations with this new authorisation of criminality, from the Environment Agency to England’s Department of Health and Social Care, but how do the Government intend to prevent creep by Government Departments and the erosion of law? What safeguards will the Government put in place within those Departments? Does the Investigatory Powers Commissioner have sufficient measures and capacity to deal in a timely fashion with the incremental increase in his workload?

Intelligence and Security Committee: Russia Report

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd July 2020 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend has made her point clearly and firmly. We wait to see how the SNP responds to the various points that have been flagged. Obviously, our priority is the national security of our whole United Kingdom, and the Government firmly continue to do that work.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I wish that the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Jo Gideon), or the special adviser who wrote that question, had actually read the report, because clearly she has not.

One of the Committee’s main recommendations was the need for a Bill to reform the Official Secrets Act and for an espionage Act. I welcome what the Minister has announced today and, more broadly and more informatively, what was in The Times this morning. The former director of MI5 and the right hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Sajid Javid) when he gave evidence to the Committee supported that.

In 2017, the Law Commissioners set off a consultation process about that, which is yet to report. I ask the Minister when it will report. I also urge him to make sure that we get the legislation in place, because it is needed. Let us hope that it is not just some spin to take the headlines the day after the report was announced. Let us get it into action.

[James Brokenshire]

I agree with what the hon. Gentleman said about legislation. He will note that in the Queen’s Speech, we committed to introduce legislation to counter hostile state activity and espionage. It is right that we put in place steps that reflect things like the foreign agent registration-type processes that exist in other countries, as well as receiving the Law Commission report on the Official Secrets Act. I can say to the hon. Gentleman that the commitment of this Government is to act at pace and speed to get this right, to ensure that we do our utmost to strengthen powers where they need to be strengthened and, in the interim, to take all necessary action to call out and highlight Russian activity and take further action as appropriate.

Policing (England and Wales)

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Monday 24th February 2020 Commons Chamber

[Kit Malthouse]

If Members do not mind, I would like to make a bit of progress. I will allow others come in a little later.

This settlement will turbocharge the unprecedented recruitment of 20,000 police officers over the next three years. All forces will have the resources they need to meet rising demand. The impact of the extra officers should not be underestimated, with the recruitment targets showing how each area will benefit. By March 2021, West Yorkshire police aims to recruit some 256 extra officers, and the figure for Greater Manchester is almost 350. As I said, the Met, a force I know well, will soon be able to deploy an extra 1,369 officers on the streets of our capital. The spending round, which concluded in September, confirmed that an additional £750 million would be made available next year to deliver this uplift. This settlement confirms that £700 million of that will go directly to PCCs to support the first wave of recruitment, and £168 million will be ringfenced to help pay for recruiting and employing additional officers. Forces will be awarded a portion of that in line with their funding formula allocation. It will be linked to results, with the money paid out as they make progress against their recruitment targets. That will ensure that forces make full use of this investment, delivering good value for money for taxpayers and the results they expect to see. In addition, £50 million of the settlement will deliver national elements of the police uplift programme to ensure that it is a success. That will include central co-ordination, national recruitment campaigns, Police Now training and College of Policing support.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

The Minister mentioned Durham, which has lost 380 officers since 2010. Even with these replacement officers—they are not new ones—there will still be a shortfall of 154 officers for County Durham. Can he tell me when County Durham will get back to the level of police officers it had in 2010?

[Kit Malthouse]

Obviously, these 6,000 officers are a down payment on a three-year protection plan, under which we will be recruiting 20,000 police officers. Just for clarity, I should point out that these are extra police officers—

[Mr Jones]

They are not. They are replacements.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ms Abbott]

As we know, the Labour Mayor is ultimately dependent on funding from the Government. Given the funding available, I am confident that Sadiq Khan has done the very best he can. The issue comes back to the totality of funding and the police funding formula.

The Tories cut the police and they should own it—cuts have consequences. But they also did much worse: they presided over soaring serious and violent crime, and an abysmally low detection and sanction rate—cautions or charges—even for some of the most serious crimes. The latest crime data for the year ending September 2019 was recently published. It shows a 7% rise in offences involving knives or sharp instruments recorded by the police. That is 46% higher than when comparable recording began—in the year ending March 2011—and the highest on record. That is the Government’s record.

Offences involving firearms hit a low in March 2015 but have risen since. Robbery offences are at a 10-year high. Fraud incidents are up sharply and now there are almost 4 million fraud crimes a year, often impacting on some of the most vulnerable members of our communities. Over the long term, the trend in total crime had been downwards, but under successive Tory-led Governments since 2010 that overall progress has stalled. A key part of this is the fact that central Government funding for police and crime commissioners has fallen by 30% in real terms since 2010-11.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is also moving money from the most deprived areas to some of the wealthiest? For example, 50% of properties in County Durham are in band A, so the ability to raise a great deal of money locally is quite limited, unlike in Surrey or Woking, where, given the larger council tax base, further money can be raised. This is moving money from poor areas and giving it to wealthier areas.

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[Richard Drax]

Ten years is how long it was predicted to take to get this country back. I know the Opposition do not like to hear it, but that is the truth of the matter. [Interruption.] Yes, there was a banking crisis too, but the people of this country do not forget the spendthrift ways of the Opposition.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Richard Drax]

No, I will not give way, because others wish to speak. There are maiden speeches to be given, and I very much look forward to hearing them.

May I first pay tribute to Dorset police—the chief constable and all the officers who serve under Dorset police?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

May I begin by agreeing with the Minister and thanking all the people who work for our police force—not just the men and women in uniform, but the community support officers and the support staff? Certainly, I thank those individuals in County Durham who work under the inspiring leadership of Jo Farrell, the chief constable, and her senior management team. I have not yet had an opportunity to mention the former police and crime commissioner, Ron Hogg, who sadly died in December. Ron was a great public servant, not only as a senior police officer, but as a visionary police and crime commissioner. He will be greatly missed across politics in County Durham. He had dedication to not just policing but the community. That shows the best of our police; they are not separate from, but part of, their community.

The Government’s new strategy aims to create the impression that December 2019 was year zero—that they had no responsibility for, or involvement at all in, anything that happened before that. The Prime Minister and Ministers prattle on at great length, like a flock of constipated parrots, about how another 20,000 police officers will make all the difference, but they do not say what they had to do with our having fewer police officers on our streets today. We are also given the impression that these “extra” 20,000 officers—they are not extra; they are replacement officers, restoring the number that the Government took away—will somehow solve all our local criminal justice and crime problems, and will be the panacea.

[Christine Jardine (Edinburgh West) (LD)]

Does the right hon. Member agree that there is so much more to policing with a small p than police officers? The best way to deal with crime—petty crime, knife crime and serious violence—is to deal with its causes, and to take a more holistic approach through health and education.

[Mr Jones]

I do not disagree, and I shall come on to some of those points. Even if we get 20,000 more police officers, the population in this country has grown since 2010 from 62.8 million people to 67.2 million. The idea that 20,000 officers would make up for that difference, and enable local police to deal with the responsibilities and pressures on them, is absolute and complete nonsense.

Take the example of County Durham. I am glad that my new neighbour, the hon. Member for North West Durham (Mr Holden), is here. Since 2010, Durham constabulary has lost 380 police officers. Through the money being provided by the Government, it will gain 226. There will still be 154 fewer police officers than in 2010. No doubt in this debate we will again hear a lot about levelling up—it is the in phrase. I doubt that in the police and crime commissioner elections, Conservatives will go around saying, “The Conservatives have cut 154 police officers in Durham,” but that is the fact. The issue is not just the numbers; it is also experience. We have lost a huge number of officers with many years’ experience. Since 2010, some have taken early retirement and others have left the force. The idea that we can replace that expertise and knowledge with new police officers is complete and utter nonsense.

Demands on our police are increasing; Members have referred to fraud and cyber-crime, and as my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) pointed out, there has been a withdrawal of services in other sectors as a result of austerity. Mental ill health, for example, is creating a huge issue for local police; unfortunately, in many areas, because of cuts, the police are the last resort when it comes to mental health, though they should not be. Youth services and other services that have been cut have led to the issues being generated on our streets.

Police do not work in silos. They are part of our community. The Minister said that the Conservative party was the natural party of law and order. I am sorry, but the record speaks for itself. Putting aside the soundbite of 20,000 extra police officers, let us look at what the Conservative party has done. There are 20,000 fewer police officers, and there has been a 20% cut in real terms to the police budget. We can have as many more police officers as we want, but if the court system cannot cope, it is no good putting police on the beat. In the last 10 years, 25% of the Crown Prosecution Service’s lawyers have been cut, and a third of its staff have gone. I am sorry, but dealing with crime in this country is not all about the police, and they would recognise that.

We can add to that the closure of courts. Since 2010, 162 courts have closed, and 50% of the courts estate has been axed. In my area, we used to have magistrates courts in Consett, Chester-le-Street and Durham. There is now one, in Peterlee, in the east of the county—not the easiest place to get to for those in my constituency and that of the hon. Member for North West Durham. That is a capacity problem, and it has also broken the key link between magistrates and their local area. I am not criticising them in any way, but those on the magistrates bench in Peterlee are not connected to many local communities. That makes a fundamental difference to their being able to understand the nature of the people who come before them.

[Mr Holden]

I agree with the right hon. Member about Ron Hogg, who was very much part of the community in County Durham and was well respected. Does he agree that the police and crime commissioner is the essential link with the community, and that someone with police experience, like Ron Hogg, is exactly who should represent the community in our great county?

[Mr Jones]

Ron was a very good friend of mine, but he was not a typical police officer. The hon. Gentleman may be trying to portray him as a hard-line “hang ’em and flog ’em” person, but Ron was far from that. We see that in his invention and implementation of Checkpoint, the alternative justice system, which is making a real difference in Durham. If the hon. Gentleman is saying that the only qualification needed by the police and crime commissioner is being a former police officer, then I am sorry, but I do not agree with him. Ron played a variety of roles in his life, but what he brought to the post was a passion for community, and for making sure that the underdog was listened to; those were the important things. He was not afraid to take on those, including members of the Conservative party, who accused him at the last PCC election of being soft on criminals because he introduced Checkpoint. He was far from soft on criminals, but he wanted to ensure that the systems that he put in place solved the problem, rather than just getting a soundbite for a headline, which unfortunately is what the Government are doing.

Do we need more police officers on the streets? Yes, but we cannot get away from what has happened in the past 10 years. I am sorry, but it is no good the Minister saying that this is a great settlement; looking at what has happened in communities, it is not. Policing is not in a silo; the prison population, for example, is bursting at the seams, and if we do not soon get a system that enables people to be diverted away from prison, I am not sure how the system will cope. There is nothing worse than the victims of crime seeing perpetrators get away, not because the police cannot detect them, but because the court system is incapable of dealing with them.

If the Government wanted a new start, I would have preferred it if they had looked at the criminal justice system as a whole, instead of focusing on what would get them headlines. “Twenty thousand more police officers” is an easy soundbite to remember; “25% more CPS lawyers”, for example, does not have the same ring to it, because many of our constituents are not aware of the vital role that those lawyers play in ensuring that very bad people get taken off the streets.

[Anne Marie Morris (Newton Abbot) (Con)]

The right hon. Gentleman talks about the holistic nature of the system that means it needs to be looked at together. Does he agree that we should take a leaf out of the book of what has happened in Wales—and now, increasingly, in Cornwall, and in Devon, in my constituency—in looking at cross-working between fire, police and ambulance services? As he said, many crimes have some basis in health matters, particularly mental health matters, and therefore working together, given the services’ different strengths and weaknesses and their different geographical nature, would be a very good way of trying to look at this holistically and make best use of the resources that we do have.

[Mr Jones]

It is no good starting to take money out of certain parts of the system such as mental health services or local councils’ support to local communities if we do not tackle, for example, the social care agenda. I will give the hon. Lady the example of an individual who has dementia or Alzheimer’s and leaves her home. That takes up a huge amount of police time. They are the responders who have to look for that individual. That ties up resources. I totally agree that there has to be a holistic approach, but it has to be joined up. Austerity was not that. Austerity was to see what the Government could slash out of the system and where. This Government have taken too much out of certain parts of the system.

If the Minister wants to get back the mantle of the party of law and order, he has to put money back into the court system, back into policing, and back into the probation service—because the Horlicks that was made of that system, in which we want to rehabilitate people, has put the thing back even further. Yes, a holistic approach is fine in talking about the structures of what policing, ambulance and fire services do. They already work very closely together. But that will not save money if we are taking big chunks of 20% out of the budget overall.

Let me finally turn to financing, which was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western). This is a debate that has to be had. How should our policing be funded? This Government have an approach that they have in local government as well—if anyone wants to wait until later on, they can perhaps hear my contribution to the next debate as well. The Government are moving away from centrally allocated moneys to locally raised finance. The argument behind this is that it is more democratic and allows local people to have a say. That is complete nonsense. It is about reducing the amount that central Government have to pay out and pushing the burden on to local taxpayers.

The Minister said that he will give local police and crime commissioners the freedom to raise the precept to a certain amount. That is holding a gun to their head. They have no option when they are faced with things such as the issue around police pensions referred to by my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), which they have to do to the maximum. That moves money around the country, from poor areas such as mine to the more affluent areas. In County Durham, under the way that the system works at the moment, because 50% of our properties are in band A, the ability to raise large amounts of additional revenue locally is limited compared with Surrey, or somewhere else that has a larger tax base and perhaps a larger number of band G and band H properties and so is able to raise a lot more money. If that continues, the ability of areas such as County Durham to raise revenue for policing will decline.

The big debate is partly about extra police numbers—yes, we do need extra police numbers: we need to restore the 20,000, and I look forward to the campaign by the hon. Member for North West Durham for the extra 154 police officers who are needed even to get back to where we were in 2010—but if we do not have a big debate about how our police are funded, then we will continue with this process that means that poor areas will get poorer, and the blame game that this Government want to play on the level of policing will continue. That will do nothing at all to help the professional people we rely on for our public safety at local level or to protect the communities that we all represent.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

I call Laura Farris to make her maiden speech.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)]

I thank all Members on both sides of the House for their heartfelt contributions to today’s debate. We have heard stories of the terrible impact of crime on constituencies across the country—stories that remind us that crime is a story not of statistics but of human suffering. There have also been unanimous expressions of support for our police forces from Members on both sides of the House, and colleagues will not be surprised to learn that I agree with each and every one of them.

Indeed, in my previous career prosecuting criminals, I saw for myself the dedication, professionalism and bravery of our officers. Home Office Ministers see that each day as well. Every day, officers face more danger than most of us will see in a lifetime. In every situation, they act selflessly to protect the public and tackle criminality in all its ugly forms, and that is one of the many reasons why, as has been mentioned by the hon. Members for Halifax (Holly Lynch) and for Sheffield, Heeley (Louise Haigh), looking after our police forces is so important. The introduction of the wellbeing service and, in due course, the police covenant will hopefully meet with the approval of the House as a whole.

As has been acknowledged today, the nature of criminality is changing. Our forces face new challenges, with new technology ushering in a new generation of crime, but our police forces are rising to the challenge. We heard from my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon (Selaine Saxby) how her local constabulary has a dedicated drone team and, indeed, the country’s first “digital search dogs” team. As the owner of a puppy who seems to be obsessed with my remote controls, I look forward to visiting that team to see its work.

At a time when criminal activity is increasingly complex and when the scourge of serious violence threatens more and more communities across the country, we have a duty to ensure that the police have the resources they need to keep our people and our country safe. However, police funding is about more than material resources. We want to send a clear message to our police that this Government support them. This historic increase in police funding sends that message. Our unprecedented recruitment drive, the largest in decades, sends that message. And our clear commitment to combating the rise in serious violence sends that message.

As a female Minister responding to my opposite number who also happens to be a woman—with a female shadow Home Secretary, I am afraid the Minister for Crime, Policing and the Fire Service, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), is the odd one out—I am delighted that we have all had the chance to speak in this great Chamber on the centenary of the first speech by the first woman to take her seat in this place. We have had the benefit of two female Deputy Speakers during this debate, too.

I am also delighted that, in marking that important moment in this place’s history, we have heard three new female colleagues give their maiden speech. I look forward to them making their mark in this century. We heard delightful tributes to their immediate predecessors, Richard Benyon, Mark Prisk and the right hon. and learned Dominic Grieve, who are remembered fondly and with respect on both sides of the House.

My hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Laura Farris), however, went one better and paid an even more personal tribute to a certain predecessor: her own father. It was very moving to listen to the example he set her, and I have no doubt that she will burnish her family’s proud record in this place and do him proud. She also raised the topic of flexible working, which the Metropolitan police are piloting to encourage a more diverse workforce and to recruit the best talent. This is an interesting challenge not just to those with childcare responsibilities but to the wider policing family, including those who have finished their 30 years’ service. I welcome the contribution she will inevitably make on this important topic.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson) mentioned the famous toothbrush collection in her constituency and the enormous bed of Ware, which can apparently accommodate four couples at one time—there is a joke there somewhere, but I will not tread there.

My hon. Friend talked very movingly of her family’s journey from the workhouse to this House, and she put her parents and her husband on the record. It was an incredibly moving speech. She also told us of her experience as a magistrate and, in particular, of a poor young, emaciated, grey boy who had been injected with heroin by those who were supposed to love and care for him and whom she met as he appeared in the adult magistrates court for the first time. She made the point that such cases haunt those of us who have worked in the criminal justice system, so I very much look forward to working with her on this Government’s exciting journey of creating opportunity for all.

My hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Joy Morrissey) said it has taken a mere 100 years for a “moderately acceptable” American accent to be heard in the Chamber—I think it is much more acceptable than that. Her message of unifying our country draws not just on the present day but on the great history of her constituency. It is a great history not simply because the good people of Beaconsfield have only ever voted for a Conservative Member of Parliament but because of her more distant predecessors, Edmund Burke and Benjamin Disraeli.

That ties in neatly with the fact that this one nation Government are working for the whole country, as demonstrated by this very good funding settlement. This is the second year that the Government have issued a record-breaking increase to police funding levels through a police settlement that shows our commitment to giving the police the resources they need to fight crime and keep the public safe.

The total funding being made available to the policing system next year will increase by more than £1.1 billion, with the help of police and crime commissioners using council tax. This increase will enable the police to bear down on criminals who are terrorising our towns and to reduce the number of victims of crime. It will provide £150 million in funding to fight organised crime and to continue cracking down on online child abuse. Tackling serious violence will be backed with £39 million, including £20 million for tackling county lines drug dealing. My hon. Friend the Member for Ynys Môn (Virginia Crosbie) spoke so eloquently about that and about the charity in her constituency, Prison! Me! No Way!, which does so much to tackle it.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Why is the Minister not just honest with the public? There is this idea that the Government are giving the record sums that she is mentioning, but that is just not the case. They are doing exactly what they did last year. Yes, extra funding is coming nationally, but she is asking my constituents and everybody else to pay more through their local precept. As I explained in my contribution, that means that areas such as mine will be at a disadvantage in terms of the amount of money they can raise compared with others. I just ask her to be honest with the public.

[Victoria Atkins]

I am happy to explain again the way in which the funding formula has been worked out. The Government grant to police and crime commissioners will be more than £701 million and the money raised by precept, should PCCs take full advantage, will be £248 million. I know that this is one of the great debates between our two parties, but I make the point gently: there is no such thing as a magic money tree. This is taxpayers’ money; there is no Government money.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

I will move on to the funding formula, if I may, as many colleagues have raised this issue. It is still the most reliable mechanism we have to distribute core grant funding to forces, but we are aware of the concerns about the current formula that have been voiced by the policing sector and in this place, including by my hon. Friend the Member for Waveney (Peter Aldous), and we have stated that the current arrangements are out of date. My hon. Friends the Members for South Dorset (Richard Drax) and for North Devon articulated the particular pressures that tourism brings to their constituencies, and the PCC for Devon and Cornwall has made this point strongly to the Policing Minister. He is, of course, considering that and other points about the future form of the funding formula.

The right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) rightly raised concerns about the criminal justice system as a whole. We have to ensure that the system as a whole works for victims, witnesses and those who are most vulnerable. It is intricately connected as a system, and we were pleased to announce in our manifesto not only the royal commission looking at the criminal justice system as a whole, but more funding for the Crown Prosecution Service and up to £2.5 billion on further prison places to ensure that those criminals who are prosecuted and convicted serve time, thus keeping our constituencies safe.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Victoria Atkins]

If I may, I will move on to the point about Cardiff, because the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) raised the point about Cardiff capital city grant funding. South Wales police will receive £312.4 million next year, if they utilise their full precept flexibility, which is an increase of £21.1 million. We recognise the impact that serious violence has had in south Wales, which is why we have given the force £1.2 million of additional funding this year from the serious violence fund. The Policing Minister is happy to meet him and other colleagues to discuss this generous settlement for South Wales if that meets with his approval.

The subject of serious violence has rightly been raised by hon. Members from across the House. We are determined to crack down on this crime, which is why we are changing the law so that the police, councils and health authorities are legally required to work together to prevent and tackle serious violence, to ensure a whole-system response to this pernicious problem. To support that effort, the Home Secretary announced in December that 18 police and crime commissioners will receive an additional £35 million to continue to fund violence reduction units, which are specialist teams that tackle violent crime in their local areas. We are also improving stop-and-search powers, giving more than 8,000 police officers enhanced powers to crack down on violent crime. We all want it to stop and through the various measures I have mentioned we will enable that to happen.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe) raised the issue of fraud, which we are absolutely committed to doing more to combat. We have pledged to strengthen the National Crime Agency so that it can tackle the threats that we face from fraud, county lines gangs, child sexual abuse, illicit finance, modern slavery and people trafficking. We are moving at pace to recruit the 20,000 extra officers to fight all forms of crime, and an ongoing review of serious and organised crime is under way to consider the powers, capabilities, governance and funding required to bolster our response to today’s threats, including fraud.

In conclusion, I thank Members again for their contributions to the debate. This settlement shows our comprehensive commitment to all areas of policing. Every police force in England and Wales will see a significant increase in funding. We are tackling serious violence, fighting serious and organised crime and delivering the largest expansion in police numbers in a generation. There can be no doubt that this settlement represents the start of a golden era for policing and a dark day for crime.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Police Grant Report (England and Wales) for 2020–21 (HC 51), which was laid before this House on 22 January, be approved.