Official Secrets Act

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Monday 15th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Before I call the Minister, I wish to make a brief statement. I found out only this morning that the charges against the two individuals relating to espionage for the Chinese authorities were to be dropped. I do not think that is good. Of course, we do not discuss the detail of security matters relating to Parliament on the Floor of the House, but given the very important issues raised by this case, I ask officials to consider whether any further steps should be taken—operational, strategic or legal—to ensure that all those who work in this Parliament are able to undertake their activities securely and without interference. I am a very unhappy Speaker with what has happened. The fact that it has taken two years, until today, for somebody to withdraw this case is not good enough.

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

This morning, the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to proceed with the prosecution of Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, who had been charged with espionage for China under the Official Secrets Act 1911. Members right across the House will be aware that the charges related to allegations of Chinese espionage within Parliament and will want reassurance, as will you, Mr Speaker. Many Members will be as extremely disappointed as I am that there will now not be a trial.

The decision not to proceed with this prosecution is an independent one for the CPS to make in its role as the UK’s independent prosecuting authority. However, I want to be clear that the Government remain gravely concerned about the threat of Chinese espionage. Parliament and our democracy are sacrosanct, and any attempt by any foreign power to infiltrate or interfere with parliamentary proceedings is completely unacceptable. With your permission, Mr Speaker, I will therefore set out the measures the Government are taking to tackle any residual risks arising from this case and outline the wider approach the Government are taking to protecting our democracy and countering state threats, including those from China.

The decision of the CPS related to charges under the Official Secrets Act 1911, which was the relevant legislation in force at the time. It is well known that state threats legislation had not kept pace with the changing threats we face. The Official Secrets Act was passed to counter the threat from German spies before the first world war. It referred to espionage as obtaining

“any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information”

that

“might be…useful to an enemy”.

Clearly, that language—drafted well over 100 years ago —does not reflect the types of espionage or state threats we face in the modern day, nor the breadth of states that engage directly in that activity.

For that reason, the UK passed and has now commenced the National Security Act 2023 with cross-party support. That legislation, which replaced the Official Secrets Act 1911, brings new criminal offences and powers to bear against the full range of modern-day state threats. Moreover, the National Security Act is state agnostic, removing the unhelpful “enemy” language from the Official Secrets Act and focusing on the malign activity we are all concerned about.

The Act also introduced the foreign influence registration scheme, which the Government brought into force on 1 July. FIRS encourages transparency, strengthening the resilience of our democratic institutions against covert influence, and gives our intelligence agencies and law enforcement additional tools to detect, deter, disrupt and prosecute state threat actors. It requires that any foreign influence in our democracy, including from China, be declared. We can now be confident that should cases of espionage or state threats be uncovered in the future, we will be in a much better position to prosecute them under the new National Security Act.

This case hits at the heart of our democracy, so let me be clear: the Government will not tolerate any state threats to the UK and its democratic institutions. We will robustly challenge China when necessary, as we would challenge any country for unacceptable behaviour on our soil. I can confirm that the Foreign Office has démarched the chargé d’affaires of the Chinese embassy in London to make clear that we will not tolerate any activity that interferes in our democracy. MI5 is considering the provision of additional advice to those most at risk of being targeted by state-led espionage, and the Government are taking robust action to counter state threats and continue to build up the UK’s resilience.

In April, we established a new cross-Government state threats unit to better co-ordinate our response to state threats. As I set out following the recently completed review of transnational repression, new training modules on identifying and countering state threats are being offered to all 45 territorial police forces through the College of Policing and are mandatory for counter-terrorism policing officers. We have committed to legislate as soon as parliamentary time allows to take forward the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation. That includes creating a new proscription-style tool for state threats.

As the former Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) set out in his statement to the House following the conclusion of the China audit, we are investing £600 million in our intelligence services to support them in detecting and disrupting state threats to the UK. In September, the National Cyber Security Centre co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored cyber-threat actors targeting global networks, including in the UK. I know there will be calls to go further, and I reassure the House and the country that we will keep all tools under review and act as necessary.

As you are aware, Mr Speaker, the safety and security of our Parliament is of the utmost importance. That is why the National Protective Security Authority will issue new protective security guidance to parliamentarians and political staff on protection against foreign interference and espionage. That guidance outlines the potential risks we all may face in our day-to-day work, and how we can all better protect ourselves. I urge colleagues to read and follow the advice once issued. I also urge Members to take up the National Cyber Security Centre’s important opt-in service for Members of both Houses. It allows the NCSC to alert individuals if it identifies evidence of malicious activity on their personal devices or accounts, and swiftly advise them on steps to take to protect their information.

The strategic defence review was clear that China presents a sophisticated and persistent challenge. As the national security strategy reinforced, instances of China’s espionage, interference in our democracy and undermining of our economic security have increased in recent years. As I have set out, we are addressing those threats, but there are also opportunities we need to grasp as we navigate our complex relationship with China. The last Government did not describe China as an enemy, and this Government do not think our relationship can be simplified down to a single word. Instead, we are taking a consistent, long-term approach to China, firmly rooted in the UK’s global interests.

I finish by paying tribute to our law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, who do so much to keep us all safe. They operate often in secret, often in the shadows and often at great personal danger, but they have our enduring gratitude. While we are extremely disappointed with the outcome in this case, the legislation it relied on has already been changed. Should we need to go further, we will not hesitate to do what is necessary to keep our country safe. I commend this statement to the House.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Home Secretary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I hope that my hon. Friend knows that this Government hugely appreciate and respect the relationship we have with Hongkongers. Through the processes in place, we will absolutely ensure that nobody, be they a Hongkonger or any other nationality, is extradited for reasons of political expediency. I can also point her to the important work, which we take incredibly seriously, on transnational repression. I previously made a statement to this House, and I hope that she and others understand the seriousness with which we take these activities. We are working closely with our international allies, and we are doing everything we can to ensure that the UK is a hard target for these threats, wherever they might originate.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

[Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)]

As always, I am very grateful to the Minister for advance sight of his statement.

For years, the Chinese Communist party has worked to undermine the democratic institutions and values that underpin our society. This House is all too aware of the warnings, not least from the Intelligence and Security Committee’s excoriating report on China. That report made it clear that the previous Government lacked a coherent strategy for dealing with the threat posed by the Chinese state and that insufficient resources had been committed to meet that challenge. We expect to see better from this Government.

We are faced with a case in which two men, one of them a parliamentary researcher with close links to senior MPs, were accused of serious offences under the Official Secrets Act, only for the Crown Prosecution Service to drop those charges due to insufficient evidence. In this context, the decision is deeply worrying. It raises serious questions about the UK’s capacity to detect and prosecute espionage linked to hostile states, particularly China. So what specific issues with the evidence led the CPS to conclude that the threshold for prosecution was no longer met?

More broadly, what does this outcome say about our preparedness to respond to threats from foreign intelligence services operating on our soil, and even within the corridors of this Parliament? The Government must make protecting our democracy a national security priority. That means implementing the recommendations of the ISC’s China report in full, and ensuring that we are not left exposed to foreign interference simply because our systems are not equipped to respond.

Finally, the Minister again today committed to introduce legislation for a proscription mechanism for state and state-linked bodies as soon as parliamentary time allows. Could he update us on the timeline for bringing this forward and what its scope will be?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

My hon. Friend raises an important point about our allies. Many of the threats and challenges we face are shared ones, which is precisely why the UK Government convened the five countries ministerial conference last week. We were proud to host our allies from the Five Eyes nations, with which we work very closely, along with other important international co-operation arrangements. We do work very closely with our allies to ensure that, collaboratively and collectively, we are best able to guard against the threat we face.

I can give my hon. Friend an assurance that we will seek to ensure that the new guidance is in place as soon possible. I also point to the fact that I wrote to all Members of this House just before the recess with advice on protective security and other matters. However, should any Member feel that they need additional support, we will work very closely with you, Mr Speaker, and the Parliamentary Security Department to ensure that they get it.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee.

[Dame Karen Bradley (Staffordshire Moorlands) (Con)]

The Minister made the point that the charges brought were under the old legislation, the Official Secrets Act, which has now been superseded. Has he made an assessment of whether the charges would have proceeded had the new offences been in place at the time the charges were brought? Will he be working with ministerial colleagues, law enforcement and others to look at whether new offences are needed in this case and in others?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who raises an important point. I can give him and his constituents the assurances he seeks. The Government take these threats incredibly seriously and we will do everything we need to do to keep the public safe. On behalf of the Prime Minister, I chair the Defending Democracy taskforce. The Prime Minister recently renewed the mandate of that cross-departmental mechanism, which ensures that we are able to provide a whole-of-Government approach to the threats we face. The Government take these matters incredibly seriously. These are not party political issues. I have always believed that these are matters that should be a shared endeavour. I will want to work with him and Members right across the House to ensure that, collectively, we keep ourselves safe.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Member who has been heavily involved in this, Alicia Kearns.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

I will be responding in a personal capacity, but may I start by thanking you, Mr Speaker, for the support you have given to us over the past two years? I also place on record my gratitude to our intelligence community and counter-terrorism police, who are exceptional.

From a securities perspective, today’s events are disastrous. They will embolden our enemies and make us look unwilling to defend our own nation, even when attacked in this place, the mother of all Parliaments. I am relieved that the National Security Act will make it safer and easier in future to prosecute foreign spies, but I urge the Minister to reform the Treason Act so that traitors are prosecuted and face justice, put China in the enhanced tier, and support private prosecution.

It remains unclear to me why Chris Cash and Christopher Berry cannot be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act. The evidence shows a clear line between those two, the United Front Work Department and the politburo—the very top of the Chinese Communist party. The information shared was prejudicial to the safety and interests of the UK, and I believe it put Members at personal risk. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) was told by agency heads that the evidence was overwhelming and the case beyond doubt. Counter-terrorism police this morning agreed and said the same to me—that the evidential standard had been met at the time of charges.

My question for the Minister is simple: if officials, the security services and the police agree that the case was a slam dunk, why has the Crown Prosecution Service not been able to get it over the line? If the CPS was not confident, why, given the compelling evidence, did it not put it to a jury and test it? Whoever is responsible for this decision—whether the Director of Public Prosecutions, an official in his own Department or the Attorney General—they have weakened the defence of our country today and I am desperately sorry to see it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I hold the hon. Gentleman in the highest regard, so I hope that he will not mind me gently pointing out to him that I could not have been clearer in my earlier remarks about how seriously we take these issues. We will work very closely with allies and partners right around the world to ensure that we do everything we can to guard against the threats that we face.

[Mr Speaker]

I call Alicia Kearns on a point of order. May I just say what a pleasure it is to see you back?

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. That is very kind. I shall be returning home to my four-month-old in a couple of hours.

On a point of order, Mr Speaker, Government Front Benchers are unable to answer the questions of this House regarding the decision making of the Crown Prosecution Service, so can you kindly advise how this House can scrutinise the Crown Prosecution Service and its decisions, as that is clearly the will of the House?

[Mr Speaker]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving me notice of her point of order. I believe that this is a matter for the Attorney General—who is responsible for the CPS—and as he sits in the other place, maybe we will have to use the Solicitor General as a way forward. In this case, I hope that a clear message has gone back to everybody that when we still have Members of Parliament who have sanctions, we cannot let this go in the way that seems to have been done.

[Neil O’Brien (Harborough, Oadby and Wigston) (Con)]

Further to that point of order, Mr Speaker, I am one of the MPs who is currently sanctioned by China, and as one of the founders of the China Research Group I am one of the MPs who was spied upon here. I find it astonishing not just that this case, which was a slam dunk last year, has now been dropped, but that we are not even being told why it has been dropped. The one bright spot in this whole process has been your leadership on the issue, Mr Speaker, and in particular your decision to ban the Chinese ambassador from this building for as long as Members of this House are sanctioned. I worry that certain people will now come to you with honeyed words. How can I put on the record our thanks to you for your leadership, and also our hope that you will continue to stand strong on behalf of Members of this House?

[Mr Speaker]

I think you have certainly put it on the record.

I take seriously the sanctions that have been laid. My worry is that we have foreign state actors who do not believe in democracy, and democracy within this House. We must defend our democracy; we must defend Members of Parliament. I have to say a big thank you to our head of security, who has worked very hard on this. I am sure—not that they would make this judgment—that we are all disappointed with the outcome, including the Minister.