Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Bellingham Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 4th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. He deployed a lot of knowledge and insight, and I have great respect for him. He mentioned the former leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, who has been consistent in his interest in this subject; I would also add Andrew Rosindell, who, from the day I joined Parliament, has been consistent in his challenging of Governments of all colours and standing up for the Chagossians.

My noble friend Lord Callanan mentioned his amendment, and the Minister was pretty impolite about that amendment. If the Government were serious about challenging our amendment, why did they not put it to a vote? Incidentally, where are the Labour Peers this evening? If they did not like our amendment, they could have voted it down and allowed the Bill to be committed to a Committee of the whole House. Surely, that would have been the sensible thing to have done.

In 2010, I was appointed Minister for the Overseas Territories. Some 31 years on from when the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, was the director of the overseas territories directorate, I was taking a great interest in this subject; whether that makes him very old or me very young, I do not know, but we both care passionately about this subject. I remember at the time looking at the whole issue of the Chagossian people, and we agreed at the time, in 2010, to set up a feasibility study, which then eventually reported in 2014. It is a great shame that the then Government, which, I think, was in transition from David Cameron to Theresa May, did not pick up the recommendations of that feasibility study, take action and look at different schemes to allow the Chagossians to return.

The Chagossians have been treated quite appallingly. There is no doubt about that. Under a Labour Government, decisions were made that were egregious, on a par probably with the Highland clearances and the appalling evictions during the famine in Ireland. These people were forcibly removed from their territory, from their land, and we should be ashamed—my Government as well, over successive decades, but all Governments.

There has been talk about consultation with the Chagossians, involvement with them and engaging with them, but I agree 100% with the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow: we should have a referendum of the Chagossian people. If it is possible to have a referendum for the position of chancellor of the University of Oxford and poll all the alumni around the world, surely it would be perfectly feasible and possible to have a referendum of Chagossians, who are living in this country, in Mauritius and in the Seychelles, with some in different parts of Europe. I believe very strongly that we should do that. One of the observations I have come away with, having had many conversations with Chagossians, is that they are a very proud group of people. What is extraordinary, beyond belief, is that they are still incredibly loyal to the Crown. We do not deserve that. We owe them a duty.

On the deal itself, we have heard many different legal opinions. We heard my noble friend Lord Lilley, who I thought made an excellent speech in which he dealt with this subject, so I will not go over that ground again. I do know Sir Christopher Greenwood extremely well—we were immediate contemporaries, reading law at Cambridge and then at the Inns of Court—and I respect his opinions enormously. During my time as the Minister for the UN, I used to go and visit him at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, where he was our resident judge. He has not once said that these decisions—there is more than one decision—and potential decisions could be totally binding. Other legal experts have said that they are always going to be advisory.

We are where we are. I personally think that the Truss Government, who did not last very long, were quite wrong to launch these negotiations, but the negotiations were launched. Eleven rounds of negotiations took place. A number of Labour Peers who are not here today have said that after 11 rounds we were bound to reach a decision, and it was only a matter of time when the new Government came in that they would decide this. Well, I have spoken to James Cleverly and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and they had red lines beyond which they were not prepared to go under any circumstances.

I will not go into them all, but there were two key red lines. The first was a properly managed MPA, preferably with joint sovereignty, and the other, more important red line was negotiating with Mauritius for a sovereign base area, and I think Mauritius would have agreed this. A sovereign base area is very different from a lease; it is a sovereign base in perpetuity. The noble Lord, Lord Beamish, made the point about us being obliged to notify Cyprus that the two Cyprus sovereign bases are our sovereign territory. In this case we have no obligation to do that; this will be not our sovereign territory but Mauritius’s, and we will be in a very different position as a lessee.

If one looks back at the Cyprus negotiations under a Tory Government in 1960, Cyprus was a country fighting for its independence after a very bloody, unpleasant conflict between the British occupying forces and EOKA. After painful negotiations, we got to the stage at which Cyprus was going to reach its independence, but we stood firm and insisted on those two sovereign base areas. The Cypriot Government were not happy, but I suggest to your Lordships that they had a much stronger bargaining position than the Mauritian Government had over the Chagos Islands and Diego Garcia. In fact, if we had negotiated a 99-year lease on those sovereign base areas in 1960, we would now be looking at 34 years to go.

If one looks at Hong Kong, would it not have been better if the Government in 1897 had secured a sovereign grant of the New Territories? Obviously, we had outright sovereignty on Hong Kong and Kowloon, but it was decided after the war that it was not feasible to maintain sovereignty over Hong Kong and Kowloon without the New Territories. If the Government then had insisted on an outright grant of sovereignty, which may well have been quite possible—I have read all the debates at the time—we would have been in a very different position. If one looks at what happened with Hong Kong, there was enormous pressure on leases and discussion, debate and uncertainty running up to 1997, and that started about 30 years out. I suggest to the Minister that, probably in about 70 years, those discussions will start taking place about the future of Diego Garcia. We may well get a very warm reception from the Mauritian Government in terms of extending the lease by those 40 years, but we may not. A lot of things can change.

The bottom line is that we have lost control. If this treaty goes through, we will have completely lost control of the future of that base. Yes, it will be secure in the short term, subject to all sorts of caveats that have been mentioned. That is why I am very disappointed and sad that that red line was crossed. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, would have allowed that red line to be crossed. Furthermore, had he tried to cross it, he would never have got it through the House of Commons anyway.

On the marine protection area, one of the first things I dealt with when I became Overseas Territories Minister was to look at the biodiversity within the territories—92% of our total biodiversity is in the OTs, of which 20% is in the Chagos Archipelago. It may well be that the commitments of Navin Ramgoolam—whom I know well—will be honoured by future Governments. His Excellency is an honourable, decent man, but he could be replaced by someone completely different. As the noble Lords, Lord Thurlow and Lord Blencathra, have pointed out, the agreements that have been made around the MPA could easily be rescinded or changed, and that MPA, which is one of the jewels in the crown of the overseas territories, could be put at very severe risk indeed.

I will not go into details about the costs, except to say that I think the Minister was wrong in her figures. If one includes the 40 years at £101 million, that comes to £14 billion, not the £3 billion that she mentioned. This decision by the Government not to commit has given us a pause to reflect on what we do now. I urge the House to remember that we have a duty to consult the Chagossian people and improve the Bill, and we absolutely must do that.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Yes, and as the noble Lord will recall from the debate that we had on the treaty, that was accelerated under the Heath Administration in 1970 and concluded under the Conservative Government. The denial of repatriation was then subsequently under another Conservative Government. My point is that all of us in this country have a dark record when it comes to Chagossian rights. Our task now should be how we at least restore some of those.

The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, started his remarks by saying that the House of Commons was denied the opportunity of debating the treaty during the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act period of scrutiny. He knows, because he will remember the debate we had on the treaty, that, as Erskine May makes perfectly clear, one of the mechanisms for the House of Commons to deny ratification of a treaty would be through an Opposition day debate. During the scrutiny period of this treaty in the House of Commons, the Conservative Party chose a different subject for its Opposition day debate. It had the chance, if it chose to take it, of debating and moving an amendment in the House of Commons during the scrutiny period.

We are here today debating this Bill for one reason and one reason alone: the previous Administration made a political decision to cede sovereignty and to enter into negotiations to conclude this. I hear noble Lords saying no, and I will come on to that, when they may wish to change their minds. Not one Conservative colleague today said why the previous Government opened negotiations to cede sovereignty in 2022. The then Government did not open negotiations to improve relations or co-operation with Mauritius. They made the principal decision to cede sovereignty, but they still have not said why. I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, will outline clearly today why that was the case.

All legal considerations on this issue, which have been debated quite a lot during this debate, predate 2022. The complaints received in this debate predate James Cleverly and that Government’s decision. We have had complaints in this debate from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, of the current Attorney-General and the advice given to this Administration. As my intervention on the noble Baroness suggested, the same would have been the case under the previous Government. I assume that when the previous Government made the policy decision in November 2022 to open negotiations which would conclude with the ceding of sovereignty, they were also advised by Attorneys-General. I have a hunch that it might have been the Attorney-General at the time of November 2022, but it could have been any of the three Attorneys-General that the Government had in 2022. No doubt, history will tell us which one of those it was.

A new argument has been presented today by the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Blencathra, that the Conservative Government were powerless and feeble and that their Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries were forced against their will by officialdom to make that statement in 2022. This is the argument of being in office but not in power. It was our suspicion at the time that the Conservatives were in office but not in power, and I am glad noble Lords have confirmed that.

I understand the argument that might say that this is a bad deal or that it has been handled badly. I think that many parts of it remain problematic, and I would have liked the Government to have handled it differently. But that is different from the Conservative Opposition in the Commons, who said in their amendment that they were “implacably” opposed to “ceding sovereignty”. They were not implacably opposed to ceding sovereignty in November 2022, so what changed?

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

The noble Lord is actually putting a very strong case. What I said in my speech was that there was a red line about a sovereign base area—the concession of sovereignty across all the rest of the territory, but keeping the sovereignty of the base.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord; I listened carefully to his speech, which he made in his characteristically sincere way. I will try to address that point in a moment.

I asked: what changed? In the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, explaining when she winds up on behalf of her party what policy changes were being made, I might assume that the only relevant change is the fact that the Conservatives were in government and are now in opposition. Without there being a clear policy change, we can only make that assumption.

This is quite important because the Statement in 2022 said,

“on the exercise of sovereignty”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.]

I have wondered why the same party that was implacably opposed then can be in favour of it now, especially because that Statement by the Government said that they were doing this to “resolve all outstanding issues” of international law. They knew that they had to resolve those outstanding issues of international law, but now they are denying the very virtue of the fact that they had any issues at all to address. That is quite hard to understand, and they have not made it any clearer today.

The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, was also made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. The 2022 Statement, which was the policy choice of the previous Government, was a mistake—as the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, indicated; I respect his honesty —or was, according to some of his colleagues, the result of deep state. Nevertheless, if that had raised serious defence concerns, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence at the time would presumably have raised concerns about it. That Minister was the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, so she has ample opportunity to address the noble Lords’ points in her speech today.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Bellingham Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendment 1 by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. I take it that he was not entirely serious when he dreamt up this particular innovation, which is right at the start of the Bill, whereby the purpose of the Bill should be presented in the way that the opponents of the Bill would find most attractive. It is a novel constitutional idea. In his reasons for the purposes of the Act, he has included only things that obviously he agrees with, but he has not included, for example, that this will secure the base for the UK and the USA for the next hundred years. There are arguments for and against, as there with any piece of legislation, but to think that you should state at the beginning of a Bill that the purpose of the legislation is what the Opposition would like to see enacted is novel. The only parallel I can think of would be if the sundry privatisation measures that were passed by the Thatcher Government had said, “The purpose of this Act is to sell off at knock-down prices the assets of the British people”. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, would have been in favour of that kind of constraint when that legislation was going through. I do not take this as a serious amendment, and I am sure he will not press it to a vote—it might be fun if he did, but we will see anyway.

One part of the noble Lord’s proposed new clause that is contentious—well, a lot of it is contentious—on which I would certainly like to hear more from my noble friends on the Front Bench is paragraph (d), which suggests that the Bill will

“limit the citizenship rights of the Chagossians”.

I do not think the Bill as it stands does that, and I want to be clear about that, but I think it raises an issue which we will come to later in the Bill, which is of concern to a number of us here, about what further rights for the Chagossians are appropriate, given the appalling way in which—we are all agreed—they were treated when they were basically thrown out of their own island.

My specific query, which if my noble friend cannot answer at the moment I would certainly like to hear later on in subsequent amendments, is that I still cannot understand why the military requires the whole of the island of Diego Garcia without any other settlement on it other than what is required for military purposes. I have asked that question of Ministers. The last time I asked my honourable friend Stephen Doughty, the Minister, he answered by saying,

“it is impossible for that to take place”—

that is, to have permanent settlement of Chagossians on Diego Garcia—

“operationally. It is not suitable or appropriate”.

I am very fond of the Minister, but just saying something is not suitable or appropriate, without any further clarification or explanation, is not good enough, as far as I am concerned.

The best I have got so far is to be told that, operationally, it is very difficult if you have civilians alongside the military, and it is much more convenient to the military if they have it all to themselves. In response to that, I can say only that repeatedly, in all parts of the world, including in my former constituency, civilian workers at a base quite happily live adjacent to the base and do a job that is of mutual benefit to the military and the civilian workers.

I think it would be a huge step forward to be able to say to the Chagossians—there may not be many who would want to do it—that those who would really like to settle in the land of their forefathers on Diego Garcia would be able to do that and work at the base or, if necessary, work in other activities as well. So far, I have not had a good argument against that happening, and I hope that at some stage during the passage of this Bill my noble friends can provide me with one.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, I rise in support of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. I think the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, was being a little bit unfair on him. He said very clearly that this is an appalling Bill that he wants to stop, and he has an amendment about Clause 1 standing part.

I would like to speak on one point about the Chagossians, which I know we are going to come to later. I agree with the noble Lord 100% on that point. There are quite a few Sri Lankan staff at Diego Garcia and there is no reason why there could not have been put in place some while back a scheme for Chagossians—Chagossians from Mauritius, from the Seychelles, from Crawley, from London—rather than the American airbase employing Sri Lankans. That should be the case. Of course, they did not originally come from Diego Garcia; they lived in some of the islands in the outer archipelago. Diego Garcia, as I understand it, was only sparsely populated historically. That was a very good point and we hope that the Minister will answer it.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Forgive me, but I did not say that I did not know; I was just about to answer that specific question. I was making a point about the inconsistency and—frankly—ludicrousness of the Opposition doing something that, when they were in government, took up a great deal of time and resource, but which they now contend they never, ever needed to do.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

Will the Minister give way? We keep hearing that the previous Government negotiated over 11 rounds and went on negotiating, but surely that reveals something about the previous Government’s steadfast determination to secure a good deal. If the Government had not been able to get a deal, would they have eventually signed up to an agreement? I do think they would have done.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

At the risk of jumping further down the rabbit hole with the noble Lord, my point was simply that to contend now that there was never any possibility of any legal jeopardy, as many noble Lords have sought to do today, does not correspond with the fact that the previous Government did enter into negotiations. If there was never a legal risk, why did they do that? That is the point that I am seeking to make, a pretty straightforward point.

The noble Lord, Lord Lilley, asked me about binding judgments and courts; they are fair questions. I believe that I have responded to them previously, but I am happy to go into more detail today, as that is what Committee debates are all about. There are numerous avenues through which Mauritius could pursue a legally binding judgment, including under the dispute provisions of the treaties to which both states are parties or further arbitral—

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

What do we mean by existential? We could still have a Diego Garcia—there could be something there. However, it would be existential because, if the operability is compromised, the base as it exists today—it is a unique place and it does things that we do not do anywhere else—would be compromised. To that extent, I suggest that that is an existential threat to the operability of the base.

With that, I hope that noble Lords who have presented their amendments are satisfied. If not, we can of course return to these issues on Report.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

Can the Minister answer my point about the UN Security Council and the UK’s ability and right to veto?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

We are not saying that this goes to the Security Council. We are saying that there could be further rulings. With respect, that is a bit of a red herring. There could be rulings that affect how we are able to operate on the base. There could be votes at the General Assembly, which the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, explained quite well. He is right; we could veto something at the Security Council, but we do not anticipate that, and that is not the legal threat that we are concerned about. It is a different legal threat.

If there are no further interventions, I respectfully request that the noble Lord withdraw his amendment.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Bellingham Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, I will say at the outset that I do not see the need for the amendments we are discussing. However, I do think that responding to and respecting the wishes and interests of the Chagossians is one of the most important and difficult issues facing the Governments of both the United Kingdom and Mauritius.

There is a lot of history to make good here. It is all the more difficult, in that there is no single Chagossian view. There are Chagossian people in Britain, in Mauritius, in the Seychelles and elsewhere, and there are different views among and indeed within the different communities. It would be unwise to think that there is an immediate or straightforward answer to meeting the wishes and interests of these different communities. My guess is that current and future British and Mauritian Governments will be dealing with these questions for quite some time to come.

It is sensible of the Government to ask the International Relations and Defence Committee to look into the issue, and sensible of them to conduct a survey of Chagossian interests and wishes. This is not an easy task. There will be, and indeed already are, doubts expressed about the time and scope of the IRDC’s work. That, I fear, is inevitable, but I hope that the results of the IRDC’s survey and its report will give the Minister some firm ground on which to make her promised statement in due course.

I know that discussions have been going on between the Mauritian and British Governments about the way forward. I hope that one conclusion of these talks will be that the £40 million trust fund to be administered by Mauritius will be administered in the interests of all Chagossians, and in a way that reassures Chagossians, wherever they are now, that their views are properly heard and represented. There is understandable scepticism about this, and it needs to be addressed.

I hope too that the Government will recognise and indeed facilitate the right of return to and resettlement on the Chagos outer islands, and that here too, there will be close and constructive co-operation between the British and Mauritian Governments.

There is a lot of history to put right as far as the Chagossian community is concerned, in Britain and elsewhere. The Government are, I know, fully conscious of that, and I am sure that future Governments will be too. Meanwhile, I hope that this Bill will soon be approved, passed and implemented.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, I would certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jay, when he says that the Chagossian people, in the disparate parts of the world in which they live, are not united on many issues. However, one thing on which they are united is their desire for employment opportunities on Diego Garcia, so I very much support the words of my noble friend Lord Callanan.

When I looked at this as a Foreign Office Minister, one of the things that staggered me was the number of people employed on that base from Sri Lanka, India and many other countries. There were occasionally some Chagossians, but there was no comprehensive, well-thought-out framework for Chagossians, be they in Crawley, Mauritius or the Seychelles, to find opportunities for employment in Diego Garcia. It was almost as though there was an underlying desire on the part of both the MoD and the Americans not to employ them on the basis, probably, that they might well go on to claim other rights. There was a lot of concern about whether there would be an issue of self-determination if they went there and settled there. I think my noble friend Lord Callanan’s amendment makes a great deal of sense. This is one issue that the Chagossian people are fully agreed on, and we should absolutely support it.

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[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

I was a Member of the European Parliament, and I spoke out quite strongly against that Government. I hope the noble Lord knows me well enough to know that I was never a party line man. I thought it was an appalling thing to do then, and I still think it is an appalling thing to do.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

Yes, the previous Government set out to give sovereignty to Mauritius across the archipelago, but not necessarily on the sovereign base. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, has made it very clear that one of his red lines was protecting the sovereign base in perpetuity, as in Cyprus. That would have been a very plausible and popular decision.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

That was my understanding, but even that was too much for me. Even if we had been able to get continued sovereignty on the base and some kind of shared sovereignty on the outer atolls, that would still have been exchanging a freehold for a leasehold. It is a preposterous thing to do when we are being told to do it by a court that has expressly been denied jurisdiction in cases between Commonwealth states. We would be doing it, setting a terrible precedent, to satisfy a tribunal that has no authority.

I was very critical of the previous Government for countenancing these changes. I have told the people involved what I think of it. I am equally critical of this Government, as I suspect are quite a lot of the people on the Labour Benches. I look at the expressions of some noble Lords opposite. I know they are decent patriots and democrats, and I know they feel a sense of obligation to our dispossessed Chagossian colleagues. Of course, they have to do their duty, such is the essence of politics.

I finish by holding out the prospect—just the vision—of people coming back: of civilian and military life coming back; of stories told again by grandmothers under newly thatched roofs, their voices stitched with salt and memory; of footsteps remembering the pale coral paths; and of the islands themselves remembering their old inhabitants, as the tides remember the moon.

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[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

My Lords, I was not sure whether anybody else wanted to follow that last speech. I do not think I have ever seen the Prime Minister drink prosecco—he would prefer a pint, I think.

Anyway, I thank noble Lords for their speeches on this quite important set of amendments, and I would be very surprised if we did not come back to some of these issues on Report, because, for all the nonsense we have just heard, there are actually some very thoughtful and quite important considerations here. Someone put it very well when they said that, while they might not agree with everything we are doing, there is a shared view across the House that we need to do as best we can through this process for the Chagossian communities.

Regarding Amendments 17, 26 and 78, the Chagossians are already entitled to work on the base and have done so. There are a range of job opportunities on Diego Garcia, open to Chagossians with British, Mauritian and Seychelles citizenship. A link to vacancies advertised by KBR, the main contractor responsible for recruiting and managing support staff at the base, is already available on the GOV.UK pages, setting out UK government support for Chagossians. On Amendment 78 from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan—

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

How many Chagossians are actually working on the base today?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I do not think that data is published anywhere, I am afraid. If it is, I shall provide it to the noble Lord.

I very much enjoyed the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, as I always do, but it is unjustifiable to define Chagossians as only those holding British Overseas Territories citizenship. I think that is what he was getting at. There are many Chagossians living in Mauritius, the Seychelles and beyond, and this would also exclude anyone who holds British citizenship, but not British Overseas Territories citizenship.

Amendment 20 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, which is one of many that would require the Government to seek something from Mauritius, is not needed. We have already committed to making a Statement to Parliament—and I think it is right that we do this—on the modalities of the Chagossian trust fund and eligibility for resettlement. That is in large part a response to the considerable interest that there has been from noble Lords across the House in making sure that the trust fund is run properly and fairly.

Taking this together with Amendment 38A from the noble Lord, Lord Hay, on air travel to Diego Garcia, I say that, as we have said numerous times, the UK is taking forward planning for a programme of heritage visits for Chagossians to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. These were paused in 2019 because of Covid, but we are working hard to reinstate them as soon as possible. Now, as then, these visits would include visits to key heritage sites. Specifically on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hay, there are no commercial flights to Diego Garcia, and nor would they be practical, as it is a working military base that is highly sensitive. Allowing commercial flights would interfere with the operational use of the base. Heritage visits in the past have often involved the use of charter aircraft and this may be the case for future visits also, but there is nothing in the treaty that would prevent this.

On Amendment 20C, noble Lords will recall that we debated the environmental impacts of the treaty and the marine protected area around the Chagos Archipelago last week. Both the UK and Mauritius are committed to protecting the unique environment around the islands. Noble Lords will be aware that on 2 November Mauritius issued a statement announcing the creation of a marine protected area once the treaty enters into force. No commercial fishing whatever will be allowed in any part of the MPA. Low levels of artisanal fishing, compatible with nature conservation or for subsistence of the Chagossian community, would be allowed in certain limited areas.

The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to delay the implementation of the Bill and the entry into force of the treaty. The treaty has already been reviewed by two Select Committees of this House. They have reported their findings and agreed that the treaty allows for positive environmental work, with the IAC welcoming

“the Government’s assurance that it will work closely with the Mauritian Government to establish a well-resourced and patrolled Marine Protected Area”.

Amendment 38C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, would require the Government to implement the resettlement recommendations of the 2015 KPMG study. The KPMG report, commissioned by the Conservative Government, concluded that resettling a civilian population permanently on BIOT would entail substantial and open-ended costs. The then Government ruled out resettlement, acknowledging the acute challenges and costs of developing anything equivalent to modern public services on remote and low-lying islands.

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[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak on Amendment 67. This part of the agreement is being portrayed as though it has some type of special status. It is similar to the agreement we have with the sovereign base areas in Cyprus. The UK and our allies use Cyprus as a staging post for a number of operations outside the Republic of Cyprus. The way it operates there is that the Government of Cyprus are not informed prior to the use of that base but, like in this agreement, are informed afterwards. I accept the point about the use of “expeditiously”—what it means is worth debate—but the way I read this is that it is no different from other bases.

The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, said she was nitpicking. To be fair to her, I do not think she is: she is trying to get clarity on this important point. We want to ensure that our forces and allies have free movement and use of the base under this treaty. I do not think that our United States allies would agree with the Bill and treaty if they in any way limited their use of the base, not only for actions against other parts of the world but in the siting of various pieces of equipment on those important islands. We look for some reassurance on that point, but it is important to have clarity. That would certainly allay some of the fears raised, quite legitimately by some people and by others as scaremongering against the Bill.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, following on from the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, surely the fundamental difference with the two bases on Cyprus that he mentioned is that we kept them in perpetuity—they are sovereign bases. Yes, we have an arrangement with the Cypriot Government to inform them of activity after deployment takes place, but what concerns me about this particular lease arrangement is very simple.

At the moment, we have in place a Government in Mauritius headed by His Excellency Navin Ramgoolam, who is a democrat and a friend of his country. I had the privilege of meeting him a number of times when he was premier before. Indeed, he took over from a Government who were also democratic and had all the right intents. We had many arguments about this issue but, fundamentally, we were two democratic Governments discussing a matter.

The concern I have is this: what would happen if there were some sort of coup or a military Government in Mauritius? In these worst-case scenarios, we have to be prepared for the future. Let us hope for the best but prepare for the very worst. Could the Minister comment on what would happen to these arrangements in the treaty in that event? If, indeed, a military coup took place and an alliance was made with a hostile power, the operations of this base could be jeopardised.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendments 20G and 20H in my name. I have tabled them because I want to probe more deeply whether the consequences of non-ratification are such that non-ratification is not an option.

Furthermore, it is important that we are clear about what we can and cannot do. The Minister has told the Committee that the treaty is a done deal; that it cannot be changed; and that the role of your Lordships’ House in relation to it and to the Bill before us today is really very limited. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has supported the Government in this view, suggesting that, going forward, there is only scope for possibly impacting the details of the implementation. It is clear that, although the CRaG process did not prevent the Government ratifying the treaty, the treaty was defined between the UK Government and the Republic of Mauritius in terms that place not only a clear distinction between the act of signing and ratification but unusual distance between the two, in that the treaty cannot come into focus unless and until the Bill before us today is passed and Clause 2 transfers sovereignty.

The comments of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, on day one in Committee were important. He said:

“Because of the way the treaty is drafted and the way Article 18 operates, the treaty can come into force only when this legislation is implemented. That is unusual”.


After an exchange, the Minister helpfully clarified the situation further and said:

“Before the UK can ratify the treaty, we will need to do the following: pass both primary and secondary legislation, update the UK-US exchange of notes, and put in place agreements on the environment, maritime security and migration”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 713.]


In this context, it is clear that, although the treaty has been negotiated and cannot be changed without reopening negotiations, it has been defined in terms to which both parties consented. This means that what could be drawn from the act of signature on 22 May was, by definition, inherently provisional and contingent. It was signed subject to recognition that the act of signing did not bring the treaty into force; and that the treaty would not come into force unless and until the respective political processes of both countries had been properly honoured. In this context, because the coming into force of the treaty depends on an Act of Parliament, this is plainly not a done deal, in my estimation.

Furthermore, as a legislature on its toes, we have to let the Executive know that we understand that, having negotiated the treaty, they will encourage us to pass this legislation so that it can move to ratification. We know that this does not mean that we have to pass this piece of legislation any more than we have to pass any other piece of legislation. If we reject this Bill, the islands could not be given to Mauritius. If the Government chose, they could then invoke the Parliament Act, which would delay things by some 13 months or thereabouts, in the context of which there is a good chance that common sense would prevail. The Republic of Mauritius could not object to this because it signed up to the treaty knowing that it depended on domestic processes that, in this case, require the passing of legislation through a legislature that cannot be dictated to by the Executive. It is really important that we are open, transparent and honest about the opportunity that we have both to stand up for the Chagossians and to say no to this treaty because, if we have the power to do so, we have the responsibility to do so. That is, I think, is of equal importance; it may even be more important.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Bellingham Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, in his remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, has tried to pre-empt the comments that I was about to make. I remember well the Falklands War in 1982. I remember many negotiations with Spain about Gibraltar. I remember the struggles with China over Hong Kong. I remember discussions about the future of the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands—both of which I have visited—as well as discussions about the future of St Helena, Ascension, Tristan da Cunha, Anguilla and the sovereign territories in Cyprus. In each case, the discussions took place on the basis of the interests of each sovereign territory concerned and I believe that that will remain the case. I cannot see why this treaty over the British Indian Ocean islands and the Chagos Islands will affect the discussions that we will have with our other overseas territories about their futures. I think that the situation will remain as it has been in the past, so I do not feel that I can support this amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, I certainly do support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I will be very brief. The amendment on which I want to focus is not one regarding referenda and consulting the Chagossian people, even though that is very important. Amendment 20L simply states—and I would be surprised if the Government could not accept this—that the Secretary of State needs to come up with a report

“assessing the potential implications for other British Overseas Territories that would arise from this Act and the Treaty”.

What is wrong with that amendment? Nothing. It would cost the Foreign Office a certain amount of time and effort to put together a report but, in the context of what has been said—at Second Reading, in the debate that we had on the treaty, on the first and second day in Committee—it is not asking a lot.

The noble Lord, Lord Jay, was looking specifically at the interests of the citizens in those different territories. He has a huge amount of knowledge, wisdom and experience, and what he said made a huge amount of sense. What he perhaps did not address is the signals that this Bill, if it becomes an Act, and the treaty, will send to other countries. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, made some specific points about Argentina—where we know that the dispute will not go anywhere; it will go on and on—as well as Gibraltar. I will also mention one other territory that could well—

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I hesitate to interrupt, but I think we need to remind ourselves before it gets repeated again that we have just done a deal on Gibraltar with Spain. That has been welcomed by the Government in Gibraltar and that situation is no longer as is being implied by the noble Lord.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

I understand that, but circumstances can change and this may well be seen as a precedent in the future.

I want to mention one other territory: Anguilla. As the Minister will know, Anguilla went through a period of huge unrest to resist becoming part of St Kitts and Nevis. The consequence was that a UK battalion of the Parachute Regiment had to deploy to Anguilla to control the unrest that took place. This is a small but incredibly proud territory that wanted to remain British. In the past few years, there have been a number of attempts by St Kitts and Nevis to reopen the whole issue of Anguilla.

There will be consequences of this treaty going through, which could be to some extent alleviated if the Government would accept this very simple amendment, Amendment 20L. This is the amendment in this group that concerns me most. I do not think that it is asking a great deal of the Government to put this in the Bill. This would be a very important signal in the Bill that those other territories would be properly considered.