Digital ID

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, we unequivocally oppose the Government’s dangerous mandatory digital ID policy, both in principle and in practice. If it is allowed to become legislation, the electorate risks being subjected to an extraordinary expansion of state power, one that comes not only at the expense of personal freedom but at great cost to the taxpayer.

Before I outline our objections to this proposal, it is important to understand the wider context in which this policy has been announced. Over this Government’s year in power, an estimated 50,000 people have entered the country on small boats, the largest recorded number to date, but the Secretary of State has claimed that digital IDs will deter these illegal migrants. Where is the evidence for this claim? Criminal gangs and illegal workers already operate outside formal employment and taxation systems. They do not care about paperwork or credentials. They work illegally, beyond the reach of existing regulation. They subvert existing national insurance requirements. Why would we expect digital ID to be different? To suggest that digital ID would somehow deter these operations is untested, unfounded and too optimistic to be convincing.

We are concerned, too, about the vast scope of this programme. The Government have claimed that digital IDs will result in “more joined-up” public services, saving people time from having to restate personal details to multiple departments. Here the Government seem to me to conflate separate issues: more effective public services and curbing illegal migration. They promise an end to bureaucracy while simultaneously constructing one of the most intrusive systems of state surveillance in our nation’s history. This is vast in its objectives, slight in its detail and, frankly, creepy in its reach into our privacy. Better online services do not require a centralised identity regime. We already have mechanisms such as right-to-work checks and DBS verification. These have all been designed with consent and privacy in mind, with nobody forced to pursue the digital route. The Government’s policy would herald an end to that freedom.

This policy was not even in the Government’s manifesto. There is no democratic mandate for digital ID, nor is there any appetite for it. In fact, over 2.8 million people have already signed a petition opposing it.

If, all of that said, the Government go ahead with this policy, we urge them to mitigate the risks and the costs in three ways. First, can they please ensure that the system is designed as a decentralised tool, using the blockchain to give citizens privacy and security? Secondly, to ensure some adherence to their stated goals, we urge the Government to adopt an agile approach of test and iterate rather than a build-once model. Thirdly, can the Government clarify and limit the stated goals? The current scope is simply too broad to be realistic.

Digital IDs fundamentally shift the burden of proof from government to citizens. In a free democracy, it is the state, not citizens, that must justify its actions. Under this scheme, one’s ability to rent, open a bank account or even order a drink would be conditional on the possession of government-issued digital ID. When the ability to work is conditioned on digital, state-approved credentials, meaningful consent ceases to exist. The choice between non-participation and never being able to work again is no choice at all. Last week, the Foreign Secretary proposed issuing digital IDs for those as young as 13. Once implemented, this policy will further infringe on people’s lives. Today, it is to determine the right to work; tomorrow, it could be to determine the right to vote or to travel.

Digital IDs are accompanied by a litany of practical problems and challenges, not least the enormous and real cybersecurity risk. The UK’s own sign-on system was breached only months ago during testing. The National Cyber Security Centre is yet to endorse the scheme. Further, 8.5 million adults lack the requisite digital skills to make use of these IDs, and many do not own a smartphone or have reliable internet access. Labour’s digital inclusion action plan is currently inadequate for the need and does not account for the structural barriers that vulnerable individuals face.

Finally, this presumably comes at a considerable cost to the taxpayer. Perhaps when he speaks, the Minister could give us some estimate of the likely costs for hardware, software, development and the operation of the system. The Government’s proposal for digital IDs is costly, controlling and risky. We do not think it will stop the boats and we do not think it will streamline services without very significant, and as yet unknowable, investment and programme delivery. Instead, we are concerned that it represents an illegitimate state encroachment on people’s privacy that they themselves are forced to fund. We are deeply alarmed.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the introduction of compulsory digital ID represents another fundamental error by this Government. The Liberal Democrats strongly oppose this proposal, which is a serious threat to privacy, civil liberties and social inclusion. We thank the Minister for bringing the Secretary of State’s Statement to this House today, but my disappointment and opposition to the Government’s plan more than mirrors that of my honourable friend Victoria Collins in the Commons yesterday.

The core issue here is not technology but freedom. The Government insist this scheme is non-compulsory, yet concurrently confirm that it will be mandatory for right-to-work checks by the end of this Parliament. This is mandatory digital ID in all but name, especially for working-age people. As my party leader Sir Ed Davey has stated, we cannot and will not support a system where citizens are forced to hand over private data simply to participate in everyday life. This is state overreach, plain and simple.

The Secretary of State quoted Finland and the ability of parents to register for daycare, but I think the Secretary of State needs to do a bit more research. That is a voluntary scheme, not a compulsory one. We have already seen the clear danger of mission creep. My honourable friend Victoria Collins rightly warned that the mere discussion of extending this scheme to 13 to 16 year-olds is sinister, unnecessary and a clear step towards state overreach. Where does this stop?

The Secretary of State sought to frame this as merely a digital key to unlock better services. This dangerously conflates genuine and desirable public service reform with a highly intrusive mandate. First, the claim that this will deliver fairness and security by tackling illegal migration is nothing more than a multibillion-pound gimmick. The Secretary of State suggests that it will deter illegal working, yet, as my colleagues have pointed out, rogue employers who operate cash-in-hand schemes will not look at ID on a phone. Mandatory digital ID for British citizens will not stop illegal migrants working in the black economy.

Secondly, the claim that the system will be free is disingenuous. As my honourable friend Max Wilkinson, our home affairs spokesman, demanded, the Government must come clean on the costs and publish a full impact assessment. Estimates suggest that creating this system will cost between £1 billion and £2 billion, with annual running costs of £100 million pounds. This is completely the wrong priority at a time when public services are crumbling.

Thirdly, the promise of inclusion rings hollow. This mandatory system risks entrenching discrimination against the millions of vulnerable people, such as older people and those on low incomes, who lack foundational digital skills, a smartphone or internet access.

The greatest concern is the Government’s insistence on building this mandatory system on GOV.UK’s One Login, a platform with security failures that have been repeatedly and publicly criticised, including in my own correspondence and meetings with government. There are significant concerns about One Login’s security. The Government claim that One Login adheres to the highest security standards. Despite this commitment, as of late 2024 and early 2025, the system was still not fully compliant. A GovAssure assessment found that One Login was meeting only about 21 of the 39 required outcomes in the NCSC cyber assessment framework. The GOV.UK One Login programme has told me that it is committed to achieving full compliance with the cyber assessment framework by 21 March 2026, yet officials have informed me that 500 services across 87 departments are already currently in scope for the One Login project.

There are other criticisms that I could make, but essentially the foundations of the digital ID scheme are extremely unsafe, to say the least. To press ahead with a mandatory digital ID system, described as a honeypot for hackers, based on a platform exhibiting such systemic vulnerabilities is not only reckless but risks catastrophic data breaches, identity theft and mass impersonation fraud. Concentrating the data of the entire population fundamentally concentrates the risk.

The Secretary of State must listen to the millions of citizens who have signed the petition against this policy. We on these Benches urge the Government to scrap this costly, intrusive and technologically unreliable scheme and instead focus on delivering voluntary, privacy-preserving digital public services that earn the public’s trust rather than demanding compliance.

[The Minister of State, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (Lord Vallance of Balham) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for the points that they have raised with the Government. Unsurprisingly, I have no doubt that this is an area in which there will be strong interest across the House. I remind the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, of the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Hague, that the:

“Arguments against digital ID are paper thin”.


I shall address the concerns that have been raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. In the context of the Data (Use and Access) Act, we were clear that the services under that legislation were not mandatory, nor were they ever designed to be, and they cover many of the areas that have been discussed so far. This new national digital ID will be required, specifically and only, for right-to-work checks by the end of this Parliament. It is a very narrow use for a very specific purpose.

However, we have always believed and continue to believe that there are huge upsides for a digitally enabled society, one where everyone feels able to participate, everyone feels a sense of agency and everyone’s lives are made easier by a digital key that indeed unlocks access to services—something that is a big upside to a digitally enabled society. Those businesses that enable this, as we have seen in other countries that have introduced a digital ID, and the services that those businesses provide will have an important role to play.

We expect the digital identity market to be able to build on the national digital pass and offer value-added services for individuals and businesses. In countries where digital ID is well established, the private sector has built a wide range of services around it, making everyday tasks such as open banking, renting a flat and applying for a mortgage faster, simpler and more secure, but that is not a mandatory use of this. The required use is for the right to work.

I turn to the subject of illegal migration, a problem that obviously has grown enormously over the past 10 to 15 years. I absolutely agree that there is no silver bullet to solving illegal migration, but ensuring that there is a single digital system to prove that you have a right to work will simplify the process and drive up compliance, making it easier for businesses and providing the Home Office—this is an important point—with an overview of employers conducting checks that they can use to audit those suspected of hiring illegally. It will be possible for it to see where there are a large number of employees but only two or three who have been checked for work. Ultimately, it should be easier for honest, legitimate employers to get started and much harder for those employing illegally.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said that this was an invasion of privacy and civil liberties. I do not agree, and I think those countries that have introduced it would not agree. Digital identities preserve and increase privacy by limiting the information that individuals have to share when proving something about themselves. The credentials in play here are name, date of birth, information on nationality or residency status, and a photo. That is what you need for a right-to-work check, and the display may be as simple as a yes or no, with none of the information shared with the third party. We will ensure that strict safeguards are in place to prevent illegal tracking or misuse of data by the Government or anyone else.

On the point that has been raised about how this actually works and whether we end up with a big target —a honeypot—this will be a federated system, as it has rightly been pointed out that it should be, not a single repository, increasing security and not creating a honeypot of data.

A question was asked about those aged 13 and upwards. This is a system designed for 16 year-olds and above. As part of the consultation, there will be consultation about younger age groups and whether there may be utility for them. Any use of personal data will continue to be regulated by the independent Information Commissioner’s Office, and our consultation, which will be launched later this year, will consider whether further safeguards will be needed or appropriate.

The question of cost was raised. While I cannot give exact details of the cost, I can say that it will be met within the existing SR budget over the SR period.

OneLogin was raised. Indeed there were problems at the beginning, and that is not unusual with a system as it is getting set up. Those problems date from 2023 and have been resolved, and the National Cyber Security Centre is working hand in hand to get the OneLogin system to the place where it needs to be. The National Cyber Security Centre will be central to getting this system set up as well.

Finally, I want to talk about digital inclusion, a key point raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and an area that is increasingly important for the times we live in. That is why this Government have made digital inclusion a priority. We set out a range of first steps in the Digital Inclusion Action Plan, published in February this year, and are working across government to improve inclusion. We know that those who do not own or cannot afford a smartphone, do not already have photo ID or have additional accessibility requirements will require special attention. One in 10 people already struggles to prove their identity and access the service that they have a right to because they lack a photo ID. This scheme is an opportunity to get them a free digital credential that proves their identity and helps them to access those services.

We will deliver a comprehensive inclusion programme, including face-to-face support to ensure that everyone eligible is able to access the new digital pass and benefit from it if they want to, including those using it for right-to-work checks—the only required need for this. It will provide targeted support to those who currently struggle to engage with digital services, including options for a digitally enabled physical alternative for those without a smartphone or who may experience data poverty, such as those unable to afford data use on their phone.

We have already started to engage with a range of expert organisations and community groups, including the Digital Inclusion Action Committee, and we look forward to continuing to do so throughout the credential’s design and development—a process that, as the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, has pointed out, must be done in an agile way and will require both external input and government technical need.

This is an important development that, although with a narrow requirement, has a broad use that I think many people already take advantage of in different forms in this country. Digital ID will make life easier for people.