Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 10th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I want to go one step back and start with domestic abuse prevention notices. These can be given by a relatively junior police officer, despite what the legislation describes as a “senior police officer”—I was a police inspector at the age of 23—on the basis that he has reasonable grounds to believe that P has been abusive towards another person aged 16 or over to whom P is personally connected and reasonably believes that the notice is necessary to protect the person from abuse by P. If P breaches the notice, P can be arrested and must be held in custody before they can be brought before the court. That is a lot of power invested in a relatively junior and potentially inexperienced police officer, with serious consequences for P. A practical alternative might be to seek the authority of a magistrate, in a similar way that the police might seek a search warrant, which can be done at short notice, on a 24/7 basis. Did the Government consider such an alternative?

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, domestic abuse prevention orders can be made by a court on application, and must be applied for if P is already subject to a domestic abuse protection notice. The orders are made on the basis that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities, the civil standard of proof, that P has been abusive towards a person aged 16 or over to whom P is personally connected and the order is necessary and proportionate to protect that person from domestic abuse, or the risk of domestic abuse, carried out by P.

The order can be made in the absence of P, and it can impose a range of prohibitions and requirements. If P fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the order, he commits a criminal offence and can be imprisoned for up to five years. Normally an accused person is convicted of a criminal offence only if the offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt, and while I accept that a breach of the order might be so proved, the basis upon which the order is given is on the balance of probabilities.

When this House debated knife crime prevention orders, we discussed whether the breach of what is effectively a civil order, granted on the balance of probabilities, should result in a criminal offence, rather than a fine or a term of imprisonment for contempt of court without a criminal conviction being recorded against the perpetrator. In that case, the Government claimed that it was the police who said that a criminal sanction was necessary, rather than a civil penalty, in order for perpetrators to take them seriously. What is the Government’s reason this time?

As we discussed then, Parliament changed a similar regime introduced under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, whereby breach of the civil order resulted in the criminalisation of many young people with no previous convictions for breach of an anti-social behaviour order or ASBO. Parliament replaced ASBOs with anti-social behaviour injunctions and community protection notices—a purely civil process—by means of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

On the basis of hearsay, potentially a malicious allegation, someone could be given a domestic abuse protection order, breach of which may result in a criminal conviction and a term of imprisonment. Can the Minister please explain why it is necessary for a criminal record to be created when there is a breach of the civil domestic abuse prevention order when it is not necessary in relation to anti-social behaviour injunctions and community protection notices?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am speaking to this amendment on the basis that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said that she will not be moving it to a vote, and that what she is seeking is, essentially, for the Minister to read into the record the contents of the letter the noble Baroness received, in which the Minister explained the nature of the process when people breach the DAPO.

I thought I would address a couple of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, when she opened her contribution, in her typically provocative way, by saying she feared that the state was expanding its coercive powers. In some ways, the situation is more extreme than she or the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said.

I remind the House that I sit as a magistrate in family and criminal cases; in particular, I sit on domestic abuse-related criminal cases. In domestic abuse criminal cases, if we find a perpetrator not guilty, we still occasionally give them what is now called a restraining order. We do that because although the necessary standard of proof has not been met, the alleged victim is clearly vulnerable, so we put a restraining order in place in any event. In the family court, we use non-molestation orders.

The purpose of the DAPO is to supersede restraining orders and non-molestation orders, but we very frequently put non-molestation orders in place without the alleged perpetrator present. The alleged perpetrator will be told of it and given an opportunity to come to court and argue against the imposition of a non-molestation order, but the reason the process is as I have described is to protect the woman, as it is usually. I understand that the purpose of the DAPN and the DAPO is to supersede the arrangements we have in place.

I understand the points the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made about the appropriateness of these sorts of orders when compared to ASBOs and community protection notices. They are points he has made before and they are interesting. Nevertheless, as I said in my opening, I see that the purpose of this short debate is for the Minister to put on the record the contents of the letter he has written to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to make crystal clear the standard of proof that would be necessary to get a conviction for breaching these orders.

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[Baroness Burt of Solihull (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for meeting the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and other supporters of this amendment, including me. There is no agenda here: we just need children to be safely supervised during contact by properly trained people who can spot the signs of stress and distress in children.

On the first day of Report, I spoke to Amendment 15, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, about the need for training for all who come into contact with victims. Child contact centres are a very strong and sensitive example of the need for training. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay said in Committee, the quiet child is not necessarily the happy child. Trained professionals know how to spot the difference and what to do. There are many examples like this, where a trained professional could, and should, intervene to help, to signpost and to stop potential harm being done.

The main issue here revolves around whether unaccredited centres are operating and in what circumstances. We know that court referrals should be made only to accredited centres, but does every member of the judiciary know? The Minister has attempted to reassure us about that. What about non-court referrals? I discussed this with Barnardo’s. Anyone can make a referral to a child contact centre—a social worker or other professional working with the family, a parent, the child who wants contact with their parent, and Barnardo’s itself. Who is making them pick an approved centre, especially when they are likely to be more costly?

Anyone can start up a contact centre. The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, in his remarks in Committee, asked for proof that unapproved child contact centres were operating. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said earlier, this has proved difficult to obtain, because there is no obligation on them to register.

In January, the Government launched an independent review into children’s social care. Will the Minister commit to including child contact centres in this review? As it stands, this is not good enough. If the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, decides to put this to a vote, we on these Benches will support her.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, the Minister has been generous with his time and has spoken with the group twice. The purpose of this amendment is well understood by the contributors to this short debate and by the Minister. The purpose is simple: it is to close a loophole, to make sure that all child contact centres reach the necessary standard, that there is some form of overview and accreditation and that there are consequences if that standard is not reached.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, succinctly put it, we know that, as far as the courts are concerned, only accredited child contact centres should ever be used. However, what about other referrals to child contact centres? What about private referrals or referrals by local councils or other organisations such as Barnardo’s?

In the discussions that we have had with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, he has asked for proof that there is a problem. As the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, said, it is difficult to provide proof, because you are looking for organisations and child contact centres that do not necessarily advertise their services. If they run into problems, they can easily withdraw the advertising and re-emerge in another form, but with the same people running them. At the moment, there are no consequences for people playing fast and loose with the system, if I may put it like that. There needs to be some consistency across the range of services and regulated services that children use. This anomaly needs to be addressed and I can see no better place to do it than in this Bill with this amendment right now. I and my party will support the amendment if it is moved to a vote.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, as I indicated in Committee, I fully recognise that the provision of child contact centres is extremely important to supporting families and enabling parents to have contact with their children, while at the same time providing a safe environment that protects children and adults from potential harm. As the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, put it, there is no agenda here, in the sense that we all have the same aim. The question is the best means of achieving it.

It is essential that all children experience the same high level of care and safeguarding where circumstances have necessitated their involvement with the family justice system and child contact centres or services. I thank noble Lords and the National Association of Child Contact Centres for their engagement with me and my officials since Committee. I have met, on a number of occasions, several noble Lords who have spoken in support of this amendment. I have found those discussions extremely helpful and I am grateful to them for the time that they gave to discussing the issue with me in more detail.

This amendment differs from the amendment debated in Committee, because it provides that the child contact centres should be accredited in accordance with national standards to be specified in regulations laid by the Secretary of State. The amendment in Committee did not specify who would set the accreditation standards. I continue to question whether the statutory accreditation proposed in this amendment is required or would provide a more effective form of regulation than that which currently exists through the NACCC accreditation framework and the statutory regulations governing local authorities.

I extend my sincere thanks to the NACCC for the useful overview of the current landscape of unaccredited child contact centres and services in England and Wales that it produced following Committee. That review was conducted at some pace and has been used to inform further discussions on this matter. While I accept and take on board the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, that it is hard to identify evidence in this area, it is fair to say that the work that was done was at a somewhat high level.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I explained in Committee the reasons for my amendments, which were directed at ensuring that special measures and the prohibition of direct cross-examination should be applied in civil cases on the same or a very similar basis as they are to be in family cases. Our debates highlighted the difficulties, fear and trauma for parties and witnesses in giving evidence and taking part in proceedings where they were victims or at risk of being victims of domestic abuse at the hands of other parties or witnesses. We spoke of the effect of reliving the trauma of abuse in subsequent court proceedings and the fear of the consequences of giving or challenging evidence given by or in the presence of perpetrators.

I argued that in many civil proceedings the risks and effects were the same. I mentioned disputes over property and goods, landlord and tenant disputes, employment disputes, inheritance disputes and business disputes—particularly when partners break up and the separation of their joint business interests gives rise to litigation. It is a truism for litigation lawyers that the disputes giving rise to the most bitterness and unpleasantness are precisely those where the litigants have a close personal connection. However, of course I take the Minister’s point that the range of disputes in civil cases is very much broader than it is in family cases.

The Government have listened to those concerns. I am particularly grateful to the Minister for the time that he and officials in his department made available to consider these issues and for the very useful discussions we had, which have led us to the position that special measures are now to be extended to persons who are or who are at risk of being a victim of domestic abuse, where the original unamended clause required that the person had to be the victim of a specified offence for which the perpetrator would have had to have been convicted, cautioned or charged.

I am delighted that the Government have agreed, no doubt because so many cases of domestic abuse never reach that stage—largely because so much abuse goes unreported or is never the subject of criminal investigation—that victims and those at risk of being victims should be protected in civil proceedings, as they are to be in family proceedings.

Although the amendments on direct cross-examination are complex, as the Minister has explained, they effectively offer broadly equivalent protection to victims of abuse in civil proceedings to that offered in family proceedings, which was the aim of my amendments. In addition to the discretionary protection which the court is to be able to give as a result of new Section 85F of the Courts Act 2003, to be introduced by Clause 64, there is now to be a clear bar on direct cross-examination in cases where the victim is a victim of an offence or protected by an injunction or where there is evidence of domestic abuse against the victim by a party or witness. The nature of the evidence to be required to trigger the mandatory bar will be specified in regulations. It is to be hoped that no undue formality will be required, but I am confident that will be the case.

These amendments achieve what I set out to achieve: to protect witnesses and parties in civil proceedings who have been subject to domestic abuse. I am therefore very pleased to have been able to add my name to the amendments and say—it is not the first time it has been said today—that this process has shown the House at its best. It has been a model of co-operation between some of us on the Opposition Benches and the Government of the day.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for pursuing this issue. It is not something I had focused on. The concessions he has got from the Government are welcome. There will be a ban on cross-examination in family courts and a broadly equivalent set of rules in the civil courts, although, as far as I understand it, there will still be some judicial discretion on these matters because of the wider nature of the types of cases heard in the civil courts. As the noble Lord just said, while the nature of the cases may be wider, the risks may be the same, particularly if the parties are personally connected in any way. I welcome these government amendments and congratulate the noble Lord on pursuing this matter.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we support this government amendment and the amendment of the Title of the Bill that goes with it. As the Minister has explained, Section 91 of the Children Act permits the court to make a barring order—that is, an order forbidding someone, usually an applicant who has failed to persuade a court to make an order in his or her favour, from making an application for an order of a particular kind; this is usually but not always a repeat application—with respect to a child, importantly, without the leave of the court.

An order under this section still permits a further application for an order to be made if the court decides to permit it, which the court may in its discretion decide to do. This amendment, as the Minister has explained, extends the discretion to make a barring order if a further application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm. That is the real purpose and merit of this amendment: it is for the protection from repeated litigation of those who might be victims of domestic abuse, when that repeated litigation often amounts to a particularly unpleasant form of harassment by legal proceedings.

The jurisdiction is similar to the court’s jurisdiction to make civil restraint orders and civil proceedings orders against vexatious and unmeritorious repeat litigants in civil cases. Under this government amendment, a person subject to a barring order may of course seek permission to apply further to the court. That application for permission will be considered, but the court considering whether permission should be given to make a fresh application must consider whether there has been a change of circumstances since the making of the original order. That, I suggest, seems entirely sensible. The amendment therefore strikes a careful and judicious balance between protecting potential applicants and providing a safeguard against people being harassed by unmeritorious repeat litigation.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these amendments, which we support. As he explained, they put in additional strengthening factors for barring orders; of course, there are barring orders in place in the family courts in any event. The purpose, as he explained, is to make it crystal clear, and to set out clearly, what the court must consider where there is any risk for the children or the other parties through repeated litigation. However, there is discretion for the court, if there is a material change in circumstances, to decide to accept and hear the case. So I accept the amendment as presented.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I supported this amendment in principle in Committee. I expressed one or two drafting reservations, one of which was about the point that not all refuges may have office addresses, but that has been amply answered by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. This amendment is extremely difficult to resist with any sense of logic or safeguarding at all. The noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, has argued the case for it and I shall be extremely brief.

The point is that everybody has stressed the importance and value of confidentiality for refuge addresses. That flows from the very nature of a refuge: it is where women go—it is generally women—to avoid the consequences and a repetition of domestic abuse. Breach of that confidence leads to perpetrators discovering where their victims have gone. Discovering the whereabouts of their victims offers them a chance of harassing those victims further—of committing further abuse—so revealing a refuge address destroys the very concept that it is a refuge. It raises the risk of changing a refuge into a target. That is what this amendment is designed to avoid and I support it.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, powerfully moved this amendment and went into the detail of the problems that arise when refuge addresses are revealed. I fail to understand why judges, in her words, are turning a blind eye to the requirement to keep the secrecy of a refuge; I fail to imagine why that might be the case. Nevertheless, either mistakes happen or some judges—very few—have an alternative view. What I understand from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, is that she wants the Minister to put on record that guidance will be updated and to make it absolutely clear that this should not happen again. I do not know whether she is going to move her amendment or what will happen, but I would have thought that, at the very least, the Minister should be able to do that and say that guidance will be updated.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Uddin, both have experience of working in refuges and they know the importance of keeping these addresses secret. I hope we will hear from the Minister something that sufficiently reassures his noble friend Lady Bertin that this issue can be properly addressed once and for all.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Bertin for her continued engagement on the issue of the confidentiality of refuge addresses. I take this opportunity to thank refuge providers and others in the sector who took time out of their very busy diaries to meet me on this issue: we had a very useful discussion.

As with many issues with the Bill, it seems to me that we all agree on the issues of principle. Refuges are places of safety. They play a vital role in effectively responding to domestic abuse, and in supporting victims and their children. Therefore, I am in complete agreement with the principle underlying my noble friend’s amendment, that those in refuges must be protected. As such, it is right that the Government and those involved in family proceedings carefully consider both whether existing measures offer enough protection and whether there are further steps that could be taken better to protect domestic abuse victims living in refuge accommodation.

In Committee, I outlined that those engaged in family proceedings are not required to disclose their address, or that of their children, unless specifically directed to do so by the court. Where such a disclosure direction is made, addresses are disclosed to the court only, and it is for the court to determine whether information it holds should be disclosed further. Where there are known allegations of domestic abuse, the court should hold this information as confidential. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that the formulation I used in Committee was certainly intended to indicate agreement.

Turning to the service of orders at refuge addresses, I again thank those from the refuge sector with whom I discussed this issue and their experience of it. They gave some valuable evidence, and we heard some more this evening from the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin. As I indicated in Committee, existing measures, particularly Part 6 of the Family Procedure Rules, enable the court to direct bespoke service arrangements, and orders can be served at alternative addresses, such as the refuge office address. This approach should be taken wherever possible.

I noted the way that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, put it: service on a refuge should be avoided. However, as I said on the last group, the real question is the welfare of the child, which is of paramount consideration in family proceedings. I remain of the view that there can be limited circumstances where the court may need to serve an order on a party at the refuge they are staying in because not doing so would pose risks to the safety of children involved in family proceedings.

One can envisage such cases, and I would not wish to limit the court’s ability to act quickly in those circumstances to safeguard a child, which might occur were we to place a blanket or inflexible restriction on addresses at which an order can be served. However, I would expect family proceedings where an order needs to be served at a residential refuge address to be very few and far between. Although the question must ultimately be a matter for the judiciary and not for the Government Front Bench, one would expect that a refuge address would be used only when there is no other viable alternative in the circumstances.

I have indicated that existing measures enable protection for victims in refuges. However, I am persuaded that there is a legitimate question of whether those measures could be strengthened to ensure that victims are better protected, that addresses are not disclosed to perpetrators, and that service of orders at refuge addresses is directed only when absolutely necessary. While I am clear that primary legislation, and therefore this amendment, is not the appropriate response here, there are other routes to explore, as I have discussed with my noble friend since Committee.

This issue has been discussed between Ministers and the President of the Family Division in recent bilateral meetings. I assure my noble friend that the judiciary is taking seriously the concerns raised. I appreciate, in this context, that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, wanted some reassurance from the Government; I hope I am giving it to him. The Whips may not agree, but one of the benefits of making slightly slower progress on Monday than we intended is that I can now say that this matter was discussed at the meeting of the Family Procedure Rule Committee on Monday, which was a couple of days ago. The committee agreed to work on this issue and will be giving it detailed consideration in the coming weeks and months.

The Government are committed to protecting vulnerable victims of domestic abuse from further harm by their abuser. I am confident that this issue is being properly and carefully considered by members of the senior judiciary and by the Family Procedure Rule Committee. I have full sympathy with the motivation behind this amendment. I understand why my noble friend has maintained this, and why the noble Lord, Lord Marks, had considerable sympathy with it on the confidentiality point, although I note that he did not engage with the lack of any exception to the proposition set out in subsection (3) of the proposed new clause—that is, service on a refuge address.

I have used my response to set out what the Government are doing and the steps being taken. I hope that, having provided that assurance to my noble friend, she will now be content to withdraw her amendment.