Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 20th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the Government’s purpose in introducing the Bill, to provide greater certainty for service personnel and veterans regarding their potential criminal liability for purported actions taken during overseas operations, gives rise to two general questions. Is there a problem that needs to be addressed and, if so, how effective is the Bill in doing that? The answer to the first question is, I think, yes. The UK Armed Forces place the highest importance on carrying out their duties within the law. They fully understand that the rationale for having a uniformed military is that it, as an organisation, is permitted under international law to exercise destructive and lethal force, provided that it complies with the provisions of that law. In other words, adherence to the law is fundamental to the military’s very existence. This is why some senior serving personnel are nervous about the Bill. They do not wish there to be any doubt in people’s minds about their commitment in this regard.

It is also true that, despite this fundamental tenet, some military personnel do commit crimes on overseas operations. Our Armed Forces personnel in general exercise incredible judgment and restraint in the most dangerous and trying circumstances, but it would be unreasonable to expect that they should be entirely free of the faults and frailties that are part of the wider society from which they spring. When such crimes are suspected, they should be investigated thoroughly—and the investigation process itself would certainly bear improvement—and, if the evidence is sufficient, the perpetrators should be prosecuted. However, it is also the case that legal process has been increasingly used to pursue political and other non-legal objectives in relation to overseas operations. Members of the Armed Forces, who have often risked all at the behest of the Government and in the service of their country, have been caught in the middle of this procedural struggle. This has created immense mental stress for them and their families—stress that has been piled on top of the inevitable psychological impact of warfare with which they must already deal. We have a moral obligation to reduce that additional suffering to the maximum extent we can within the bounds of the rule of law.

So, how effectively does the Bill before us today achieve that objective? It attempts to strike a balance, but whether it is the best that can be done is not entirely clear. It certainly will not achieve its aim if it simply moves the legal process from UK jurisdiction to that of the International Criminal Court—quite the opposite, in fact. In addition, the Bill focuses on the issue of criminal prosecutions, but I am not sure that they are really the most significant problem. After all, the tests that the Bill introduces for prosecutors are mostly ones that they follow already, and that generally protect all people, civilian and military, from speculative trials. The stress on personnel arises less from actual prosecutions and more from protracted investigations, even when these come to nothing. We need look no further than at the notorious Metropolitan Police investigations under Operation Midland to see the truth of this. The lack of an eventual prosecution is not necessarily a protection against mental suffering. There is a doubt in my mind as to whether the Bill really gets at this issue.

Then there is the question of the extent to which the Bill aims to support members of the Armed Forces, and the degree to which it seeks to protect the Ministry of Defence. A department of state is well able to deal with vexatious claims. It may find them irritating and frustrating, but it is not subject to mental anguish in the way that individuals are, and I would have thought that it needs no special provision under the law.

Having said that, I am not clear that the provisions of the Bill are quite so dramatic as some have suggested. They do not condone or permit torture; nor is there a new time limit on pursuing such cases, only a more tightly but not obstructively defined set of conditions for doing so.

I for one entirely understand the rationale for excluding sexual offences from those conditions. It is not that a particular kind of offence is worse than another, but in one case an admitted outcome—death or injury—may reasonably be the result of lawful military action, while in the other a sexual assault can never be anything but criminal, whatever the circumstances. This seems to me a valid basis for excluding that category of offence from the provisions of the Bill.

So while I welcome the Bill, I believe that it can and should be improved. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the concerns that I have raised today, and to developing some of these themes further in Committee.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard
Tuesday 9th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. I hope that his concern about delay will be addressed in Amendment 4, to which I commend him, when we come to it.

I was talking to a cousin of mine at the weekend, a retired Army major, about his evacuation as a boy to Devon in the spring of 1944. The fields were crammed with soldiers, he said, until, on one day, they all vanished. I have my own memories of the Royal Welch Fusiliers exercising in the fields around my home before departing as suddenly, some to lose their lives on the beaches of Normandy. We owe the military an enormous debt. In this House, there will be few who did not lose close family members in the conflicts of the 20th century for the defence of our country and for the freedom of Europe and of Asia.

Today, I think there is great sensitivity for the welfare of our Armed Forces and their families, when we have committed our young men to risk their lives in overseas operations when the lifeblood of our country is not at risk at all—where the overseas operations have been for contestable political reasons and no longer, even as in our dubious past, for conquest and empire.

The military depends on discipline and the obeying of lawful orders within a framework of law. When we come later in the year to debate the new Armed Forces Bill, it may surprise many to discover that it is essentially concerned with discipline and military justice. The reason is that it is discipline and the law which enforces it which bind the Armed Forces into an effective arm of the state.

In my professional career, I never prosecuted at court martial. I was always on the defence side, in one instance for an officer but mainly for ordinary soldiers. The stated policy for this Bill, as set out in the Explanatory Notes, is to protect sailors, soldiers and airmen against historic investigations and prosecutions deriving from them. I do not believe that a presumption against prosecution is a protection; I believe that it weakens the bonds of discipline.

What the progenitors of this policy have failed to recognise are the protections which already exist. A soldier is trained to kill and to maim and given the means of so doing. His protection is that he does not commit a criminal offence in the use of violence if he acts in accordance with lawful orders—the lawful commands of his superiors. If he acts without or against those orders, by raping a woman or by shooting a defenceless civilian or a wounded or captured enemy, it surely must be public policy that, if proved, he is to be punished for it. He is also criminally and personally responsible, even if he is acting in obeying an unlawful order; for example, to torture a prisoner for information. But even in that case there is a system of justice, which we have developed over centuries, which is specifically designed to protect him.

He will know that the decision to prosecute will rest in the hands of an independent Director of Service Prosecutions. All the successive holders of that office will have to have demonstrated—to use the words of the Explanatory Notes—

“proper regard to the challenging context”

and the mitigating factors specified in the Bill. It is the DSP who is charged with considering the service interest and the public interest.

Further, a defendant soldier will not appear before the ordinary civilian jury, far removed from the stresses and strains of the battlefield, but before a panel of responsible and experienced officers and warrant officers who will have personal knowledge of the exigencies of the service and will take those matters into account. The soldiers who were engaged in the torture of Baha Mousa and those detained with him were acting under the unlawful orders of the corporal in charge. He pleaded guilty to a war crime, but they were all acquitted of murder or neglect of duty. A civil jury might have taken a different view.

Of course, the Government say that, if there is evidence of serious criminal acts, the presumption does not prevent a prosecution entirely, nor does the requirement for the consent of the Attorney-General—I shall say more on those topics later in this Committee. So what is the presumption and the seriousness of a crime which will rebut it? Is it a presumption against prosecution for stealing the mess funds in Iraq 10 years ago or, as in the current trial at Bulford, for claiming school fees as legitimate expenses? Of course not. If, as the former Judge Advocate-General, Jeff Blackett, has publicly stated, there have been only eight trials of serious crime in relation to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which of these would this presumption have operated to prevent a prosecution? Would it have been in the case of Sergeant Blackman, who only subsequent to his court marital admitted on appeal having deliberately shot under stress a captured and wounded man? Would it have prevented the prosecution of the eight soldiers and three officers in the Baha Mousa case? If it would, there are a number of consequences.

First, the use of the presumption would be a violation of the spirit of the laws of this country which maintain coherence and discipline in our Armed Forces. There is nothing in the statute law since 1661 or in the Articles of War which followed which talks about a presumption against prosecution. The law and the values it represents protect our military, and those who speak of the dangers of “lawfare” know not of what they speak.

Secondly, it would violate the laws of war which exist internationally to temper the brutality and the devastation which are the inevitable consequences of armed conflict.

Thirdly, it would invite the investigation and punishment of British soldiers by the International Criminal Court. That court has, by treaty, investigatory powers and jurisdiction for criminal offences committed by the British Armed Forces. I suspect that its prosecutors are eager to demonstrate that the values and standards which are the core reason for the court’s existence are not designed simply for Slavic generals or African despots but are universal. Picture Parliament Square if a British squaddie or officer stands trial in The Hague. This Prime Minister would undoubtedly break the treaty.

Fourthly, it inhibits investigations. That is the barely concealed motivation for the triple lock in the Bill. I challenge the Minister to deny it. I shall discuss the difficulties of investigating overseas actions later but, with limited resources, why would an investigator undertake an expensive and time-consuming investigation if his report had to mount the hurdles of a presumption against acting on his report by the prosecutors and the fiat of the Attorney-General?

Fifthly—and we shall discuss this in the context of derogation from the Human Rights Act—it is a signal to an enemy or an insurgent that they need show no restraint in torturing or killing captured British soldiers in precisely the same way. Show me the Minister of Defence who is prepared to dispatch troops who are exposed, by the very legislation that we are considering today, to retaliatory risks such as these.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I have some significant concerns over the Bill, but I confess that I am puzzled by Amendment 1 and those other amendments directly associated with it.

A proposal to extend the timescale for the application of the provisions within Part 1 of the Bill from five years to 10 years must surely be based on some perceived shortcoming associated with the lesser period that would be remedied by the substitution of the longer one, but what is that relative shortcoming? I start by accepting the Government’s assertion that there is no significant legal watershed involved in the proposed limitation. After that period, prosecutors will need to take account of the various considerations set out in the Bill but, as was generally conceded at Second Reading, a competent prosecutor would take account of those considerations even if the case arose before the expiry of the five-year period.

If this be so, arguments that defendants would try to defeat investigations by delaying them beyond the five-year period, or that those who had been rendered physically or mentally unable to begin such proceedings until after the expiry of that period would be denied justice, must surely rest on the presumption that the prosecuting authority is incompetent or biased. In that case, no proceedings would be safe, whenever initiated.

Similarly, the argument that the Attorney-General would act politically—for which I read “improperly”—regarding his or her responsibilities calls into question an important part of our entire legal structure. That would raise serious constitutional issues that went well beyond the scope of this Bill. It has also been suggested that it might be difficult to gather adequate evidence within a five-year period, particularly if the relevant conflict was still ongoing. That may well be true, but it might also be difficult to gather satisfactory evidence after the passage of many years. There is a need for balance here.

All this raises the question of whether there is any substantive benefit to be gained by defining a time period at all. The Government say that there is value in codifying the requirement in the way that they propose. If that is the case, why not codify it so that it applies to all potential prosecutions, no matter what timescale is involved? However, that is not what this amendment seeks to achieve, and it is to this amendment that I speak. Assuming that there must be a timescale, a five-year period is a reasonable span to choose in preference to any other. The Government’s position appears to be that one of the main purposes of the Bill is to reassure serving personnel that they will have a significantly reduced risk of being left exposed to prolonged, repeated, and mischievous accusations. If so, a period of 10 years would go a long way towards defeating that purpose. Although 10 years may not be for ever, it will seem like it to those who undergo such risks. I very much doubt that they would take any real comfort from such a provision.

Amendment 1 may be a way of neutering Part 1 to such an extent as to render it largely meaningless. If so, surely the various questions on clause stand part in the group are a better way of achieving this, although that would be to reject a Bill that has already been passed by the other place. Some might in this instance wish that we could, but they must consider whether we should.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 29, to which I have attached my name. Its purpose is to ensure that service personnel are not debarred by time from pursuing claims against the Government for harm suffered on overseas operations. Of course, the purpose of the Bill is to provide reassurance to those very personnel that they will be to some degree protected against malicious proceedings, so it seems rather perverse that the Bill should also seek to prevent them gaining redress for harm that they themselves suffered. The Government have asserted that such an outcome is not their intention, and of course I accept that. However, the question is not the present Government’s intention but the potential consequences of the Bill as worded. It seems that one consequence might well be to deprive a number of serving personnel or veterans of their right to pursue a claim against the Government.

Part of the Government’s response to this concern is to stress the small numbers involved. They say that some 94% of service personnel and veterans who brought claims relating to events in Iraq and Afghanistan did so within six years. Are we then to assume that, had the proposed timescale been applied to them, the Government believe that it would have been acceptable for the other 6% to lose the opportunity to pursue their cases? The Government also say that the vast majority of cases relate to events in the UK, not to overseas operations. That may be so, but to argue that only a small number of service personnel would suffer injustice does not seem a respectable position for a Government to take at any time, let alone in a Bill that is supposed to provide support and reassurance to those people.

This timescale is very different from the one proposed in Part 1. The latter, as I observed earlier, does not introduce a significant legal watershed. Complaints can still be brought to prosecution, subject to certain tests that ought to be applied with or without the Bill. The time limit placed upon complaints brought by service personnel or veterans is of a very different character. It is not a high bar—it is an impassable wall. In support of this absolute limit the Government have prayed in aid statements from the courts about the need for limitation periods in civil litigation to ensure legal certainty and finality and to avoid the need to adjudicate on events so far past that memories and evidence become too unreliable. Of course I see the sense in that, but why six years? Upon what empirical data is such a time period based?

I listened very carefully to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, but since the expiry of the proposed time limit would have such dramatic legal consequences, there seems to be a powerful argument for a much longer period in this case. That which is proposed in the current Bill is too short, too disadvantageous to serving personnel and veterans, and should be reconsidered.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, like my noble friend Lady Smith and others, I am concerned that there should not be a different principle of limitation for service personnel for injuries received as the result of overseas operations as opposed to those injured while they are serving in the United Kingdom. However, I want to also speak up for the civilians in the country where the overseas operations took place.

I am not naive about this. I very much recall a court martial in Colchester, in 2005, for which a lady was brought from Iraq with a complaint that a British soldier had stripped her naked in the street and had caused her huge embarrassment. She went into the witness box, took the oath on the Koran and then turned to the judge and said, “Now I have taken the oath on the Koran, I have to tell the truth. I made it all up.” There were many complaints that were made up at that time.

At the time of the Baha Mousa trial, Mr Phil Shiner was wandering around trying to infiltrate our discussions, and he always had someone taking a note of the evidence as it emerged, which he subsequently misapplied. I am very glad that he was struck off by the Law Society.

That, however, should not prevent, in an appropriate case, a claim for damages going forward if it is equitable to do so. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, expressed with considerable authority the complexity of this area of law and the difficulties that exist in any event—never mind in overseas operations.

There are valid claims. I put in a Written Question on 2 June last year. The Answer told me that, since 2003, there have been

“1,330 claims for damages relating to alleged misconduct … The claims … focus predominately on alleged unlawful detention but many incorporate allegations of mistreatment”.

The Ministry of Defence has paid out £32 million in respect of these allegations, and says that it does not pay out without consideration and finding the claim valid. It meets the bill, which does not fall on the soldier in question.

The practice of the court is not to extend to extend limitation periods easily, and that is a particular concern where valid claims are coming forward. When the court considers whether to extend the limitation period, it investigates all the circumstances. It is very difficult for a poor person in a foreign country to bring a case, and as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, pointed out, it is not easy to extend the limitation period. Date of knowledge is frequently an issue. Sometimes it almost seems as if when a court hears an application for an extended limitation period it will be granted on the nod. But that is not the case: it is a difficult thing to argue. I am, therefore, in favour of these amendments, and I look forward to seeing how they appear on Report.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 11th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a real privilege to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Dannatt, whom I greatly respect. He has raised some of the issues that we have been discussing over the last two days. I have made my views well known on those aspects, and I do not propose to challenge what he has just said. He is absolutely right in requiring there to be a duty of care set out in statute—a touchstone whereby the ways in which service personnel are dealt with can be tested.

In our own way, those who have practised in courts martial have seen the sort of improvements to which the noble and gallant Lord referred. I recall that, at the first court martial that I went to, there was a lot of swishing of swords—swords pointed at the guilty man when the decision was announced, and so on. Also, I think I played some part in the abolition of the process whereby an accused in a Navy court martial was marched into the court with a cutlass at his back. I put down a Question questioning that particular practice and, when I got up to hear the Answer from the noble Lord, Lord Bach, he announced that the practice had been abolished. But that is only symbolic of the very considerable changes that have taken place in the court martial system, which I believe have brought greater fairness and fewer problems of what one might call “shock and awe”—of a soldier going in to stand trial before a court martial of senior officers. In that way, we have sought I think to modernise the old court martial system, and we have been successful in that. If that sort of movement could be applied generally and not just in the very narrow area to which I have referred, it would be a very good thing. I wholly support the noble and gallant Lord in his amendment.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I speak in support of this amendment, to which I have attached my name. In doing so, I convey the apologies of my noble and gallant friend Lord Boyce, whose name is also on the amendment but who is prevented by a medical issue from speaking this afternoon.

To explain why my noble and gallant friend and I support the amendment, it is necessary for me to go back to the very purpose of the Bill. It is in the Minister’s own words to reassure service personnel and veterans that the Government have their back and that they will be offered a degree of protection from the pressures and strains of malicious prosecutions. But the Government know that prosecutions are not the issue; that much has been widely acknowledged during debates on the Bill to this point. It is the seemingly endless cycle of accusations and investigations that is casting such a shadow over our service personnel and veterans, not the prospect of being brought to trial.

It is a principle of our legal system that an accused person is innocent until proved guilty—but this is true only in a narrow legal sense. It simply means that the burden of proof lies with the accuser, not the defender; it does not mean that an accused person is treated as innocent. For example, they may be held in detention. They are certainly subject to the wondering if not outright suspicion of observers, and they certainly suffer the agonies of uncertainty and the mortification of being suspected of and, in the minds of some, guilty of a criminal offence. The strain on them and their families is immense. Can anyone doubt the anguish that assailed those accused as a result of Operation Midland, despite the fact that not only were there no prosecutions but their accuser was shown to be lying? Can anyone deny that they suffered acutely—and in some cases still do?

Accusations must certainly be investigated, but such investigations will bring pain to guilty and innocent alike. How much more is this the case when the investigations are repeated and protracted? That is the evil that this Bill should address. The Government’s view seems to be that it is not possible to legislate on investigations since that would almost certainly increase the risk of UK service personnel and veterans coming under the scrutiny of the International Criminal Court. They have therefore taken an indirect approach to the problem, in the hope that codifying the factors that must be considered by a prosecutor will discourage speculative and malicious accusations. Of course, this is a wholly untested thesis; it may work to an extent, but equally it may have little impact.

For my part, I believe that the Government have by their own lights set themselves an impossible task in this Bill. They have recognised that they cannot address the real problem directly, so has come at it obliquely with a proposition that will have dubious benefits and poses real presentational risks—risks that could harm the reputation of our Armed Forces. Meanwhile, the underlying issue remains: the pressure of investigations. If that cannot be addressed legislatively, it is surely incumbent on the Government to ensure that those accused are supported appropriately during their ordeal—hence this amendment.

If we cannot entirely prevent the suffering, at least let us do all that we can to ameliorate it. The Government may say that they do so already, and there is no need to legislate on the matter, but I would find such a view puzzling. The Government have accepted that prosecutors already take into account the considerations set out in the Bill, but they regard their codification in law as necessary for the reassurance of our military personnel. If they take that view on something that they admit is not the real problem, how can they take a contrary view on something that is? That would seem to me to be an extraordinary contradiction.

The many amendments proposed to this Bill so far have sought largely to ameliorate the harmful effects that it might have. This amendment, on the other hand, seeks to tackle as far as possible the root of the problem that the Bill is intended to address, and I commend it to the Government.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, what a privilege to have heard, let alone to follow, the speech of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, so much of which I completely agreed with. One thing I would say is that, while legislators are limited in what they can do in this regard—and he and his noble friends have had a very good go at using a probing amendment to try to get the Government to stand by veterans and service personnel in real terms—the Government can actually do more.

They could do more even now to address the problem of investigations. Of course, they could not do so by legislation alone, but they could throw resources at it and redesign the nature of investigations, and they could include the noble and gallant Lord and his colleagues, among others, in creating a new investigation system that would inspire the confidence of the public at large, of wretched human rights lawyers like me and, crucially, of veterans and personnel. They could do what we have said in recent days is essential, which is to ensure that investigations are robust, independent and speedy, and not repeated. That could do a great deal to avoid the kind of anxiety that we have heard so much about in consideration of this Bill.

That is not something that any mere legislators can do, so we have to probe in this way and table amendments, such as the previous one from my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe about laying reports, and this more extensive one from the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Stirrup and Lord Boyce, and my noble friend. These amendments are, of course, necessarily limited by the scope of the Bill. I therefore understand why, for example, the noble Lord could not include in the duty of care to service personnel chronic issues of housing and of mental health problems beyond just those caused by litigation.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 13th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, in speaking to this amendment, I start by saying that I accept a number of the arguments that the Government have advanced against it. I do not think that the Bill is intended to provide UK forces with a blank cheque for torture or genocide; nor do I consider that, as currently worded, it has that legal effect. Investigations into and prosecution of those suspected of such offences should and could be pursued even after the five-year limit, provided that the evidential case is sound. I am in no doubt that those involved in such decisions would consider the facts carefully and conscientiously before coming to a decision one way or the other.

I do not regard the exclusion of sexual offences, and not of torture or genocide, as attributing any hierarchy of seriousness to these crimes. I accept that in claims of torture or genocide, the admitted outcome—the death or wounding of individuals—might reasonably be the consequence of legal military action. Sexual assault, on the other hand, can never be the result of anything but a criminal act. There is a logic behind the distinction. Nor do I accept the argument that the Bill as worded would make our own military personnel more likely to be tortured themselves. During the first Gulf War, I commanded aircrew who were shot down, captured and tortured. The Iraqis did not have, nor did they require, the incentive and cover of this Bill for their actions. I seriously doubt that future captors of UK military personnel would be likely to say to themselves, “Well, I would not ordinarily have tortured these prisoners but, in view of the UK overseas operations Act, I now will.” Regimes that are going to torture captors will; those that are not, will not. I do accept, however, that this Bill might make it harder for us to protest such actions or subsequently to hold the perpetrators to account.

My concern about this part of the Bill has less to do with its legal intent and effect, and more to do with the perceptions it may create and the consequences of such perceptions. I have said that in my view, the Bill does not diminish the seriousness with which we view or treat torture or genocide, but it is clear that many people disagree, and that they will not be persuaded by any words of mine or of the Government. This is important. What people think about such matters is crucial, regardless of whether we regard their interpretation as correct. Reputations, national as well as personal, depend on perception as well as on fact, and the UK’s reputation in the international arena is not something to be taken lightly or to be hazarded without great cause.

One possible consequence of a diminished reputation for an unswerving opposition to torture or genocide could be the increased interest of the International Criminal Court in accusations against UK military personnel—an outcome that I would regard as disastrous. I have heard the arguments against this likelihood, and I am unconvinced by them. I have in the past heard similar arguments advanced about the negligible impact that human rights legislation would have on military operations, only to see those confidently expressed opinions proved dramatically wrong. The Government no doubt feel that they are on firm legal ground with regard to the International Criminal Court, but that view has yet to be tested. Meanwhile, risk must be measured as a combination of probability and consequence. Even if the chance of challenge by the ICC is not large, the severe damage it would cause demands that we do all we can to guard against it.

The risks that I have identified might nevertheless be borne if they were sufficiently outweighed by the advantages that Clause 6 offers, but I do not believe this to be the case. The underlying problems that need to be addressed are the protracted and repeated investigations of speculative and malicious claims, along with the extension of human rights legislation into areas for which it is ill-suited. The Bill, of necessity, comes at these issues obliquely and is therefore likely to be of limited value. I know that the Government believe that the measures proposed on prosecutions will have an impact on the timeliness of investigations. I hope they are right, but the potential benefit is not obviously overwhelming. So, while I support the Government’s aim, and while I understand the logic behind the drafting of Clause 6, I believe that the current wording poses risks that far outweigh the potential benefits. Unless I hear in this debate a far more compelling argument than has so far been made against it, I shall support Amendment 3.

[Lord Dubs (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, as well, indeed, as my noble friend Lady Kennedy in the arguments they have put forward. The House has enormous respect for the Minister. I share that respect but it is noticeable that, despite her arguments, she had no support in Committee. I looked at her closing arguments then and found this one:

“In the course of their duties on overseas operations, we expect our service personnel to undertake activities which are intrinsically violent in nature. They fight, they use force”.


That seemed to be the justification for this provision: that force has to be used. I do not believe that force is the same as torture. If there were to be confusion between the two, it would be up to the courts to make a decision. It would not be up to a government Minister to say whether an action was unacceptable or, indeed, appropriate for it to be excused altogether by the provisions of this Bill.

In her closing remarks—she was trying to be helpful—the Minister also said:

“I undertake to consider with care the arguments that have been advanced and to explore if there is any way by which we can assuage your Lordships’ concerns.”—[Official Report, 9 /3/21; cols. 1575-77.]


I am not sure that anything has happened about that commitment. I understand why Ministers make such commitments and why she did so; perhaps she was not comfortable with the Government’s whole argument. However, I am not clear what she has done to assuage our concerns; I do not believe she has.

As has been said before, the reputation of this country is at stake. One thing we surely value very much is our reputation for adhering to the rule of law—for having a proper system for considering it and, indeed, being implacable in our opposition to any breach of it. That reputation is surely worth preserving, yet it is now at stake. We deal all the time with countries that do not observe the rule of law, be it Hong Kong, China in respect of the Uighurs, or Myanmar in respect of the Rohingyas—or, indeed, of their own citizens. There are too many examples of the rule of law being breached; we can ill afford to join the ranks of countries that breach it. We have had severe warnings that we might find our service men and women up before the International Criminal Court—which would be mortifyingly embarrassing and absolutely appalling were it to happen.

I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which made a detailed assessment of the Bill and its various provisions and produced a report. At paragraphs 63 and 64, the report says that

“we have significant concerns that the presumption against prosecution”

runs the risk of contravening

“the UK’s legal obligations under international humanitarian law (the law of armed conflict)”

and

“international human rights law ... It risks contravening the UK’s obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute and international customary law.”

The report goes on to say:

“At a minimum, the presumption against prosecution should be amended so that it does not apply to torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.”


Nothing could be clearer than that.

We have also heard quoted today Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. She said:

“No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”


I can think of no clearer comments than those I have quoted. I fully support this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I support these amendments, with a very strong preference for Amendments 7 and 8, although I understand that they will not be pressed; half a loaf is better than no bread. It is clear to me that a combination of rules and discretion is what the law is. This is the protection against arbitrary action, and I have heard no compelling argument whatever at any point in the proceedings relating to this legislation for limiting the discretion of the courts completely, particularly in the light of the sorts of cases described by my noble friend Lord Hendy.

However, I was interested in the newly expressed concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, about discrimination; his view of equal treatment under the law is novel to me. He seems to be concerned about discrimination in relation to a Bill, which he supports, that is inherently discriminatory. He is concerned about giving extra protection to a particular class of claimant—namely, veterans and personnel, who are supposed to be protected by this legislation. But he is not concerned, it would seem, about giving special protection to a class of defendants—the MoD, the Executive—which is the initiator of the legislation as well as the civil defendant. He is not concerned about giving special protection and limitations to criminal defendants in the military, but he is concerned to give the protection offered by Amendment 13 when it is not being offered to overseas civilians, yet he does not support Amendments 7 and 8. This is not levelling up; it is levelling down.

As I say, I would very much prefer Amendments 7 and 8 to be pressed, but in their absence I will support Amendment 13. The Government brought forward this legislation with a promise to give protection to service personnel and veterans but, instead, if they do not go along with at least Amendment 13, it will protect the Exchequer—the Ministry of Defence—from the very people that it claims to protect.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 13, to which I have attached my name. Its purpose is to ensure that service personnel are not debarred by time from pursuing claims against the Government for harms suffered on overseas operations. It seems strange to me that a Bill with the avowed purpose of providing government reassurance to service personnel seems intent on preventing those very personnel from seeking redress from that same Government. This may not be the intention, but it is one of the potential consequences of the Bill as it is currently worded.

In responding to a similar amendment in Committee, the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland, argued against it because it would have very limited effect. At Second Reading, the Government said that some 94% of service personnel and veterans who brought claims relating to events in Iraq and Afghanistan had done so within six years. He later confirmed that this figure included those who had brought a claim within six years of the date of knowledge. My response is to repeat the question that I posed on that occasion, and which was never answered: are we to assume then that, had the proposed timescale been in effect, the Government believe that it would have been acceptable for the other 6% to lose the opportunity to pursue their cases?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, in support of the vital amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt. It is vital because there does not seem to be anything quite like it on the statute book.

While the Bill, controversially, attempts to protect the MoD from civil suit and individual members of the Armed Forces and veterans from criminal prosecution, it does not provide actual support for them. It does not provide mental health support, legal support or anything else mentioned in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt.

I will not repeat what I said earlier, but even the Statement that was made today clearly to reassure your Lordships that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, is not necessary gives me cause for concern. There are holes in the automatic non-means-tested legal advice and support, which should be automatic and non-means-tested for any serving member of the Armed Forces or veteran, whether they are facing investigation or prosecution or are a potential witness. That was the biggest problem I found.

Even the mental health support was less than specific or certain and seemed to be about signposting people to general NHS services, even though we all accept that people serving overseas are under particular strain. If their mental health is under particular strain and they are especially exposed to the law, as the Government maintain, why do they not get specific statutory and automatic support?

This is perhaps one of the most important parts of the debate today, and this amendment is possibly one of the most important that has been tabled. I sincerely hope that the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, will press it to a vote.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I start by adding my thanks to the Minister for the time and trouble she has taken since Committee to listen to the concerns that my noble friend Lord Dannatt and the other movers of this amendment, of whom I am one, have sought to address. The Government have argued, and no doubt will continue to argue, that what we are trying to achieve is both unnecessary and dangerous. I am unconvinced and I shall try to explain why.

In her response in Committee, the Minister pointed to the mechanisms and processes already in place to support service personnel and veterans. There are indeed both official and charitable structures set up for this purpose; they do a great deal of excellent work, as today’s ministerial Statement made clear. But as I tried to explain in Committee, the situation of those accused of criminal activities and subject to the corresponding and prolonged investigations is particularly difficult. I pointed out that the stresses on these individuals and their families are profound and enduring.

These people are not just accused of a crime; they are charged with trampling underfoot the values and ethos that are an essential element of the special body of which they have been a trusted part. They are suspected of betraying their comrades and bringing them into disrepute. I ask noble Lords to imagine what sort of impact all of that has on people who are members of such a close and unique community.

It is alas true that in some cases the opprobrium will be deserved, but we also know that in such circumstances the innocent and the guilty will suffer alike. Even a subsequent and unequivocal demonstration of innocence will not entirely remove the shadow from their lives or allow them to feel quite the same ever again.

Given such horrendous and, in some cases, undeserved consequences, is it so unreasonable to seek a special degree of support for these people? Is it unreasonable to ask that the requirement for and processes to deliver such support should be codified? After all, Part 1 of this Bill is itself mostly about codifying procedures that nearly everyone agrees a competent prosecuting authority would follow in any case. If these need to be set out in the Bill, why not the processes for ensuring the appropriate source of support for service personnel and veterans? To argue in favour of the former and against the latter would strike me as strangely inconsistent. Just to be clear, I do not believe that defence information notices constitute adequate codification.

The dangers that the Government seem to think lurk within this amendment apparently derive from the legal rights it would afford to those it seeks to protect. The accused could sue the Government if they thought that they had been inadequately supported—and who is to say what level of support should be considered adequate? The only beneficiaries, it appears, would be the legal profession.

Well, my first response would be that if the Government failed to provide the appropriate support, then they should be liable. It seems that in this day and age, we are keen to afford justiciable rights to just about everyone—except our service men and women. As to the definition of adequacy, I entirely accept that Amendment 14 as worded may not have adequately circumscribed this, but is it really beyond the wit of government lawyers to come up with a form of words that would do the trick? Surely, the concept of reasonableness and the appropriate kinds of test are not alien to our legal system.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has said that this amendment would do nothing to prevent future Shiners, and I agree with him. I also agree wholeheartedly that tackling the difficulties caused by the extraterritorial application of the Human Rights Act is essential. None of this, though, obviates the need to support those who need our help.

The Government’s argument appears, in essence, to be, “We don’t think this amendment is necessary because we already do what it suggests, but we’re rather afraid of being sued for not doing what the amendment proposes.” This does not strike me as a tenable position. I urge the Government to think again.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I speak in this debate to support the amendment moved by my noble friends. I do so because it is the closest to resolving, or at least ameliorating, the problem—and it is a problem, as many have rehearsed. It is essentially a practical one, relating to training, leadership, command oversight, operational reporting and improved investigative capacity and competence.

I fear that I remain convinced that the resort to legal exceptionalism which this Bill contemplates, and which appears to have initiated so much of the debate in the House, is an ill-considered course of action. It will make our service men and women more, not less, exposed to the challenges of the law. Law, in the context of this debate, is not simply the legislative framework within which war is conducted; it has become a weapon of that war. In the jargon, it is a new vector of attack. By way of emphasising my point, while this Bill has been maturing, we have seen the product of an extended review of the country’s security, defence, development and foreign policy. The results have been the integrated review paper and the companion MoD document, Global Britain in a Competitive Age.

These are both excellent pieces of work and speak to the radically different character of future war. At the heart of both documents are the themes of systemic and enduring competition between nations, between political systems, across multiple spheres. The documents emphasise the lack of clarity over where the threshold of conflict sits, the impossibility of differentiating between peace and war, home and away, friend and foe. They speak of the far greater reliance, in future, on technical advantage, automated processes, autonomous systems. They move the comprehension of conflict beyond the recent sense that it is periodic, adversarial, away fixtures.