Armed Forces Bill

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2016 Grand Committee

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I remind the Committee that I still have an interest as I will be commissioned until October, when I have to retire.

At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, suggested that we needed to look at the composition and operation of the court martial. The Minister said that it would be a big change to alter these arrangements. However, that is why we have a quinquennial review. The MoD can quite easily change the court martial rules but bigger changes are a matter for us in Parliament.

One of the problems we have with some of the suggestions from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is that we have very little idea of how either a civil jury or a court martial board works because research is illegal, except for certain criminal investigations. Therefore, the Minister cannot prove that the system is as good as we can make it, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, cannot show that it is defective—we do not know how the system operates. The difficulty is particularly relevant to the noble Lord’s amendment on majority verdicts. The Committee needs to remember that the board of a court martial is not a jury; it is composed of officers and warrant officers superior in rank to the defendant. My Amendment 11 proposes to permit closely controlled research into how the board works. I envisage that this would take place soon after all normal appeal rights had been exhausted or were time-expired. Members of the board would not be told in advance that they would be contributing to the research, and there would have to be numerous other protections.

In Amendment 1, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, proposes that the board of a court martial be composed of “all ranks”. Presumably, if the amended is accepted, court martial boards would provide that members must be at least one rank superior to the accused. Interestingly, I do not have a problem with his proposal, provided that the noble Lord recognises that he is moving away from a very select panel who have already been chosen as officers and warrant officers on the basis of a whole range of qualities that other ranks do not necessarily possess. If he wants to do that, I think we will need a military jury of 12. They will still understand the military context, which is surely the reason we have a military court martial, and the increased number I am suggesting would make up for any reduction in intellectual horsepower. I would suggest that on average a military jury could be of better quality and more suited to these cases than a civilian one, and therefore an all-ranks military jury could be just as reliable as a civil jury.

However, there are some snags. I suspect that the noble Lord feels that an all-ranks board would be more forgiving and understanding. I am not convinced. For instance, I fear that an all-ranks board could be swayed by the accused appearing to be a rotten soldier when military jury members are sure that they are not. The officers on the board of a court martial would put that to one side and study it with much more intellectual rigour. I suspect that the noble Lord would still have some officers on the board or the jury, but I cannot really envisage a junior NCO asking searching questions to test an officer’s position on a case, even though a large proportion would undoubtedly be able to do so. A warrant officer certainly would, which is why we already have them on the board.

Finally I turn to the noble Lord’s amendment concerning who determines the sentence. If we went for a military jury of 12, this would be merely a consequential change. Again, I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, believes that the judge advocate would be more lenient. I have to tell the Committee that I have heard, although I should not have, that on one occasion the board of a court martial in Germany dealing with an assault case regretted not being able to consider a not-guilty verdict because the accused pleaded guilty. Nevertheless, the judge advocate was recommending quite severe penalties which the board had to resist strongly. In any case, complex though the matters are, the judge advocate tells the members of the board of the court martial what their options are. The sentence is internally reviewed and the case can then be taken to the court martial appeals court, so it is not clear to me what can go wrong.

Lastly, I do not have a view on the noble Lord’s suggestions about which offences should be triable only in a civilian court.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the first two groups for debate today discuss the generality of military law. The first group relates to how an individual is found guilty and sentenced, while the second group deals with the extent and scope of the body of military law. I make the point because I take a very different view about the extent to which we should consider changing the two groups, and hence these groups of amendments. We will come on to debate the second group, but I approach the first group from the point of view of the rights of the citizen who, as a member of the Armed Forces, has become the accused. I find the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, persuasive. With that individual having committed an offence and gone into a process which is now so analogous to that of a civil court, I find quite strong the idea that the individual should have the right to a trial that is analogous to that in a civil court.

The amendments before us would, first, create more of a jury of the individual’s peers and, secondly, produce a voting system that is much closer to that of a Crown Court, which seeks unanimity. The proposals put by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, are close to unanimity in their form. The reforms the noble Lord is suggesting would mean that the rights of the individual who has been accused would become increasingly similar to those of a normal civilian in a criminal case. Since 2006 we have developed the three bodies of law, brought them together and introduced civilian best practice—there is probably a better way of putting that, but it is essentially what we have done—so I find this next step very attractive.

As an alternative or as a supplement, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has suggested a minimum number of 12 on the board. That is an interesting suggestion which again is in step towards achieving similarity, and I would guess that he has suggested the figure on the basis that while such a revolutionary change might not appeal to the Government, there is also the idea of an inquiry to see how courts martial work to see if that could be a step towards reform.

Clearly, and I have sat on that side, these amendments will not work and there will be something wrong with them. However, that is irrelevant. What matters is: should we make steps in this direction using this quinquennial Act? We do it only every five years and I would find unconvincing the argument that it is not appropriate. I am putting a burden on the Government, today and perhaps in subsequent meetings and in writing, to argue the case for why we should not move in the general direction of these amendments and make the whole process for the defendant more analogous to that of a civil court.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, I am very conscious of the close interest taken by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and my noble friend Lord Attlee, as well as by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, in the operation of the court martial and I welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters today. The first amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, would amend Section 155 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, which makes provision with respect to the constitution of the court martial. It provides that only officers or warrant officers may be lay members of the court martial. As the noble Lord explained, Amendment 1 would change this; it would also provide that court martial rules may provide that lay members must,

“be drawn from each and every branch of the armed services”.

The noble Lord’s next amendment, Amendment 2, would insert a new Section 155A into the 2006 Act. The effect of proposed new Section 155A would be to allow serving personnel of any rank to be lay members.

The court martial consists of a judge advocate and between three and seven lay members. Lay members of a court martial, who are also referred to as the panel or the board, have a role in relation to findings on a charge and sentencing. The lay members for any proceedings are specified by or on behalf of the court administration officer. Only commissioned officers and warrant officers may be lay members. Amendments 1 and 2 would change this, as I have said, by allowing members of the Armed Forces of any rank to be lay members.

It will not surprise the Committee to hear that I am resistant to the proposals that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has put forward. The first point I wish to make in response is that the existing rules governing lay membership of the court martial result from the fact that the court martial is part of an overall system of justice and discipline. Those rules recognise the importance of experience of command and the exercise of service discipline at a sufficiently high level to enable lay members to assess the actions of those who appear before them in the court martial in the appropriate command and disciplinary context. The role of a lay member in the court martial differs from that of a juror in a Crown Court trial. In the Crown Court, the jury’s role is limited to findings of fact: sentencing is a matter solely for the judge. In the court martial, the lay members and the judge advocate vote on the sentence. In considering sentencing, they must have regard to the maintenance of discipline, so must have a strong understanding of what things affect discipline and what things do not.

All service courts have to apply the statutory principles set out in the Armed Forces Act 2006 as to the purpose of sentencing. These are closely based on the civilian sentencing principles but include, in addition, “the maintenance of discipline” and the reduction of “service offences”—that is, both service discipline offences, such as looting or absence without leave, and criminal offences.

These principles reflect four special aspects related to the service justice system. The first is the existence of disciplinary offences unknown to the general criminal law, such as absence without leave. The second is the fact that the military context of an offence may be relevant to sentencing—for example, an assault against a superior or an inferior may make an offence more serious, and then there is the well-known naval concern about the effect on morale and discipline of mess-deck theft.

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[Lord West of Spithead]

My Lords, I have considerable sympathy for Amendment 4, which stems from my view that I see the composition of the board of courts martial as much more to do with discipline and military things. Clearly with some of these very serious crimes, jurisdiction is very important. I am not clear how that could be clarified to make sure that things do not slip through the net because of it. However, the other aspect is perception. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, talked about public perceptions of courts martial. I think that there is also the perception of the military about the way in which they are put on trial. If we went down this route mitigation would have to be very clearly put, particularly when in what one might loosely call a war zone where there has been fighting and nation building, because the circumstances in which something like the Baha Mousa case happens are different from the normal civilian understanding. We would have to be absolutely certain that we were able to get that sort of proper mitigation into the civil court. However, I have great sympathy with Amendment 4, because some of these things should not generally be tried by court martial nowadays.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, as I said earlier, I see this debate as being in two parts, of which this is the second part. The development of service law in this country has been going on for several hundred years and we have seen important movements in the past 10 years with the 2006 Act and now with these proposals. I am unsympathetic to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, proposes in this area, because it goes too deep into the body of military law. There is presumably an argument that you do not need military law on any offence that is covered by an equivalent piece of civil law, but we are not there yet in the minds of either the public or the military. We are on a journey and I think that we are at the right place in that journey, so to carve these offences out of the scope of military law at this point would be wrong. I shall read with great care the speeches that have been made and listen with great care to the Minister’s response. We will ponder on those views but, as a generality, the scope of military law is probably right at this time. I repeat that we should address the courts martial system to make the judgment process analogous but leave the scope substantially as it is.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, these further amendments address other aspects of the service justice system about which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, is exercised. I agree that it is right that this Committee should engage in close and careful scrutiny and assure ourselves of the rationale that underpins the system.

Amendment 4 would limit the jurisdiction of the court martial. It would prevent the court martial from trying certain offences: murder; manslaughter; the wide range of sexual offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003; and any offence committed overseas that a civilian criminal court in the United Kingdom has jurisdiction to try.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, explained that his intention with Amendment 15 is to extend the jurisdiction of civilian criminal courts in England and Wales by giving them jurisdiction to try members of the Armed Forces and civilians subject to service discipline for acts overseas that, had they been committed here, would have constituted sexual offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Committee may be aware that service courts are able to exercise jurisdiction in respect of acts overseas. Section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 provides that a member of the Armed Forces is guilty of an offence under service law if they do an act outside the United Kingdom that would constitute an offence under the law of England and Wales were it done here.

Amendment 16 would give members of the Armed Forces accused of committing certain crimes overseas a right to elect whether to be tried by the court martial or by a civilian criminal court. The crimes in question are those that the civilian criminal courts may try even if the events in question took place overseas. Those offences include murder and, although the noble Lord explained that this was an alternative to his previous proposal, would also include sexual offences if Amendment 15 were accepted as well.

I note one point in passing. Amendment 16 does not appear to propose that members of the Armed Forces should have a right to elect civilian criminal trial in respect of conduct in the United Kingdom or in respect of conduct overseas other than on active service in operational circumstances, yet it is not immediately apparent why such cases should be treated differently.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, may not be too surprised to hear that the Government do not support these amendments, which imply that there are problems with the court martial system. Yet the service justice system has been scrutinised by the UK courts and by Strasbourg, and has been held to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights for both investigations and prosecutions within the UK and abroad, where the civilian police do not have jurisdiction.

As regards the implication about the competence of the service police and prosecutors, the service police are trained and able to carry out investigations into the most serious offences, with members of the Special Investigations Branch having to pass the serious crime investigation course before being selected for that unit. In addition, selected members of the service police attend a range of specialist and advanced detective training at either the Defence College of Policing and Guarding or externally, with the College of Policing or training providers accredited by the college.

At the Service Prosecuting Authority, prosecutors are trained to effectively prosecute serious cases. For example, prosecution of serious sexual offences requires attendance on the CPS rape and serious sexual offences specialist training course, and the SPA ensures that decisions on charging in such cases are taken only by prosecutors who have completed that training. The Government believe that the service justice system is capable of dealing with the most serious of offences and should be able to continue to do so. In the case of offences which both the civilian criminal courts and service courts have jurisdiction to try, it is recognised that it is necessary for prosecutors to consider in each case whether the offence is more appropriately tried in the civilian criminal courts or in a service court. This applies not only to offences committed overseas in respect of which the civilian criminal courts have jurisdiction but to offences committed in the United Kingdom.

The existing protocol between service and civilian prosecutors recognises that some cases are more appropriately dealt with in the service system and some more appropriately in the civilian system, particularly those with civilian victims. The principles of the protocol were approved by the Attorney-General for England and Wales, and by the Ministry of Justice. The protocol recognises that any offence can be dealt with by the service authorities. The main principle in deciding who acts is whether the offence has any civilian context, especially a civilian victim. The protocol therefore provides that cases with a civilian context are dealt with by the civilian criminal justice system. However, where a case has a service context, it is important that the service justice system—which is specifically constructed to deal with that unique service dimension—is able to manage the case in question. But were we to create a right to elect of the kind contained in Amendment 16, I submit that it could undermine the service justice system, as an accused could make an election which would see the types of cases which civilian and service prosecutors currently consider should be dealt with in the service system—because of their service context—instead having to be dealt with by the civilian criminal courts.

The noble Lord, Lord West, referred to the importance of mitigation in certain cases. Partly for that reason but also for others, many cases which concern conduct outside the UK will have a service context such that both service and civilian prosecutors would consider that they would be more appropriately tried in the service system. That is significant because of the key point that I made on the previous group of amendments: court martial is part of an overall system of justice and discipline, and the existing provisions governing sentencing in the court martial reflect this.

As I mentioned earlier, all service courts have to apply statutory principles set out in the Armed Forces Act 2006 as to the purpose of sentencing. These are closely based on the civilian sentencing principles but include, in addition, “the maintenance of discipline” and the reduction of “service offences”. These principles reflect special aspects related to the service justice system, including those factors that I touched on earlier and shall repeat: first, in service courts the military context of an offence may be relevant to sentencing, and I mentioned an assault against a superior or an inferior; secondly, in service courts a heavier sentence may be justified by reference to the fact that the offender is in the Armed Forces, and I mentioned a drugs offence in that context; and, thirdly, certain penalties are available only to service courts, requiring an assessment of whether they are appropriate from a broadly disciplinary point of view—for example, service detention or dismissal. Allowing a case with a purely service context to be dealt with in the civilian system on the election of an accused therefore risks undermining the system of justice and discipline in the Armed Forces.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords—

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I wonder if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, would let me speak before him because I intend to quote him at some length and he can correct any mistakes I make. I make it clear that the Opposition would not support this amendment as set out. I am not talking about little technicalities about wording; I am talking about an erosion of the Human Rights Act. We believe that that is a proper and admirable piece of legislation and that its retention is important. No doubt this will be the basis of a major battle between the parties in the weeks to come when the legislation is published.

I turn to the specific area of the judgment. Before Second Reading, I had not heard of Smith and others v Ministry of Defence. I googled it, thinking, “This will give me the information”, only to discover that the judgment was 72 pages and 188 paragraphs long. At the very moment when I had a sense of doom, I noticed that it had been given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, whose office is some 50 metres from mine, so I tried to save myself some effort by going to see him, and I thank him for the briefing he gave me.

I looked through the 72 pages to get a wider flavour of the judgment. I will concentrate solely on the Challenger 2 event. The Snatch Land Rover issue is complicated by the fact that it was not formally a combat situation but a peacekeeping one, so while it is important to the debate, it is capable of being part a much wider debate. In my view, however, the tone of the judgment on the Challenger 2 event is straightforward. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has already quoted paragraph 76 of the judgment, but if the Committee will forgive me I shall quote a few more paragraphs. Paragraph 82 states:

“The Challenger claims proceed on the basis that there is no common law liability for negligence in respect of acts or omissions on the part of those who are actually engaged in armed combat”.

That is a pretty flat statement. It continues:

“So it has not been suggested that Lt Pinkstone or anyone else in the Black Watch battle group was negligent. Nor, as his decision to fire was taken during combat, would it have been appropriate to do so. The Challenger claimants concentrate instead on an alleged failure to ensure that the claimants’ tank and the tanks of the battle group that fired on it were properly equipped with technology and equipment that would have prevented the incident, and an alleged failure to ensure that soldiers were provided with adequate recognition training before they were deployed and also in theatre. Their case is founded entirely on failings in training and procurement”.

Its final sentence says that:

“The Ellis claim at common law also raises issues about procurement”.

If we delve further into the document, we get what is in a sense the substance of the ruling. Paragraph 95 says that:

“The same point can be made about the time when the failures are alleged to have taken place in the Challenger claimants’ case. At the stage when men are being trained, whether pre-deployment or in theatre, or decisions are being made about the fitting of equipment to tanks or other fighting vehicles, there is time to think things through, to plan and to exercise judgment. These activities are sufficiently far removed from the pressures and risks of active operations against the enemy for it to not to be unreasonable to expect a duty of care to be exercised, so long as the standard of care that is imposed has regard to the nature of these activities and to their circumstances. For this reason I would hold that the Challenger claims are not within the scope of the doctrine”—

that is, combat immunity—

“that they should not be struck out on this ground and that the MOD should not be permitted, in the case of these claims, to maintain this argument”.

Its argument was to rule that it should be struck out through the doctrine of combat immunity.

The tone of the whole judgment is summed up in paragraph 100 where the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, says:

“The sad fact is that, while members of the armed forces on active service can be given some measure of protection against death and injury, the nature of the job they do means that this can never be complete. They deserve our respect because they are willing to face these risks in the national interest, and the law will always attach importance to the protection of life and physical safety. But it is of paramount importance that the work that the armed services do in the national interest should not be impeded by having to prepare for or conduct active operations against the enemy under the threat of litigation if things … go wrong. The court must be especially careful, in their case, to have regard to the public interest, to the unpredictable nature of armed conflict and to the inevitable risks that it gives rise to when it is striking the balance as to what is fair, just and reasonable”.

In other words, over and over again in the findings as I read them—as an amateur and not as a general, although I was made acting pilot officer, and having never been a lawyer, although I was a great employer of lawyers—the noble and learned Lord seems to go out of his way to express that this is not about combat. It is about when it is reasonable and practical to do so that the MoD has a duty of care.

I come back to my question. Where is the harm in sustaining the Human Rights Act as it has been used in this case, and what are the implications? The implications are that it says that simply because the process eventually leads to combat, the Ministry of Defence cannot use the doctrine of combat immunity to avoid its duty of care. Where it is reasonable to exercise its duty of care, it has a duty to do that.

Also in my career, I worked for the Ministry of Defence as a non-executive director of defence and equipment support. As such, I was asked to look into the safety of equipment in the MoD, and I have to say that it was variable. In some areas it did not meet the highest civil standard. I do not mean silly standards; I mean the general duty that you have in civil law to reduce risk to as low as is reasonably practicable. Civil law does not say that you cannot do dangerous things and no one is suggesting that the military should not, but where you have an opportunity to reduce risk, you have a duty to take it. That cannot be an unreasonable duty. My reading of the judgment is that that is where the duty remains: where it is practicable it should be exercised, but where it is impractical, specifically in combat, then a court should not regard it.

The area of harm that does exist is what in other circumstances people would call the chill factor. The Health and Safety at Work Act has been around for so long now that most industries that are subject to it, whatever you read in the press, are mature enough to live with it. However, there are still things like the presumption of guilt—the chill factor that will stop executives from doing their job. In fact people get over it and get used to it, but if it is influencing in combat the decisions that soldiers, sailors and airmen are making, then that is wrong. That is a challenge for the MoD, not a challenge to change the law but in its training, in its teaching of the doctrine and in ensuring that the people who are making decisions fully understand that this ruling does not relate to combat and that they should continue to make their combat decisions as they have been taught to, within the rules of what I loosely call the Geneva convention, and get on with the job.

We will not support this amendment. If it comes up on Report we will oppose it, or in trying to dilute the Human Rights Act, we will oppose it.

[Lord West of Spithead]

Just before my noble friend sits down, I would like to get clarification. Is he saying that combat immunity trumps the Human Rights Act? In a European Court judgment on human rights, combat immunity will trump it—is that what is being said? That does not appear to be the case, which is one of the worries that I have with what is going on. The French and another nation, for example, have both taken their military out of that and said that they are not liable to the Human Rights Act in action. However, my noble friend seems to be saying that combat immunity trumps the Act, so this is not a problem that we should be discussing. Is that correct?

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

One of the reasons why I spoke when I did was so that there could be a summing-up of the law by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. My understanding of the judgment is that there is no question that the Human Rights Act applies to military personnel when they are serving overseas. It was a unanimous decision of the court and all seven judges agreed that it was true. What they then asked was, “What does the Human Rights Act require?”. People really should read the Human Rights Act. It is about three or four pages long and is a brilliant document. It refers to the European Convention on Human Rights, which is also well worth every person in our legislature having a read of. The Act is an extremely balanced document, virtually every provision of which expects you to behave reasonably.

What the court said, and I précis, is that the duty in the Human Rights Act to have care for those you are responsible for—the right to life—has to be interpreted reasonably, and the doctrine of the common law right of combat immunity holds good in a combat situation. Where there is proper opportunity to consider actions that may reduce risk then you have a duty of care to consider those actions, but not in combat and in the heat of battle.

[Lord West of Spithead]

My noble friend’s exposition explains exactly my concerns about what is going on because it is not at all clear. That is why we need this in order to have the issue clarified. What my noble friend has said has actually left me totally confused as a military commander, so we need to have this clarified. That is why I believe that this is important.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I can see why my noble friend was made an admiral and I only an acting pilot officer.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I wonder whether I could say a word. First, I apologise for the fact that due to other business I was not able to hear the speech and analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, although he did show me in advance the paper from which much of his speech was drawn. I also expressed my regret to the Minister, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, that I have other business to attend to and might not be able to be here all the time.

I should like to say a few words because I feel a heavy weight of responsibility on my shoulders; I had the responsibility of writing the judgment. It covered an enormous amount of ground. I was not responsible for all the paragraphs because other people wrote as well. The starting point of the analysis was what to make of developments in the European court in Strasbourg, which has been expanding the jurisdiction in a way that I do not think judges in this country entirely welcome. It has always been understood that the European convention applies to our embassies abroad; that is accepted and has never been in doubt.

Gradually the thinking has developed so that, for example, when in Iraq the military set up a detention centre, bringing local people in to be detained and examined there, they had the protection of the human rights convention—the right not to be tortured, the right to life and so on—because we had control over what happens within the detention centres that we set up. What is different about the law which we were trying to analyse and explain is the extension of that jurisdiction, as I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, explained, to members of the Armed Forces serving outside the territory—not just outside the territory of the signatories to the European convention itself but outside the territory over which they have control. We are now contemplating Article 2 applying to areas where the Army are not in control of events but nevertheless have some duty, apparently, or have the protection under Article 2. That applies both ways. The amendment by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, could in fact be read as applying to the need to be protected under Article 2 as well as the right to immunity from challenge under it for things done to other people.

What I was attempting to do, having secured the agreement of all my colleagues on my analysis, was that we had to recognise that Article 2 applied outside the territory, so we had to explain what that meant. It was not an easy task. One of the problems in trying to get across to people like the noble Lord, Lord West, and others was that we were not dealing with a case that put in front of us the kind of situation that he was faced with. They did not bring a case against the commander in the tank or anyone who was actually on the ground that they were in some way subject to criticism under Article 2 or subject to a claim for negligence at common law. I rather wish they had, because we would certainly have struck it out. We would have made it absolutely plain that people in that position, the heat of battle, are not to be exposed to criticism or to litigation because of things done in those circumstances. Decisions have to be taken for all sorts of reasons and it is quite impossible for a court to analyse them as to whether they were properly taken.

All I could do in my judgment—the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has been very generous to me by setting out the various paragraphs in which I tried to do it—was to make it as plain as I could that there is an area that the courts will not go into. I did not secure the agreement of my colleagues on what to do about the cases in front of us. There was a four to three majority in favour of allowing the Challenger cases to go to trial to find out more about the facts before a decision was taken, and there was a five to two majority about the Snatch Land Rover cases that they should go to trial as well. There can be different views about this. The advantage of more facts was in fairness to the families that what was actually going on was absolutely clear before a final decision was taken. However, I made it as clear as I could that those who were taking the cases to trial should not think they were going to succeed. They had to get over the hurdles, which I explained in the various parts of my judgments. What the result of these cases will be, I simply do not know.

I cannot add to my judgment; that is not a position that a judge can ever enjoy. My judgment has to speak for itself. All I can say is that I would not change any of the words that I see when I read it over and over again. It is a difficult problem because one has to balance the need for the military to conduct operations without impediment, whether in wartime or peacetime, with, at the same time, the interests of the servicemen and their families. The noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Tunnicliffe, both illustrated the other side of the balance. I am not suggesting that legislation should not be resorted to, if the Government think that they can improve on what I attempted to say in Smith. Lord Bingham of Cornhill, one of the greatest judges that we have had in recent times, used to say that the law is made not by scoring boundaries by sixes but that you develop the law in singles. In a way, Smith was an attempt to face up to a problem and explain under modern circumstances what could be made of it. I do not claim that we achieved perfection by any means. I am deeply sorry that it has caused such alarm among senior members of the military for reasons that I certainly did not intend. I cannot do anything about that, except to apologise to them and hope they understand what I was trying to say.

The task that the Minister faces is the very difficult one of trying to analyse exactly how to express in legislation the need for protection of the individuals serving in our interest and, at the same time, giving freedom to those who have to take the decisions not to be impeded in a way that would defeat our national interest.

There is only one other point I wish to make, which I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, hinted at in his speech. Any legislation will have to stand up to scrutiny under the European convention itself. It has to be compatible with the convention rights. However, I think that the noble and learned Lord was pointing out the direction in which the Government could go by saying that there is a margin of appreciation, which gives quite a latitude to the Government in deciding how to frame legislation. In a way, I was trying to explain in paragraph 76 that and how the margin of appreciation might lie. Not everyone agreed with me, and perhaps the Minister can improve on what I was trying to say.

Before I sit down, I repeat my apology to the senior officers in the military who think that that are being in some way targeted by what I said. That was certainly not my intention and I did the very best I could to make it clear that they were not to be open to that kind of criticism.

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[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

That is the question.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Surely the judgment given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, makes that absolutely clear. The issue of the operational decisions in combat could not, in the view of the Supreme Court, be prayed in aid of negligence. The issue is those decisions not taken in a combat environment.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I entirely agree. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, made that as clear as he could. However, as Lord Mance pointed out, the problem is that, while that is the principle, it is quite difficult to apply in practice. If you are trying to sue the ministry, the question may be whether what happened on the ground followed what from the ministry had done. The Snatch case is the easiest one, in a way. I used the case of the noble Lord, Lord West, only because he mentioned it himself, but the Snatch case is perhaps the best example of where it is possible to say that the ministry provided the right equipment but the right vehicle was not picked. There are three vehicles waiting and you pick one. It is not the right one; the other two are somewhat different. I am not suggesting for a minute that the people who made the choice could be sued for negligence, but the question of whether or not the claim against the higher authority is made out may depend on the investigation of these things. That is what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, was talking about.

As I said, I never intended to press this amendment at a later stage; I simply tabled it to raise the issues and to see what can be done. My approach would be that we should see what we want the final situation to be. We should forget what the human rights convention has to say. We should look at what we want and consider legislation. We should believe that if it is suitable legislation it will be covered by the margin of appreciation and that the human rights convention, which of course we cannot alter ourselves, will not be affected in any way. With great respect, as a result of all this debate, that is the approach that I would commend.

I am sorry that we have gone beyond the time when we were supposed to finish, but I regard myself as not completely responsible for that because things depend on what went before. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment and I do not propose to raise it on Report.