National Insurance Contributions (Employer Pensions Contributions) Bill

Mark Garnier Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

I have to say that it is a joy to yet again be locking horns with the Pensions Minister on a topic that is important to us all: saving for our retirement. And it is important to note that there are many things that we agree on. We all acknowledge there is an impending issue with pension adequacy: when 50% of savers are projected to miss a retirement income target set by the 2005 Pensions Commission, we agree there is a problem that needs dealing with. We also all acknowledge that UK pension funds are not investing into the UK equity market to the extent that we would all want, although I would caveat that with a fundamental disagreement: on this side, we want to understand the problem; the Minister wants to tell fund managers what they should and should not be doing in terms of where their investment goes. But we also agree with the noble aim of delivering growth in the UK economy, even if the Government are making a little bit of a mess of delivering that aim— growth slowing, inflation up, unemployment up—but we hope they get the hang of it in due course.

But that is why the Chancellor’s Budget is disappointing. For pensioners, she has flown kites about the tax-free lump sum, frozen the personal allowance threshold, and forced millions of pensioners to start paying income tax. Those are her choices. For savers, she has reduced the cash ISA limit to £12,000, scrapped the lifetime ISA for new investors, and increased tax on dividends and savings by two percentage points. Those are her choices. For hard-working people, this Government have reduced real household disposable income, pulled millions more people into paying the higher rate of income tax, and created perverse incentives that make some better off on benefits. These are her choices. So it is no wonder that this Budget has been dubbed the smorgasbord of misery.

It has now got to the stage where our economy has never been taxed so much, and it will get worse. When coming into office, the tax take was 36.4% of GDP. By the time Labour leaves office in four years’ time, it will be 38.2%. It is worth looking at examples of how it is levied. For example, a basic rate taxpayer earning £100 will pay 20% tax, but they will also pay 12% national insurance—an actual tax rate of 32%. Add to that their employer’s contribution, and for a headline basic rate taxpayer on up to £50,000, for each £100 they earn, the taxman takes £47. For a higher rate taxpayer, the marginal rate goes to 57%. The taxman takes more than the employee.

Given the hit to payrolls, both at the employee and employer level, it is no wonder that saving into a pension through salary sacrifice has become popular. Even the Government think it is a brilliant idea, using it for 10% of government employees. It is no wonder, therefore, that people use incentives such as salary sacrifice to make the most of their money, to do the right thing, to save a little bit more, to take responsibility for their futures, and to not rely on the state in their retirement. It is no surprise then that 7.7 million people take advantage of that.

Here we are with something that is popular and that incentivises the right behaviour, and the Government say, “No, we don’t like it.” The Government’s proposal, which we are discussing today, is a tax on 3.3 million people and 290,000 employers—those in the highest levels of pay. How much are they being asked to contribute? How much are we going to whack savers? Some £4.48 billion. That is right—if you do the right thing, if you work and save, this Government will come after you. The Office for Budget Responsibility gets it. It realises—unlike, apparently, the Government—that this will change behaviour and so the tax take drops to £2.6 billion in the second year because people will change their behaviour. Even the Government lose out.

The Government’s contradictions are legion. The financial inclusion strategy, published recently, stated very clearly:

“Our aim is to create a culture in which everyone is supported to build a savings habit, building their financial resilience in the long term.”

A brilliant idea. [Interruption.] Thumbs up from the Pensions Minister! But even after that very clear message, the Government reduced the cash ISA limit, scrapped lifetime ISAs for new investors, and introduced a 2% increase to dividend tax and, the icing on the cake, a £4.8 billion tax on pension savers.

[Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)]

To the hon. Gentleman’s point about changing behaviour, we have already seen reports that two out of five people are less likely to save if the salary sacrifice scheme goes. We have already seen a reduction in contributions because of the cost of living crisis. Are we not just moving the pain somewhere else? Will we not end up with fewer people able to support themselves in old age and it will be back on the state again?

[Mark Garnier]

Absolutely. The Government are really keen to get people to save for their futures and then they do everything they can to try to stop them doing that. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. We are just going to kick another problem down the road. By the way, when the Minister talks about hip replacements and so on, it is savers’ money. It is just that they are taxing them less.

At the same time as the Government look to improve pensions adequacy, they will be taking £4.8 billion from savers and employers. They identify a problem, say they will work to make it better, and then make it worse. Surely, when they were writing the Budget—I know the Pensions Minister has been a significant penholder in that process—they must have seen the extraordinary contradictions in their proposals?

The House would expect me to bang on about this—I am the shadow Minister and that is my job—but let us listen to the verdict from a few experts about the policy we are debating today. Pensions UK stated:

“Any change to salary sacrifice would inject uncertainty into a system that needs long-term trust, not sudden shocks…Introducing a cap would weaken incentives to save when we are facing a generation retiring with inadequate retirement savings.”

The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales stated:

“This cap will make it more complex for employers to offer a simple and flexible solution for retirement savings.”

The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries stated:

“The decision to impose a £2,000 limit…will undermine current efforts to improve retirement outcomes for individuals. In doing so, the act of saving into a pension will now be more expensive, more complex and less attractive to both employees and employers.”

Evelyn Partners stated:

“Restricting this sensible tax benefit that makes private sector saving more attractive adds insult to injury in a two-tier pension system”.

PwC stated:

“In a bid to bolster the public purse…Budget risks reducing employees’ take-home pay while placing additional pressure on businesses through rising employment costs”.

Hargreaves Lansdown stated:

“Restricting salary sacrifice on pension contribution could cause long-term damage to people’s retirement prospects. We could see employees less likely to increase pension contributions beyond auto-enrolment minimums”.

The Society of Pension Professionals—it goes on and on. Are the Government proud of this rousing endorsement by the industry? It is absurd.

When I was quizzing the Minister about this last week at oral questions—he will remember it well—he proudly held up the report that was commissioned under the previous Government—

[Torsten Bell]

Your report!

[Mark Garnier]

Indeed—our report, though it was published in May this year. It is a weighty tome. Even its title is pretty dry: “Understanding the attitudes and behaviours of employers towards salary sacrifice for pensions”. The Minister proudly told us that this document underscored the rationale for—[Interruption.] Oh—because it is important stuff. He told us that it underscored the rationale for capping salary sacrifice. However, having read the report, I can tell the House that it actually concludes that:

“All the hypothetical scenarios explored in this research”,

including the £2,000 cap, “were viewed negatively” by those interviewed. The changes would cause confusion, reduce benefits to employees and disincentivise pension savings. The report the Minister is using tells him not to do this.

The report also goes into why salary sacrifice for pensions is used by employers in addition to the incentive of paying into a pension, stating that extra benefits include: savings for employees, so that they have more to spend on essentials, tackling the cost of living crisis; savings for employers, which they can then invest back into their business and staff; and incentives for recruitment and retention. These are all good things—this is the stuff of delivering growth and the basis of creating a savings and investment culture. Why would this Government want to take it away?

The report came to the conclusion that of the three proposed options for change, the £2,000 cap is no more than the least terrible option. [Interruption.] The Minister talks about it being a secret plan—it is a published document. What is he talking about? It is the most extraordinary thing. He refers to it in terms that none of us recognises. But he has brought this in—this is the point. Is the Minister chuffed that his choice comes down to the least worst option for everyone? Here is the truth: it was the Chancellor’s choice to introduce this policy, and this Government are the ones implementing it—they are the ones who are in government.

Let us get to the measures and the impact of the Bill. To be fair, it is a very even Bill; there is something in it for everybody to hate. Take middle-income earners, who are typically in their 30s, and who earn on average a touch under £42,000 a year. This is the target area where the attack on savings starts. This is right at the point in life where people should be doing their very best for their future retirement. It is a perfect target market for the Government’s savings ambitions. However, it does not stop there. In total, at least 3.3 million savers will be affected, which is 44% of all people who use salary sacrifice for their pension. These are all people who work hard—people on whom the Chancellor promised not to raise taxes.

In fact, middle-income employees will be affected more than higher earners. According to the Financial Times, under the Bill, an employee who earns £50,000 and sacrifices 5% of that will pay the same amount in national insurance contributions as an employee on £80,000. If the contribution rate is doubled to 10% of their salary, the disparity grows even further, meaning that an employee earning £50,000 will pay the same amount in national insurance contributions as an employee on £140,000. How is that fair? The Government keep telling us that this policy will affect top earners, but the reality is that those on middle incomes will be disproportionately hit—the very people we should be encouraging to save more.

The Bill will also potentially hit low earners. Somebody who is lucky enough to get a Christmas bonus will not be able to add it to their salary sacrifice, taking advantage of any headroom, because the accounting looks at regular payments, not one-offs. [Interruption.] I am slightly worried, Madam Deputy Speaker, that the pairing Whip has a rather bad cough; I hope he gets better. This will potentially hit the 75% of basic rate taxpayers the cap supposedly protects.

Finally, the Bill hits employers. In the previous Budget, the Government absolutely hammered business. They increased employer national insurance contributions to 15% and, at the same time, reduced the starting threshold to £5,000. Businesses reacted and adapted. They were reassured by the Chancellor’s promise that she would not come back for more, yet here we are discussing further tax rises on businesses.

Let us look at the actual impact this raid on pensions will have on employers. According to the Government’s own impact assessment, it will hit 290,000 employers. A business highlighted in the 2025 report that

“If salary sacrifice were to go away, it would be additional cost of £600,000 to £700,000 per annum to the company in national insurance”.

While the Government are not abolishing it altogether, 44% of people currently using salary sacrifice—[Interruption.] I am worried; the pairing Whip is coughing. Anyway, there is going to be a cost, and that money will be taken away from businesses. This is going to be—[Interruption.] The Minister is chuntering from a sedentary position; he is obviously proud of what he is doing to the pensions industry.

Furthermore, the change will create administrative burdens for employers. With the current system, there are few administrative issues; the only thing that businesses have to bear in mind is ensuring that their employees’ pay does not fall below the national living wage—that is it. So what do the Government do? They go for the most complicated option that the report considered. That was explicitly stated by those involved in the research. As a pensions administration manager for a large manufacturing employer said,

“We’d have to reconfigure all our payroll systems and all our documentation. It would be a big job.”

The National Audit Office estimates that the annual cost on business just to comply with this Government’s tax system is £15.4 billion, yet the Government feel that the time is right to put more costs on businesses. I have to ask, what happened to the Chancellor’s pledge to cut red tape by a quarter?

I think I will move on to my conclusion in order to save people. [Laughter.] There was some great stuff in this speech, but I understand that people want to get away and wrap their Christmas stockings—particularly the Pensions Minister who, like the Grinch, is taking a lot of money away. To conclude, the Government should think again on this policy. People are simply not saving enough for their retirement. We need to do more to encourage them to save for their retirement. I know that the Minister would agree with that, so I hope that he hears the genuine concerns I have raised on behalf of a lot of people. Many people and businesses and are very worried about this policy, and he needs to take it away and think carefully about it.

Fundamentally, we are taking away something that is beneficial to the individual while also being tax efficient for business. Instead of encouraging the creation of incentives such as salary sacrifice or pensions, we are reducing the number. It is the wrong policy, and it sends the wrong message at the wrong time. All it does is add to the ongoing narrative that, “If you work hard to make a decent income, you will lose out. If you work hard as an employer to grow your business, you will lose out. If you try to save towards dignity and retirement, you will lose out.” It is the wrong policy to pursue and we will definitely vote against it tonight.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I remind Members that the knife will fall at 7 o’clock.

Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

The Chancellor’s Budget put a cap on salary sacrifice for pension savers at just £2,000. That was to raise an extra £4.8 billion in 2029, and it will affect 3.3 million savers and 290,000 employers. What research has the Pensions Minister done to understand and quantify the negative effects that this will have on pension savings?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question because it gives me a chance to bring the House’s attention to research published after the general election in 2024 but commissioned under the last Conservative Government—I have the document here. What was the research into? It was into capping salary sacrifice pension contributions at £2,000. The hon. Gentleman can read the research published and commissioned by his own party about putting back under control this tax relief, which had got out of hand.

[Mark Garnier]

Well, it was not us who put it in place; it was Labour.

This policy hits the private sector disproportionately: 14 times as many people save through salary sacrifice in the private sector as they do in the public sector. Whether it is kite-flying about lump sum withdrawal or taxing inherited pension pots, in a week when Labour Together is canvassing Labour members about a new Labour leader, is it not the case that the Chancellor is more interested in throwing red meat to her sad and unfortunate Back Benchers in a vain attempt to save her job than she is in the interests of the savings of our hard-working constituents?

[Torsten Bell]

There is nothing sad about Labour Members watching wages rise faster under this Government than they did under the Conservatives. There is nothing sad about our Back Benchers seeing the end of austerity and seeing public services being improved right across this country.

Young People not in Education, Employment or Training

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Wednesday 26th November 2025 Westminster Hall

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. I add my congratulations to the hon. Member for Amber Valley (Linsey Farnsworth) on bringing this important debate to Westminster Hall.

Conservatives are the party of aspiration. We believe that work is not just a payslip; it is a pathway to opportunity, dignity and hope, but for too many young people across the country, those words may ring hollow. The number of people who are NEET has soared to nearly 1 million, meaning that one in eight people aged 16 to 24 is currently deprived of the sense of purpose that comes from holding down a stable job or training for a future career. In 2024, over half of the NEETs had a health condition, and around one in five had a mental health condition. These are young people with talent and potential; they could, one day, set up a social enterprise or make the next scientific breakthrough, or they could join the workforce as postmen, plumbers and paramedics, as well as countless other roles that form the backbone of our economy and our country. However, they are currently languishing at home with no purpose and no hope for the future.

Being out of work at a young age can cost over £1 million in lost earnings over a lifetime, according to the “Keep Britain Working” review. Every single day of worklessness is a day of wasted opportunity, damaged ambition and diminished income. So far, this Government have not demonstrated an incredible plan to turn the tide; the benefits bill is ballooning, with 1 million more people on welfare than when Labour first entered office, and they are kicking the can down the road with the independent investigation into youth inactivity led by Alan Milburn—we will not hear its findings until summer 2026. Meanwhile, the number of NEETs will continue to grow, with each one costing the economy nearly £200,000.

By contrast, previous Conservative Governments have demonstrated a strong track record of supporting young people into work. [Laughter.] I am glad that some Members find that amusing. We cut youth unemployment by 43.8% between 2010 and 2023, despite the rocky economic terrain that we inherited after the 2008 financial crisis. We oversaw the creation of 1 million more apprenticeships. Our new plan to get Britain working again will give young people a first job bonus, redirecting the first £5,000 of national insurance that they would have paid into a savings account instead, which they can then use to save towards their first home, for example.

However, this Government’s policies are effectively locking young people out of work, denying them the chance to build their own future. The Government have announced a youth guarantee, a new jobs and careers service, and foundation apprenticeships, which are available only to young people. To me, those sound like empty assurances. Labour should not be promising more apprentices on the one hand while slashing accessible jobs in hospitality and retail on the other.

If we are serious about reducing the number of NEETs, we must increase the number of jobs available overall, yet jobs in hospitality and retail have plummeted after Labour’s damaging hikes in employers’ national insurance contributions, with 150,000 jobs having been lost since the last Budget. Between October 2024 and August 2025, a staggering 89,000 jobs were lost in restaurants, bars and hotels, according to UKHospitality.

Additionally, the Employment Rights Bill has rightly been labelled the “Barriers to Work Bill”. Banning probation periods will discourage employers from giving young people a chance. We should be rewarding employers for taking a risk and hiring an inexperienced recruit, not narrowing the talent pool by taking this option off the table. To truly tackle worklessness, we must trust our small and medium-sized businesses to make their own staffing decisions. Increased employment rights mean nothing if there are no jobs in the first place. Shortly after I was elected, I set up the Wyre Forest jobs fair to connect private and public sector employers with local jobseekers, including young people. I recognise that looking for work can, in itself, be hard work, and that was one way to broaden people’s horizons.

Supporting this nation’s NEETs comes with great rewards. If we could get just 5% of unemployed under-25s back into work, the Government would save £903 million over the course of this Parliament, according to research commissioned by the Work and Pensions Committee. Indeed, it found that spending £1 in return-to-work schemes could save the taxpayer £6 through consequential cuts to benefits and increased tax intake from the subsequent jobs. Most importantly, we would also be offering young people the confidence boost that comes from discovering a job where they can thrive.

To conclude, we must ensure that there is targeted support for all young people, no matter what barriers they face, so that they can start and succeed in work. We urge the Government to reverse their damaging economic policies that are crippling the very sectors that offer many young people their first stint in employment. We must back our small and medium-sized enterprises to the hilt, rather than strangle them with ever more costly regulations. Having stronger businesses means more and better jobs for everyone. We cannot afford to waste a generation.

Draft Occupational Pension Schemes (Collective Money Purchase Schemes) (Extension to Unconnected Multiple Employer Schemes and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2025

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Monday 24th November 2025 General Committees

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

I suspect the name of this statutory instrument is probably longer than my speech will be. I am grateful to the Minister for his words about the details of this instrument. Its intention is to bring more people who are not saving into pensions into the pension schemes. In that respect, it builds on work done by the previous Conservative Government, which I think we would all agree were 14 years of strong and stable Government [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] Thank you very much. We are 100% behind this. It continues the work of the previous Government. It has the intention that we always had—to get more people saving into pension schemes. In the broader sense, it follows the intentions of the Pension Schemes Bill, which is currently passing through Parliament, and on which we disagree with one or two things. But we are in agreement on the overall thrust of this statutory instrument, so I will not trouble the Committee any longer.

Pensions

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Tuesday 11th November 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

I thank the Secretary of State for advance sight of his statement. As he rightly says, this is an important, albeit technical, statement, and we in the Opposition certainly accept the contents and the spirit in which it is given. It is about a legal process, and we respect that.

This relates to a matter of keen interest to many of our constituents: those women who have been affected by the changes in retirement age. Known as WASPI, the Women Against State Pension Inequality Campaign have probably met with all of us here in one way or another, and they will be looking at the point made by the Secretary of State late in his statement:

“retaking this decision should not be taken as an indication that Government will necessarily decide that they should award financial redress.”

The WASPI women are rightly angry with this Government. In opposition, shadow Ministers and Labour MPs stood alongside these women, as the Secretary of State did, campaigning for

“a better deal for WASPI women.”

However, when the Labour party won the general election, they quickly apparently U-turned on that position, blaming the fiscal situation they were left with. Indeed, in December last year, the Government made a statement confirming their about-turn on supporting WASPI women. If I may, Mr Speaker, I would like to quote the shadow Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Helen Whately), who said in response to that statement:

“But let us be clear: the decision to provide no compensation is the Government’s decision, and they need to own it. I am not going to let them get away with saying that there is no compensation because of a fictional black hole in the public finances… Government compensation should always be based on what is fair and just.”—[Official Report, 17 December 2024; Vol. 759, c. 170.]

She is absolutely right: the Government had the choice then to stand behind the women who they said have faced a great injustice, but they chose not to. Instead, the Labour party is now fighting them in a judicial review in the High Court. Whether it be the multiple U-turns on pensioners’ winter fuel payments or the imminent rumoured freezing of tax thresholds in the Budget, forcing many pensioners into paying income tax, it is clear that this Government are not on the side of our pensioners.

That brings me to some questions for the Secretary of State. First, the Minister for Pensions said in a Westminster Hall debate on this topic on 15 January:

“we will work with the ombudsman to develop a detailed action plan, identifying and addressing lessons from this and other PHSO investigations.”—[Official Report, 15 January 2025; Vol. 760, c. 156WH.]

However, to my knowledge, nothing has been released to that effect. Could the Secretary of State provide an update on when we can expect the plan and what will be in it?

Secondly, in a follow-up to written parliamentary questions from the hon. Members for West Dunbartonshire (Douglas McAllister) and for Newport West and Islwyn (Ruth Jones), the Government said that they have “no plans” to meet representatives of the WASPI campaign. Indeed, the last time a Minister did meet them was on 5 September 2024. Why have this Government decided not to directly engage with the group they once stood shoulder to shoulder with, especially given that there is new evidence to consider?

Thirdly, during the 14 years we were in Government, we chose to help pensioners by increasing the personal allowance income tax threshold. However, independent research suggests that 1.6 million more pensioners are doomed to be filling in self-assessment tax returns within the next four years, thanks to the Government’s choices that may be made in the upcoming Budget. Has the Secretary of State had conversations with the Chancellor about the serious impact this retirement tax would have on a group that have consistently targeted by this Government?

Finally, why are this Government determined to blame everyone else for the decisions they have made? All this statement shows is that the Government want to keep kicking the can down the road and not be held accountable for their actions, but we should look at the record: unemployment is at 5%, the highest level since the pandemic, up from 4.2% in June last year; inflation is now sitting at 3.8%, up from 2% in June last year; economic growth has flatlined, despite having improved by 0.5% in the three months before this Government took office; borrowing costs have increased to their highest level since 1998, with 30-year gilt yields reaching 5.2%, compared with 4.7% when the Government took office; debt is now 96.4% of GDP, the highest since the 1960s; and winter fuel payments were cut for millions of pensioners, only for the Government U-turn on that after feeling the pressure of our strong campaign.

The Government are set to break their manifesto pledge and increase the tax burden to a historic high. Is it not true that this Government have been trying to dodge taking any form of responsibility for their actions? What is their problem with pensioners?

Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Monday 27th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

Back in May last year, while in opposition, the Labour party was outraged to learn that the average processing time for applications to the Access to Work programme was running at 43.9 days. In fact, so outraged were Labour Members that they made it a manifesto pledge to tackle that problem. After more than 15 months in government, Labour is far from having slashed waiting times; applicants now have to wait an average of 93.6 days. That is more than twice the waiting time under the previous Government. After a year in government, the Labour party has doubled the misery and uncertainty suffered by disabled people—why?

[Sir Stephen Timms]

We are fixing the very serious problems left behind by the previous Government. The number of people who are processing Access to Work applications has been increased by 118 since May last year, but the hon. Gentleman is right that delays are still a problem. That points clearly to the need for reform, which is what we are getting on with.

Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting)

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Thursday 11th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

I thank the proposers of these new clauses. I will take them in the way they were intended—to spark debate.

We have had quite a wide debate and I think there is consensus on the subject, but I want to put a slightly different spin on the problem statement we are talking about. We have come at a lot of the discussion on the new clause as if there is too little advice. I would slightly reframe the question when it comes to pensions, which is that there is too much complexity, and too little advice or guidance. I think that is the right way to think about the problem that we are confronting with the system as a whole.

I will broadly outline our approach to try to tackle that problem statement. The task is to reduce the complexity as well as to increase the guidance and the advice that are available. Having watched the pensions debate over the past 15 years, I have observed that we have too often made pensions more complicated, and then said, “If we only had this advice, it would all be fine.” I do not think that is the right answer. That is a mistake about the nature of the system that we are delivering.

Our job is to reduce the complexity, or to reduce the consequences of it being difficult for people to deal with. That is obviously what a lot of the Bill is trying to do. With small pots, the aim is obviously to reduce complexity. That is what the value for money measures are designed to do. Seen through that lens, they are also aimed at reducing the costs of that complexity. The value for money regime is there to reduce the consequences of it being difficult to engage with and members not choosing their own provider.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

The Minister raises an interesting point. We have talked about a lot of different bits and pieces with complexity and all the rest of it. We have not spoken about when we educate people about money.

In the olden days, when I was a newly elected MP, I was one of the chairs of the all-party parliamentary group for financial education for young people. That was about getting financial education into the curriculum. It is probably now more important than ever that we teach people of school age about the importance of financial planning, including pensions. Can the Minister assure the Committee that he will take up with his colleagues in the Department for Education the changes that could be made to bring this type of education into the curriculum for kids, who are all going to be adults soon?

[Torsten Bell]

I shall take that up directly with the new Economic Secretary to the Treasury, who I am sure will talk to her colleagues in the Department for Education. I can offer the hon. Member some entirely anecdotal optimism on that issue. Whenever I now do school events in Swansea, I am seeing very high levels of financial engagement. After I have given a very worthy speech, most of the questions are not about how to reduce inequality but instead are about personal financial advice. I think the youth of today are all over it—that is my lived experience.

I have mentioned small pots and value for money. I want to flag two other areas. Dashboards have been mentioned, and they are a very large part of how we provide support. The default pensions solutions are crucial to reducing complexity, and that is probably the biggest measure in the Bill. The need to provide more advice or guidance for people to access their defined-contribution pots is reduced significantly because of the existence of default solutions. We definitely still want people to have access to advice and the ability to opt out of those defaults, but default solutions help significantly. That is why the communication of those default pension solutions, which we discussed quite extensively, is so important for people. That is why that is in the Bill.

We have touched on making more support available. We have universal access for people of any age to free impartial support through MoneyHelper—that is what the Money and Pensions Service is providing—and we have a specific focus on support for over-50s in Pension Wise. Several hon. Members have said, absolutely rightly, that access to financial advice fell in the aftermath of the reforms over a decade ago, but there is some better news on Pension Wise. The 2024 Financial Lives survey showed that of those who accessed a defined-contribution pot within the last four years, 40% had accessed Pension Wise. I think that is probably more than most hon. Members in this debate would expect, though it may not be enough. However, those people had used Pension Wise when heading towards access; they had not used it as a mid-life MOT product, which is a different thing. That 40% was up from 34% in 2020, so some things have gone in the right direction. I am gently noting that, not claiming any credit for it because it predates the election. There is a lot of overlap between what those systems of advice are providing and the measures in new clause 1.

Regarding new clause 40, I absolutely agree on how we think about under-saved groups. The groups identified in the new clause are more or less the same groups of people experiencing financial wellbeing challenges whom MaPS targets, so that is a point of consensus, but I am absolutely open to suggestions of what more we can do to make sure that we are tackling that issue. The Pensions Commission is considering the wider question of adequacy, which is why we are looking at not just average adequacy but the fairness of the system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I rise to speak in support of the new clause tabled by the Liberal Democrats and new clauses 18 and 19, which were tabled by my wonderful colleague from Plaid, the hon. Member for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies).

The witnesses who came before us last week to speak about the lack of indexation for pre-1997 pensions made an incredibly passionate and powerful case for changing the system. We mentioned earlier the Work and Pensions Committee’s report, which suggested that the Government need to look at this issue seriously. I was quite disappointed by the Government’s response, which did not actually say very much. All it said was that changing the system would have an impact on the Government’s balance sheet. Well, yes, it might have an impact on the Government’s balance sheet, but it would have a significant impact for people who are in this situation through absolutely no fault of their own. They did the right thing all the way along, but the company they were with collapsed and the Pension Protection Fund or the financial assistance scheme has not given them the uplift.

The group of people we are talking about are getting older. They are not young any more. We know that older pensioners are the most likely to be in fuel poverty and to be struggling with the cost of living crisis. They are the ones making the choice about whether to switch on the heating. Given the rate of inflation that we have had in recent years, there is a real argument for utilising a small amount of the PPF’s surplus to provide a level of indexation. The cut-off is very arbitrary; it is just a date that happened to be put in legislation at that time. Were the Government setting up the PPF today, and the compensation schemes for people who lost their pension through no fault of their own, I do not think they would be arguing for not indexing pensions accrued before 1997. That would not be a justifiable position for today’s Government to take.

I am not sure whether the Bill is the right place to do this, but my understanding is that it needs to be done in primary legislation; it cannot be done in secondary legislation. Given what I mentioned earlier about the significant length of time between pieces of primary pension legislation, if the Government do not use the Pension Schemes Bill to address this problem today, on Report or in the House of Lords, when will they? How many more of the pensioners who are suffering from the lack of indexation will have passed away or be pushed into further financial hardship by the time the Government make a decision on this, if they ever intend to?

As I have said, I cannot see a justification for not providing the indexation. We know the PPF levy changes have been put in place because of that surplus, and there is recognition that the surplus exists and has not been invented—the money is there. I understand that the situation is different for the two funds, but particularly with the PPF, I do not understand how any Member of this House, let alone the Government, could argue against making this change to protect pensioners.

It may have an impact on the Government’s balance sheet, but it does not have an impact on the Government’s income, outgoings and ability to spend today. The PPF money cannot be used for anything other than reducing the levy or paying pensions. It is very unusual to have such ringfenced, hypothecated money within the Government’s balance sheet, but this money is ringfenced. The Government cannot decide to spend it on building a new school or funding the NHS. It can be used only for paying the pensions of people whose companies have gone under.

I very much appreciate the hard work of my colleagues in Plaid Cymru on this issue in supporting their constituents, as well as people such as Terry Monk, who gave evidence to us last week along with Mr Sainsbury. Now is the time for the Government to change this to ensure fairness and drag some pensioners out of poverty, so that they have enough money to live on right now during this cost of living crisis.

[Mark Garnier]

I want to follow on from the two powerful speeches by the Liberal Democrat and SNP spokespeople, the hon. Members for Torbay and for Aberdeen North, in highlighting the fact that this problem is—dare I say it—disappearing over time. This feels slightly similar to the ongoing contaminated blood debate, and it is a similar type of thing. The people who would be compensated for the contaminated blood are, for tragic reasons, disappearing. Indeed, I think there are now 86,000 pensioners who were caught up in this particular problem, and the longer this is kicked down the road, the smaller the problem will become, for obvious reasons.

The principle behind this is absolutely right. It is incredibly important that we as a country, society and community look after all these people. Where people have done the right thing and put money into their pension, but it has not followed through, that is a big problem.

One thing does bother me: I do not want to be too political, but the Government have dug themselves a freshly made £30 billion black hole in the last year. Although the SNP spokesperson is absolutely right that the £12 billion in the PPF is available to spend only on pensions, the problem is that because it appears on the country’s balance sheet, if the money to pay the price for this—I think it is £1.8 billion—came out of that, there would be a £1.8 billion increase on the country’s collective balance sheet. The argument would go that it would then reduce it. At some level, fiscal prudence has to come in to make sure we are not creating a deeper black hole. Because of the change of accounting at the back end of last year, this could turn the Government’s £30 billion fiscal black hole into a £32 billion one, even though that money is earmarked only for pensions.

I would like to hear from the Minister how the Government will resolve that. I would like him to make an undertaking that we will hear something about it on 26 November, and that there will be something in the Budget to resolve this fiscal conundrum. We need to know where the money will come from, and that the Government have set it aside. This is a perfect opportunity to deal with a problem that has been going on since 1997, and that becomes more profound every time the Office for National Statistics announces the rate of inflation. If the Minister gave us that assurance, I would trust him—being an honourable and decent man—that he could make his current boss get something done about this on 26 November.

[Torsten Bell]

Despite the hon. Member’s kind invitation, and as he well knows, I am not about to start commenting on the Budget—something I have heard him say himself many times over the years in his previous roles.

More seriously, the last 50 years tell us that the question of pension uprating is a big deal and very important. By “uprating”, I mean how pensions keep pace with earnings or prices. Obviously, on the state pension we tend to talk in terms of earnings. It is a big issue. The lesson of the 1980s and 1990s was about rising pensioner poverty at a time when the state pension was not earnings indexed but earnings were growing significantly. That is why we ended up with 30% or 40% pensioner poverty during those years. History tells us that those things are important. History aside, they are also obviously important for individuals, as we heard at the evidence session.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I suspect that I have already written to the hon. Lady, because she has raised some constituency cases with me, but she can receive another one of those letters.

New Clause 33

Report of defined benefit schemes impact on productivity

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the impact on corporate productivity of defined benefit schemes.

(2) The report must include an assessment of—

(a) investment strategies of defined benefit funds,

(b) the returns on investment of defined benefit funds, and

(c) the impact of investment strategies and returns on productivity.

(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Mark Garnier.)

This new clause would require the Government to commission a report on the impact on corporate productivity of defined benefit schemes.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 34—Recognition rules for Defined Benefit scheme deficits—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations revise the balance sheet recognition rules for Defined Benefit pension scheme deficits.

(2) Revision of the balance sheet recognition rules under subsection (1) may include allowing the deferment or partial deferment of deficits to future financial years when calculating the balance sheet.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to revise the balance sheet recognition rules for Defined Benefit pension scheme deficits.

New clause 35—Alternative disclosure for long-term deficits—

“(1) When a Defined Benefit pension scheme has a long-term deficit, it shall be permitted to disclose the deficit on an alternative basis, rather than recognising the full deficit as an immediate liability, if a formal recovery plan has been agreed.

(2) For subsection (1) to apply, a formal recovery plan must have been—

(a) agreed by the scheme trustees, and

(b) approved by The Pensions Regulator.

(3) The Pensions Regulator shall issue guidance on the format and content of the alternative disclosure specified in subsection (1).”

This new clause permits DB schemes to disclose a long-term deficit on an alternative basis.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

When we look at the thrust of the Bill, the mandation measure is all about trying to get pension funds to help to create greater productivity within the UK economy. A couple of days ago, in a very helpful intervention on a speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Leicestershire, the hon. Member for Hendon made the point that, while we are standing against mandation, we must ask: what are we standing in favour of? How are we trying to get behind the grain of the Bill? These three new clauses respond to that question of what we are doing to ensure that the Bill actually can use pension fund money to promote economic growth, invest into the UK and get better returns for the pensioners.

One of the problems facing defined-benefit pension schemes is that, in response to the outrage over Maxwell and Mirror Group Newspapers pinching money from pension schemes back in the 1980s and 1990s, rules were introduced that were basically designed to ensure that it would not happen again. They were introduced in such a way to ensure that, if a defined-benefit pension scheme were to go into deficit, the deficit would be reflected on the balance sheet of the host company.

We still see that today in some larger companies; I think the British Telecom pension scheme currently has a deficit of £7 billion, and that appears on British Telecom’s balance sheet. That does two fundamental things. First, if a company has a deficit on its balance sheet, that restricts its ability to raise equity or debt to invest into its business, so the host business cannot expand because it has a defined-benefit pension scheme with a deficit attached to it.

A second problem then comes as a result of the Maxwell rules: the trustees of a defined-benefit scheme with a host company will be reluctant to invest that into high-volatility assets. We know that, over a long period of time, the equity market will perform far better than the bond market. The problem is that we can have volatile markets in the short term, which could introduce a deficit in the defined-benefit pension scheme that translates to a deficit on the balance sheet.

For example, if we look at stock market performances from the 1980s to now, we will see a very steady rise in the stock markets over time, which have done particularly well. However, if we go back to 1987 or various other times, such as 2000-01, we will see big stock market crashes that will have appeared on the balance sheets of those defined-benefit pension scheme host companies. As a result, these pension schemes are missing out on the long-term growth to push away the short-term volatility that hits the host company. With these three new clauses, we are trying to get that out of the way so that defined-benefit pension schemes feel more comfortable about investing in higher-growth and therefore higher-volatility assets.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for tabling the new clauses, and for his impressive consistency; he has spoken to this issue many times not only in this Committee, but elsewhere, and I have heard him. I agree on some of the wider issues he is raising, particularly his reflections on some of the impacts of decisions taken in the late 1990s. Before I come to the more technical responses to the new clauses, the hon. Member’s objective is to see different investment approaches taken by defined-benefit schemes. Many issues that were historically the case have been removed by the passing of time, because they are now closed schemes whose investments are now changing for other reasons, not because of the questions of regulatory pressure in the 1990s and so on. I leave that as an aside.

To give the hon. Member a bit more optimism, based on the Bill, I already have schemes saying to me that they may take different approaches on investments because of the option of a surplus release. That gives a different incentive structure for employers about what they wish to see their pension schemes doing, and for trustees, if there is a sharing of the benefits of upside risk that comes with that. I have had several large employer’s pension schemes raising that issue with me in the recent past. That is to give him some case for optimism to set against the long-term pessimism.

I will turn to the details of the new clauses. New clause 33 would require the Government to produce and lay a report before both Houses of Parliament, with an assessment of the investment strategies of defined-benefit pension schemes and their impact on productivity.

There is already a requirement for defined-benefit schemes to produce much of that information in their triennial valuation and to submit key documents to the Pensions Regulator, including information on investments and changes in asset allocations over time, so the regulator has much of the information already. In addition, multiple reports are already produced annually on defined-benefit schemes and their investments. The purple book is the most obvious example; it is produced by the Pension Protection Fund. I know that everybody here will be an avid reader of it; I promise people that it is reasonably widely read, including in the City.

New clause 34 seeks to change the arrangements for reporting defined-benefit pension scheme liabilities in the employer’s accounts. I am impressed by the wish of the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for us to engage in a Brexit from international financial reporting standards, but he will be unsurprised to learn that the Government are not about to do that. These are globally recognised financial reporting frameworks that allow comparability, and we are not in the business of changing them.

New clause 35 would require the Secretary of State to introduce an alternative basis to disclose schemes’ funding deficits. The Pensions Act 2004 put in place the current regime for valuations. Our view is that that approach has taken some time to implement but it is now well understood and well established, so leaving it in place is by far the best thing that we can do, while also considering in more detail the consequences of other things that drive the choices of pension schemes. On that basis, I encourage the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw the new clause, and I certainly do not expect to see my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon support it.

[Mark Garnier]

I am partially reassured by the Minister’s comments, but it really comes down to the kindness of my heart—I would not want the hon. Member for Hendon to be pulled off the Committee and put in an awkward situation. It would be unfortunate to force him to fall out with the Whips so early in his parliamentary career, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 37

Review of impact of this Act

“(1) Within five years of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must carry out a review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes.

(2) The review must consider—

(a) the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes, and

(b) whether further measures are needed to ensure that pension scheme members receive an adequate income in retirement.

(3) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”—(Mark Garnier.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to prepare a report on the impact of this Act within 5 years of its passing.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Under new clause 37, the review of the impact of the Act would focus on pensions adequacy. The current Government plan to delay the comprehensive consideration of pensions adequacy to future phases of the pensions review. Any resulting reforms from those future evaluations are projected to take several years to develop and implement, and there is widespread concern that without a mandated regular review process, inadequate pension outcomes will persist. Millions of people in the UK therefore risk having insufficient retirement income, particularly lower earners, ethnic minorities, the self-employed and those with interrupted careers.

Automatic enrolment has expanded workplace pension participation and now covers over 88% of eligible employees, but significant savings shortfalls remain. Recent forecasts and analysis warn of a retirement crisis, with many future pensioners expected to have less income than today’s retirees unless action is taken. The Government’s renewed Pensions Commission is due to report in 2027, focusing on the adequacy, fairness and sustainability of the retirement framework, but that report will only come in 2027.

The new clause would create a statutory obligation for the Secretary of State to conduct a full review within five years of the Bill’s passage, focusing on its impact on actual and projected retirement incomes. It would require an assessment of whether current policies and contribution levels are sufficient to ensure adequate retirement incomes. The Secretary of State would have to report the findings to Parliament, increasing accountability and transparency. That would formalise an ongoing review cycle to monitor pension adequacy regularly, preventing the consideration of the issue being indefinitely postponed.

As we all know, pension adequacy is vital to preventing poverty in later life and to ensuring quality of life for retirees. Despite expanded coverage through auto-enrolment, however, many people are still on track to fail to meet retirement income targets. Financial resilience frameworks show disparities in adequacy among lower earners, women and other vulnerable groups, and current retirement income depends on a number of variables, including contribution, sufficiency, investment returns, longevity and state pension level.

The new clause would ensure that the Government take responsibility to monitor and report regularly on pension adequacy outcomes. It would mandate a formal review mechanism, enhancing policy responsiveness and parliamentary oversight. Ultimately, it aims to safeguard millions of future retirees from inadequate incomes, and support a sustainable and fair retirement system.

[Torsten Bell]

We have now had a few discussions about the case for monitoring and evaluating the Bill and what is going on in the pension landscape more generally. I do not want to repeat everything I have said previously, so I will just address whether this is the right approach or whether it should be done through the Pensions Commission that is under way and looking at most of these issues. My view is that the Pensions Commission is focused on the headline issues that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has just mentioned. I do not want to confuse that work by having another process consider the same issues at the same time. It is also valuable to have the independence of the commission when doing that.

My main message is that we do not have to wait long, because the Pensions Commission will report in 2027, which is earlier than the five years that we would have to wait for the Secretary of State’s inevitably excellent report as a result of this new clause. We should have faith in Baroness Drake, Ian Cheshire and Nick Pearce to deliver that.

[Torsten Bell]

I do not want to speak for the commissioners because that would be to prejudge their work. I can tell the hon. Lady what the terms of reference require and they definitely rule out long-grassing in that they require actual recommendations for change to deliver a fair, adequate and sustainable pension system. It would certainly be open to them to say, “Do these things, and we also think that monitoring should be x and y.” That would be for them to say, and as it is an independent commission, I do not want to prejudge that. It definitely cannot be just that; it would have to include recommendations for change.

[Mark Garnier]

We tabled new clause 37 partly to try to get some reassurance from the Minister. Two years is still quite a long time, as is five, but it is incredibly important that we are on top of what is going on in the pension industry, not least because we do not want any of our constituents to end up with miserable retirements. However, I am marginally reassured by the Minister’s comments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 38

Guidance on the roles of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator

“(1) The Secretary of State must establish a joint protocol outlining the roles and responsibilities of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator regarding their regulatory responsibility of the pension industry.

(2) A protocol established under subsection (1) must include—

(a) an overview of the coordination mechanisms between the two bodies;

(b) a published framework for oversight of hybrid or work-based personal pension schemes;

(c) a requirement for regular joint communications from both bodies to clarify regulatory boundaries for industry stakeholders.”—(Mark Garnier.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This will be the last new clause I will be talking to. It looks at the guidance on the roles of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator. In preparing for this Bill, we spent a lot of time engaging with the industry just a mile and a half up the road. Among the industry there is persistent confusion regarding the division of regulatory responsibility between the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator.

The FCA regulates contract-based pension schemes—personal pensions, group personal pensions and stakeholder pensions—focusing on firm authorisation, conduct and consumer financial advice. TPR regulates trust-based occupational schemes, including defined-benefit and defined-contribution trust schemes, and it targets schemes, governance and employer duties. Overlapping interests exist in hybrid or workplace pension schemes, but unclear boundaries and differing enforcement powers can create regulatory gaps and inconsistencies. That ambiguity causes compliance difficulties for employers, trustees and industry stakeholders, and may ultimately affect pension savers.

The new clause would require the Government to establish a statutory joint protocol between the FCA and TPR, clearly defining and publishing their respective roles and responsibilities. The protocol must outline formal co-ordination mechanisms between the FCA and TPR, include a published framework specifically addressing oversight of hybrid and workplace personal schemes where regulatory remit overlaps, and include a requirement for regular joint communications from both regulators to guide industry and clarify regulatory boundaries. That matters because collaboration between the FCA and TPR ensures comprehensive consumer protection across all pension products.

With pension system complexity increasing—with mega schemes, master trusts and hybrid arrangements—co-ordinated regulation is critical. That will enable both regulators to leverage their strengths—the FCA in consumer conduct and financial advice, and TPR in governance and compliance enforcement. That will help trustees, employers, firms and savers to better understand which regulator to engage to resolve issues and access support.

Industry feedback consistently calls for more precise demarcation to avoid confusion and compliance risks. The Government’s wider reforms and digitisation initiatives, such as pension dashboards, further heighten the need for co-ordination. The new clause would promote regulatory clarity and efficiency through mandated guidance, protecting pension consumers and enabling robust governance across the sector. Clear regulatory pathways will better support pension savers by ensuring consistent standards and enforcement across all types of pension schemes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

We all agree that we want providers and, most importantly, consumers to operate in this landscape as easily as possible. Particularly in the case of consumers, we do not want them to know the difference between the two. I have been very clear with both regulators that that is the objective, and I have been very clear with both Departments that oversee them that that is what we are doing.

Delivering that in practice requires thinking about how we legislate, and that is what we have done with the Bill to make sure that we are providing exactly the same outcomes through both markets. It is about Government providing clarity to regulators—we are absolutely providing that—and then about how the regulators themselves behave.

I am very alive to the issue that is being raised. There is some good news about the existing arrangements, which need to continue, because they are examples of effective co-ordination between the FCA and TPR. I have seen that through joint working groups, consultations, shared strategies and guidance, and regular joint engagement with stakeholders. The value for money measures in the Bill are probably the most high-profile recent experience of entirely joint working between the FCA, TPR and DWP.

The wider collaboration is underpinned by what is called the joint regulatory strategy and a formal memorandum of understanding that sets out how the two regulators should co-operate, share information and manage areas of overlap. I think that that basically achieves the objectives that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest set out, even if it is provided not by the Secretary of State but by a memorandum of understanding between the two organisations. I can absolutely reassure him and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North that I am very focused on this issue.

[Mark Garnier]

I am highly reassured by the Minister’s words. The important point is to ensure that if the bodies are to work together and do this, we need to keep them held to account on it. The Financial Conduct Authority was set up as an independent regulator and reports back to such things as the Treasury Committee. Presumably, TPR reports back to the Work and Pensions Committee. Already we can see a potential problem there, because separate Select Committees are doing the investigation. That is an important point, but I am confident that the Minister and his civil servants are aware of the problem and will be resolutely super sharp-focused on this issue to ensure that we have regulatory clarity. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 39

Section 38: commencement

“(1) The provisions in section 38 shall not come into force except in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(John Milne.)

This new clause would require that the provisions in clause 38 could only be enacted once agreed through secondary legislation.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Overall, this Bill has wide cross-party support, as evidenced by the fact that we have been rattling through it at such a pace. However, the power of mandation is undoubtedly the most controversial aspect. To be briefly Shakespearean: to mandate or not to mandate, that is the question.

The new clause would require that the provisions in clause 38—the mandation powers—be enacted only through secondary legislation. It is an attempt to square the circle between two competing views. The Liberal Democrats have concerns about the implications of mandation, frankly, as has much of the pensions industry. For example, Pensions UK, which is a signatory of the Mansion House accords, has stated:

“We believe that the best way of ensuring good returns for members is for investments to be undertaken on a voluntary, not a mandatory basis. We also note powers being taken to specify required investment capability for schemes, and to direct LGPS funds to merge with specific pools. All of these powers will require careful scrutiny.”

Similarly, the Society of Pension Professionals has said:

“The SPP does not support the reserve power to mandate investment in private market assets and recommends its removal from the legislation. The mandation power creates significant uncertainty, including questions about legal accountability for investment underperformance and how eligible assets will be defined. The threat of mandation risks distorting market pricing and could reduce public trust in pensions, as savers may fear that financial returns are no longer the top priority.”

The Minister has stated on a number of occasions that mandation should not be necessary, that he does not expect to have to use it and that the Mansion House accord demonstrates the industry’s willingness to act voluntarily. The obvious response is that if that really is the case, and that UK private markets truly offer the best option for pension savers while meeting the fiduciary duties, the industry should not need any prodding and mandation will not be required. The Minister’s response on previous occasions, and no doubt today, has been to observe the history and point out that thus far, the industry has been slow to make that change.

We recognise that the Minister is wholly committed to the path of giving himself mandation powers, whatever we or anyone else says. Indeed, he sees it as core to the legislation. For that reason, we have proposed the new clause as a halfway house. The power would be put on the books, but it would require secondary legislation to be enacted. It would give the Minister the ability to have access to mandation powers at short notice if he deemed it necessary, without needing primary legislation, but in the meantime, it does not hang over the industry like a sword of Damocles. It may seem just a psychological difference, but psychology matters, and there are other advantages.

Somewhat counterintuitively, sometimes having too much of a stick can be a problem in itself. The Minister would be under pressure to use the stick for the sake of consistency in every case where any company went slightly over the limit or was under the limit, even when he might prefer to take a softer, more conciliatory approach. We therefore see this new clause as a way to help the Minister exercise the powers he needs, but without stepping too heavily on industry’s toes. As he has said, he does not believe that he will ever need to exercise the power, so let us keep it at arm’s length.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 98 is a standard provision setting out how regulation-making powers in the Bill may be used. It confirms that all regulations will be made by statutory instrument and allows them to be tailored to different situations and scheme types. The clause ensures that the Bill can work effectively in practice.

Clause 99 sets out how regulations under the Bill will be scrutinised by Parliament, using either the affirmative or negative procedures—we were discussing a particular case relating to clause 38 just now. The clause also allows that regulations that would otherwise be subject to the negative procedure can be made as part of a joint package of regulations under the affirmative procedure.

Government amendment 241 is a technical amendment. The new provisions in chapter 1 of part 4 about changes to Northern Ireland salary-related, contracted-out pension schemes apply specifically to schemes in Northern Ireland. The rest of the provisions in chapter 1 apply to schemes in England, Wales and Scotland. Clause 100 is a standard legislative provision confirming the territorial extent of the measures in the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 100

Extent

Amendment made: 241, in clause 100, page 98, leave out line 10 and insert—

“( ) Subject as follows, this Act extends to England and Wales and Scotland only.

(1A) Sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc : Northern Ireland) extend to Northern Ireland only.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment secures that the new clauses inserted by NC28 to NC30 extend to Northern Ireland only. Northern Ireland has its own pensions legislation, but in view of the retrospective provisions in those new Clauses it is considered appropriate to include material in the Bill for Northern Ireland corresponding to the new clauses inserted by NC23 to NC26.

Clause 100, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 101

Commencement

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 255, in clause 101, page 98, line 22, leave out “Chapters 1 and 2” and insert “Chapter 1”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 256, in clause 101, page 98, line 23, at end insert—

“(aa) Chapter 2 comes into force six months after Chapter 4 comes into force.”

Government amendments 225 to 228, 242 and 243.

Amendment 263, in clause 101, page 99, line 5, at end insert—

“(d) section [Administration levy] comes into force on 1 April 2026.”

This amendment is consequential on NC44 and would ensure the amendment to abolish the PPF administration levy should come into force on 1 April 2026 (at the start of the 2026/27 levy year).

Clause stand part.

Clause 102 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

Amendments 255 and 256 relate to the value-for-money framework timeline that we discussed when we considered clause 41 on Tuesday and are related to Conservative amendment 257, which was withdrawn. When we considered amendment 278, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Tamworth, the Minister committed to consider the matter on Report, so I will not press those amendments today.

This is, however, because I think it is the last time that I will speak in this Committee—or I hope it will be—a good opportunity to thank everyone. I say a huge thank you to everyone who has worked incredibly hard: the Clerks; you, Ms Lewell, and your fellow Chairs; and all the DWP officials who have supported the Minister who, frankly, with his not inconsiderable inexperience and youth, has done a magnificent job of working in his first Bill Committee. I think we can all agree that he has a terrific future in front of him as an individual who can get stuck into really quite dry, anodyne Bills. Of course, I also thank the members of my office staff, who have worked extraordinarily hard. I had not quite realised how difficult it is to be in opposition and up against the might of the Government, but my office staff have done very well, so I thank them all very much indeed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I thank all Opposition Members for those reflections. I will come to my own after I have dealt with the remaining clauses and amendments—we must finish the job.

On the Opposition amendments, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for his words. I am firmly committed to writing to both him and my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth, which I shall do before Report. I am glad that the hon. Member will not press his amendments on that basis.

Amendments 225, 227 and 228 address the timing of the implementation of the provisions introduced by clause 38. Amendments 225 and 227 make it clear that the relevant master trusts and GPPs will not have to comply with the scale requirement until 2030. That is a point of clarification. In response to industry concerns, elements of the provision, such as the transition pathway, can be commenced and become operable prior to the scale requirement itself being active. We are responding to those concerns, and the amendment achieves exactly that. Amendment 228 provides clarification on the asset allocation elements of clause 38 by making it clear that those requirements will fall away if not brought into force by the end of 2035. Amendment 226 provides for the commencement of new chapter 3A, which will be inserted by new clauses 12 to 17.

On amendment 263, we have just discussed the PPF admin levy question. Given what we have just discussed about new clause 44, I ask the hon. Member for Torbay not to press the amendment.

Government amendment 242 introduces a commencement provision for the new chapter 1 of part 4 of the Bill on the validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes for both Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This measure means that two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent, effective pension schemes will be able to use a confirmation from their actuary obtained under this part of the Bill to validate a previous change to benefits—this is the Virgin Media discussion we had earlier today. Two months after the Bill becomes law, a previous change to benefits under an effective pension scheme will be considered valid if the scheme actually confirms that it met the legal requirements at the time of the change. This measure means that this part of the Bill will come into force two months after the Act receives Royal Assent and is a necessary accompaniment to new clauses 23 to 30.

Turning to the clauses, clause 101 is a standard commencement provision that details the timetable for bringing the Bill’s measures into operation and allowing transitional and saving provisions to ensure orderly implementation. Clause 102 is crucial, because it gives the Bill its short title. I commend those clauses to the Committee.

I will finish by adding my support to the comments made by all hon. Members about the proceedings of this Committee. I thank all hon. Members from all parties for their support—broadly—and also for their scrutiny, which is an important part of everything we do in this place. The Bill is important, but the debate around it is also important, both so that the legislation can be improved and in its own right. Such debate makes sure that issues are brought to the attention of the House and are on the record. I also thank this Chair, as well as several others, including those who have stood in at short notice at various phases of the Bill’s consideration. I am particularly grateful to one individual, and I am also grateful to the Clerks for all their work.

Most of all, I put on record my thanks to all the civil servants in the Department for Work and Pensions, His Majesty’s Treasury, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator. Many of them have been working on the content of this Bill for many years, far longer than I have been Pensions Minister and, as many hon. Members have kindly reminded me, far longer than I may end up being the Pensions Minister, given the high attrition rate over the past 15 years in modern British politics. I thank them for the warning, and will take it in the way it was hopefully intended.

To be slightly worthy at the end of my speech, it is probably true that pensions legislation does not get the attention it deserves, but looking back over the 20th century, nothing was more important to the progress that this country and others made in delivering leisure in retirement. That very big win was delivered not only by productivity growth, but by Government decisions and collective decisions made by unions and their employers. The Bill goes further in that regard and, on that basis, it deserves all the coverage it gets.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 225, in clause 101, page 98, line 24, leave out “after 31 December 2029”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 227, means that relevant Master Trusts and group personal pensions will not have to comply with the scale requirement until after 2030, but that Chapter 3 of Part 2 (including provision relating to the scale requirement, such as the application can otherwise be brought into force at any time in accordance with regulations.

Amendment 226, in clause 101, page 98, line 25, at end insert—

“(ba) Chapter 3A comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State and the Treasury jointly may by regulations appoint;”.

This amendment provides for commencement by regulations of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15.

Amendment 227, in clause 101, page 98, line 30, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) Regulations under subsection (4)(b) may not provide for the following to come into force before 1 January 2030—

(a) section 38(4), in respect of the insertion of Condition 1 in section 20(1A) of the Pensions Act 2008 (Master Trusts to be subject to scale requirement);

(b) section 38(8), in respect of the insertion of section 26(7A) of that Act (group personal pension schemes to be subject to scale requirement)

(but nothing in this subsection prevents section 38 from being brought into force before that date in respect of the insertion in that Act of other provision related to that mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b)).”

This amendment ensures that schemes will not be legally subject to the scale requirement before 1 January 2030. It allows, however, for provision relating to that requirement (e.g., provision around applications for approval) to be commenced before that date in anticipation of the requirement itself taking effect.

Amendment 228, in clause 101, page 98, line 34, at end insert—

“(5A) If section 38 has not been brought into force before the end of 2035 in respect of the insertion of—

(a) Condition 2 in section 20(1A) of the Pensions Act 2008 (asset allocation requirement: Master Trusts), and

(b) subsection (7B) in section 26 of the Pensions Act 2008 (asset allocation requirement: group personal pension schemes),

section 38 is repealed at the end of that year in respect of the insertion of those provisions.”

This amendment transposes and clarifies the provision currently in clause 38(16). It provides for the key provisions imposing the asset allocation requirement to fall away if they are not brought into force before the end of 2035.

Amendment 242, in clause 101, page 98, line 37, at beginning insert—

“( ) Chapter 1 of Part 4 comes into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.

( ) Chapter 2 of”.

This amendment provides for the commencement of the new Chapter relating to the consequences of the Virgin Media case .

Amendment 243, in clause 101, page 99, line 5, after “section 96” insert

“and (Information to be given to pension schemes by employers)”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment provides for the commencement of NC20.

Clause 101, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

I also thank all hon. Members, Committee Clerks and officials, and our Doorkeeper team.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting)

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 11th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

The Opposition support the clauses and welcome the action to legislate formally for defined-benefit superfunds. Securing this in a legislative framework will give trustees and sponsors greater confidence when considering this new consolidation option for defined-benefit schemes. The measures build on the consultation conducted under the previous Government, as well as the intention that the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt), laid out in his 2023 Mansion House speech.

Superfunds are capital-backed consolidators that allow defined-benefit schemes to shift liabilities away from the sponsoring employer, thereby enhancing the security of members’ benefits. By transferring pension obligations to a superfund, companies can reduce long-term liabilities and refocus on core operations, while maintaining strong protection for retirees. Superfunds offer a new endgame strategy for DB schemes unable to secure an insurance buy-out, helping to safeguard member benefits in underfunded or marginal schemes. These measures all seem reasonable, and as I said, this work started under the previous Government, so we wholeheartedly support it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 52 to 56 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 57

Prohibition of unapproved superfund transfers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Torsten Bell]

Chapter 3 sets out the criteria for approving superfund transfers. The clause protects the integrity of the superfund regime that we are aiming to put in place through the Bill by making it clear that the penalty for committing an unauthorised superfund transfer may be a fine, imprisonment for up to two years, or both. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 57 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58

Approval of superfund transfers

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

Before a 2022 High Court ruling, it was widely accepted that the Pensions Ombudsman had the status of a competent court, so that a Pensions Ombudsman determination alone would be sufficient for a pension scheme to recoup an overpayment from a member’s pension. The ruling called that into question. Clause 93 simply reinstates the original policy intent that the ombudsman’s determination in pension overpayment dispute cases is sufficient. That is what was debated in Parliament when the ombudsman was established in 1931. Without this legislation, a large additional burden would be imposed on an already stretched county court system.

Turning to clause 94, being diagnosed with life-limiting illness can cause unimaginable suffering for a person and their loved ones. Those nearing the end of their life should be able to access the financial support that they need at that difficult time. I am pleased that we are now able to introduce this clause to amend the definition of terminal illness in the Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme legislation.

Terminal illness is currently defined as where a member’s death from a progressive disease can be reasonably expected within six months. Clause 94 extends that to within 12 months. These new arrangements may enable a few more affected members to claim a payment, but they will mostly enable members to receive payments at an earlier stage of their illness. That small change could make a big impact for affected members at a very difficult time.

Clause 95 covers another aspect of the Pension Protection Fund: its levy. Improved scheme funding of the PPF means that it is far less reliant on the levy than it was previously. For the 2025-26 financial year, the levy has been set at £45 million, its lowest rate. However, the current legislation restricts the PPF board from increasing the levy by more than 25% of the previous year’s levy. That has made it risky for the PPF to reduce the levy significantly, even when it is not needed, because it could take several years to restore it to the previous levels if required. Clause 95 gives the board greater flexibility to adjust the levy by amending the safeguard. The new safeguard will be to prevent the board from charging a levy that is more than the sum of the previous year’s levy and 25% of the previous year’s levy ceiling.

Clause 96 focuses on pensions dashboards. Current legislation does not allow the PPF to provide to pensions dashboards information about the compensation that people can expect, or for the display of that information. The clause expands the scope of pensions dashboards to include information relating to compensation from the PPF and financial assistance from the financial assistance scheme, and it could benefit around 140,000 people. I commend clauses 93 to 96 to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

I will be incredibly brief. We have heard a number of details from the Minister. Clauses 93 to 96 contain what we believe are sensible and welcome amendments that reflect current market and scheme conditions. In particular, the changes related to the Pension Protection Fund are positive. With a strong funding position in many defined benefit schemes recently and the PPF’s healthy reserves exceeding £14 billion, these legislative changes are timely. The industry strongly supports the option for a zero levy, which reduces financial pressure on well-funded schemes. The Opposition wholeheartedly support these clauses.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

The Liberal Democrats welcome the direction of travel. As the shadow Minister identified, the industry has demanded some elements of the clauses, but they are mostly about supporting consumers. The end users of these services should be a key element of what the Bill is about.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Milne]

This is really about trying to place the Minister’s attention on this important issue—we will not press the new clause to a vote. It is about focusing the Minister’s mind on the task at hand. The undersaving groups include, but are not limited to, women, ethnic minority groups and others affected by long-term pay or pension gaps. The new clause would provide mechanisms to fund and deliver targeted support.

New clause 41 is designed to put a cap or ceiling on the amount of free advice accessed by any individual saver. It is a subset of new clause 1. Some individuals have very complicated financial affairs, which threaten to take a disproportionate amount of effort to decipher, in the event that we were to provide free advice. Those individuals will tend to be much better off and with multiple pension pots, which is precisely why they will end up needing more advice. Placing a ceiling on the advice available would ensure that the free advice was targeted only at those who needed it most.

New clause 43 is a potential solution to the information deficit that we are trying to address. It would enable auto-enrolment into Pension Wise as the vehicle for giving advice. We tabled it as a probing amendment to provoke the Minister’s consideration. The purpose of the new clause is to help people properly understand and engage with their pension by auto-enrolment into Pension Wise advice at key stages, with the freedom to opt out. Pension Wise guidance is free, impartial and has very high satisfaction rates—94%—among those who have used it, yet uptake remains strangely low, which is an excellent illustration of exactly why the whole advice area needs urgent attention.

Government data shows that of those who have accessed defined-contribution pension pots, only 14% have done so after receiving Pension Wise advice. That is despite various efforts, including a stronger nudge to encourage taking guidance before pots are accessed. Wake-up packs and other communications have shown limited effectiveness, and the evidence shows that savers will need more than passive information; they need action-oriented support.

If anything, the situation is getting worse. The proportion of pensions accessed after receiving guidance or advice has reduced by around 9 percentage points since 2021-22. Evidence from the DWP’s 2022 research shows that although most people start saving for retirement in their 20s and 30s, many do not start planning for retirement until their 50s. Auto-enrolment into guidance would therefore significantly increase take-up and improve retirement outcomes for many. Defined-contribution scheme members, in particular, often lack clear information about their options; Pension Wise would help fill that gap.

New clause 43 leaves flexibility for the Secretary of State to determine the appropriate ages, processes and notification methods. We recognise that it would be a significant move, and that there would be technical issues to solve. That is why we have tabled it only as a probing new clause, to explore whether the Government will look at trials or further measures to boost guidance uptake. Auto-enrolment into a pension scheme has been a great success, so perhaps the next logical step is auto-enrolment into advice. Why not try it?

[Mark Garnier]

I am keen to speak to these Liberal Democrat new clauses, because we have a fundamental problem. Research by Pensions UK shows that more than 50% of savers will fail to reach their retirement income targets set by the 2005 Pensions Commission, and closing the gap between what people are saving and what they will need must be a pressing concern of any Government. So, we need the second part of the pensions review to be fast-tracked, with a laser-like focus on pensions adequacy.

This takes me back to when I first became a Member of Parliament some 14 or 15 years ago. The big issue at the time in the independent financial advisers market was the retail distribution review. My hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire (Dame Harriett Baldwin) and I held our first Backbench Business debate on the retail distribution review, and it is recorded in Hansard that we predicted this would be a problem as a result—fewer independent financial advisers being available to give advice.

There were three key elements of the retail distribution review. They were very well-intended, and let us not beat about the bush: there were reasons why they were brought about. One of them was intended to raise the professional standards of independent financial advisers, and I think we would all agree that that has to be a good thing. The advisers complained at the time because they did not want to take exams. If they had been in the business for 40 years, why would they feel that they needed to take an exam? But why should they not improve their standards? There were issues to do with lifetime liability—advisers’ taking responsibility beyond seven years for advice that they had given, which was very contentious. Also there was clarity on the models of advice being given.

However, the key element that caused the problems was where independent financial advisers, prior to that moment, were being paid a commission on the product that was being sold, which potentially led to product bias. If a commission was being paid at 2.5% on one product and 1% on another, the independent financial adviser would have a material interest in selling that higher-commission product, even if it was a worse product. That could have been dealt with by having a maximum commission rate on all the products; it could have been set at 100 or 150 basis points, which would have dealt with that problem. We saw this issue in the London stock exchange until 1986, when there were fixed rates of commission, so nobody could undercut another broker by providing cheaper dealing measures. We therefore knew it could work.

The direct result of all this was that when the retail distribution review was brought in by the FCA in January 2013, we saw a massive drop in the 35,000 independent financial advisers. That has since recovered, and we now have around 36,000 advisers. The important point is that a financial adviser who goes out to persuade somebody to take advice on their pension now needs to charge a fee. Before that, to the person receiving the advice, the financial adviser would appear to be doing it for nothing. There would be an agreement, so it would be transparent and they would know exactly what was going on.

However, the point is that now, if I am being asked to put money into a pension fund and I know I am paying the 1.5%, the fact that the commission is coming out of the money going in feels much less restrictive than being sent a bill for £1,500 or £2,000. That is much more difficult to meet, even though it comes to the same point in the end. The result of this is that, whereas about 50% of people used to put money into pensions and receive financial advice, the number is now 9%.

There are an awful lot of newly elected Members of Parliament here. After 10 or 15 years, they will find themselves in a Bill Committee making these points and saying, “We told you this would be a problem. We told you so, yet here we are trying to resolve a problem that we knew was going to happen, and we allowed it to.” I am very cynical about Parliament sometimes, as all Members will be eventually. The important point is that the Liberal Democrat new clauses are an attempt to deal with the problems that we knew would come about. Auto-enrolment is brilliant—we really like auto-enrolment—but there are various things coming in under this Bill. We have to be careful that the things we bring in with the best intentions do not end up creating bigger problems due to unforeseen circumstances.

If the Liberal Democrats pressed new clause 1, we would happily support it, as it is a good amendment. It will be interesting to see if that comes through, but this is something we have to get right. People need to get advice because far too many people are going to go barrelling into their 67th birthday, or whatever it is, and suddenly discover that they have run out of money, and that is not a good place to be.

Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting)

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

It is a pleasure to serve under you today, Ms McVey. We recommence our consideration of the small pots part of the Bill. I thank all Members for their engagement during the sittings last week.

Clause 27 is fundamental. It allows regulations to be made to create an authorisation and supervisory framework for pension schemes to become authorised consolidators. This framework will allow master trusts to apply to the Pensions Regulator to become authorised, on the basis that they meet certain conditions and standards, including the value for money test we discussed at length last Thursday.

The clause also ensures ongoing oversight. If a scheme no longer meets the standards, regulations can enable the Pensions Regulator to step in to require the trustees to take prescribed steps and, ultimately, to withdraw authorisation if necessary. That ensures better outcomes, not just fewer pension pots. The clause represents a vital safeguard in the small pots framework.

Clause 28 provides a definition of a “consolidator scheme” and “consolidator arrangement”. A “consolidator scheme” can either be an authorised master trust or a Financial Conduct Authority-regulated pension scheme that appears on a designated list published by the FCA. A “consolidator arrangement” refers to a specific part of the scheme that is intended to receive small pots.

This reflects the structure of pension providers that operate in the UK. Some pension providers offer multiple arrangements within their scheme whereas others may have a single arrangement or offering. The clause caters for both scenarios to ensure that regulators can focus on the particular arrangements that will require authorisation.

To simplify: in practice, all schemes will be authorised by specific arrangement, but there will be some occasions where schemes may only have a single arrangement so the whole scheme will be authorised. By having at least one authorised arrangement, schemes or providers will be authorised consolidators.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

This is a very uncontentious and highly technical part of the Bill. We have no objections to any of these provisions and so will be supporting them.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, I echo that this is a direction of travel that we welcome. The vast majority of the proposals that are before us today are uncontentious. They follow the correct direction of travel in growth and change that we want to see in our pensions system in the United Kingdom.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29

Further provision about contents of small pots regulations

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 29 will make the small pot consolidation framework work in practice, through allowing the small pots regulations to cover a range of operational, administrative, data protection and consumer protection matters. It enables the Pensions Regulator to charge a fee for authorisation and gives applicants the right to appeal if their application is refused. Regulations will be able to require trustees and scheme managers to maintain and improve records, and they will protect members from high transfer fees. The clause enables the delegation of functions and powers to the Pensions Regulator, the FCA and the small pots data platform operator. It ensures that data protection and privacy obligations are respected, while allowing necessary data processing to support the scheme’s efficient operation.

The clause will allow the Government to amend existing legislation to support the small pots consolidation framework. Examples of uses of the power include giving the Pensions Ombudsman new powers to investigate member complaints, and ensuring that the small pots data platform is properly funded through the general levy. Pensions law is complex and technical, and needs to evolve with time, so the Government need the flexibility to respond to those changes and regulators’ operational experience without having to table a new Bill every time.

The Bill clearly sets out the multiple default consolidator framework. With targeted amendments, the clause will allow us to fine-tune the framework over time, ensuring operational effectiveness. Any use of so-called Henry VIII powers will be subject to the affirmative procedure. The clause is essential for the practicality, reliability and integrity of the small pots consolidation framework to ensure it is fit for purpose now and for the future.

The Government amendments to the clause are purely technical drafting improvements. Amendment 36 clarifies that appeal rights for schemes are not limited solely to decisions regarding an application for authorisation, so one could appeal on other grounds. Amendment 37 provides further clarity on the liability framework that will be established to ensure that members are protected. It makes it clear that the small pots data platform operator or the trustees or managers of a relevant pension scheme can be made responsible for paying compensation to an individual who has suffered a loss as a result of a breach of the small pots regulations. Amendments 38 to 40 take account of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, which was passed by Parliament subsequent to the introduction of this Bill. The amendments do not alter the policy, and I ask the Committee to support them.

[Mark Garnier]

Again, this is all very technical and rather dry.

[Torsten Bell]

It’s very exciting!

[Mark Garnier]

Perhaps it is exciting for those who enjoy dry reading. We in the Opposition have no objections.

Amendment 36 agreed to.

Amendments made: 37, in clause 29, page 27, line 30, leave out—

“a relevant person, other than the FCA,”

and insert—

“the small pots data platform operator or the trustees or managers of a relevant pension scheme”.

This amendment ensures that the FCA cannot be required to pay compensation under small pots regulations.

Amendment 38, in clause 29, page 27, line 39, leave out “Subject to subsection (4),”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39.

Amendment 39, in clause 29, page 28, line 3, leave out subsection (4).

This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.

Amendment 40, in clause 29, page 28, leave out lines 8 and 9.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39.

Clause 29, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30

Enforcement by the Pensions Regulator

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 41.

Clause 31 stand part.

Government amendment 42.

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 30 seeks to ensure that the rules and conditions set by the regulations are, in practice, followed. These regulations can allow the Pensions Regulator to issue three types of notices: a compliance notice, requiring a person to take specific steps to comply; a third-party compliance notice, directing someone to ensure another party’s compliance; and a penalty notice, imposing a financial penalty for non-compliance or a breach of the regulations. If a scheme fails to comply with the regulations or with a notice issued under them, the Pensions Regulator can impose a financial penalty capped at £10,000 for individuals and £100,000 in other cases. The clause also enables regulations to provide for appeals to the first-tier or upper tribunal, ensuring procedural fairness and accountability. All those are standard approaches to pensions legislation.

Clause 31 gives the Treasury the power to make regulations to enable the FCA to monitor and enforce compliance with the small pots consolidation framework for contract-based schemes. It ensures that the FCA can act decisively to protect consumers and uphold the integrity of the system. Clauses 30 and 31 ensure consistent standards across the pensions market as we look to enforce these measures. Any regulations made under clause 31 must go through the affirmative procedure, ensuring parliamentary oversight.

Amendments 41 and 42 seek to clarify the definition of the term “FCA regulated” when referring to an authorised person in the context of the legislation. The amendments seek to provide greater clarity by ensuring harmony and removing any ambiguity between clause 30(1) and clauses 31 and 34. They ensure that the Pensions Regulator is not inadvertently prevented from regulating a trustee of a pension scheme solely because that trustee is also regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in a separate capacity. The amendments are purely technical clarifications, and I ask the Committee to support them. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

Again, I have no real comments, apart from to ask the Minister, perhaps when winding up, if he could explain how the Government came to the penalty levels of £10,000 for individuals and £100,000 for others. It would be useful to understand what the thinking was behind that.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

My question was not dissimilar to the shadow Minister’s question on the amounts of the penalties—£10,000 for an individual and £100,000 in any other case. There is no delegated authority to raise it beyond those levels. There is an ability to set the amounts, provided they do not go above those. Would the process have to be in primary legislation should the Government wish to raise it above those levels? I am not generally in favour of a level of delegated authority, but if we end up in a situation where inflation is out of control, £10,000 may not seem a significant amount for an individual and £100,000 may not seem significant for a larger organisation. They may not be enough to prevent people or create the level of disincentive we wish to see. Have the Government looked at whether £10,000 and £100,000 are the right amounts?

On the clarification about FCA regulation, and the fact that if somebody is FCA regulated in another capacity, it may stop them from being subject to this, it is absolutely sensible that the Government have tabled the amendments. I am happy to support the changes and the clauses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

The clause provides the flexibility, as I have just said, to increase or decrease the threshold without requiring new primary legislation, enabling the Government to move quickly and efficiently as developments—whether it be wage growth or changes in contribution patterns—change our pensions landscape. Under the clause, any change to the pot limit must always be approved by Parliament through the affirmative procedure, something that we also discussed last week.

The Government are committed to engaging with industry and consumer groups to ensure any adjustments are evidence-based and informed by the relevant data at the time, enabling us to consider wider impacts such as market competition. Under clause 32, the Secretary of State must undertake public consultation, publish details of the proposed amendments and the reasons for making the proposal, and consider any representations made—putting flesh on the bones on the kind of review that would take place, as we have just discussed.

New clause 36 seeks to introduce a new provision to the Bill, which would establish a “pot follows member” model for pension consolidation. The new clause proposes that, on changing employment, an individual’s pension pot would automatically transfer into their new workplace’s pension scheme. This proposal is not aligned with the Government’s established policy direction, and it would present significant practical and operational challenges, although I recognise that that approach has been discussed extensively over the last 20 years. The approach taken in the Bill has been shaped through extensive engagement and formal consultation with industry, regulators and consumer groups. As part of that policy development work, largely under the last Government, they and we carefully considered the “pot follows member” approach, including its potential benefits and risks. Our impact assessment shows that the multiple default consolidator solution in the Bill is projected to deliver greater net benefits. The evidence in the impact assessment supports our view that that route offers the best value for savers and for the system as a whole.

New clause 36 would require a fundamental overhaul of the current framework that the Bill seeks to introduce. It is not consistent with the rest of the Bill. It would introduce a parallel mechanism that risks duplicating effort, creating confusion and undermining the coherence of the consolidation system. Two of its main downsides are significant administrative barriers for employers, if employees choose to opt out, and the risk that pots are transferred into schemes that offer poor value for money—or, at least, poorer value for money than the ones they are sitting in before they move between employers. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Wyre Forest not to press new clause 36.

Clause 33 makes it clear that the small dormant pots consolidation measures in this chapter apply equally to pension schemes run by or on behalf of the Crown and to Crown employees, as we have discussed previously. Clause 34 provides clear definitions for key terms used throughout the small pots legislation to ensure clarity and consistency of interpretation, and clause 35 provides a definition of what constitutes a pension pot. That might be thought to be straightforward, but for the purposes of small pots consolidation we want to provide clarity on the accurate identification and treatment of individual pension pots. To provide an example, if someone is enrolled into the same pension scheme through more than one job and the scheme keeps the accounts separate, each is treated as a separate pension pot so that they can be consolidated together.

As Members will be aware, the Pensions Regulator oversees the trust-based schemes and the Financial Conduct Authority oversees contract-based schemes. Clause 36 amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to ensure that the FCA has the powers required to support the small pots consolidation framework through the existing financial regulatory system. This is a vital enabling provision to provide the FCA with the necessary statutory powers to regulate contract-based schemes that wish to act as authorised consolidators in the years ahead. It allows the FCA to make rules requiring pension providers to notify them if they intend to act as a consolidator pension scheme, and it allows the FCA to maintain a list of consolidator schemes and to apply appropriate regulatory standards to them.

More broadly, clause 36 ensures that members of FCA-regulated pension schemes benefit from the same level of protection, transparency and accountability as those in the trust-based system, while also avoiding regulatory gaps and ensuring that all consolidator schemes, regardless of their structure or legal framework, are subject to robust oversight.

Consistent with my arguments on clause 36, clause 37 repeals unused provisions of the Pensions Act 2014 related to automatic transfers, also known as “pot follows member”. This is tidying up the statute book. It was the previous Government who initially legislated for “pot follows member”, but they then decided that that was not the policy they wished to pursue and moved away from it between 2014 and 2024. The amendment recognises that and makes sure we do not have powers on the statute book that confuse the situation.

Finally, Government amendment 43 is a minor and technical amendment necessitated by the repeal of schedule 17 to the Pensions Act 2014 by clause 37(1)(b) of the Bill. The amendment is necessary to update the statute book and clarify a reference in section 256 of the Pensions Act 2004, which otherwise would have been unclear and was making hon. Members nervous. The amendment does not alter policy, and I ask the Committee to support it. I commend clauses 32 to 37 to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

I will speak to our new clause 36. I am grateful to the Minister for his comments; I will come to those in a minute. The Government dropped plans for the lifetime provider or “pot for life” model, which would have allowed individuals to direct all workplace pension contributions into a single, personally chosen pension pot throughout their career. That was first proposed by the Conservative Government. Although we appreciate that the initial lifetime pot model has not had support from the current Government or, to be fair, from the industry, we believe there is much merit in exploring a model that would allow for pensions to follow individuals between jobs. The new clause would ensure that fragmented small pots are not left as workers move between jobs. By changing our current proposals from a lifetime pot to a magnetic pot proposal where the pot follows the individual, we hope we can bring down some of the administrative costs of the initial lifetime pot proposal.

Our new clause 36 will provide for a pension pot that would follow members from job to job, consolidating with each new workplace scheme rather than relying on a single lifetime provider. This approach could reduce fragmentation while retaining the advantages of employer oversight and collective governance. This would have similarities with the Australian system, where a person can staple to their first chosen pension provider so that it follows them from job to job. That helps to reduce the administrative burden on individuals and the number of small pots, and that can reduce costs for consumers and help the overall consolidation of the market. These changes have been backed by some in the industry, including Hargreaves Lansdown, which has said that having a single pot would simplify someone’s pension investment, bringing transparency and clarity. It has said that for those who move jobs frequently, a single pension pot would be invaluable.

The Minister made a couple of points. The first was about the substantial overhaul of the system to be able to deliver reform. Although I appreciate that this may be outside the scope of the Bill, we should not worry about substantial overhauls to make things better for people who are saving for their retirement. It is incredibly important that we get this right. Just because it is a lot of work does not necessarily mean it is a bad thing to do, so I urge him to think about it.

The Minister made a very important point: somebody could move from one job to another and find that their pension moves from a fund that offers good value for money and is performing well to a fund that is performing worse. But exactly the opposite is also the case. If somebody frequently changes jobs, the law of averages and statistics means that over their lifetime they will get the average rate, which means they do not get stuck in one or the other. One would cancel the other out—it is a maths problem.

The Minister has made his points. This is not something we want to press, but we feel very strongly that the Treasury and Treasury Ministers should think very carefully about it, because, as I say, hard work is not a reason not to do the right thing. There is much more support from the industry for the magnetic pot rather than the lifetime pot, which stays with one provider.

[Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. As a proud Englishman, it is not often that I admit the Australians are better than us at something. I am talking not about cricket, but about the immensely important issue of pensions adequacy. The Australians do it better, and what underpins their success is the super stapling model, a system that fundamentally changes how savers interact with their pensions. That is why our new clause 36 seeks to follow in Australian footsteps by establishing a model that would automatically amalgamate pension pots through an individual’s working life. Although I recognise and commend the Government’s work on small pot consolidation, I believe that real engagement and adequacy benefit lies in moving towards a lifetime pension pot model. It is a bolder, more engaging and more adequate model that would benefit pension funds and savers alike.

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[Torsten Bell]

It was self-professed weak patriotism. But the hon. Gentleman is completely right to raise the adequacy issue, which is obviously the role of the Pensions Commission, launched in July, to take forward. He and several others are also right to say that making things easier for savers is a really important objective. That is what the pensions dashboard aims to do in the coming years as well.

Let me make a set of reflections directly on the question being raised. To be clear, the policy in 2014 was “pot follows member”. That is also the policy within new clause 36. The policy being more supported here is a lifetime pot, which is a different policy. The “pot follows member” is still that the employer chooses the pension scheme and the pot moves to the new employer’s scheme as the employee goes, so it is still an employer-to-a-single-scheme model. The lifetime provider model, also advocated by many in the industry but never part of Government policy—it was not in the 2014 Act—is that each individual holds a pension pot, and, on joining an employer, provides the details of that scheme to the employer, and the employer then pays to multiple pension schemes whenever it does its PAYE.

The comments I made refer to the “pot follows member” approach. There is a consensus across the industry that that is not the right way to go; I totally hear the points made in favour of a lifetime provider model. That is not the approach being taken forward by this Bill, but it needs to be kept under review in the longer term. I give hon. Members the reassurance that I will continue to do that.

[Mark Garnier]

I think the Minister has got this the wrong way round. It was the lifetime pot, which was being paid into as people went around, that the industry did not like, because that was administratively quite difficult. The stapled pot—stapled to the lapel, or whatever, to be dragged around like the Australian one—is what we are proposing this time round, which is the new version that the industry does agree with. I think the Minister might have got his notes upside down.

[Torsten Bell]

Never! No. We should clarify what we mean by “industry”: in a lifetime provider model, employers take on a significantly greater administrative burden, because they have to engage with potentially every pension scheme in the country. Admittedly, we are limiting the number of those in future, but still, that is what employers find burdensome about a lifetime provider model. That was the preferred model of the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) when he was Chancellor, but it was never actioned as Government policy.

As I said before, the 2014 Act was about “pot follows member”—for good reason, to try to address the small pots worry. I hope that that at least reassures the hon. Gentleman that my notes were the right way up.

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Other amendments are more general, ensuring that the legal wiring works between different parts of the legislation, improving legal language or removing any language that is unnecessary. I commend these technical amendments to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

I would like to speak to the wider clause before coming to our amendments. It is important to get on the record that this is a very bad clause. The Minister mentioned asset allocation, and this measure, which is known as mandation, has gone down incredibly badly with the pensions industry.

Mandation risks undermining the core obligation of trustees, which is to act in the best interests of savers. Pension savings reflect decades of work and are not an abstract figure on a balance sheet—they are the hope of a secure future for millions of people. Trustees and fund managers bear a legal responsibility to protect and grow these savings, investing wisely where the best opportunities may be found. Their role is not to follow political direction but to uphold the trust placed in them and the fiduciary duty they owe, which is the foundation of confidence in the pension system.

As has been said in multiple responses to the Bill, clause 38 as currently written undermines the UK’s reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment. When trustees select investments, they must find the safest and strongest options for beneficiaries. Can we even be confident that the Government will be able to provide a pipeline of investment opportunities? Pension funds could end up being forced to fight against each other for a selection of low-performing assets. If these powers are used, it changes accountability. If mandated investments fail, is it the trustees or the Government who should answer for those losses? Savers deserve clarity about who ultimately protects their hard-earned pension pots.

It has been said that this merely provides the powers to do mandation and does not necessarily force firms to do this, but I will come to that later. Our amendment 275 highlights the fact that there is a political party, whose Members are not in attendance here, which has already said that if it gets into government—and, let’s face it, it has a fighting chance—it will mandate pension funds to invest in the UK water industry in order to support the Government renationalising the UK water industry.

I would like to highlight some of the issues that have been raised. The Pensions Management Institute has said:

“this provision sets a dangerous precedence for Government interference in the fiduciary duty of trustees to act in members’ best financial interests.”

Pensions UK has said:

“this ambition is subject to fiduciary duties and is dependent on supporting actions by Government, namely that there will need to be a strong pipeline of investable UK assets. Without this, schemes will be competing against each other for the same assets, which risks asset bubbles and poor value for money.”

The Investment Association has said:

“It comes with significant risks for members in the form of capital being poorly allocated if political preferences take priority over member needs. Any resulting poor investment outcomes will be borne by the member. By creating the risk of political interference in capital allocation, the power undermines the UK’s global reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment”.

Which? has said that this measure

“may result in schemes making worse or riskier investment decisions that may not be in the best long-term financial interests of savers.”

Aviva has said:

“as currently drafted in Section 28C, the power in the Bill goes far beyond this policy intent and the scope of the Accord, with very limited constraints on how, and under what circumstances, the requirements could be introduced.”

The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries has said:

“We are concerned about the introduction of investment mandation powers, and potential interference of those powers—or their threatened use—with trustees’ fiduciary duties.”

Unison has said:

“We have significant concerns about these clauses. Fiduciaries are best placed to set the correct balance between asset classes, and equities have liquidity, governance, transparency of pricing, equality of treatment between investors, and other advantages for pension funds.”

Finally, the Association of British Insurers said:

“A mandation reserve power would undermine trust in the pension system and create a risk of political interference in capital allocation, which would undermine the UK’s reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment.”

I understand that this is a reserve power of mandation, but it sets a very bad precedent, so we will oppose the clause.

[The Chair]

Do you wish to speak to the specific, technical amendments?

[Mark Garnier]

We have no objection to the technical amendments, but we will oppose the whole clause.

[Steve Darling]

We have no issue with the technical amendments. However, for us the crucial issue in the Bill is driving an environment of positive investment, and a system in the United Kingdom that individual investors—as in, would-be pensioners—can believe in.

The mandation element causes concern. As has been alluded to, there are assumptions that Ministers are reasonable people; however, we do not have to look that far across the Atlantic ocean to see politicians behaving unreasonably. It concerns us as Liberal Democrats that giving powers in the Bill without clear management of them is potentially a step too far. While the Minister, and other Ministers in the current Government, may be reasonable, who knows what is coming down the line in a very turbulent political system?

We therefore continue to have grave concerns around mandation, and look forward to hearing what assurances the Minister is able to give. The key outcome for us is making sure that there is a stable pensions system in which people can have confidence, because confidence is crucial for driving the positive investment that I am sure everybody in this room wants to see.

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[Torsten Bell]

I offer reassurance, as we will shortly come to the end of the amendments for substantive debate.

This group of amendments deals with the main scale default arrangement, along with the scale test and penalties. The MSDA is the pool of investments against which scale will be assessed. As I mentioned, the definition of that is obviously central to the effective enforcement of the scale requirements.

Key among these amendments are Government amendments 72 and 91, which set out some of the details of the MSDA for master trusts and group personal pensions, including that it can be used for the purposes of one or more pension schemes, and that the assets held within it are those of members who have not chosen how they are invested. Regulations will be made that cover other matters, including the meaning of “common investment strategy”. The details we set out in these amendments reflect the invaluable input we received from pension providers and regulatory bodies.

The remaining amendments in the group relating to the MSDA largely clarify how it fits into the wider approval requirements in the new sections 28A and 28B.

Moving on to scale, Government amendments 69 and 85 clarify the circumstances in which assets held by connected master trusts and group personal pension schemes, or where the same provider runs a GPP and master trust, can count towards the scale test. This is to ensure that, where appropriate, assets managed under a common investment strategy where there is a family connection between the master trust and GPP scheme, and where they are used for the same purpose, can be added together to achieve the £25 billion requirement.

Government amendment 71 ensures that the provisions governing penalties are consistent between the TPR and the FCA. Government amendment 90 ensures that regulations can provide for appeals to the tribunal in respect of penalties under regulations under new section 28C(9)(c).

Amendment 63 agreed to.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 250, in clause 38, page 37, line 12, at end insert

“or

(c) the relevant Master Trust meets the innovation exemption requirement.”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 251, in clause 38, page 37, line 16, at end insert—

“(3A) A relevant Master Trust meets the innovation exemption requirement if the Trust can demonstrate that it provides specialist or innovative services.

(3B) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for a definition of ‘specialist or innovative services’ for the purposes of this section.”

Amendment 252, in clause 38, page 39, line 11, at end insert

“or

(c) the relevant GPP meets the innovation exemption requirement.”

Amendment 253, in clause 38, page 39, line 15, at end insert—

“(3A) A relevant GPP meets the innovation exemption requirement if the Trust can demonstrate that it provides specialist or innovative services.

(3B) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for a definition of ‘specialist or innovative services’ for the purposes of this section.”

Amendments 250, 251, 252 and 253 create an innovation exemption for pension funds that provide specialist or innovative services, as part of the new entrants clause.

[Mark Garnier]

The Bill sets a minimum asset threshold of £25 billion for workplace pension schemes to operate as megafunds by 2030. This is not, in itself, particularly controversial, and we are all fully aware of the arguments about scale being effective when running pension funds. The requirement is intended to drive consolidation, improve economies of scale and boost investment in UK assets, but there is concern that such a high threshold could disadvantage boutique or niche funds or new entrants into the market that provide specialist services to cater for financially literate members who prefer a more tailored approach to their pension management. For example, Hargreaves Lansdown has highlighted that its £5 billion fund serves members who value investment autonomy and expertise. The risk is that the policy could reduce competition, limit consumer choice and stifle innovation by making it harder for smaller, specialist providers to operate or enter the market

Clause 38 provides little detail of the meaning of the “ability to innovate” and how “strong potential for growth” will be measured, but it is essential that the Bill provides a credible route to support innovation. If we tie the pensions market up by restricting it to a handful of large providers focused on back-book integration and building scale, there will be less space for innovation aimed at pension member engagement. The benefit of the existing market is that its diversity provides choice and creates competition, and competition is an important part of this. Smaller schemes are chosen by employers for specific reasons. If we lose that diversity and essentially create a handful of the same scheme propositions, employers and members will lose out on this benefit.

Realistically, it will be extremely challenging for new entrants to the market to have a chance of building the required scale. Our amendments create an innovation exemption for pension funds that provide specialist or innovative services as part of the new entrants clause. This will allow boutique or niche providers to continue operating if they demonstrate diversity in the market or serve a specific member need, even if they do not meet the £25 billion threshold.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Amendments 250 to 253, as well as Government amendment 113, which we will discuss later, clarify the word “innovation” and look at how best to define it. There are two different approaches from the Government and the Opposition to what innovation means. I raised the issue of defining innovation on Second Reading, so I am glad that both parties are trying to clarify it here, but I am not entirely happy with the way in which the Government have chosen to do so.

When we come to Government amendment 113, I do not feel that the chosen definition of “innovative products” is necessarily right. There could be a way of working that is innovative not in the product but in the way people access the product. For example, some of the challenger banks that we have had coming up are not necessarily providing innovative products, but they provide innovative ways to access those products, and in some cases, their pitch is that they provide a better interface for people to use. I think there is potentially a niche in the market for innovative services rather than innovative products. Government amendment 113 perhaps ties too much to products, although it depends on what the definition of “products” is.

Obviously regulations will come in behind this that define “innovative”, but I think the pitch made by the Opposition for the addition of “or specialist” is helpful. “Innovative” suggests that it may be something new, whereas there could be specialist services that are not of that size but are specific to certain groups of people who value the service they are receiving, one that is very specific to their circumstances, and who would prefer that operation to keep running and to keep having access to it because of the specialist service that is provided.

I am concerned about Government amendment 113. My views are perhaps closer to the Conservatives’ amendment, but thinking particularly about services rather than the products, and the way in which the services are provided to people and the fact that there could be innovation in that respect. Also, as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said, there could be particular niche areas that do not need to be that size in order to provide a truly excellent service to perhaps a small group of people. It depends on how the Government define “innovative” and what the regulations may look like this, but I am inclined to support the Conservatives’ amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

I am not entirely happy with the Minister’s comments. I am slightly surprised, and I thought he might have listened a bit more carefully. We absolutely understand the economies of scale. A large, £25 billion pension fund can do amazing things. We are 100% behind that. We have not disagreed with that at all. However, I somehow feel myself listening to the Minister and hearing the reverse of the arguments we were making as we tried to allow new-entrant banks into the market after the financial crisis.

Those of a certain age—and the Minister turned 43 the other day, so he will remember the financial crisis—know that the problem was that a few very big banks were spreading the contagion. I remember being on the Treasury Committee and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards after the financial crisis, when we were trying to sort out Labour’s previous mess, and not a single ab initio banking licence had been issued for 100 years. The only way that companies could get into the banking market—as Virgin and Metro were doing—was by buying dormant banking licences. I remember having long conversations—successfully, as it turned out—in order to try to allow companies such as Starling into the market. I think that Starling received the first ab initio banking licence for 100 years.

Having learned over the past 10 or 15 years about the effects of having large scale only, we are now having an argument about potentially stifling the pensions equivalent of companies such as Starling, Metro, Revolut and other innovators coming into the pensions market. I was hoping that from debating the amendments I could be convinced that the Minister would take away the thinking behind what we have come up with: that innovation should be good, and that there should permanently be new, fresh blood coming through. However, I do not think that he has got it. I was not going to push the amendments to a vote, but I now feel motivated to do so.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to make a brief comment about the definition of “specialist”. I appreciate the Minister’s clarification about the default products provided, but there could be a sensible definition of “specialist” that included, for example, that if providers can demonstrate that over 75% of their members engage in the management of their pension fund every year, that would be a very specialist and well-liked service. I understand that the scale is incredibly important. However, if a provider can demonstrate that level of engagement in its pension scheme, because of its innovative product or service, I think it would be sensible to look at the scale requirements, even if that provider does not yet meet them.

The Opposition have kindly left it up to the Minister and the Government to define what “specialist” would be, so I will support the Opposition amendments on that matter. However, when we come to Government amendment 113, I will require some clarification from the Minister about the definition of “products”.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 10

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 6

Noes: 8

[Mark Garnier]

On a point of order, Ms McVey. Might it be easier, for brevity, if we vote on amendments 251 to 253 together?

[The Chair]

The amendments are consequential on amendment 250, so I cannot do that. I will now suspend the sitting while we consider how and whether to meet the hon. Gentleman’s request.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I will be brief. The link between the definition of a main scale default arrangement and the common investment strategy is key to ensuring that the scale requirements apply to the correct elements of a pension scheme. Amendments 70 and 84 provide more detail on how the power to define a common investment strategy may be used to provide further information on the Government’s meaning when referring to that term.

Amendment 97 removes the “common investment strategy” element from the definition of default funds to avoid confusion with how that term is used in the main scale default arrangement approval in new sections 28A and 28B. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

Amendment 70 agreed to.

Amendments made: 71 in clause 38, page 38, leave out lines 32 to 38 and insert—

“(d) permitting the Authority to impose, on a person who fails to comply with a requirement under paragraph (c), a penalty determined in accordance with the regulations that does not exceed £100,000;”.

This amendment ensures that the penalties language used in section 28A is consistent with that used in new section 28B.

Amendment 72, in clause 38, page 39, leave out lines 1 to 4 and insert—

“(12) In this section ‘main scale default arrangement’ means an arrangement—

(a) that is used for the purposes of one or more pension schemes, and

(b) subject to which assets of any one of those schemes must under the rules of the scheme be held, or may under those rules be held, if the member of the scheme to whom the assets relate does not make a choice as to the arrangement subject to which the assets are to be held.”

This amendment defines “main scale default arrangement” for the purposes of new section 28A.

Amendment 73, in clause 38, page 39, line 7, leave out “relevant”.

This amendment removes an unnecessary tag.

Amendment 74, in clause 38, page 39, line 10, after “requirement” insert—

“by reference to the main scale default arrangement”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 75, in clause 38, page 39, line 12, after “requirement” insert—

“by reference to a main scale default arrangement”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 76, in clause 38, page 39, line 16, leave out “subsection (6)” and insert “subsections (5) and (6)”.

This amendment adds a further cross reference to new section 28B(4).

Amendment 77, in clause 38, page 39, line 17, leave out “held in funds”.

This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for the sake of consistency.

Amendment 78, in clause 38, page 39, line 18, at end insert—

“(ia) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 79, in clause 38, page 39, line 20, leave out “held in funds”.

This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for the sake of consistency.

Amendment 80, in clause 38, page 39, line 24, at end insert—

“(ia) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 81, in clause 38, page 39, line 27, leave out “held in funds”.

This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for the sake of consistency.

Amendment 82, in clause 38, page 39, line 27, leave out—

“one (and only one) relevant”

and insert “a qualifying relevant”.

This amendment corrects a reference to a relevant Master Trust in new section 28B(4)(c) to take account of new section 28B(8).

Amendment 83, in clause 38, page 39, line 30, at end insert—

“(ia) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and”.

This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.

Amendment 84, in clause 38, page 39, leave out lines 38 and 39 and insert—

“(b) what it means for assets of a pension scheme to be managed under a ‘common investment strategy’ (including in particular provision defining that expression by reference to whether or how far the assets relating to each member of the scheme are allocated in the same proportion to the same investments).”

This amendment provides more detail as to how the power to define “common investment strategy” may be used.

Amendment 85, in clause 38, page 40, line 3, leave out from “(4)” to end of line 6 and insert—

“(a) a group personal pension scheme is ‘qualifying’ in relation to the GPP if the provider of the GPP is also the provider of the group personal pension scheme;

(b) a relevant Master Trust is ‘qualifying’ in relation to the GPP if the provider of the GPP is also the scheme funder or the scheme strategist in relation to the relevant Master Trust (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Pension Schemes Act 2017).”

This amendment clarifies the circumstances in which assets held by connected Master Trusts and group personal pension schemes can be counted for the purposes of the application of the scale test to a group personal pension scheme.

Amendment 86, in clause 38, page 40, line 19, leave out “relevant Master Trust or”.

This amendment removes an unnecessary reference to a relevant Master Trust.

Amendment 87, in clause 38, page 40, line 25, leave out—

“managers of the GPP that their”

and insert—

“provider of the GPP that its”.

This amendment replaces a reference to the “managers” of a GPP with “provider” (reflecting normal usage in relation to personal pension schemes).

Amendment 88, in clause 38, page 40, line 27, leave out “the managers” and insert “the provider”.

This amendment replaces a reference to the “managers” of a GPP with “provider” (reflecting normal usage in relation to personal pension schemes).

Amendment 89, in clause 38, page 40, line 35, leave out—

“considered by the Authority to have failed”

and insert “who fails”.

This amendment ensures consistency with the new language in section 28A.

Amendment 90, in clause 38, page 40, line 38, at end insert—

“(e) providing for the making of a reference to the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal in respect of the issue of a penalty notice or the amount of a penalty.”

This amendment ensures that regulations can make provision for appeals to the Tribunal in respect of penalties under regulations under new section 28C(9)(c).

Amendment 91, in clause 38, page 40, line 42, leave out from beginning to end of line 3 on page 41 and insert—

“(12) In this section ‘main scale default arrangement’ means an arrangement—

(a) that is used for the purposes of one or more pension schemes, and

(b) subject to which assets of any one of those schemes must under the rules of the scheme be held, or may under those rules be held, if the member of the scheme to whom the assets relate does not make a choice as to the arrangement subject to which the assets are to be held.” —(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment defines “main scale default arrangement” for the purposes of new section 28B.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 248, in clause 38, page 41, line 4, leave out from beginning to end of line 9 on page 43.

This amendment would remove the ability of the Government to set mandatory asset allocation targets for certain pension schemes, specifically requiring investments in UK productive assets such as private equity, private debt, and real estate.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 275, in clause 38, page 41, line 31, at end insert—

“(5A) A description of asset prescribed under subsection (4) may not be securities in any UK water company.”

This amendment would ensure that the prescribed percentage of asset allocation would not include assets in the water sector and fund trustees will not be compelled to allocate scheme assets to the water sector.

Amendment 249, in clause 38, page 45, line 3, leave out from beginning to end of line 27 on page 46.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 248.

New clause 4—Establishment of targeted investment vehicles for pension funds—

“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the establishment or facilitation of one or more investment vehicles through which pension schemes may invest for targeted social or economic benefit.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must specify the descriptions of targeted social or economic benefit to which the investment vehicles are to contribute, which may include, but are not limited to, investment in—

(a) projects that revitalise high street areas;

(b) initiatives demonstrating social benefit;

(c) affordable or social housing development.

(3) The regulations must make provision for—

(a) the types of pension schemes eligible to participate in such investment vehicles;

(b) the governance, oversight, and reporting requirements for the investment vehicles and participating pension schemes;

(c) the means by which the contribution of such investments to targeted social or economic benefit is measured and reported;

(d) the roles and responsibilities of statutory bodies, including the Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority, in authorising, regulating, or supervising such investment vehicles and the participation of pension schemes within them.

(4) The regulations may—

(a) make different provision for different descriptions of pension schemes, investment vehicles, or targeted social or economic benefits;

(b) provide for the pooling of assets from multiple pension schemes within such vehicles;

(c) require pension scheme trustees or managers to have regard to the availability and suitability of investment vehicles when formulating investment strategies, where consistent with—

(i) their fiduciary duties, and

(ii) the long-term value for money for members.

(5) In this Chapter, ‘pension scheme’ has the same meaning as in section 1(5) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.”

This new clause would allow the Secretary of State to establish investment funds to encourage investment in areas such as high streets, social housing and investments with clear social benefits.

[Mark Garnier]

Amendments 248 and 249 talk about removing mandation—something I spoke about when we debated clause 38, so I will not cover those amendments other than to say that it is something we feel strongly about. Amendment 275 concerns mandation with regard to the water industry. It comes as a result of an announcement from the leader of Reform about potentially using pension fund money to invest in Thames Water, and part of Reform’s manifesto talked about nationalising the water industry, but using pension fund money to own 50% of those holdings. To a certain extent, that is performative because we are talking about a specific sector. This amendment specifically talks about the water companies, but it could be carried forward to any other potentially nationalised sector.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bedford]

I will come on to some of those points later, so I will address them then.

[Mark Garnier]

This is rather strange, because I wanted to intervene on the intervention, but I hope that my hon. Friend will come on to the various other things that we have proposed. For example, we have proposed looking at the Maxwell rules, which are driving the incentive of pension fund trustees to invest in gilts because of the implications of volatile markets for balance sheets. We are trying to look at the wider regulation that is driving certain behaviour, and I hope that my hon. Friend will raise that in due course. We are 100% behind the Bill—not every single part of it, although the thrust is very good—but, as my hon. Friend will mention, there are areas that could be changed to achieve its aims.

[Mr Bedford]

I hope to address some of those points.

The Government are willing to take investment decisions out of the hands of pension fund trustees to force investments into projects that may be politically convenient for them, but may potentially lead to financial loss for members. They are directing investment on the backs of ordinary UK savers. When people save into a pension scheme, they are entrusting their future security to a system that is working supposedly for them and not for political gain. To answer the point made by the hon. Member for Hendon, rather than coercing trustees to follow conditions set by Ministers, would it not be better to create the right economic conditions to make trustees want to invest in the UK?

The last Conservative Government, through their Mansion House reforms and the work of my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash, brought in active commitment from the pension fund trustees who want to invest. We did not need to mandate that, and the Government should learn from that approach. Amendment 248 will preserve the fiduciary duty, but continue the trajectory to increase pension fund investment in the UK.

Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting)

Mark Garnier Excerpts

Tuesday 9th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Torsten Bell]

I will start with the Government amendments and then turn to new clause 32. The amendments relate to proposed new section 28C and specify more detail about the role of the regulator in over- seeing the granting and withdrawal of approvals under this section, including a penalty-making power where a provider does not comply with the relevant requirements, and a clarification to ensure that subsection (14) on the interaction of these provisions with scheme documentation operates as intended.

New clause 32 would require the Secretary of State to conduct an impact assessment—and I appreciate, as I am sure the Opposition will come to shortly, that it is an impact assessment for a particular purpose—before implementing any regulatory or policy change for defined-benefit schemes’ asset allocation. First, let me reassure the hon. Member for Wyre Forest that the Government have no plans to make such changes to defined-benefit schemes’ asset allocation. I reiterate that the reserved powers contained in the clause only relate to defined-contribution workplace schemes. There are no plans to change defined-benefit asset allocations through the Bill. Therefore, the new clause is not considered necessary, and I encourage the hon. Member not to press it. I am sure he will want to make some wider points about the changes in asset allocation within defined-benefit schemes, and their impact on the wider economy.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

I rise to speak to new clause 32, which looks at the effects of some of the changes on the UK gilt market. Defined-benefit pension schemes are major holders of UK Government bonds, with pension funds holding around 28% of the gilt market —the UK Government bond market—as of early 2022. Those investments provide stable, long-term funding for the UK Government and are essential to the functioning of the debt market.

Significant shift by DB schemes away from gilts and into equities—which, in itself, is not a bad thing, as long as it does not happen in a disorganised way, which could be prompted by policy changes—may reduce the demand for gilts, potentially increasing yields and destabilising the market. At the end of the day, if 28% of the ownership of the gilt market is taken away, somebody else needs to be found to buy it. Otherwise, there will be a falling market. We all know what a gilt crisis looks like for pension funds. The 2022 gilt crisis highlighted the market’s vulnerability to large and sudden sales by pension funds, which triggered a fire-sale spiral and required Bank of England intervention to stabilise prices. It was not a good day. The Debt Management Office and market experts have noted that the gilt market is highly reliant on pension fund investment, and any structural reduction in demand could impact Government borrowing costs and market stability.

The Office for Budget Responsibility has highlighted concern about the impact of a low gilt allocation scenario, which is likely if the Bill achieves the outcomes that the Government want. A low gilt allocation scenario would mean that pension sector allocation of gilt holdings would drop to 10% of GDP by around 2040, down from around 30% today. That in itself, all other things being equal, would result in an extra £22 billion of debt interest payments on the current gilt market. We are highly concerned that a wholesale move from the gilt market by the pension industry places even more burden on the Treasury to manage debt payment. As the deficit continues to grow, the Government must have laser focus on the impact on the gilt market in relation to how they fund Government debt.

The new clause introduces a requirement for an impact assessment before any regulatory or policy changes that could materially alter DB schemes’ asset allocations away from gilt. It should mandate consultation with the Debt Management Office and industry stakeholders to monitor and mitigate risk to market stability. We are not trying to stop the Government persuading pension funds into equities or other alternative investments, but we need a proper conversation with the Debt Management Office about what that means for the cost of Government borrowing, which could potentially be significant.

[Torsten Bell]

I will not speak for long. The hon. Member is absolutely right to say that defined-benefit schemes have been material buyers of gilts over a long period. The market is perhaps deeper and more robust than what some of his remarks might imply. There is a range of participants in our gilt markets. However, I take the point that pension schemes are one of them. Contributions such as those from the Office for Budget Responsibility are valuable in that debate, and I reassure him on two fronts. First, I know that he did not mean it quite like this, but the deficit is not growing this year; in fact, it is falling by around 1% of GDP, marking us out from some other countries. Secondly, he is absolutely right to say that the DMO should and does engage with market participants across a wide range of matters. However, on that basis, and on the basis that the Bill does not envisage changes in DB schemes’ asset allocations, I ask him to withdraw the new clause.

Amendment 98 agreed to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

This group of amendments deals with the transition pathway relief, which we touched on earlier in the context of support for innovation within the pension landscape.

First, amendments 108 and 109 amend proposed new section 28D so that, to be approved on the transition pathway, a master trust or group personal pension scheme respectively must produce a credible plan for meeting the scale requirements, before the end of the pathway. I should clarify what I said earlier, sorry—this is the transition pathway; we are not talking about the new entrant pathway.

In addition, via amendment 131, we are inserting new subsection (15A) into clause 38, to ensure that the pathway will expire five years after the scale requirements come into force. We accept that in certain circumstances schemes may need more time to reach scale, but we want the end destination—going back to our conversation about scale and certainty that scale will be achieved—to be clear. I commend these minor amendments to the Committee.

[Mark Garnier]

I thank the Minister for talking through the amendments. We understand the intention behind them, but we are worried that, as can often be the case, there may be an unintended consequence: the creation of a closed shop for master trusts. We do not want suddenly to find that, in trying to make a transition pathway, we end up making things more difficult because it has been interpreted in the wrong way. We are minded to oppose the amendments, but perhaps the Minister could instead give us his thoughts on how we can ensure that they do not get used the wrong way and that we do not end up with a closed shop of master trusts.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

I echo what the shadow Minister has just highlighted. We all want the reform that the Bill introduces, but we do not want what results from this process to be set up forever, with a lack of opportunity for change; I will talk a little further about that when we come to new clause 3. Some reassurance from the Minister that there is an opportunity for new entrants and innovation would be extremely welcome.

[Torsten Bell]

I apologise for my slip of the tongue at the start of my speech. This group of amendments deals with transition pathway relief. Here, in many cases we are talking about existing schemes that may not meet the £25 billion threshold, but which have a plausible path to that scale requirement over the following five years—I think that is a point of consensus across the Committee. That is what we are engaging with here. It is a reasonable approach to avoid a cliff edge, for exactly the reason that the shadow Minister set out.

[Mark Garnier]

I completely understand that. The question is, what is plausible? One man’s plausible might be another man’s impossible. That is the bit that we are worried about: how to ensure that someone is not squeezed out who otherwise could be in it.

[Torsten Bell]

I completely recognise that. Let me say a few words about how we have tried to balance those tests. We want to see the industry get to scale, and we want clarity about what the end point is, but we want to provide a pragmatic approach to how we get there. Balancing that is what drove us to the five-year approach, which is different from some of the earlier discussions in the pensions investment review about an earlier, harder deadline of 2030.

Within the Bill there is flexibility for regulators where people are just approaching the deadline or in other situations, to avoid difficult situations where people’s authorisation is put into question at short notice. That is important, but so is providing the clarity that they will be required to get to scale. It cannot be a never, never. It needs to be a pathway to a destination; it cannot just be a hope.

I think that we have taken a pragmatic, balanced approach, but I appreciate that others will have their views. There will be those in the industry who will worry that they may not be on track to meet those scale requirements, but that is in the nature of the beast of our saying that the industry needs to change. I appreciate that that will mean some change for some organisations. We have tried to be flexible and to take a pragmatic approach.

Amendment 108 agreed to.

Amendments made: 109, in clause 38, page 43, line 28, at end insert—

“, and

(b) has a credible plan in place for meeting the scale requirement within the meaning of section 28B(2).”

This amendment makes it a condition of approval for transition pathway relief that a group person pension scheme has a credible plan in place for meeting the scale requirement.

Amendment 110, in clause 38, page 43, line 33, leave out “authorisation” and insert “approval”.

This amendment is to ensure that new section 28D of the Pensions Act 2008 refers correctly to an approval under new section 28A or 28B of that Act.

Amendment 111, in clause 38, page 44, line 15, after “20(1A)” insert “or section 26(7C)(c)”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment corrects an omission so that new section 28E of the Pensions Act 2008 works effectively for group personal pension schemes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Edwards]

On that basis, I am happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 257, in clause 41, page 53, line 7, at end insert—

“117GA FCA guidance

(1) The FCA must issue guidance on contractual overrides.

(2) Guidance on contractual overrides must include—

(a) when and how overrides can be used;

(b) how to demonstrate transfers are always in members’ best interests; and

(c) how contractual overrides are independently certified.”

Amendments 255, 256 and 257 ensure that contractual override powers are operational in advance of the first value for money assessments.

The amendment is very similar to amendment 278, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Tamworth. The industry has highlighted to us a concern that the Government’s proposed sequencing will not provide enough time between contractual overrides becoming permissible and VFM assessments being conducted, which will totally undermine the effectiveness of consolidation and value improvement. Pensions UK has encouraged the Government to accelerate that and to bring forward the implementation to allow schemes to make progress on consolidation sooner, so that the override is in place well in advance of the VFM framework.

We drafted amendment 257 with the idea that if transfers took place before the VFM framework was implemented, further guidance from the FCA would be required on how and when overrides could be used. However, we welcome the compromise set out in amendment 278, which would ensure that external transfers do not take place until VFM assessments are available. Frankly, that amendment is better-crafted than ours. If we had done them the other way around, I would have deferred to the advice of the hon. Member for Tamworth on whether she wanted to move the amendment. She was right to withdraw her amendment, and we will withdraw ours, but I urge the Minister to write to us both on the outcome of this matter before Report. It would be useful to have his comments beforehand so that we can challenge him on Report, and possibly move the amendment again—who knows?

[Torsten Bell]

As the hon. Member has asked so kindly, I assure him that I will write to him and to my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth ahead of Report.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 143, in clause 41, page 53, line 8, leave out “Powers to make” and insert “Treasury”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 144.

Amendment 144, in clause 41, page 53, line 25, at end insert—

“(1A) The Treasury must by regulations require the FCA to include provision of a description specified in the regulations in general rules made in compliance with section 117E(4)(a) (how to determine whether a person is independent), alongside any other provision included in such general rules.

(1B) Regulations under subsection (1A) must in particular require the FCA to include in such general rules provision designed to ensure that the independent person does not have a conflict of interest.”

This amendment requires the Treasury to make regulations about the requirements that need to be met by an independent person appointed under section 117E.

Amendment 145, in clause 41, page 53, line 38, leave out from “benefits”” to end of line 39 and insert

“means money purchase benefits within the meaning of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 181(1) of that Act) or the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 (see section 176(1) of that Act);”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 140.

Amendment 146, in clause 41, page 54, line 3, leave out from “scheme”” to end of line 4 and insert

“means a personal pension scheme within the meaning of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 1(1) of that Act) or the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 (see section 1(1) of that Act);”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 140.

Clause 41, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 42

Default pension benefit solutions

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 147, in clause 42, page 55, line 9, leave out “eligible members” and insert “each eligible member”.

This amendment clarifies that trustees or managers are required to make a default pension benefit solution available to every eligible member of the scheme.