Lobular Breast Cancer: Moon Shot Project

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Thursday 9th July 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Mrs Hobhouse. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Horsham (John Milne) for securing today’s debate, and to the Members from across the House who have given their voice to this campaign over a number of years. It is entirely right that Parliament should pause today to consider not just the science, the policy and the funding, but the human reality that sits behind all three of those things.

Behind the words “lobular breast cancer” are people who knew something was wrong, but the system could not prove it. That is the point at the heart of today’s debate. This is not a call for special treatment or a demand that we place one cancer above another; it is a recognition that different cancers behave differently, present differently and may require different approaches if we are serious about improving outcomes.

Today, we are also remembering Dr Susan Michaelis. Many people in public life are described as courageous, but in Susan’s case that word feels insufficient. She was, as we have heard, a commercial pilot, a researcher, a campaigner, a wife and a woman whose instinct, when faced with injustice or uncertainty, was not to turn away from it but to investigate it. She had already devoted much of her professional life to public safety, particularly in the aviation sector. We have heard about how she challenged assumptions, gathered evidence and pursued truth in an area where the consequences mattered for passengers, crews and the wider public. In 2013, she received her devastating diagnosis of invasive lobular breast cancer. As we have heard today, her symptoms were not dramatic; they presented as just a tiny mark on her breast.

Two mammograms and two ultrasounds failed to identify the disease, and it was ultimately identified by an MRI scan. We have heard how that revealed what appeared to be a relatively small lesion of about inch that was later confirmed to be over 7 cm. That single account tells us why this debate continues to matter and shows the particular challenge of a cancer that can be harder to detect through standard imaging.

Remarkably, Susan did not live her final years in retreat from the world; she continued with her work and her research, and continued campaigning. As we have heard, nine days before her death, she travelled to Manchester to help launch the scientific programme for the lobular breast cancer Moon Shot Project, knowing full well that any breakthrough would come too late for her. That is an extraordinary act of generosity and a challenge to all of us in this place. If someone is living with advanced cancer and can spend her final days and the last of her strength ask for progress for others, surely it is our responsibility and Government to find the clarity and urgency to respond.

As we have heard, lobular breast cancer is not rare. It is the second most common type of breast cancer, accounting for around 15% of cases, but despite that it too often remains hidden in plain sight.

[Seamus Logan]

This is not a party-political issue; it is something the shadow Minister and the whole House can agree on. In 2022, the Scottish Government began the process of improving their imaging kits with the introduction of 3D mammography, which is a major step forward. Two months ago, the Scottish Parliament lodged a motion supporting the lobular breast cancer Moon Shot Project and called for the £20 million to be allocated. Does he agree that the breadth of support for this campaign—440 MPs now support it, including myself—is now irresistible, and that the Minister should award the funding?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Gentleman is right; there is collective support for doing more on this issue. That starts with getting the research right. Without the research, we do not know how to plan for the treatments of the future. I will move on to the other points, but he is also entirely right that this is not a party-political issue, but one that affects all of us and all of our constituents. We have to work with a sense of urgency around it.

As we have heard, the lobular breast cancer Moon Shot Project is looking for £20 million over five years to advance the understanding of invasive lobular breast cancer and to support better detection, treatment and surveillance. We cannot dispute that that is a significant sum, but we have to look at it in the context of national health spending and what cancer costs: the cost to families and patients and the cost to the NHS when it is detected late or treated inadequately. We have to bear those factors in mind.

We should also be clear about what research funding means in practice. It does not mean a guarantee of easy answers. Science does not work like that, but it does mean giving our best minds the chance to ask the right questions. It means building the evidence base and moving beyond a generic understanding of breast cancer and towards a more precise understanding of this specific disease. That is the direction of travel that we have seen over a number of years in modern healthcare. We have seen it in genomics and targeted therapies and we see it in the increasing recognition that treatment must be shaped by the biology of the disease and the needs of the patient. There is no reason that lobular breast cancer should be left behind in that progress.

There has been movement—it is right to acknowledge that. The National Institute for Health and Care Research has issued a highlight notice encouraging applications for research into lobular breast cancer; the Government have published their own national cancer plan; and the Health Bill speaks of research duties and innovation. Those are by no means meaningless, but they are not yet enough. That is why today’s debate must focus on delivery, so I ask the Minister whether the Government will set out a timeline to fund the lobular breast cancer Moon Shot Project. If the answer is yes, campaigners deserve to know how and through what mechanism that will happen. If the answer is no, they deserve an honest explanation. Is it a financial barrier? Is it a scientific one? Is it procedural? Are the Government waiting for further proposals, reviews or assessments? The people who have campaigned with such dignity on this issue should not be left trying to decode in silence.

I also ask the Minister to address the issue of guidance. Lobular breast cancer is referred to only in limited form in existing national breast cancer guidance, and campaigners have called for the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence to review whether the guidance properly reflects the disease. That guidance, of course, shapes clinical practice and influences what clinicians look for, what tests are considered and how treatment is approached. If the evidence is not yet strong enough to support separate recommendations, that should strengthen the case for targeted research, not weaken it. We cannot use the absence of evidence as a reason not to gather it. That would be a circular argument. The patients affected by this disease deserve much better.

There is also a wider lesson here about women’s health. Too often women’s symptoms have been dismissed as vague, complex or difficult to categorise. Too often women have had to become their own advocates at the very moment when they are frightened, unwell and least able to fight. One duty of a good health system is to reduce the burden on the patient and prove that they are worth listening to. Susan Michaelis understood that deeply. As we heard earlier, on 24 June last year, while on oxygen and clearly in pain, she stood outside Downing Street as part of a silent vigil representing the 22 people diagnosed every day with lobular breast cancer in the United Kingdom. She delivered a letter asking for help. Two weeks later she died wearing her Lobular Moon Shot Project T-shirt. That is an image that should stay with all of us today, not because policies should be made on emotion alone—clearly they should not. Policy has to be evidence-based, financially responsible and clinically sound. But should policy not be stripped of a moral seriousness, either. Evidence tells us what may work. Compassion reminds us why we keep working. Responsibility requires us to bring those two factors together.

The last Government invested in cancer research, including support for the Institute of Cancer Research and the Royal Marsden biomedical research centre, along with wider work relevant to lobular breast cancer. In opposition we have continued to press the Government on the Moon Shot Project, including through the shadow health team and other colleagues. But this should not, as we have discussed, become a party political contest. Cancer does not observe party lines, and neither should our determination to improve the outcomes for patients.

The test for the Government is relatively simple. Can they turn sympathy into a plan? Can they gave campaigners a clear route forward? Can they match the scale of the problem with a response that is specific, funded and time-bound? What those affected by lobular breast cancer need is not another expression of admiration for their bravery and courage. They need progress: a system that sees their cancer sooner, treatments shaped by its biology, surveillance that reflects the risk of recurrence and spread, guidance that recognises the particular character of the disease and research funded at a level that gives discovery a fair chance.

Susan Michaelis gave the final chapter of her life to this cause. She did so not for herself, but for women she would never meet and families she would never know. That legacy is worthy of more than a mere tribute; it is worthy of action. I hope the Minister will leave this debate having listened carefully, but also prepared to act decisively. The Government should not only meet the campaigners, but set out the remaining barriers, publish a route to a decision and make clear whether they will fund the Moon Shot project. Dr Susan Michaelis spent her life making hidden risks visible; the task before us now is to ensure that lobular breast cancer is hidden no longer.

Neuropsychiatric Conditions: PANS and PANDAS

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Thursday 25th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a privilege to respond to the debate on behalf of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for North East Fife (Wendy Chamberlain) for securing the debate and for setting out the landscape facing those with PANS/PANDAS in the UK, as well as recognising the lack of knowledge about the conditions and the challenge that presents. I thank her for her sustained work through the APPG on the issue.

Many right hon. and hon. Members have contributed to the debate. The hon. Member for Carlisle (Ms Minns) spoke movingly about Joanne and Jake, who have been living with PANS/PANDAS for the past six years, and the challenges of not getting the treatment or the funding that they need. The hon. Member for Henley and Thame (Freddie van Mierlo) made a good point about how those affected do not want sympathy but action. He talked about the excellent campaigning by Albie, who is in the Gallery today, following his brother’s diagnosis—I suspect Albie’s handwriting is somewhat better than my doctor’s scrawl and I commend him on his campaigning. The hon. Member for Harlow (Chris Vince), who is always keen to speak up and champion issues on behalf of his constituents, spoke about the importance of guidance. My right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) talked about the importance of the early use of antibiotics.

Above all, I want to speak directly to the families and children who are following the debate and who live with PANS/PANDAS every day, some of whom are with us in the Gallery today. For them, this is not an abstract discussion about guidance, systems or clinical pathways; it is about the child they love, the moment something changed and the exhaustion of trying to explain that change to people who may never have heard of the condition before. It is about parents who overnight become advocates, researchers, case managers and campaigners, while simultaneously trying to hold their families together, and about the children and young people whose lives can be altered suddenly and terrifyingly.

As we have heard, PANS/PANDAS sit at the intersection of neurology, psychiatry, immunology and infectious diseases. That matters because they do not fit neatly into one service, specialty, clinic or budget line. For the children affected, symptoms can be sudden and severe. They include obsessive-compulsive behaviours, restricted eating, tics, anxiety, behavioural change, sleep disturbance, regression, movement difficulties, school refusal and distress that can overwhelm the entire family.

For some families, the story is stark. A child who was settled and sociable becomes frightened, withdrawn and unable to eat. A child who was thriving at school begins to struggle. Families find themselves moving from GPs to child and adolescent mental health services, from paediatrics to emergency departments, and from school meetings to safeguarding conversations, often without a clear pathway or a clinician who is able to say, “Do you know what? I recognise this, and this is what we need to do next.”

The first task before us is to diagnose the problem honestly. The problem is not that every scientific question has been answered, because clearly it has not. There is uncertainty and professional disagreement, and there is a need for stronger evidence, better data and more research into diagnosis, treatment and long-term outcomes. However, uncertainty has too often translated into inconsistency. It has meant too many families left without a clear answer, too many clinicians left without guidance, too many schools unsure of how to respond and too many children caught between services. Each see part of the picture, but they do not see the child as a whole.

At present, there is no official NHS clinical guidance for the diagnosis and treatment of PANS/PANDAS. NICE has previously concluded that the evidence was insufficient to provide useful guidance. The Government have said that data on the number of children affected is not currently collected, because internationally the criteria cannot be agreed. Local integrated care systems are expected to plan services, but they are asked to do so without consistent national direction, which risks variation.

As we have heard, in reality variation leads to a postcode lottery. It means that one family may find an informed GP, paediatrician or neurologist, while another family is left scrambling for help. It means that one school may understand the sudden onset and fluctuating need, while another school sees only challenging behaviour. It means that one parent may feel believed, while another parent feels blamed. That is the difficulty at the heart of this debate.

PANS/PANDAS cut across the way our systems are organised. The NHS is still too often structured around separate silos, whether it is mental health, neurology, infectious disease, immunology or paediatrics, but children living with these conditions do not arrive in neat administrative categories; their needs are complex, sudden and overlapping. That makes it hard for families to know where to turn, as well as for clinicians who want to help but may not have had the training to do so, and for schools that see a child’s behaviour change dramatically without understanding what is driving it.

We must also be candid about the emotional difficulty. Parents can feel dismissed. They can feel treated as difficult or seen as overanxious when they are simply trying to explain what has happened to their child. No child should be left waiting for help because the system is unsure about where they fit. The previous Government did not solve this issue, but foundations were laid through the UK rare diseases framework, annual action plans and engagement with research, including with the APPG and the working group.

The current Government have welcomed clinical guidance being developed by PANS PANDAS UK and have said that NICE will consider national guidance as evidence improves. They have also pointed to NIHR research and extended the rare diseases framework into 2027. Where the Government do the right thing, we should welcome it, but the question is whether those actions are sufficient. Do they need to go faster? Are they reaching the families on the ground?

Families do not experience this as a framework, action plan or written answer; they experience it as the moment when a child refuses food, compulsions appear, school attendance collapses or a parent is told that a professional has never heard of the condition. If the problem is complexity, inconsistency and a lack of recognition, the solution must be equal in its seriousness. The foundations have been set, and now we must all go further.

We need action on guidance. The clinical guidance being developed by PANS PANDAS UK and the PANS guideline development group brings together expertise from general practice, paediatrics, neurology, immunology, infectious diseases, psychiatry, psychology and nursing. I would be grateful if the Minister could set out how the Government will engage with that guidance once it is published. Will she commit to a clear process for assessing emerging evidence?

We also need to take action on professional awareness. I recall reading about these conditions in Kumar & Clark when I was a medical student, but I do not recall receiving any formal training on them. It is not enough to ask our clinicians to be responsible for keeping their knowledge up to date; atypical, complex and contested conditions require practical support. As such, I ask the Minister to consider an awareness package for frontline professionals, developed in conjunction with clinicians, families and experts. We also need action on data and research—we need better data, diagnostic clarity, and research into treatment and long-term outcomes. With that in mind, I would appreciate the Minister setting out how the Government intend to support that work and encourage greater patient involvement.

There is also a need for greater consistency across local systems. If support is left entirely to local discretion, care will depend on where a family lives or how hard they are able to fight for it. Clearer information on how suspected cases can be supported across specialties should be available to ICBs, and schools also have to be part of the answer. For many families, school is where the change is first noticed; better awareness of sudden onset and fluctuating symptoms could help ensure sensible attendance policies and flexible, rapid and responsive classroom adjustments.

This debate should not be one that divides the House, but one that unites it. There will be different views on the evidence, on treatment and on guidance, but there should be no difference between us on the need for children to be seen, for families to be heard, for clinicians to be supported, and for care to be based on evidence, rather than the accident of geography. For families living with PANS/PANDAS, progress will be measured by whether the next family gets an earlier answer, whether the next child is believed sooner, whether the next GP has somewhere to turn, and whether the next school understands. That is a fair and compassionate standard, and it is the one that the Government should now meet.

NHS Federated Data Platform

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Thursday 16th April 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

I was expecting a promotion there, Dame Siobhain. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I congratulate the hon. Member for Newton Abbot (Martin Wrigley) on securing the debate. He has brought forward an issue that sits right at the centre of how we shape the future of our national health service: how we use data, who we trust with it and how we ensure that technology supports care rather than complicates it.

The debate has been a thoughtful one, and in many respects it has been revealing. It has shown both the promise of the NHS federated data platform and the unease that still surrounds it. That tension really matters. I am grateful for the significant contributions we have heard from right hon. and hon. Members, with 13 coming from the Back Benches by my count. Let me start by setting out where I think there is common ground across the House.

The NHS is under enormous pressure as demand is rising, complexity is increasing and waiting lists remain too high. Too often, clinicians are working without the full picture in front of them. Anyone who has spent time in the health service knows that this is not a system that lacks dedication. It is, however, a system that too often lacks coherence. Data is part of that problem as it is scattered, fragmented and difficult to use in a joined-up way. Records do not always reliably follow the patient, and information is duplicated, delayed or simply not available when it is needed most. The consequence of that is not just theoretical; it is time lost, inefficiencies and, at times, patients not getting the care they should when they should.

The case for doing things better is a strong one; in fact, it is unavoidable. The FDP is one attempt to respond to that challenge. It seeks to bring together information in a way that allows the NHS to work more effectively, helping clinicians and supporting managers with the ultimate aim of improving care for patients. There are some early signs that this is beginning to deliver; waiting lists have been cleaned up, and some hospitals have reported better flow through theatres and wards. Those are practical improvements. As is so often the case in government, the easier question is whether something can work; the much harder question is whether it will be accepted. There are clearly concerns here.

We have heard about reluctance in part of the workforce. I am not suggesting there is uniform opposition, but there is certainly hesitation and, in some cases, disengagement. We should be careful, however, not to exaggerate that. Big reforms in the NHS have always faced resistance, often at the start. This is not necessarily something new, and on its own it is not necessarily decisive. At the same time, however, it is not irrelevant; if the people expected to use this system do not have confidence in it, its impact will always be limited. Will the Minister say what is the assessment of staff engagement with the FDP and how the Government are ensuring that this is something done with the NHS, rather than done to it? In the end, that will make the real difference.

The same issue arises with public trust. People are right to care about their medical data—it is sensitive, personal and deeply private. Once confidence is lost in this area, it is very difficult to rebuild it. There are important safeguards in place: the data remains under NHS control, the access is tightly regulated, and the provider does not own or use the data for its own purposes. The legal framework underpinning those safeguards is strong. Those are not minor points—they really matter.

However, we also have to recognise something else. People are not just asking whether the system is safe today, but what it enables tomorrow. Could the data be combined in ways that reveal more than people expect? Could systems evolve in ways not originally intended? Could future Governments choose to use the capability in different ways? Those are not unreasonable questions; they are the natural questions people ask when large new systems are created. Again, I ask the Minister what more will be done to reassure the public about the limits of how NHS data can be used and whether he can set out clearly where parliamentary oversight comes in if the use of data is expanded in the future. Trust is not built by reassurance alone; it is built by clarity and restraint.

A significant part of this debate has understandably focused on Palantir, and it is right that it has. Palantir is now a major supplier within the NHS data infrastructure as well as elsewhere across Government, and that raises legitimate questions about not just capability but dependence. For some the concern is political, while for others it is about principle. For many, though, it is something much more practical: what happens if we become too reliant on a single provider for something as critical as health data infrastructure? I think that is a fair question.

However, we should also separate those questions from the broader argument about the company’s international work. In a global economy, companies will inevitably work with different Governments, and that alone is not a sufficient reason to exclude them from public contracts in the UK. The question of procurement design, competition and resilience, however, is a different matter.

[Andrew George]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I will not. I want the Minister to have sufficient time to respond to the multiple contributions there have been today.

I ask the Minister the following questions. How are the Government ensuring that the NHS is not locked into a single supplier over the long term? What is the plan for maintaining genuine competition in this space? How easy would it be in practical terms to move to an alternative system if that was ever required?

There is then the issue of resilience. Some have argued that the FDP creates a single point of failure, while others have argued that the current fragmented system is itself a weakness and that greater coherence improves security and oversight. Both arguments deserve to be taken seriously. But practical questions remain: how resilient is this system to cyber-attacks or technical failure? What safeguards are in place? What happens if something goes wrong at scale?

The last matter I wish to address is that of governance. With the abolition of NHS England, there is now a question about where the responsibilities for the FDP properly sit. That matters because accountability cannot be diffuse. I take this opportunity to ask the Minister: who is responsible for the programme now, where does that accountability lie, and how will Parliament be able to scrutinise its performance going forward?

Better use of data has a real role to play in NHS reform, and the FDP may well prove to be part of that answer. Success will depend on more than just delivery; it will depend on confidence within the system: confidence from clinicians that the system helps rather than hinders them, confidence from patients that their data is properly protected and confidence from the public that our decisions are transparent, proportionate and properly accountable. If those conditions are met, this reform can succeed. If they are not, even the best designed system will struggle. We, as His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, will support what improves care and welcome what works, but will continue to ask questions that ensure reform is done properly in a way that sustains public trust. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Meningitis Outbreak

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Tuesday 17th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Wes Streeting]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for his question, and I am mindful of the concerns of neighbouring communities across his part of London and the wider south-east. I can provide reassurance on two points. The general risk is low because of the nature of the transmission of this disease and because of the active contact tracing that is under way, on which UKHSA has done a particularly impressive job, given the unusual nature of this outbreak. We can be reasonably confident that we are tracing people and managing risk in that way. Even as students return home from university, we are managing the risk, proactively contacting people and making antibiotics available. We are preparing for a targeted vaccination campaign in the coming days, but we are also considering the wider cohorts that UKHSA may deem necessary to vaccinate.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

I know from my time in medicine that all those involved in combating this outbreak will be working at pace, and they have our utmost respect. However, there will be concern about the report in The Independent in the last hour or so that certain pharmacies in the region are running out of or running low on the menB vaccine. Will the Secretary of State commit to looking into that personally and ensure that we get a robust supply chain?

[Wes Streeting]

I can understand that some people may choose to buy the vaccine, but I will reassure the hon. Gentleman on two points. First, we have a significant stockpile of vaccines. Secondly, we are taking an evidence-based approach to vaccination, starting with the targeted vaccination programme that UKHSA is preparing. We are thinking about additional cohorts, and we always keep an eye on our medicine supply more generally.

Defibrillators

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Westminster Hall

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I also congratulate the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Sam Rushworth) on securing this important debate, and I start by sending my condolences to George Smith’s family at this very difficult time.

Many Members may know that, before coming to this place, I was both a doctor and a barrister. As a doctor, I worked predominantly in acute care, so I have seen the brutal speed with which cardiac arrest can lead to death. But as a barrister, I specialised in inquests and clinical negligence, and I also saw what happened when people did not get timely interventions, and the devastating consequences that arose.

As many Members have set out, the stark reality is that every minute counts. Every minute reduces life expectancy by 10%. If someone gets prompt intervention, their survival rate can be as high as 70% if their defib is within 200 metres of their location. That is a three-to-five-minute brisk walk there and back. But the stark reality is that out-of-hospital arrests have a survival rate of less than one in 12. Compared with in-hospital arrests, the survival rate to discharge is in the region of 25%. That is why this was an important focus for me when I was elected to Parliament for Solihull West and Shirley.

Despite the fact that my constituency has a mix of urban and semi-rural places, only 40.32% of our defibs are within the recommended distance and there are only seven public defibs per 10,000 people, which is well below the national recommendation. Across the United Kingdom, the per-population count for defibs is approximately five to 10 times lower than it is in a country such as Japan. That cannot be right in this day and age, which is why, for one of my office fundraisers this year, we all went and did the Solihull way. We walked 20-odd miles in the day, and raised money for two defibs and some bleed kits on behalf of a brilliant charity called the Daniel Baird Foundation. It was particularly moving to be able to donate one of those defibs to the Wave café in my constituency, where a valued member of the community had sadly died some months earlier because they did not have access to a defib.

I am going to reiterate a couple of calls that have already been made to the Minister, who I know has been listening carefully. First, we should exempt defibs from VAT—it is ridiculous. For every five defibs that are currently bought, we could afford another if we got rid of VAT.

[Douglas McAllister (West Dunbartonshire) (Lab)]

I agree with the hon. Member that this is a UK-wide issue. However, my concern is the potential for inequality and the need to ensure that poorer communities such as my constituency, where 63% of postcodes are out of direct reach of these lifesaving machines, are not left behind. The hon. Member referred to the fact that he is a barrister; believe it or not, because public and community access is essential, defibs are often stolen or vandalised, so does he agree not only that a VAT exemption would help to tackle the issue of inequality in poorer constituencies, but that we should consider creating a specific criminal offence to help to protect these vital machines?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Member makes a really important point. The consequences of vandalism or damage to this equipment can be life-changing—it can end a life. The ramifications have to be clearly pointed out and reflected in the law of the land.

Secondly, my hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries and Galloway (John Cooper) and I recently wrote to the Secretary of State for Transport about expanding education on lifesaving skills as part of driving tests, and we should also incorporate it more into the national curriculum. Will the Minister speak to her colleagues in the Department of Health and Social Care and the Department for Transport about ensuring that everybody in this country knows not only where a defib is but how to operate one, to enable lifesaving interventions as quickly as possible?

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Evans]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I rise to speak in support of the new clause, which was tabled by the Conservative party. It would place a duty on the Secretary of State to review the effectiveness of the regulatory authority’s role under the Mental Health Act 1983 within one year of the Act’s passage.

Allow me to provide the current legal and regulatory context. Under the framework in the Mental Health Act 1983, the Care Quality Commission, which is the regulatory authority in England, is tasked with monitoring and regulating providers of mental health services. We have debated some of this, and there are issues still to be addressed.

The CQC inspects hospitals, community mental health teams, and other relevant services to ensure compliance with statutory safeguards and standards. It publishes reports on providers and issues recommendations where it identifies failings. Additionally, there is an existing reporting framework under the Act whereby the Secretary of State is expected to oversee and ensure the Act’s proper implementation, with periodic ministerial reports to Parliament and CQC inspection outcomes made publicly available. However, there is currently no statutory requirement to review the CQC’s own role and effectiveness in carrying out these specific mental health functions. The gap means that although providers are scrutinised, the regulator itself escapes similar structured accountability and review.

This question was debated in the other place and I welcome the comments from the Minister in the Lords, Baroness Merron, who, in a letter, rightly highlights existing transparency measures. She states that,

“findings from CQC’s monitoring activity are reported annually in their Monitoring the Mental Health Act report, which is laid before Parliament and published publicly.”

That is true. She also notes the annual quality account reports produced by NHS healthcare providers under the Health Act 2009, which cover patient safety, treatment effectiveness, and patient feedback. True. Those are indeed important components of the current oversight framework, and we support the continuation and strengthening of those transparency mechanisms.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point about transparency, but it is not just about that. Does he agree that it is also about having an evidence base that allows reform and improvement of the regulator?

[Dr Evans]

I do, and to expand the point, this is about understanding the performance of CQC as well. We know from the Dash report and from Mike Richards that there are, and have been, concerns about CQC performance. That is at the heart of this new clause—to try to make sure we actually look at the performance and regulation of the regulator. Those reports focus on the performance of mental health services and providers, but they do not amount to a dedicated statutory review of the regulator itself—specifically, the CQC’s role, effectiveness, and capacity under the Mental Health Act.

Annual reports primarily reflect the CQC’s monitoring outcomes rather than a comprehensive, independent evaluation of whether its regulatory functions are being discharged optimally, or whether it is adequately equipped to meet the new challenges posed by the legislation. In other words, reporting on what the regulator monitors is not the same as reviewing how well the regulator performs its duties.

The new clause would address that distinct gap by mandating a focused review with a parliamentary report and a Government response, thereby strengthening accountability at the regulatory level. The new clause aims to establish an additional layer of scrutiny, not duplicative reporting. It would require the Government, within 12 months of the Bill becoming law, to conduct a formal review of the CQC’s effectiveness, specifically in regulating mental health services under the 1983 Act. It mandates an assessment of whether the CQC is adequately fulfilling its duties, including monitoring, inspection, and enforcement responsibilities, as well as whether it will be capable of carrying out its duties under the new legislation. Given the well-documented problems in mental health, it seems entirely appropriate to address the key point: is the regulator regulating effectively?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My hon. Friend makes a strong point about having a review to ensure that the regulator is operating effectively. Does he share some of my concerns that a one-off review may not demonstrate ongoing oversight and scrutiny of the performance of the regulator?

[Dr Evans]

We do not want to introduce too much bureaucracy, but ensuring an accountable statutory mechanism to ensure adequate oversight is incredibly important. Much of the debate about the Bill has been about whether we put things in primary legislation or in policy, or whether we allow policy and legislation to be done at a secondary level—or even leave them for the organisation to deal with. My concern with the CQC is that we have not seen the organisation step up in the way that it should do. That does not mean that it is not making progress, but we need to see further progress.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Chambers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would require the number of patients transferred to hospitals outside their area to be reduced to zero within five years, and the Secretary of State would have to produce a report on how this would be achieved. We should not underestimate the harm and distress caused to patients and their families when they are allocated an out-of-area mental health placement. At the end of March 2024, there were 900 active out-of-area placements in England, of which 89% were deemed inappropriate.

Patients must be treated in a centre close to their home and family, and that can be achieved by increasing capacity and co-ordination between services. The new clause calls on the Secretary of State to publish guidance within six months of the Bill’s passage, setting out what processes and funding will be available for that purpose. Vulnerable people deserve to be treated near to their families and home, and the new clause would ensure that happens.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The new clause is underpinned by noble intentions, but does the hon. Gentleman believe that patients would be better served if such a process were in guidelines rather than in the Bill? That would ensure that it is deliverable.

[Dr Chambers]

I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s comments. That is a sensible and insightful point, and I will take on board the Minister’s response too.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Seventh sitting)

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 19th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

I accept the point made by the Minister and others that mental health advocates are perhaps not best placed to deliver an initiative similar to the Winchester Citizens Advice project, which supports mental health in-patients. I understand the point made that advance choice documents are potentially not the way to implement this type of support either. I want to press the issue again, because it is so important; it affects so many people and the economic viability of mental health care. If advance choice documents are not the appropriate mechanism through which to run a scheme to help people with their life admin and debt, whatis the way to deliver that support, in a way that is linked to the Bill in some way?

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I want to speak in support of amendment 46. It is eminently sensible and would give all eligible patients the statutory right to create an advance choice document to record their treatment preferences in a formal legal document. Those preferences would be enjoyed only in the event of a future mental health crisis or detention under the Mental Health Act.

The amendment would give important control to patients and to those around them to know that their future care decisions would be applicable at the point at which they become incapacious. It would quite rightly place a requirement on NHS England—for as long as it continues to exist—and ICBs to ensure that those individuals are aware of their rights and, more importantly, that they are not just aware of them but are supported in creating an advance choice document if they so wish.

The amendment is all about empowering patients. The more we can empower patients who face these challenges, the better. It would increase their autonomy and help with the planning of their future care. It would help both in the understanding and the honouring of patients’ wishes. Critically, it would reduce conflict. In these circumstances, tensions are high and pressures are acute, so conflict can arise in the most unintended of ways. Having an advance choice document minimises that risk.

If the Government will not support amendment 46, what reassurances can the Minister give in relation to the code of practice? How will this be accounted for in the code of practice to ensure consistency in the information imparted to patients across the country by NHS England and the ICBs? We must ensure that there is not a postcode lottery and that everybody, regardless of where they live in the country, gets the consistency of care that they are entitled to.

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I rise to speak in support of amendment 46, tabled by the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, which seeks to strengthen clause 45, an already welcome and progressive clause, by creating a statutory right for all eligible patients to create advance choice documents if they so wish.

Let me begin by saying that I think everyone on the Committee recognises the importance of advance choice documents. They are an excellent initiative, and I am glad that the Bill introduces a framework to support their use. I hope we can all agree that they represent a constructive and compassionate shift in how we think about mental health care—one that puts the patient’s voice at the centre. ACDs are fundamentally about empowerment. They allow individuals, while they are well and have full capacity, to record their wishes, preferences and concerns regarding their treatment, so that during future periods of unwellness, when they may lack capacity, their past self can still be heard and respected. As Bipolar UK has rightly put it:

“The idea behind an ACD is that you use your past to plan your future.”

That simple principle holds immense power. Individuals with lived experience of severe mental illness like bipolar disorder are often experts in their own care. They know what works, what does not and what signs to look out for. An ACD allows that hard-earned knowledge to be recorded, shared and used to guide clinical decisions. By identifying early warning signs and outlining preferred treatments, ACDs can enable families, friends and professionals to intervene earlier, potentially avoiding a crisis or reducing the severity of an episode. This is not just about better care; it is about safer care and, crucially, more timely care.

The research is persuasive. Studies suggest that ACDs can reduce rates of compulsory detention under the Mental Health Act by up to 25%. That is not a small statistic; it is a significant reduction in trauma for patients, in the use of force and in resource pressures on services. It is hard to think of a better example of a policy that both improves outcomes and reduces system strain. ACDs can also play a vital role in reducing inequalities, especially among racial minority groups, who, as we have all said, are statistically more likely to be detained under the Act. Ensuring that those patients can express their wishes in advance gives them greater agency and helps to address long-standing disparities in the system.

ACDs are not just a useful administrative tool; they are, as Earl Howe put it in the House of Lords,

“are a major component part of one of the Bill’s key strands, which is to give mental health patients better control over their own care—which, of itself, carries a therapeutic value.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 27 January 2025; Vol. 843, c. 79.]

I absolutely agree, which brings me to amendment 46. The clause as drafted places duties on NHS England and integrated care boards to consider making information about ACDs available, and to help those people whom they consider “appropriate” to create one. That is a start, but it falls short of what is needed. The shadow Minister’s amendment would take us further and create a statutory right for eligible patients to create an advance choice document. It would define clearly who is eligible—for example, those previously detained under the Act, those diagnosed with a condition that may require future detention and qualifying informal patients—and would put a clear duty on NHS bodies to inform these patients of their right and to help them to exercise it. This is not about placing a burden on services; it is about ensuring that everyone who stands to benefit from an ACD knows that they can make one and is supported to do so if they wish.

I appreciate that the Government have tabled amendments 32 and 33 to clause 45, and I welcome the intention behind them. Amendment 32 requires that NHS England and integrated care boards must bring the availability of this information and help to the attention of such people “as it considers appropriate.” Amendment 33 expands on how that might be delivered, including through conversations with qualified individuals and by having specific regard to the benefits of ACDs in the 12 months following discharge from hospital.

Although these are improvements, I must respectfully say that they stop short of what is needed. They continue to frame the duty in terms of who the board considers appropriate, yet the very point of ACDs is that we should not be gatekeeping access. We should not be making assumptions about who would or would not benefit from having one. Every eligible patient should be offered the choice, not just those whom the system deems suitable. We are dealing here with people’s autonomy and right to shape their future care, and if we start from a place of selective provision, we immediately disempower many of the very individuals we claim to support.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting)

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 19th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

I will take a few moments to reflect on clauses 46 and 47. They deal with aftercare, which is at the heart of how we help people to recover from serious mental illness and reduce the chance of their readmission. Clause 46 will give mental health tribunals the ability to make recommendations about aftercare services—a welcome shift in emphasis towards recognising that recovery is something that happens not at the point of discharge, but in the weeks, months and even years that follow.

Until now, tribunals could recommend things like hospital leave or transfer, but they had no say in the vital question of what happens after discharge. Clause 46 gives them a voice in shaping that next phase. It is a step that could help to ensure that aftercare is not an afterthought, but a core part of discharge planning. The effectiveness of this change, however, depends on whether there are services to recommend. As the independent review made clear, the challenge is not just in writing aftercare into law, but in making sure that it is there in practice.

Clause 47 takes a welcome step in providing greater clarity and accountability around which local authority is responsible for arranging section 117 aftercare. By clarifying the rules on ordinary residents, especially for people who received care as children, and by requiring that local authorities and NHS bodies jointly issue written notice when aftercare is ending, the clause helps to ensure that decisions are made in a timely and transparent way. That improved clarity should support smoother transitions from hospital to community, reduce disputes between services and, ultimately, help to prevent relapse and readmission.

Clarity in law must be met by capacity on the ground, which is why the core question is not just what the clauses enable, but whether the system is equipped to deliver on them. I therefore ask the Minister what assessment has been made of the availability of appropriate aftercare services in the community. Can we be confident that NHS and social care teams have the resources that they need to meet the duty effectively?

We know that aftercare, under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983, can include support with housing, employment, social engagement and culturally appropriate services, all of which can mean the difference between recovery and relapse, but they only work when they are properly joined up, tailored to the individual and delivered in a timely way. The independent review put it well:

“priority should be given to making sure that good services are available to all…But we also believe that it is right that people who have been detained should have additional support to ensure a successful transition to the community.”

I agree with that principle. If we want to see fewer people detained, we must do better at supporting people once they leave hospital.

I support clauses 46 and 47. They are sensible, necessary reforms that will give structure and clarity to a part of the system that has often been patchy or overlooked. But if we want them to work as intended, they must be backed up by investment in community services, good local commissioning and effective partnership between health and social care. In short, these are good steps but must be followed through with real delivery on the ground if we are to achieve the lasting outcomes that we all want.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. Having taken your clear instructions, I will be very brief in speaking to clauses 46 and 47.

Clause 46 is a positive step in principle, but there are concerns that the recommendations remain non-binary and may therefore lack the practical effect—or the teeth —without enforcement or review mechanisms. I have three questions that I hope the Minister will address. First, will he clarify whether there are any plans to give legal weight to tribunal recommendations, perhaps by requiring a written response or justification where those recommendations are not followed? Secondly, how will the Government ensure that resource-constrained local authorities can implement recommended aftercare plans promptly and fully? Thirdly, could he please provide data on the expected impact of this provision on readmission rates?

Clause 47 clearly sets out and improves on the legal clarity, which is welcome, but I have a couple of questions. What steps will be taken to ensure that frontline practitioners understand and consistently apply the revised ordinary residence test? Has the Department conducted an assessment of the administrative burdens or delays that may result from the implementation of the clause? Apart from those questions, I welcome the provision.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship this afternoon, Mrs Harris. I will go through the questions that have been asked.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, asked whether there will be any duty on ICBs or local authorities to respond to recommendations. The tribunal will have the power to recommend that plans are put in place for a patient’s aftercare. To assist in ensuring that these recommendations are followed, the tribunal can reconvene if its recommendations are not acted on, ensuring accountability from aftercare bodies.

The shadow Minister asked what mechanisms are in place to resolve disputes between authorities. There is already a process in place under the Care Act 2014 for resolving disputes and an opportunity to escalate decisions to the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers, if required. He also asked what the notice must contain. We will absolutely look at the guidance in the code on the process for ending aftercare and notifying the person.

The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley asked about plans for legal weight, resourcing and data. I will write to him on his questions about plans for legal weight and data. I think that resourcing will be a constant theme. Obviously, we have to assess all the resourcing implications once the Bill receives Royal Assent, and we will develop an implementation plan on that basis. The first annual written ministerial statement will be the hon. Gentleman’s opportunity to hold the Government to account on that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Tribunal powers in guardianship cases: burden of proof

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Currently, where an application is made to the appropriate tribunal by or in respect of a patient who is subject to guardianship, the patient can be discharged only if they can prove to the tribunal that they do not continue to meet the guardianship criteria. The burden of proof is on the patient. The clause will amend the Mental Health Act so that it will now be for the local authority responsible for the guardianship to prove to the tribunal that the patient continues to meet the guardianship criteria. As the independent review pointed out, the current burden of proof is “out of line” with all other applications to the tribunal. The Government consider that this should be remedied.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I fear that I may test your patience a little further on this occasion, Mrs Harris, but I rise to address clause 48. Although much of the Bill aims to modernise and humanise our mental health framework, and in many ways it does so commendably, clause 47 presents not only an opportunity, but a challenge: to ensure that we get the balance right between liberty and protection.

The clause will make an amendment to section 72(4) of the Mental Health Act 1983. As the Minister said, it will shift the burden of proof in tribunal proceedings concerning patients who are subject to a guardianship order. Under the current legal framework, it is the patient who must demonstrate that the criteria for guardianship are no longer met, by showing either that they are no longer suffering from a mental disorder or that continued guardianship is no longer necessary for their welfare or the protection of others.

Clause 48 would reverse that burden. It would place the onus instead upon the local authority to demonstrate, in the mental health tribunal, that the individual still meets the statutory test. The tribunal would be required to direct a discharge unless the authority can prove otherwise.

Let me be clear: I am not opposed to the principle of this reform. On the contrary, I believe that there is a strong case for rebalancing the legal dynamics in favour of the individual, particularly when we reach situations in which their liberty and autonomy are at stake. The principle of least restriction is not, or should not be, merely aspirational; it should be foundational to any mental health regime in a liberal democracy.

I say with equal conviction that the practical operation of such a change requires careful thought and adequate resourcing. It must be done under clear legal parameters. Precisely on those fronts, I seek clarification from the Minister and, if I may be so bold, I seek some improvements to this aspect of the Bill.

First, we must consider the legal principle at play. A reversal of the burden of proof in this context is not technical or incidental; it marks a constitutional shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Traditionally, as the Minister well knows, the burden of proof lies on the party making an assertion that departs from the status quo. In this case, that would ordinarily be the patient applying for discharge from the guardianship. However, when the state exercises more coercive powers—particularly powers that have an impact on an individual’s liberty and private life—it is appropriate that the state be required to justify those powers afresh, especially when challenged. That is the logic that clause 48 seeks to embrace. In broad terms, as I say, I support it.

The approaches are reinforced by our obligations under article 5 of the European convention on human rights, which protects the right to liberty and security of the person. It is clear that any deprivation of liberty must be justified not just initially, but on an ongoing basis. Jurisprudence from Strasbourg has repeatedly emphasised that periodic review mechanisms must be substantive and not merely procedural in nature. The state must show continuing justification and must not rely on past assessments or presumptions in its favour.

Clause 48 helps us to move closer to compliance with those principles, but the legislation, as drafted, does leave some important questions unanswered. What, precisely, is the standard of proof that local authorities must meet? Is it the civil standard on the balance of probabilities, or is it something higher, given the gravity of what is at stake? If we are to take this shift seriously, we must also give tribunals clear statutory guidance on how to interpret the new burden. Otherwise, we will fall into the trap of risking inconsistency in decision making, confusion among professionals and a potential increase in appeals and legal challenges.

Secondly, and crucially, I would like to press the Minister on the question of practical implementation. Changing the legal burden is not merely a matter of legislative drafting; it requires a systematic adjustment in how evidence is gathered, how professionals prepare for tribunal hearings, and how decisions are reviewed internally within local authorities. As hon. Members will know, local authorities are already operating under intense financial and operational pressures. Mental health social workers are often working with caseloads that stretch the limits of what may be considered reasonable. Legal teams within councils are often overstretched and under-resourced; if we now place them under a legal obligation to present a comprehensive, evidentially sound case for continued guardianship—perhaps at multiple intervals across an individual’s care pathway—we must ensure that they are adequately supported to do so.

What assessment have the Government made of the financial and operational impact of clause 48? Will local authorities receive new funding to enable them to meet that duty? Will social care professionals receive specific training on the evidential requirements now expected of them? Without such support, we risk not only undermining the intent of the clause, but creating a perverse outcome in which discharges may occur not because the patient no longer meets the criteria, but because the local authority lacks the capacity to make the evidential case in time.

I also caution against the risk of overcorrection. Although I fully support the principle that individuals should not bear an unfair evidential burden, we must not move so far in the other direction that we weaken the legitimate protective mechanisms that should be in place. Guardianship is not detention; it is a community-based measure designed to provide oversight and structure for individuals who may struggle to live independently due to serious mental illness. It is used infrequently and only where strictly necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I ask my hon. Friend to pass on our thanks to her sister for the vital work that she does in what I know can often be a challenging environment—we appreciate it. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that this is an important principle. There has been a remarkable drop in the use of police cells, which is to be warmly welcomed. We think that now is the time to make it clear, on the face of the Bill, that a police cell is not an appropriate place for these purposes.

The clause’s amendment to sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act will not change the police’s ability to intervene when someone is in a mental health crisis, nor their ability to detain someone in a cell when exercising their powers in relation to criminal, or suspected criminal, activity. The clause will prevent courts from temporarily detaining people with severe mental illness in prison as a place of safety while they are waiting to access a bed for treatment or assessment under the Mental Health Act. Under the reforms, a defendant or convicted person who meets the criteria for detention under the Mental Health Act for treatment or assessment must be transferred directly to hospital, or, in the case of children, to a hospital, surgery, community home or other place that the court considers suitable, ensuring that they receive swifter access to the care they need. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

You will be pleased to know that I will be briefer this time, Mrs Harris; I want to leave room for my Opposition colleagues. The intent of the clause is entirely sound: to treat mental health as a health issue, not a criminal one. However, the capacity of NHS services to provide timely and suitable alternatives remains in question.

With that in mind, I have three questions that I hope the Minister will be able to address. First, will the Government commit to publishing the implementation plan for ensuring adequate numbers of health-based places of safety across regions before the clause comes into force? Secondly, what contingency measures are currently in place or foreseen if no place of safety is available and police powers have been limited? Thirdly, can the Minister commit to an annual publication of data on hospital-based places of safety, their capacity and their use?

[Aphra Brandreth]

As we have heard, the clause removes police stations and prisons as designated places of safety for individuals in mental health crises, ensuring that they are instead taken to appropriate healthcare settings. In my view, this is a pragmatic and practical part of the Bill that supports patients going through an extremely challenging time. Perhaps, in the past, it has been all too easy to look to police stations as, if not the default option for those suffering a mental health crisis, certainly an easy one. That is not because police stations are the right place for patients, but because alternative provisions were not readily accessible.

Clause 49 brings about several critical changes. First, it redefines “place of safety” so that for adults it now refers exclusively to hospitals that are willing and able to provide care. For children and young people, the definition aligns with the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 but crucially, it explicitly excludes police stations. Furthermore, the clause repeals section 136A of the Mental Health Act 1983, which previously allowed police stations to be used in so-called exceptional circumstances. The crux of the clause is to recognise that a mental health emergency is a medical crisis rather than a criminal one, and our system must reflect that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I absolutely can give my hon. Friend that assurance. There has to be a team-based approach to this work. In any successful team, it is about ensuring that everybody knows their role and that everybody’s role within that team is appropriate. There has to be good collaboration and co-ordination.

That is why I must say that I am quite taken aback by the attempts in the other place to insert these clauses; I do not think that is a safe way to make legislation. That is why it is so important that we remove the clause from the Bill.

The statement that I referred to earlier, by all those eminent organisations, called it a

“radical proposal with a number of serious and potentially dangerous consequences”.

It also says:

“Delegating police powers to professionals without consulting them, or patients would be a very damaging way to make policy.”

It is important to restate what I said in an earlier sitting, namely that the majority of assessments under the Mental Health Act happen without police involvement, and that action is already under way to further reduce the amount of police involvement. However, we of course recognise the pressures that the police are facing and that police involvement can be stigmatising for people who are detained. Almost all police forces in England and Wales are implementing the “right care, right person” approach, a police-led initiative to reduce inappropriate police involvement in cases where people have health or social care needs. There has already been a 10% decrease in section 136 detentions in the year ending March 2024.

There remain certain circumstances in which the police play a vital role in keeping particular people and the wider public safe. A blanket approach of extending powers in sections 135 and 136 to other professionals may not necessarily address the issues being faced by police officers and could create other unintended challenges. For example, while the current Act deliberately sets out who has what powers in what situations, a blanket extension of the police’s powers under sections 135 and 136 to other professionals—giving multiple agencies the same powers—risks confusion over who should respond in an emergency situation and could lead to delays in action as services try to decide who should act. That would be counter to our shared aim of ensuring that people in a mental health crisis get the right support as rapidly as possible.

We are also concerned that giving health and social care staff statutory powers that increase the number of situations in which they may have to use reasonable force could have unintended risks for the safety of staff, patients and the public.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I rise to speak briefly to clause 50, which expands the authority to remove individuals under Mental Health Act powers by allowing trained and authorised non-police personnel to carry out removals that previously could be carried out only by police constables. A couple of key changes arise from the clause.

First, the clause provides for the inclusion of authorised persons by amending sections 135 and 136 of the 1983 Act. That will allow individuals other than police officers, if they are authorised—“authorised” is the important word—to remove and transport people under Mental Health Act powers. That provides wider operational flexibility, and includes removals under warrant, by virtue of section 135, and without a warrant in public places. It is predicated on the fact that those authorised persons are appropriately trained and designated. Prior to the clause being inserted into the Bill, only police officers could carry out removals.

[Anna Dixon]

I am hearing that the hon. Gentleman supports clause 50, despite the very clear joint statement from organisations such as the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, the British Association of Social Workers, the British Medical Association, the Royal College of Nursing and the Royal College of Psychiatrists. They see huge risks, not least the risk of the measure having an impact on the therapeutic relationship between clinicians and their patients. Is he ignoring that?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention, but I am doing no such thing. I hope that I am doing my constitutional duty, which is to scrutinise the legislation and put some respectful challenges to the Minister about the operability of the clause were it to remain part of the Bill. Call me old fashioned, but I think that is what we are here to do.

The intent behind clause 50 is to support a more health-led response to enabling trained healthcare or crisis responders to act. That aligns with the Bill’s broader goals of reducing the perception of criminality around mental health illness and improving patient experiences.

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Member agree that section 136 is used when the police are alerted to a disturbance in a public place? If I saw a disturbance outside the Palace of Westminster, I would call the police, not a mental health professional. If the police arrive and think that the person is suffering from a mental illness, they will use the power under section 136. How can we give powers to health professionals to attend a public disturbance?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Gentleman speaks with a huge amount of experience and knowledge in this area. Of course, what he describes would be the default setting, but there may be scenarios in which a qualified healthcare worker is in the vicinity and can provide the support that that individual needs before the police can get there. The clause seeks to provide that flexibility. I acknowledge the split in the Committee on this, but the clause has some significant advantages: reducing police involvement in mental health crises, where that is most appropriate; improving response times, as I have just touched on; and supporting de-escalation.

I accept that there are operational and legal questions to be addressed, but we are here to look at all the potential scenarios. The Minister has clearly set out the consequences of removing the clause from the Bill, but it is perfectly possible that a Government Member on the Committee will choose to support it, and I therefore seek some clarification from the Minister on the operational and legal challenges around training, oversight and the uniformity of authorised roles were the clause to remain part of the Bill. How would training standards be mandated for authorised persons and who would accredit them? How would consistency in practice be ensured across NHS trusts and ambulance services? Will the Minister also clarify the liability position in a case in which an authorised person used force or restraint during a removal?

[Dr Evans]

I am pleased that the Minister has clarified that the Government intend to take out clause 50, because that allows me to take out some of my speech. It would not be appropriate for me to retread the entirety of the argument—we have been through it, and I am aware of the numbers on the Committee—but I will address a few points, because the clause is important.

The clause would keep the role of authorised persons for the purposes of sections 135 and 136. Hon. Members will know that this is not a new issue, as we debated the removal of the definition of authorised person in relation to clause 5. On that occasion, I expressed my concerns about the risk of doing so, which were shared by Baroness May, who rightly argued that we must stop treating mental health as a policing issue and start enabling care to be delivered by the right person in the right way at the right time. This clause gives us a chance to make that principle real.

Clause 50 allows certain non-police professionals, defined as authorised persons, to use existing powers under section 135 to enter premises under a warrant and remove a person in a mental health crisis to a place of safety or assessment of care. It also allows those professionals to use powers under section 136, which is even more sensitive, permitting the removal and detention of a person from a public place without a warrant if they appear to be suffering from a mental health disorder.

The clause is not about weakening safeguards. It is about strengthening the frontline and moving away from a model where the police are the default responders to every mental health crisis, which is often not because they are best placed, but because no one else has the authority. As modelling has shown, 95% of mental health-related police calls do not require a criminal justice response. Officers are spending hours, even days, sitting in A&E with patients in distress, because no one else is trained and empowered to act.

Clause 50 helps to break that cycle. It creates a legal basis for trained health professionals—mental health nurses, paramedics and approved mental health practitioners —to intervene in crisis situations, rather than relying solely on the police.

The hon. Member for Ashford asked how we decide, but we already triage people when they ring 999 or 111. How do we decide who gets an ambulance for what sounds like a heart attack or stroke? That decision is made by clinicians. We have the ability to make those triaging decisions, and I think it is completely appropriate to try to empower the health services to find a better way of dealing with these people.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

Clause 51 will reform the Bail Act 1976 to prevent courts from remanding a defendant for their own protection where the only concern relates to their mental health.In response to the independent review, a commitment was made to end the use of prison as a place of safety. Those reforms were welcomed, but concerns were raised about the use of a similar power under the Bail Act 1976 to remand a defendant to prison for their “own protection”. That power can sometimes be used when the court is concerned that the defendant’s mental health presents a risk to their own safety.

Nobody should be sent to prison because they are struggling with their mental health, so the clause will amend the Bail Act to prevent the remand of a defendant for their own protection solely on mental health grounds. Instead, courts will be directed to bail the defendant and work with local health services to put in place appropriate support and care to address risks to their safety.

The clause does not amend the court’s power to refuse bail in respect of a child or young person for their own welfare, because it is already the case that youths cannot be subject to a custodial remand solely for mental health reasons. However, in exceptional circumstances it may still be necessary for a court to remand a child to local authority accommodation for their mental wellbeing, and for that reason the power is preserved.

On clause 52, patients from the Crown dependencies—the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man—currently cannot be transferred to England and Wales under sections 35, 36 and 38 of the Mental Health Act. The clause will introduce new powers to enable the Crown dependencies’ courts to send patients who are subject to their equivalent of remand under sections 35 or 36, or an interim hospital order under section 38, to suitably secure hospitals in England and Wales for treatment and assessment. The changes will ensure that that vulnerable cohort of patients can receive appropriate and secure treatment in England and Wales, while enabling the Crown dependencies’ courts to maintain control of the criminal proceedings, so that justice can be done swiftly and efficiently.

Finally, clause 53 will ensure that where provisions in the Mental Health Act provide for the processing of personal data, any such processing, including the sharing of data, is subject to data protection legislation, including the Data Protection Act 2018 and the UK general data protection regulation principles. For example, personal data—including special category data such as health data—is likely to be contained in a report produced under clause 4, which inserts clauses specific to people with a learning disability and autistic people, so that their care, treatment and differing support needs are identified, and recommendations are made to ensure that those needs can be met. That report will be shared with the bodies set out in the clause, including the patient’s responsible clinician, the relevant integrated care board and the local authority.

Clause 53 will ensure that such processing of personal data must comply with the controls and safeguards in the legal framework that governs the use of personal data. That includes compliance with key principles such as lawfulness and fairness, and adherence to high standards of information security, privacy and transparency.

In essence, the provision means that where there is a duty or power under the Mental Health Act to process personal data, the processing—including the sharing—of the information must be done in a way that will not contravene data protection legislation, including the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018. In turn, among other things, that requires personal data to be processed lawfully, fairly and transparently, and confers certain rights on data subjects to access that data and have any errors rectified. That gives vital reassurance to patients about the processing of their personal data under the Mental Health Act. For those reasons, I commend clauses 51 to 53 to the Committee.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I ask for a series of clarifications from the Minister about all three clauses. On clause 51, how will the courts be supported in identifying community-based alternatives to remand? What training or guidance will be provided to judges in applying the provisions effectively? What assurances can the Minister give that support pathways will be available before and after the changes have taken effect?

I accept that clause 52 is a technical a change to the legislation, but it is an important clarification none the less. It will require some robust co-ordination between jurisdictions and clearer procedural safeguards. How will the Government monitor the implementation of proposed new schedule A2 to ensure that patients’ rights are preserved during transfers? Will guidance be issued to courts and practitioners in the UK and the Crown dependencies about the new procedures, particularly their cross-jurisdictional nature? What consultation has taken place, and will continue to take place, with authorities in Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man before the measures are implemented in law?

Finally, I recognise that clause 53 is arguably a sensible safeguard. The challenge will be to ensure compliance on the frontline, especially where legal duties to share information and duties to protect confidentiality can butt against some degree of tension. With that in mind, what support or training will be given to health and care professionals to navigate overlapping legal duties? Will the Minister publish sector-specific guidance on data sharing as a consequence of the Bill? How will the Government assess whether the legal framework strikes the right balance between patient safety and privacy?

[Dr Evans]

Clause 51 amends the Bail Act 1976 to restrict the court’s ability to remand individuals in custody for their own protection or, in the case of children, for their welfare, where the sole concern is mental health. Under existing law, the court may refuse bail to a defendant if it is satisfied that the individual should be kept in custody for their own protection. For those under 18, the relevant test is whether custody is required for their own welfare. Those provisions are found in schedule 1 to the Bail Act.

There is currently nothing in statute that precludes the court from remanding someone entirely on the basis of their mental health conditions—for example, if the defendant appears to pose a danger to themselves but no suitable mental health provision is immediately available. Clause 51 aims to change that. It amends all three parts of schedule 1 to the Bail Act—those dealing with imprisonment and non-imprisonment offences—so that the adult defendant, aged 18 or over, may not be remanded in custody for their own protection if the only concern is mental health.

Paragraph 360 of the Government’s explanatory notes states:

“Evidence suggests that in some cases this power is being used by the courts to remand defendants into custody where they would otherwise have been bailed were it not for the court’s concern for their mental health.”

The intent here is good: to end the inappropriate use of custody—especially in prison, as we have been discussing—as a place of safety for people with acute mental health needs. The clause is consistent with the wider direction of the Bill, which seeks to ensure that people in crisis are met with healthcare and not handcuffs. Although I support the clause, I have a few questions and concerns about how it will operate in practice, and invite the Minister to consider further safeguards.

Where is the alternative provision? That is a question we will keep asking, not in the form of an attack, but as something helpful for our consideration. We are told that instead of custody, courts may impose bail conditions under section 3(6) of the Bail Act, such as requirements to engage with mental health services or, where the statutory criteria are met, remand the person to hospital under the Mental Health Act. That sounds reasonable, but the reality on the ground is often different. We know from NHS data, and from countless reports by inspectors and charities, that community mental health services are stretched, beds are scarce and out-of-hours support can be lacking.

What assessment has been made of local mental health capacity to absorb those individuals who, under clause 51, will no longer be eligible for a custodial remand? Do the Government know, for example, how many are currently in that position? If the law changes overnight, how much extra provision will be needed for these specific patients? How will the Government, specifically on remand patients, ensure that there are places? What are the requirements, if any, on NHS integrated care boards to ensure that a place of safety or support is available in every local area? Without that, there is a real risk that the courts will be left with no safe options, particularly when a person presents in crisis late at night, in distress and with nowhere else to go.

Are the bail and hospital powers workable substitutes? The explanatory note refers to courts using the power to remand for mental health reports or treatment, but the orders depend on medical evidence, the availability of beds and local agreement. They are not always available at the moment when bail is being considered. Meanwhile, bail conditions, however well-meaning, cannot guarantee care or prevent harm if services are not responsive. Has the Department considered issuing new statutory guidance to accompany the clause, outlining what courts should do when no hospital or community support is available, but the defendant is clearly at risk? Further to that, will there be a formal route for courts to escalate concerns to NHS bodies where no safe custodial options exist?

We also need to consider children and young people. As I read it, the clause applies only to adults. The Government are arguing that section 98 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 already prevents the remand of children solely for mental health reasons. Does that not potentially leave a loophole? I am no lawyer, but the Bail Act still allows for remand for the child’s own welfare, and the revised wording in clause 51(2) and (4) does nothing to prevent that being interpreted in practice as the mental health concern that we have been discussing. Why have the Government not taken the opportunity to clarify in statute the status of children? They must not be remanded to custody solely on the basis of mental health-related welfare concerns.

Finally, how will we track the effects of the changes? I suggest that there must be ongoing scrutiny of how the clause operates. To that end, will the Minister commit to releasing annual statistics on the number of people refused bail under the provisions, to reporting on incidences where a safe, non-custodial alternative was not available, and to monitoring outcomes for those affected by the changes? Does the data fall under NHS or Ministry of Justice datasets? It is important that we understand who is responsible.

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[Aphra Brandreth]

It is a pleasure to continue to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of new clause 12, which has been tabled by the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, and to comment on clause 54, which has been grouped for this debate alongside it. Those two provisions both deal with the care and treatment of children and young people admitted to hospital for mental health reasons. In doing so, they touch on one of the most sensitive and critical responsibilities we have as legislators: safeguarding vulnerable children at a moment of profound crisis in their lives.

Clause 54, as introduced in the Lords, will place a duty on the Secretary of State to review whether the current requirement to notify the Care Quality Commission should be extended. Currently, notifications are required only when a child or young person is placed in an adult ward for more than 48 hours. The clause asks whether that threshold remains appropriate, and whether other scenarios—for example, where a child is admitted for assessment or placed in an adult setting even for less than 48 hours—should also trigger notification. That is a welcome first step, and I support the clause.

However, I also recognise the limitations of a clause that asks the Secretary of State only to review existing safeguards, rather than requiring that those safeguards be strengthened. That is why I also support the aims of new clause 12, which sets out a more detailed and practical framework to ensure that children are admitted to adult wards only when there are truly exceptional circumstances, and always with appropriate scrutiny and documentation.

The issue has been a consistent concern across multiple reviews, including the independent review of the Mental Health Act, the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Each has made clear that existing protections are insufficient and that too often, vulnerable children are still being placed in inappropriate settings. That concern was echoed in evidence submitted to this Bill Committee by the Children and Young People’s Mental Health Coalition. Their written submission sets out the risks in stark terms.

In 2023-24, the CQC was notified of 120 instances in which a child or young person was placed on an adult ward. We also know that between December 2023 and November 2024, 319 children were sent out of area to receive treatment, often far from their families, schools and local support networks—that is nearly one child every single day. Those are not just numbers; they are children and teenagers, many already facing significant trauma, mental health challenges or adverse life experiences. They are often the most vulnerable young people in our society. How they are treated in the days and weeks following a mental health crisis may have lifelong consequences for their wellbeing, development and future.

The Mental Health Act and the code of practice are already clear: children should not be admitted to adult wards except in emergency situations, and even then, only if it is in their best interests. But as the Committee heard in written evidence, that standard is not always met in practice. Young people have reported feeling terrified on adult wards, with an expectation that they behave like adults in environments that were never designed for their needs. That is why new clause 12 is so important: it would give legal weight to existing guidance by requiring that any such admission was explicitly justified in writing, with clear reasons why no other options were available or suitable.

The new clause would also ensure that steps were taken to protect the young person during their time on the ward and, crucially, to transfer them to a more appropriate setting as soon as possible. It would also require immediate notification to the regulator when a child was placed on an adult ward or was out of area for more than 24 hours. Those are simple procedural safeguards, but they really matter. Requiring decisions to be explained and recorded helps ensure they are properly thought through, and provides transparency, oversight and a route to accountability.

I appreciate that the Government are seeking to address the issue through updates to the Mental Health Act code of practice. I welcome that intention and I recognise the role that the code can play in setting out professional guidance, but, with respect, I do not believe that is sufficient on its own. When children are being placed in adult psychiatric wards, potentially for weeks at a time, or being sent far from home in moments of crisis, we must do more than issue guidance—we must provide clear legal safeguards. This is not about placing unrealistic constraints on the NHS or criticising frontline professionals, who we know are working under significant pressure with limited resources. It is about ensuring that when difficult decisions are made, they are made transparently, in the best interests of the child and only when absolutely necessary.

We have a rare opportunity in the Bill to put those protections in place. I hope the Minister will consider the evidence submitted to the Committee, the recommendations of previous reviews and the cross-party consensus on the importance of getting this right. Let us not miss this opportunity to ensure that our mental health system treats every child with the care, dignity and protection they deserve, and to set out clearly and transparently the standards we expect when they are at their most vulnerable.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

You will be disappointed to know, Mrs Harris, that the notable contributions from my hon. Friends the Members for Chester South and Eddisbury and for Farnham and Bordon mean that my contribution will be even briefer than usual. [Interruption.] Rapturous support across the Committee—exactly the consensus-building that we are seeking to achieve.

I rise to speak in support of new clause 12. It necessarily addresses the inappropriate placement of children on adult wards, which is not just distressing but deeply damaging to those involved. The issue is about having child-centred safeguards. It is essential that we ensure that children under 18 are placed on adult wards only when it is absolutely necessary and there is no alternative. The new clause would not only support best practice—it aligns with clinical guidelines on age-appropriate care—but provide welcome legal clarity. It would strengthen and clarify the existing provisions within the Mental Health Act. For those reasons, I encourage all hon. Members to support it.

On clause 54, the Minister would be disappointed if I did not put a couple of questions to him.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Yes, I would.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

That is an invitation that I will remember as we go on in this Committee. On this occasion, I have just two questions. First, will any interim guidance be issued while the review is ongoing? Secondly, can the Minister commit that the consultation will be undertaken on a wide basis, and include patient advocates, child psychologists and safeguarding boards?

Because I cannot count, I will add a third question: did the Government consider an alternative to a two-year review period, either through an immediate extension of regulation 18 or perhaps a shorter period, so that these important changes can be put in place without delay?

[Dr Evans]

I will first speak to clause 54, to give context to my comments about new clause 12, which is in my name, and new clauses 17 and 20, tabled by the Liberal Democrats.

Currently, under regulation 18 of the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009, registered providers must notify the CQC if a child under 18 is placed in an adult psychiatric unit for longer than 48 continuous hours. The notification duty enables the CQC to monitor such placements and take appropriate action to protect young people.

The clause places a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to review whether the duty to notify should be extended to other cases when a child is admitted to a hospital or registered establishment for treatment or assessment of a mental disorder—that bit is really important. It also requires a review of whether the current 48-hour notification timeframe remains appropriate. As the explanatory notes make clear, the purpose of the review is

“to ensure that where a child is admitted...notifications are made to the CQC in appropriate circumstances”,

so that the regulator can respond effectively. That is a welcome and sensible provision. It recognises that safe-guarding in mental health settings must be comprehensive and responsive in changing circumstances. For example, children placed in settings other than adult psychiatric units, such as specialist units or community hospitals, may also face risks that warrant timely CQC oversight.

However, I have a few questions for the Minister. Given the potential risks to children placed even briefly in adult psychiatric units or other settings, is the 48-hour threshold for notification too long? Would early notification—perhaps on admission—provide better protection for young people? Are there known gaps in the current notification system? For instance, how often do incidents involving children in mental health treatment go unreported under the existing framework?

The review is to be completed within two years of Royal Assent. Given the urgency of safeguarding children’s mental health and wellbeing, would it be possible to provide interim updates to Parliament to maintain transparency? Will that be part of the written statement, or stand alone? Will the review consider notifications from private and third sector providers, as well as NHS trusts, to ensure that no setting is overlooked?

We must look at the role of the CQC. In another letter from Baroness Merron, the Minister in the House of Lords, she addressed some of the issues raised and laid out the rationale for her confidence in the CQC as it stands. The letter emphasises the CQC’s “multiple roles” under the Mental Health Act as an independent regulator of services, an investigator of complaints and part of the national preventive mechanism to safeguard human rights. It points out that in 2022-23, the CQC carried out 860 monitoring visits and spoke to over 4,500 patients and 1,200 carers. Those impressive figures speak to a considerable degree of activity and reach.

However, as we have debated, the Bill puts significantly more requirements on the CQC, and clause 54 is a further one. The letter also stresses the CQC’s evolving role and notes that the creation of a new chief inspector of mental health is under way—a recommendation from Professor Sir Mike Richards. The aim, we are told, is to

“put mental health on an equal footing with physical health in CQC”

and to ensure “better information sharing” and

“stronger focus on Mental Health Act compliance.”

All that is welcome, but we also need to scrutinise what is not said. While the letter asserts that

“we will have a regulator that all of us can trust”,

it concedes that that

“will take time to achieve.”

That is a fair admission, but it weakens the case for relying on the status quo while reforms are still being bedded in. If the CQC’s systems are currently being rebuilt or recalibrated, can we be confident that they are robust enough right now to identify and respond to safeguarding concerns, especially when they are about children?

Then, there is the 48-hour threshold for notification when children are placed in adult units, which clause 54 seeks to address. Do we really believe that a child being in an inappropriate or unsafe environment for 47 hours is acceptable? Should the default not be real-time notification on admission, with durations used only to prioritise the level of scrutiny? We should aim for real-time notification in the 21st century—after all, we can track a bus on our phones anywhere in the world. Should we not aim for real-time data to spring services into action? Forty-eight hours is a long time in a young person’s life.

The clause rightly instructs the Secretary of State to review those questions, but I urge the Government to approach the review with openness—not just to minor procedural tweaks, but to the possibility that more fundamental changes might be necessary. On that point, does the Minister envisage the review as a desktop-type data review, or will it engage with children and families who have experienced these placements? Will it examine how well the notifications currently translate into timely action by the CQC? Seeing the data is important, but acting on it is more so. How will Parliament be kept informed before the two-year deadline for reporting? Will that be part of the written statement?

All that leads me to our new clause 12, which aims to address a lot of the background I have set out. At present, the Mental Health Act provides for the detention of patients who require treatment for mental health disorders, including children. Section 131A of that Act governs the accommodation of patients in hospital wards, but lacks explicit safeguards preventing children from being placed in adult wards, except in limited circumstances. That has led to troubling examples across the country, where children have been admitted to adult wards because of a lack of appropriate CAMHS beds.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to make some brief comments on amendment 49.

I am sympathetic to aims of the hon. Member for Winchester in tabling the amendment. A patient who is being discharged from hospital may indeed require specific, targeted support. The overall success of their treatment and continued recovery can be greatly enhanced where the right structures are in place to support them in the community. The amendment rightly draws attention to social and financial stressors that may affect an individual at the point of discharge and in the weeks and months that follow. We all recognise that there is a pressing need for a more joined-up approach between in-patient services and community provision. Without that, we risk patients falling through the cracks and suffering unnecessary and distressing re-admissions. Better discharge planning must be at the heart of our efforts.

I have some concerns, however. Although I acknowledge the good intentions behind the amendment, it risks expanding the remit of independent mental health advocates beyond what might be appropriate. There is a delicate balance, but an important distinction, between advocacy and care co-ordination. Independent mental health advocates play a vital role, and it is essential that their independence and clarity of purpose be preserved. If we are not careful, we risk blurring that boundary. In doing so, we may undermine the very effectiveness of the independent mental health advocate in fulfilling their primary function.

The role of an IMHA is to support patients in understanding and exercising their rights under the Mental Health Act. They may already be involved in supporting an individual to prepare for discharge, including by contributing to plans for ongoing care and support. The amendment would significantly increase the breadth of that role and might shift the focus away from the core purpose of advocacy.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

My hon. Friend makes a pressing point. Does she agree that if the amendment is accepted, there will be a requirement for additional training to deal with financial and social support, which goes outside the current scope of these important advocates?

[Aphra Brandreth]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. This is not a simple or straightforward addition; it would require potentially substantial training. We would not want somebody in a role that they were not adequately prepared for. With any amendment, we would need to ensure that training, and the time and expense of it, had been factored in.

Even with the best intentions, the success of any extended support role, such as that envisaged in the amendment, will ultimately rely on the availability and integration of local services. Where appropriate services are in place and are working well together, advocates can play a valuable role in signposting and supporting access. Rather than placing additional responsibilities on the IMHA, our focus should be on working with community providers to ensure that the necessary support, particularly for social and financial needs, is consistently available and is effectively joined up across the system.

Having said that, I recognise and welcome the emphasis placed by the hon. Member for Winchester on the role of carers and family members. Too often, they are overlooked in discharge planning, yet their involvement can make a critical difference to a patient’s successful transition from hospital to home. When carers feel informed, supported and prepared, it gives patients the reassurance and stability that they need to continue their recovery with confidence. The primary responsibility of the independent mental health advocate, however, must remain their responsibility to the patient. I am concerned that the drafting of the amendment could create ambiguity about who the IMHA is principally there to support.

Financial stress is undoubtedly a real and urgent concern. Mental ill health can severely affect an individual’s capacity to work, to manage their finances or even to engage with systems of support. Equally, financial instability can exacerbate mental health difficulties. Those are serious challenges that must be addressed, but I would question whether the IMHA is the right professional to take on that role directly. Instead, we should ensure that they are well placed to refer individuals to appropriate services without assuming responsibility for co-ordinating that support themselves.

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By making automatic referrals more frequent for restricted patients and introducing automatic referrals for conditionally discharged patients, we are improving access to the tribunal. That will ensure that patients who lack the ability or initiative to make an application to the tribunal can benefit from the safeguard of increased independent judicial scrutiny of their detention by the tribunal.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak on clauses 30 to 33, which go to the core of the rights architecture that surrounds mental health law in this country—namely, the oversight and challenge mechanisms available to individuals subject to detention, supervision or conditional discharge. I think we are all aware that the 1983 Act, although fit for its time, has failed to keep pace with the evolving understanding of mental health illness and modern expectations of legal accountability or procedural fairness. The clauses, although technical in nature, seek to rectify a number of the long-standing shortcomings in the operation of the mental health tribunal system.

Clause 30 will extend and clarify the time period within which patients may apply to tribunals. Essentially, it will do two things. First, it will extend the application window for section 2 patients—those detained for assessment—from 14 to 21 days. Secondly, it will reduce the initial waiting period for section 3 patients and those under guardianship from six months to three months. Those are sensible and overdue changes, because 14 days is a narrow window for any legal action, let alone one initiated by an individual who may be experiencing acute psychological distress.

Extending the application window to 21 days provides a fairer opportunity to seek representation and prepare a meaningful application. Equally, the reduction of the initial period for section 3 and guardianship patients to three months offers an important safeguard against prolonged detention without scrutiny. It restores a measure of clarity between the gravity of the detention order and the speed with which it may be challenged.

The clause will also clarify the rights of conditionally discharged restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions—that is, those who are discharged from hospital but required to comply with supervisional residence requirements that are so restrictive that they cross the legal threshold for a deprivation of liberty. At present, those individuals occupy a legal grey zone: they are not formally detained, yet the liberty they enjoy is so curtailed that it raises significant questions as to their article 5 rights. Clause 30 will properly address that anomaly by creating a defined, regular route of appeal, initially between six and 12 months from the imposition of the deprivation of liberty conditions, and biannually thereafter. Those are measured and proportionate changes that enhance access to justice, improve compliance with human rights obligations and restore clarity to a field that has suffered, at times, from legal opacity.

The reforms are not without consequences. A wider cohort of eligible applicants and more frequent review periods will inevitably increase the burden on the tribunal service, on legal aid provision and on clinical teams who must prepare documents and attend hearings. That challenge is not to be dismissed lightly.

[Gregory Stafford]

Does my gallant and learned hon. Friend have any information on the current waiting times for tribunals? What does he expect the effect of the changes proposed in these clauses to be on waiting times?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My hon. Friend makes a pertinent point. We all know, from our casework or personal experiences outside of this place, about the pressures on the Courts and Tribunals Service. Mental health tribunals are not exempt from that pressure. Changing the timeframe on which tribunals operate, and the frequency with which reviews take place, will inevitably increase the burden on the service. Therefore, although these changes are broadly welcome, it is important that we are cognisant of their impact on the resources that will be required, the number of judges and wing members that will be needed, and of course the hard standing of the court and tribunal infrastructure that will need to be made available. Other issues, such as those around the digitalisation of the service, will also need to be addressed.

Clause 31 will recast the regime for automatic tribunal referrals, replacing the prior six-month structure with the concept of “a relevant period”. For detained patients, referrals will now occur at three months, then 12 months, and annually thereafter. For community patients, they will occur at six months, then 12 months, then annually. Most significantly, hospital managers will be under a new duty to refer a case when no review has occurred in 12 months, regardless of whether an application has been made. That is a sound reform.

The clause will introduce coherence to a previously fragmented system, and establishes a minimum standard of legal oversight. The inclusion of a backstop provision—that no individual should go more than 12 months without review—is essential. In a system in which patients may not always have the means or capacity to apply for a review themselves, it offers a critical safety net. Clause 31 will also repeal section 68A of the 1983 Act, which has become unwieldy and duplicative. By streamlining the referral process, the Bill enhances legal clarity and administrative efficiency, but I would caution that the increased complexity of the new timeframes may require significant training of those responsible for their implementation.

Clause 32 will provide for restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. It goes further than clause 30 by imposing mandatory referral duties on the Secretary of State. Under the clause, a tribunal must be convened after 12 months, every two years thereafter, and at four years if no review has occurred. Crucially, the clause also codifies the tribunal’s powers. It may now vary or impose conditions, including those that constitute a deprivation of liberty, provided that they are necessary to protect the public from serious harm and are no more restrictive than hospital detention. That clause introduces a principled, proportionate framework for balancing public protection with patient liberty, and avoids vague or discretionary use of such powers.

Finally, clause 33 will apply the same principles to restricted patients not subject to deprivation of liberty orders. Such individuals, although under fewer constraints, are none the less subject to significant legal orders. The new requirement for a tribunal review at two years, and every four years thereafter, ensures that oversight is regular and non-discriminatory.

All four clauses are united by a clear objective to rationalise tribunal access, enhance procedural safeguards and bring the Mental Health Act into alignment with modern standards of fairness and proportionality. However, I will close with a caveat: rights without resourcing are hollow. If we are to place greater demand on the tribunals service, and to rely on it as the guardian of liberty for thousands of individuals, it must be adequately funded, staffed and supported. Legal representation must be accessible. Tribunal members must be properly trained. Hospital managers must be equipped to meet their new responsibilities.

With those reservations, I broadly welcome clauses 30 to 33 as a necessary recalibration of our mental health law. They reflect the dignity of the individual, the demands of public safety, and the enduring principle that no one should be deprived of liberty without fair or timely review.

[Natasha Irons (Croydon East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of clauses 30 to 33. I echo many of the remarks of the gallant and learned hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, but I will try not to go over too much of the same ground.

These clauses seek to provide clarity and improvement in access to the tribunal process, both for patients detained under the Mental Health Act and for those on conditional discharge, and seek to implement key recommendations from the independent review. Section 66 of the Act is amended to extend the period in which a patient detained under section 2 can apply to the tribunal from 14 days to 21 days. Clause 30 also allows for auto-enrolment in a hearing, reducing that time from six months to three months. It clarifies that conditional discharge patients are included in this package, so they also have the right to have their treatment reviewed at a tribunal. Providing for auto-enrolment simplifies the system for people who, as the hon. Member mentioned, are perhaps not in the best position to make administrative decisions and fill in the paperwork to apply to a tribunal.

Although this framework and these changes are necessary to bring clarity and autonomy back into people’s healthcare, it would be good to hear from the Minister about how we will support patients throughout these processes as we learn about the different timelines. How will we ensure people can access this change in the system and understand what they are entitled to under this new provision?

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[Anna Dixon]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. I will briefly speak in support of clauses 36 to 40. These clauses reflect the principle of least restriction, albeit for people who are subject to part III, and who are therefore subject to the deprivation of liberty conditions. It is really important that there are frameworks around conditional discharge, and these clauses will do a lot to bring it in line with best practice, and to put the limit set out in the best practice guidelines on a statutory footing to ensure that there is a 28-day transfer. To be successful, that will require multidisciplinary working between the health and justice systems. With that in mind, will the Minister give an assurance that he is confident that the 28-day limit can be met? If there is already data on how many transfers are made within that time limit, in line with best practice guidelines, that would give some assurance that the new statutory time limit is likely to be met.

I am pleased to see that the time limit should be breached only in exceptional circumstances, and that the Bill specifies that a shortage of hospital beds or staff does not constitute exceptional circumstances. It is really important that that is not used as a reason not to transfer or discharge people later than the 28-day limit. Some of the discharge test rests not only on whether there is a risk of harm to another person, but on a public test. Can the Minister clarify how those two tests will work in tandem? Is that already being done in practice?

Finally, I note that the evidence that we have received from the Care Quality Commission says that it welcomes closing the legal gap following the High Court ruling, as set out in the explanatory notes. However, the CQC believes that supervised discharge should be used only “when strictly necessary”, and I know that there are ongoing discussions between the Department’s officials and the Care Quality Commission. Can the Minister give an update on those discussions and clarify what role, if any, the CQC will play in the oversight of these measures?

As the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said, clauses 67 to 70 bring the Bill in line with youth justice practices and terminology, and with immigration policy. It is important that we take the opportunity to make sure that the Bill is fully up to date and in line with other pieces of legislation, so I support the clauses.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I rise to speak in support of clauses 36 to 40, which provide critical legal clarification and technical refinements to the 1993 Act. While differing in scope and impact, each of these provisions is underpinned by a clear shared commitment to enhance public protection, uphold patient rights, and ensure that the legal framework reflects both current clinical practice and developments in case law.

Let me begin with clause 36, which addresses a long-standing lacuna in the legislative architecture governing conditionally discharged restricted patients. It follows the 2018 Supreme Court ruling in the case of Secretary of State of Justice v. MM, where it became clear that the existing Mental Health Act did not permit the imposition of conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty as part of conditional discharge. The decision created uncertainty for clinicians, tribunals and, most crucially, risk-managed patients living in the community. It is therefore pleasing to see that clause 36 seeks to address that gap. The clause introduces new statutory powers for both the Secretary of State and the first-tier tribunal, in respect of imposing deprivation of liberty conditions in the community. It does so with some stringent safeguards.

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[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I will speak briefly on schedule 3, which makes a number of important amendments to the 1983 Act concerning the role of independent mental health advocates. The schedule implements several practical reforms to provide consistent and accessible advocacy and support for individuals receiving mental health care. It builds upon existing statutory provisions by extending the right to advocacy beyond detained patients and setting out clearer expectations of how and when advocacy services should be made available.

One of the most notable changes is the extension of IMHA eligibility to include informal patients—individuals receiving voluntary treatment rather than under compulsion. This responds directly to the recommendations made in both the independent review and the 2021 White Paper, which identified disparities in support available to different patient groups. Under these reforms, access to advocacy is no longer limited to those detained under the Act. Instead, all qualifying patients, including informal ones, will be eligible for IMHA support where appropriate. This change reflects the recognition that voluntary status does not necessarily equate to full understanding or confidence in navigating care decisions.

To ensure that eligible individuals are aware of and able to use this support, hospital managers will now be required to notify advocacy services when a patient becomes eligible. This automatic referral mechanism removes the onus from patients themselves to initiate contact, many of whom may not be aware of their rights or may face barriers to asserting them. In turn, advocacy providers will have a duty to arrange an interview with each referred patient to establish whether they wish to use the service. This helps to close the loop between eligibility and engagement, and ensures that advocacy is offered in a timely and structured manner.

Schedule 3 also sets out clearer responsibilities on both hospital managers and advocacy providers. Clearly, that will improve co-ordination and ensure the consistent application of the policy across different care settings and regions. In practice, it should help to reduce gaps where eligible patients might otherwise miss out on support due to ambiguity around who holds the responsibility for initiating contact. It is worth noting that these reforms complement the broader set of changes proposed in clauses 41 to 44, which collectively aim to strengthen patient rights, increase transparency in decision making and improve the overall quality of patient experience in mental health services.

This approach has a number of potential benefits. First, it is likely to improve access to advocacy for groups who have historically been underserved. These include informal patients, individuals with communication difficulties and those less familiar with the mental health system. Secondly, it enhances procedural fairness by ensuring that patients are supported in understanding their options, raising their concerns, or appealing decisions where necessary. Thirdly, it brings the statutory framework into closer alignment with human rights principles and best practice standards, particularly in terms of informed participation and supported decision making.

There are, however, three specific practical challenges that I wish the Minister to acknowledge. First, these reforms will require sufficient resources for advocacy services, particularly as demand is likely to increase once eligibility is broadened. Secondly, effective implementation will depend upon robust co-ordination between hospital managers and external advocacy providers, which may vary in capacity and capability across regions. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s approach to ameliorating that. Thirdly, there is a risk of inconsistency in delivery without clear national guidance and adequate oversight mechanisms, so I would be grateful if the Minister could address the mechanisms that are intended to be put in place.

These are not insurmountable issues, but they highlight the importance of a carefully planned implementation strategy, supported by training, monitoring and adequate funding. Schedule 3 represents a targeted and proportionate set of amendments that support the underlying aims of the Bill to ensure that all individuals receiving mental health care, whether formally detained or not, are able to access independent support, understand their rights and participate more fully in decisions about their treatment. [Interruption.]

[The Chair]

My apologies for the noise in the corridor; there was meant to be a yoga event in here at 6 o’clock. I thank the Doorkeeper for trying very hard to keep everything under control.

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[Aphra Brandreth]

I rise to make a few brief remarks about clauses 42 to 44, which would amend the 1983 Act to place statutory duties on hospital managers to supply complaints information to both the patient and the nominated person in respect of detailed patients, patients subject to a CTO and conditionally discharged patients.

These are important clauses. The people concerned are potentially vulnerable individuals. They need to know that they have a voice in this process and feel empowered to speak out and complain, should they wish. There is a duty on hospital managers to ensure that detained patients understand how to make complaints. However, I ask the Minister how that duty will be checked and evaluated. We all agree that the ability to speak out to make a complaint is important, but we need to ensure that proper safeguards and parameters are in place on how that will happen.

I also welcome the provision requiring that the information must be provided as soon as is practicable. That is important to give patients confidence. The timing requirements will potentially make a huge difference. The journey of a patient may change rapidly over the course of their treatment, so not leaving it too long will potentially make a substantial difference to their ability to recover swiftly, and ensure that they have been able to speak out if they are concerned not just about their detainment but about the way that their treatment is being carried out, and the potential implications of that.

Like many of the measures that we have discussed, these clauses might have administrative implications. We need to ensure that we have fully considered and are able to put in place the necessary support for hospital managers to deal with complaints appropriately. It is important that if someone comes forward with a complaint, it can be dealt with swiftly.

As mentioned on some other matters, we need to ensure consistency for patients, so that they understand the information that they are being provided and that, whatever region they might live in or hospital they might be at, consistent information is provided. I would like the Minister’s reassurance on that point.

Overall, however, the clause improves patients’ awareness of their rights and how they can seek redress. I think we all agree that that is extremely important. It will promote accountability in mental health services by encouraging feedback and complaints. I would like reassurance of some oversight to ensure feedback on any complaints that come forward so that we identify where consistent issues come up, to provide better services not just to the individual but to future individuals. Overall, the clauses support better outcomes by addressing potential grievances and ensuring that they are addressed early and constructively, so I am supportive of them.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

You will be delighted to know that I will be mercifully brief, Mrs Harris, because I am broadly supportive of all three clauses. Having worked as a doctor in clinical practice, and as a barrister, I am cognisant of the importance of transparency, patient autonomy and procedural fairness, in particular with vulnerable patients who are often seen in a mental health care setting.

I welcome this trio of clauses, but I have some gentle challenges to put to the Minister for when he gets to his feet. First, how will data be captured on the information that is to be provided to patients and their families? What feedback mechanisms will be in place, not just for patients but for those who support them—their carers and families—and for clinicians, on the practicalities of how the system is working?

[Sojan Joseph]

I was a clinician and I practised on wards; patient records are electronic for staff. When staff complete the explanation of section 132 rights, they record that on the electronic patient records. Does the hon. Member agree that that would be a good place to get the data?

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[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Member makes a very valid point. There is that mechanism, but this is also about ensuring that the quality of the information that has been imparted—not just the process of it being done—is recorded. An audit process must ensure that the important conversations and information are imparted in a way that the patient and their family understand, in sufficient detail and as part of a process whereby, if there are concerns or doubts, they can be addressed in a ready manner. I take his point that there are metrics by which to measure things, but it is not just about capturing data; it is about capturing quality data in order to ensure that that is being fulfilled.

To pick up on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Chester South and Eddisbury about regional variability, consistency across the board is important not only in the regions, but in the delivery methods and capacity that underpin this crucial service.

Finally, on potential confusion and legal information being communicated in inaccessible ways, it is important that legalese does not get in the way of clarity for individuals who will have to navigate the information. I am interested to hear the Minister’s views on how we can ensure that the information is imparted in an accessible way for all those concerned—importantly, not just for patients and their families, but for clinicians who have to impart the information. They need to feel comfortable navigating their way around what can often be a complex set of regulations and legislation.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Aphra Brandreth]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. If parents are not acting in the best interests of their children, there is a wider safeguarding issue that needs to be considered. One would question why such parents had been left in a situation in which they have responsibility for their children and are potentially harming them.

That leads me nicely to another point, which is that introducing the additional wording would bring mental health in line with physical health. For someone under the age of 16, it is their parents who have the responsibility to act in the best interests of their physical health; it seems to me that one would expect the same for mental health. I therefore urge the Committee to support amendments 54 and 55.

Let me return briefly to the overarching aims of clause 24. I underscore the point that the wider principle at stake—patient autonomy—is one that I support. The ability to make informed choices about one’s care should be a central component of our care system. In mental health, where individuals can feel particularly vulnerable, that becomes even more essential. Granting patients the power to nominate someone who will advocate for them, advise them and represent their wishes is a powerful act of empowerment. Moreover, this change enhances safeguards for patients. It ensures that the person acting on their behalf is someone they have chosen and trust. It reduces the potential for conflict and opens the door to a more collaborative and compassionate model of care.

If the Committee agrees to the amendments, which would provide the necessary safeguards for children, who I believe should be considered separately to adults, my overall view is that clause 24 represents a pragmatic, compassionate and patient-focused update to the Mental Health Act. It aligns with our modern understanding of mental healthcare and puts trust, respect and dignity at the heart of our legislative framework.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to amendments 54 and 55, which propose that where a nominated person is appointed to represent the interests of a patient under the age of 16, that individual must hold parental responsibility. At face value, that is a concise and apparently straightforward proposal. However, as with much in the Bill and in our mental health legislation more broadly, what appears simple can raise intricate legal and ethical questions. I therefore wish to probe both the merits and the challenges of these amendments. I do so not to come down firmly on one side of the argument or the other, but in the hope of assisting the Committee to think through the implications of the amendments. I hope to prompt the Minister to provide further clarification as our consideration of the Bill proceeds.

I will start by setting out the case in favour of the amendments. There is an intuitive and, I would argue, legally grounded rationale behind amendment 54. It rests on the principle that serious decisions concerning a child’s mental health—decisions that might involve treatment without consent, or even deprivation of liberty—ought to be taken, or at least overseen, by somebody who already holds recognised legal responsibility for that child.

Parental responsibility is not merely administrative. It carries statutory and common-law duties to protect, support and advocate for a child’s welfare. By requiring the nominated person to have such responsibilities, the amendment seeks to ensure a level of legal legitimacy and continuity. It would strengthen the position of those with a formal bond to the child and might help to guard against the risk of unsuitable or ill-informed individuals stepping in to play such a critical role.

In that sense, amendment 54 reflects what many would see as good legal hygiene. It would bring new legislation into closer alignment with the Children Act 1989 and with broader child welfare practice. It would create a baseline expectation that only those with legal authority over a child should make, or help to make, decisions of such magnitude. It would also offer reassurances to families. For parents and guardians already concerned about the complex and sometimes opaque processes of mental health detention, the amendment offers a clear signal that their role cannot be set aside lightly. That reassurance may be particularly important when children are subject to long-term care or involuntary treatment. However, questions begin to surface at precisely that point, because although the principle appears sound, the practice is far from straightforward. It is therefore important that we probe both the advantages and disadvantages of the amendment.