Oral Answers to Questions
Wayne David Excerpts(13 years, 1 month ago)
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Mr Lidington
I think that the previous Minister for Europe was sold a pup, although he was not helped by the fact that at the time his Chancellor and Prime Minister were not talking to each other, even about the figures that they used in those negotiations. I can assure my hon. Friend that in the negotiations on the new multi-annual financial framework, the Government will defend the British rebate, which we believe remains completely justified.
Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)
Given the importance of the eurozone to Britain, what are the Government doing to ensure that Britain is not excluded from decision-making processes that will have a direct impact on our economy?
Mr Lidington
We are ensuring that we engage fully on a bilateral basis with those of our partners who are members of the eurozone and with the European institutions. We also remain in regular contact with EU member states that are not part of the eurozone. I find, from talking to eurozone and non-eurozone members alike, that there is a common acceptance of and support for the participation of the UK and other non-eurozone members in discussions and decisions about the single market and the direction of European economic policy. There is no wish to relegate us to a side room.
Inter-Parliamentary Scrutiny (EU Foreign, Defence and Security Policy)
Wayne David Excerpts(13 years, 2 months ago)
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Richard Ottaway
My hon. Friend makes his point well and I rather share the sentiments behind it. For the benefit of those who bring up illustrations of the weight that the European Parliament places on these issues, however, may I draw attention to some of the details of the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report?
Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)
Before the hon. Gentleman moves on from consideration of the European Parliament I must say that I take the points that a number of Members have raised about it. I find the recommendation before us somewhat surprising in its suggestion that the European Parliament should be involved in the new body, which should be for national Parliaments primarily. Would it not be better simply to acknowledge that the European Parliament has its own distinct mode, but that national Parliaments have theirs as well?
Richard Ottaway
It was felt that the European Parliament has some expertise in this area, but the hon. Gentleman leads me neatly on to the details of our proposals that I was about to set out. The European Parliament would have the same sized delegation to the proposed conference as all other Parliaments, which is six members. With the 20-plus members of the EU each having six members, and only six from the European Parliament, it is clear that the European Parliament will not be in a dominant position. I will come back to the rival proposal in a few moments.
What is proposed is that, as set out in the Lisbon treaty, we establish an EU inter-parliamentary conference on foreign affairs, defence and security, to be known as COFADS, which would meet twice a year. Its members would be the EU national Parliaments and the European Parliament; the Parliaments of the EU candidate countries—Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Turkey—would be invited to attend as observers. The conference would be able, but not obliged, to adopt conclusions by consensus, which would not be binding on participants or their Parliaments. It would replace the current informal conferences of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairs and Defence Committee Chairs, known respectively as COFACC and CODCC.
The urgency of today’s debate is connected with the fact that the Assembly of the Western European Union has already held its last regular plenary session and will hold an extraordinary final session in May. The forum that is trying to establish agreement on a future inter-parliamentary scrutiny committee is the EU Speakers’ conference, which will meet on 4 and 5 April. It will consider a proposal presented by the Belgian presidency, on which comments are invited. They must be submitted by 14 March, hence the need for the debate to be held today.
The Speakers’ conference is already aware of the Foreign Affairs Committee report and the parallel report from the House of Lords. If the House of Commons approves the Foreign Affairs Committee report today, we will of course make that known to the conference, and the Speaker or his representative at the conference will be able to refer to the motion. Given the United Kingdom’s importance in relation to European foreign, defence and security issues, the express view of the Westminster Parliament could be expected to carry considerable weight.
The Belgian presidency proposal—the rival proposal—would put the European Parliament in a stronger position than the proposal in the FAC report. Under the Belgian proposal, the European Parliament would be able to send up to a third of the participants in the new conference. It would co-chair the rotating presidency country Parliament, and it would provide the secretariat. In my judgment, that is not the kind of national Parliament-led forum that we want. It is not in keeping with the intergovernmental nature of the common foreign and security policy. Today’s debate, and the motion, constitute a key part of the effort to get that message across to the Speakers’ conference.
The FAC report has been widely circulated, and efforts are under way to seek support actively. I am able to report, with pleasure, that either through the passage of resolutions or through correspondence, the French, Swedish, Czech and Portuguese Parliaments, or committees thereof, have already indicated their support for the model proposed in the FAC report rather than the proposal from the Belgian presidency. It would therefore be a matter of some international difficulty, not to mention embarrassment, if the House were to decline to endorse the approach that we have taken.
Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)
I begin on a lighter note. Earlier today I was talking to my good friend and colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn), and he told me that Lord Tomlinson, when he was a Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister in 1978, had the pleasure of speaking to the WEU Assembly. There was a point of disagreement, and he shouted out that it should be wound up. The chant came, “Never, never, never!” Some 33 years later, Lord Tomlinson has apparently had his wish.
I am a big advocate for, and supporter of, parliamentary scrutiny of international, and particularly European, affairs. The European Scrutiny Committee does excellent work, which we saw very clearly on Third Reading of the European Union Bill, and the Foreign Affairs Committee does an excellent job. I was a member of the ESC for a number of years, so I can vouch for its excellent work.
As a member of the ESC, I was also a member of COSAC. The role of national Parliaments was enhanced by the Lisbon treaty, and it is important to stress that there are opportunities for Parliament to increase its role and effectiveness in European affairs. Parliament has a lot still to do—it needs to get its act together—but a step forward has been taken. However, although scrutiny of European legislation in national Parliaments is important, it is not enough. We need to co-ordinate and co-operate with the Parliaments of other member states. I am pleased that that is beginning to happen through COSAC, which has become more effective over the past few years.
With the end of the WEU and its parliamentary Assembly, it is important that the good work that COSAC has established is built on and extended. That is why the Opposition warmly support the proposal for the EU inter-parliamentary conference on foreign affairs, defence and security to meet twice a year and to work closely with COSAC.
The Opposition also agree entirely with the three fundamental points set out in the report: that the role of national Parliaments should be explicitly recognised and that they should have meaningful oversight of EU foreign, defence and security policies; that value should be added to the individual work of national Parliaments; and that the arrangements should be inter-parliamentary. The last of those points recognises, as hon. Members have said, that common foreign and security policy, and common security and defence policy, essentially involve intergovernmental co-operation at European level. It therefore makes sense for national Parliaments to take the lead role in scrutiny and oversight.
I have a couple of points in response to the debate, and perhaps the hon. Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway) will respond to them when he concludes. First, as a former Member of the European Parliament, I am not against its involvement, but I take on board the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes). Unfortunately, there is a tendency inside the European Parliament to push for more influence all the time, irrespective of the subject area. That is certainly true of defence and foreign affairs. I am not saying that the European Parliament should be unable to express an opinion and through its Members exert influence, but questioning whether it is appropriate for the Parliament to send its Members to COFADS.
The justification for that could be that the Parliament is involved in COSAC, but we are talking about intergovernmental co-operation. Therefore, the emphasis in COFADS should be entirely on national Parliaments coming together. Will the hon. Member for Croydon South comment on that when he concludes, because it is important to bear that in mind?
The Opposition entirely agree that observers from national Parliaments should attend COFADS when it meets twice a year. I also welcome the fact that applicant member states of the European Union should send observers. However, I point out that although countries such as Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Turkey have the facility to send observers, for some strange reason Norway and Albania will be formally excluded from sending representatives. It is unfair and unreasonable not to have a bit more flexibility, because they are, after all, European members of NATO. I ask for that to be looked at once again.
In conclusion, by and large we are strongly in favour of the proposals put forward. I certainly take the point that what we have before us is far better than the suggestion from the Belgian presidency, which I view with concern. We believe that the administrative proposals set out are sensible and appropriate, and that the costs are being kept to a minimum. That is appropriate and correct. Equally, it is important to recognise the good work done by COSAC, and we want to ensure that the proposal from the House seeks to build on that.
European Union Bill
Wayne David Excerpts(13 years, 2 months ago)
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Mr MacShane
We can enter into a political science or constitutional debate on the nature of decision making in the EU—which, I remind right hon. and hon. Members, spends only 1% of Europe’s gross national income—but the plain fact is that the Commissioners are appointed and it is the Council of Ministers that takes decisions, as mandated by its member countries. It is no more a legislature than it is a legislative process when one goes to negotiate a treaty on the law of the sea or on new environmental rules.
Mr MacShane
There is a curious alliance between two distinguished former Members of the European Parliament—my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris)—in saying that perhaps this House can learn from the European Parliament. Other right hon. and hon. Members might care to look at that.
The European Union will be taking very big decisions on Friday, when there are two special meetings of the Council, the first of which—
Mr Shepherd
I believe so, because there is a matter of the most profound trust involved. When Ministers speak at the Dispatch Box, we trust that they are telling the truth. That is one of the rules and we must hold them to it—[Interruption.] No, that is a convention of the House. Ministers have fallen when they have lied at the Dispatch Box.
Mr Buckland
I want to make a few brief remarks about what is, on the face of it, a very laudable new clause. It is proposed by a number of Members whose reputations for seeking more openness in the transactions of government precede them. However, I hesitate to support it for several reasons, many of which have been ably outlined by other Members during the debate. In an intervention, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips) really got to the heart of one problem with the terminology used in the new clause, particularly the word “relevant”, which is used in subsections (1) and (2).
Mr Buckland
I disagree, because I think that the term used in the Bill in relation to significance is very well couched. It has been explained very carefully and is backed up by a careful and clear text. There is a list in the Bill of the particular aspects that will trigger a referendum. I am afraid that I do not think that our points about those two words are analogous.
The word “relevant”, which I am focusing on, causes lawyers and all those with an interest in the law much difficulty in a wide range of issues. For example, an application for relevant documentation made before a criminal trial can cause much debate and argument on precisely what the term means. Frankly, I can see the same thing happening with the new clause and the issue going before the courts. In other words, I can see a judicial review of a particular laying of documentation by a Minister as part of the process, which again would make juridicable those issues that are properly dealt with by this House. I do not think that that is the intention of the Members who tabled the new clause, but it would be an unfortunate and unforeseen consequence of the use of that terminology, because what is relevant to one person will not be relevant to another. I can see a long and exhaustive list of documents being laid before the House and yet more requests being made for further documentation, which will then have to be ruled on by a court. Those would be regrettable consequences that none of us wants to see.
Another main problem with this rather wide-ranging new clause is the fact that not all the documents would be in the possession or ownership of the UK Government. It is clear from the phrasing of the new clause that many of the documents will have been drafted by either EU officials or other member states. Therefore, they are not under the ownership or control of the UK Government; they are what we call third-party documents.
The new clause would therefore have a great impact on the position of other member states and the institutions of the European Union. As we have heard, from my hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) in particular, other member states have their own procedures and ways of dealing with pre-negotiation positions, and many are dealt with in secret. Are we to say that this House has a right to interfere directly with the procedures of other member states?
My hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd), in his eloquent speech, said that what is for the Danes is a matter for them, but I am afraid that the new clause would drive a coach and horses through that, because what is for the Danes would no longer be a matter for them; it would become a matter for us. In effect, we would decide to disclose documentation that they, under their procedures, did not want formally disclosed, and that would have a consequence for our relations with other member states in the context of freedom of information.
Such a decision would also have a consequence for existing regulations on access to EU documents. The current regulations, to which this country is a signatory, provide rights of access to documents held by EU institutions, and with the consent of those institutions the documents can then be disclosed to the public. The new clause would override and potentially conflict with that rule, and that is a problem—a practical difficulty—which makes questionable the fundamental deliverability of the aims of the proposed change. We cannot legislate in a vacuum, and we cannot ignore the rules of other member states or the rules and regulations to which we are a signatory.
Ironically, in an attempt to assert the power of this House to scrutinise negotiation and legislation, we risk interfering directly with the domestic arrangements of other member states, and I am absolutely sure that many who have spoken in today’s debate, who always speak so eloquently about the rights of nation states in the European Union, would not want that to happen.
I yield to no one in my fervent belief in transparency and openness. I believe fundamentally that some of the previous Government’s conduct was a negation of democracy, and, if the European Union is to be sustained as an institution that is worthy of the trust and support of not just its members but its peoples, much more must be done to increase that transparency.
Finally, I also believe fundamentally that we have to be realistic and strike a balance between the interests of openness and the interests of efficient and effective negotiation. My hon. Friend the Member for Dover, in his speech—
Mr David
Before the Minister finally moves on, I point out that I have been thinking long and hard about what to buy the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) for Christmas, and now I am going to buy him a drum kit.
I welcome the tone and content of the Minister’s comments about having more scrutiny in the House. May I suggest to him that we really need to reinstate the twice-yearly debate about Europe before the Council meetings? Before he responds that that is an issue for the Backbench Business Committee, I once again implore him to ensure that Government time is provided for those debates.
Mr Lidington
I know that the hon. Gentleman has at least been consistent in pushing that line, but I have to remind him that his party, when it was in office, and all other parties, agreed unanimously to changes to our procedures and the organisation of parliamentary time that explicitly gave responsibility for those biannual debates on European matters to the Backbench Business Committee rather than the Government.
We have heard this afternoon about the importance of decisions in the EU to everybody in the country, and it would be a good expression of Parliament’s understanding of that point if Back Benchers of all parties put pressure on the Backbench Business Committee to make a debate on Europe a priority, instead of debates on the other matters that the Committee has chosen in response to Back Benchers’ demands. Back Benchers’ priorities should be debated in Back-Bench time, and I believe that most of us present this evening would like the Committee to feel that a debate on Europe was what Back Benchers wanted. I hope the hon. Gentleman will persuade his colleagues of that.
Mr David
As we come to the end of this Third Reading debate, it is worth reflecting on the impact that the Bill has had on Britain’s standing in Europe and the world. With unemployment rising and living standards falling, and with people the length and breadth of Britain concerned about the health service and the education of their children, this Government have placed before Parliament a Bill that is monumentally irrelevant to the needs of this country.
Although there are parts of the Bill that Labour Members support, I believe that we have demonstrated that large sections of it are ill conceived, ill thought out and contradictory. While the Government have singularly failed, and did not even try, to address the issues that are at the forefront of the minds of the British people, they have succeeded in sending a clear message to our partners in Europe—that this Government do not have a coherent European policy. Where we should have consistency and vision, we see inconsistency and ambiguity. Instead of promoting our national interest in the European Union with vigour and determination, we see a Government ignoring the reality of the modern world—a Government who look in on themselves and see bilateralism as a simplistic alternative to the multilateral engagement that is vital in a fast-changing world.
Such an approach is determined not by what is in Britain’s national interest but by political expediency that places above all else the maintenance of an unholy coalition of pro-European Liberal Democrats and Conservative Eurosceptics. However, as the seven days of debate on this Bill have demonstrated, the Eurosceptics have recognised that this Bill is a ham-fisted attempt to placate them—and if that has been the intention, it has clearly failed. I disagree with many of the arguments of the Eurosceptics, but I recognise their honesty and tenacity. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) for his work and that of his Committee, the European Scrutiny Committee. Without their hard work and the excellent documents that they have produced, the debates in this House would have been nowhere near as good as they were.
If the Government have failed to buy off the hon. Member for Stone and his colleagues, they have failed, equally, to convince prominent Liberal Democrats that their anti-European tone is more apparent than real. Only this morning, I received a copy of a letter sent by a federalist Liberal Democrat MEP who is a former leader of the Lib Dems in the European Parliament—Mr Andrew Duff. Mr Duff has written to the President of the European Parliament, Jerzy Buzek, proposing a new treaty provision. It is interesting to see what he has written. I quote from his letter:
“Dear Jerzy…As you will be well aware, the British Parliament is about to enact a law which will install and entrench referendums as part of the UK’s national ratification process for all important amendments of the European Union treaties…That being the case, I believe the time has come to lighten somewhat the European Union’s procedure for treaty revision…I propose that”
the European
“Parliament launches an initiative…so that all future treaty revisions will enter into force once they have been ratified by four fifths of the States.”
This means that Mr Duff wants to abolish the need for unanimity among member states and is quite happy for treaty changes to be imposed on the British people and the British Parliament. If anything shows how the Bill has exposed the fault lines in this hapless coalition, it is that absolutely ridiculous letter from the Liberal Democrat, Andrew Duff.
To be serious, one of the most worrying consequences of the Bill is that it seriously questions Britain’s full participation in the European Union. Nowhere has that been more keenly demonstrated than in the comments of the United States ambassador to the United Kingdom. Just a few weeks ago, Ambassador Susman stated that the United States valued the special relationship between the US and Britain. However, he thought that it was also vital for Britain to play a strong role within the EU. Because of the negativity caused by the Bill, Mr Susman felt that it was necessary for the UK to rule out withdrawal from the EU. I am pleased that the Prime Minister has done that. The United States recognises, even if this Government do not, that Britain’s influence in the world requires it to be an active participant in the EU.
After consideration in this House, the Bill will go to the other place. I sincerely believe that it will be scrutinised in detail, and that its fundamental flaws will be not only criticised, but corrected. As it stands, the Bill will lead to a questioning of our parliamentary democracy, a weakening of Britain’s role in the world, and a diminution of our influence in the EU. The British people deserve better, and I hope—indeed, I am confident—that the other place will bring about the much-needed change.
Russia (Exclusion of Journalist)
Wayne David Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Mr Lidington
My hon. Friend makes good and sensible points. We consistently raise both individual cases and the broader issues to which he rightly ascribes importance with Russian visitors to the United Kingdom, but they are also raised by British Ministers and officials when visiting Russia, and we will continue that practice.
Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) for tabling this urgent question. I am sure that Members on both sides of the House will be extremely concerned about the detention and then the expulsion from Russia of Luke Harding. Freedom of the press should be one of the cornerstones of a modern democratic country. Therefore, this incident can only reflect badly on the Russian Government, especially as it is, unfortunately, not an isolated instance of the negation of press freedom. It is, indeed, of great concern that such a respected and highly regarded journalist as Mr Harding should be treated in such a way.
I am glad that the Government share the Opposition’s concern about what is happening in Russia, and I urge the Government to continue to make urgent and vigorous representations to the Russian Government. I also urge the Government to ask for specific reassurances regarding British journalists. Moreover, can the Minister urge the Prime Minister to raise the case of Mr Harding when he visits Russia later this year?
Mr Lidington
I can certainly assure the hon. Gentleman that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will raise human rights issues when he talks to Russian leaders, whether during his visit to Moscow that we hope will take place later this year, or at the margins of other international gatherings where he might meet members of the Russian leadership. It is very much in the interests of the Russian Government that they start to demonstrate that they respect international norms on human rights and media freedoms, not least because Russia itself has signed up to the various European and international conventions that embody those principles.
European Union Bill
Wayne David Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
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Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)
We are, of course, in a rather unusual situation with European Parliament elections, in that Gibraltar is included, and Gibraltar shares Members of the European Parliament with the south-west of England. What methods for determining the electors in Gibraltar have been used in the calculations?
Mr Lidington
I think that is a matter for the Electoral Commission. It advises that it has used the Sainte-Laguë method throughout, and in comparing electorates for each region it would have taken the Gibraltar electorate into account when making its calculation for the south-west. I undertake to double-check what I have just told the hon. Gentleman; if I have inadvertently led him up the garden path, I will of course correct that on the record, but I have confidence that the Electoral Commission has done its job properly.
Mr Lidington
I think the hon. Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) is demonstrating that he has political ambitions as yet unfulfilled.
I can now assure the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David) that expert advice has reached me confirming that my trust in the Electoral Commission was well placed and that the electorate of Gibraltar were indeed considered in the context of the south-west region and assessed in accordance with the Sainte-Laguë system.
The hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East asked me about the different options for selecting the additional MEPs. The protocol allows member states to choose between three options. First, member states could use the 2009 European parliamentary election results and elect the additional MEPs as if the additional seats had existed at the time of those 2009 elections. That is the method that we have chosen.
The second option would be to hold a by-election. In this case, that would mean holding a by-election in the west midlands region for a single MEP at an estimated cost of perhaps £10 million. The third option would be for member states to appoint temporarily one of their national parliamentarians to become the new MEP for the remainder of the current European parliamentary term. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East indicates that the hon. Member for Luton North or perhaps the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) might be candidates in such circumstances.
The previous Government decided in February 2010 that the UK’s additional MEP would be elected by reference to the results of the most recent European parliamentary elections, as though the additional seat had existed at that time. The present Government have continued our predecessor’s chosen approach, and the clauses are framed in that way. That is also the method used by the great majority of other member states that are gaining MEPs. In fact, some member states elected additional MEPs during the 2009 elections on the basis that they could take up their seats only once the transitional protocol had come into force.
Our chosen method avoids the delay and the cost associated with a by-election and would allow us to return the additional MEP as soon as possible after the approval of the relevant provision in the Bill. It also has the merit of being exactly the same method that we use in any case to fill a vacant British seat in the European Parliament after the death or resignation of an elected MEP. Again, these clauses and schedule 2 would apply only until the additional seat had been filled and until the next European parliamentary election, which is scheduled for 2014.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Election of additional MEP
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr David
May I briefly ask the Minister an additional question on the extra MEP, simply to gain some broader context? He mentions correctly that other member states have additional MEPs. Of course, as he points out, all member states must agree to adopt the necessary legislative procedures to bring about such MEPs, but what is the time scale? We are dealing with the situation now. I wonder whether other EU member states have had an opportunity to alter their legislation to bring out such MEPs. Are we waiting for them to do so? What is the time scale? That obviously has a bearing on when the MEP from the west midlands can take her seat.
Mr Lidington
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, and I apologise for having overlooked that question when it came from the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds). The most sensible thing for me to do would be to write to the hon. Gentleman with a full list and to deposit a copy of that letter in the Library for the information of all Members. However, the latest information available to me is that in respect of the other member states that are gaining MEPs—or, indeed, other member states generally, because the protocol must be ratified by all 27 of them, whether they gain or lose MEPs, or whether there is no difference in the number of MEPs from a country—something like two thirds to three quarters of member states have reached the stage of notifying their accession to the proposal, but others have not done so. Germany, for example, has debated the measure in the Bundestag, but my understanding is that Germany has not yet ratified it. We are awaiting news on where France is going. Some of the others, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Malta, have gone a considerable distance towards ratification already, but we are not right at the back of the pack, by any means. My expectation is that this measure will probably be ratified by all 27 member states later this year, but it could slip into 2012, because each member state can decide how high a priority it gives to this measure. I hope that that gives the hon. Gentleman an adequate holding answer for now, but I undertake to write to him with chapter and verse as soon as possible.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Election of additional MEP
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Second schedule to the Bill.
Mr Lidington
If the hon. Gentleman will allow me to make a little progress, I will explain where potential costs might conceivably arise. Any costs would consist of the minimal costs arising from the administrative expenditure of the returning officer of the west midlands electoral region. The costs involved there will depend on what those administrative costs are, but they are costs that would have to be budgeted for in the normal way. The returning officer does not have a blank cheque that he can draw on. If the seat could not be filled in accordance with schedule 2 and a by-election had to be held, there would be costs associated with that by-election, for which clause 19 makes provision. On our best current estimate, a by-election would cost about £10 million to run.
Mr Lidington
If a by-election were to be held, my understanding is that it would be held on the basis of the first-past-the-post system, if only one candidate could be elected. Again, if I am mistaken, I will correct the record.
Mr David
May I press the Minister a little further on that? I am sure that what he is saying is correct, but would it not be strange if all the other MEPs from Britain—in fact, I would guess all the other MEPs from every other European country—were elected under a form of proportional representation, yet this one individual was the only one elected under first past the post?
Mr Lidington
The fact that this is a transitional arrangement means that it is sui generis. As the hon. Gentleman will know, normally the European Parliament has a rule that a legislator cannot have a dual mandate and be a member of both a national legislature and the European Parliament. Here we have insisted that people had to leave active membership of the House of Lords in order to take a part in the European Parliament, and Members here have had to make a choice in the past when they have held a dual mandate in the House of Commons and the European Parliament about which they wished to pursue after a particular election. Special arrangements are being made because this matter is transitional.
Mr Lidington
That was possible for a long time, but the rules were changed and the right hon. and noble Lord Bannside, as he now is, decided to leave the European Parliament at the appropriate election because he wished to remain a Member of the House of Commons.
The other costs covered by clause 19 arise by virtue of clause 13, which provides that the Electoral Commission shall
“take whatever steps they think appropriate to promote public awareness… and… may take steps they think appropriate to promote public awareness of the subject-matter”
in connection with any referendums held, pursuant to part 1 of the Bill. Clause 19 provides for any additional costs incurred as a result of that activity.
It is also worth underlining the fact that since 14 July 2009 the salaries of Members of the European Parliament are paid from the European Parliament’s budget. The United Kingdom will make no direct payments as a result of the implementation of the transitional protocol on MEPs, so clause 19 makes no provision for any such payments.
Mr David
I would like to refer to one point relating to financial provisions. The Minister has referred to clause 13, which we debated last week, although in insufficient detail in my view. What possible costs could be incurred by provisions of the Bill relating to possible referendums, because the Electoral Commission is given tremendous scope? For example, clause 13(b) states that the Electoral Commission “may”—I stress that word—
“take whatever steps they think appropriate to promote public awareness of the subject-matter of the referendum.”
We have also discussed the fact that there could be referendums on extremely complex and almost esoteric issues, and the Government of the day would have to make an enormous effort to ensure that there was a reasonable debate among the public on the issue under consideration, rather than some other issue. Will the Minister spell out what sort of cap there could be on the Electoral Commission’s expenditure? We have also touched on the possibility that public money would be given to the campaign in favour of a change that a Government want and to the campaign against it. What sort of cap will be included for two opposing campaigns that could be initiated as a result of this legislation?
Mr Lidington
On current prices, a referendum, if held on its own, could cost between £80 million and £100 million. If it were combined with other elections on the same day, the figure might well be considerably less. However, these things would have to be calculated in detail at the time. It depends on factors such as whether another election is being held on the same day, so all the apparatus of paying for staff to set up polling stations and to count ballot papers is already being provided for, or it is being done as a one-off solely as a referendum on a European subject.
Mr Lidington
I was trying to respond to the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), but I will give way.
Mr David
These are very important issues. At a time of austerity, as the Government say, it is of great concern that there is such a lax approach to quite considerable sums. Does the figure that the Minister mentioned include merely funding for the conduct of a referendum, or does it also include the grants to organisations to enable them to put the respective arguments in a referendum?
Mr Lidington
I will come back to the hon. Gentleman having taken advice on that point. I would say gently to him, however, that giving the people their say, in the way they would expect, about the transfer of significant powers to act and make policy from this Parliament and this country to Brussels ought to be a high priority for Government expenditure. The reputation, not just of his party but of British politics in general, would have been a lot higher had the previous Government given a higher priority to spending money on the referendum that they had promised on the Lisbon treaty, rather than making a saving on that while spending billions of pounds on other objectives, many of which were of significantly less importance to the people whom we represent.
Mr David
I take my hon. Friend’s point about the comparison with the referendum in Wales on 3 March, but at the same time it could be said that that referendum is on an important constitutional issue—whether the Welsh Assembly is to have primary legislative powers. My concern is that the current Bill could lead us to have a multiplicity of referendums on very small, technical issues. A lot of public money might be spent on that basis.
Chris Bryant
My hon. Friend has essentially made my point for me again. As you are looking quizzical, Mr Hoyle, there is no need for me to detain the House longer. [Interruption.] No, it is quizzical, honestly. Well, it certainly is now, even if it was not a few seconds ago. I look forward to hearing the Minister explain why there is no provision in the Bill for a value-for-money test before there is a referendum.
Mr David
I am pleased that the Minister has gone out of his way to emphasise that there has been consultation and agreement with Gibraltar—I am sure that you, Mr Hoyle, will be especially pleased about that. However, will the Minister clarify further what consultation there has been with the devolved Administrations? I am thinking of the Scottish Parliament and Executive in particular, because I noted in evidence submitted to the European Scrutiny Committee that concern was expressed that elements of the Bill might impinge upon devolved areas. Certainly, when the evidence was submitted, those concerned were not entirely satisfied that the Government had taken that fully into account. Will he give a cast-iron commitment—if I can use that phrase—that there has been consultation, and that all parties are happy?
Mr Lidington
Yes, we consulted the devolved Administrations in 2010, at the same time as final policy approval was sought from Departments. The text of the Bill was circulated to the devolved Administrations as soon as it had been drafted and was available for circulation in Whitehall. We have tried to keep them as much in the picture as possible and as soon as was practical. As the hon. Gentleman will understand, the Government took office in May last year, and arranging policy clearance and then the drafting of the Bill has been an intensive piece of work. However, I do not think that the devolved Administrations have been treated in any way unfairly. I have assured them that the Government remain completely committed to what the Prime Minister has termed the “respect agenda”, and that we are committed to honouring in full the various memorandums of understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom and the devolved Administrations. I am happy to make clear that commitment once again.
Mr Clappison
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his comments. This has been a worthwhile debate and a worthwhile amendment, particularly in light of what he has just said. He has brought the commencement date forward one month further than had previously been indicated by the Government. Also, I agree with him that the arrangements in the Bill are much more satisfactory than the current arrangements, which were left to us by the previous Government, when it comes to any treaty changes that might come about as a result of changes to the eurozone. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr David
I should like to say a few words about the clause. The whole issue of when the Bill comes into effect causes us some concern, because it has been our contention from the start of our deliberations that the Bill is essentially window dressing. It is not an attempt to introduce genuine participation and accountability, but is instead, as a Minister has said, a rather crude attempt to tie future Governments.
Certainly, in terms of parliamentary scrutiny, I welcome what the Minister has said today and previously. Logically, many of things that the Government have announced in the Bill and in recent written statements are to be welcomed. We are firmly in favour of as much parliamentary accountability and involvement as practicable. Indeed, that was the whole tenor of the Opposition’s amendment at the start of our Committee deliberations. However, it worries me that we still have the important issue of the justice and home affairs opt-ins, particularly the European Court of Justice provisions, which will have to be considered during this Parliament. The Minister has been absolutely firm in his determination to ensure that although we will have additional scrutiny considerations regarding whatever a Government may decide to do, there will not be a referendum on this extremely important issue. These matters worry us greatly, because we contend that there is a certain amount of illogicality in the Bill. It is contradictory, it does not hold together and there is not a great deal of intellectual sense behind it. That is clearly illustrated by the whole issue of the ECJ opt-in provisions.
If the Government were true to their rhetoric, they would insist that the legislation would be introduced and that a referendum would be held during this Parliament if they decided to opt into those provisions, as some suggest they would like. That is why the whole issue of when different parts of the Bill commence and have legal effect is of tremendous importance. I want to register and reinforce the Opposition’s concern that the Government are approaching this matter in what we consider to be a totally ham-fisted way.
Mr Lidington
I shall be brief. I think the hon. Gentleman has a bit of a nerve. It was actually the Government whom he supported and served who agreed to the treaty that collapsed the third pillar, which communitised justice and home affairs, bringing those areas of policy under European Court of Justice jurisdiction when previously they had been intergovernmental. As we debated last week, we have as a Government announced that we shall be discussing with the scrutiny Committees and others the ways in which we can strengthen parliamentary scrutiny over justice and home affairs and give greater accountability of the Government to Parliament for those decisions.
We have said publicly, on the record, that the decision that must be made by 2014 on whether to opt out of or remain party to the pre-Lisbon corpus of justice and home affairs measures will be subject to a debate and to a vote in each House of Parliament. The previous Government made no provision for such an arrangement. They were content for the 2014 decision, which the hon. Gentleman now describes as of great magnitude, to be subject simply to the normal scrutiny provisions and for the Committee to determine whether to call it in for debate. I note that, despite all the hon. Gentleman’s strictures about there being no need for this Bill, he did not suggest that a hypothetical future Labour Government would seek to repeal the legislation. He knows the penalty that would accrue to any political party that tried to deny the people the democratic rights that they are being given under the Bill.
Mr David
In response to the Minister’s last remark, I would say simply that we have belief in the parliamentary process, and although the Bill may pass through this House, we are sure that Members of the other place will have enough wisdom and common sense not just to give it a mauling but to reject it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 7
Annual report on Part 1 of the Act
‘(1) The Prime Minister shall prepare and lay before the House each year a report on the operation of Part 1 of this Act.
(2) The report shall identify—
(a) any statements made in the previous 12 months under section 5, indicating specifically where Ministers have indicated an opinion under section 5(3) as to whether a treaty or Article 48(6) decision falls within section 4 of this Act, and any opinion given under section 5(4) of the Act on the significance of the relevant provision in relation to the United Kingdom;
(b) any powers and competences transferred under the terms of the TEU or TFEU from the United Kingdom to the European Union within the previous 12 months which—
(i) have, and
(ii) have not
required specific authorisation under any provisions of Part 1 of this Act;
(c) any powers and competences arising under any of the provisions of the TEU or TFEU referred to in Part 1 of this Act which have been repatriated to the United Kingdom from the European Union over the previous 12 months; and
(d) any such powers and competences which the Prime Minister seeks to repatriate to the United Kingdom from the European Union.
(3) The report shall also include—
(a) an assessment of the likelihood of further transfer of such powers and competences in the succeeding 12 months;
(b) a cost benefit analysis of the impact on the United Kingdom of any decisions made in the past 12 months under any of the provisions of the TEU or TFEU powers referred to in Part 1 of this Act.’.—(Priti Patel.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Priti Patel (Witham) (Con)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This is a straightforward probing amendment, designed to provide greater openness and transparency in connection with the Bill, and particularly the transfer of powers. It would give the public and Parliament an annual opportunity to review, in one comprehensive report, the powers transferred to the EU under part 1—for example, by providing a cost-benefit analysis of the impact on the UK of those transfers of powers—details of the powers that are likely to be transferred to the EU over the 12-month period and an indication of the powers that the UK seeks to repatriate from the EU.
Since coming to office, the Government have been at the forefront of pioneering the transparency agenda across all our politics. The new clause builds on those efforts, as the EU should not be exempt from robust parliamentary and—especially—public scrutiny. I believe it is essential that we keep a close eye on the powers that are being transferred to the EU, whether through referendum, Act of Parliament or ministerial decisions, for three reasons.
First, there is the matter of keeping a track record of the cost to this country of the EU’s having more powers, and letting people know who is governing Britain. Secondly, there is the matter of democracy and the public’s being able to hold the EU, the Government and Parliament to account for the decisions they take and the powers they ultimately exercise. Thirdly, there needs to be scrutiny of the powers handed over that are not deemed to be significant. After a single transfer, they may appear to be innocuous, but a series of such transfers over time may constitute naturally something more significant.
The Minister will be aware that the Government publish some of the details on the transfer of powers, such as the report on EU justice and home affairs matters that details the use of the opt-in protocol. More information of that nature across the Government should be published, and the new clause would facilitate an opportunity for the Prime Minister to present it to the House.
Priti Patel
Absolutely not! I believe that the Conservative party has very much embraced the views of the party that I represented back then. I have been campaigning for a referendum for more than 15 years, and the Conservative Government are now proposing it.
I was talking about the powers that have been handed over to the European Union. The European arrest warrant has been the subject of a great deal of debate in the House, and social and employment policies have cost the UK more than £38 billion. We have heard mention of the working time directive, as well as of waste in regional policies, economic controls and financial services, not to mention the endless regulations that burden our businesses, the £1 billion that the EU is seeking to fine the UK and the £50 billion, which I mentioned during questions today, that the UK is set to hand over as a net contribution over the next few years to 2016.
Mr Lidington
There are some elements of EU membership that could be put into such a calculus, but we cannot measure, in the way my hon. Friend wishes, things such as the diplomatic leverage that we obtain by being able to work in partnership with other European countries. [Hon. Members: “No!”] Some will differ from me in that analysis, but the fact that we were active members of the European Union helped us to achieve a package of sanctions against the Iranian nuclear programme last year that was tougher and more effective than either the United States or the Government of Iran believed possible. We were there at the table, so we were able to exert a powerful influence, in partnership with others, in the defence and enhancement of our national interest in securing sanctions against that programme, and we were able to overcome opposition from a number of other member states that weighed in the balance some very big commercial interests in Iran. That sort of advantage does not lend itself easily to the calculation that my hon. Friend invites me to make.
There are all sorts of things wrong with the EU as well, and we can find other occasions to debate its flaws, but the Government’s position is that membership of the European Union is one of the key ways in which we seek to advance the United Kingdom’s influence in the world.
Mr Lidington
I do not regard as insignificant or risible giving the people of the United Kingdom a final say over treaty changes that transfer new powers and competences from this Parliament to Brussels. We would have much more public confidence in politics, and a much better chance of positively putting the case for British membership of the European Union, if the public did not feel so betrayed by the absence of any endorsement, by means of a referendum, of past treaty changes.
On new clause 7, which my hon. Friend the Member for Witham moved, my response to our hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) indicates why some of what it seeks is not suitable. Subsection (2)(a), for example, would require a report on
“any statements in the previous 12 months under section 5”—
both the statement about whether such a treaty or decision transfers power or competence, and the statement on whether any transfer under Clause 4(1)(i) or (j) is significant.
It would not be onerous to include that requirement in an annual report, but there are unlikely to be so many treaties or decisions in any one year, so there would not be any real value in that information being collected and set out in an annual report. Under the Bill, there will be a minimum requirement for a written ministerial statement and an Act of Parliament before any such measures can be agreed, and that seems to represent sufficient transparency.
On repatriation, I listened to my hon. Friend the Member for Witham, who put her argument very powerfully and cogently. She knows that, under the coalition agreement, the Government are committed to examining the existing balance of competences and what they mean for Britain, and we continue to look at that issue.
The new clause raises some very important issues, and I welcome my hon. Friend’s aims of seeking much better value for money, more transparency and vigilance against competence creep within the European Union. Those matters are not for the Bill, however, which deals with treaty changes and ratchet clauses transferring powers or competences to the EU. We need to focus immediately on the individual issues to which she refers, measure by measure, as they arise in the Commission or as individual items of legislation, rather than taking up time preparing retrospective reports that I fear would be of largely historical interest.
What is relevant and important to the work of Ministers throughout Whitehall is for the Government to pursue with Parliament ways in which we can improve the scrutiny of EU issues and the opportunities for Parliament to hold Ministers to account for their stewardship of the United Kingdom’s interests in European discussions. I therefore urge my hon. Friend to withdraw her new clause.
Mr David
I do not wish to intrude upon private grief among Conservative Members, but I agree with you absolutely, Ms Primarolo, and you are absolutely correct that there is no question of the proposal being out of order.
The Minister gave a very interesting summation of the Bill, but he did not mention one crucial aspect of it. He did not say that referendums will not apply in this Parliament.
Mr Lidington
Assuming that the Bill gains parliamentary approval and Royal Assent in the normal way, it will apply during this Parliament from the time when it comes into effect. As I said earlier today, one illustration of that is that the treaty change proposed by Germany and being taken through EU institutions at the moment will have to be ratified by primary legislation rather than simply by a resolution of both Houses, as would be the case under the current legislation, which was introduced by the previous Government in 2008. What distinguishes this Parliament is that the Government have said, as part of their coalition agreement, that we do not intend to agree at European level to any proposal to amend the treaties or invoke passarelle clauses that would require a referendum under the terms of the legislation that we have been debating for a numbers of days now.
The referendums authorised under the Bill are intended to be final decisions. They will give people the opportunity to judge whether a particular proposal to give new powers to the European Union is in the national interest. One of the things that is troubling about the new clause is that it implicitly assumes that those who vote no to a particular proposition also want to challenge the UK’s membership of the EU, but I do not think that that can be taken for granted. As other hon. Members have said, there is a risk that some people could be influenced in how they vote on the substance of a proposal by a calculation of whether it would be likely to produce the end result of an in/out referendum. Such electors might take into account his or her views on the in/out proposal and not just the pros and cons of the measure on which they are being invited to cast a vote.
I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough overlooks the problem of a possible succession of referendums on Britain’s membership of the EU. It is possible to imagine that under a future Government—not this one—referendums on moving to qualified majority voting for common foreign and security policy and on joining the euro might be scheduled for two successive years. The new clause would leave open the possibility of an in/out referendum after one—or, indeed, both—of those referendums, because under his new clause a rejection of the first proposition would trigger an in/out referendum, which might result in the public deciding to stay in the EU. A second referendum on a treaty change might come forward 12 months later and also be rejected, and then, in the course of less than a year, we would find ourselves with two successive referendums on the UK’s membership of the EU. That is not a sensible way in which to conduct our relationship with the countries of the EU.
Nor does the new clause address what would happen if there were two questions on a ballot paper in one day, which we debated earlier. Why should a positive vote for one treaty change proposition and a negative vote for a second trigger a referendum? One cannot read into how people cast their votes on treaty change proposals what their view would be of the desirability of a referendum on membership. More fundamentally, however, the new clause does not capture the range of opinions held by the British people. The hon. Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey), whom I completely respect on these matters, said that she wanted people to be able to express a view on the direction that the EU was taking. However, that is not what people are being offered through the new clause, of course. They are being offered the opportunity not to express their view on the direction of the EU, but to say whether the UK should remain a member.
European Union Bill
Wayne David Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)
I would like to address my remarks to clauses 7, 8, 9 and 10, rather than to the amendments.
The Temporary Chairman
The hon. Gentleman will be able to talk about clause 7 when we come on to clause stand part.
Mr David
I thank the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) for providing an indication of what his Committee’s recent report says. We have heard over the last few days how important his reports have been in the consideration of this Bill. I also thank him for providing a useful context to the developing relationship between British law and European law.
During the last couple of days, we have heard a great deal from the Government about so-called direct democracy—enabling the people to make decisions themselves. However, it is worth remembering that the Conservative party has never been the party of devolution in Britain and it has always had a very limited definition of the European concept of subsidiarity. During the last few days, we have also discussed the exemption clause and the significance test—ways in which the Govt are substantially qualifying their apparent commitment to referendums. This afternoon, we go on to discuss the Government’s proposals for those issues that they deem, to quote the Minister for Europe, are “not of sufficient significance” to require a referendum.
Clause 7 sets out where primary legislation is required in such areas. It is interesting that the Government see Parliament playing a key role, but only on what it considers to be second tier issues—issues that do not require, to quote the Minister again, a “full-blown referendum”. Leaving aside the difference between a full-blown and a half-blown referendum, this differentiation between what is deemed appropriate for direct democratic decision making and for parliamentary decision-making well illustrates the incoherence and contradictions at the heart of this Bill.
For example, yesterday we heard from the Minister how under schedule 1 to the Bill any change to the appointment procedure of the advocates-general of the ECJ would attract a referendum. However, according to the letter that the Minister sent to his Back Benchers in November, a move from unanimity to qualified majority voting for decisions concerning the number of advocates-general would not attract a referendum, but would be covered by clause 7. Perhaps he will be kind enough to explain to the Committee why there are to be different procedures on those two related issues. It would be difficult in the extreme for any Government to explain why a referendum would be held on the one issue, but not the other.
It should be stressed that clause 7 is not about stopping changes at either the Council of Ministers or the European Council, because any member state can block a change to an internal passerelle clause. Clause 7 is only about providing parliamentary approval if the Government have already agreed to use one of the decisions set out in the clause. As my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds) pointed out yesterday, it would be extremely difficult for a Council decision to abolish unanimity in respect of the adoption of any future acts. Indeed, Sir John Grant, the former United Kingdom permanent representative to the European Union put the matter extremely well in his evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee when he said that
“everybody’s got to agree that some of them are going to be outvoted.”
It is extremely unlikely that such a scenario would arise, so in reality the impact of clause 7 will be very small indeed.
After clause 7 we have clause 8, which would give Parliament a greater role over the so-called flexibility clause in the Lisbon treaty, and after that there is clause 9, which deals with justice and home affairs issues. Yesterday we discussed how some justice and home affairs issues would be covered by a referendum; today we discuss some justice and home affairs issues that will not. In particular, I want to refer to opt-ins to measures
“under the area of freedom, security and justice”.
Interestingly, the Bill does not really deal with one extremely important area. Britain has a temporary opt-out in the Lisbon treaty with regard to certain justice and home affairs measures. Under that protocol there are transitional provisions that provide for the United Kingdom to participate—or not—in certain European Union justice and home affairs measures. For example, the Government decided not to opt in to the draft EU directive on human trafficking. They decided not to opt in to that directive at the start of the legislative process, making the same decision during that process and at its conclusion, although I understand that they are to review the position when it comes to the adoption of the directive.
We believe that this is an important issue—an issue that clearly has to be addressed on an international and a European basis. I understand that the Government have decided to opt in to the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography directive—and quite right too—but what about the issue of international human trafficking? Our view is clear: it is an important issue that Britain should be tackling in co-operation with our European partners. However, the issue before us today is whether it is sensible, according to the Government’s own logic, to agree to their proposal that such opt-in provisions should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, but not a referendum. We fully believe that there should be more parliamentary scrutiny. That is why we agreed to an enhanced role for national Parliaments in the Lisbon treaty. However, given that the Government have been arguing for referendums on important issues, why are they not proposing a referendum on such an important issue?
According to the protocol to the Lisbon treaty, the United Kingdom has an opt-in provision that will last for four and a half years. After that, Britain will be fully part of the justice and home affairs decision-making process. Last night we heard that the Government had absolutely no intention whatever of allowing referendums to take place before 2015 at the earliest. The question that I ask is: why? According to the Government’s own logic, if there are to be referendums on important changes that affect the United Kingdom, there should surely be a referendum on this justice and home affairs opt-in during the course of this Parliament. Nothing better shows the inconsistency and incoherence of the Bill than this. It is a muddled clause in a very muddled Bill.
So much for clause 9. Next is clause 10. If what we have been discussing does not make things complicated enough, clause 10 sets out a further six decisions that require parliamentary approval. It is as though the Government have gone out of their way to create a piece of legislation that is deliberately confusing, obsessively complex and designed to confound every constitutional expert in the land.
Let me be clear: we strongly support greater parliamentary involvement and greater parliamentary scrutiny. That is why Baroness Ashton, when she was Leader of the House of Lords under the previous Government, made a statement setting out commitments by the then Government for more parliamentary scrutiny on actions arising from the justice and home affairs protocols. Last week, this Government made a statement that reaffirmed those commitments, and I welcome that. However, we are genuinely concerned about the lack of clarity. This is an obtuse and even eccentric way of addressing serious constitutional issues. They are issues that affect the people of this country on a day-to-day basis, and the country and the House deserve better than the Bill before us today.
Mr Lidington
May I first respond to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash)? He spoke with his characteristic dignity, courtesy and thoroughness about the issue of EU accession. I am sure that he will understand that I want to look carefully at the report from his Committee, rather than responding on the hoof this afternoon. As he would expect, a subject of this significance needs to be discussed by Ministers collectively in order for the Government to come up with the thorough and considered response that every member of his Committee deserves.
Clause 7 fulfils the pledge made in the coalition programme for government that
“the use of any passerelle”—
or ratchet clause—
“would require primary legislation.”
It sets out that the Government may not agree to the use of a number of passerelles, or ratchet clauses, in the EU treaties unless the approval from this House is specified in an Act of Parliament.
As the Foreign Secretary and I have made clear in the past, there is no straightforward legal or treaty definition of a ratchet clause. The European Union (Amendment) Act 2008 listed 10 such clauses and limited the definition to use of the simplified revision procedure and to nine articles that allow for the giving up of the British veto in specific areas. When we considered that commitment in the coalition programme, we decided that that definition was insufficient. So for a start, we have put a referendum lock on many of the passerelles listed in the 2008 Act. We debated those matters earlier in our Committee proceedings. Others we have subjected to a primary legislation lock under clause 7. So the use of article 48(7) to give up the UK veto in an area that we did not include in schedule 1 to the Bill would, none the less, still require full parliamentary approval in an Act of Parliament. The same principle applies to any proposal to move to qualified majority voting in an area of enhanced co-operation in which the UK is a participant.
Mr Lidington
I am conscious of the pressure on time and I am going to try to make some progress.
Let me respond to the challenge from the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David) about the numbers of advocates-general. There are not 27 advocates-general, so we are not in the position of having one for every member state, but it is important that we retain the veto on this, and we have no intention of giving it up.
It is important for the United Kingdom to be able to approve the appointments of judges and advocates-general, and we felt that it was sufficiently important to be included in schedule 1.
Mr Lidington
There will be other opportunities for us to debate the number of advocates-general, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is ingenious enough to identify them. He and his hon. Friends have managed to weave the issue into every speech they have made so far at every stage of the Bill’s progress.
Mr Lidington
I am afraid that I am going to deny myself the pleasure of hearing a further explanation from the hon. Gentleman.
The other articles listed in clause 7—covering decisions on provisions for elections to the European Parliament, on the system of own resources of the EU, and on the adoption of provisions to replace the excessive deficit procedure—already require primary legislation before this country can agree to them, and clause 7 replicates those earlier requirements. Decisions under the articles listed in clause 7(2) would require approval in accordance with the constitutional requirements of the member state before the member state confirmed its approval of a decision. The four articles that I mentioned are also subject to enhanced parliamentary control in Germany following the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Lisbon treaty.
For the other decisions listed in subsection (4), primary legislation will be needed before this country votes in the Council of Ministers or the European Council. In other words, the Act will be needed before the United Kingdom can cast its vote. We intend that to happen before the final political decision to use the ratchet clause is made at European Union level but after official-level negotiations have been completed, so that it is clear to Parliament that that is the final text and it can make a decision on what is proposed without the risk of further changes.
Unlike the 2008 Act, the Bill does not contain a disapplication provision giving Ministers discretion to approve a decision that has been amended since being approved by Parliament. That is deliberate. We want Parliament to approve the final version, although it will of course be examining the proposals from an early stage under the existing arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny of European legislation.
I should emphasise that these provisions will apply only when the Government intend to agree to a measure. If the Government of the day did not support the exercise of any of the ratchet clauses, they would simply block their adoption. However, the pledge in the coalition agreement and the commitment in the Bill provide that when the Government would be in favour of such a decision, Parliament must approve it first.
Chris Bryant
Referendums in different countries operate in different ways. I think that I have heard the Minister say on a couple of occasions both here and elsewhere that there was never a referendum that supported the Lisbon treaty. That is completely untrue, as the Spaniards were the first to hold a referendum and it had an 83% or 84% yes vote, so he is wrong about that.
I think I have made my argument on Strasbourg.
Mr David
My hon. Friend is making a very important point. He has used the example of Strasbourg, but he is making a wider point. The process of change in the European Union, as anybody who knows anything at all about it will be aware, is based on negotiations. The point of the Bill is that it makes it impossible for future Governments in this country to negotiate in Britain’s national interest.
Chris Bryant
Absolutely. There are many different things in the European Union—many determined in treaty—that I want to change as a pro-European and as somebody who wants always to defend the British interest. I do not see those two things running counter to each other. My argument in essence is that the Government must have enough freedom to proceed in negotiations, so that they can gain concessions from the other side. If a country has already locked itself down, it is impossible to gain concessions from the other side.
Mr Clappison
That is why the opt-out is so very important, and that point brings me to the subject of this amendment.
Mr David
The hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) made an indirect reference to the opt-in by the Government on the European investigation order. The Government provided the reason—some might that think that it was an excuse—but it could not be scrutinised by the Scrutiny Committee here or in the other place because of the general election. If the political will had been there, would it not have been possible to have at least informal consultation with leading members of the outgoing Committee, so that the Government had an indication of informed Back-Bench opinion on the issue?
Mr Clappison
During the period that the hon. Gentleman’s party was in office, we tried informal consultations, formal consultations and many other forms of consultation, and we did not get very far. To be fair to Ministers, this clause is a step forward and improves on the position that they inherited. I am trying to go just a little further than that, because this is such an important issue. I seem to remember that we were told that the opt-out on justice, freedom and security was one of the differences between the defunct constitutional treaty and the treaty of Lisbon—that the UK had an opt-out. That was given as one reason why we did not require a referendum.
I also seem to recollect—I will be corrected if I am wrong—that justice and home affairs were described as one of the then Government’s “red lines” when they were negotiating the treaty of Lisbon. The former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said that he was not prepared to cross those red lines. The opt-out was one of those red lines, so if the present Government opt in to those areas, we will have crossed those red lines. That illustrates how important the issue is. However, I give credit to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench, because they are taking it very seriously indeed. They have made a lot of progress, but we are not talking about something over which, like it or not, the European Union has competence, because it does not. That is the important point.
We have opted out. We can sit back. We do not need to do anything as far as those matters are concerned. We are not in a position, which we would be in if we had not opted out—that is, if we had ordinary membership and were involved in ordinary participation—where we could be outvoted on qualified majority voting; nor, if something was subject to unanimity, would we face being in the possibly invidious position of being the only ones objecting to it, thereby holding up all the other members and preventing them from doing something that they wanted to do. Those considerations do not arise. We have opted out of those matters, and there is no pressure on us to opt in to them. Opting in would be a voluntary decision on our part, and would mean choosing to submit ourselves to the institutions of the European Union—the Community method and the jurisdiction of the European Court—and to abnegate self-government for this country on those matters.
Mr David
I would like to say a few additional words about clause 9, which follows on directly from what has been said. I do not want to repeat what I said earlier, but I hope that the Minister will respond to the points I raised earlier about the clause. Unfortunately, he simply dismissed my earlier question about the advocates-general. We are in Committee and we have every right to expect proper and considered responses from the Minister.
As the hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) said, this is an important issue. It has in the past been a red line in the negotiations, and the opt-ins that are possible in the not-too-distant future should at the very least be subject to proper debate and parliamentary scrutiny. That is absolutely correct. What I am concerned about, to return to a point I made earlier, is the apparent illogicality of the Bill. If, by common agreement, this is an important area, surely there should be careful consideration of whether or not there should be a referendum on this subject.
I am not arguing the case for having referendums generally—as I said in the debate a couple of days ago, there are profound conceptual problems in having a multiplicity of referendums—but I believe this is an important issue. If the Government claim to be producing a piece of legislation that is logical, coherent and systematic, I would like to know their argument for not having a referendum on these opt-ins.
Stemming from that, the Minister has made it abundantly clear—he made it very clear last night—that the Government will not contemplate holding a referendum until 2015 at the earliest, but the issue of these JHA—justice and home affairs—opt-ins will come to the fore in the next few years. It is therefore important to have a proper response from the Government, so the Minister should at the very least attempt to justify his position.
Mr David
I have some sympathy in policy terms with the Government on the issue of the European investigation order, but would it not have been possible to have had informal consultation with, let us say, the outgoing Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, rather than having no consultation with Parliament at all?
Mr Lidington
I cannot recall without advice whether the Committee had just been appointed but had not met, or whether it had not yet been constituted, but the lesson that I draw from that episode—and the Government were far from happy with the fact that we had to take a decision at the end of the three-month period without a formal scrutiny process—is that we have, in the forthcoming discussions, to find a way to address the real difficulty that arises during a Dissolution of Parliament and the period after that before the scrutiny Committees are fully reconstituted. What the new Government found on coming into office was that the EU’s legislative timetable on justice and home affairs had not stopped and there was an accumulation of measures, each with a non-extendable three-month timetable, at the end of which we had to decide whether to make the initial opt-in. A large chunk of that time had already been devoured by the period of Dissolution, and there were no scrutiny Committees in place to do the job that we would want and expect Parliament to do.
Mr Lidington
I disagree with my hon. Friend’s statement either that we face an impossible dilemma or that the situation is untenable. We have a situation in which two political parties with differences of perspective and tradition on a number of issues are finding a way in which to work together in the interests of the nation as a whole. I think that the coalition is providing stable government. It is new in recent British political experience, but I find that it is hugely welcomed by many people of all political persuasions and no strong political persuasion.
Mr David
When the Minister says “people of all political persuasions”, he certainly should not include those on the Opposition Benches. I found his recent comment very interesting indeed. We understand how keen and enthusiastic he was to become a Minister, and this is the first time that he has revealed why he really, really wanted to be one. Also, this is the first time that he—or any other Minister—has acknowledged that the Bill is basically a compromise. It is the result of negotiations between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives. It is important that that point is now firmly on record. This is the first time in this whole debate that it has been said. In the interests of transparency and openness, will he elaborate, so that we can find out the exact nature of the negotiating process that led to this rag-bag of a Bill?
Mr Lidington
It is a bit rich for the hon. Gentleman to intervene in that fashion. He and I know that, in regard to policy on Europe or on any other matter, Governments of a single party in recent history—Conservative and Labour—have had to compromise a great deal, given the different points of view in the broad churches that those parties represent.
Mr Lidington
We are due to debate the measures later.
The Government will have three options. They can decide to opt in to all the measures en bloc, or they can decide to opt out of them en bloc. The judgment that Ministers will have to make—I emphasise that no decision has yet been made, and that we are nowhere near making one or making a recommendation—is that these are measures in which the United Kingdom freely decided that it wanted to participate, because it served our national interest to do so, during the “third pillar” process that existed before the Lisbon treaty.
The Government of the time—Labour or Conservative—decided that each measure was right and that it was in the British national interest to participate; but, of course, that decision was made on the basis that those were intergovernmental matters which did not fall within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. That is a material difference. If we opt in to all these measures in 2014, we must accept that we are opting in to matters all of which will, from that point, be subject to ECJ jurisdiction.
Mr Lidington
Yes, the default position is that we stay opted in. We have to take a decision one way or the other, and the Government are not going to hide in the corner and hope that nobody notices a decision to opt in. We are going to make a public announcement at the due time and have the debate in Parliament.
The third option for the Government would be to opt out of the measures en bloc and then seek to opt back in where we continue to believe that the balance of advantage to our national interest lies in participation. A complicated analysis is involved and we are talking about 90 such measures coming up for determination in or before 2014. As this is, again, a matter within existing competence, it is best dealt with through the enhanced scrutiny arrangements that I am proposing and it should certainly require a vote in the House. The Government have explicitly committed themselves to that and it will, of course, happen before the end of this Parliament in 2015.
The two amendments standing in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere and others tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry propose to subject all opt-in decisions to a requirement for an approval motion in both Houses, not simply those on which there is a significant level of parliamentary interest. Because of the practicalities of such a move on all opt-in decisions, that requirement would risk preventing the Government from being able to secure Parliament’s approval in time to opt in to any new JHA proposal within the three-month time limit set down in article 3 of protocol 21 in order to enable us to participate in negotiations at EU level. That would have a knock-on effect on our ability to help shape the proposal effectively in negotiation, and sometimes that is of great importance. Our votes made it possible to clinch an agreement on the EU-US terrorist finance tracking measure that suited our national interest and ensured that the Americans were content too. That deal became available during a parliamentary recess, when it would not have been possible to go through the formal procedures that the amendments seek to apply to each and every opt-in. That is one reason why in the discussions about enhancing scrutiny we have to find a way to handle the real difficulties that can sometimes arise, both during recesses and in periods of and following parliamentary Dissolution.
May I say in passing to my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry that, although the detail will be the subject of discussions with the relevant Committees and business managers, the possibility of a parliamentary vote would apply to any opt-in decision under the proposals that I made in my written statement. Included in that would be measures following the adoption of a measure by other member states and decisions not to opt out of Schengen measures where there is strong parliamentary interest in the measure or where the measure is of the importance that I have indicated in my written statement. The process proposed in the amendments does not lend itself to timely decision making when a rapid decision needs to be taken. I have outlined the practical reasons why this approach would not be proportionate and I hope that my hon. Friends will therefore be prepared not to press their amendments to a Division.
Amendment 47 would require parliamentary approval before we could opt in to a measure brought forward under article 83(2) of TFEU, which allows for the establishment of minimum rules regarding the definition of criminal offences and sanctions if such approximation of member state criminal laws and regulations is judged to be essential to ensure effective implementation of policy areas in which the EU has already harmonised standards. For example, if the EU set rules about environmental protection and a criminal sanction proved essential to make those rules effective, the EU could consequently set a minimum standard for a criminal offence in that area.
I listened carefully to what my hon. Friend the Member for Stone said, but I do not believe that article 83(2) is a ratchet clause in the way that articles 81(3), 82(2)(d) or 81(1) are so considered. Article 83(2) makes provision for Europe to be able to act under its existing competence without the need to be able to expand EU action in the same way, for example, as article 83(1) provides for the ability to expand the list of areas of serious cross-border crime in which the EU can act. I do not therefore think that it should be subject to the enhanced level of parliamentary control set out in the Bill to which the ratchet clauses are to be subject, given the relative differences in effect.
Mr Jenkin
I am perfectly prepared to accept that some Liberal Democrats have compromised considerably on the Bill.
What does the Bill add up to? The problem is that it does not change anything. It does not change the relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom one comma or dot. It is about the arrangements between the British Government and the British Parliament. We all know that it is designed to give the impression that this and future Governments will somehow be locked down by the referendum lock and will be obliged to have referendums as never before. It is certainly useful to create that expectation because the disappointment when no referendum occurs will then be much deeper, but what does the Bill actually mean?
Clauses 2 to 7 make a lot of legal arrangements to ensure that decisions taken by the Government are approved by referendum or Act of Parliament. There are certain exclusions that we have already argued about, such as whether the treaty on fiscal union will somehow be exempted from referendum even though it is probably one of the most significant European treaties we will see in our lifetimes. That is the state of the Bill, which has some remarkable tripwires—so many that the Opposition spokesman has been saying, “This is getting too particular and detailed; we will have to have Acts of Parliament and referendums on all kinds of things that are patently ridiculous.” That is why I think that future Governments will wriggle out of the obligations without much difficulty.
My amendments concern the opting-out proposals. In order to make the Lisbon treaty, which establishes the European Union’s authority over criminal and civil law, more palatable, there was an arrangement that the United Kingdom could opt out at a later date. One would have thought that a party and a Government who were elected on a platform to repatriate powers from the EU, and who fought against the Lisbon treaty on the principle that the European Union should not have jurisdiction over our criminal law, would be keen to ensure that any coalition agreement reflected that policy, particularly as they have talked about a sovereignty clause, a referendum lock and so on.
We know that there will probably never be a new treaty amendment that meets the test that triggers a referendum. Indeed, the Minister made it clear that he has no intention of letting a Bill through the House that would trigger such a referendum during the lifetime of this Parliament. The Lisbon treaty has made the EU self-amending. The Liberal Democrat MEP, Andrew Duff, who is chair of the Federal Trust, said on the BBC World Service: “The treaty of Lisbon is in force and it won’t be unpicked by the British. It can’t be. It is the statute which will probably govern the Union for some time.” As I said in the debate on Monday,
“The problem is that this is not the ‘thus far and no further’ Bill; it is the ‘locking the stable door after the horse has bolted’ Bill.—[Official Report, 24 January 2011; Vol. 522, c. 116.]
We do not know whether the next five years will see any changes to the EU treaties—I suspect they will—but there is one area in which the Government will have to make a very significant decision: whether to give more powers to Brussels or to bring them back to Britain. I remind the Committee that were the measure outside the jurisdiction of the European Communities Act, there would be no question but that there would be hundreds of pages of Acts of Parliament to implement this stuff, instead of its automatic inclusion in our law and implementation. It is fundamentally undemocratic to reorganise our constitution by the stroke of a Minister’s pen in this way.
In crime and policing, EU measures which were passed under the pre-Lisbon third pillar arrangements are in this transitional period. Under the Lisbon treaty, there is a period in which we can opt out en bloc, as the Minister said. These measures include the European arrest warrant and the recognition of the trial of UK citizens in EU countries held in absentia. I have in my passport something about the protection of UK citizens, and here we are, handing over the possibility that UK citizens can be tried in other European jurisdictions without even being there. That is something that we do not do in our own jurisdiction.
The creation of the European public prosecutor will happen under the arrangement. The Government will have a straight choice between expanding the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice over the British justice system, or opting out of the measure. It is a rare opportunity that we have in the treaty to repatriate power. One would have thought that we would want to do it, but the Bill as it stands does not include any control whatever over that decision. All we have is a personal assurance from the Minister that he will bring it to the House for a decision. That is welcome, but it not the kind of democratic control that is needed.
The Government have just announced the revision of control orders, which will require legislation. That is subject to democratic control. Imagine if the control orders decision was announced by the Government and required no legislation. That is what we are being offered in the Bill.
Mr David
The hon. Gentleman is making a logical, coherent argument. The Government’s position on the Bill, as I was led to believe, was that if there were a significant move towards powers being transferred from the UK to the European Union, there should be a referendum. We have referred to a number of cases when there would be small changes, on which there might be a referendum, but he is talking about a very significant change. Does he not think there should be a referendum on that?
Mr Jenkin
The hon. Gentleman is right. The Bill is completely inconsistent. Relatively tiny matters covered by the Bill and caught by its provisions will have to come to Parliament and may even have to be the subject of a referendum. But this incredibly significant change to our legal system that is taking place now is exempted from the Bill. It is totally illogical. If there is anything that makes a complete nonsense of the Bill, it is this total exclusion of the 2014 decision.
European Union Bill
Wayne David Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
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Priti Patel
I would be very happy if the country had a referendum on in or out of Europe, and I have consistently maintained that view. That is my personal view, but it is not the subject of debate on the Bill.
Amendment 81 would guarantee a referendum in the event that the EU proposed to reduce our powers over our inshore territorial waters up to the 12 nautical mile limit. I therefore ask the Minister and the Committee, through this debate, to put that safeguard in place. The amendment would not solve all the historical problems with the common fisheries policy, but importantly it would protect many of the efforts that this Government and the devolved Administrations are making in our sovereign territorial waters.
Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)
On that point about the devolved Administrations, is the hon. Lady as concerned as I am about the evidence that the Scottish Parliament submitted, in which it worries that the devolved dimension is not being considered properly?
Priti Patel
Those issues should be given proper and due consideration.
As it stands, the Government and the devolved Administrations collectively exercise control and restrictions in our territorial waters up to the 6 nautical mile limit, and access is for British fishermen only. Access to our territorial waters between the 6 and 12 nautical mile limit is restricted to a handful of neighbouring countries. Those arrangements exist only by regulation, so at any time they could be amended by qualified majority voting and Britain could effectively lose control over access to its territorial waters within the 12 nautical mile limit of our shoreline.
The current regulation, passed in 2002, details the common fisheries policy arrangements for national territorial waters, and it expires at the end of 2012. As we know, the EU has plenty of flexibility to determine the future of our territorial waters, and I fundamentally believe that that is not in our national interest. The European Commission is, however, consulting on the post-2012 arrangements, and my significant concern is that through either that reform or future measures the majority of our European counterparts in the European Parliament or in the Council of Ministers will be able to determine the future of our territorial sovereignty.
I have been in touch with the Minister for Europe about the issue, and he has very kindly written to me to confirm that currently the Commission has no plans to change the arrangements, but I do not believe that we should leave it to chance, as it is simply not in our national interest to have other EU countries determining the future of access to our territorial waters.
Chris Bryant
The attitude of the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) is rather different from that before the election, as is that of the Liberal Democrat party. That will not surprise many Conservative or Labour Members. The hon. Gentleman seemed to suggest that a vast army of people are constantly campaigning on Europe and our relationship with the European Union. In my time in this House, which is coming up to 10 years, I think that I have received four letters from my constituents about our relationship with the European Union. I have received quite a lot of letters from other people’s constituents, but remarkably few from my own. I agree completely with the hon. Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris) about the failure in the way in which we scrutinise the mandate that Ministers think they are taking to meetings of the Council of Ministers and the legislation that comes from the European Union. I have made that point many times to the House.
Chris Bryant
I do. It is unfortunate that the Leader of the House has adopted the approach of insisting that pre-Council debates have to be provided for by the Backbench Business Committee from its allocation. Those debates are about the Government’s mandate, and they should be in Government time. I hope that at some point the Leader of the House will change his position on that. We may well not need a full day’s debate—two and a half hours might be sufficient. Having participated in nearly every one of them since 2001, along with my hon. Friend and neighbour from the south Wales valleys, I can fairly safely predict who will take part in them. I can pretty much guess exactly what they will say, as quite a few of us have single transferrable speeches.
I wish to refer specifically to some of the amendments in this group, and my points will be made against the background of my belief that the whole of clause 6 is nonsense. It will harm the power of the British Government to negotiate on behalf of the British people and advance the British interest. It will make Parliament look like a body that is not genuinely interested in significant economic or trade advances. To Indian, Chinese, Russian, Brazilian and Mexican potential counterparts, we will look like the country that is standing in the way of the means of enhancing trade with their economies. I believe that that is a mistake.
The hon. Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) tabled amendment 54 and referred to it earlier. As he knows, it would ensure that there could be no extension of the rights afforded to members of the EU by virtue of article 25 of the TFEU, which is related to article 20(2). I say to him that in the middle of the general election campaign earlier this year, as Europe Minister, I had to go to a meeting—I cannot remember whether it was in Brussels or Luxembourg—to agree to the paper on the founding of the European External Action Service that Baroness Ashton had brought forward as High Representative. Many member states were keen for the paper to contain specific provision for consular services, because as I said earlier, many of the smaller countries in the EU have no representation in many of the 190 or so countries in the world. They frequently use the consular services of other EU member states, and most of the larger member states, such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain and ourselves, are perfectly happy to extend the hand of friendship in that way. Sometimes it is paid for by the country concerned and sometimes it is not, but there is give and take between different member states, so we are perfectly happy for that arrangement to exist.
Chris Bryant
I look forward to hearing the hon. Gentleman’s arguments.
My final point is that my anxiety about the drafting of this Bill, and in particular this clause and its attendant schedule, is that it is a lawyers’ paradise. There will be constant judicial review of decisions made by Ministers. For instance, in the case of the agreement on the External Action Service, the eventual format would have been agreed by a Minister from any political party in this House, but it could well be subject to judicial review under the amendment. It is also true of many other elements of the clause, and it means that Ministers’ actions at meetings in Europe will constantly be subject to judicial review. Rather than increasing the power of Parliament, that will actually increase the power of the judges in this country, which I consider to be a very big mistake.
Mr David
My hon. Friend makes an important point, but is he aware that the European Scrutiny Committee, when considering the issue of judicial review, concluded that the clause, which has been projected by the Government as an apparent safeguard, was an illusory protection, because, in its view, a decision on a referendum would be a political decision and therefore not subject to judicial review?
Chris Bryant
Indeed, I have read the Committee’s report. I thought it was interesting, not least because the Committee includes significant Eurosceptics on both sides of the House. Much as I admire and respect—and almost adore—the Minister for Europe, I fear that the Bill is a complete and utter chimera. It does not do what it seeks to do, it will not do what many hon. Members on the Government Back Benches hope it will do, and in the end, it will damage the country’s interests.
Mr Cash
The hon. Gentleman and I have engaged in debates on the European question since we first met. I have the greatest respect for him and he has hit the nail right on the head here, because this problem does not just arise because of our exposure to what happens in Portugal and Spain in the future; it also arises from the lack of a sound legal base for the decision taken in the first place by the outgoing Chancellor and endorsed subsequently by the incoming Chancellor. We know that there was a consensus and that an agreement was reached—that answers the question put by the hon. Member for Ilford South. I would not be going about this if I did not believe that substantial matters of principle and of huge cost to the taxpayer are involved.
Mr David
The hon. Gentleman has raised an extremely important point. I wish to emphasise that he is correct to say that there was a consensus between the outgoing Chancellor and the incoming Chancellor—proper discussions and consultation took place—but that was not the impression given to this House by the current Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Mr Cash
I was not necessarily here when an impression was being given one way or the other. What I do know is that I have an accurate record of what did take place. I also have with me an article from Monday 10 May containing what are clearly accurate descriptions of the position of the then Chancellor—I believe he was just still the Chancellor then, because the coalition agreement had not been entered into. I recall writing to the Prime Minister on that day, suggesting, among other things, that he should go for a minority Government. I also said that if he was determined to go down the route of a coalition, he should require the Liberal Democrats to abstain on any matters relating to Europe that came up. That possibly explains some of my concerns as matters have developed and more and more European decisions, roadblocks and other difficulties in respect of the decisions we took in our manifesto have emerged.
Stephen Gilbert
I am more than happy to give way to the Opposition spokesman.
Stephen Gilbert
In fact, what we know from yesterday’s debate in this Committee is that the Labour party, given the bizarre system it proposed in its defeated amendments, is in favour of giving the House of Lords a veto on whether the British Parliament chooses to put a referendum to the British people.
Ben Gummer
I had many comments to make but, happily, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) has covered much of the ground I wanted to cover. I shall therefore be quite brief. Yesterday, in a memorable speech, my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford (Nick Boles) described the Bill as the William Cash memorial Bill. Although I would not like to use such lapidary language with regard to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone, it is certainly a memorial in the sense that all that he has done over the years to protect the House and nation from the transference of powers to the European Union is contained within clause 6, so that it will not happen again without a referendum of the British people. I suspect that that is why my hon. Friend, whom I admire and have watched with great interest today, as a newcomer to the House, is uncertain about parts of the Bill.
Mention was made earlier of the fact that my hon. Friend’s seat is often left cold while he explains the dangers of the transference of powers. The Bill will render much of that function, which he has served with such honour over the years, no longer necessary, because it encompasses what the British people have wanted for so long, as has been pointed out by so many people in this debate, which is for the powers of Parliament to remain here and not be transferred. Whether on the euro, social policy, finance, jurisprudence or border control—all those things that he has spoken about so many times—will now sit here in statute unable to be moved to a qualified majority voting system in the Council without the matter being referred to the British people.
The Bill does not just enshrine in law the wishes of the British people over many years; it is also a testament to the intellectual coherence of the coalition’s project. It is about retaining power at the most local level possible. That does not just apply to this Parliament, but involves pushing power down to local communities wherever possible. That is why the cat-calling about the Bill from the Opposition is so misguided. They do not understand how it fits into the wider revolution being instituted by the coalition Government of bringing power as close to the people as possible. That is why I suspect they do not like it very much. It goes against everything that the Labour party believes in, which is to push power up to people who know best at all times.
We need only look at some of the comments made in this and previous debates. The right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane), who is no longer in his seat, said in a previous debate on the European Union that the Bill would be a mistake because it would make it harder for Turkey to accede to the EU. Today, we heard points about the European arrest warrant—because, of course, it is he who knows best, and not the British people. Of course, it is the Opposition Front-Bench team who know best—in their minds—and not the British people.
Mr Lidington
It would be helpful if, by way of introduction, I gave a brief explanation of our approach to how the referendum provisions in the Bill would work—the referendum mechanics, in other words. I stress that provision for the conduct of UK referendums on all issues, including those in the Bill, is set out in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. That statute covers the overall regulatory framework applying to referendums and sets conditions in relation to the referendum period, the date of the poll, the wording of questions, the role of the Electoral Commission in commenting on the intelligibility of those questions to ensure that questions are “clear, simple and neutral”, and the conditions to be set in relation to the registration of campaign organisations and for financial and other assistance to be given to designated individuals or organisations. For this purpose, the Act allows the Electoral Commission to designate one individual or organisation for each possible outcome of a particular referendum, which could include political parties, and to award them a public grant of up to £600,000 and other benefits.
In addition, the provisions of the PPERA impose financial controls on the expenditure and income of campaigning individuals or organisations that are not political parties. They place controls on referendum publications by Government and others, and make provision for enabling secondary legislation to be made for the conduct of referendum polls. Those provisions in the PPERA would apply to any referendum conducted under the terms of the Bill and, as the Committee knows, the referendum proposed in the Bill on the parliamentary voting system. Similarly, any amendment to, or replacement of, the PPERA in the future would correspondingly apply to any referendums held under the Bill.
The PPERA, however, does not cover matters that are inherently specific to a particular referendum. Those include the precise wording of the question, the date of the referendum, its franchise, or the precise length of what is termed the referendum period, which is that period during which campaign expenditure is regulated. The Act does not cover how challenges to the referendum result are to be handled, the payment of counting officers, or the conduct of the referendum—for example, decisions on locations, opening hours of polling stations, permitted size of posters and any electoral offences related to the holding of a referendum.
When considering how many of these specific issues to address in the Bill and how many to leave for a specific Bill at the time of a particular referendum, the Government took account of our commitment in the coalition agreement that there would be no further transfer of competence or power from the United Kingdom to the EU over the course of this Parliament. Logically, therefore, there will be no referendums about the transfer of competence or power until 2015 at the earliest, as there would be no such transfers on which the British people should be asked to opine. But as I made clear in earlier debates on the Bill, any proposed treaty change even during this Parliament would none the less be subject to the rigours of this legislation—a statement would have to be laid before Parliament setting out the Government’s analysis on competence and whether any transfers of power would result, and that treaty change would still require Parliament’s clear approval through primary legislation.
Mr David
May I take the Minister back to what he was saying about the Electoral Commission and possible financial support to those putting forward a case for or against an issue under consideration? A referendum is due to take place in Wales on 3 March and, because there is no recognised body advocating a no vote, no finances are being given in that direction, but that means that no finances have been given to those who support a yes vote. Could a similar thing happen to any referendums that the Minister is outlining?
Mr Lidington
We would certainly want to avoid that and would look at the experience that the hon. Gentleman describes. It is important to recall that the principle of grants being made available for lead campaign organisations was recommended by the independent Committee on Standards in Public Life and approved by Parliament in legislation passed under the previous Labour Government in 2000. I hope that he agrees that it would not be in the public interest for one side in a referendum campaign to be able to outspend the other hugely. A grant ensures that both lead campaign organisations can campaign effectively and that helps the public make an informed choice.
I emphasise that the Bill is not intended to serve as a vehicle for providing for all the detailed referendum rules required to supplement the provisions already contained in the PPERA. That is because we cannot anticipate exactly what referendums might be required in the future, when they would be held or, indeed, what the relevant electoral and referendum law would look like at that time. I do not want to write on tablets of stone arrangements that could prove to be at odds with a subsequent change in general electoral legislation. Therefore, we cannot provide everything on the convening of those specific referendums in the Bill. Rather, it sets out the circumstances in which those referendums would have to be held.
Mr Lidington
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his comments.
The other point that a future Government would have to bear in mind in determining a referendum date would be whether there was any particular urgency to a treaty or passerelle proposal that required a referendum. In normal circumstances the various national ratification procedures take quite a bit of time, and if there were a proposal under the ordinary revision proposal, it is probable that more than one member state would have to have a referendum. There would therefore be quite a long period between agreement at European Council level and ratification by all 27 member states, or more by then, I hope. However, it is conceivable that there may be a particular need for urgency, and the Government of the day would have to bear that in mind.
The other point that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds) made was about the relationship with the devolved Administrations. The Government take that seriously, and we have regular formal meetings with them about Europe through the joint ministerial committee on Europe. I am also in contact with Ministers in each of the devolved Administrations. I can assure her and the Committee that they never hesitate to bring their concerns to me. We would certainly want to continue that process of consultation, bearing their interests in mind.
Mr Lidington
We try to do both. We in the Government can pride ourselves on enjoying a rather better relationship with the devolved Administrations than the previous Government were usually able to manage.
Mr Lidington
As far as I am aware, there is no particular reason for it. However, the Electoral Commission will have a duty to comment on the question that the Government of the day have chosen, and I am sure that, if the Commission felt that placing yes above no gave an unfair advantage in some way, it would so opine and the Government would take account of that. It is quite difficult to envisage a ballot paper that did not have either yes or no at the top of the paper. At the end of the day, it comes down to a choice by the people: they have two options available to them, and I think that they will know which side they are on when it comes to the vote.
Mr David
I am tempted to ask the Minister whether Welsh will appear above English on the ballot papers in Wales, but I will not. Is there anything in the legislation that would prevent the Government from going back to the electorate if a no vote had been secured when the Government clearly wanted a yes vote? Could the question be put to the electorate for a second time, and, if so, what period would have to elapse before that could happen?
Mr Lidington
The Bill makes it very clear that the referendum condition has to be satisfied, in the circumstances in which the law requires a referendum to be held, before the Government are able to ratify the proposed treaty. I simply do not believe that any British Government who had been defeated at a referendum would then come forward and say to their electorate, “No, you’ve got it wrong. Let’s dissolve the people and have a new one!” That really does not make political sense.
Mr Lidington
What happened in Ireland was that the Irish Government went back to their EU partners and received various assurances, which were incorporated into a protocol to the treaties. We can debate whether the Irish Government were right or wrong to be satisfied by those assurances, but I actually think that it is a matter for the Irish people, not for me, to decide. In such slightly far-fetched, hypothetical circumstances, were a British Government to do as the hon. Gentleman suggests, they would have to bring the protocol back here and go through the entire process again, including the assessment of the ministerial declaration and the Act of Parliament. There would then have to be a new referendum. I just think that any Government who tried to do that would be punished so severely by the people every time they got the opportunity to go to the ballot box that it would be the last thing on any Minister’s mind.
Mr Lidington
Clause 13 covers the role of the independent Electoral Commission in the administering of any future referendums held under the Bill. The clause would supplement the existing provisions of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. The Neill committee originally suggested the establishment of such a commission to supervise the restrictions on spending by, and donations to, both political parties and third parties.
As I have explained, we have not sought to disapply or replace any of the general provisions of PPERA. There is, of course, nothing to prevent Parliament doing so in any legislation that might be needed for a referendum in future, in order to reflect the context and the circumstances in which that referendum would be held. Significantly, however, the Act contains no provision to confer on the Electoral Commission power to promote public awareness and understanding of the subject matter of referendums.
We feel that, as part of the Government’s firm commitment to helping to rebuild trust and reconnect the British people to decisions made in their name on the European Union, it is important that the administration of any future referendum to be held under this Bill facilitate the understanding and clarity required to enable the British people to make informed decisions on whether or not to approve a treaty change or decision that would transfer power or competence from Britain to Brussels. Clause 13 provides that if a referendum is triggered under the EU Bill, the Electoral Commission has an obligation to take whatever steps it thinks appropriate to promote public awareness of the referendum and how to vote in it.
Mr David
I hear what the Minister says about an appropriate public debate and a high degree of awareness, but the clause states that the Electoral Commission
“may take whatever steps they think appropriate”.
If the Minister thinks that public awareness is so important, why did he not ensure that the word “will” was used rather than the word “may”?
Mr Lidington
The Electoral Commission was rightly established as an independent body. I think it important for the Government not to issue instructions to it, and to be seen not to do so. Given that the commission’s value to our political process is by virtue of its being a completely independent statutory body, I consider it right for us to give it these new powers without laying down rules requiring it to use them in a particular way. It is for the commission to make its own judgments. How it chooses to promote awareness is rightly a matter for it, but we are giving it a statutory duty to promote awareness before any referendum held under the provisions of the Bill.
European Union Bill (Programme)(No. 2)
Wayne David Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)
This is a fascinating and intriguing Bill. There have been times in the past few weeks when, because I have had trouble sleeping, I have simply reached for a copy of the Bill to read and have been off in a wink. There are a number of important points to make. The Government have tabled several significant amendments that need to be debated and considered fully in due course by the House. They are in part concessions to comments that have been made by Government Back Benchers. One of the amendments due for consideration today relates to the treaty change for which the Germans are pressing strongly. Amendments have also been tabled due to the complexity of the Bill. From the start, one of our criticisms has been the Bill’s undue complexity, and that point has been borne out, because the Government have tabled amendments to try to clarify things. There has been tremendous debate among lawyers in the Foreign Office and elsewhere about whether the Bill is compatible with existing legislation, and that simply underlines the fact that the Bill is an extremely complex piece of legislation.
We have had one day in Committee of the whole House, and during the course of the debate we heard that there are grave reservations about the inadequacy of the explanatory notes. I hope that the Government will rewrite them, given that we have an extra day, and come forward with a full and comprehensive explanation for the changes that they are bringing about.
In the light of that, and because of our belief that we need the maximum amount of time to debate the Bill, we have no objection to the motion.
European Union Bill
Wayne David Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 85, page 2, line 6, at end add—
‘(7A) References to “the Committee” are to the European Union Referendum Committee as established by section [European Union Referendum Committee] below.’.
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 86, in clause 2, page 2, line 10, leave out
‘a statement relating to the treaty was’
and insert
‘the treaty and a statement relating to it were’.
Amendment 1, page 2, line 13, leave out ‘or the exemption condition’.
Amendment 92, page 2, line 16, leave out from ‘until’ to end of line 22 and insert
‘the referendum procedure set out in subsection (2A) below has been completed.
‘(2A) The referendum procedure is completed if—
(a) a decision has been taken by either or both Houses of Parliament not to hold a referendum, whether by agreeing with a recommendation from the Committee that a referendum is not required or by disagreeing to a recommendation from the Committee that a referendum is required; or
(b) a referendum has been held throughout the United Kingdom, or where the treaty affects Gibraltar, throughout the United Kingdom and Gibraltar, and a majority of those voting in the referendum are in favour of ratification of the treaty.’.
Amendment 2, page 2, line 23, leave out subsection (3).
Amendment 87, in clause 3, page 2, line 29, leave out
‘a statement relating to the decision was’
and insert
‘the decision and a statement relating to it were’.
Amendment 67, page 2, line 32, leave out paragraph (c).
Amendment 3, page 2, line 32, leave out
‘the exemption condition or the significance condition’.
Amendment 68, page 2, line 34, leave out subsections (2), (3) and (4).
Amendment 93, page 2, line 36, leave out from ‘until’ to end of line 42 and insert
‘the referendum procedure set out in subsection (2A) below has been completed.
‘(2A) The referendum procedure is completed if—
(a) a decision has been taken by either or both Houses of Parliament not to hold a referendum, whether by agreeing with a recommendation from the Committee that a referendum is not required or by disagreeing to a recommendation from the Committee that a referendum is required; or
(b) a referendum has been held throughout the United Kingdom, or where the treaty affects Gibraltar, throughout the United Kingdom and Gibraltar, and a majority of those voting in the referendum are in favour of approval of the decision.’.
Amendment 4, page 2, line 43, leave out subsection (3).
Amendment 5, page 3, line 1, leave out subsection (4).
Amendment 64, page 3, line 3, leave out from ‘4’ to ‘and’ in line 4.
Amendment 65, page 3, line 4, leave out ‘(1)(i) or (j)’ and insert
‘(1)(a), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) (i), (j), (k), (l) or (m)’.
Amendment 66, page 3, line 4, after ‘(1)’, insert ‘(g), (h)’.
Amendment 88, in clause 4, page 3, line 8, before ‘(1)’ insert—
‘(A1) A treaty or Article 48(6) decision which falls within this section shall be subject to the procedure of determination by the Committee and both Houses of Parliament as to whether a referendum is required’.
Amendment 89, in clause 5, page 4, line 10, leave out
‘the required statement before Parliament’
and insert
‘the treaty and the required statement before the Committee and before Parliament’.
Amendment 90, page 4, line 14, leave out
‘the required statement before Parliament’
and insert
‘the decision and the required statement before the Committee and before Parliament’.
Amendment 7, page 4, line 17, leave out subsections (3) to (5) and insert—
‘(3) The required statement is a statement that there will be a referendum on that treaty.’.
Amendment 91, page 4, line 19, leave out subsections (4) and (5).
Amendment 11, page 4, line 24, at end add—
‘(6) If the Minister’s opinion is that the effect of that provision in relation to the United Kingdom is not significant the Minister must seek Parliamentary approval for his opinion.
(7) Parliamentary approval is given if—
(a) in each House of Parliament a Minister of the Crown moves a motion that the House approves of the Minister’s opinion; and
(b) each House agrees to the motion without amendment.
(8) If the Minister fails to obtain Parliamentary approval for his opinion the significance condition is not met.’.
New clause 9—European Union Referendum Committee
‘(1) There shall be a Committee, to be known as the European Union Referendum Committee, to examine—
(a) any amendment of the Treaty on the European Union or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, whether by simplified or ordinary revision procedure;
(b) any decision already provided for in those treaties, as set out in Schedule 1 to this Act;
(c) any treaty or Article 48(6) decision as defined in section 4 of this Act; and
(d) any decision as set out in section 6(2) or 6(4) of this Act.
(2) The Committee shall report to Parliament in respect of each such treaty amendment or decision as to—
(a) whether it involves a significant transfer of power or competence, and if so
(b) whether it requires a referendum to be held.
(3) When the Committee has reported its view as to whether or not a referendum is required, a Motion shall be moved in each House of Parliament to give effect to that recommendation.
(4) If both Houses agree to recommend a referendum, a referendum shall be held accordingly.
(5) The Committee shall consist of no more than 19 Members, drawn from both Houses of Parliament, none of whom shall be Ministers of the Crown.
(6) The members of the Committee shall be nominated by the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Lord Speaker of the House of Lords respectively, in accordance with the Standing Orders or Resolutions of their respective Houses, and subject to the approval of their respective Houses.
(7) Members of each House shall be members of the Committee until discharged by their House or if they cease to be a Member of that House or if they become a Minister of the Crown.
(8) The Committee shall elect a Chair from among those of its members who sit in the House of Commons.
(9) The Committee may determine its own procedure, which shall be broadly in line with that followed by Joint Committees of the two Houses.’.
Mr David
The week before last, the Committee enjoyed an excellent debate on the sovereignty clause of the Bill. Perhaps surprisingly, there was a high degree of consensus on the need to ensure that Parliament remains central to our democracy. Indeed, it must be said that even the Government appeared to acknowledge that there was at least a genuine debate on whether Parliament owed its sovereignty to common law or whether sovereignty was a fundamental right. Consequently, we look forward to seeing how the Government rewrite the Bill’s explanatory notes to acknowledge that debate.
That makes it all the more surprising that part 1 of the Bill so profoundly departs from the consensus established in the House that Parliament is central to this country’s democratic process. The Government do that by proposing that most extensions of EU competence or power, even relatively small ones, should be subject to a referendum if the change has a material impact on the UK’s relationship with the EU.
The Government set out in the Bill in mind-numbing detail umpteen scenarios when a referendum might be triggered. The Opposition believe that there is a case for referendums to be held on important constitutional issues. For example, in government, we introduced referendums on devolution in Scotland and Wales, and indeed, there will be a further referendum in Wales on 3 March.
Mrs Anne Main (St Albans) (Con)
With reference to the hon. Gentleman’s remarks on holding referendums on fundamental matters that affect the UK, does he regret not giving us a vote on the Lisbon treaty?
The Chairman
Order. We are not dealing with the Lisbon treaty. Can we please stick to the amendments before us?
Mr David
With all due respect to my hon. Friend, it was not she who wrote the treaty or the constitution; she made a contribution, as did many people.
We support a referendum on the alternative vote system, and we believe that a referendum should be held if ever there is a European constitution or if any Government favoured Britain’s joining the single currency. I remind the Committee that Baroness Thatcher declined to hold a referendum on the Single European Act, and that the Foreign Secretary voted against a referendum on the Maastricht treaty when he was in opposition.
Richard Fuller (Bedford) (Con)
The issue is that the Labour party promised a referendum and then reneged on it when in office.
Mr David
I will stick to the point. It is really important that Members recognise that there is a fundamental difference between the constitution and the treaty of Lisbon. I am more than happy to explain those differences, with your permission, Mr Hoyle, but I know that you want us to pursue the issue under discussion.
Mr David
I do not think that is the case at all. There are certain principles at issue that it is important we consider. One of the things that has marred the debate about Europe is the fact that too much expediency has been demonstrated. We need to talk about principles, and I would argue that an important one is at stake here. We have to make it clear that we are talking about political consistency, of which there is little among Government Members. Only in January last year, an hon. Gentleman said:
“The Conservatives want a referendum on the bulk purchasing of paper clips. That is nonsense. It does not stand up to any serious scrutiny, and I do not believe that if they were in government, they would put forward this proposal.”—[Official Report, 19 January 2010; Vol. 504, c. 238.]
I am tempted to have a competition to see whether anyone knows who might have said that, but I will just tell the Committee instead: yes, it was a Liberal Democrat, and yes it was the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr Davey)—so much for consistency; so much for principles.
One of our main concerns about the Bill is the proposal that referendums could be held on highly technical issues that are not of constitutional significance. I am not suggesting that a future Labour Government would want to change the European treaty, but are the Government seriously suggesting that we should have a referendum on changing the voting system in the Council of Ministers on the environment from the special legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure ?
Claire Perry (Devizes) (Con)
I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, which is that there is a lot of complexity and a precise attempt to define the conditions under which referendums would be held, but surely it is better to ask the British people to make up their minds than to wriggle out of one fundamental promise on the whole constitutional question of whether we should be signed up to the Lisbon treaty. My constituents would far rather have the opportunity to vote on these things than have 13 years of broken promises.
Mr David
With all due respect to the hon. Lady, it was her party that reneged on the commitment to have a referendum on the Lisbon treaty. Government Members could have had a referendum had the Government kept their promise, but it was they who decided not to have one despite their commitment to do so.
Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman will forgive me, but my recollection of the history is that the treaty was ratified and then it became impossible to have a referendum on it. Would new clause 9 not enable a Government to make a promise at election time to hold a referendum and then wriggle out of it under the cover of some committee, as the previous Labour Government did?
Mr David
This party does not make promises which it breaks. [Laughter.] I would point out to Government Members that, as I recall, there was a clear commitment on the Lisbon treaty. The hon. Member for Devizes (Claire Perry) cannot get out of that by saying, “Well, it was already endorsed. It was ratified. We couldn’t do anything about it,” because they could have done. If the Conservatives had wanted a referendum on a treaty change, they could have had one. It is political will that this Government lacked.
Although I am not suggesting that a future Labour Government would want to change the Lisbon treaty, are this Government serious about introducing some of the changes that they claim they want to introduce? Are they seriously suggesting that we should have a referendum on the voting system for introducing a European patent, for example? Are they seriously suggesting that we would have a referendum on how judges are appointed to the European Court? [Hon. Members: “Yes.”] It seems that some Members are quite happy to have referendums, even on the proverbial paper clips. But seriously, the place to make a decision on the merits of any potential changes that are not of constitutional significance is in Parliament.
Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)
Is it not in fact remarkably important to have a detailed Bill that sets out all the conditions? The habit of Europe has been to accrete power by stealth; therefore, when added together, things that seem to be minor turn out to be creating a European Government, about which the British people should have the choice.
Mr David
There are two problems with that intervention. The first concerns the issue of detail. We have already seen the Government getting themselves into a right knot, bringing forward new amendments to plug some of the gaps that they have left. My guess is that, even at the end of the day, if this Bill goes through, there will still be gaps. The other issue concerns constitutional creep, and I will come to that point later, because there are exceptions in the Bill, which I will touch on.
The role of Parliament should be absolutely central to the issue of Europe—and, indeed, to all our deliberations. It is Parliament that should formally and properly consider such issues; it is Parliament that should devote the time to focused debates and deliberations on the pros and cons of any change; and it is Parliament that is accountable to the people. Hopefully, before too long there will be a House of Lords that is wholly or partly elected, and then both Houses will be answerable to the people for their actions. That is surely the essence of representative democracy. Indeed, in recent times the most authoritative inquiry into the role of referendums has come from the Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, whose report was published last year. After hearing from many witnesses, the Committee concluded:
“The balance of the evidence that we have heard leads us to the conclusion that there are significant drawbacks to the use of referendums.”
It continued:
“Notwithstanding our view that there are significant drawbacks to the use of referendums, we acknowledge arguments that, if referendums are to be used, they are most appropriately used in relation to fundamental constitutional issues.”
That report is important and should be acknowledged. However, it is not just the opinion that that House expressed that is significant; the evidence that was submitted is also important. In an important appendix to the report, it was pointed out that the distinguished commentators David Butler and Austin Ranney had noted that
“while the vast majority of democracies”
throughout the world
“have held referendums, only a few have institutionalised them, and used them in anything other than an ad hoc fashion. The vast majority of referendums are held at founding moments: decisions about joining a state or federation, accepting or rejecting new constitutions, or making constitutional revisions.”
If the Bill reaches the statute book in its present form, not only will it be at odds with common sense; it will also be out of step with most of the world’s democratic states. And before any Members think that the Lords Constitution Committee was packed with Labour Peers, I would simply point out that they were in a minority on the Committee.
In the second excellent report produced by the European Scrutiny Committee, chaired by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), one of the key witnesses, Professor Simon Hix, lucidly made the case for the limited, rather than widespread, use of referendums. I would not agree with everything that Professor Hix argued, but he was absolutely right when he said:
“Referendums are a legitimate tool, but often they are not regarded as legitimate unless they are on major constitutional questions. In a democracy we believe that ultimately sovereignty resides with the people, so it is legitimate that referendums should be used for major constitutional changes.”
Professor Hix was correct in his argument about major constitutional issues. He was also correct to question the wisdom and legitimacy of referendums on much smaller, technical issues.
Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)
I understand the logic of my hon. Friend’s argument, but, given the profound changes since 1975 in the prospectus set out by members of all three parties in the House, is there not now a thirst among the public for a referendum, either on whether we should be in or out of the European Union or on some of the other issues of major constitutional significance—from the Single European Act to the Lisbon treaty—on which they have not been consulted?
Mr David
I have to say that I have not had one constituent come into any of my surgeries since the last election—or, indeed, during the last Parliament—to raise this issue with me. People are concerned about their jobs, their livelihoods, and, under this Government, their falling standards of living. Those are the issues that we should be focusing on. Nevertheless, we are addressing the issue before us today, the European Union Bill.
George Freeman (Mid Norfolk) (Con)
On the subject of what we were sent here to do, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the people of Mid Norfolk sent me here to speak up against their powers being given away without their consent. He quoted the evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee. In written evidence, Professor Philip Allott, professor emeritus of international public law at Cambridge, said:
“The Bill has a whiff of revolution about it. It is a Boston Tea Party gesture against creeping integration…So far as I know, no other member state has anything remotely approaching the degree of parliamentary involvement which the Bill would create”.
The Bill might not be perfect, and it might not be the ideal mechanism, but does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that the Government are trying to ensure that the creeping integration that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) referred to earlier is prevented in future?
Mr David
I have read all the evidence submitted to the Committee, and the significant point about that particular quote was the use of the word “gesture”. The Bill is a gesture, and I will say more about that later. It is a gesture to placate hostility to the European Union among Government Back Benchers, but it is not a serious, considered piece of legislation.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman has referred to Professor Hix’s evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee. Will he note that the professor also said that previous EU amending treaties—Maastricht under a Conservative Government and Amsterdam and Nice under a Labour Government, as well as the Lisbon treaty—should all have been subjected to referendums? If the conditions of the Maastricht referendum campaign, which I founded and which had about 750,000 signatures, had been implemented by the Government at the time—let alone those for Amsterdam and Nice—is it not right to say that we would not be sitting here today discussing this nonsense?
Mr David
I am aware of all Professor Hix’s comments, and I was careful to say earlier that I did not agree with all his remarks. The point remains, however, that he is fundamentally opposed to the idea of having a multiplicity of referendums, for the reasons that he outlined to the Committee.
Charlie Elphicke
The hon. Gentleman will correct me if I am wrong, but I believe that Professor Hix also went on to say:
“I think there should have been a referendum on Maastricht, on Amsterdam, on Nice…on the Lisbon treaty”.
That is surely significant. The Bill is all about ensuring that, having been cheated of referendums on those treaties in the past, we can now have referendums on other matters, enabling the House to give greater consideration to them before passing away powers to Europe. The committee proposed in the hon. Gentleman’s new clause 9 would not achieve that.
Mr David
With all due respect, I must point out that the hon. Gentleman has made exactly the same point that the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) has just made. I therefore give him the same answer: I was careful to say earlier that I did not agree with all of Professor Hix’s comments, but the central thesis that he presented to the European Scrutiny Committee was that there should be referendums on major constitutional issues, not on the minutiae of legislation as is proposed in the Bill, and this Bill is what we are now debating.
Mr David
What I am saying is that if some of the questions implied by the Bill were put, no reasonable human being, including Members in this House, would understand what on earth the debate was all about. Nobody would. Debating how many angels can stand on the head of a pin might be okay for the middle ages, but it is unlikely to enthuse people in 21st century Britain.
Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)
I may well be more in sympathy with the hon. Gentleman’s position than some of my colleagues on the Government side, but is he not aware—I appreciate, as he said, that he might have some difficulty understanding all of the Bill—of the “significance” provision in clause 3(4)(b)? Surely that is designed to guard precisely against the possibility of having referendums on minutiae.
Mr David
It is interesting to hear the hon. Gentleman refer to the exceptional clause in that way. I will come on to the very interesting point that he has raised, which I am sure would not be shared by many Conservative Back Benchers.
Let me pursue my argument. These two factors—the lack of proper debate that having a referendum on a small technical issue would mean, and the low turnout—might lead to a questioning of any referendum result. For example, I cite Professor Hix again in his evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee, when he referred to the example of Texas. I heard a Government Member earlier making a sedentary comment about the USA, so let us look at this example from Texas. It has referendums in local communities on whether smoking or drinking should be banned. I am sure that everybody understands the questions, but they have a referendum on the same issue every year. Why? It is because people keep on questioning the validity of every year’s result because the turnout is so low.
The Bill implies that this Parliament can bind future Parliaments, but we all know that this cannot be done constitutionally. It is an interesting point, as the Government have made it clear that they do not intend to test the legislation. Perhaps one of their amendments might do so, but generally speaking, they do not intend to use this legislation—it is intended for something in the future. I would argue very strongly that there is a constitutional question mark over that.
I also believe that the Bill weakens the role of Parliament because it obliges Parliament to pass on much of its decision-making capacity. Yes, it is true that the Bill gives additional responsibilities to Parliament in some areas, which we will debate at a later stage. The Bill’s most important impact, however, will be to weaken the role of Parliament. I would even suggest that the Bill’s whole approach is crudely populist and fraught with practical problems and constitutional risks.
Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman’s comments seem to be a diatribe against all referendums anywhere and are not specific to the Bill. Of course a referendum is populist; it is the most direct form of gauging the popular will. The approach of his argument seems a complete waste of time.
Mr David
That is completely untrue. My argument is that there is a clear distinction between important constitutional issues and detailed minutiae. We can argue about the constitutional issues, but there is a big difference between them and a referendum on a raft of detailed minutiae. That is the big difference, which the Bill fails to acknowledge. The Bill is about having referendums on not the big issues, but the small, relatively unimportant ones.
Ms Gisela Stuart
It might come as a great relief to my hon. Friend to learn that I totally agree with him on this occasion. The Bill would weaken Parliament. Does he not find it extraordinary that a Bill that is meant to strengthen Parliament has in clause 5 a provision whereby, if in doubt, the matter will be given to the courts, which we cannot even remove in the way we can a Government, so it is an abdication?
Mr David
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention; she makes a good point. However, the matter might not be quite as she has said. I will address that point later in my contribution, if I may.
Amendment 85 seeks to reaffirm the role of Parliament by giving it the power to consider and decide whether a proposed European change is significant enough to hold a referendum on. A special committee of both Houses—we call it the referendum committee—would be established, and it would consider the fine detail of the Government’s proposal. A recommendation would then go to both Houses, and if both Houses agreed that the change was important enough to warrant a referendum, a referendum would be held.
Stephen Gilbert (St Austell and Newquay) (LD)
Will the hon. Gentleman tell the Committee what would happen if one of the Houses of Parliament took the view that a referendum should take place, and the other took the view that it should not? Is that not an inherent contradiction in the Opposition amendments?
Stephen Gilbert
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s purpose, but it is conceivable that the House of Commons would reach one view on whether a referendum is required, and the House of Lords would reach another view. How do the Opposition intend to settle that discrepancy?
Mr David
Before too long, we hope, both Chambers would be elected. Therefore, we believe that it is important for Parliament to speak with one voice. Under our amendment, Parliament would be centre-stage in the whole process. Parliament, and Parliament alone, would decide whether a referendum ought to be held, which is far preferable to referendums being decided according to abstract criteria under this ill-conceived Bill. It is also far better than allowing the Government to make the decision.
Claire Perry
I am intrigued to know whether the workings of the proposed committee would have come into force when the previous Government decided, without, I believe, a debate on the Floor of the House, that the Lisbon treaty was not the same thing as the EU constitutional treaty and therefore could be signed. At that point, would his committee have intervened, given the definitional question of whether it was an EU constitutional treaty, as Open Europe and most of the country believe that it was?
Mr David
I have argued consistently that that was not the case, but the new Committee, drawn from both Houses, would consider all changes that occur inside the European Union and that have a direct impact on the United Kingdom. We can discuss what is significant and what is not, but my point is that the proposed Committee would come to a considered view on what was important and what should warrant a referendum.
I emphasise this point because we are concerned about the extent to which the Government will have discretion to decide what goes to a referendum. We are concerned because we fear that the Government’s rhetoric does not match the reality of their Bill. I am sure that the Minister is absolutely sincere in his intention to give the electorate the maximum ability to vote on a range of European minutiae, but let us just suppose that the Bill is smoke and mirrors. The nature of the proposals before us could turn out to be more apparent than real.
By common agreement, the Bill is one of the most complicated pieces of legislation to come before the House of Commons for many years. As we all know, in legislation the devil is always in the detail, and this Bill contains one heck of a lot of detail. Some Members, including those on the European Scrutiny Committee, have suggested that the Government may be looking for wriggle room. In particular, there has been reference to clause 3(4), the so-called “significance” subsection, which allows the Government to avoid a referendum if they believe that certain EU sanctions or obligations are insignificant. If I were a Government Member, I should consider that very ominous, as little detail is provided.
The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
Given the concerns that the hon. Gentleman has just expressed, will he please explain why the Opposition amendments, and in particular new clause 9, would extend the significance test so that the Committee that he proposes would consider whether a decision to join the euro, or a decision to scrap British border controls, was significant enough to warrant a referendum at all?
Mr Stephen Dorrell (Charnwood) (Con)
Will the hon. Gentleman address the question asked by my right hon. Friend the Minister a bit more seriously? New clause 9(2) makes it clear that the Opposition are suggesting that there could be significant transfers of power that did not merit a referendum. Will the hon. Gentleman give us an example of a significant transfer of power that he thinks should not merit a referendum? The principle is there in his new clause.
Mr David
There is a fundamental point here. We are not second-guessing Parliament’s view. These are essentially subjective statements. I think it wrong for the Government to pretend that there can be predetermined formulas that will suit any eventuality. They know in their heart of hearts that that is not possible in the real world, which is why they have come up with the “significance” subsection.
Mr Dorrell
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who is being very patient. However, he is not second-guessing the Government; he is proposing an amendment to the House of Commons. He is proposing that there should be a dual key before a referendum is held. First, a proposal should be significant; secondly, his committee should recommend a referendum. That implies the possibility of a significant transfer of power that would not require a referendum. It is his proposal; I am simply asking him to explain it to the Committee.
Mr David
What I am saying is that it depends on how “significance” is defined. I propose that, rather than our accepting a formula stating what is and what is not significant—which, as the Government themselves recognise, would fall at the first hurdle—responsibility for deciding what is important should be in the hands of parliamentarians. That would mean a transfer of decision-making power from the Executive to Parliament, of which we are in favour.
Ms Gisela Stuart
In our system the Government are drawn from the largest party in Parliament, and our Committees have a tendency to reflect the composition of Parliament. Would my hon. Friend’s committee also have an inbuilt Government majority?
Hywel Williams (Arfon) (PC)
Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?
Mr David
No, I have made my decision.
I have referred to the significance provision but, as if that were not enough, the Bill also contains the exemption condition. If the significance provision is the smoke, the exemption condition is surely the mirrors. With a striking lack of clarity, clause 4(4) refers to “the codification of practice”—one hon. Member mentioned that earlier. That could lead to a significant extension of competences by European Union institutions, yet the Bill does not provide for a referendum on such matters.
Clause 4(4) then stipulates that changes that apply
“to member States other than the United Kingdom”
should not attract a referendum. That may appear reasonable but, given that this country is an integral part of a single European market, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty that anything happening in the rest of the European Union would not have an important impact on this country.
In addition to all that is the most amazing exemption. In a Bill that claims to be about giving the electorate the ability to make decisions on important changes affecting this country, the
“accession of a new member State”
is expressly excluded in that regard; accession will not trigger a referendum. Where is the logic in saying that we can have a referendum on whether or not a voting system should be changed for the appointment of judges, but not on whether Turkey joins the European Union? Does the Minister seriously suggest that Turkey joining the European Union would be of no consequence? Does he seriously believe that the membership of Turkey, a country of more than 70 million people, will not affect the United Kingdom’s vote in the Council of Ministers? The Minister is a nice chap, but surely he cannot honestly believe that Turkey’s membership will not have a significant impact on Britain’s role in the European Union?
Martin Horwood
I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, but surely the issue under discussion is the transfer of power to Europe and that transfer triggering a referendum. What powers does he think would be transferred from the British to the European level in the event of Turkey joining the European Union?
Mr David
The ultimate decision-making body in the European Union is the Council of Ministers, where, broadly speaking, votes are exercised according to the size of a country relative to other countries. I am suggesting that if a large country such as Turkey joins the European Union, the influence of the United Kingdom will inevitably diminish—that is absolutely simple and straightforward. Given the logic of the Government’s argument for this Bill, I find it incredible that that circumstance is painfully excluded.
Chris Heaton-Harris (Daventry) (Con)
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his wholehearted support for the amendment that I tabled on this issue, which, alas, we are not going to get to later this evening. Are we not assuming that Turkey would want to join the European Union? Given the direction in which its economy is going and given that it is already a member of the customs union, it would perhaps be very wise of Turkey to take a step back and have a look at where it is going. I was wondering whether this approach is a complete change in Labour party policy on this area, and it would be fascinating to know whether the party is for or against Turkish accession. Has the diminution of powers at the Council, whereby the previous Government gave away so many powers in different qualified majority voting circumstances that it sends shudders down the spine, led to Labour Members beginning to tighten up and see that we really should not have given away some of these powers?
Mr David
Perhaps I should not have given way on that point. I want to go on to make it absolutely clear that the Opposition would like to see Turkey join the European Union. There are a host of positive reasons for that to happen. Our position on the European Union and Turkey’s membership has not changed, but I cannot understand how the Government can say on the one hand that they believe in holding referendums on EU changes that affect the UK and on the other that they are against holding a referendum on such a huge issue of great importance to this country. The Government cannot have their cake and eat it.
Mr Dorrell
May I bring the hon. Gentleman back to the subject of his amendment? Does it follow from what he is now arguing that if the committee existed he would anticipate that a proposal that Turkey should join the European Union would constitute a significant transfer of power or competence? Does he think that in those circumstances, if the committee reached that conclusion, the decision would require a referendum to be held?
Mr David
It is not for me or anyone else in the debate to say what the committee should or should not decide. I am saying that the Bill expressly excludes a referendum on Turkey’s accession, irrespective of whether it is considered important or not, as a matter of principle. The Bill says that there will not be a referendum on Turkey’s accession no matter how important it is. That is illogical.
Kwasi Kwarteng
The simple question that Government Members wish to ask the hon. Gentleman is whether, under his committee, the proposed referendum on Turkish membership would take place. It is incumbent on him to explain how the proposal that his party has made will work in practice. That is what we are trying to get to.
Mr David
Who knows who will be on the committee? Who knows what opinions will be expressed? Who knows on what terms Turkey will join the EU, if it ever does join? The big difference is that we are suggesting that there should be proper, open-minded consideration. We are against a closed book on the issue, which is what this Bill suggests.
Kwasi Kwarteng
I am reminded of a constituent of mine going to a doctor who gave her some very powerful medicine. When she drank the medicine, she asked, “What will happen to me?” The doctor gave her a reason, but the hon. Gentleman’s answer reminds me of the doctor saying, “I don’t know what will happen to you if you drink this medicine. I do not know what condition you will be in after you have drunk the medicine. I cannot possibly tell you how it will work out.” That seems analogous to the hon. Gentleman’s position.
Mr David
I do not think that it is.
Members have asked about our rationale in tabling the amendment. I believe that we have explained it logically and systematically, but I ask the Minister: what is the Government’s rationale in specifically excluding a referendum on accession? Will the Government respond to that? What is the rationale? This is a debate but there is silence from Government Front Benchers—I can only conclude that there is no rationale. There is not, is there?
The situation is quite simple. The Government want Turkey to join the European Union. They consider that to be of tremendous foreign policy importance and they will not allow a referendum to get in the way. That is the truth and they should accept it.
Martin Horwood
First, I apologise for saying that I was in sympathy with the drift of the hon. Gentleman’s argument. I am certainly not now. I am very puzzled. A minute ago, he was arguing that we should be wary of having too many referendums. He now seems to be arguing for another one. Does he want more or fewer referendums?
Mr David
Once again, the hon. Gentleman is not following the debate very closely. What we are saying is that these issues should be considered—watch my lips—carefully by a special committee drawn of both Houses. What we are against is a predetermined conclusion that, irrespective of the circumstances, there should not be a referendum on Turkish accession. Although I challenged the Minister to explain the rationale, he declined to do so. I am sure the Committee will draw its own conclusion.
Mr Dorrell
May I ask the hon. Gentleman a simple question? Is he in favour of a referendum on Turkey’s accession to the European Union?
Mr David
No. I will move on. It is important that we realise that as well as the significance provision, the exception provision and the specific exclusion of a referendum on accession of any kind, our good friend the explanatory notes make matters worse and add to the obfuscation of the Bill.
I shall quote from the explanatory notes. Although they are wholly inaccurate and unsatisfactory, they are of some significance. They state that the so-called list in clause 4(4) is “illustrative rather than exclusive,” and they continue:
“In other words, there may be other types of treaty change which do not transfer competence or power from the UK to the EU and therefore do not trigger a referendum.”
What are the other types of treaty change? Has anyone got any ideas? Has the Foreign Office been rubbing its crystal ball? It is not good enough. There should be a clear indication of what the other types of treaty change are.
Mr Cash
The shadow Minister referred earlier to the meaning of the word “significance”, and he has just mentioned it again. Is he aware that the “Oxford Dictionary” defines “significance” as
“having a particular meaning; indicative of something”,
and goes on to give as an example,
“in times of stress her dreams seemed to her especially significant”.
Does he know something we don’t?
Mr David
No, not yet.
When I first read the Bill, I was worried about this complicated piece of legislation, compounded by the lack of clarity about the meaning of “power” as opposed to “competence”. I was concerned that it was a potential paradise for lawyers. As I am not an enthusiast for judicial activism, that worried me. I was also worried by the comments of the Foreign Secretary in the Second Reading debate.
Then I delved deeply into the how and why of judicial reviews, and in particular the circumstances in which they are held and the criteria that they examine. The House of Commons Library, as always, provided excellent objective information, and with forensic precision the European Scrutiny Committee carefully examined whether, in the case of the Bill, judicial reviews are likely.
Kwasi Kwarteng
I shall try again. In the context of the Bill, does the hon. Gentleman believe there should be a referendum on Turkish accession to the EU?
Mr David
No, I will not give way.
I asked the House of Commons Library whether a judicial review was likely. The European Scrutiny Committee’s conclusion was that
“re-course to Judicial Reviews is a more illusory safeguard than the Explanatory Notes imply.”
That is important. Surely it would be sensible for the Government to set out clear criteria for reviewing the reasonableness of a Minister’s decisions. More importantly, the European Scrutiny Committee report tells us that the courts have already ruled that decisions by Government on whether to hold referendums are political decisions and that the courts have therefore been reluctant to get involved.
That was borne out by the Wheeler case in 2008, in which the divisional court was asked to review the previous Government’s decision not to hold a referendum on the Lisbon treaty. It concluded that the issue lay
“so deep in the macro-political field that the Court should not enter the relevant area at all”.
If that was the case in the past, it is certain to be the case in the future.
Stephen Phillips (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)
Is not the distinction that the Bill envisages that, were a Minister to decide that something was not of significance, even though it was of significance, that could be reviewed by the courts in a judicial review? Surely the hon. Gentleman would agree that it is those provisions in the Bill that create the difference and distinguish the Wheeler case and that it is for that reason that the explanatory notes are to at least some extent correct.
Mr David
Part of the problem, as was mentioned earlier, is that we are talking about a Government making subjective decisions, and the courts have ultimately said that such decisions are political. Given the lack of clarity and the level of obfuscation in the Bill, my contention is that the courts are likely to come to exactly the same conclusion in future.
Graham Stringer
I share my hon. Friend’s worry about judicial review and the interference of the courts in what should be the business of the House. Given that, does he intend to support amendment 11, tabled by some of our hon. Friends, because it would get over that point?
Mr David
The Committee will have to wait to see how we will decide to vote.
I should like to finish the point about judicial reviews. Why do the explanatory notes refer to the so-called safeguard of judicial review on no fewer than four occasions? The reason is obvious: it is an attempt by the Government to give the wrong impression. It is yet another example of smoke and mirrors. The Minister has already promised to amend the woefully inadequate explanatory notes in one respect, but I urge him to rewrite them with regard to judicial reviews.
Neil Carmichael (Stroud) (Con)
On the significance test, why has the shadow Minister skipped over the idea that anything that was judged to be significant would end up being a matter for an Act of Parliament anyway?
Mr David
We have not skipped over the issue at all. While we recognise that some people might have a different view on what is significant and important, we suggest that rather than subjectively expressing a view on what is significant, it should be for a purposeful and deliberative forum representing both sides of the House to come to an objective decision on what is of significance, according to the priorities of its members, because they are accountable directly to the people.
Neil Carmichael
Is that where the hon. Gentleman’s proposed committee would ride to the rescue and perhaps solve the problem?
Mr David
The important point to stress is that it would not be our committee, but Parliament’s committee. We are not saying that it should be a partisan body; its membership should be drawn from all parties in this House and from the other House. To allow the Executive simply to make their own decisions on what is or is not important and on what should or should not have a referendum is to undermine the sovereignty of Parliament.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
There is a slight contradiction. The hon. Gentleman is worried on the one hand about judicial activism and Parliament giving away its sovereignty, and on the other that the judicial review will not be operative anyway. It cannot really be both ways around. He also says that the committee will come to its decision, which will be voted on. Is he promising that when the vote takes place neither House will be whipped, so it will be genuinely independent, or is it just going to be part of the great party machine?
Mr David
On judicial activism, I read the explanatory notes, and they gave me the impression that I should not worry if the Government decide not to have a referendum, because there will be the ultimate safeguard of judicial reviews. The notes made that point not once or twice, but four times, and many Members said, “Fair enough; we will have an opportunity to challenge a decision in the courts because we believe that right is on our side and the strength of our argument is self-evident.” That opportunity does not really exist, however, because all the evidence suggests that all the Government are proposing, as the European Scrutiny Committee concludes in its report, is an illusory safeguard. At the end of the day, the Executive will decide in many, many areas whether there will be a referendum.
Mr Dorrell
The hon. Gentleman cannot get away with that. Some of my hon. Friends are concerned, as he appeared to be, about the threat of judicial activism, but as my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) says, if the judges are not going to engage in the issue, it will be a matter for the House of Commons, not for the Executive. The Executive make a recommendation; it is the House of Commons that decides.
Mr David
No, because other Members want to contribute to the debate.
In conclusion, this tortuous Bill is problematic in the extreme. This part of the Bill in particular undermines the centrality of Parliament in Britain’s democracy. The convoluted clauses setting out when a referendum will be held are not only complex but contradictory; the significance and exemption clauses place a question mark over the Government’s true intentions; and the false impression given in the explanatory notes about judicial reviews is truly reprehensible.
We have tabled amendments that would significantly alter and, we believe, improve this ham-fisted Bill. Central to our main amendment is a belief that Parliament should be at the very heart of our democracy, and such an approach would ensure that the long-standing principles of representative parliamentary democracy were truly upheld. Without the amendment, this part of the Bill is at best a ragbag of half-baked inconsistencies and at worst a recipe for constitutional chaos.
Chris Heaton-Harris
Before I make the couple of points that I want to make, I suggest to the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David), as a Welsh Member, that referendums are quite important to people, that people understand simple and basic details and that they can understand, within the questions set, technical and important points. Democracy evolves, it always has done and it always will do, and through the Bill we suggest that referendums are a solid and sensible way forward. We trust the people who elected us in the first place to take a view, if asked, on the issues that the legislation raises.
Chris Heaton-Harris
I thank my hon. Friend, because every time he stands up, he educates me with a fact that I do not know.
The Labour proposals, in particular amendment 92, seek to redefine the referendum condition for UK ratification of amending treaties. As I will spell out in a couple of minutes, the proposed referendum committee would have to ask both Houses for agreement. As my hon. Friend the Member for St Austell and Newquay (Stephen Gilbert) said, there must be agreement by both Houses before there is a referendum. The amendments are anti-referendum, anti-people and anti-common sense.
Currently, the referendum condition is that an Act approving an amending treaty must provide that its approval will not be effective until the ratification of the treaty has been supported in a referendum. Under amendment 92, the referendum condition would require an Act approving a treaty to provide that its approval will not come into force until the whole procedure has been completed. If the hon. Member for Caerphilly is to be believed, that procedure would involve the European Union referendum committee delivering a recommendation on whether a referendum should be held, both Houses of Parliament opposing or agreeing to the holding of a referendum, and a majority being in favour of ratification in a referendum on the treaty. The Bill’s main alternative, which is the exemption condition for UK ratification of amending treaties, would remain intact. That means that an Act approving an amending treaty could state simply that the treaty did not fall within clause 4—the definition of a transfer of competence or power—and a referendum would not be held.
Essentially, the hon. Member for Caerphilly is selling us a sop. There would be a whole procedure to go through, but a clause that says that there might not be a referendum would not be amended. Amendment 92 is not clear. It is probable that the redefined referendum condition would be met if an approving Act required a referendum to be held on the amending treaty, and if that produced a supportive result, without the EU referendum committee having made a recommendation on whether a referendum should be held. By seeking to amend some parts of the Bill and to leave other parts standing, the hon. Gentleman is confusing the point. I suspect that that is a deliberate ploy, because I am not convinced that the Labour party is willing to trust the people with decisions about significant moves in Europe. I am not convinced that many hon. Members understand the significance of the amendments.
Amendment 88 suggests that the intention behind amendment 92—both were tabled by Labour Front Benchers—is that no referendum should be held unless the European Union referendum committee has delivered an opinion on whether there should be a free public vote. Amendment 88 makes it clear that all amending treaties or article 48(6) decisions, which simplify provisions, that fall under clause 4 must be referred to the procedure involving the EU referendum committee and both Houses to determine whether a referendum is required. In other words, even treaties or article 48(6) decisions that are deemed to fall under clause 4, which require a referendum under the Bill, would be exempted from a referendum under the Opposition proposals. Again, that would take away the British people’s chance to have a say in these important areas.
New clause 9 would establish the referendum committee and the procedure for deciding on referendums on treaties and certain decisions, including article 48(6) decisions. It would report to Parliament in all cases on whether an amending treaty or relevant EU decision
“involves a significant transfer of power or competence, and if so…whether it requires a referendum to be held.”
In other words, only if the Committee judged there to be a significant transfer of competence or power would it provide an opinion to Parliament on whether the referendum should be held. For all other decisions, it would not have to report to Parliament. That is a recipe for keeping decisions on which the British people might want a say behind closed doors in this place, rather than for adding more transparency.
Nia Griffith
Indeed. I shall be dealing with that point shortly, because it is very important. There is a huge difference between the attitude now in Wales and the one prior to 1999, when people were very excited and enthused about the setting up of a new institution, there was a lot of media coverage and a lot of people were talking about it. With five weeks to go before the vote on 3 March, people are not particularly interested. They are saying, “This is a technical difference. If it is a matter of making the process better and simpler, so that things can be done in the Assembly rather than in Parliament, could you not just get on with that and do it?” That is not because people are not interested, because they do not appreciate what the Assembly is doing or because they do not accept that we have different ideas about how to run the health service and education and about how to protect the education maintenance allowance; it is because referendum fatigue is setting in. People are saying that on the big issue they want to have a vote—they want to say that there is going to be an Assembly—but on the technical issue they are saying, “You are telling us that there are better ways of doing things. We would like you to look at the detail, rather than for us to have to do that all the time.”
Mr David
Does my hon. Friend agree that an important issue is involved in the case of the Welsh referendum? It concerns whether the Welsh Assembly will have primary or secondary powers, which is an important constitutional issue. Despite that, it is very difficult to get people engaged and to encourage them to make a decision according to the arguments on that constitutional point.
Nia Griffith
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is the problem. The referendum is about the technicalities and that is why it is so difficult to get the media and press interested and so difficult to make it the ordinary subject of conversation in pubs.
Charlie Elphicke
I see the Bill as a ground-breaking and essential force for good. It is important to understand that the context of the Bill is the reaction of many people throughout the land against the denial of a referendum on an EU constitution renamed and rebadged as the Lisbon treaty, but not changed.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Llanelli (Nia Griffith), and a privilege to hear from a Member of Parliament who has not had the ire of constituents come down upon her head for not standing up for a referendum on Europe. I congratulate her on having a constituency which is clearly full of people who are delighted with the European Union and delighted never to be consulted by means of a referendum. It is a fine constituency that she has. No doubt she has the odd housing claim—
Mr David
Surely the hon. Gentleman recognises that people are not concerned about constitutional abstractions. They are concerned about their jobs, their children’s education and their health. Those are the issues that matter to people. If he does not realise that, he is not in this world.
Charlie Elphicke
The shadow Minister for Europe makes a fair point. In my constituency, yes, people’s prime concern is that Labour all but closed the hospital down and that we will be getting a new hospital. They are concerned that they lost jobs and money. They worry about how they will get by, and about the massive amount of borrowing and taxation. I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman. My right hon. and hon. Friends in the Government are trying hard to sort out that difficult problem. That will take time.
Charlie Elphicke
With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I think that that is increasingly less likely to be the case.
Charlie Elphicke
Perish the thought. Were such a Minister to make such a decision, my constituent would be able to challenge it and ensure that there was a more objective assessment.
Charlie Elphicke
The shadow Minister knows from our discussions on clause 18 that it is not possible to do that. Nevertheless, were he to become Minister in future and find the Act tiresome in holding back the floodgates of his Euro-enthusiasm and desire to embrace the greater Europe, he could dispense with the Bill by repealing it. However, he would take a political hit in doing so, because he would be taking away from the British people their right to have a say on the treaties that would follow. Therefore, he would have to be pretty forthright with the electorate in an election manifesto. If he was not, he would be open to the questions and ire of a large section of the British public who would regard that as an issue of concern.
Without further ado, it is right that I discuss new clause 9, which was tabled by the Leader of the Opposition, the shadow Foreign Secretary and the shadow Europe Minister. As far as I can see, it proposes a total watering down of everything in the Bill. I have been told by the Clerks that I am not allowed to describe it as a wrecking amendment, but I believe that I am allowed to say that it would, in my humble opinion, wreck the Bill, as far as its purpose and intent are concerned.
Charlie Elphicke
I entirely agree. My hon. Friend makes a strong and forceful point.
I have another concern about new clause 9. My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex, as I have said, fought valiantly for the people to have a say on the Maastricht treaty. If Maastricht were refought and the matter reconsidered, is it likely that out of the Opposition’s proposed committee a referendum would come forth? Many of us have some doubts about that. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary in former times made the case that the Amsterdam and Nice treaties should also have been subject to a referendum. If we had had such a committee system, would there have been a referendum? Can the shadow Europe Minister, the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David), tell us whether there would have been a referendum if his committee system had been operational?
Charlie Elphicke
We come to the vexed question of Lisbon, when the push for a referendum reached its apogee and the people felt that they were outrageously cheated. If there were a Lisbon question once again, and if the facts were the same or similar, could the new clause 9 committee be relied upon to sit and, in making a determination, to ensure that we had a referendum? If a Government had said in their election manifesto, “We will have a referendum on this matter, the committee will sit, and we will make sure that it recommends a referendum,” would the committee then do so? Some people have grave doubts, because of the Whips’ system, and that is why the new clause should not be the preferred way.
The Bill’s measures on a referendum lock are the way forward. The amendments are all about breaking up that lock, and they would take us back to where we were with the Lisbon treaty, which was rammed through both Houses. The new clause is a concern for that reason. It would water down the referendum lock and leave us with significance tests writ large. Do we want that, or do we want to ensure that the British people have a referendum guarantee? That is very important.
Charlie Elphicke
That is a very important question. It shows the respect that the new Government have for our democratic process, for consulting the people and for taking bold steps in the national interest—not just bringing Britain back from the brink of bankruptcy, but ensuring that the British people have a say in referendums.
George Eustice
No, I personally do not agree with that, and there is a good reason why. What the Bill should aim to do is prevent the handing over of power from this country to the European Union. I want sovereignty for this Parliament; I do not want this Parliament to interfere in the decisions of other countries. However, once we start saying that we should have a veto on the accession of countries such as Turkey, we start to get into that territory.
George Eustice
Because rather than allowing such countries to join—and we have already expanded the number of countries in the European Union—we would then be saying that every country should have a veto on future accessions. I do not think that that is right. Let me also just say that Turkey is a moderate, Muslim country, and a great example of a successful secular democracy, which we should be supporting and encouraging, rather than sending signals that suggest that we are against accession.
As I have said, I have campaigned for referendums for a long time. In my time campaigning against European integration, it is fair to say that I have seen a lot of referendums promised and then subsequently taken away.
George Eustice
I am not sure that I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point. If any major transfer of power from the UK Parliament to the EU were proposed, a referendum would automatically be triggered.
Mr David
The hon. Gentleman said earlier that the Bill was about giving this country’s people a voice on significant changes. I have already tried to ask the Front-Bench team, but the Minister would not respond, so let me try again to ask about the Government’s rationale for deliberately excluding one of the most important changes that will affect the European Union and Britain—the accession to and possible membership of the EU by Turkey. Why is that excluded?
Michael Ellis
With great respect to the hon. Gentleman, a new country—whether it be Turkey or any other—joining the EU does not mean that more decisions will be shifted to the EU. Nor does a new country joining the EU mean the giving up of vetoes. That is the difference. Conservative Members have always supported the widening of the EU, and a wider EU has changed it for the better by bringing in free-market allies such as the Czech Republic. I hope and expect Turkey to join, and I would encourage it to do so.
Michael Ellis
I was not present for that, so I shall forbear making further reference to the matter.
The Labour amendments to the Bill are nonsensical. They seek to take away power from the people, and even from the House. They seek to empower a committee, and it was Winston Churchill, I think, who said that wars are not won by committee, and nor would this type of legislation be won over by committee. With great respect to the Whips, such a proposal would involve them having greater sway, over how a committee might be constituted and what might result from it. The public need to be satisfied, and a referendum will at last satisfy them that they will have a say. Labour’s suggestion of involving a committee is erroneous and on the wrong track entirely.
I am also anxious that other amendments do not weaken the Bill. Amendments tabled by my hon. Friends might have the opposite effect from that which is intended. By creating too strong a test as to what is substantial, and requiring a referendum on almost any issue, we might bring European Union institutions to a standstill—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] That might be the wish of hon. Members, and I respect that, but I do not agree with it, as it is not the way forward. Subsequent Governments—not Her Majesty’s Government as currently constituted, who would never buckle under such pressure—might be put under disproportionate pressure from other member states of the European Union to alter and interfere with the Bill once it is on the statute book. With respect to hon. Friends who take such a view, that might indirectly have an effect of weakening the Bill and leading to diplomatic crises.
On the significance test, Labour seeks to have a significance test on everything, which would not work. I was fascinated by one Labour amendment suggestion to give greater power to the other place. I venture to suggest that it is 100 years since the House of Lords has had greater authority than the House of Commons, yet the Labour party proposal of a veto on a referendum is tantamount to giving the unelected House of Lords, illustrious and greatly respected though it is, a right over and above that of the House of Commons. That would be an entirely unhealthy position. The Labour party does not dare oppose the principle of the Bill, as it knows it will have the support of the vast majority of members of the public, but nor does it want to accept it, as it wants to oppose for the sake of opposition.
The Bill sets out 44 vetoes, 12 decisions and eight different ways of increasing the European Union’s competences, and there will not be a significance test on any of those. One would hope that that would have the effect of placating those on the Government side of the House who are concerned about the significance test.
Michael Ellis
I am afraid that that is not relevant to the Bill.
Matthew d’Ancona has said:
“Imperfect though it may be, the bill is a dramatic punctuation mark in the history of Britain's relationship with the European Union.”
Opposition Members ought to accept that. They ought to acknowledge that the Bill is a ground-breaking, landmark piece of legislation which will do that which has not been done in this country for decades, and give the general public the rights that they so obviously desire in relation to the European Union and further expansion of its powers.
Martin Horwood
The hon. Gentleman might want to listen to the rest of my speech, because there is some risk of what he describes, and that is the thrust behind our amendments.
Amendments 67 and 68 may look drastic to some of our Conservative colleagues, because they seem to remove a swathe of the referendum provisions from the Bill. However, they seek to tease out the rationale for the referendum lock in the case of amendments to the treaty on the functioning of the European Union using the simplified revision procedure. The amendments do not relate to referendums on changes to the treaty on European Union or even to referendums on changes to the treaty on the functioning of the European Union that do not use the SRP. So the amendments do not seek to remove referendums altogether from this Bill; they ask whether referendums on treaty changes under article 48(6) of the treaty on European Union—the simplified revision procedure—which, after all, was created for relatively uncontentious and insignificant changes in the functioning of the European Union, are really justified.
As a small aside, may I ask the Minister to explain why “transfer” of power or competence “to” the EU is used in the explanatory notes and in some of the language associated with the Bill, rather than “pooling” or “sharing” powers and competences “with” the European Union, which has been the established language until now? To those of us who are fairly relaxed about pooling sovereignty and powers with the European Union when it is right to do so, “transfer” sounds a slightly more pejorative term and its use an example of linguistic drift.
Martin Horwood
That stretches credibility somewhat. The hon. Gentleman has heard in many eloquent speeches from Members on the Government Benches how important the Bill is to our relationship with the European Union and how it offers the possibility of reconnecting the British public with the decision-making processes in the European Union. It is beyond doubt that the Bill will be a significant piece of legislation.
Mr Lidington
My hon. Friend is tempting me to go way beyond the scope of the Bill. At the moment, any legal aid application would be subject to the normal rules that apply to legal aid, which are the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, and not of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The Bill comprehensively goes through the nuts and bolts of the treaties to identify how power and competence could be shifted from this country to the European Union. We have deliberately and determinedly taken steps to limit the wriggle room for any Government or Minister in this regard. We are committed to ensuring, as best we can, that the Bill is watertight, with no omissions or loopholes that would allow a future Government to avoid giving either Parliament or the people the control that they deserve.
Let me spell out in a little more detail how we plan to achieve this. Following the agreement of any future treaty change under the ordinary revision procedure—that is, the process involving an intergovernmental conference and, probably, since the Lisbon treaty, a convention of the European and national Parliaments as well as of national Governments—three conditions must be fulfilled before the United Kingdom could ratify such a treaty change. First, the Minister must lay a statement before Parliament. That statement would give the Minister’s decision as to whether the proposed treaty change would involve one or more of the criteria in clause 4 of the Bill, and therefore whether a referendum would be required or not. A change that would transfer power or competence from this country to the EU would be subject to a referendum of the British people.
If the proposal were considered by the Minister not to involve one or more of the criteria in clause 4, it would be considered to meet the exemption condition—in other words, it would not require a referendum to be held. The important point is this: the Minister cannot simply conjure his decision out of the air. He has to obey the law. He has to follow the criteria set out in the Bill, especially those in clause 4 and schedule 1. His statement will have to demonstrate how he has applied those criteria in coming to his decision. He will simply not have the scope in law to make some arbitrary decision in defiance of what is spelled out in the legislation.
Mr Lidington
The points are not vague. I invite the hon. Gentleman to have another look at clause 4 and schedule 1, both of which define in clear terms the various ways in which competences could, within the terms set out in the treaties, be enlarged, transferred or expanded, while schedule 1 sets out in detail a list of national vetoes, the removal of which would automatically trigger a referendum. I gently suggest that the hon. Gentleman studies the Bill a little bit harder.
Mr Lidington
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that.
I wish now to discuss the significance test. New clause 9 would submit all referendum criteria, all treaty changes and all uses of article 48(6) to a significance test, but even the narrow use of the significance test, as set out in the Bill, has been the subject of a great deal of concern, so I wish to be clear about what it means for the Bill as it stands and to explain why it is needed. The significance test can be used only in very specific circumstances. Clause 4 identifies 13 instances when a treaty change transferring competence or power to the EU would attract a referendum. The significance test applies not to 13, but to two of those instances. Moreover, it can be used only when a decision under article 48(6) is being taken. It cannot be used for treaty amendments adopted under the ordinary revision procedure.
Article 48(6) decisions could seek to confer on a European institution a power to require this country to act in a particular way, or to impose sanctions on the UK for our failure to act in a particular way. Although that could be done only within existing areas of competence, and not within new ones, it would enable EU institutions or bodies to use those existing competences in a different way. A future proposal under article 48(6) to do either of these things would, as a matter of general principle, require a referendum to be held.
Let me give the Committee a hypothetical example. There might be a proposal to allow an EU agency to impose sanctions on a national regulator or to act in a way that compelled British businesses to do something that would increase significantly the burdens on British business and harm the competitiveness of this country. That sort of decision would, in my view, be classed as significant and should attract the referendum lock, but there might equally be instances in the future—my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham was right—where article 48(6) might be used to give a new power to a body in an area that is not significant to this country. For example, it might require a national regulator or some other British organisation to provide an EU agency with a set of statistics annually.
Let us consider, for example, the European Maritime Safety Agency. It was set up to provide member states of the Commission with technical and scientific assistance in the field of maritime safety and the prevention of pollution by ships. If, in the future, it was decided to change the treaty so that that agency could issue binding directions to national regulators and that that would be a permanent cession of authority and powers, that would be a significant power within the meaning of clause 4(1)(i) or (j). If, however, the proposal was to change the treaty to allow the agency to require national regulators to provide it with an annual digest of statistics, I do not think that that would be a significant power under the Bill. That is why we have provided for the significance test.
Amendments 3 and 5 would remove the significance condition from the Bill, so it would in practice require a national referendum on such things as the provision of statistics. I think that most people in this country would accept that such technical changes should be left to the Government, under the scrutiny of Parliament, who of course would still have to authorise the minor treaty change through primary legislation—a formal Act of Parliament subject to detailed scrutiny and capable of amendment in either House. In all those instances the proposal would need to be thoroughly analysed and we have ensured that any use of the significance test would be subject to strong scrutiny and accountability.
When he spoke about amendment 11, my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere took a different approach to parliamentary scrutiny. His amendment would require a Minister to seek parliamentary approval not to hold a referendum on the basis of the significance test, through both Houses agreeing to a motion without amendment. I have a great deal of sympathy for where my hon. Friend is coming from and I do not for one moment challenge his passionate commitment to the duty of Parliament to hold Ministers to account or his wish to see the powers of Parliament over European Union business and ministerial decisions on Europe strengthened and improved. If I felt that his amendment would secure that objective better than the provisions in the Bill, I would be with him on the detail. However, I want to explain why I do not believe that it does that.
First, when a Minister makes the statement required by clause 5 on whether a proposed amendment requires a referendum, they must give reasons why the proposed change does or does not meet the significance test. Those reasons will need to refer to the criteria set out in clause 4, so their reasoning will need to be clearly set out. There is a first measure of protection already in the Bill.
Secondly, the Bill ensures that every proposed treaty change, regardless of whether the significance test applies, would require the approval of Parliament through primary legislation. That would allow sufficient time for Parliament to scrutinise the use of the test to legislate for a referendum if it deemed such a provision necessary.
Thirdly, there is the risk that having a separate debate on significance in the way that amendment 11 proposes could weaken Parliament’s scrutiny of the primary legislation that the Bill requires. That point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) in an intervention. In view of the dynamic of the House of Commons, it would be tempting for a Government who wanted to rush through a particular treaty change to schedule an early debate on the motion not to require a referendum and then, when the ratification Bill came forward and Members of Parliament had had the opportunity to look at the detail, perhaps consider the evidence of a Select Committee, and listen to what outside experts had to say on the matter, they would find their Whips coming up and saying, “We’ve already voted on this. You personally went through our Lobby to support the proposition that a referendum was not required. How can you change your mind and try to insert the requirement for a referendum at this stage?”
The unintended consequence of amendment 11 could be to strengthen the hand of the business managers and to weaken the independence of judgment that Members would be able to exercise under the requirement for primary legislation laid out in the Bill. Amendment 11 would also weaken any prospect of a successful judicial review. Judicial review is not a panacea, but the House should see it as a significant step to give the citizen the right to challenge a Minister’s decision, where that decision is irrational or unreasonable.
There are two important distinctions between what we are proposing here and what we saw in the Wheeler case, to which a number of Members referred in the debate. First, the Minister has to give reasons, and give reasons by reference to the Bill. That opens up the possibility that a court might wish to consider a challenge to the reasonableness of the Minister’s decision. Secondly, whereas in Mr Wheeler’s case the Court was invited to judge the wording of the constitutional treaty against the wording of the treaty of Lisbon and declined to do so, in this case we are talking about a possible invitation to the Court to judge the actions and decision of a Government Minister in his Executive capacity against the statutory duties on that Minister set out in the language of the Bill. Those are important distinctions.
Mr Lidington
No. I want to do justice to the amendments tabled by the Opposition. They have been presented as increasing the role of Parliament. In fact, they do the reverse. The effect of the Opposition amendments, especially new clause 9, is to subject every referendum criterion to a significance test. If accepted, the Opposition’s amendments would leave it open as to whether a move to join the euro was significant, a move to give new competences to the European Union was significant, a move to give up our border controls and take part entirely in a European immigration system was significant, or a move to join a European public prosecutor system was significant.
The hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr David) is trying to persuade us that he is offering new powers to Parliament, when it is clear to anybody who studies the wording of his amendments and his new clause that the intentions are the reverse. The Opposition’s amendments would drive a coach and horses through the Bill. They would deny both Parliament and the people the additional powers and controls which I believe Parliament and people in this country want to see. The Bill is designed to be tough. As academic experts have said when giving evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee, it delivers the referendum lock that we have promised. I will not yield by weakening the Bill in the way that the Opposition propose.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
European Union Bill
Wayne David Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Charlie Elphicke
My hon. Friend is right. However, that is not a debate about the sovereignty of the UK Parliament. It is a concern that the EU has grown too much, extended too far, cost too much and intruded too much into our national life. It should cost less, intrude less and our relations with it should be reworked.
I underline again that I believe that clause 18 is a fair reflection and codification of the current legal position. I do not think that we need it, but I will wear it and live with it. I do not believe that we need to include extra stuff about sovereignty, which is not defined, and has not been defined in the amendments. The best thing we can do is be more straightforward about the need for fewer laws and less interference from the EU.
Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)
This Bill, and more particularly this clause, have had a long gestation. In November 2009, the then Leader of the Opposition promised that if his party won power there would be a United Kingdom sovereignty Act
“to make clear that ultimate authority stays in this country, in our Parliament.”
He told his party that this was
“not about Westminster striking down individual items of EU legislation”,
but that its intention would be to
“put Britain on a par with Germany.”
He said that the German constitutional court had consistently
“upheld that ultimate authority lies with the bodies established by the German constitution”.
No doubt some Conservative party activists had some reservations about the idea of Great Britain being the same as Germany; nevertheless his proposal was warmly received.
Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)
Perhaps my hon. Friend has noticed—as I have over the last six months—that there is not much point talking about the manifestos of the parties that are now in government, as it is clear that the very first thing they did on achieving power was to bin their manifestos and try to pretend that they had never existed.
Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)
On the issue of manifestos, does the hon. Gentleman regret the fact that his party, when in government, broke its manifesto pledge to give the British people a referendum on the Lisbon treaty?
Mr David
The hon. Gentleman’s comments are inaccurate, because we did not give a commitment to have a referendum on the Lisbon treaty; we gave a commitment to have a referendum if there was a constitution, and there never was a constitution.
We have heard a long and well-argued speech by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash). Although many of us on this side of the House would not agree with many of his views, we recognise that the European Scrutiny Committee, and he himself, have done much to ensure that this House will give proper consideration to the Bill. I have to say that I was shocked that the Prime Minister allegedly tried to block the hon. Gentleman’s appointment as Chair of the Committee. I was a member of that Committee for several years, alongside the hon. Gentleman, and I was pleased that when this Bill was presented to Parliament on 11 November last year, the Committee immediately announced its intention to conduct an inquiry and produce a report on the sovereignty clause before the Bill’s Second Reading. This report was extremely helpful during the Second Reading debate, and I am sure that all hon. Members will also find it useful for today’s debate.
I note that it is the intention of the Committee to publish further reports on aspects of the Bill, and I welcome that too. It is important to note that this is the first occasion on which the Committee has conducted pre-legislative scrutiny; I hope that its work is recognised by the Government and that the practice will be more widely adopted. Even more importantly, I sincerely hope that the Government will change the Bill in the light of the Committee’s report.
I have two disappointments. The first is that the Government did not allow the Committee sufficient time between First and Second Readings to hold thorough public evidence sessions. Given that the Committee stage of the Bill is being drawn out over several weeks—indeed, we do not even officially know when the other Committee days will be held—it is clear that the Government are in no rush to put this Bill on the statute book. Why then did they not allow the Committee more time for its evidence sessions? Are they afraid of more scrutiny?
My other disappointment is that the Foreign Secretary was not prepared to give evidence to the Committee. If he is so sure that his Bill is as robust as he says, why would he not appear before the Committee, put his case and answer questions? We all know that the reality of the Bill does not match the rhetoric that the Government employed. This so-called sovereignty clause is not what its advocates claim it is. It does not challenge the supremacy of European law; nor should it. It does not alter the nature of European law, change the relationship of European law or elevate the sovereignty of Parliament to a higher level.
In fact, what is most striking about the sovereignty clause is that it does not even mention the word “sovereignty”. It is simply a reaffirmation of the status quo. As the explanatory notes admit, this is merely a declaratory clause. It reflects the dualist nature of the UK’s constitutional model, by which I mean that EU law has effect in the UK only because of a decision taken by Parliament. In this case, the relevant legislation is the European Communities Act 1972. That is what clause 18 confirms, and as such it is nothing more than an exercise in legislative tautology—a puffed-up reiteration of what the law of the land already states.
So why have the Govt chosen to draft this clause? The reason we have been given is, in part, in the explanatory notes, which explain that in the metric martyrs case—Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council 2002—an attempt was made by counsel for Sunderland city council, Eleanor Sharpston QC, who is now the Advocate General at the Court of Justice, to argue before the divisional court that the binding effect of the EC treaty in domestic law depended, in part, on the higher principle of the supremacy of EU law. Eleanor Sharpston argued that the EC treaty did not owe its authority wholly to an Act of Parliament. That doubt, expressed by one individual in one case, is being used by the Govt to try to justify this clause.
Mr Kevan Jones
Does my hon. Friend agree that the case also clearly rejected the notion that EU institutions or legislation could somehow limit the powers of Parliament?
Mr Cash
Does the hon. Gentleman also accept that Eleanor Sharpston has moved seamlessly upwards and has now reached a very eminent position? Does he also accept that the Thoburn case was decided only at first instance, so no one is absolutely sure what would have happened if it had gone to appeal, or if another similar case were brought and those arguments—especially given Eleanor Sharpston’s present eminence—were accepted?
Mr David
It is extremely unlikely that her arguments would have been accepted by any legal authority given the categorical rejection of them in that case.
In other words, as Professor Hartley, one of the Committee’s witnesses, stated, the metric martyrs—or Thoburn—principle is that
“the position of EU law in the UK and the sovereignty of the British Parliament ultimately depends on British law”.
In apparent contradiction of the reference to the metric martyrs case, the explanatory notes say that the Foreign Office itself sent written evidence to the Committee that stated:
“Our own analysis has led us to the conclusion that there is no persuasive legal authority to support the contention that the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer absolute. Our assessment is that, to date, case law since 1972 has consistently upheld the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty. There is no uncertainty here.”
Therefore, an argument that the Government accept is irrelevant is the only one that they can advance in their explanatory notes to justify the clause. How ridiculous can things get?
Small wonder, then, that when the European Scrutiny Committee concluded that
“the legislative supremacy of Parliament is not currently under threat from EU law”,
most scholars agreed. Moreover, the Committee went on to say:
“we have no reason to doubt that Thoburn reflected the well understood and orthodox position, which left the constitutional principle of dualism intact and is unlikely to be overturned”.
In view of that assessment, it is hardly surprising that the Government have tried two different arguments. The Minister for Europe said in a letter to his parliamentary colleagues:
“it cannot be denied that the issue has been the subject of legal and political speculation.”
We know about the legal speculation. As we have heard, it was dismissed by Lord Justice Laws and even by the Foreign Office itself. But what about the political speculation? Where is that coming from?
We know from evidence submitted to the European Scrutiny Committee by Jean-Claude Piris, director general of the legal service of the European Council—in other words, its legal adviser—that in his opinion clause 18 changes nothing. He believes that it reaffirms the doctrine of UK constitutional law under which EU law has effect in the UK by virtue of an Act of the UK Parliament. Furthermore, he went on to say that the clause is consistent with declaration 17 annexed to the final act of the intergovernmental conference, which concluded the treaty of Lisbon, and with the case law of the European Court of Justice. It is clear, therefore, that there are no threats coming from European Union institutions.
We do not imagine that any of the Government’s Conservative Back Benchers have questioned the sovereignty of Parliament, and I can assure the Committee that it has not been questioned by any Labour Members. Can it be, however, that the sovereignty of Parliament has been questioned by the Liberal Democrats? After all, they are the most pro-European party in Britain, and of course a former leader of the Liberal Democrats, the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Mr Kennedy), is the president of the European Movement. Furthermore, a former leader of the Liberal Democrats in the European Parliament, Andrew Duff, is a well-known European federalist.
That there is political speculation is one of the new arguments. Another has been suggested by the Minister for Europe in his letter to his own MPs, and more recently was advanced by the Foreign Secretary in The Sunday Telegraph at the weekend. He said:
“In its sovereignty clause the Bill also deals with one potential but important problem for the future.”
Having accepted that there are no current valid legal arguments, the Government are now pointing political fingers at unnamed politicians, and even suggesting that clause 18 is being introduced because of a hypothetical problem that may, or may not, materialise at some time in the dim and distant future. At the same time, the Government accept that clause 18 is not really needed at all, because Parliament is already sovereign. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that some have referred to the clause as being indicative of the Bill’s confusion, contradictions and general lack of clarity.
Mr Redwood
Does the hon. Gentleman think that there is ever the danger that if a sovereign authority gives away too much power, it ceases to be sovereign? That is what happened when the sovereign Crown ceded too much power to Parliament. Is he worried that his party gave away too much power to the EU?
Geraint Davies
Does my hon. Friend agree that if there is a risk to sovereignty it is from this Conservative Prime Minister, who last autumn signed up to EU authorities that, as I said earlier, can impose binding standards on securities, markets, insurance, occupational pensions, banking and systemic risk? We can talk about the words, but what counts is the action, and the actions of the Conservative Prime Minister are not to cling to sovereignty but to give it away.
Mr David
That is an interesting point. The Prime Minister, rightly or wrongly, certainly believes that it is in Britain’s national interest to adopt from time to time measures that he perceives to be in Britain’s national interest and then to encourage Parliament to follow suit. We have to decide whether that is the case—but that is another debate.
The debate has brought to the fore a number of important issues. I am thinking in particular of the extremely important argument made in the European Scrutiny Committee’s report on the true nature of the threat to parliamentary sovereignty. The objective evidence presented by the Committee to the House leads it to conclude that
“if the legitimate supremacy of Parliament is under threat, it is from judicial opinions in other areas of law”,
not EU law. That is true. I am thinking in particular of the Jackson case of 2004, which concerned the constitutional validity of the Hunting Act 2004, and in which three Law Lords indicated that in certain circumstances the courts had inherent powers to disapply legislation.
I am worried that the Government do not appear to recognise that there is a real debate taking place on this issue between those who argue that the absolute supremacy of Parliament remains unqualified—as explained by Dicey, the British constitutional scholar—and those who believe that sovereignty of Parliament is a construct of common law. According to those who hold this view, the sovereignty of Parliament is open to revision by the courts. In the Bill’s explanatory notes, the notion of parliamentary sovereignty as a construct of common law is expressed as though it were a matter of fact and entirely uncontroversial. Similarly, a one-page note on the Bill produced by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office states:
“there is a common law principle that the UK Parliament is sovereign”.
It is dangerous to view the legislative supremacy of Parliament as an offshoot of common law, because it means that the principle will vary according to the judicial whims of judges at any given time.
Mr Cash
I am somewhat encouraged by the Opposition’s line of argument because, as I explained in my speech, my amendment 10, which deals specifically with excluding the common law principle, does not derive entirely from the explanatory notes but—as the hon. Gentleman has just reminded us, and as we knew from evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee—from the fact of judicial trends, which will not go away. Whatever happens to the explanatory notes, we are still left with a problem, and I believe that the Foreign Office has known this all along.
Mr David
The hon. Gentleman might well have a point. This is something that has to be looked at carefully. I am mindful of the fact that although we are in Committee today, this is not the end of the process. I am sure that we will return to the issue on Report.
It appears that the Government hold the view that parliamentary supremacy is a construct of common law. However, if that is the case, it could be argued that parliamentary sovereignty could be qualified by the courts and that this would not be opposed by the Government. Professor Tomkins, who has been referred to already, is the distinguished chair of public law at the university of Glasgow. He submitted extremely important written evidence before the European Scrutiny Committee and gave extremely significant oral evidence. Let me be clear: Professor Tomkins is not anti-European. He specifically said in his written evidence that he considered that
“it is in the United Kingdom’s clear interest to remain a committed member of the EU.”
However, he expressed his concerns to the European Scrutiny Committee about the supremacy of Parliament and common law as follows. Referring to the Jackson case, Professor Tomkins said:
“one of the things that that case most sharply and, to my mind, alarmingly indicates is that even our highest court, as was, is not sure what to do with parliamentary sovereignty. It isn’t sure what the legal basis for parliamentary sovereignty is. It isn’t sure how much parliamentary sovereignty is under challenge. It isn’t sure how much parliamentary sovereignty continues to represent the group ‘norm’ or the ‘bedrock’ or the ‘keystone’ of the constitution—all of those words are used.
The reason why the Jackson and the Attorney-General case is so long…is that so many of the judges who decided that case…wanted to use the case as a vehicle for the expression of a bewildering variety of different views about the past, present and future state of parliamentary sovereignty. The case, I think, is authority for not much, but it is authority for the proposition that we have the right to be concerned about what is going to happen to parliamentary sovereignty in the hands of the courts.”
That is a powerful statement, and all of us who believe in the importance and the supremacy of Parliament should take note.
As I have tried to argue, the Opposition believe that clause 18 is otiose and unnecessary. It is purely declaratory and merely reaffirms what is widely understood to be the legal and constitutional position regarding the application of EU law in the United Kingdom.
Martin Horwood
I am rather confused about the Labour Front-Bench position. Having apparently endorsed the fear that there is judicial mission creep, the hon. Gentleman now seems to be rejecting a clause that seeks to resolve that issue. What exactly is the Labour party suggesting? Would it propose an alternative clause, or would it prefer that the Bill did not exist? What is the Labour position?
Mr David
I am just coming to the amendment that we are proposing, which would allow an opportunity for the issues raised by the hon. Member for Stone and others to be considered in a rational and thoughtful way. In the spirit of generosity, we accept that others may have genuine doubts. That is why we tabled amendment 52, which would ensure that the Secretary of State made an annual report—[Interruption.] The Deputy Leader of the House has read our amendment. Well done. Amendment 52 would ensure that the Secretary of State made an annual report to indicate whether parliamentary sovereignty had been challenged or questioned in the British courts or the European Court of Justice. Our amendment spells out in clear terms the duality principle, whereby the law of the European Union is totally dependent on the European Communities Act 1972. We see such a report being presented to Parliament and being voted on annually.
Martin Horwood
With all due respect to the hon. Gentleman, I shall have to restate my question. I was not asking whether he was proposing a report to find out the Secretary of State’s position; I was asking him what the Labour party’s position would be. What would he want in that report? What would he expect?
Mr David
We would want an accurate reflection of what has been happening in the British courts and the European Court of Justice. I want to see the objective evidence presented to us. It is interesting that we have not heard from the Government in this debate as to whether there is more justification than what they have so far presented to us. I suspect that there is none, but there are many Conservative Back Benchers who believe that there is ample evidence. What I am saying is that there is certainly an indication that there are more things to be considered.
Chris Heaton-Harris (Daventry) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman will know from his time as leader of the Labour MEPs that for those of us who are concerned about sovereignty in the United Kingdom, there is another problem—the mission creep that is omnipresent in the European Parliament across most political groups, including the European socialist group, which is probably the worst in that respect. Does he not believe that if his amendment were to have any weight and value, it would be worth looking at mission creep from the European Commission and the European Parliament as well?
Mr David
I am not sure what the “mission creep” that the hon. Gentleman is talking about really is. We have been talking about the sovereignty of the British Parliament, and we are pretty clear that the European Union exercises its powers through European law in this country by virtue of an Act of this Parliament. That is undeniable, and it is an important principle on which I hope every Member of the House would agree.
I fully appreciate that many Members of the House have sincerely held concerns. Although we would argue that some of those concerns are exaggerated, we should nevertheless have an annual review—an annual report, an annual debate and, yes, an annual vote. If it can be shown that the sovereignty of Parliament is being questioned or challenged in the courts, either at home or abroad, we will have a strong basis on which to act.
Martin Horwood
I am hoping that my persistence will pay off. The hon. Gentleman appears to be saying that on the one hand, clause 18 is otiose and, according to all the eminent sources to whom he has referred, that there is no particular threat to parliamentary sovereignty. However, he also seems to be conceding that there is some generalised concern, because he is calling for an annual debate and an annual report on the subject. Let me once again ask: what would the Labour party do? Would it also suggest such a clause? Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that we should restate parliamentary sovereignty in statute or not?
Mr David
The hon. Gentleman is making hard work of this—or perhaps he is not listening as carefully as he might. Our starting point is that we would not have this Bill in the first place. We would be talking about the issues that really matter to the people of this country and the people of Europe. Nevertheless, we recognise that we are in the here and now. The Government have introduced the Bill, dedicating much parliamentary time to it, and, as a good Opposition, we are determined to make the best of it. We are simply saying that, on the face of it, there is no case for clause 18. However, we have respect for the concerns that have been expressed, both here and elsewhere. We are saying that we should be careful to take into account all the points that are expressed, clearly and effectively. However, let us not dwell on them on a one-off basis and make a definitive decision here and now; let us instead have an ongoing process, with an annual review and an annual report. Let us ensure that the Government are fully accountable to the House of Commons. That is a straightforward position.
Mr David
The hon. Gentleman will have to wait and see what the Opposition decide to do. As true democrats, one of the things that we want to do is listen to the debate. We are not entering into the exercise with a closed mind, and that is why we have tabled our amendment. We want to ensure that the debate does not finish here and now, but continues throughout the Bill’s progress through Parliament. I referred to Report stage earlier.
There is also the important issue of parliamentary sovereignty and all the complex ramifications involved. An ongoing debate has been started by the Government, but let us ensure that we have an annual debate on this matter in the House, based on a report produced by the Government. I very much hope that the House will accept our amendment. There may be different views on the conclusions that such reports would reach, but let us all recognise that the way to have an effective debate is to have an annual debate based on an annual report.
Many points have already been raised today, and I have listened carefully to the arguments, particularly those put forward by the hon. Member for Stone. I urge all colleagues to think carefully about supporting amendment 52. Clause 18, as it stands, means nothing from any point of view, but our amendment would make it far more meaningful. If our amendment is not successful, clause 18 will take us forward neither a millimetre nor an inch. As it stands, it is a bland restatement of a law that already exists. European Union law is enforceable in the United Kingdom only because of legislation made by this Parliament. That is a self-evident truth and, with or without clause 18, it will not be altered.
Mr Redwood
The Crown was sovereign once. It is intriguing that we are more than two hours into this debate but so far we have talked only about parliamentary sovereignty, even though the sovereignty technically still belongs to the Crown in Parliament. We all know about the events that took place over several hundred years, particularly when they were accelerated during the 17th century revolution and crisis. There was a large transfer of power from the Crown to Parliament. When a sufficiently large transfer of power takes place from someone who was sovereign to those who would be sovereign, a point is reached at which that sovereignty passes because enough power has been surrendered and the arrangements have changed sufficiently.
As other Members have suggested, we need briefly to look at how that very big transfer of power occurred in the 17th century from the Crown to Crown in Parliament and, in due course, effectively to Parliament standing on its own. One important factor was that Parliament was very good at aggregating power to itself. In those days, it decided to be very nice to bankers, which worked very well for it, because it got the City of London and the men of finance on its side. In those days, the English Navy did not have French ships in it, and Parliament made sure that it responded to the English Parliament. Parliament also took the precaution of hiring and training and paying—something quite unusual in those days—the best army in the country. It got over the problem of competing armies and, in due course, established that it had military power and could command the Army.
Parliament also needed to deal with the judges. It was established during the revolutionary period that judges were necessary and that, according to our current tradition, they had to be independent and should not interfere in parliamentary matters by trying to make the law. They simply had to deal with the law as Parliament provided it. We therefore eventually ended up with a very powerful Parliament.
In the 19th and 20th centuries, Parliament did something that everyone in the House is now united in admiring: it made the exercise of power by Parliament a democratic matter by extending the franchise until practically every adult in this country was able to participate in elections. That gave Parliament the authority of having a democratic voice and mandate. The question that we are debating today is whether that great democratic settlement, in which most Members believe, is now under threat from judge-made law, from European-made law and from other centres of power. Could parliamentary sovereignty come under pressure in the not-too-distant future? Is it being damaged because too much power is being transferred? These questions account for the nervousness, certainly on the Conservative Benches, about the degree of power that has already been surrendered by successive Parliaments over the years, particularly under the most recent Government following the treaties of Nice, Amsterdam and Lisbon. Under those treaties, a large number of areas were transferred either to joint decision taking or to sole European decision taking.
That means that the exercise of power in many important areas of activity, including regulation, the expenditure of money and the provision of public services, now emanates from the continent. Those powers are trying to establish their own democratic credibility through the European Parliament. They are also trying to establish their own judicial credibility through the European Court of Justice, and their own administrative credibility by strengthening the powers that are exercised around the various collective corporate tables that constitute the ever-evolving, and ever more powerful, European Union settlement.
The nub of our debate today is whether there is something that this Parliament could and should do, no matter how much power has passed, how many decisions are taken through the European Union and how much money it now takes to itself and spends on our behalf, to make it clear that, should we want those powers back, we can have them back. If we wish to change or moderate what the European Union is doing, do we have every right to do so because we are still the sovereign?
Some of us fought long and hard to keep the currency under British sovereign control. These arrangements involve a British sovereign and preserve the settlement of the Queen in Parliament, and the Queen’s face appears on the banknotes of the realm, but we all know that they are Parliament’s notes and that they represent an expression of parliamentary sovereignty. Indeed, it was this very Parliament that, by a majority, approved the previous Government’s decision to print a lot more of those notes—or electronic notes—as an expression of what that sovereignty can do for the people of Britain. We can argue about whether that was a good thing or a bad thing, but it was an undoubted expression of sovereignty.
Mr Clappison
The amendments are not mine, although I would be happy to put my name to them. They were drafted after we received the evidence from the experts, and as a Select Committee member I believe that they are entirely consistent with what the experts told us. Other hon. Members might say more about that. The amendments would better meet the threat that was identified by the experts, for all the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) set out in his considered speech.
Mr Clappison
The hon. Gentleman would do as well to ask what is the point of his amendment. The gist of his speech was that the clause will achieve nothing and we are going to have a report on it every year saying how it has achieved nothing. This is not a party political speech, but I think that the Labour party could have produced something a bit better than amendment 52, which is just a marking-time amendment that gave the hon. Gentleman the opportunity to make a few random points, but does not deal with the problems that we face. To be fair to Ministers, they have tried to face those problems.
The clause does not sufficiently address the situation because it is a restatement of the existing position, under which the present challenges to parliamentary sovereignty have developed, as has been said. It does not go much further than what people were told before the referendum on the European Union in 1975, to which hon. Members have referred. Interestingly, the Labour party said that it would never have a referendum and yet it was the Labour party that put the issue to the people after the negotiations had taken place and after the country had joined. The people decided to stay in the European Union. I am sad to say that I am old enough to have taken part in that referendum, which probably makes me past it, as the BBC would say.
Mr David
The hon. Gentleman makes the point that there is absolutely nothing in the Bill—and no indication whatever from the Government either—to say that the Government do not accept the primacy of European Union law. That is the fundamental point that we are at. I therefore take his comments to be a direct challenge to what his Government are proposing. My second point is that we are also talking about the duality principle, whereby European Union law has effect in this country only because of an Act of this Parliament. That is our position.
Mr Jenkin
I think I am safe to agree with what the hon. Gentleman says, and that is why clause 18 is not a sovereignty clause, as he says. Therefore, if he agrees with everything that I am saying, I cannot quite understand why he does not want to make clause 18 a sovereignty clause. It would be quite easy to do so. I cannot for the life of me understand this. What could be less contentious than a declaration in the Bill that said, “The sovereignty of Parliament is hereby reaffirmed”? The idea that this would somehow open the issue of parliamentary sovereignty to judicial interpretation seems to me the daftest bit of legal advice of the lot. We make the statute and statute overrules everything, so if Parliament is sovereign and says in statute that it is sovereign, we clobber whoever challenges that; indeed—it is up to Parliament—we could actually sack the judge who tried to do that.
Mr Lidington
Certainly not. I am saying that we made sure we took legal advice from all the relevant Departments across Whitehall. The views I am expressing—what is in the Bill—reflect the legal advice that has been given, as well as the political decisions that Ministers have taken about what should be included in the legislation.
As I said on Second Reading, clause 18 is declaratory or, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dover said, it is a codification. The clause creates a statutory point of reference to which any future court that considers an argument about the source of authority for European law in this country must have regard. It reflects the dualist nature of our constitutional system, under which international obligations—including those assumed by the UK through our membership of the European Union—are not self-executing within the UK legal system. The fact that the UK is dualist means that European Union law is enforceable here only because this Parliament has legislated to make it so. The clause makes it clear that such European law has authority only by virtue of the fact that Parliament has, through its Acts, decided to import it into the domestic legal order.
In the event of any litigation arising where a party sought to claim that directly applicable or effective EU law had an autonomous legal existence in the UK, the other party would be able to counter that argument by referring to clause 18 and, similarly, judges would take this into account in addressing the arguments raised in their judgments.
Mr Lidington
If one follows the logic that my hon. Friend and others have adduced this evening about the ambitions and activism of certain members of the senior judiciary, and if one considers the arguments that would be made by counsel and parties on both sides if a case were pleaded before a court—they would inevitably draw attention to the absence of any definition of parliamentary sovereignty—one sees that my hon. Friend underestimates the risk that the amendment would encourage judicial activism rather than provide an antidote to it. The concerns about definition apply to other amendments and new clauses, as well.
I wish to say a brief word about the explanatory notes, which have been mentioned in a number of speeches. I note that the European Scrutiny Committee’s report recommended that they should reflect the balance of opinion on the matter. As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said on Second Reading, references to the common law are meant simply as a contradistinction to statute, given that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is defined nowhere in statute. They are not meant to be determinative of the origin of the principle, which goes far beyond the scope of the Bill.
Although I do not believe that one phrase in seven substantial paragraphs of the explanatory notes bears the weight that some of my hon. Friends have placed upon it, I will respond to the concerns that have been addressed. The coalition will amend the explanatory notes before the Bill enters the Lords, to address satisfactorily the concerns that the European Scrutiny Committee has raised. That will in no sense change the effect of the clause, which is couched in terms of the status of EU law in the UK legal order, and does not refer explicitly to parliamentary sovereignty or take a position on the origins of that principle.
Mr Lidington
I have had no private conversations with my hon. Friend the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee—the hon. Member who expressed concern. The hon. Gentleman is in his place. Like every other hon. Member, he has had the opportunity to hear about the proposed change.
New clause 1 deals with section 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. By virtue of that Act, jurisdiction has been conferred on our courts to determine and adjudicate on disputes arising under EU law. That jurisdiction does not arise from the treaties, nor have the courts conferred it on themselves. Courts here possess that power because Parliament has determined that it is appropriate for them to do so and has legislated accordingly.
Section 3(1) of the European Communities Act provides that, for the purposes of legal proceedings in the UK courts, any question about the meaning or effect of the treaties is to be treated as a matter of law and requires the UK courts to take judicial notice of the treaties, the Official Journal and any decision of the European Court of Justice. Together with section 2, it is a cornerstone of the European Communities Act and, like the rest of the measure, subject to appeal or amendment by Parliament if we choose.
New clause 1 would restrict the exercise by the courts of their jurisdiction to interpret and address issues of EU law by ensuring that it does not extend to construction or interpretation by the courts of the nature or legal effect of parliamentary sovereignty.