Asked by: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, with reference to the Pelindaba Treaty, what discussions she has with the Secretary of State for Defence on the long-term potential capability of storing nuclear weapons on Diego Garcia.
Answered by Stephen Doughty - Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
I refer the Hon Member to the answers provided by the Ministry of Defence on 14 January in response to Question 103951, and on 5 December 2024 in response to Question 16455.
Asked by: Jeremy Corbyn (Independent - Islington North)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 17 April 2025 to Question 45840 on RAF Lakenheath: Nuclear Weapons, when it first became policy for his Department to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at United States military bases in the United Kingdom.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
It has been UK policy for decades to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any given location.
Asked by: Jeremy Corbyn (Independent - Islington North)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether agreements between the United States and United Kingdom on the presence of US military forces in Britain place restrictions on the ability of the US to deploy nuclear weapons in Britain.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
The terms, conditions and jurisdiction considerations that govern the US – and any other visiting NATO force permanently based in the UK – are enshrined in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (1951), which is embedded into UK law by the Visiting Forces Act (1952). This is publicly available. It is longstanding UK policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any given location.
Asked by: Charlie Dewhirst (Conservative - Bridlington and The Wolds)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with reference to paragraph 2.1.2 of her Department’s policy paper entitled UK Government Green Financing Framework, published on 26 November 2025, for what reason facilities intended for the production of weapons grade nuclear material or for other primarily military uses are excluded; and what assessment she has made with the Secretary of State for Defence of the potential impact of this exclusion on the level of private sector participation in the Trident renewal programme.
Answered by Lucy Rigby - Economic Secretary (HM Treasury)
The Green Financing Framework, updated in 2025, explains how proceeds from green gilts and NS&I’s retail Green Savings Bonds will finance public expenditures that have the goal of delivering a direct and positive environmental impact.
Eligible expenditures are assessed on the basis of their contribution to the government’s climate and environmental objectives. Military nuclear spending, including the Trident renewal programme, is primarily for national defence purposes and as such is not eligible to be financed under the Framework. This exclusion is in line with international norms for green bond frameworks and enables the UK’s green gilts to be accessible to the greatest possible pool of investors, improving value-for-money.
The Green Financing Framework only applies to public expenditures and does not apply to private investment. Eligible expenditures are drawn from departments’ confirmed Spending Review settlements. There has been no rationale for HM Treasury and the Ministry of Defence to assess the potential impact on private sector participation in the Trident renewal programme.
Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, who is next in the Nuclear Firing Chain after the Prime Minister; and under what circumstances is the Prime Ministerial Directive superseded.
Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
As the honourable Member should know and in line with the policy under successive governments, the most sensitive operational details of our continuous at sea deterrent are obviously not disclosed publicly.
Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, whether the Government has established thresholds for dangerous weapons-related capabilities in frontier AI models.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) has policy responsibility for promoting responsible AI innovation and uptake. Risks related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (and other dangerous weapons), including defining thresholds for harm in these domains, are managed by a combination of the Home Office, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Cabinet Office, and the Ministry of Defence. DSIT does not set thresholds for dangerous capabilities in risk domains owned by other departments.
The AI Security Institute (AISI), as part of DSIT, focuses on researching emerging AI risks with serious security implications, such as the potential for AI to help users develop chemical and biological weapons. AISI works with a broad range of experts and leading AI companies to understand the capabilities of advanced AI and advise on technical mitigations. AISI’s research supports other government departments in taking evidence-based action to mitigate risks whilst ensuring AI delivers on its potential for growth. AISI’s Frontier AI Trends Report, published in December 2025, outlines how frontier AI risks are expected to develop in the future.
Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, whether the Government has established a defined threshold of dangerous capability in frontier AI models, including capabilities relating to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, which would trigger Government action.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) has policy responsibility for promoting responsible AI innovation and uptake. Risks related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (and other dangerous weapons), including defining thresholds for harm in these domains, are managed by a combination of the Home Office, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Cabinet Office, and the Ministry of Defence. DSIT does not set thresholds for dangerous capabilities in risk domains owned by other departments.
The AI Security Institute (AISI), as part of DSIT, focuses on researching emerging AI risks with serious security implications, such as the potential for AI to help users develop chemical and biological weapons. AISI works with a broad range of experts and leading AI companies to understand the capabilities of advanced AI and advise on technical mitigations. AISI’s research supports other government departments in taking evidence-based action to mitigate risks whilst ensuring AI delivers on its potential for growth. AISI’s Frontier AI Trends Report, published in December 2025, outlines how frontier AI risks are expected to develop in the future.
Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what steps the Government is able to take to delay or prohibit the public release of a frontier AI model in instances when the UK AI Security Institute assesses that model as posing a serious risk of assisting users in developing chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
We are optimistic about how AI will transform the lives of British people for the better, but advanced AI could also lead to serious security risks.
The Government believes that AI should be regulated at the point of use, and takes a context-based approach. Sectoral laws give powers to take steps where there are serious risks - for example the Procurement Act 2023 can prevent risky suppliers (including those of AI) from being used in public sector contexts, whilst a range of legislation offers protections against high-risk chemical and biological incidents.
This approach is complemented by the work of the AI Security Institute, which works in partnership with AI labs to understand the capabilities and impacts of advanced AI, and develop and test risk mitigations.
Asked by: Mike Wood (Conservative - Kingswinford and South Staffordshire)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the answer of 15 December 2025, to Question 98492, on F-35 Aircraft: Nuclear Weapons, whether a decision to (a) launch a US sovereign nuclear weapon from the UK's F-35A planes whilst on a particular NATO mission, or to (b) participate more generally in a NATO nuclear mission, would require the authorisation of the Prime Minister.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
As with the answer given to the hon. Member on 15 December 2025 to Question 98492, I refer him to the answers I gave on 8 September and 11 November 2025 to Questions 70471 and 87345 respectively.
https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-08-29/70471
https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-11-03/87345
Asked by: Priti Patel (Conservative - Witham)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, whether she has held discussions with her Mauritian counterpart on whether nuclear weapons can (a) be stored and be present on Diego Garcia and (b) transported to and from Diego Garcia under the terms of (i) the UK-Mauritius Treaty on the Chagos Archipelago and (ii) in accordance with Mauritius obligations under the terms of the Pelindaba Treaty.
Answered by Stephen Doughty - Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
I refer the Rt Hon Member to the answer I gave her on 11 June 2025 in response to Question 57628.