Energy Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)
Tuesday 23rd May 2023
(11 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Energy Act 2023 View all Energy Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 May 2023 - (23 May 2023)
The Chair
I welcome the Committee to this first sitting of line-by-line consideration of the mighty Energy Bill. Even though most of the Committee will be experts in these matters, it might be helpful for me to run through a few parish notices first. Those of you who are not familiar with Bill Committees should let me know, but if I am teaching granny to suck eggs, forgive me.
The Bill is as you see it before you. If any member of the Committee, whether from the Government side or the Opposition, wishes to table amendments to it, they must do so by close of business—when the House rises—on the Thursday for formal consideration on the Tuesday, or by close of business on the Monday for formal consideration on the Thursday. If amendments are not laid by that time, they will not feature in our considerations until a later stage.
The amendments as laid are grouped together—by me in theory, although in fact by my learned friends the Clerks, with my approval—into convenient debates. Amendments that might be spread all over the Bill are brought together in one grouping to be considered by the Committee in a debate. However, decisions on individual amendments are taken at the appropriate stage in the Bill, when those amendments come up, so the vote is not taken at the time that the amendment is debated, but later on in consideration, when they come up in the Bill. Of those speaking on amendments, the first person whose name is at the top of the amendment speaks first; others may speak as they wish throughout the debate.
Just a small word: the standards of behaviour in Committee are precisely identical to those in the Chamber, in terms of dress, drinking coffee and all those other things. I am a bit of an old-fashioned stickler on such matters, so forgive me, but I warn you in advance that I tend to be on the conservative side on them.
We will consider first the programme motion, which stands in the Minister’s name. It was discussed yesterday in the Programming Sub-Committee.
Ordered,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 23 May) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 23 May;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 25 May;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 6 June;
(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 8 June;
(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 13 June;
(f) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 15 June;
(g) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 20 June;
(h) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 22 June;
(i) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 27 June;
(j) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 29 June;
2. the proceedings shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 16; Schedule 1; Clauses 17 to 21; Schedule 2; Clauses 22 to 32; Schedule 3; Clauses 33 to 52; Schedule 4; Clauses 53 and 54; Schedule 5; Clauses 55 to 98; Schedule 6; Clauses 99 to 132; Schedule 7; Clause 133; Schedule 8; Clauses 134 to 137; Schedule 9; Clauses 138 to 158; Schedule 10; Schedule 11; Clause 159; Schedule 12; Clause 160; Schedule 13; Clause 161; Schedule 14; Clauses 162 to 167; Schedule 15; Clauses 168 to 174; Schedule 16; Clauses 175 to 203; Schedule 17; Clauses 204 to 239; Schedule 18; Clauses 240 to 254; Schedule 19; Clauses 255 to 259; Schedule 20; Clauses 260 to 273; new Clauses; new Schedules; Clauses 274 to 279; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
3. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 29 June.—(Andrew Bowie.)
The Chair
The Committee will therefore meet again this afternoon at 2 o’clock and twice every sitting Thursday and Tuesday until 29 June, unless we complete before then, which depends on the Committee. We now have to consider written evidence.
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Andrew Bowie.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence received by the Committee will therefore be circulated to members by email and published on the Bill website.
We now proceed to line-by-line consideration of the Bill.
Clause 1
Principal objectives and general duties of Secretary of State and economic regulator
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 75, in clause 1, page 3, line 11, at end insert—
“or who seeks to be a party to arrangements for the use of sequestered and transported carbon dioxide”.
This amendment seeks to refer specifically to the “use” of carbon dioxide, as well as arrangements for transport for the purpose of disposal.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 76, in clause 2, page 3, line 35, at end insert—
“(c) the use of sequestered and transported carbon dioxide.”
This amendment seeks to provide an additional area of activity prohibited on an unlicensed basis.
Amendment 81, in clause 57, page 51, line 19, at end insert—
“(d) a carbon capture use revenue support contract.”
This makes explicit the case of a contract for the use of carbon capture.
Dr Whitehead
It is a pleasure to serve once again under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. We have served in Committee together on a number of occasions, and I know that you will keep us closely to the subjects in hand as we go through the Bill, which I am sure will be a good thing for its progress.
Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I want to make a personal point: may I ask him to speak up slightly? I am hard of hearing and I am already struggling to hear what he is saying. I thank him.
Dr Whitehead
I appreciate that point. A moment ago, I was just making a personal aside to the Chair. I will try to address the Committee in a more expansive manner.
This group of amendments would put the full definition of carbon capture, usage and storage into the Bill. As Members know, this Bill chapter is about various activities that go on with carbon capture, usage and storage, but unaccountably the detail in the Bill talks about only carbon capture and storage. We may think that is the definition of what we are talking about, but it is not just a process of sequestering the carbon that arises from, say, a power station or cement works. Various carbon capture and storage arrangements will have to be made for the sequestering of carbon dioxide in many uses, both industrial and energy-based, throughout the country.
Then, so the story goes, that carbon dioxide is transported, by either pipe or barge, and is sequestered at a suitable site. The Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero waxed lyrical recently about just how much sequestering space there is around the UK waters. His view, which I think is absolutely correct, is that the sequestration of carbon dioxide as an industrial activity in the UK, with all the preparation that goes with it, is not just a necessary feature for the end of the carbon capture and storage process but something that the UK can offer to many countries around the world for their carbon sequestration, making a substantial plus-industry for the UK out of the process.
That is the end of the carbon dioxide story—how it goes from capture, either by chemical means or by extracting it from flue gases or whatever, to being put on its journey. In my long history of engagement on carbon capture and storage, I have always said that that is the case, but a number of years ago the Government added an important rider to that process in the definition that we use: CCUS, not CCS. CCUS is important because it is not just an uninterruptable process of carbon going into the transportation and sequestration arrangements, having been captured in the first place; there are points in the process whereby the carbon can be taken out of the transportation and sequestration process. Depending on the quality of the carbon dioxide that has been captured, it can be put to secondary use, before being captured again in the process, as it goes round again.
There are considerable opportunities in making the cycle go round twice, or several times, before the sequestration takes place. That is potentially an important part of getting best value out of the carbon capture and storage process. One of the first uses of the process that I came across was quite a while ago, when I paid a visit to one of the world’s first operational carbon capture and storage plants at the Boundary dam in Saskatchewan. The energy company in Saskatchewan was capturing the carbon output from a fossil fuel energy plant and diverting the carbon that was being captured in the first instance to the process of repressurising wells in oil fields to enhance the recovery of oil. Of course, the carbon was then recaptured after that point but, importantly, that cycle had been broken and something else had happened.
That is just one use, but there are many other uses that we could think about putting carbon dioxide to. It can be used in the chemical industry in the production of methanol, in metalworking to harden the casing of moulds, or in the petroleum industry to optimise the yield of oil wells. It has a substantial use in healthcare and in horticulture. As we know from junior-school biology, plants can increase their size and output by having a carbon dioxide-rich atmosphere in which to grow, and there are substantial opportunities to use carbon dioxide under those circumstances.
Those are not significant interruptions, as it were, in the carbon-capture cycle. Indeed, the use of carbon under those circumstances is beginning—or will begin—to be programmed into the carbon capture and sequestration process. Of course, programming it in is important in terms of the arrangements being set out in the Bill for the circumstances under which licences can be granted.
We will hear a lot about licences in the passage of this Bill. As we know, certainly in the energy sphere, pretty much everything that can or cannot be done is licensed in one way or another, and there is a great deal of legislation for that purpose—for example, the Petroleum Act 1998 and the electricity and gas Acts, which set out the circumstances under which licences should be granted. Indeed, as we will see in the first part of the Bill, there is a restated imperative that people cannot carry out these things on an unlicensed basis; they really must have a licence at all stages of carbon capture—a licence to capture, a licence to transport and a licence to sequester.
The hole in the Bill is in what happens when the process is interrupted. I do not use the word “interrupted” in a derogatory sense; it is very positive that we can make the most use of carbon dioxide in its passage. Having invested a lot of money in capture, it is a good idea to try to recycle the process as much as we can, but for reasons I am not quite clear on—the Minister may be able to enlighten me—the wording of the Bill does not appear to account for that particular sphere of CCUS activity.
It may be that I have missed something and that the use of carbon should not be included in the licensing and licensable arrangements. The Government may be quite satisfied that the interruption of the process is perfectly okay to leave alone. I do not think that is the case because, as I have set out, it is part of the whole process. If we are to take carbon capture and storage seriously, we will want to know that carbon dioxide use, as part of the process, goes back into the cycle of capture and storage in the long term, and that carbon is not just captured but used for a particular purpose in the way I described. After that, it disappears back into the atmosphere, presumably to be captured again at a future date.
It is important that the licensing arrangement is complete as far as the passage of carbon is concerned. Amendments 75, 76 and 81 would add the use of carbon dioxide to the various clauses that relate to the overall process. The amendments would provide a definition of carbon capture use, and additional wording for the process of licensing and of use itself. We would not want to move the amendments separately; they are rightly marshalled together in today’s proceedings. I move the amendments together, as they are grouped in the selection list, because, as I have said, they are essentially concerned with the question of use.
I am sure the Minister will provide us with a suitably inspired reply, so that we can be reassured either that this has all been thought about, and our amendments are therefore superfluous, or that there is a problem and, whether or not he accepts the amendments this morning, the process will be looked at to ensure that we have the full definition, and the full process is in hand as far as the passage of carbon capture and storage is concerned.
The Chair
Technically speaking, the Member has moved only amendment 75. The other two amendments will be decided on when we reach the relevant clauses. He cannot move all three together; he has moved amendment 75. I call Taiwo Owatemi.
The Chair
Sorry. I thought you were waving your hand. If people could stand up and make it plain to me that they wish to speak, I will call them. If they wiggle an eyebrow, raise a hand or otherwise, I will not see them and therefore will not call them. I call Olivia Blake.
Olivia Blake (Sheffield, Hallam) (Lab)
Thank you, Mr Gray. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship and to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test. Having spoken to researchers at the University of Sheffield, and understanding that carbon capture and storage is more complicated than just the big carbon capture and storage programmes, I think his amendment is crucial. Modular and small carbon capture is really important, but where the captured CO2 then goes is really important too. Having a CO2 hub provider in this space is important for the circular economy of products, which, although not within the Bill’s exact remit, is fundamental to reducing carbon in the environment.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (Andrew Bowie)
As ever, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray, and particularly for the first time as a Minister on a Public Bill Committee. I am sure you will keep me on the straight and narrow over the next few weeks. I look forward to working with you and members of the Committee as we scrutinise this landmark and, as you described it, mighty Energy Bill.
To begin, I want to remind Members of the purpose and background of the Bill. The Energy Bill will provide a clearer, more affordable and more secure energy system. It will liberate private investment in clean technology, reform our energy system so that it is fit for purpose, and ensure the safety, security and resilience of the energy system.
I turn first to amendments 75, 76 and 81, tabled by the hon. Members for Southampton, Test and for Bristol East. Amendment 75 seeks to expand the definition of a transport and storage network user in clause 1 to refer additionally to users who may seek to use carbon dioxide taken off a transport and storage network, not just those who are seeking to transport and store carbon dioxide for its permanent geological storage.
Although there are many uses for carbon dioxide across industrial sectors in the UK, including fertiliser production, cement, lime, and food and drink, as the hon. Member for Southampton, Test set out—indeed, there was little in what he said with which I found myself disagreeing—not all these applications result in the permanent abatement of carbon dioxide. For some of those products, the carbon dioxide is ultimately released back into the atmosphere.
The Government’s aim in prioritising support for the deployment of carbon capture and storage in the UK is to incentivise large-scale, permanent abatement of carbon dioxide and the establishment of a transport and storage infrastructure, which is essential to achieve net zero emissions. Carbon capture and usage technologies resulting in the permanent abatement of carbon dioxide could represent only a small abatement potential as compared with carbon capture when the carbon dioxide is disposed of by geological storage. For those seeking to use captured carbon dioxide, alternative options are likely to be available, such as off-taking carbon dioxide directly from an emitter before it enters a transport and storage network. For those reasons, the Government do not consider the amendment to be necessary or appropriate.
Clause 2 establishes a prohibition on operating at a geological carbon dioxide storage site or providing a service of transportation of carbon dioxide by pipeline without a licence. Amendment 76 seeks to expand the scope of this licensing requirement to include licensing the use of carbon dioxide that has been captured and transported. The licensing requirement in clause 2 is intended to establish a regulated investment model for the transport and storage of carbon. This is a “user pays” economic regulation model that involves the network users—power and industrial emitters—paying for the transport and geological storage of the carbon dioxide that they produce. Licensed transport and storage companies will be able to recover their investment in the transport and storage network through the fees charged for transport and storage services. This model provides long-term revenue certainty for investors to pool through the invested needed to establish and scale up carbon dioxide transport and storage infrastructure here in the UK.
As pipeline, transport and storage assets have monopolistic characteristics, oversight by Ofgem, the independent economic regulator of carbon dioxide transport and storage, will ensure that users are protected from anti-competitive behaviour and that costs are economic and efficient. A model of economic regulation for delivering carbon dioxide transport storage was identified as the preferred option following the Government’s 2019 consultation on business models for carbon capture, usage and storage.
Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)
The Minister mentioned Ofgem. What discussions were had with Ofgem about its capability, expertise and resources to deal with what is going to be a whole new suite of competencies for Ofgem?
Andrew Bowie
Of course, none of this is without its challenges, and Ofgem recognises that. However, I have regular conversations with Ofgem and the Department is happy that it is indeed scaling up its capability, to enable it to deal with not only the new carbon capture utilisation and storage procedures that we are discussing but the whole range of areas in which Ofgem will have a role as we move towards a net zero future. Given the aims and purpose of the economic licensing framework that clause 2 establishes, I hope that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test will agree to withdraw his amendment.
Amendment 81 seeks explicitly to include within the scope of the term “revenue support contract” a contract for the use of carbon capture. We understand that to mean a contract to support carbon capture and usage. The carbon capture revenue support contracts are intended to support the deployment of carbon capture technologies. The Bill allows for carbon capture revenue support contracts to be entered into with eligible carbon capture entities. Broadly, a carbon capture entity is a person who, with a view to the storage of carbon dioxide, carries on activities of capturing carbon dioxide that has been produced by commercial or industrial activities, is in the atmosphere or has dissolved in seawater.
Storage of carbon dioxide is storage with a view to the permanent containment of carbon dioxide. It is important to emphasise that provisions in the Bill may therefore allow for a broad range of carbon capture applications, including those carbon capture entities that utilise the carbon dioxide, resulting in the storage of carbon dioxide with a view to its permanent containment. Decisions on which carbon capture entities will receive Government support are to be made on a case-by-case basis. Prioritising support for carbon storage is considered essential to help deliver our decarbonisation targets.
Alec Shelbrooke
Will my hon. Friend describe the actual mechanisms of the carbon dioxide storage, geologically? How will that be done—for instance, will that be out into the North sea, using old oil platforms?
Andrew Bowie
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. I would be happy to give a thorough explanation of exactly how the carbon capture and storage will proceed; I am sure we will get to that in the course of our debate on the Bill, and in other places. However, I am not sure where that would fit within the context of this debate, other than to say that the technology being developed by companies, organisations and clusters around the UK is world leading. When it comes to being able to store in the future the carbon dioxide being produced in the UK now, the North Sea is of course the greatest asset that we have as a country. The oil and gas industry will be able to play a pivotal role in that development as we move forward.
Given the reasoning I have set out, I hope that the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test will be withdrawn.
Dr Whitehead
I appreciate what the Minister has said this morning. Frankly, though, I am not wholly convinced that the processes have been fully accounted for. I emphasised the various uses of carbon dioxide. The Minister is right that not all those uses lead to eventual sequestration. However, most of the uses that do not lead to additional sequestration do, on occasions, sequester the carbon dioxide in the process itself.
For example, carbon dioxide used in horticulture is substantially sequestered during the process of growing the plants. There is potentially an important use of carbon dioxide in processing hydrogen and in producing sustainable aviation fuel. Those processes sort of sequester the carbon in producing a different product, which is itself then burned. We then have to sequester the whole lot again, but the product has been used in the meantime.
It is important to concentrate on aligning the processes within carbon dioxide use as closely as possible with the process of sequestration, not simply allowing the carbon dioxide to escape. One thing that concerns me is the use of carbon dioxide in the process of the enhanced recovery of oil, because unless that carbon dioxide can be sequestered at the point it is injected into a well, although it produces greater amounts of oil it leaks into the atmosphere again, so we have a net negative outcome. We have produced more oil, but arguably it should have been left where it was in many instances.
Alec Shelbrooke
That leads to the question that I asked the Minister. The issues that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test is raising show that there is a research and development need for sequestration in, for instance, licensing oil and gas. That will need a large investment, so does he agree that it is important that the oil and gas industry uses some of its large profits to ensure that it can do the R&D available to sequester carbon dioxide, and does that call into question the idea of scrapping the return on profits—often criticised by the Opposition—because we need R&D to achieve this?
Dr Whitehead
All right, I won’t be.
The key point that I am trying to add to this morning’s debate is that a number of systems could be greatly enhanced in their operation by, for example, having a much greater supply of carbon dioxide available to them than is the case at the moment. The Minister may remember that we had a mini-crisis a little while ago: one of the factories that was producing industrial-use carbon dioxide closed down and we were left in the UK with one factory producing carbon dioxide. There was then a considerable run on it, which meant that, going to the heart of our civilisation, carbonating fizzy drinks was potentially under threat.
Having much greater availability through the carbon capture and storage process of carbon dioxide that could be used in industrial processes could be very good for industry, and indeed for the security of the processes that we continue to need carbon dioxide for. At the same time, that process needs some supervision to ensure that we are not undoing what we have started to do in carbon capture by making the product more widely available. Although I do not intend to push the amendment to a vote, I hope that the Minister will take onboard the idea that this is a substantial area, which we need to pay close attention to. We need to regulate it so that it points in the same direction as the carbon capture and storage process and so that the whole system is not undone by what is available.
Katherine Fletcher (South Ribble) (Con)
I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman. If I understand our historical regulatory regime, it was about prevention from harm—we would regulate cyanide, but not necessarily CO2. Does the hon. Gentleman have the right balance? Net zero is a systemic challenge; if we seek to regulate every single individual piece of it, we risk clogging the system with regulation.
What I see is a Government trying to make sure that carbon capture and storage has not turned into some fool’s errand, with some Shylock allowing carbon to come out of the other side of the mine. We are finding the right balance and not over-regulating an industry—
The Chair
Order. Interventions must be brief; Members should not ramble on for half an hour. I call Alan Whitehead.
Dr Whitehead
The hon. Member is right that we should not seek to regulate everything out of existence. As she says, provided that the basic position is in place many industrial and commercial processes do not actually do harm, and there are all sorts of ways of making sure of that; then we can leave them alone.
My only point is not about separately regulating something that has otherwise been completely unregulated, but that this is an overall process and we need to make sure that, overall, the processes all point in the same direction. That is, one way or another, that we produce less carbon dioxide, allow less carbon dioxide to escape into the atmosphere and do what we can to use sequestered carbon dioxide in the best way. Normally, that means transporting it, for which we need regulations to make sure that there are no leakages, for example.
At the moment, we are considering a number of different options when it comes to the transportation of carbon dioxide. As the hon. Member for South Ribble will know, that does not just consist of trying to put down pipelines to deliver the carbon dioxide to the port of exit before it is put into the storage site. Obviously, sites themselves need proper regulation so that they are safe for the purposes of storage.
Earlier, the right hon. Member for Elmet and Rothwell questioned the process of storage. It is vital that the storage itself is suitable. We know, from what we have to rely on, that the storage is likely to be sound—that means, frankly, that once we have put the stuff underground it stays there and does not leak out subsequently. That is quite a science in its own right. A great deal of the time spent looking at storage sites is about being absolutely sure that the site is as we thought it was in order to avoid disaster once we have committed ourselves to storage on the site. Given the different kinds of storage site, considerable work is under way, all of which needs to be regulated properly.
We have to consider alternative forms of storage—saline aquifers, for example. It is not just a question of storing carbon dioxide in depleted oil or gas fields; a number of other geological formations appear to be suitable for the purpose. Whether those alternative formations can be used for storage onshore as well as offshore is a particular concern. People may raise the issue of carbon dioxide leaking out onshore—as well as offshore, potentially.
Throughout, there is a need to regulate how the process works. With respect to the hon. Member for South Ribble, I do not think that it is over-prescriptive to say that we need some regulation of the use of carbon dioxide—after all, in theory at least, using the carbon for the best purpose is an essential part of the process—hence the amendments that we have tabled, which I hope are constructive.
Olivia Blake
There are two points to this, are there not? There is a set amount of carbon at the moment, which is increasing annually. Usage allows us to reduce that—instead of new forms of carbon going into the atmosphere, we would reuse what we have. That is why the amendment is key. I hope that the Government take it away to look at again. It is also basic chemistry that if we are putting CO2 into a chemical reaction, we will not get CO2 coming out the other end until the product degrades, so it is a falsehood that it will all immediately leak—
Olivia Blake
Sorry, Mr Gray. There are two points there that I think the Minister has not considered fully.
The Chair
Dr Whitehead, perhaps you will be brief. We have already given this group quite a long debate.
Dr Whitehead
Thank you, Mr Gray. My hon. Friend makes an important point about the distinction between what we do now with carbon dioxide and what we might do with it in future. At present—I mentioned a carbon dioxide factory that closed down—we are actually purposely making carbon dioxide in other processes, where it was previously sequestered among the molecules or whatever of the raw material. In future, we will take the carbon dioxide that we have captured in a different form to replace the manufactured carbon dioxide. It is important to understand the difference and to have a positive effect on the arrangements for carbon dioxide used for industrial purposes by substituting the creation of carbon dioxide with the use of carbon dioxide already going through the system.
I agree, Mr Gray, that we have had a good debate. We do not wish to press the amendment to a Division, but I am sure that although the Minister has not exactly been taking copious notes, he will be assured of the purpose of the amendment and can consider whether anything further needs to be done to ensure that such processes are integral to the system as a whole. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 33—Purposes—
“(1) The principal purpose of this Act is to increase the resilience and reliability of energy systems across the UK, support the delivery of the UK’s climate change commitments and reform the UK’s energy system while minimising costs to consumers and protecting them from unfair pricing.
(2) In performing functions under this Act, the relevant persons and bodies shall have regard to—
(a) the principal purpose set out in subsection (1);
(b) the Secretary of State’s duties under sections 1 and 4(1)(b) of the Climate Change Act 2008 (carbon targets and budgets) and international obligations contained within Article 2 of the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change;
(c) the desirability of reducing costs to consumers and alleviating fuel poverty; and
(d) the desirability of securing a diverse and viable long-term energy supply.
(3) In this section “the relevant persons and bodies” means—
(a) the Secretary of State;
(b) any public authority.”
This new clause and NC34, NC35 and NC36 are intended as a suite of purpose and strategy clauses for this Bill.
New clause 34—Strategy and policy statement—
“(1) The Secretary of State may designate a statement as the strategy and policy statement for the purposes of this Act.
(2) The strategy and policy statement is a statement prepared by the Secretary of State that sets out—
(a) the strategic priorities, and other main considerations, of His Majesty’s Government in formulating its energy policy for Great Britain (“strategic priorities”);
(b) the particular outcomes to be achieved as a result of the implementation of that policy (“policy outcomes”); and
(c) the roles and responsibilities of persons (whether the Secretary of State, a relevant public authority or other persons) who are involved in implementing that policy or who have other functions that are affected by it.
(3) The strategy and policy statement must have regard to the considerations listed in subsection (2) of section [Purposes].
(4) The Secretary of State must publish the strategy and policy statement in such manner as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(5) For the purposes of this section, energy policy “for Great Britain” includes such policy for—
(a) the territorial sea adjacent to Great Britain, and
(b) areas designated under section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964.
(6) A relevant public authority must have regard to the strategic priorities set out in the strategy and policy statement when carrying out regulatory functions.
(7) The Secretary of State and a relevant public authority must carry out their respective regulatory functions in the manner which the Secretary of State or the relevant public authority (as the case may be) considers is best calculated to further the delivery of the policy outcomes.
(8) A relevant public authority must give notice to the Secretary of State if at any time the relevant public authority concludes that a policy outcome contained in the strategy and policy statement is not realistically achievable.
(9) A notice under subsection (8) must include—
(a) the grounds on which the conclusion was reached; and
(b) what (if anything) the relevant public authority is doing, or proposes to do, for the purpose of furthering the delivery of the outcome so far as reasonably practicable.”
This new clause and NC33, NC35 and NC36 are intended as a suite of purpose and strategy clauses for this Bill.
New clause 35—Strategy and policy statement review—
“(1) The Secretary of State must review the strategy and policy statement if a period of 5 years has elapsed since the relevant time.
(2) The “relevant time”, in relation to the strategy and policy statement, means—
(a) the time when the statement was first designated under section [Strategy and policy statement], or
(b) if later, the time when a review of the statement under this section last took place.
(3) A review under subsection (1) must take place as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the 5 year period.
(4) The Secretary of State may review the strategy and policy statement at any other time if—
(a) a Parliamentary general election has taken place since the relevant time;
(b) a relevant public authority has given notice to the Secretary of State under subsection (8) of section [Strategy and policy statement] since the relevant time;
(c) a significant change in the energy policy of His Majesty’s Government has occurred since the relevant time; or
(d) the Parliamentary approval requirement in relation to an amended statement was not met on the last review (see subsection (12)).
(5) The Secretary of State may determine that a significant change in His Majesty’s Government’s energy policy has occurred for the purposes of subsection (4)(c) only if—
(a) the change was not anticipated at the relevant time, and
(b) if the change had been so anticipated, it appears to the Secretary of State likely that the statement would have been different in a material way.
(6) On a review under this section the Secretary of State may—
(a) amend the statement (including by replacing the whole or part of the statement with new content),
(b) leave the statement as it is, or
(c) withdraw the statement’s designation as the strategy and policy statement.
(7) The amendment of a statement under subsection (6)(a) has effect only if the Secretary of State designates the amended statement as the strategy and policy statement under section [Strategy and policy statement].
(8) For the purposes of this section, corrections of clerical or typographical errors are not to be treated as amendments made to the statement.
(9) The designation of a statement as the strategy and policy statement ceases to have effect upon a subsequent designation of an amended statement as the strategy and policy statement in accordance with subsection (7).
(10) The Secretary of State must consult the following persons before proceeding under subsection (6)(b) or (c)—
(a) a relevant public authority,
(b) the Scottish Ministers,
(c) the Welsh Ministers, and
(d) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(11) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b), a review of a statement takes place—
(a) in the case of a decision on the review to amend the statement under subsection (6)(a)—
(i) at the time when the amended statement is designated as the strategy and policy statement under the previous section, or
(ii) if the amended statement is not so designated, at the time when the amended statement was laid before Parliament for approval under subsection (7) of the next section;
(b) in the case of a decision on the review to leave the statement as it is under subsection (6)(b), at the time when that decision is taken.
(12) For the purposes of subsection (4)(d), the Parliamentary approval requirement in relation to an amended statement was not met on the last review if—
(a) on the last review of the strategy and policy statement to be held under this section, an amended statement was laid before Parliament for approval under subsection (7) of section [Strategy and policy statement: procedural requirements], but
(b) the amended statement was not designated because such approval was not given.”
This new clause and NC33, NC34 and NC36 are intended as a suite of purpose and strategy clauses for this Bill.
New clause 36—Strategy and policy statement: procedural requirements—
“(1) This section sets out the requirements that must be satisfied in relation to a statement before the Secretary of State may designate it as the strategy and policy statement.
(2) In this section references to a statement include references to a statement as amended following a review under subsection (6)(a) of section [Strategy and policy statement review].
(3) The Secretary of State must first—
(a) prepare a draft of the statement, and
(b) issue the draft to the required consultees for the purpose of consulting them about it.
(4) The “required consultees” are—
(a) the relevant public authority,
(b) the Scottish Ministers, and
(c) the Welsh Ministers.
(5) The Secretary of State must then—
(a) make such revisions to the draft as the Secretary of State considers appropriate as a result of responses to the consultation under subsection (3)(b), and
(b) issue the revised draft for the purposes of further consultation about it to the required consultees and to such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(6) The Secretary of State must then—
(a) make any further revisions to the draft that the Secretary of State considers appropriate as a result of responses to the consultation under subsection (5)(b), and
(b) prepare a report summarising those responses and the changes (if any) that the Secretary of State has made to the draft as a result.
(7) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—
(a) the statement as revised under subsection (6)(a), and
(b) the report prepared under subsection (6)(b).
(8) The statement as laid under subsection (7)(a) must have been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament before the Secretary of State may designate it as the strategy and policy statement.
(9) The requirement under subsection (3)(a) to prepare a draft of a statement may be satisfied by preparation carried out before, as well as preparation carried out after, the passing of this Act.”
This new clause and NC33, NC34 and NC35 are intended as a suite of purpose and strategy clauses for this Bill.
Andrew Bowie
New clauses 33 to 36 would insert provisions for the review of the strategy and policy statement, and procedure requirements for the designation of such a statement.
The Bill already contains a number of measures to deliver a cleaner, more affordable and more secure energy system for the long term, as set out by the long title, so there seems to be little to be gained from the proposed new clause 33. The Government’s approach to these matters will be informed by the strategy and policy statement provided for under the Energy Act 2013, on which we are currently consulting.
I turn to new clauses 34, 35 and 36. The 2013 Act introduced a power to designate a strategy and policy statement setting out the Government’s strategic priorities for energy policy in Great Britain, the roles and responsibilities of those implementing such a policy and the policy outcomes to be achieved. The strategic priorities of the Government’s energy policy are to be taken as a whole. They include, but are not limited to, our targets under the Climate Change Act 2008, reducing costs for consumers, tackling fuel poverty, and securing a diverse and viable long-term energy supply. The strategy and policy statement power in the 2013 Act is not specific to the measures contained in any specific Act. The power is wider, and it enables the strategy and policy statement to cover any or all of the Government’s strategic energy priorities, wherever they are set out.
On 10 May 2023, the Government published their consultation on a draft strategy and policy statement for energy policy in Great Britain. We are seeking responses until 2 August, and we intend to designate a final strategy and policy statement by the end of this year. Designation of a strategy and policy statement will ultimately be a decision for Parliament, not for the Secretary of State. I hope that hon. Members are satisfied by those reassurances.
Alan Brown
Will that be a wider strategy and policy statement that goes to Ofgem? An overarching energy policy has long been outstanding.
Andrew Bowie
I believe that that was made clear. As I said earlier, we are working with Ofgem to ensure that it has the capabilities to deal with all of this. In terms of a national policy statement for Ofgem moving forwards, there will be a series of announcements over the next few months and, indeed, the year that will enable Ofgem and the future service operator to get into a position where they are able to deal with what we introduce through the Bill and other statements.
Clause 1 establishes Ofgem as the economic regulator for carbon dioxide transport and storage. It also establishes the principal objectives and statutory duties for both the Secretary of State and Ofgem in carrying out their functions under part 1 of the Bill. Transport and storage networks will act as the enabling infrastructure for carbon capture and storage from a range of sources, including power plants, industrial facilities, low-carbon hydrogen production and, potentially, direct air capture.
The economic regulation model provides long-term revenue certainty for network operators while protecting network users from monopolistic behaviours, as has already been described. The Government consider that Ofgem is the most appropriate body to act as the economic regulator for carbon dioxide transport and storage, due to its experience and expertise in the economic regulation of the overall energy sector. The selection of Ofgem as the regulator has received broad support from the industry. The principal objectives set out in clause 1 reflect the balance of considerations for a nascent carbon dioxide transport and storage sector.
Dr Whitehead
Clause 1 concerns the appointment of Ofgem as a regulator for these activities—in particular, carbon capture and storage. The new clauses that we have tabled seek to gather together what is in the Bill and provide it with a purpose clause, and to suggest to the Secretary of State that the Bill’s contents might be encapsulated, for future direction and use, in a strategy and purpose document.
The Chair
Order. Let me interrupt the hon. Gentleman. New clauses would normally be discussed towards the end of the Committee’s debates. We took the view that, because these new clauses deal with strategy and purpose, they might by that time be out of order. We therefore thought it reasonable to allow His Majesty’s loyal Opposition to have a full debate on them now, rather than towards the end of our consideration, as would happen normally.
Dr Whitehead
Indeed, Mr Gray; thank you for reminding the Committee of that. I am grateful to you and to the Clerks for your careful consideration of how we should proceed with these new clauses. As you say, the normal procedure—indeed, I have taken part in a number of Bill Committees where this has happened—is that new clauses are put at the end of the selection list. I can see that a number of new clauses have been selected for debate right at the end of our consideration of the Bill. By the way, I am slightly less pleased to see that the changes to the Bill that were wrought in the other place have been placed, by and large, in a new section at the end. I assume that those will be debated—
Dr Whitehead
Indeed. They will be debated at the same time, at the end of our consideration of the Bill.
As you rightly say, Mr Gray, new clauses 33 to 36 may have be surplus to our discussions, should we have debated them at the end of proceedings rather than at the beginning. I am pleased that we are able to debate them now, given that they are concerned with our discussions on the early part of the Bill.
As has been widely trailed, the Bill is one of the most extensive that has come before this House, certainly in the energy sphere, and is probably one of the most extensive and substantial Bills in recent history. It seeks to do an enormous number of things. Although we do not think it does enough, by and large the things that it does are all necessary for the passage of our energy economy from a high-carbon to a low-carbon basis, with all the things that go with that, which we will discuss later in the Bill, such as carbon capture and storage, hydrogen, new forms of management of grid systems—all the things that point in a green, low-carbon direction. It is essential to put them into legislation by means of what I would describe as the green plumbing of the system. A great deal of the Bill is not about high-flown rhetoric on why we should decarbonise our structures, but about getting down to the real business of doing it as quickly as possible.
I think we can agree that the Bill lists a disparate series of things that are fit for our discussion and ready to go. Indeed, in a famous recent TikTok video, the Secretary of State stood against a wall with individual pages of the Bill stuck on it and said that it is the largest Bill on energy in history. I tweeted a response to the effect that the Government have been really good at getting the largest bills in history into the laps of customers—that was a bit of levity in response to the Secretary of State’s more serious point. The Bill is extensive, for deliberate purposes, which all point in the same direction.
There is perhaps cause for a little concern. When Bills seek to do such extensive plumbing work, it is easy to lose sight of what that plumbing is actually about. We need to be clear that we do not have a series of actions that might or might not be taken in respect of the various subject headings in the Bill; they are all actions that have to be taken in pursuit of what should be the overall purpose of the Bill, which is to secure us a low-carbon future. The Conservatives and Labour agree that those actions are not in dispute; they are essential for the purposes that we think are important for the future of our low-carbon economy.
The idea of a purpose clause is not something dreamt up by the Opposition as an interesting diversion during the early stages of discussing the Bill. A number of pieces of legislation have purpose clauses; they have fallen out of fashion in more recently, but if one looks back over a reasonable period, one sees that many Acts have such sections at the beginning. They recapitulate what comes after and put it in context, so that people who have not been subjected to our detailed discussions in Committee can say, “That is what this Act is about. There are provisions in the Act that point in this direction, and I should look at and respond to the Act in the light of that overall purpose.” That is a good and important thing.
Purpose clauses are not just nice things to have at the front of a Bill. They are quite useful for those who seek to interpret an Act at a later date—lawyers and the like. They may have opinions about what a particular part of the Act does, but they will be guided by the purpose clause at the front of the Act. For the Ministers who implement the terms of an Act, it is useful to have a clear statement of what Parliament thought we were doing when we put the Act on the statute book and of the framework in which the rest of the Act should be read.
The purpose clause that we have tabled, new clause 33, states:
“The principal purpose of this Act is to increase the resilience and reliability of energy systems across the UK, support the delivery of the UK’s climate change commitments and reform the UK’s energy system while minimising costs to consumers and protecting them from unfair pricing.”
That is a good summation of the Bill’s purpose. Members may want to add or subtract bits, but it is reasonable summation of where we are and where we want to go. Subsection (2) seeks to ground the Bill in other important legislation and states:
“In performing functions under this Act, the relevant persons and bodies”—
that is, people who are interpreting the Act’s principal purpose—“shall have regard to” certain matters, including, most importantly,
“the Secretary of State’s duties under sections 1 and 4(1)(b) of the Climate Change Act 2008…and international obligations contained within Article 2 of the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.”
The new clause therefore grounds the Bill firmly in the historic Climate Change Act 2008, sections 1 and 4(1)(b) of which provide for the target in the reduction of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions that the Secretary of State is supposed to ensure that we achieve by 2050. What will happen to whoever is the Secretary of State in 2050 if they are unable to deliver that target is debateable, but I think we can agree that the Act has really stood the test of time.
Andrew Bowie
I thank the hon. Member for his careful and considered contribution, which reflected the careful and considered discussions that His Majesty’s loyal Opposition and the Government have been having on the Bill and on the wider issue of net zero and energy security over the past few months and years. He is absolutely right: this is not a partisan debate, and there is very little to distinguish the Opposition’s approach to this issue from that of the Government. We all agree that our overarching aims, though this Bill and through the other actions that we as a country are taking, are to reduce emissions, reduce bills, strengthen our energy security, and create and secure new British jobs in the process, which will be to the benefit of this country and help us to lead the way in the world.
The hon. Member spoke with great purpose. I find very little to disagree with in the substance of what he said about the purpose clause, but he also admitted that the Bill is stuffed full, to use his phrase, of clauses that explain exactly what we are striving to do. For that reason, I suggest that despite the good intentions behind this specific purpose clause, it would be superfluous to the Bill at this stage. However, it is something that we are willing to consider moving forward.
With regard to the hon. Member’s comments on the strategy and policy statement, the power of the 2013 Act was not specific to the measures contained in that Act but covered all of the Government’s strategic energy priorities. That is why we published the consultation on an SPS just 13 days ago.
Andrew Bowie
Well, we got around to it eventually. The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun asked whether the strategy and policy statement covers Ofgem. Yes, it does, and Ofgem will have regard to the SPS consultation that we are working on right now.
As I said, we intend to designate a final strategy and policy statement by the end of this year. That will be a decision for Parliament, not the Secretary of State, whichever party the Secretary of State happens to be from at the time. The new clauses are therefore superfluous to the Bill, despite the fact that they are well intentioned and that there is very little in their contents that I can disagree with. That is why I ask the hon. Member for Southampton, Test not to press his new clauses.
The Chair
It would be difficult for him to do so, as they will be considered when we come to the relevant part of our discussion on the Bill. The question for now is that clause 1 stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Prohibition on unlicensed activities
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Bowie
Clauses 2 to 6 relate to the licensable activities for carbon dioxide transport and storage.
Clause 2 establishes the prohibition on the transport of carbon dioxide by pipeline and its geological storage without an economic license regulated by Ofgem. As carbon dioxide pipelines for storage and site infrastructure are likely to be operated as regional monopolies, a framework of economic licensing and regulation is designed to prevent anti-competitive behaviours. Licensable activities will initially include the transportation of carbon dioxide via onshore pipelines and offshore pipelines, and the operation of an associated geological storage facility. The clause enables other methods of transportation of carbon dioxide to become licensable activities, should that be considered appropriate as the carbon capture and storage market evolves.
Non-pipeline methods of transportation—shipping, road or rail—are expected to form part of wider carbon dioxide transport and storage networks. These methods of transport are particularly important for dispersed sites, where there are emitters who wish to have their carbon dioxide captured and transported for permanent storage, but are not suitably located to join a transport storage network by pipeline.
While non-pipeline methods of transport will have an important role in the development of carbon capture and storage networks, the Government consider that there is currently insufficient evidence to justify economically regulating non-pipeline methods of carbon dioxide transport. As those methods of transportation have differing characteristics from pipelines, with a potential lower cost of entry and an ability for multiple asset-running in parallel, competitive regional markets may emerge naturally for non-pipeline transportation of carbon dioxide. However, should competitive markets not emerge as anticipated, that may be rationale for future regulatory intervention. The ability of the Secretary of State to bring activities within the scope of the licensing framework is particularly important, given the financial support provided by the Exchequer to support carbon capture facilities and to ensure appropriate and effective protections can be put in place for users of the network.
I turn to clause 3. Any future use of the power established in clause 2 to extend the economic regulation framework to other methods of transporting carbon dioxide, should that be considered appropriate, would be subject to statutory consultation, as provided for in clause 3. Under the provisions of the clause, the Secretary of State is required to give notice of their intention to make regulations to extend the licensing framework to other methods of carbon dioxide transportation. That would include statutory consultation with the economic regulator to confirm the rationale for market intervention and consultation with the devolved Administrations.
Clause 4 sets out the territorial scope of the economic licensing framework for carbon dioxide transport and storage. The economic regulatory regime established by chapter 1 and part 1 of the Bill will extend to all parts of this United Kingdom. The licensing regime and economic regulation will also apply to transport and storage activities offshore, both in the UK’s territorial seas and in waters designated as a gas importation and storage zone under section 1(5) of the Energy Act 2008.
Clause 5 provides for the Secretary of State to grant exemptions from the requirement to hold a carbon dioxide transport and storage licence. That provision is important to ensure that the prohibition established by clause 2 operates effectively and as intended and does not, for example, impact or inhibit activities that it is not considered appropriate to economically regulate.
For example, exemptions are a means by which a small-scale operator would not be burdened by licensing costs and obligations that could be considered disproportionate to the scale of their operation. However, exemptions should not enable a competitive advantage over licensed operators. Exemptions will be set out in the way of regulations and may be granted either to a class of persons or to an individual person. A statutory consultation process is set out in the clause, to ensure that appropriate notice is given ahead of making exemption regulations and to allow for representations to be made.
Clause 6 provides for the Secretary of State, by way of regulations, to be able to vary, withdraw or revoke exemptions from the licensing requirements that have been granted under the provisions of clause 5. As market circumstances change, it is conceivable that certain activities, categories or classes of activity that are appropriately exempt from economic regulation in the early years of CCUS deployment may, as the sector matures, be considered more appropriate for licensing and regulation, or the particular activity that was subject to exemption may itself develop or change. That will ensure that any exemptions granted remain appropriate as the UK CCUS industry matures. I hope that the Committee will agree that clauses 2 to 6 should stand part of the Bill.
Alan Brown
Thank you, Mr Gray. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I will just ask the Minister a few brief questions.
In clause 3, the consultation on proposals for additional activities sets a 28-day timeframe in which objections or representations can be made, and the clause details that the Secretary of State must consider those. However, there is no timeframe for the Secretary of State to respond, and there is nothing that actually details the process of how representations will be considered and responded to. Could the Minister give a bit more information on that?
Clause 3(3)(b) is about notice given to Scottish Ministers relating to devolved competences, so could the Minister give examples of the types of activities he envisages that covering? Also, what process will the Secretary of State follow in taking the views of the devolved Administrations?
That goes to the wider concern that I have already expressed about the UK Government having powers to interfere in what would usually be devolved competences. I know that it is slightly nuanced in this case, but I just want to flag that I do not want to later have lodge loads of amendments and force votes on replacing “consult” with “approval”. I know that it is slightly different at this stage, but could the Minister give details of what he thinks the activities would be? The same question applies to subsections of clause 5 and 6.
The Chair
I presume that His Majesty’s loyal Opposition wish to say something. I remind the Committee that when you wish to catch my eye, it is important to stand up and make it plain that you wish to speak. If you do not do so, I will not call you. I call Dr Alan Whitehead.
Dr Whitehead
Thank you, Mr Gray, and I appreciate that undertaking. My knees do not necessarily work in the way that I would ideally like them to in my advanced years, but I will attempt to do that.
The clauses provide a pretty good start point on prohibition on unlicensed activities. Indeed, clause 2 states:
“It is an offence for a person to carry on an activity within subsection (2) unless the person is authorised to do so by a licence.”
Again, that is the whole licensing arrangement that pervades the energy sector. The clause then specifies the activities, including
“operating a site for the disposal of carbon dioxide by way of geological storage”,
and
“providing a service of transporting carbon dioxide by a licensable means of transportation.”
We tabled an amendment on the use of carbon dioxide, but we were assured by the Minister at that time that that would be effectively covered by the scope of this clause.
That is a great start, but then we move on to not just the consultations but, in clause 5, the exemption from prohibition. Interestingly, clause 5 states:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations grant exemption from the prohibition under section 2(1).”
It does not actually specify what those exemptions might be; it just states that the Secretary of State may by regulations grant exemption. I therefore presume that, within that secondary legislation, the Secretary of State will unpack and set out the exemptions, and indeed how far those exemptions might run. It is interesting that the Bill states:
“An exemption may be granted…unconditionally, or subject to such conditions as may be specified.”
I presume that those conditions will be specified in the regulations that the Secretary of State will be required to introduce in secondary legislation. It also states:
“An exemption may be granted…indefinitely, or…for a period specified in, or determined by or under, the exemption.”
That will also presumably be in the regulations.
Kerry McCarthy (Bristol East) (Lab)
I know that this is a lengthy Bill, and there is a lot to get through, but I slightly had trouble keeping up with the breakneck speed at which the Minister introduced the clauses, so I am glad to have an opportunity to question him. He said that although there will be instances where licences are not needed, the situation might change and a licence may be needed. It would be helpful to have some examples of those scenarios to illustrate when the Secretary of State might invoke these powers. Does my hon. Friend agree?
Dr Whitehead
Yes, indeed. My hon. Friend has read my mind, as she often does.
This clause is procedural, as I have illustrated, and essentially says: “There may be exemptions. We don’t know what they are or what they might consist of, but don’t worry about it. The Secretary of State will think about that in due course and produce regulation that we hope—but we don’t know—might set that out in greater detail.” It is important that the Minister sets out today what might be in his mind when he makes those regulations, as far as exemptions are concerned. Is he a wide exemption Minister or a narrow exemption Minister? If he is a wide exemption Minister, what is the scope of the exemptions that he will be thinking about? If he is a narrow scope Minister, how does he interpret subsection (7), which states that an exemption may be granted indefinitely, given what he just said about how things may change in the future?
I know that there are things that we thought were indefinite in legislation that have turned out not to be—most importantly because Parliament cannot decide what the previous Parliament thought. However, it seems to be a hostage to fortune to put the word “indefinitely” in this legislation in the way that we see in clause 5(7).
I would be grateful if the Minister could provide us with some thoughts on what exemptions might look like and what his intentions are as far as regulation is concerned. I have not looked yet at the end of the Bill to see how any regulations might be considered by Parliament, but when the Secretary of State makes regulations on exemptions, I would expect those to be put forward under the affirmative rather than the negative procedure so that we have an opportunity to examine what they consist of.
Kerry McCarthy
Clause 5(6) refers to “Notice of an exemption” being given. It would be helpful to have clarity on the reference to
“Other persons who may be affected by it.”
I am not sure how that would be decided. It is really important that we have transparency and accountability in these processes. Does my hon. Friend agree?
Dr Whitehead
Yes, I do agree. Again, I appreciate that the wording of this Bill might be regarded as necessarily fairly vague, because of the fact that—in the words of Donald Rumsfeld—there are known knowns, known unknowns, unknown knowns and unknown unknowns about the future. However, it is important at least to have on the record something that guides us in a more positive way on who might be the “other” people affected and on indefinite exemptions and so on. It would be a good idea if that could at least be included in the discussion of the Bill.
By the way, our proceedings in Committee are of course recorded, and they are used on occasion in law to determine what the purpose of particular clauses was and what was thought to be in the mind of legislators when they introduced them. So it would be helpful, not just for our discussions today but perhaps for the future record, if the Minister was able to clarify these matters in a suitable way.
Alec Shelbrooke
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray, for what will be a long and detailed consideration of the Bill.
I want to focus on these clauses, because they provide an overall setting for the entire agenda. As the hon. Member for Southampton, Test outlined, the Bill is perhaps one of the most important pieces of legislation to come before the House in the 21st century, as we look at how we deal with these issues for the rest of the 21st century—it really is that significant.
To draw on the hon. Gentleman’s comments about unknown knowns and so on, we have to be careful at this early stage that we do not regulate to the point that we choke off innovation and research. A complaint is often made at several levels about how difficult it can sometimes be in this country for innovators and entrepreneurs to move forward without getting tied up in huge amounts of red tape. Given the global competition that exists in the field of climate change, environment and green energy, we want to have a competitive advantage.
I am sure we will discuss later areas such as tax credits and how research and development can be expanded in this industry. The Bill is so wide-reaching, across so many Departments—indeed, you might rule us out of order as we consider it, Mr Gray—that I expect to be told once or twice that some provision is not the responsibility of the Minister. The Bill ties up so many areas of Government, including the Department for Business and Trade, the Treasury and the responsibilities of the Minister.
Therefore it is important that we do not try to license every possible outcome that we may consider at this stage. That would delay the process. Often, it is important to allow a Minister to make a reasonably quick decision as something comes to the fore, whether through secondary legislation or a delegated decision. If we look at America’s Inflation Reduction Act or the EU’s response to it, we know that we are in a highly competitive, subsidised market. I do not believe in the heavy subsidisation of companies; I believe in being able to exploit their intellectual capability to be innovative, to be world leading and to get things to market as quickly as possible. Having said that, later clauses of the Bill concern things, such as battery storage, about which I have great concerns and on which we probably need a bit more legislation. That is one of those areas that may well fall under a different Department, but it will be important to raise those issues in the context of the Bill.
I understand the desire to say, “We must try to use the Bill to offset any health and safety concerns that may come along, because we are in such a new technological area.” But when we look at the granting of licences in this part of the Bill, we would not want to choke off the innovators for which this country is well regarded in so many countries around the world. We are an innovative nation. We have the lead on innovation. China steals IT and reduces the cost of producing materials through poor wages and a disregard for health and safety, but it is not an innovator, which is what our universities and sectors work so well towards being.
The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam mentioned that she had spoken to the institutions in her great city. In a previous life, when I worked for the University of Leeds, I was involved in the early days of nanotech. We joined up all our seven major universities, including the universities in the hon. Lady’s city, and that accelerated Yorkshire’s ability to lead in nanotechnology. We could do that because we could draw those things together, bring the expertise together and accelerate it. Innovation hubs formed out of those universities in the early 2000s and gave us a leading edge, which we have used.
As legislators, we must try to ensure that we provide a framework for companies, innovators and researchers to work within. But that should not be prescribed in such a way that, when a product is ready to take to market, needs extra investment or needs to be able to work elsewhere, we have put a very tight pair of handcuffs on the ability to do those things. The premise of the Bill gives direction, but my hon. Friend the Minister should not make it so tight that we choke off the very things that we are trying to do.
We all talk about the huge potential investment in the green economy, about the green investment bank and about the massive changes that have taken place in the Treasury in recent years. Of course, we talk about having a smooth transition when there is a potential change of Government. That is why the Bill is so important and why I pushed to be on this Committee. The Bill is a major change that will stand this country—and indeed the world, if we can export some of the technology—in good stead in terms of achieving the better society we are trying to achieve on climate change. It is important that we go down this road, but let us not make the provisions so restrictive that we choke off the innovation at which this country excels.
Andrew Bowie
I thank right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions. I agree completely with my right hon. Friend the Member for Elmet and Rothwell. Indeed, one example for an exemption would be to ensure that the regime is not overly burdensome—for example, smaller operators for whom a requirement to hold a licence, if operated, would be overly onerous. That is why the power is intended to allow exemptions from the requirement to hold a licence when an activity would otherwise fall into the prohibition that we do not think it would be technically or economically necessary to require a licence. That is not an original thought: it is the exact situation in the gas and electricity markets, as they stand right now. I cannot give any other specific examples, because we intend to engage with the market and with industry on potential classes of exemption before we bring forward the secondary legislation in that area. Under the provisions in the Bill, we will conduct a formal consultation process ahead of laying exemptions regulations.
On the consultation process, as the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun pointed out, there is no timeframe for the Secretary of State to respond; however, he is obliged to consider any representation or objection made. I am sure that the Department—especially myself—will be keen to keep him updated on progress with any response to the consultation.
On consultation with Scottish Government and Welsh Government Ministers regarding the Bill, we will cover that in greater detail as we proceed through the Bill. I have already met my counterpart in Edinburgh and yesterday met virtually my counterpart in the Welsh Government. We are discussing how best to proceed with consulting on the nature of the Bill. As I referred to earlier, the differences between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations mirror the differences between the Opposition and Government, in that we are all very much in agreement on the broad scope of the Bill and on a huge majority of what we seek to do through it. I look forward to working constructively with Ministers and colleagues in Holyrood and Cardiff, so that we can get the balance right and move forward in a way that is good for the entire United Kingdom. That is why I recommend the Committee to agree that clauses 2 to 6 stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 3 to 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Power to grant licences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Bowie
Clause 7 provides the economic regulator, Ofgem, with the power to grant licences that permit the carrying out of carbon dioxide transport and storage activities and charging for transport and storage activities. It is the Government’s intention that in the enduring regulatory regime, Ofgem is responsible for rewarding carbon dioxide transport and storage licences. The Government’s CCUS cluster sequencing process will identify the first CCUS clusters eligible for government support and the first transport and storage operators to be granted an economic licence.
Through clause 16 and schedule 1 the Bill provides for the Secretary of State to grant the first licences. That is appropriate, given that Exchequer support will be available to the first clusters. Although it will be the Secretary of State who makes the decision to grant the first licences, once a licence has been granted Ofgem will assume full regulatory oversight of the licences. Following the initial cluster sequencing process, our procedure for future licence applications is expected to be developed, taking into account learnings from the sequencing processes that have gone before. That is provided for in the next clause.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Joy Morrisey.)
Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Seventh sitting)
Tuesday 23rd May 2023
(11 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 View all Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 May 2023 - (23 May 2023)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
Stephanie Peacock (Barnsley East) (Lab)
On a point of order, Mr Paisley. I would like to correct the record regarding my comments on clause 13, which appear in column 148 of the Committee proceedings in Hansard for Tuesday 16 May. I referred to the views of Lexology and included a quote, which I attributed to that organisation, when in fact the views and quote in question were those of an organisation named Prighter, which were simply published by Lexology.
The Minister for Data and Digital Infrastructure (Sir John Whittingdale)
I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 78, page 100, line 30, after “86” insert “and [Codes of conduct]”.
This amendment is consequential on NC2.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 1 and Government new clause 2.
Sir John Whittingdale
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Paisley. Welcome to the Committee.
The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 place specific requirements on organisations in relation to use of personal data in electronic communications. They include, for example, rules on the use of emails, texts and phone calls for direct marketing purposes and the use of cookies and similar technologies.
Trade associations have told us that sometimes their members need guidance on complying with the legislation that is more bespoke than the general regulatory guidance from the Information Commissioner’s Office. New clause 2 will allow representative bodies to design codes of conduct on complying with the PEC regulations that reflect their specific processing operations. There are already similar provisions in articles 40 and 41 of the UK General Data Protection Regulation to help organisations in particular sectors to comply.
Importantly, codes of conduct prepared under these provisions can be contained in the same document as codes of conduct under the UK GDPR. That will be particularly beneficial to representative bodies that are developing codes for processing activities that are subject to the requirements of both the UK GDPR and the PEC regulations. New clause 2 envisages that representative bodies will draw up voluntary codes of conduct and then seek formal approval of them from the Information Commissioner. The Information Commissioner will approve a code only if it contains a mechanism for the representative body to monitor their members’ compliance with the code.
New clause 1 makes a related amendment to article 41 of the UK GDPR to clarify that bodies accredited to monitor compliance with codes of conduct under the GDPR are required to notify the Information Commissioner only if they suspend or exclude a person from a code. Government amendment 5 is a minor and technical amendment necessary as a consequence of new clause 2.
These provisions are being put into the Bill at the suggestion of business organisations. We hope that they will allow organisations to comply more easily with the requirements.
Stephanie Peacock
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Paisley, and I too welcome you to the Committee.
As I have said more than once in our discussions, in many cases the burden of following regulations can be eased just as much by providing clarification, guidance and support as by removing regulation altogether. I advocated for codes of practice in more detail in the discussion of such codes in the public sector, under clause 19, and during our debates on clauses 29 and 30, when we were discussing ICO codes more generally. New clauses 1 and 2 seem to recognise the value of codes of practice too, and both seek to provide either clarification or the sharing of best practice in terms of following the PEC regulations. I have no problem with proceeding with the Bill with these inclusions.
Amendment 5 agreed to.
Sir John Whittingdale
I beg to move amendment 48, in clause 78, page 100, line 30, after “86” insert “and [Pre-commencement consultation]”.
This amendment is consequential on NC7.
Sir John Whittingdale
New clause 7 clarifies that the consultation requirements imposed by the Bill in connection with or under the PEC regulations can be satisfied by consultation that takes place before the relevant provision of the Bill comes into force. That ensures that the consultation work that supports development of policy before the Bill is passed can continue and is not paused unnecessarily. A similar provision was included in section 182 of the Data Protection Act 2018. Government amendment 48 is a minor and technical amendment which is necessary as a consequence of new clause 7. I commend the new clause and amendment to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
The new clause and accompanying amendment seek to expedite work on consultation in relation to the measures in this part. It makes sense that consultation can begin before the Bill comes into force, to ensure that regulations can be acted on promptly after its passing. I have concerns about various clauses in this part, but no specific concerns about the overarching new clause, and am happy to move on to discussing the substance of the clauses to which it relates.
Amendment 48 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Sir John Whittingdale
Clause 78 introduces part 4 of the Bill, which amends the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003. Clauses 79 to 86 refer to them as “the PEC Regulations” for short. They sit alongside the Data Protection Act and the UK GDPR. We will debate some of the more detailed provisions in the next few clauses.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 78, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 79
Storing information in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move amendment 116, in clause 79, page 101, line 15, leave out
“making improvements to the service”
and insert
“making changes to the service which are intended to improve the user’s experience”.
Cookies are small text files that are downloaded on to somebody’s computer or smartphone when they access a website; they allow the website to recognise the person’s device, and to store information about the user’s preferences or past actions. The current rules around using cookies, set out in regulation 6 of the PEC regulations, dictate that organisations must tell people that the cookies are there, explain what the cookies are doing and why, and finally get the person’s freely given, specific and informed consent to store cookies on their device. However, at the moment there is almost universal agreement that the system is not working as intended.
To comply with the legislation, most website have adopted what is known as a cookie banner—a notice that pops up when a user first visits the site, prompting them to indicate which cookies they are happy with. However, due to the sheer volume of those banners, in many cases people no longer feel they are giving consent because they are informed or because they freely wish to give it, but are doing so simply because the banners stop them using the website as they wish.
In their communications regarding the Bill, the Government have focused on reducing cookie fatigue, branding it one of the headline achievements of the legislation. Unfortunately, as I will argue throughout our debates on clause 79, I do not believe that the Bill will fix the problem in the way that users hope. The new exemptions to the consent requirement for purposes that present a low risk to privacy may reduce the number of circumstances in which permission might be required, but there will still be a wide-ranging list of circumstances where consent is still required.
If the aim is to reduce cookie fatigue for users, as the Government have framed the clause, the exemptions must centre on the experience of users. If they do not, the clause is not about reducing consent fatigue, but rather about legitimising large networks of online surveillance of internet users. With that in mind, amendment 116 would narrow the exemption for collecting statistical information with a view to improving a service so that it is clear that any such improvements are exclusively considered to be those from the user’s perspective. That would ensure that the term “improvements” cannot be interpreted as including sweeping changes for commercial benefit, but is instead focused only on benefits to users.
I will speak to proposed new regulation 6B when we debate later amendments, but I reiterate that I have absolute sympathy for the intention behind the clause and want as much as anyone to see an end to constant cookie banners where possible. However, we must place the consumer and user experience at the heart of any such changes. That is what we hope to ensure through the amendment, with respect to the list of exemptions.
Sir John Whittingdale
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for making it clear that the Opposition share our general objective in the clause. As she points out, the intention of cookies has been undermined by their ubiquity when they are placed as banners right at the start. Clause 79 removes the requirement to seek consent for the placement of audience measurement cookies. That means, for example, that a business could place cookies to count the number of visitors to its website without seeking the consent of web users via a cookie pop-up notice. The intention is that the organisation could use the statistical information collected to understand how its service is being used, with a view to improving it. Amendment 116 would mean that “improvements to the service” would be narrowed in scope to mean improvements to the user’s experience of the service, but while that is certainly one desirable outcome of the new exception, we want it to enable organisations to make improvements for their own purposes, and these may not necessarily directly improve the user’s experience of the service.
Organisations have repeatedly told us how important the responsible use of data is for their growth. For example, a business may want to use information collected to improve navigation of its service to improve sales. It could use the information collected to make improvements to the back-end IT functionality of its website, which the user may not be aware of. Or it could even decide to withdraw parts of its service that had low numbers of users; those users could then find that their experience was impaired rather than improved, but the business could invest the savings gained to improve other parts of the service. We do not think that businesses should be prevented from improving services in this way, but the new exception provides safeguards to prevent them from sharing the collected data with anyone else, except for the same purpose of making improvements to the service. On that basis, I hope the hon. Lady will consider withdrawing her amendment.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful for the Minister’s answer. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Sir John Whittingdale
I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 79, page 102, leave out lines 21 to 23.
Clause 79 amends regulation 6 of the PEC Regulations to create new exceptions from the prohibition on storing and accessing information in terminal equipment. New paragraph (2C) contains an exception for software updates that satisfy specified requirements. This amendment removes a requirement that the subscriber or user can object to the update and does not object.
Sir John Whittingdale
Clause 79 reforms regulation 6 of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, which sets the rules on when an organisation can store information or gain access to information stored on a person’s device—for example, their computer, phone or tablet. This is commonly described as the cookies rule, but it includes similar technologies such as tracking pixels and device fingerprinting. Currently, organisations do not have to seek a user’s consent to place cookies that are strictly necessary to provide a service requested by the user—for example, to detect fraud or remember items in a user’s online shopping basket.
To reduce the number of cookie pop-up notices that can spoil web users’ enjoyment of the internet, clause 79 will remove the requirement for organisations to seek consent for several low privacy risk purposes, including the installation of software updates necessary for the security of the device. Government amendments 49 and 51 remove the user’s right to opt out of the software security update and the right to remove an update after it has taken effect. Government amendment 50 removes the right to disable an update before it takes effect.
Although these measures were initially included in the Bill to give web users a choice about whether security updates were installed, stakeholders have subsequently advised us that the failure to install certain updates could result in a high level of risk to the security of users’ devices and personal information. We have been reflecting on the provisions since the Bill was introduced, and have concluded that removing them is the right thing to do, in the interests of security of web users. Even if these provisions are omitted, organisations will still need to provide users with clear and comprehensive information about the purpose of software security updates. Web users will also still have the right to postpone an update for a limited time before it takes effect.
Government amendment 54 concerns the regulation-making powers under the new PEC regulations. One of the main aims is to ensure that web users are empowered to use automated technology such as browsers and apps to select their choices regarding which cookies they are willing to accept. The Secretary of State could use powers under these provisions to require consent management tools to meet certain standards or specifications. so that web users can make clear, meaningful choices once and have those choices respected throughout their use of the internet.
The Committee will note that new regulation 6B already requires the Secretary of State to consult the Information Commissioner and other interested parties before making any new regulations on consent management tools. Government amendment 54 adds the Competition and Markets Authority as a required consultee. That will help ensure that any competition impacts are properly considered when developing new regulations that set standards of design.
Finally, Government amendments 52 and 53 make minor and technical changes that will ensure that future regulations made under the reformed PEC regulations can include transitional, transitory or savings provisions. These will simply ensure there is a smooth transition to the new regime if the Secretary of State decides to make use of these new powers. I commend the amendments to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
I understand that amendments 49 to 51 primarily remove the option for subscribers or users to object to or disable an update or software for security reasons. As techUK has highlighted, the PEC regulations already contain an exemption on cookie consent for things that are strictly necessary, and it was widely accepted that security purposes met this exemption. This is reflected by its inclusion in the list of things that meet the criteria in new paragraph (5).
However, in the Bill the Government also include security updates in the stand-alone exemption list. This section introduces additional conditions that are not present in the existing law, including the requirement to offer users an opt-out from the security update and the ability to disable or postpone it. The fact that this overlap has been clarified by removing the additional conditions seems sensible. Although user choice has value, it is important that we do not leave people vulnerable to known security flaws.
In principle, Government amendment 54 is a move in the right direction. I will speak to regulation 6B in more detail when we discuss amendment 117 and explain why we want to remove it. If the regulation is to remain, it is vital that the Competition and Markets Authority be consulted before regulations are made due to the impact they will likely have in entrenching power in the hands of browser owners. That the Government have recognised that it was an oversight not to involve the CMA in any consultations is really pleasing. I offer my full support to the amendment in that context, though I do not believe it goes far enough and will advocate the removal of regulation 6B entirely in due course.
Amendment 49 agreed to.
Amendments made: 50, in clause 79, page 102, line 25, leave out “disable or”.
Clause 79 amends regulation 6 of the PEC Regulations to create new exceptions from the prohibition on storing and accessing information in terminal equipment. New paragraph (2C) contains an exception for software updates that satisfy specified requirements. This amendment removes a requirement for subscribers and users to be able to disable, not just postpone, the update.
Amendment 51, in clause 79, page 102, leave out lines 27 to 29.
Clause 79 amends regulation 6 of the PEC Regulations to create new exceptions from the prohibition on storing and accessing information in terminal equipment. New paragraph (2C) contains an exception for software updates that satisfy specified requirements. This amendment removes a requirement that, where the update takes effect, the subscriber or user can remove or disable the software.
Amendment 52, in clause 79, page 104, line 20, leave out “or supplementary provision” and insert
“, supplementary, transitional, transitory or saving provision, including provision”.—(Sir John Whittingdale.)
This amendment provides that regulations under the new regulation 6A of the PEC Regulations, inserted by clause 79, can include transitional, transitory or saving provision.
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move amendment 117, in clause 79, page 104, line 32, leave out from the beginning to end of line 38 on page 105.
I begin by re-emphasising my overarching support for exploring ways to reduce consent fatigue and cookie banners. However, because of the direction that new regulation 6B takes us in, it requires far more consultation before entering the statute book. My amendment seeks to remove it. Regulation 6B aims, at some point in the future, to enable users to express any consent they wish to give or objections they wish to make regarding cookies to an operator of a website—commonly a browser—so that this can be done automatically on visiting the website. The three main concerns I have with this must be addressed and consulted on before such a regulation becomes law.
I am concerned that it will pose concerns for competition if browsers, often owned by powerful global tech companies, are given centralised control and access to data surrounding cookies across the entire internet. That concern was echoed by the Advertising Association and the CEO of the Data and Marketing Association during an oral evidence session. When asked whether there was any concern that centralising cookies by browser will entrench power in the hands of the larger tech companies that own the browsers, Chris Combemale answered:
“It certainly would give even greater market control to those companies.”––[Official Report, Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Public Bill Committee, 10 May 2023; c. 21, Q43.]
He said:
“If anything, we need more control in the hands of the people who invest in creating the content”––[Official Report, Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Public Bill Committee, 10 May 2023; c. 21, Q42.]
online.
Sir John Whittingdale
As the hon. Lady sets out, amendment 117 would remove new regulation 6B from the Bill, but we see this as an important tool for reducing frequent cookie consent banners and pop-ups that can, as we have debated already, interfere with people’s use of the internet. Members will be aware, as has already been set out, that clause 79 removes the need for organisations to seek consent to place cookies for certain non-intrusive purposes. One way of further reducing the need for repeated cookie pop-up notices is by blocking them at source—in other words, allowing web users to select which cookies they are willing to accept and which they are not comfortable with by using browser-level settings or similar technologies. These technologies should allow users to set their online preferences once and be confident that those choices will be respected throughout their use of the internet.
We will continue to work with the industry and the Information Commissioner to improve take-up and effectiveness of browser-based and similar solutions. Retaining the regulation-making powers at 6B is important to this work because it will allow the Secretary of State to require relevant technologies to meet certain standards or specifications.
Without regulations, there could be an increased risk of companies developing technologies that did not give web users sufficient choice and control about the types of cookies they are willing to accept. We will consult widely before making any new regulations under 6B, and new regulations will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. We have listened to stakeholders and intend to amend 6B to provide an explicit requirement for the Secretary of State to consult the Competition and Markets Authority before making new regulations.
Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)
Is this something the Department has considered? For example, Google Chrome has a 77% share of the web browser market on desktop computers, and over 60% for all devices including mobile devices. Although we want to improve the use of the internet for users and get rid of unwanted cookies, the consequence would be the consolidation of power in the hands of one or two companies with all that data.
Sir John Whittingdale
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. He accurately sums up the reason that the Government decided it was important that the Competition and Markets Authority would have an input into the development of any facility to allow browser users to set their preferences at the browser level. We will see whether, with the advent of other browsers, AI-generated search engines and so on, the dominance is maintained, but I think he is absolutely right that this will remain an issue that the Competition and Markets Authority needs to keep under review.
That is the purpose of Government amendment 54, which will ensure that any competition impacts are considered properly. For example, we want any review of regulations to be relevant and fair to both smaller publishers and big tech. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Barnsley East will consider withdrawing her amendment.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate the Minister’s comments and the Government change involving the CMA, but we simply do not believe that that is worth putting into law. We just do not know the full implications, as echoed by the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe. I will therefore press my amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Sir John Whittingdale
I shall not repeat all that has been said about the purpose of the clause. To recap quickly, consent is required for any non-essential functions, such as audience measurement, design optimisation, presentation of adverts and tracking across websites but, clearly, the current system is not working well. Researchers found that people often click yes to cookies to make the banner go away and because they want to access the service quickly.
The clause will remove the requirement for organisations to seek consent to cookies placed for several low privacy risk purposes. As a result of the new exceptions we are introducing, web users should know that if they continue to see cookie pop-up messages it is because they relate to more intrusive uses of cookies. It is possible that we may identify additional types of non-intrusive cookies in the future, so the clause permits the Secretary of State to make regulations amending the exceptions to the consent requirement or introducing new exceptions.
The changes will not completely remove the existence of cookie pop-ups. However, we are committed to working with tech companies and consumer groups to promote technologies that help people to set their online preferences at browser level or by using apps. Such technology has the potential to reduce further the number of pop-ups that appear on websites. Alongside the Bill, we will take forward work to discuss what can be done further to develop and raise awareness of possible technological solutions. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
I spoke in detail about my issues with the clause during our debates on amendments 116 and 117, but overall I commend the Government’s intention to explore ways to end cookie fatigue. Although I unfortunately do not believe that these changes will solve the issues, it is pleasing that the Government are looking at ways to reduce the need for consent where the risk for privacy is low. I will therefore not stand in the way of the clause, beyond voicing my opposition to regulation 6B.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 79, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 80
Unreceived communications
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sir John Whittingdale
Clause 80 provides an additional power for the Information Commissioner when investigating unsolicited direct marketing through telephone calls, texts and emails—more commonly known as nuisance calls or nuisance communications.
Some unscrupulous direct marketing companies generate hundreds of thousands of calls to consumers who have not consented to be contacted. That can affect the most vulnerable in our society, some of whom may agree to buy products or services that they did not want or cannot afford. Successive Governments have taken a range of actions over the years—for example, by banning unsolicited calls from claims management firms and pensions providers—but the problem persists and further action is needed.
Under the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, the Information Commissioner can investigate and take enforcement action against rogue companies where there is evidence that unsolicited marketing communications have been received by the recipient. The changes we are making in clause 80 will enable the Information Commissioner to take action in relation to unsolicited marketing communications that have been generated, as well as those received or connected.
Not every call that is generated reaches its intended target. For example, an individual may be out or may simply not pick up the phone. However, the potential for harm should be a relevant factor in any enforcement action by the Information Commissioner’s Office. The application of the regulations, through the changes in clause 80, to communications generated will more accurately reflect the level of intent to cause disturbance.
Clause 81 is a minor and technical clause that should improve the readability of the PEC regulations. The definition of “direct marketing”, which the PEC regulations rely on, is currently found in the Data Protection Act 1998. To help the reader quickly locate the definition, the clause adds the definition to the PEC regulations themselves.
Under the current PEC regulations, businesses can already send direct marketing to existing customers, subject to certain safeguards. That is sometimes known as the soft opt-in rule. Clause 82 applies the same rule to non-commercial organisations, such as charities. The changes will mean that charitable, political and non-commercial organisations will be able to send direct marketing communications to persons who have previously expressed an interest in the organisation’s aims and ideals.
The current soft opt-in rules for business are subject to certain safeguards. We have applied the same safeguards to these new provisions for non-commercial organisations. We think these changes will help non-commercial organisations, including charities and political parties, to build ongoing relationships with their supporters. There is no good reason why the soft opt-in rule should apply to businesses but not to non-commercial organisations. I hope Members will see the benefit of these measures in ensuring the balance between protecting the most vulnerable in society and supporting organisations. I commend clauses 80 to 82 to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
As I have said many times during our discussion of the Bill, I believe that the Information Commissioner should be given proportionate powers to investigate and take action where that is needed to uphold our regulations. That is no less the case with clause 80, which introduces measures that allow the Information Commissioner to investigate organisations responsible for generating unsolicited direct marketing communications, even if they are not received by anyone.
Clause 81 simply lifts the definition of “direct marketing” from the Data Protection Act 1998 and places it into the PEC regulations to increase the readability of that legislation. I have no issues with that.
Clause 82 extends the soft opt-in rules to charities and non-commercial organisations. It is only right that the legislation is consistent in offering non-profits the opportunity to send electronic marketing communications in the same way as for-profit organisations. It might, however, be worth raising the public’s awareness of the rule and of the ability to opt out at any point. If they suddenly find themselves on the end of such communications, they will have a clear understanding of why that is the case and that consent may be withdrawn if they so wish.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 81 and 82 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 83
Direct marketing for the purposes of democratic engagement
Sir John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 55 in clause 83, page 107, line 41, leave out ‘or transitional’ and insert ‘, transitional, transitory or saving’.
This amendment provides that regulations under clause 83 can make transitory or saving provision.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 83 and 84 stand part.
Sir John Whittingdale
Before I speak to the amendment, I will set out the provisions of clause 83, which gives the Secretary of State the power to make exceptions to the PEC regulations’ direct marketing provisions for communications sent for the purposes of democratic engagement. We do not intend to use the powers immediately because the Bill contains a range of other measures that will facilitate a responsible use of personal data for the purposes of political campaigning, including the extension of the soft opt-in rule that we have just debated. However, it is important we keep the changes we are making in the Bill under review to make sure that elected representatives and parties can continue to engage transparently with the electorate and are not unnecessarily constrained by data protection and privacy rules.
The Committee will note that if the Secretary of State decided to exercise the powers, there are a number of safeguards in the clause that will maintain a sensible balance between the need for healthy interaction with the electorate and any expectations that an individual might have with regard to privacy rights. Any new exceptions would be limited to communications sent by the individuals and organisations listed in clause 83, including elected representatives, registered political parties and permitted participants in referendum campaigns.
Before laying any regulations under the clause, the Secretary of State will need to consult the Information Commissioner and other interested parties, and have specific regard for the effect that further exceptions could have on the privacy of individuals. Regulations will require parliamentary approval via the affirmative resolution procedure. Committee members should also bear in mind that the powers will not affect an individual’s right under the UK GDPR to opt out of receiving communications.
We have also tabled two technical amendments to the clause to improve the way it is drafted. Government amendment 55 will make it clear that regulations made under this power can include transitory or savings provisions in addition to transitional provisions. Such provisions might be necessary if, for example, new exceptions were only to apply for a time-limited period. Clause 84 is also technical in nature and simply sets out the meaning of terms such as “candidate”, “elected representative” and “permitted participant” for the purposes of clause 83.
Stephanie Peacock
The clauses mirror somewhat the involvement of democratic engagement purposes on the recognised legitimate interests list. However, here, rather than giving elected representatives and the like an exemption from completing a balancing test when processing under this purpose, the Bill paves the way for them to be exempt from certain direct marketing provisions in future.
The specific content of any future changes, however, should be properly scrutinised. As such, it is disappointing that the Government have not indicated how they intend to use such regulations in future. I appreciate that the Minister has just said that they do not intend to use them right now. Does he have in mind any examples of any exemptions that he might like to make from the direct marketing provisions for democratic engagement purposes? That is not to say that such exemptions will not be justified; just that their substance should be openly discussed and democratically scrutinised.
Sir John Whittingdale
As I have set out, the existing data protection provisions remain under the GDPR. In terms of specific exemptions, I have said that the list will be subject to future regulation making, which will be also subject to parliamentary scrutiny. We will be happy to supply a letter to the hon. Lady to set out specific examples of where that might be the case.
Amendment 55 agreed to.
Clause 83, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 84
Meaning of expressions in section 83
Amendment made: 31, in clause 84, page 110, line 31, leave out “fourth day after” and insert
“period of 30 days beginning with the day after”.—(Sir John Whittingdale.)
Clauses 83 and 84 enable regulations to make exceptions from direct marketing rules in the PEC Regulations, including for certain processing by elected representatives. This amendment increases the period for which former members of the Westminster Parliament and the devolved legislatures continue to be treated as "elected representatives" following an election. See also NC6 and Amendment 30.
Clause 84, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 85
Duty to notify the Commissioner of unlawful direct marketing
Sir John Whittingdale
I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 85, page 112, line 35, at end insert—
“(13A) Regulations under paragraph (13) may make transitional provision.
(13B) Before making regulations under paragraph (13), the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Commissioner, and
(b) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”
This amendment enables regulations changing the amount of a fixed penalty under regulation 26B of the PEC Regulations to include transitional provision. It also requires the Secretary of State to consult the Information Commissioner and such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate before making such regulations.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 118, in clause 85, page 113, line 3, at end insert—
“(1A) Guidance under this section must—
(a) make clear that a provider of a public electronic communications service is not obligated to monitor the content of individual electronic communications in order to determine whether those communications contravene the direct marketing regulations; and
(b) include illustrative examples of the grounds on which a provider may reasonably suspect that a person is contravening or has contravened any of the direct marketing regulations.”
Government amendment 33.
Clause stand part.
Sir John Whittingdale
Before I speak to Government amendment 56, it might be helpful to set out the provisions of clause 85. The clause will help to ensure that there is better co-operation between the industry and the regulator in tackling the problem of nuisance communications. It places a duty on public electronic communications service and network providers to notify the Information Commissioner within 28 days if they have “reasonable grounds” for suspecting that unlawful direct marketing communications are transiting their services or networks. Once notified, the ICO will investigate whether a breach of the PEC regulations has occurred and take appropriate action where necessary.
We cannot expect network and service providers to know for certain whether a customer has agreed to receive a marketing call, which is why the new requirement is predicated on the organisation having reasonable grounds for suspecting that something unlawful is occurring. For example, there might be cases where a communications network or service provider notices a large volume of calls being generated in quick succession, with only one digit in the telephone number changing each time. That might suggest that calls are being made indiscriminately, without regard to whether the customer has registered with the telephone preference service or previously advised the caller that they did not want to be contacted.
We do not envisage that the provision will place significant new burdens on the network and service providers. It does not require them to put new systems in place to monitor for suspicious activities. However, where they have that capability already and have reasonable grounds to believe that unlawful activity is going on, we would like them to share that information with the ICO. The clause also requires the ICO to produce and publish guidance for network and service providers to help them to understand what intelligence information could reasonably be shared.
I shall respond to amendment 118 after the hon. Member for Barnsley East has spoken to it, but it might be helpful for me briefly to explain Government amendment 56. The fixed penalty for failure to comply with the duty, which is currently set at £1,000, is being kept under review. Where appropriate, the Secretary of State can use regulations to change the fine amount. The amendment will ensure that those regulation-making powers are consistent with similar powers elsewhere in the Bill. The regulations could include transitional provisions, and the amendment will also require the Secretary of State to consult the Information Commissioner and other persons they consider appropriate before making such regulations.
Government amendment 33 is a minor and technical change designed to improve the readability of the legislation.
The Chair
The amount is fixed in the Bill at £1,000, Minister. That is stated at clause 85 in proposed new regulation 26B. The Bill states:
“The amount of a fixed monetary penalty under this regulation shall be £1,000.”
That does not indicate any flexibility. I draw that to the attention of the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
The ambition of the clause is broadly welcome, and we agree that there is a need to tackle unwanted calls, but the communications sector, including Vodafone and BT, as well as techUK, has shared concerns that the clause, which will place a new duty on telecoms providers to report to the commissioner whenever they have “reasonable grounds” for suspecting a breach of direct marketing regulations, might not be the best way to solve the issue.
I will focus my remarks on highlighting those concerns, and how amendment 118 would address some of them. First, though, let me say that the Government have already made it clear in their explanatory notes that it is not the intention of the Bill to require providers to monitor communications. However, that has not been included in the Bill, which has caused some confusion in the communications sector.
Amendment 118 would put that confusion to rest by providing for the explicit inclusion of the clarification in the clause itself. That would provide assurances to customers who would be sure their calls and texts would not be monitored, and to telecoms companies, which would be certain that such monitoring of content was absolutely not required of them.
Secondly, the intent of the clause is indeed not to have companies monitoring communications, but many relevant companies have raised concerns around the technological feasibility of identifying instances of unlawful and unsolicited direct marketing. Indeed, the new duty will require telecommunications providers to be able to identify whether a person receiving a direct marketing call has or has not given consent to receive the call from the company making it. However, providers have said they cannot reliably know that, and have warned that there is no existing technology to conduct that kind of monitoring accurately and at scale. In the absence of communication monitoring and examples of how unsolicited direct marketing is to be identified, it is therefore unclear how companies will fulfil their duties under the clause.
That is not to say the industry is not prepared to commit significant resources to tackling unwanted calls. BT, for example, has set up a range of successful tools to help customers. That includes BT Call Protect, which is used by 4.4 million BT customers and now averages 2.35 million calls diverted per week. However, new measures must be feasible, and our amendment 118 would therefore require that guidance around the implementation of the clause include illustrative examples of the grounds on which a provider may reasonably suspect that a person is contravening, or has contravened, any of the direct marketing regulations.
If the Minister does not intend to support the amendment, I would like to hear such examples from him today, so that the communications sector was absolutely clear about how to fulfil its new duties, given the technology available.
Sir John Whittingdale
As the hon. Lady has said, amendment 118 would require the commissioner to state clearly in the guidance that the new duty does not oblige providers to intercept or monitor the content of electronic communications in order to determine whether there has been a contravention of the rules. It would also require the guidance to include illustrative examples of the types of activity that may cause a provider reasonably to suspect that there had been a contravention of the requirements.
I recognise that the amendment echoes concerns that have been raised by communications service providers, and that there has been some apprehension about exactly what companies will have to do to comply with the duty. In response, I would emphasise that “reasonable grounds” does mean reasonable in all circumstances.
The hon. Lady has asked for an example of the kind of activity that might give reasonable grounds for suspicion. I direct her to the remarks I made in moving the amendment and the example of a very large number of calls being generated in rapid succession in which, in each case, the telephone number is simply one digit away from the number before. The speed at which that takes place does provide reasonable grounds to suspect that the requirement to, for instance, check with the TPS is not being fulfilled.
There are simple examples of that kind, but I draw the attention of the hon. Lady and the Committee to the consultation requirements that will apply to the ICO’s guidance. In addition to consulting providers of public electronic communications networks and services on the development of the guidance, the ICO will be required to consult the Secretary of State, Ofcom and other relevant stakeholders to ensure that the guidance is as practical and useful to organisations as possible.
Damian Collins
Does my right hon. Friend agree that, if amendment 118 were made, it could be used as a general get-out-of-jail-free card by companies? Let us consider, for example, a situation where a company could easily and obviously have spotted a likely breach of the regulations and should have intervened. When the commissioner discovered that the company had failed in its duty to do so, the company could turn around and say, “Well, yes, we missed that, but we were not under any obligation to monitor.” It is therefore important that there is a requirement for companies to use their best endeavours to monitor where possible.
Sir John Whittingdale
I completely agree; my hon. Friend is right to make that distinction. Companies should use their best endeavours, but it is worth repeating that the guidance does not expect service and network providers to monitor the content of individual calls and messages to comply with the duty. There is more interest in patterns of activity on networks, such as where a rogue direct marketing firm behaves in the manner that I set out. On that basis, I ask the hon. Lady not to press her amendment to a vote.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate the Minister’s comments and those of the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe. We have no issue with the monitoring of patterns; we wanted clarification on the content. I am not sure that the Minister addressed the concerns about the fact that, although the Government have provided a partial clarification in the explanatory notes, this is not in the Bill. For that reason, I will press my amendment to a vote.
Amendment 56 agreed to.
Amendment proposed: 118, in clause 85, page 113, line 3, at end insert—
“(1A) Guidance under this section must—
(a) make clear that a provider of a public electronic communications service is not obligated to monitor the content of individual electronic communications in order to determine whether those communications contravene the direct marketing regulations; and
(b) include illustrative examples of the grounds on which a provider may reasonably suspect that a person is contravening or has contravened any of the direct marketing regulations.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Sir John Whittingdale
I beg to move amendment 57, in clause 86, page 113, line 38, at end insert—
“(13A) Regulations under paragraph (13) may make transitional provision.
(13B) Before making regulations under paragraph (13), the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Information Commissioner, and
(b) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”
This amendment enables regulations changing the amount of a fixed penalty under regulation 5C of the PEC Regulations to include transitional provision. It also requires the Secretary of State to consult the Information Commissioner and such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate before making such regulations.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 32 and 58.
That schedule 10 be the Tenth schedule to the Bill.
Sir John Whittingdale
Before turning specifically to the provisions of the amendment, I will set out the provisions of clause 86 and schedule 10. Clause 86 updates the ICO’s powers in respect of enforcing the PEC regulations. Currently, the ICO has to rely mainly on outdated powers in the Data Protection Act 1998 to enforce breaches of the PEC regulations. The powers were not updated when the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act came into force in 2018. That means that some relatively serious breaches of the PEC regulations, such as nuisance calls being generated on an industrial scale, cannot be investigated as effectively or punished as severely as breaches under the data protection legislation.
The clause will therefore give the ICO the same investigatory and enforcement powers in relation to breaches of the PEC regulations as currently apply to breaches of the UK GDPR and the 2018 Act. That will result in a legal framework that is more consistent and predictable for organisations, particularly for those with processing activities that engage both the PEC regulations and the UK GDPR.
Clause 86 and schedule 10 add a new schedule to the PEC regulations, which sets out how the investigatory and enforcement powers in the 2018 Act will be applied to the PEC regulations. Among other things, that includes the power for the Information Commissioner to impose information notices, assessment notices, interview notices and enforcement and penalty notices. The maximum penalty that the Information Commissioner can impose for the most serious breaches of the PEC regulations will be increased to the same levels that can be imposed under the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act. That is up to 4% of a company’s annual turnover or £17.5 million, whichever is higher.
Relevant criminal offences under the Data Protection Act, such as the offence of deliberately frustrating an investigation by the Information Commissioner by destroying or falsifying information, are also applied to the PEC regulations. The updated enforcement provisions in new schedule 1 to the PEC regulations will retain some pre-existing powers that are unique to the previous regulations.
Clause 86 also updates regulation 5C of the PEC regulations, which sets out the fixed penalty amount for a failure to report a personal data breach under regulation 5. Currently, the fine level is set at £1,000. The clause introduces a regulation-making power, which will be subject to the affirmative procedure, for the Secretary of State to increase the fine level. We have tabled Government amendment 57 to provide an explicit requirement for the Secretary of State to consult the Information Commissioner and any other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate before making new regulations. The amendment also confirms that regulations made under the power can include transitional provisions.
Finally, we have tabled two further minor amendments to schedule 10. Government amendment 58 makes a minor correction by inserting a missing schedule number. Government amendment 32 adjusts the provision that applies section 155(3)(c) of the Data Protection Act for the purposes of the PEC regulations. That is necessary as that section is being amended by schedule 4. Without making those corrective amendments, the provisions will not achieve the intended effect.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 86 and schedule 10 insert and clarify the commissioner’s enforcement powers with regards to privacy and electronic communications regulation. Particularly of note within the proposals is the move to increase fines for nuisance calls and messages to a higher maximum penalty of £17.5 million or 4% of the undertaking’s total annual worldwide turnover, whichever is higher. That is one of the Government’s headline commitments in the Bill and should create tougher punishments for those who are unlawfully pestering people through their phones.
We are in complete agreement that more must be done to stop unwanted communications. However, to solve the problem as a whole, we must take stronger action on scam calling as well as on instances of unsolicited direct marketing. Labour has committed to going further than Ofcom’s new controls on overseas scam calls and has proposed the following to close loopholes: first, no phone call made from overseas using a UK telephone number should have that number displayed when it appears on a UK mobile phone or digital landline; and secondly, all mobile calls from overseas using a UK number should be blocked unless the network provider confirms that the known bill payer for the number is currently roaming. To mitigate the fact that some legitimate industries rely on overseas call centres that handle genuine customer service requests, we will also require Ofcom to register those legitimate companies and their numbers as exceptions to the blocking.
As the clause and schedule seek to take strong action against unwanted communications, I would be pleased to hear from the Minister whether the Government would consider going further and matching our commitments on overseas scam calling, too.
Sir John Whittingdale
I say to the hon. Lady that the provisions deal specifically with nuisance calls, not necessarily scam calls. As she will know, the Government have a comprehensive set of policies designed to address fraud committed through malicious or scam calls, and those are being processed through the fraud prevention strategy. I accept that more needs to be done and say to her that it is already taking place.
Amendment 57 agreed to.
Clause 86, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 10
Privacy and electronic communications: Commissioner’s enforcement powers
Amendments made: 32, in schedule 10, page 180, line 25, leave out “for “data subjects”” and insert
“for the words from “data subjects” to the end”.
This amendment adjusts provision applying section 155(3)(c) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (penalty notices) for the purposes of the PEC Regulations to take account of the amendment of section 155(3)(c) by Schedule 4 to the Bill.
Amendment 58, in schedule 10, page 183, line 5, at end insert “15”.—(John Whittingdale.)
This amendment inserts a missing Schedule number, so that the provision refers to Schedule 15 to the Data Protection Act 2018.
Schedule 10, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 87
The eIDAS Regulation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sir John Whittingdale
Clauses 87 to 91 make changes to the UK’s eIDAS regulation to support the effective functioning of the UK’s trust services market into the future. Clause 87 states that when clauses 88 to 91 talk about the eIDAS regulation, this refers to regulation 910/2014, on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market, which was adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council on 23 July 2014.
There is potential for confusion between the UK eIDAS regulation and the EU eIDAS regulation from which it stems and which shares the same title. I can confirm that all references to the eIDAS regulation in clauses 88 to 91 refer to the regulation as it was retained and modified on EU exit to apply within the UK.
Clause 88 amends the UK eIDAS regulation so that conformity assessment reports issued by an accredited EU conformity assessment body can be recognised and used to grant a trust service provider qualified status under the regulation. UK-qualified trust services are no longer legally recognised within the EU, which has meant that qualified trust service providers who wish to operate within both the UK and the EU need to meet two sets of auditing requirements. That is not cost effective and creates regulatory barriers in the nascent UK trust services market. Unilateral recognition of EU conformity assessment bodies will remove an unnecessary regulatory barrier for qualified trust service providers wishing to operate within both the UK and EU markets.
Clause 89 provides the Secretary of State with a power to revoke articles 24A and 24B of the UK eIDAS regulation in the future, should the continued unilateral recognition of EU-qualified trust services, and the recognition of conformity assessment reports issued by EU conformity assessment bodies, no longer meet the needs of the UK market. Clause 89 also provides a power to amend article 24A in order to wind down the recognition of EU-qualified trust services, by removing the recognition of certain elements of EU-qualified trust service standards only.
For example, it will be possible to continue to recognise EU-qualified electronic time stamps and delivery services while ending the recognition of EU-qualified electronic signatures and seals, which will give the UK eIDAS regulation flexibility to adapt to future changes. The clause provides that any regulations made under this power will be subject to the negative resolution procedure.
Stephanie Peacock
“Trust services” refers to services including those relating to electronic signatures, electronic seals, timestamps, electronic delivery services and website authentication. As has been mentioned, trust services are required to meet certain standards and technical specifications for operation across the UK economy, which are outlined under eIDAS regulations. These clauses seek to make logistical adjustments to that legal framework for trust service products and services within in the UK.
Although we understand that the changes are intended to enable flexibility in case EU regulations should no longer be adequate, and absolutely agree that we must future-proof regulations to ensure that standards are always kept high, we must also ensure that any changes made are necessary, to ensure that standards remain high, rather than being made simply for their own sake. It is vital that any alterations made are genuinely intended to improve current practices and have been thoroughly considered to ensure that they are making positive and meaningful change.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 87 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 88 to 91 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 92
Disclosure of information to improve public service delivery to undertakings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sir John Whittingdale
The clause will amend the Digital Economy Act 2017 to extend the powers under section 35 to include businesses. Existing powers enable public authorities to share data to support better services to individuals and households. The Government believe that businesses too can benefit from responsive, joined-up public services across the digital economy. The clause introduces new data sharing powers allowing specified public authorities to share data with other specified public authorities for the purposes of fulfilling their functions.
The sharing of data will also provide benefits for the public in a number of ways. It will pave the way for businesses to access Government services more conveniently, efficiently and securely—by using digital verification services, accessing support when trying to start up new businesses, completing import and export processes or applying for Government grants such as rural grants, for example. Any data sharing will of course be carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Data Protection Act and the UK GDPR.
Being able to share data about businesses will bring many benefits. For example, by improving productivity while keeping employment high we can earn more, raising living standards, providing funds to support our public services and improving the quality of life for all citizens. Now that we have left the EU, businesses that take action to improve their productivity will increase their resilience to changing market conditions and be more globally competitive. The Minister will be able to make regulations to add new public authorities to those already listed in schedule 4 to the Digital Economy Act. However, any regulations would be made by the affirmative procedure, requiring the approval of both Houses. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause amends section 35 of the Digital Economy Act to enable specified public authorities to share information to improve the delivery of public services to businesses with other specified persons. That echoes the existing legal gateway that allows for the sharing of information on improving the delivery of public services to individuals and households.
I believe that the clause is a sensible extension, but would have preferred the Minister and his Department to have considered public service delivery more broadly when drafting the Bill. While attention has rightly been paid throughout the Bill to making data protection regulation work in the interests of businesses, far less attention has gone towards how we can harness data for the public good and use it to the benefit of our public services. That is a real missed opportunity, which Labour would certainly have taken.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 92 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 93
Implementation of law enforcement information-sharing agreements
Sir John Whittingdale
I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 93, page 119, line 18, leave out first “Secretary of State” and insert “appropriate national authority”.
This amendment, Amendment 10 and NC5 enable the regulation-making power conferred by clause 93 to be exercised concurrently by the Secretary of State and, in relation to devolved matters, by Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 9 to 16.
Government new clause 5—Meaning of “appropriate national authority”.
Sir John Whittingdale
Clause 93 creates a delegated power for the Secretary of State, and a concurrent power for Welsh and Scottish Ministers, to make regulations to implement international agreements relating to the sharing of information for law enforcement purposes. The concurrent power for Welsh and Scottish Ministers has been included in an amendment to the clause. While international relations are a reserved matter, the domestic implementation of the provisions likely to be contained in future international agreements may be devolved, given that law enforcement is a devolved matter to various extents in each devolved Administration.
In the light of introducing a concurrent power for Welsh and Scottish Ministers, amendments to clauses 93 and 108 have been tabled, as has new clause 5. Together they specifically detail the appropriate national authority that will have the power to make regulations in respect of clause 93. The Government amendments make it clear that the appropriate national authority may make the regulations. New clause 5 then defines who is an appropriate national authority for those purposes. I therefore commend new clause 5 and the related Government amendments to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
It is right that the powers conferred by clause 93 can be exercised by devolved Ministers where appropriate. I therefore have no objections to the amendments or the new clause.
Amendment 8 agreed to.
Amendments made: 9, in clause 93, page 119, line 18, leave out second “Secretary of State” and insert “authority”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 8.
Amendment 10, in clause 93, page 119, line 36, at end insert—
‘“appropriate national authority” has the meaning given in section (Meaning of “appropriate national authority”);’.—(Sir John Whittingdale.)
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 8.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Sir John Whittingdale
As I have already set out, clause 93 creates a delegated power for the Secretary of State, along with a concurrent power for Welsh and Scottish Ministers, to make regulations to implement international agreements relating to the sharing of information for law enforcement purposes. The legislation will provide powers to implement technical aspects of such international agreements via secondary legislation once the agreements have been negotiated.
Clause 93 stipulates that regulations can be made in connection with implementing an international agreement only in so far as it relates to the sharing of information for law enforcement purposes, and that any data sharing must comply with data protection legislation. These measures will enable the implementation of new international agreements designed to help keep the public safe from the threat posed by international criminality and cross-border crime, as well as helping to protect vulnerable people.
Sir John Whittingdale
I believe the position is that at the present time, Northern Ireland does not have a functioning Assembly, so it is not possible, but that may change in due course.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause allows the Secretary of State to make regulations to enact an international agreement for the sharing of information for law enforcement purposes. The substance of any such agreement will likely therefore come through secondary legislation and, as such, it will be appropriate at that point to scrutinise their contents. If the Minister and his Department have identified any targets for such agreements at this stage, I am sure that the Committee would be grateful to hear of them. If not, however, I expect that he would update the House of that through the usual channels.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 93, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 94
Form in which registers of births and deaths are to be kept
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 95 to 98 stand part.
That schedule 11 be the Eleventh schedule to the Bill.
Sir John Whittingdale
Clauses 94 to 98 amend the Registration Service Act 1953 and the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953—which I will refer to as the Act —and introduce schedule 11, which contains minor and consequential amendments. Currently, under the Act, the Registrar General for England and Wales provides the local registration service with paper live birth, stillbirth and death registers and with paper forms for making certified copies of the register entries—for example, birth and death certificates. Since 2009, registrars in England and Wales also record birth and death registration information electronically, in parallel with the paper-based systems. That is a duplication of effort for registrars.
Clause 94(2) amends the Act and substitutes section 25 with a new section 25. The new section will allow the Registrar General to determine in which form registers of live births, stillbirths and deaths are to be kept, and contains additional provision appropriate for the keeping of registers in an electronic form only. New section 25(2) of the Act allows the Registrar General to require that registrars keep information in a form that will allow the Registrar General and the superintendent registrar to have immediate access to all live birth and death entries as soon as the registrar has entered the details in the register. In the case of stillbirths, new section 25(2)(b) allows the Registrar General to have immediate access to the entries in the register.
New section 25(3) provides that where a register is kept in such form as determined under new section 25(2) —for example, an electronic form—any information in that register made available to the Registrar General or superintendent registrar is deemed to be held by that person, as well as the registrar, when carrying out that person’s functions—for example, the issue of certified copies.
Clause 94(3)(a) and (b) omit sections 26 and 27 of the Act, which set out the requirements for the quarterly returns made by a registrar and superintendent registrar. These returns will no longer be needed, as the superintendent registrar and the Registrar General will have immediate access to the records as provided for by new section 25 of the Act.
Clause 94(3)(c) omits section 28 of the Act, which sets out how paper registers must be stored by registrars, superintendent registrars and the Registrar General. With the introduction of new section 25, that provision is no longer necessary as it would not be relevant to an electronic register.
Proposed new section 25(4) of the Act provides that anything that is required for the purposes of creating and maintaining the registers—for example, providing registrars with the electronic system—is the responsibility of the Registrar General. Proposed new section 25(5) of the Act places a responsibility on the Registrar General to provide the required forms that the local registration service will need to produce certified copies of entries—for example, birth and death certificates.
Stephanie Peacock
Clauses 94 to 98 amend the Births and Deaths Registration Act, with the overall effect of removing the provision for birth and death records to be kept on paper, and allowing them to be held in an online database. This is a positive move, with the potential to bring many benefits. First, it will improve the functioning of the registration system—for example, it will allow the Registrar General and the superintendent registrar to have immediate access to all birth and death entries as soon as they have been entered into the system. The changes will undoubtedly be important to families who are experiencing joy or loss, because they make registrations easier and more likely to be correct in the first instance, minimising unnecessary clarifications at what can often be a very difficult time. Indeed, one of the recommendations of the 2022 UK Commission on Bereavement’s landmark report, which looked at the key challenges facing bereaved people in this country, was that it should be possible to register deaths online.
It is great that the Government have chosen to pursue this change. However, despite it being the recommendation listed right next to online death registration, the Government have not used this opportunity to explore the potential of extending the Tell Us Once service, which is disappointing. Indeed, the existing Tell Us Once service has proved very helpful to bereaved people in reducing the administrative burden they face, by enabling them to inform a large number of Government and public sector bodies in one process, rather than forcing them to go through the same process time and again. However, private organisations are not included, and loved ones are still tasked with contacting organisations such as employers, energy and electricity companies, banks, telephone and internet providers, and more. At a time of emotional struggle, this is a huge administrative burden to place on the bereaved and leaves them vulnerable to other unsettling variables, such as communication barriers and potentially insensitive customer service.
The commission found that 61% of adult respondents reported experiencing practical challenges when notifying the organisations that need to be made aware of the death of a loved one. We are therefore disappointed that the Government have not explored whether the Bill could extend the policy to the private sector in order to further reduce the burden on grieving friends and families, and make the inevitably difficult process a little easier. Overall, however, the clauses will mark a positive change for families up and down the country, and we are pleased to see them implemented.
Sir John Whittingdale
I merely say to the hon. Lady that, having used the Tell Us Once service myself in relation to the death of my mother not that long ago, I absolutely hear what she says about the importance of making the process as easy as possible. We will certainly consider what she says.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 94 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
Congratulations to the hon. Member for Solihull.
Clauses 95 to 98 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 11 agreed to.
Clause 99
Information standards for health and adult social care in England
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discussing the following:
That schedule 12 be the Twelfth schedule to the Bill.
Sir John Whittingdale
Schedule 12 makes it clear that information standards published under section 250 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, as amended by the Health and Care Act 2022, can include standards relating to information technology or IT services that are used or intended to be used in connection with the processing of information. The schedule extends the potential application of information standards to the providers of IT products and services to the health and adult social care sector for England. It also introduces mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance by IT providers with information standards, and allows for the establishment of an accreditation scheme for IT products and services.
It is absolutely right that health and care information can flow in a standardised way between different IT systems and across organisational boundaries in the health and adult social care system in England, for the benefit of individuals and their healthcare outcomes. Information standards are vital to enabling that, alongside joint working between everyone involved in the processing of heath and care information.
These changes will support the efficient and effective operation of the health and adult social care system by making it easier for people delivering care to access accurate and complete information when they need it, improve clinical decision making and, ultimately, improve clinical outcomes for patients. The clause is a crucial enabler for the creation of a modern health and care service with systems that are integrated and responsive to the needs of patients and users. I therefore commend it to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
Information standards govern how data can be shared and compared across a sector. They are important in every sector in which they operate, but particularly in health, where they are critical to enabling the information sharing and interoperability necessary for good patient outcomes across health and social care services. For many reasons, however, we do not have a standard national approach to health data; as such, patients receive a far from seamless experience between different healthcare services. The Bill’s technical amendments and clarifications of existing rules on information standards in health, and how they interact with IT and IT services, are small but good steps in the journey towards trying resolve that.
Tom Schumacher of Medtronic told us in oral evidence that one of the problems faced by his organisation and NHS trusts is
“variability in technical and IT security standards.”
He suggested that harmonising those standards would be a “real opportunity,” since it would mean that
“each trust does not have to decide for itself which international standard to use and which local standard to use.”––[Official Report, Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Public Bill Committee, 10 May 2023; c. 42, Q90.]
However, it is unclear how much headway these IT-related changes will make in providing that harmonisation, let alone the seamless service that patients so often call for.
I have one query that I hope the Minister can help with. MedConfidential has shared with us a concern that new section 251ZE of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 on accreditation of information technology, which is introduced by schedule 12, seems to imply that the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England will have the power to set data standards in social care. MedConfidential says that would be a major policy shift, and that it seems unusual to implement such a shift through an otherwise unrelated Bill. Will the Minister write to me to clarify whether it is the Government’s intention to have DHSC and NHS England take over the information infrastructure of social care—and, if so, why they have come to that decision?
Sir John Whittingdale
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her support in general. I hear the concern that she expressed on behalf of the firm that has been in contact with her. We will certainly look into that, and I will be happy to let her have a written response in due course.
Mr Paisley, might I beg the Committee’s indulgence to correct the record? I incorrectly credited the hon. Member for Solihull for the private Member’s Bill, but it was in fact my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Saqib Bhatti). I apologise to him for getting his constituency wrong—
The Chair
So we will take the congratulations away from Solihull and pass them elsewhere.
Sir John Whittingdale
I am afraid that congratulations have been removed from Solihull and transferred to Meriden.
The Chair
Better luck next time, Solihull! Thank you, Minister, for the correction.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 99 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Steve Double.)
Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Eighth sitting)
Tuesday 23rd May 2023
(11 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 View all Data Protection and Digital Information Bill 2022-23 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 May 2023 - (23 May 2023)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 44 and 45.
That schedule 13 be the Thirteenth schedule to the Bill.
Clauses 101 to 103 stand part.
The Minister for Data and Digital Infrastructure (Sir John Whittingdale)
We now turn to part 5 of the Bill. Clauses 100 to 103 and schedule 13 will establish a body corporate, the Information Commission, to replace the existing regulator, the Information Commissioner, which is currently structured as a corporation sole. I should make it clear that the clauses will make no changes to the regulator’s role and responsibilities; all the functions that rest with the Information Commissioner will continue to sit with the new Information Commission.
Clause 100 will establish a body corporate, the Information Commission, to replace the existing regulator, the Information Commissioner. The commission will be governed by an independent board, with chair and chief executive roles, thereby spreading the responsibilities of the Information Commissioner across a larger number of people.
Clause 101 will abolish the office of the Information Commissioner and amend the Data Protection Act 2018 accordingly. To ensure an orderly transfer of functions, the Information Commissioner’s Office will not be abolished until the new body corporate, the Information Commission, is established.
Clause 102 provides for all regulatory and other functions of the Information Commissioner to be transferred to the new body corporate, the Information Commission, once it is established. The clause also provides for references to the Information Commissioner in enactments or other documents to be treated as references to the Information Commission, where appropriate, as a result of the transfer of functions to the new Information Commission.
Clause 103 will allow the Secretary of State to make a scheme for the transfer of property, rights and liabilities, including rights and liabilities relating to employment contracts, from the commissioner to the new commission. The scheme may transfer property such as IT equipment or office furniture, or transfer staff currently employed by the commissioner to the commission. The transfer scheme will be designed to ensure continuity and facilitate a seamless transition to the new Information Commission.
Schedule 13 will insert a new schedule 12A to the Data Protection Act 2018, which describes the nature, form and governance structure of the new body corporate, the Information Commission. The commission will be governed by an independent statutory board, which will consist of a chair and other non-executive members, as well as executive members including a chief executive. The new structure formalises aspects of the existing governance arrangements of the Information Commissioner’s Office and brings the ICO in line with how other UK regulators, such as Ofcom and the Financial Conduct Authority, are governed. The chair of the new commission will be appointed by His Majesty by letters patent on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, as is currently the case for the commissioner.
Schedule 13 also provides for the current Information Commissioner to transfer to the role of chair of the Information Commission for the remainder of their term. I put on record the Government’s intention to preserve the title of Information Commissioner in respect of the chair, in acknowledgment of the fact that the commissioner’s brand is recognised and valued both domestically and internationally. Other non-executive members will be appointed by the Secretary of State, and the chief executive will be appointed by the non-executive members in consultation with the Secretary of State.
Government amendment 45 will allow the chair to appoint the first chief executive on an interim basis and for a term of up to a maximum of 24 months, which will minimise any delay in the transition from the commissioner to the new commission. As drafted, the Bill provides that the chief executive of the commission will be appointed by the non-executive members once they are in place, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The transition from the commissioner to the new Information Commission cannot take place until the board is properly constituted, with, as a minimum, a chair, another non-executive member and a chief executive in place. That requirement would be likely to cause delay to the transition, as the appointment of the non-executive members by the Secretary of State and the chief executive would need to take place consecutively.
Amendment 44 is a minor consequential amendment to paragraph 3(3)(a) of proposed new schedule 12A, making it clear that the interim chief executive is appointed as an executive member.
The amendments seek to minimise any delay in the transfer of functions to the new commission by enabling the appointment of the chief executive to take place in parallel with the appointments process for non-executive members. The appointment of the interim chief executive will be made on the basis of fair and open competition and in consultation with the Secretary of State. I commend clauses 100 to 103, schedule 13 and Government amendments 44 and 45 to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock (Barnsley East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again, Mr Hollobone. The clauses that restructure the Information Commissioner’s Office are among those that the Opposition are pleased to welcome in the Bill.
The Information Commissioner is the UK’s independent regulator for data protection and freedom of information under the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Under the current system, as the Minister outlined, the Information Commissioner’s Office is a corporation sole, meaning that one person has overall responsibility for data protection and freedom of information, with a group of staff supporting them. However, as the use of data in our society has grown, so too has the ICO, from a team of 10 in 1984 to an organisation with more than 500 staff.
In that context, the corporation sole model is obviously not fit for purpose. Clauses 100 to 103 recognise that: they propose changes that will modernise the Information Commissioner’s Office, turning it into the Information Commission by abolishing the corporation sole and replacing it with a body corporate. It is absolutely right that those changes be made, transforming the regulator into a commission with a broader set-up structure and a board of executives, among other key changes. That will bring the ICO in line with other established UK regulators such as Ofcom and the Financial Conduct Authority, reflect the fact that the ICO is not just a small commissioner’s office, and ensure that it is equipped to deal with the volume of work for which it has responsibility.
It is essential that the ICO remains independent and fair. We agree that moving from an individual to a body will ensure greater integrity, although the concerns that I have raised about the impact of earlier clauses on the ICO’s independence certainly remain. Overall, however, we are pleased that the Government recognise that the ICO must be brought in line with other established regulators and are making much-needed changes, which we support.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 100 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 13
The Information Commission
Amendments made: 44, in schedule 13, page 195, line 21, after “members” insert
“or in accordance with paragraph 23A”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 45.
Amendment 45, in schedule 13, page 204, line 6, at end insert—
“Transitional provision: interim chief executive
23A (1) The first chief executive of the Commission is to be appointed by the chair of the Commission.
(2) Before making the appointment the chair must consult the Secretary of State.
(3) The appointment must be for a term of not more than 2 years.
(4) The chair may extend the term of the appointment but not so the term as extended is more than 2 years.
(5) For the term of appointment, the person appointed under sub-paragraph (1) is ”the interim chief executive”.
(6) Until the expiry of the term of appointment, the powers conferred on the non-executive members by paragraph 11(2) and (3) are exercisable in respect of the interim chief executive by the chair (instead of by the non-executive members).
(7) In sub-paragraphs (5) and (6), the references to the term of appointment are to the term of appointment described in sub-paragraph (3), including any extension of the term under sub-paragraph (4).”—(Sir John Whittingdale.)
The Bill establishes the Information Commission. This new paragraph enables the chair of the new body, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to appoint the first chief executive (as opposed to the appointment being made by non-executive members). It also enables the chair to determine the terms and conditions, pay, pensions etc relating to the appointment.
Schedule 13, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 101 to 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 104
Oversight of retention and use of biometric material
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sir John Whittingdale
Clause 104 will repeal the role of the Biometrics Commissioner and transfer the casework functions to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. There is an extensive legal framework to ensure that the police can make effective use of biometrics, for example as part of an investigation to quickly and reliably identify suspects, while maintaining public trust. That includes the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which sets out detailed rules on DNA and fingerprints, and the Data Protection Act 2018, which provides an overarching framework for the processing of all personal data.
The oversight framework is complicated, however, and there are overlapping responsibilities. The Bio -metrics Commissioner currently has specific oversight responsibilities just for police use of DNA and fingerprints, while the Information Commissioner’s Office regulates the use of all personal data, including biometrics, by any organisation, including the police. Clause 104 will simplify the framework by removing the overlap, leaving the ICO to provide independent oversight and transferring the casework functions to another existing body.
The casework involves extending retention periods in certain circumstances, particularly on national security grounds, and is quasi-judicial in nature. That is why clause 104 transfers those functions to the independent Investigatory Powers Commissioner, which has the necessary expertise, and avoids the conflict of interest that could occur if the functions were transferred to the ICO as regulator. Transparency in police use of biometrics is essential to retaining public trust and will continue through the annual reports of the Forensic Information Databases Service strategy board, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the ICO. I commend clause 104 to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
I will speak in more detail about my more general views on the oversight of biometrics, particularly their private use, when we come to new clauses 13, 14 and 15. However, as I look specifically at clauses 104 and 105, which seek to abolish the currently combined offices of Biometrics Commissioner and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, I would like to draw on the direct views of the Information Commissioner. In his initial response to “Data: a new direction”, which proposed absorbing the functions of the Biometrics Commissioner and Surveillance Camera Commissioner into the ICO, the commissioner said that there were some functions that,
“if absorbed by the ICO, would almost certainly result in their receiving less attention”.
Other functions, he said,
“simply do not fit with even a reformed data protection authority”
with there being
“far more intuitive places for them to go.”
That was particularly so, he said, with biometric casework.
It is therefore pleasing that as a result of the consultation responses the Government have chosen to transfer the commissioner’s biometric functions not to the ICO but to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, acknowledging the relevant national security expertise that it can provide. However, in written evidence to this Committee, the commissioner reiterated his concern about the absorption of his office’s functions, saying that work is currently being undertaken within its remit that, under the Bill’s provisions, would be unaccounted for.
Given that the commissioner’s concerns clearly remain, I would be pleased if the Minister provided in due course a written response to that evidence and those concerns. If not, the Government should at the very least undertake their own gap analysis to identify areas that will not be absorbed under the current provisions. It is important that this Committee and the office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner can be satisfied that all the functions will be properly delegated and given the same degree of attention wherever they are carried out. Equally, it is important that those who will be expected to take on these new responsibilities are appropriately prepared to do so.
Sir John Whittingdale
I am happy to provide the further detail that the hon. Lady has requested.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 104 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 105
Oversight of biometrics databases
Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 123, in clause 105, page 128, line 22, leave out subsections (2) and (3).
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
New clause 17—Transfer of functions to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—
“The functions of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner are transferred to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.”
Carol Monaghan
Society is witnessing an unprecedented acceleration in the capability and reach of surveillance technologies. Such an acceleration calls for protections and safeguards. Clause 105, however, does the opposite and seeks to abolish both the office of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner and its functions. The explanatory notes to the Bill state that the functions of the office of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner are duplicated and covered by the Information Commissioner’s Office and its CCTV code of practice. That is not the case: the code is advisory only and is primarily concerned with data processes, not with actual surveillance.
Amendment 123 and new clause 17 would retain the functions of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner but transfer them to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, thus preserving those necessary safeguards. The IPCO already scrutinises Government activity and deals with the covert use of surveillance cameras, so dealing with overt cameras as well would be a natural extension of its function.
Stephanie Peacock
Having outlined my broad concerns about clause 105 when I spoke to clause 104, I will focus briefly on the specific concern raised by the hon. Member for Glasgow North West, which is that the Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s functions will not be properly absorbed.
In evidence to the Committee, the commissioner outlined a number of non-data protection functions in relation to public space surveillance that their office currently carries out, but that, they believe, the Bill does not make provision to transfer. They cite the significant work that their office has undertaken to ensure that Government Departments are able
“to cease deploying visual surveillance systems onto sensitive sites where they are produced by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China”,
following a November 2022 instruction from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. The commissioner says that such non-data protection work, which has received international acclaim, is not addressed in the Bill.
I am therefore hopeful that the explicit mention in amendment 123 that that the functions of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner will be transferred provides a backstop to ensure that all the commissioner’s duties, including the non-data protection work, are accounted for. If the amendment is not accepted, a full-depth analysis should be conducted, as argued previously, with a full response issued to the commissioner’s evidence to ensure that every one of the functions is properly and appropriately absorbed.
I understand the argument that the Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s powers would be better placed with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, rather than the ICO. Indeed, the commissioner’s evidence to the Committee referenced the interim findings of an independent report it had commissioned, as the hon. Member for Glasgow North West just mentioned. The report found that most of the gaps left by the Bill could be addressed if responsibility for the surveillance camera code moved under the IPCO, harmonising the oversight of traditional and remote biometrics.
I end by pointing to a recent example that shows the value of proper oversight of the use of surveillance. Earlier this year, following a referral from my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones), the ICO found a school in Bristol guilty of unlawfully installing covert CCTV cameras at the edge of their playing fields. Since then, the Surveillance Camera Commissioner has been responding to freedom of information requests on the matter, with more information about the incident thereby emerging as recently as yesterday. It is absolutely unacceptable that a school should be filming people without their knowledge. The Surveillance Camera Commissioner is a vital cog in the machinery of ensuring that incidents are dealt with appropriately. For such reasons, we must preserve its functions.
In short, I am in no way opposed to the simplification of oversight in surveillance or biometrics, but I hope to see it done in an entirely thorough way, so that none of the current commissioner’s duties get left behind or go unseen.
Sir John Whittingdale
I am grateful to the hon. Members for Glasgow North West and for Barnsley East for the points they have made. The hon. Member for Glasgow North West, in moving the amendment, was right to say that the clause as drafted abolishes the role of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner and the surveillance camera code that the commissioner promotes compliance with. The commissioner and the code, however, are concerned only with police and local authority use in England and Wales. Effective, independent oversight of the use of surveillance camera systems is critical to public trust. There is a comprehensive legal framework for the use of such systems, but the oversight framework is complex and confusing.
The ICO regulates the processing of all personal data by all UK organisations under the Data Protection Act; that includes surveillance camera systems operated by the police and local authorities, and the ICO has issued its own video surveillance guidance. That duplication is confusing for both the operators and the public and it has resulted in multiple and sometimes inconsistent guidance documents covering similar areas. The growing reliance on surveillance from different sectors in criminal investigations, such as footage from Ring doorbells, means that it is increasingly important for all users of surveillance systems to have clear and consistent guidance. Consolidating guidance and oversight will make it easier for the police, local authorities and the public to understand. The ICO will continue to provide independent regulation of the use of surveillance camera systems by all organisations. Indeed, the chair of the National Police Data Board, who gave evidence to the Committee, said that that will significantly simplify matters and will not reduce the level of oversight and scrutiny placed upon the police.
Amendment 123, proposed by the hon. Member for Glasgow North West, would retain the role of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner and the surveillance camera code. In our view, that would simply continue the complexity and duplication with the ICO’s responsibilities. Feedback that we received from our consultation showed broad support for simplifying the oversight framework, with consultees agreeing that the roles and responsibilities, in particular in relation to new technologies, were unclear.
The hon. Lady went on to talk about the oversight going beyond that of the Information Commissioner, but I point out that there is a comprehensive legal framework outside the surveillance camera code. That includes not only data protection, but equality and human rights law, to which the code cross-refers. The ICO and the Equality and Human Rights Commission will continue to regulate such activities. There are other oversight bodies for policing, including the Independent Office for Police Conduct and His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary, as well as the College of Policing, which provide national guidance and training.
The hon. Lady also specifically mentioned the remarks of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner about Chinese surveillance cameras. I will simply point out that the responsibility for oversight, which the ICO will continue to have, is not changed in any way by the Bill. The Information Commissioner’s Office continues to regulate all organisations’ use of surveillance cameras, and it has issued its own video surveillance guidance.
New clause 17 would transfer the functions of the commissioner to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. As I have already said, we believe that that would simply continue to result in oversight resting in two different places, and that is an unnecessary duplication. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office oversees activities that are substantially more intrusive than those relating to overt surveillance cameras. IPCO’s existing work requires it to oversee over 600 public authorities, as well as several powers from different pieces of legislation. That requires a high level of expertise and specialisation to ensure effective oversight.
For those reasons, we believe that the proposals in the clause to bring the oversight functions under the responsibility of the Information Commissioner’s Office will not result in any reduction in oversight, but will result in the removal of duplication and greater clarity. On that basis, I am afraid that I am unable to accept the amendment, and I hope that the hon. Lady will consider withdrawing it.
Carol Monaghan
I thank the Minister for responding to my amendments. However, we have a situation where we are going from having a specialist oversight to a somewhat more generalist oversight. That cannot be good when we are talking about this fast-moving technology. I will withdraw my amendment for the moment, but I reserve the right to bring it back at a later stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 105 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 106
Oversight of biometrics databases
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move amendment 119, in clause 106, page 130, line 7, leave out
“which allows or confirms the unique identification of that individual”.
This amendment is intended to ensure that the definition of biometric data in the Bill includes cases where that data is used for the purposes of classification (and not just unique identification).
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 8—Processing of special categories of personal data: biometric data—
“(1) Article 9 of UK GDPR is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (1), after “biometric data”, omit “for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person.”
This new clause would extend the same protections that are currently in place for the processing of biometric data for the purposes of identification to the processing of all biometric data, including if the processing is for the purpose of classification (i.e. identification as part of a group, rather than identification as an individual).
Stephanie Peacock
Biometric data is uniquely personal. It captures our faces, fingerprints, walking style, tone of voice, expressions and all other data derived from measures of the human body. Under current UK law, biometric data is defined as
“personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person”.
Furthermore, biometric data counts as special category personal data only when it is used or collected for
“the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person”.
However, as the use of biometrics grows, they are not only used for identification; indeed, there is a growing set of biometric technologies used to categorise or classify people on the basis of traits thought to be statistically related or correlated, however tenuously, with particular characteristics. For instance, biometric systems have been developed that attempt to infer people’s sexuality from their facial geometry, or judge criminality from pictures of people’s faces. Other biometric classification systems attempt to judge people’s internal emotional state or intentions from their biometrics, such as tone, voice, gait or facial expressions, known as emotion recognition. For example, employers have used facial expression and tone analysis to decide who should be selected for a job, using biometric technologies to score candidates on characteristics such as enthusiasm, willingness to learn, conscientiousness and responsibility, and personal stability.
Members of the Citizens’ Biometrics Council convened by the Ada Lovelace Institute in 2020 to build a deeper understanding of the British public’s views on biometric technologies have expressed concerns about these use cases. Members suggest that these technologies classify people according to reductive, ableist and stereotypical characteristics, harming people’s wellbeing and risking characterisation in a database or data-driven systems. Further, these cases often use pseudoscientific assumptions to draw links between external features and other traits, meaning that the underlying bases of these technologies are often not valid, reliable or accurate. For example, significant evidence suggests that it is not possible accurately to infer emotion from facial expressions. Despite that, existing data protection law would not consider biometric data collected for those purposes to be special category data, and would therefore not give data subjects the highest levels of safeguards in these contexts.
Sir John Whittingdale
Clause 106 makes changes to the national DNA database strategy board, which provides oversight of the operation of the national DNA database, including setting policies for access and use by the police. Amendment 119 would seem to extend the power to widen the board’s potential scope beyond biometrics databases for the purpose of identification, to include the purpose of classification.
The police can process data only for policing purposes. It is not clear what policing purpose there would be in being able to classify, for example, emotions or gender, even assuming it was proven to be scientifically robust, or what sort of data would be on such a database. Even if one were developed in the future, it is likely to need knowledge, skills and resources very different from what is needed to oversee a database that identifies and eliminates suspects based on biometric identification, so it would probably make sense for a different body to carry out any oversight.
New clause 8 aims to make changes in a similar way to amendment 119 in relation to the definition of biometric data for the purposes of article 9 of the GDPR. As the GDPR is not concerned with the police’s use of biometric data for law enforcement purposes, the new clause would apply to organisations that are processing biometric data for general purposes. The aim seems to be to ensure that enhanced protections afforded by GDPR to biometric data used for unique identification purposes also apply to biometric data that is used for classification or categorisation purposes.
The hon. Lady referred to the Ada Lovelace Institute’s comments on these provisions, and its 2022 “Countermeasures” report issued on biometric technologies, but we are not convinced that such a change is necessary. One example in the report was using algorithms to make judgments that prospective employees are bored or not paying attention, based on their facial expressions or tone of voice. Using biometric data to draw inferences about people, using algorithms or otherwise, is not as invasive as using biometric data uniquely to identify someone. For example, biometric identification could include matching facial images caught on closed circuit television to a centrally held database of known offenders.
Furthermore, using biometric data for classification or categorisation purposes is still subject to the general data protection principles in the UK GDPR. That includes ensuring that there is a lawful ground for the processing, that the processing is necessary and proportionate, and is fair and transparent to the individuals concerned. If algorithms are used to categorise and make significant decisions about people based on their biometric characteristics, including in an employment context, they will have the right to be given information about the decision, and to obtain human intervention, as a result of the measures we previously debated in clause 11.
Therefore, we do see a distinction between the use of biometric information for identification purposes and the more general classification which the hon. Lady sought to draw. Though we believe that there is sufficient safeguard already in place regarding possible use of classification by biometric data, given what I have said, I hope that she will consider withdrawing the amendment.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the Minister for his comments. We will be speaking about the private uses of biometric data later, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sir John Whittingdale
DNA and fingerprints are key tools in helping the police to identify and eliminate suspects quickly and accurately by comparing evidence left at crime scenes with the appropriate files on the national databases. As I previously set out, clause 106 makes changes to the National DNA Database Strategy Board. The board provides oversight of the operation of the database, including setting policies for access and use by the police.
These reforms change the scope of the board to make it clear that they should provide similar oversight of the police fingerprint database, which operates under similar rules. The change brings the legislation up to date with the board’s recently published governance rules. Clause 106 also updates the name of the board to the Forensic Information Databases Strategy Board, to better reflect the broadened scope of its work. We are also taking this opportunity to simplify and future-proof oversight of national police biometric databases. While DNA and fingerprints are well established, biometrics is an area of rapid technological development, including for example the growing use of iris, face and voice recognition. Given the pace of technological change in this area and the benefits of consistent oversight, Clause 106 also includes a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations which make changes to the board’s scope, for example by adding new biometric databases into the board’s remit or to remove them, where a database is no longer used. Such regulations would be subject to the affirmative procedure.
For these reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 106 will primarily increase the scope of the Forensic Information Databases Strategy Board to provide oversight of the national fingerprint database. However, there are also provisions enabling the Secretary of State to add or remove a biometric database that the board oversees, using the affirmative procedure. I would therefore like to ask the Minister whether they have any plans to use these powers regarding any particular databases—or whether this is intended as a measure for future-proofing the Bill in the case of changed circumstances?
I would also like to refer hon. Members to the remarks that I have made throughout the Bill that emphasise a need for caution when transferring the ability to change regulation further into the hands of the Secretary of State alone.
Sir John Whittingdale
I would add only that this is an area where technology is moving very fast, as I referred to earlier. We think it is right to put in place this provision, to allow an extension if it becomes necessary—though I do not think we have any current plans. It is future-proofing of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 106 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 107
Regulations
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Sir John Whittingdale
Clause 107 will give the Secretary of State a regulation-making power to make consequential amendments to other legislation. The power enables amendments to this Bill itself where such amendments are consequential to the abolition of the Information Commissioner and his replacement by the new Information Commission. Such provision is needed because there are a number of areas where data protection legislation will need to be updated as a consequence of the Bill. This is a standard power, commonly included in Bills to ensure that wider legislation is updated where necessary as a result of new legislation. For example, references to “the Commissioner” in the Data Protection Act 2018 will no longer be accurate, given changes to the governance structure of the Information Commissioner’s Office within the Bill, so consequential amendments will be required to that Act.
Clause 108 outlines the form and procedure for making regulations under the powers in the Bill: they are to be made by statutory instrument. Where regulations in the Bill are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, they may not be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House. That provision is needed because the Bill introduces new regulation-making powers, which are necessary to support the Bill’s policy objectives. For example, powers in part 3 of the Bill replace an existing statutory framework with a new, enhanced one.
Clause 109 explains the meaning of references to “the 2018 Act” and “the UK GDPR” in the Bill. Such provision is needed to explain the meaning of those two references. Clause 110 authorises expenditure arising from the Bill. That provision is needed to confirm that Parliament will fund any expenditure incurred under the Bill by the Secretary of State, the Treasury or a Government Department. It requires a money resolution and a Ways and Means resolution, both of which were passed in the House of Commons on 17 April.
Clause 111 outlines the territorial extent of the Bill. Specifically, the clause states that the Bill extends to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, with some exceptions. Much of the Bill, including everything on data protection, is reserved policy. In areas where the Bill legislates on devolved matters, we are working with the devolved Administrations to secure legislative consent motions. Clause 112 gives the Secretary of State a regulation-making power to bring the Bill’s provisions into force. Some provisions, listed in subsection (2), come into force on the date of Royal Assent. Other provisions, listed in subsection (3), come into force two months after Royal Assent. Such provision is needed to outline when the Bill’s provisions will come into force.
Clause 113 gives the Secretary of State a regulation-making power to make transitional, transitory or saving provisions that may be needed in connection with any of the Bill’s provisions coming into force. For example, provision might be required to clarify that the Information Commissioner’s new power to refuse to act on complaints will not apply where such complaints have already been made prior to commencement of the relevant provision. Clause 114 outlines the short title of the Bill. That provision is needed to confirm the title once the Bill has been enacted. I commend clauses 107 to 114 to the Committee.
Stephanie Peacock
The clauses set out the final technical provisions necessary in order for the Bill to be passed and enacted effectively, and for the most part are standard. I will focus briefly on clause 107, however, as a number of stakeholders including the Public Law Project have expressed concern that, as a wide Henry VIII power, it may give the Secretary of State the power to make further sweeping changes to data protection law. Can the Minister provide some assurance that the clause will allow for the creation only of further provisions that are genuinely consequential to the Bill and necessary for its proper enactment?
It is my belief that this would not have been such a concern to civil society groups had there not been multiple occasions throughout the Bill when the Secretary of State made grabs for power, concentrating the ability to make further changes to data protection legislation in their own hands. I am disappointed, though of course not surprised, that the Government have not accepted any of my amendments to help to mitigate those powers with checks and balances involving the commissioner. However, keeping the clause alone in mind, I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the powers in clause 107 will be restricted and used.
Sir John Whittingdale
We have previously debated the efficacy of the affirmative resolution procedure. I recognise that the hon. Lady is not convinced about how effective it is in terms of parliamentary scrutiny; we will beg to differ on that point. Although the power in clause 107 allows the Secretary of State to amend Acts of Parliament, I can confirm that that is just to ensure the legal clarity of the text. Without that power, data protection legislation would be harder to interpret, thereby reducing people’s understanding of the legislation and their ability to rely on the law.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 107 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 108
Regulations
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
In order for the public to have trust in algorithmic decision making, particularly where used by the Government, they must be able to understand how and when it is being used as a basic minimum. That is something that the Government themselves previously recognised by including a proposal to make transparency reporting on the use of algorithms in decision making for public sector bodies compulsory in their “Data: a new direction” consultation. Indeed, the Government have already made good progress on bringing together a framework that will make that reporting possible. The algorithmic transparency recording standard they have built provides a decent, standardised way of recording and sharing information about how the public sector uses algorithmic tools. There is also full guidance to accompany the standard, giving public sector bodies a clear understanding of how to complete transparency reports, as well as a compilation of pilot reports that have already been published, providing a bank of examples.
However, despite that and the majority of consultation respondents agreeing with the proposed compulsory reporting for public sector bodies—citing benefits of increased trust, accountability and accessibility for the public—the Government chose not to go ahead with the legislative change. Relying on self-regulation in the early stages of the scheme is understandable, but having conducted successful pilots, from the Cabinet Office to West Midlands police, it is unclear why the Government now choose not to commit to the very standard they created. This is a clear missed opportunity, with the standard running the risk of failing altogether if there is no legislative requirement to use it.
As the use of such algorithms grows, particularly considering further changes contained in clause 11, transparency around Government use of big data and automated decision-making tools will only increase in importance and value—people have a right to know how they are being governed. As the Public Law Project argues, transparency also has a consequential value; it facilitates democratic consensus building about the appropriate use of new technologies, and it allows for full accountability when things go wrong.
Currently, in place of that accountability, the Public Law Project has put together its own register called “Tracking Automated Government”, or TAG. Using mostly freedom of information requests, the register tracks the use of 42 algorithmic tools and rates their transparency. Of the 42, just one ranked as having high transparency. Among those with low transparency are asylum estates analysis, used to help the Home Office decide where asylum interviews should take place, given the geographical distribution of asylum seekers across the asylum estate; the general matching service and fraud referral and intervention management system, used as part of the efforts of the Department for Work and Pensions to combat benefit fraud and error—for example, by identifying claimants who may potentially have undisclosed capital or other income; and housing management systems, such as that in Wigan Metropolitan Borough Council, which uses a points-based system to prioritise social housing waiting lists.
We all want to see Government modernising and using new technology to increase efficiency and outcomes, but if an algorithmic tool impacts our asylum applications, our benefits system and the ability of people to gain housing, the people affected by those decisions deserve at the very least to know how they are being made. If the public sector sets the right example, private companies may choose to follow in the future, helping to improve transparency even further. The framework is ready to go and the benefits are clear; the amendment would simply make progress certain by bringing it forward as part of the legislative agenda. It is time that we gave people the confidence in public use of algorithms that they deserve.
Sir John Whittingdale
I thank the hon. Member for Barnsley East for moving new clause 9. We completely share her wish to ensure that Government and public authorities provide transparency in the way they use algorithmic tools that process personal data, especially when they are used to make decisions affecting members of the public.
The Government have made it our priority to ensure that transparency is being provided through the publication of the algorithmic transparency recording standard. That has been developed to assist public sector organisations in documenting and communicating their use of algorithms in decision making that impacts members of the public. The focus of the standard is to provide explanations of the decisions taken using automated processing of data by an algorithmic system, rather than all data processing.
The standard has been endorsed by the Government’s Data Standards Authority, which recommends the standards, guidance and other resources that Government Departments should follow when working on data projects. Publishing the standard fulfils commitments made in both the national data strategy 2020 and the national artificial intelligence strategy. Since its publication, the standard has been piloted with a variety of public sector organisations across the UK, and the published records can be openly accessed via gov.uk. It is currently being rolled out more widely across the public sector.
Although the Government have made it a priority to advance work on algorithmic transparency, the algorithmic transparency recording standard is still a maturing standard that is being progressively promoted and adopted. It is evolving alongside policy thinking and Government understanding of the complexities, scope and risks around its use. We believe that enshrining the standard into law at this point of maturity could hinder the ability to ensure that it remains relevant in a rapidly developing technology field.
Therefore, although the Government sympathise with the intention behind the new clause, we believe it is best to continue with the current roll-out across the public sector. We remain committed to advancing algorithmic transparency, but we do not intend to take forward legislative change at this time. For that reason, I am unable to accept the new clause as proposed by the Opposition.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the Minister, but I am still confused about why, having developed the standard, the Government are not keen to put it into practice and into law. He just said that he wants to keep it relevant; he could use some of the secondary legislation that he is particularly keen on if he accepted the new clause. As I outlined, this issue has real-life consequences, whether for housing, asylum or benefits. In my constituency, many young people were affected by the exam algorithm scandal. For those reasons, I would like to push the new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Overall, the aim of the GDPR is to ensure the effective and complete protection of data subjects. That protection cannot be considered effective or complete if people cannot seek justice, remedy and repair if an organisation processes personal data unlawfully. Therefore, there must be suitable methods of redress for all data and decision subjects in any suitable data protection regime. Bringing any kind of legal case is not something people take lightly. Cases can be lengthy, costly and, in many lower-level cases, seem disproportionate to the loss suffered or remedy available. That is no different in cases surrounding the misuse of personal data.
As the law stands, article 80(1) of the EU GDPR has been implemented in the UK, meaning a data subject has the right to mandate a not-for-profit body or organisation to lodge a complaint on their behalf. That means, for example, a charity can help an individual to bring forward a case where they have been materially impacted by a data breach. Such provisions help to ensure that those who have suffered an infringement can be supported in lodging a claim, and are not disincentivised by a lack of understanding, resources or cost. However, the UK has not yet adopted article 80(2), which goes one step further, allowing those same organisations to lodge a complaint independently of a data subject’s mandate.
Sir John Whittingdale
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for setting out the purposes of the new clause. As she has described, it aims to require the Secretary of State to use regulation-making powers under section 190 of the Data Protection Act to implement article 80(2) of the UK GDPR. It would enable non-profit organisations with an expertise in data protection law to make complaints to the Information Commissioner and/or take legal action against data controllers without the specific authorisation of the individuals who have been affected by data breaches. Relevant non-profit organisations can already take such actions on behalf of individuals who have specifically authorised them to do so under provisions in article 80(1) of the UK GDPR.
In effect, the amendment would replace the current discretionary powers in section 190 of the Data Protection Act with a duty for the Secretary of State to legislate to bring those provisions into force soon after the Bill has received Royal Assent. Such an amendment would be undesirable for a number of reasons. First, as required under section 189 of the Data Protection Act, we have already consulted and reported to Parliament on proposals of that nature, and we concluded that there was not a strong enough case for introducing new legislation.
Although the Government’s report acknowledged that some groups in society might find it difficult to complain to the ICO or bring legal proceedings of their own accord, it pointed out that the regulator can and does investigate complaints raised by civil society groups even when they are not made on behalf of named individuals. Big Brother Watch’s recent complaints about the use of live facial recognition technology in certain shops in the south of England is an example of that.
Secondly, the response concluded that giving non-profit organisations the right to bring compensation claims against data controllers on behalf of individuals who had not authorised them to do so could prompt the growth of US-style lawsuits on behalf of thousands or even millions of customers at a time. In the event of a successful claim, each individual affected by the alleged breach could be eligible for a very small payout, but the consequences for the businesses could be hugely damaging, particularly in cases that involved little tangible harm to individuals.
Some organisations could be forced out of business or prompted to increase prices to recoup costs. The increase in litigation costs could also increase insurance premiums. A hardening in the insurance market could affect all data controllers, including those with a good record of compliance. For those reasons, we do not believe that it is right to extend the requirement on the Secretary of State to allow individuals to bring actions without the consent of those affected. On that basis, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the motion.
Stephanie Peacock
Data is increasingly used to make decisions about us as a collective, so it is important that GDPR gives us collective rights to reflect that, rather than the system being designed only for individuals to seek redress. For those reasons, I will press my new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Privacy enhancing technologies are technologies and techniques that can help organisations to share and use people’s data responsibly, lawfully and securely. They work most often by minimising the amount of data used, maximising data security—for example by encrypting or anonymising personal information—or empowering individuals. One of the best-known examples of a PET is synthetic data: data that is modelled to reproduce the statistical properties of a real dataset when taken as a whole. That type of data could allow third-party researchers or processors to analyse the statistical outcomes of the data without having access to the original set of personal data, or any information about identifiable living individuals.
Another example of PETs are those that minimise the amount of personal data that is shared without affecting the data’s utility. Federated learning, for example, allows for the training of an algorithm across multiple devices or datasets held on servers, so if an organisation wants to train a machine-learning model but has limited training data available, they can send the model to a remote dataset for training. The model will then return having benefited from those datasets, while the sensitive data itself is not exchanged or ever put in the hands of those in ownership of the algorithm. The use of PETs therefore does not necessarily exclude data from being defined as personal or falling within the remit of GDPR. They can, however, help to minimise the risk that arises from personal data breaches and provide an increased level of security.
The Government have positioned the Bill as one that seeks to strengthen the data rights of citizens while catalysing innovation. PETs could and should have been a natural area for the Bill to explore, because not only can such devices help controllers demonstrate an approach based on data protection by design and default, but they can open the door for new ways of collaborating, innovating and researching with data. The Royal Society has researched the role that PETs can play in data governance and collaboration in immense detail, with its findings contained in its 2023 report, which is more than 100 pages long. One of the report’s key recommendations was that the Government should develop a national PET strategy to promote their responsible use as tools for advancing scientific research, increasing security and offering new partnership possibilities, both domestically and across borders.
It is vital to acknowledge that working with PETs involves risks that must be considered. Some may not be robust enough against attacks because they are in the early stages of development, while others might require a significant amount of expertise to operate, without which their use may be counterproductive. It is therefore important to be clear that the amendment would not jump ahead and endorse any particular technology or device before it was ready. Instead, it would enshrine the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity definition of PETs in UK law and prompt the Government to issue a report on how that growing area of technology might play a role in data processing and data regulation in future.
That could include identifying the opportunities that PETs could provide while also looking at the threats and potential harms involved in using the technologies without significant expertise or technological readiness. Indeed, in their consultation response, the Government even mentioned they were keen to explore opportunities around smart data, while promoting understanding that they should not be seen as a substitute for reducing privacy risks on an organisational level. The report, and the advancing of the amendment, would allow the Government that exploration, indicating a positive acknowledgment of the potentially growing role that PETs might play in data processing and opening the door for further research in the area.
Even by their name, privacy enhancing technologies reflect exactly what the Bill should be doing: looking to the future to encourage innovation in tech and then using such innovation to protect citizens in return. I hope hon. Members will see those technologies’ potential value and the importance of analysing any harms, and look to place the requirement to analyse PETs on the statute book.
Sir John Whittingdale
We absolutely agree with the Opposition about the importance of privacy enhancing technologies, which I will call PETs, since I spoke on them recently and was told that was the best abbreviation—it is certainly easier. We wish to see their use by organisations to help ensure compliance with data protection principles and we seek to encourage that. As part of our work under the national data strategy, we are already exploring the macro-impacts of PETs and how they can unlock data across the economy.
The ICO has recently published its draft guidance on anonymisation, pseudonymisation and PETs, which explains the benefits and different types of PETs currently available, as well as how they can help organisations comply with data protection law. In addition, the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation has published an adoption guide to aid decision making around the use of PETs in data-driven projects. It has also successfully completed delivery of UK-US prize challenges to drive innovation in PETs that reinforce democratic values. Indeed, I was delighted to meet some of the participants in those prize challenges at the Royal Society yesterday and hear a little more about some of their remarkable innovations.
As the hon. Lady mentioned, the Royal Society has published reports on how PETs can maximise the benefit and reduce the harms associated with data use. Adding a definition of PETs to the legislation and requiring the Government to publish a report six months after Royal Assent is unlikely to have many advantages over the approach that the ICO, the CDEI and others are taking to develop a better understanding in the area. Furthermore, many PETs are still in the very early stages of their deployment and use, and have not been widely adopted across the UK or globally. A statutory definition could quickly become outdated. Publishing a comprehensive report on the potential impacts of PETs, which advocated the use of one technology or another, could even distort a developing market, and lead to unintended negative impacts on the development of what are promising technologies. For that reason, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the Minister for his clarification on the pronunciation of the acronym. I acknowledge the points he made. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 13
Oversight of biometric technology use by the Information Commission
‘(1) The Information Commission must establish a Biometrics Office.
(2) The Biometrics Office is to consist of a committee of three commissioners with relevant expertise, appointed by the Commission.
(3) The functions of the Biometrics Office are—
(a) to establish and maintain a public register of relevant entities engaged in processing biometric data;
(b) to oversee and review the biometrics use of relevant entities;
(c) to produce a Code of Practice for the use of biometric technology by registered parties, which must include—
(i) compulsory standards of accuracy and reliability for biometric technologies,
(ii) a requirement for the proportionality of biometrics use to be assessed prior to use and annually thereafter, and a procedure for such assessment, and
(iii) a procedure for individual complaints about the use of biometrics by registered parties;
(d) to receive and publish annual reports from all relevant entities, which must include the relevant entity’s proportionality assessment of their biometrics use;
(e) to enforce registration and reporting by the issuing of enforcement notices and, where necessary, the imposition of fines for non-compliance with the registration and reporting requirements;
(f) to ensure lawfulness of biometrics use by relevant entities, including issuing compliance and abatement notices where necessary.
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations add to the responsibilities of the Biometrics Office.
(5) Regulations made under subsection (4) are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
(6) For the purposes of this Part—
“biometric data” has the meaning given by section 106 of this Act (see subsection 13);
“relevant entity” means any organisation or body corporate (whether public or private) which processes biometric data, other than where the biometric processing undertaken by the organisation or body corporate is otherwise overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, because it is—
(a) for the purposes of making or renewing a national security determination as defined by s.20(2) Protection of Freedoms Act 2012; or
(b) for the purposes set out in s.20(6) Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.’.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This new clause, together with NC14 and NC15, are intended to form a new Part of the Bill which creates a mechanism for the Information Commission to oversee biometric technology use by private parties.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 14—Requirement to register with the Information Commission—
‘(1) Any relevant entity intending to process biometric data for purposes other than those contained in section 20(2) and section 20(6) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 must register with the Information Commission prior to the deployment of the biometric technology.
(2) An application for registration must include an explanation of the intended biometrics use, including an assessment of its proportionality and its extent.
(3) All relevant entities must provide an annual report to the Biometrics Office addressing their processing of biometric data in the preceding year and their intended processing of biometrics in the following year .
(4) Each annual report must contain a proportionality assessment of the relevant entity’s processing of biometric data in the preceding year and intended processing of biometric data in the following year.
(5) Any relevant entity which processes biometric data without having registered with the Information Commission, or without providing annual reports to the Biometrics Office, is liable to an unlimited fine imposed by the Information Commission.’
See explanatory statement to NC13.
New clause 15—Private biometrics use prior to entry into force of the Act—
‘Any relevant entity engaged in processing biometric data other than for the purposes contained in section 20(2) and section 20(6) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 prior to the entry into force of this Part must register with the Information Commission in accordance with section [Requirement to register with the Information Commission] within six months of the date of entry into force of this Part; and subsection (5) of that section does not apply to such an entity during that period.’
See explanatory statement to NC13. This new clause would provide a transitional period of six months for entities which were already engaged in the processing of biometric data to register with the Commission.
Stephanie Peacock
A wider range of biometric data is now being collected than ever before. From data on the way we walk and talk to the facial expressions we make, biometric data is now being collected and used in a wide range of situations for many distinct purposes. Great attention has rightly been paid to police use of facial recognition technology to identify individuals, for example at football matches or protests. Indeed, to date, much of the regulatory attention has focused on those use cases, which are overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. However, the use of biometric technologies extends far beyond those examples, and there has been a proliferation of biometrics designed by private organisations to be used across day-to-day life—not just in policing.
We unlock smartphones with our faces or fingerprints, and companies have proposed using facial expression analysis to detect whether students are paying attention in online classes. Employers have used facial expression and tone analysis to decide who should be selected for a job—as was already mentioned in reference to new clause 8. As the proliferation of biometric technologies occurs, a number of issues have been raised about their impact on people and society. Indeed, if people’s identities can be detected by both public and private actors at any given point, there is potential for it to significantly infringe on someone’s privacy to move through the world with freedom of expression, association and assembly. Similarly, if people’s traits, characteristics or abilities can be automatically assessed on the basis of biometrics, often without a scientific basis, it may affect free expression and the development of personality.
Public attitudes research carried out by the Ada Lovelace Institute shows that the British public recognise the potential benefits of tools such as facial recognition in certain circumstances—for example, smartphone locking systems and in airports—but often reject their use in others. Large majorities are opposed to the use of facial recognition in shops, schools and on public transport, as well as by human resources departments in recruitment. In all cases, the public expect the use of biometrics to be accompanied by safeguards and limitations, such as appropriate transparency and accountability measures.
Members of the citizens’ biometrics council, convened by the Ada Lovelace Institute in 2020 and made up of 50 members of the public, expressed the view that biometric technologies as currently used are lacking in transparency and accountability. In particular, safeguards are uneven across sectors. Private use of biometrics are not currently subject to the same level of regulatory oversight or due process as is afforded within the criminal justice system, despite also having the potential to create changes of life-affecting significance. As a result, one member of the council memorably asked:
“If the technology companies break their promises…what will the implications be? Who’s going to hold them to account?”
It is with those issues in mind that experts and legal opinion seem all to come to the same consistent conclusion that, at the moment, there is not a sufficient legal framework in place to manage the unique issues that the private proliferation of biometrics use raises. An independent legal review, commissioned by the Ada Lovelace Institute and led by Matthew Ryder KC, found that current governance structures and accountability mechanisms for biometrics are fragmented, unclear and ineffective. Similar findings have been made by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, and Select Committees in this House and in the other place.
The Government, however, have not yet acted on delivering a legal framework to govern the use of biometric technology by private corporations, meaning that the Bill is a missed opportunity. New clause 13 therefore seeks to move towards the creation of that framework, providing for the Information Commission to oversee the use of biometric technology by private parties, and ensure accountability around it. I hope that the Committee see the value of this oversight and what it could provide and will support the new clause.
Sir John Whittingdale
New clause 13 would require the Information Commission to establish a new separate statutory biometrics office with responsibility for the oversight and regulation of biometric data and technology. However, the Information Commissioner already has responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the processing of biometric data, as it falls within the definition of personal data. Under the Bill, the new body corporate—the Information Commission—will continue to monitor and enforce the processing of all personal data under the data protection legislation, including biometric data. Indeed, with its new independent board and governance structure, the commission will enjoy greater diversity in skills and decision making, ensuring that the regulator has the right blend of skills and expertise at the very top of the organisation.
Furthermore, the Bill allows the new Information Commission to establish committees, which may include specialists from outside the organisation with key skills and expertise in specialist areas. As such, the Government are of the firm view that the Information Commission is best placed to provide regulatory oversight of biometric data, rather than delegating responsibility and functions to a separate office. The creation of a new body would likely cause confusion for those seeking redress, by creating novel complaints processes for biometric-related complaints, as set out in new clause 13(3)(c)(iii). It would also complicate regulatory oversight and decision making by providing the new office with powers to impose fines, as per subsection (2)(e). For those reasons, I encourage the hon. Lady to withdraw her new clause.
New clauses 14 and 15 would require non-law enforcement bodies that process biometric data about individuals to register with the Information Commissioner before the processing begins. Where the processing started prior to passage of the Bill, the organisation would need to register within six months of commencement. As part of the registration process, the organisation would have to explain the intended effect of the processing and provide annual updates to the Information Commissioner’s Office on current and future processing activities. Organisations that fail to comply with these requirements would be subject to an unlimited fine.
I appreciate that the new clauses aim to make sure that organisations will give careful thought to the necessity and proportionality of their processing activities, and to improve regulatory oversight, but they could have significant unintended consequences. As the hon. Lady will be aware, there are many everyday uses of biometrics data, such as using a thumbprint to access a phone, laptop or other connected device. Such services would always ask for the user’s explicit consent and make alternatives such as passwords available to customers who would prefer not to part with their biometric data.
If every organisation that launched a new product had to register with the Information Commissioner to explain its intentions and complete annual reports, that could place significant and unnecessary new burdens on businesses and undermine the aims of the Bill. Where the use of biometric data is more intrusive, perhaps involving surveillance technology to identify specific individuals, the processing will already be subject to the heightened safeguards in article 9 of the UK GDPR. The processing would need to be necessary and proportionate on the grounds of substantial public interest.
The Bill will also require organisations to designate a senior responsible individual to manage privacy risks, act as a contact point for the regulator, undertake risk assessments and keep records in relation to high-risk processing activities. It would be open to the regulator to request to see these documents if members of the public expressed concern about the use of the technology.
I hope my response has helped to address the issues the hon. Lady was concerned about, and I would respectfully ask her to not to press these new clauses.
Stephanie Peacock
It does indeed provide reassurance. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chair
We now come to the big moment for the hon. Member for Loughborough. Weeks of anticipation are now at an end. I call her to move new clause 16.
New Clause 16
Processing of data in relation to a case-file prepared by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision
‘(1) The 2018 Act is amended in accordance with subsection (2).
(2) In the 2018 Act, after section 40 insert—
“40A Processing of data in relation to a case-file prepared by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision
(1) This section applies to a set of processing operations consisting of the preparation of a case-file by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision, the making of a charging decision by the Crown Prosecution Service, and the return of the case-file by the Crown Prosecution Service to the police service after a charging decision has been made.
(2) The police service is not obliged to comply with the first data protection principle except insofar as that principle requires processing to be fair, or the third data protection principle, in preparing a case-file for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision.
(3) The Crown Prosecution Service is not obliged to comply with the first data protection principle except insofar as that principle requires processing to be fair, or the third data protection principle, in making a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service.
(4) If the Crown Prosecution Service decides that a charge will not be pursued when it makes a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service it must take all steps reasonably required to destroy and delete all copies of the case-file in its possession.
(5) If the Crown Prosecution Service decides that a charge will be pursued when it makes a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service it must return the case-file to the police service and take all steps reasonably required to destroy and delete all copies of the case-file in its possession.
(6) Where the Crown Prosecution Service decides that a charge will be pursued when it makes a charging decision on a case-file submitted for that purpose by the police service and returns the case-file to the police service under subsection (5), the police service must comply with the first data protection principle and the third data protection principle in relation to any subsequent processing of the data contained in the case-file.
(7) For the purposes of this section—
(a) The police service means—
(i) constabulary maintained by virtue of an enactment, or
(ii) subject to section 126 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (prison staff not to be regarded as in police service), any other service whose members have the powers or privileges of a constable.
(b) The preparation of, or preparing, a case-file by the police service for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision includes the submission of the file.
(c) A case-file includes all information obtained by the police service for the purpose of preparing a case-file for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision.”’ —(Jane Hunt.)
This new clause adjusts Section 40 of the Data Protection Act 2018 to exempt the police service and the Crown Prosecution Service from the first and third data protection principles contained within the 2018 Act so that they can share unredacted data with one another when making a charging decision.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Jane Hunt (Loughborough) (Con)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to speak before you today, Mr Hollobone, and to move my new clause. I recently met members of the Leicestershire Police Federation, who informed me of its concerns regarding part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018, which imposes unnecessary and burdensome redaction obligations on the police and taking them away from the frontline. I thank the Police Federation for providing me with the information I am going to discuss and for drafting the new clause I have tabled.
Part 3 of the 2018 Act implemented the law enforcement directive and made provision for data processing by competent authorities, including police forces and the Crown Prosecution Service, for “law enforcement purposes”.
Although recital (4) to the law enforcement directive emphasised that the
“free flow of personal data between competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences…should be facilitated while ensuring a high level of protection of personal data,”
part 3 of the 2018 Act contains no provision at all to facilitate the free flow of personal data between the police and the CPS. Instead, it imposes burdensome obligations on the police, requiring them to redact personal data from information transferred to the CPS. Those obligations are only delaying and obstructing the expeditious progress of the criminal justice system and were not even mandated by the law enforcement directive.
The problem has arisen due to chapter 2 of part 3 of the 2018 Act, which sets out six data protection principles that, as I have mentioned, apply to data processing by competent authorities for law enforcement purposes. Section 35(1) states:
“The first data protection principle is that the processing of personal data for any of the law enforcement purposes must be lawful and fair.”
Section 35(2) states:
“The processing of personal data for any of the law enforcement purposes is lawful only if and to the extent that it is based on law and either—
(a) the data subject has given consent to the processing for that purpose, or
(b) the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for that purpose by a competent authority.”
The Police Federation has said that it is very unlikely that section 35(2)(a) will apply in this context. It has also said that, in the case of section 35(2)(b), the test of whether the processing is “necessary” is exacting, requiring a competent authority to apply its mind to the proportionality of processing specific items of personal data for the particular law enforcement purpose in question. Under sections 35(3) to (5), where the processing is “sensitive processing”, an even more rigorous test applies, requiring among other things that the processing is “strictly necessary” for the law enforcement purpose in question. Section 37 goes on to state:
“The third data protection principle is that personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which it is processed.”
For the purposes of the 2018 Act, the CPS and each police force are separate competent authorities and separate data controllers. Therefore, as set out in section 34(3), the CPS and each police force must comply with the data protection principles. A transfer of information by a police force to the CPS amounts to the processing of personal data.
The tests of “necessary” and “strictly necessary” under the first data protection principle and the third data protection principle require a competent authority to identify and consider each and every item of personal data contained within information that it is intending to process, and to consider whether it is necessary for that item of personal data to be processed in the manner intended.
The Police Federation has explained that, when the police prepare a case file for submission to the CPS for a charging decision, the practical effect is that they have to spend huge amounts of time and resources on doing so. They go through the information that has been gathered by investigating officers in order to identify every single item of personal data contained in that information; decide whether it is necessary—or, in many cases, strictly necessary—for the CPS to consider each item of personal data when making its charging decision; and redact every item of personal data that does not meet that test.
Stephanie Peacock
New clause 16 would amend section 40 of the Data Protection Act 2018, allowing police services to share unredacted data with the Crown Prosecution Service when it is making a charging decision. I am incredibly sympathetic to the aim that the hon. Member for Loughborough has set out, which is to get the police fighting crime on the frontline as much as possible. In oral evidence, Aimee Reed, director of data at the Metropolitan police, said that if the police could share information redacted before charging decisions were made, it would be “of considerable benefit”. She said that that would
“enable better and easier charging decisions”
and
“reduce the current burden on officers”––[Official Report, Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Public Bill Committee, 10 May 2023; c. 58, Q126.]
That would allow them to focus their time on other things. It is therefore good to see that concept being explored in a new clause.
To determine the value of the change, we would like to see a full impact assessment of the potential risks and harms associated with it. I hope that that could be conducted with the intention of weighing the change against the actual cost of the current burden that police face in redacting data. Without such an assessment, it is hard to determine whether the benefit to the police would be proportionate to the impact or harms that might occur as a result of the change, particularly for the subjects of data involved. That is not to say that any change would not be beneficial, but perhaps more detail could be explored with regard to the proposal.
As I believe that this is the final time that I will speak in this Committee, may I say a few words of thanks?
Stephanie Peacock
Okay, I will wait for the next Question. Thank you for your guidance, Mr Hollobone.
Sir John Whittingdale
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough, who has been assiduous in pursuing her point and has set out very clearly the purpose of her new clause. We share her wish to reduce unnecessary burdens on the police as much as possible. The new clause seeks to achieve that in relation to the preparation by police officers of pre-charge files, which is an issue that the National Police Chiefs’ Council has raised with the Home Office, as I think she knows.
This is a serious matter for our police forces, which estimate that about four hours is spent redacting a typical case file. They argue that reducing that burden would enable officers to spend more time on frontline policing. We completely understand the frustration that many officers feel about having to spend a huge amount of time on what they see as unnecessary redaction. I can assure my hon. Friend that the Home Office is working with partners in the criminal justice system to find ways of safely reducing the redaction burden while maintaining public trust. It is important that we give them the time to do so.
We need to resolve the issue through an evidence-based solution that will ensure that the right amount of redaction is done at the right point in the process, so as to reduce any delays while maintaining victim and witness confidence in the process. I assure my hon. Friend that her point is very well taken on board and the Government are looking at how we can achieve her objective as quickly as possible, but I hope she will accept that, at this point, it would be sensible to withdraw her new clause.
Jane Hunt
I thank the Minister greatly for what he has said, and for the time and effort that is being put in by several Departments to draw attention to the issue and bring it to a conclusion. I am happy that some progress has been made and, although I reserve my right to bring back the new clause at a later date, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chair
Hon. Members will be disappointed to hear that we have reached the final Question that I must put to the Committee.
Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.
Stephanie Peacock
It has been a real pleasure to represent His Majesty’s loyal Opposition in the scrutiny of the Bill. I thank the Minister for his courteous manner, all members of the Committee for their time, the Clerks for their work and the many stakeholders who have contributed their time, input and views. I conclude by thanking Anna Clingan, my senior researcher, who has done a remarkable amount of work to prepare for our scrutiny of this incredibly complex Bill. Finally, I thank you, Mr Hollobone, for the way in which you have chaired the Committee.
Sir John Whittingdale
May I join the hon. Lady in expressing thanks to you, Mr Hollobone, and to Mr Paisley for chairing the Bill Committee so efficiently and getting us to this point ahead of schedule? I thank all members of the Committee for their participation: we have been involved in what will be seen to be a very important piece of legislation.
I am very grateful to the Opposition for their support in principle for many of the objectives of the Bill. It is absolutely right that the Opposition scrutinise the detail, and the hon. Member for Barnsley East and her colleagues have done so very effectively. I am pleased that we have reached this point with the Bill so far unamended, but obviously we will be considering it further on Report.
I thank all my hon. Friends for attending the Committee and for their contributions, particularly saying “Aye” at the appropriate moments, which has allowed us to get to this point. I also thank the officials in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. I picked up this baton on day two of my new role covering the maternity leave of my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch and Upminster (Julia Lopez); I did so with some trepidation, but the officials have made my task considerably easier and I am hugely indebted to them.
I thank everybody for allowing us to get this point. I look forward to further debate on Report, in due course.
The Chair
May I thank all hon. Members for their forbearance during the passage of the Bill and thank all the officers of the House for their diligence and attention to duty? My one remaining humble observation is that if the day ever comes when a facial recognition algorithm is attached to the cameras in the main Chamber to assess whether Members are bored or not paying attention, we will all be in very big trouble.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.
Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)
Tuesday 23rd May 2023
(11 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Energy Act 2023 View all Energy Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 May 2023 - (23 May 2023)
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
I do not have anything much to say about clause 7 standing part. I will have some things to say about some of the clauses that follow, but the power to grant licences is pretty unexceptional, and we do not have anything to add or take away from the clause.
Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)
Unusually, I will speak for longer than the hon. Gentleman—I say that just as everybody was getting excited. I understand that clause 7 and subsequent clauses on granting licences and the economic models are critical to getting carbon capture up and running. Obviously, I want these provisions in place, but I ask the Minister for a bit more detail.
Clause 7 is all about the grant of licences, which is to be undertaken by the regulator. That will be Ofgem, as was said earlier in response to an intervention. The Minister assures us that it has the expertise and resource to do all the additional licensing work, but we discover in the explanatory notes for clause 7 that under clause 16, for an interim period, it is actually the Secretary of State who has responsibility for granting licences. Why is that? Why have the interim period? What expertise is available to the Secretary of State in-house when they are granting these licences? Who will oversee that? How long does the interim period last? From what I can see in schedule 1, it lasts until the Secretary of State passes regulations to end the interim period. I would like a bit more clarity on how long the interim period will last.
Is the interim period and the granting of licences by the Secretary of State a mechanism to speed up the grant of licences for track 1 projects that have already been selected by the Government? Does that not potentially give them an unfair financial advantage? The Minister touched, in his opening remarks, on competition for licensing and keeping everything competitive. How does he square these two things?
When does the Minister envisage the first licences being granted by the Secretary of State, and when does he envisage them being granted by the regulator? How will the licences that are issued in the interim period be compliant with clause 12, which is still to come and is all about standardisation? That helps to keep things competitive and transparent.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (Andrew Bowie)
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his multiple questions. Given the number of them, I will write to him with greater detail, but the point at which the Secretary of State’s power to grant licences is transferred to Ofgem will depend on developments in the market in the early years of the operation and the evolution of carbon capture, usage and storage. We are in the nascent stages of this technology. It is standard practice for the Secretary of State to have a power over something like this before it is transferred across to Ofgem. As I said, the timing will depend on market forces as the technology develops and matures.
The hon. Gentleman asked when the first licences will be granted. Licences will be granted to transport and storage operators for track 1 CCS clusters for deployment in the mid-2020s, subject to the final decision of Ministers. The final decisions on any Government support will be taken only if a CCS cluster represents value for money for the consumer and the taxpayer. He referred to subsequent clauses that deal with these issues directly; we will come to his other questions when we debate those clauses, and I will be happy to engage in more detail then.
Alan Brown
What is going on when it comes to the Department and Ofgem building up and sharing expertise? They are both looking at licensing. As the Minister said, with this nascent technology, there is a whole ramping up, so we need to ensure that the right resource is allocated to the right place to move forward.
Andrew Bowie
I completely agree. We will share expertise with Ofgem as we move forward. This is a whole new technology being deployed in the United Kingdom, and the expertise being developed in the Department will of course be shared with Ofgem, so that when the regulator takes responsibility for licensing, it will have at its fingertips the ability to conduct the processes properly.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Power to create licence types
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Bowie
The clause enables different types of carbon dioxide transport and storage licences to be granted. That will enable the economic licensing framework for carbon dioxide transport and storage to evolve as the market grows and matures.
For the first carbon dioxide transport and storage networks, a cluster-based approach is being taken. Under that approach, the licences for the first transport and storage networks are expected to cover the full network, which includes a set of onshore pipelines, the offshore pipeline and associated offshore storage facilities. As the market matures, however, we recognise that it may become desirable to licence separately constituent parts of a network, such as an onshore pipeline network or an offshore geological storage site. It may be appropriate for licence conditions to look quite different for different transport and storage activities. Providing for that will allow operators to specialise in provision of different transport and storage services. The delegated power under the clause enables the regulatory regime to respond to market developments by allowing different licence types to be created and granted for different types of transport and storage facility. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Whitehead
My knees get worse as the afternoon goes on.
The clause is, as the Minister said, about the power to create a licence type. I appreciate that that is in the gift of the Secretary of State in the first instance; the power will be transferred subsequently, as we said when debating clause 7. This clause, however, appears to do two things, and possibly goes far wider than the Minister envisages. It allows for regulations so that
“different types of licence may be granted…in respect of different descriptions of activity falling within section 2(2).”
Clause 2(2), as we have discussed, defines activities that are prohibited if unlicensed. Those are:
“operating a site for the disposal of carbon dioxide by way of geological storage”;
and
“providing a service of transporting carbon dioxide by a licensable means of transportation”.
We mentioned the possibility of an amendment that would have covered carbon dioxide usage as well, as the Minister will be aware. The power under clause 8 would allow different licence types within that overall framework. As the Minister said, different activities may emerge. Various activities will fall well within clause 2(2), and others will be to the side of that.
As far as I can see, the power in clause 8 allows the Secretary of State to sweep up what is both central to and to the side of the activities in clause 2(2). That may be good for the Secretary of State, but it is not good for the companies developing carbon capture and storage, who are not sure whether this power will or will not sweep them up—they do not know. They are not sure whether the activity they are carrying out on the margins of the licensing arrangement is non-licensable, or will become licensable if and when the Secretary of State decides by regulation that different kinds of licences can be provided. A lot of that depends on what the regulations say. If they are broad, as this power to create licence types appears to be, companies will not have any assurances about what they are doing. When the regulations come out, they might prefer a menu of the different licence types in the Secretary of State’s mind.
I appreciate that we are in the realm of known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns, but a menu of different licence types that are reasonably close to licensability in the mind of the Secretary of State would be very helpful for companies operating in this sphere. Will they be more or less likely to need to apply for a license? Would the licensing situation hold up their activities in any way, or could they go ahead with what they were doing on the margins, not within the new license type? Could the Minister comment on what is in his mind about the regulations? Will he provide that menu? If so, what might it consist of?
Andrew Bowie
I thank the hon. Member for his questions. I do not think the former Defence Secretary of the United States would have expected to be mentioned so much in the UK’s Energy Bill Committee—we have talked about known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns. The hon. Member is correct: we are dealing with a lot of unknown unknowns when we talk about exactly how and when the industry and technology will develop. As they develop, a decision will be taken at an appropriate point about what will and will not be licensable, and what types of licence will and will not apply.
The hon. Member talks about the regulations and whether there will be a menu of options. Clarity is good for everyone, especially when developing a new technology and deciding whether to invest in carbon capture, usage and storage. We will be as clear as we can in regulations about what will and will not be licensable and what licences will apply. However, I would not like to be drawn at this stage on what will be in the regulations. That will be for Government and industry to work up together as we move toward the date when they will apply.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Procedure for licence applications
Dr Whitehead
I beg to move amendment 77, in clause 9, page 10, line 6, after “the Secretary of State” insert
“must ensure that licences are only granted to fit and proper persons, and”.
The aim of this amendment is to put the onus on the Secretary of State to personally deem the individual as “fit and proper”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 78, in clause 18, page 19, line 33, at end insert—
“(c) may only be transferred to a person the Secretary of State considers to be a fit and proper person for this purpose.”
The aim of this amendment is to put the onus on the Secretary of State to personally deem the individual as “fit and proper”.
Amendment 79, in clause 43, page 39, line 16, at end insert
“provided that the transferee is considered by the Secretary of State to be a fit and proper person for this purpose”.
The aim of this amendment is to put the onus on the Secretary of State to personally deem the individual as “fit and proper”.
Amendment 80, in clause 50, page 45, line 35, after “any” insert “fit and proper”.
The aim of this amendment is to put the onus on the Secretary of State to personally deem the individual as “fit and proper”.
Amendment 82, in clause 61, page 54, line 16, after “given to a” insert “fit and proper”.
The aim of this amendment is to put the onus on the Secretary of State to personally deem the individual as “fit and proper”.
Amendment 83, in clause 61, page 55, line 5, at end insert
“provided that the transferee is considered by the Secretary of State to be a fit and proper person for this purpose”.
This amendment refers specifically to the need for the hydrogen counter party to be a fit and proper person. The aim of this amendment is to put the onus on the Secretary of State to personally deem the individual as “fit and proper”.
Amendment 87, in clause 82, page 71, line 42, at end insert—
“(l) for the certification by the Secretary of State that the transferee is a fit and proper person.”
If the Secretary of State needs to find a new counterparty this amendment obligates that they must ensure they are a fit and proper person.
Dr Whitehead
Amendment 77 concerns licences being granted to fit and proper persons; the other amendments relate to matters such as the transfer of licences. Members may think that the application of the term “fit and proper” to licensing arrangements is pretty obscure, but I will try to disabuse them of that notion. The term “fit and proper” can apply to both a real person and a person in law, which can be a company or an organisation. It appears in a number of laws and regulations where the Government or a regulator have a responsibility for appointing or licensing individuals or companies.
Andrew Bowie
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his amendments. They seek to place responsibility on the Secretary of State to ensure that individuals obtaining a carbon dioxide transfer and storage licence are fit and proper. The amendments would affect the licence application, the licence transfer, the special administrative regime and transfer schemes.
It is clear that the Opposition and the Government share the same desire here, requiring the utmost standards for those wishing to engage in the transport and storage of carbon dioxide, in support of the Government’s ambitions to scale up the deployment of CCUS and its important role of achieving our net zero target. I therefore support the hon. Member for Southampton, Test’s aim; however, as addressed in the other place, the specific inclusion of “fit and proper” within the drafting of clauses across part 1 is actually unnecessary. That assurance is already inherent within the Secretary of State and the economic regulator’s role within the licensing regime. Despite sharing the desire, I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn because I believe that it is superfluous in this instance.
Amendments 82, 83 and 87, which were also tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, seek to make the Secretary of State responsible for ensuring that an individual designated as a hydrogen production counterparty is deemed “fit and proper”. The Government anticipate that the Low Carbon Contracts Company Ltd, or LCCC, which is the existing counterparty for contracts for difference and the planned counterparty for the dispatchable power agreement, will be the counterparty for the low-carbon hydrogen agreement, subject to its successful completion of administrative and legislative amendments.
In taking the decision to proceed with LCCC as the counterparty to the low-carbon hydrogen agreement, the Secretary of State considered, among other things, LCCC’s ability to deliver the required functions and its experience and track record in contract management. Those considerations would bear on any future decisions, which would also be subject to normal principles of public decision making. Again, I agree with and share the same aim and desire as the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, but the amendments are superfluous. I politely ask that he withdraw his amendment.
Dr Whitehead
Naturally, the fact that the Minister did not eagerly grasp and endorse the substance of the amendments and run off to the Table Office is disappointing, but I accept that he has perhaps looked in detail at how the legislation will work and is satisfied that an equivalent of the “fit and proper person” test can effectively be carried out under the provisions of the Bill. However, that has not been the judgment of other parts of Government, which have found that particular wording to be of great help in underlining what their responsibilities are. It also ensures that the judgments that they make in exercising their responsibilities are fairly bomb-proof: if the Secretary of State presses the “fit and proper person” button, there is not too much an aggrieved party can do about it. I appreciate that that is different for different licences.
The Government have effectively decided that the LCCC, which I think is a fit and proper person, will be the hydrogen counterparty, although that is still to come in legislation—so we are legislating for something that we think will happen later, but not right this minute. I leave that with the Minister. He has not agreed to amendment 77; he thinks it superfluous. I slightly disagree—I think it would be useful—but that is to some extent a matter of judgment. Perhaps in a few years’ time, when a Minister becomes seriously unstuck with a particular appointment, we will get together again and see what can be done about it. For now, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Andrew Bowie
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 9, page 10, line 15, leave out subsection (10) and insert—
“(10) Section 10(6) (meaning of ‘appropriate devolved authorities’) applies for the purposes of subsection (3) of this section as it applies for the purposes of section 10(3).”
This amendment corrects a drafting error in the definition of “appropriate devolved authorities”.
Andrew Bowie
I thank the hon. Member for Southampton, Test and share his optimism that in a few years’ time we will be in a position to continue with appointments in relation to what we are legislating for today.
Amendment 1 corrects a drafting error in relation to the statutory basis on which the devolved Administrations are to be consulted in relation to regulations that may be made under the powers in part 1. The amendment ensures that the statutory basis for consultation is consistent across the drafting of the relevant clauses.
I turn to clause 9. The Government’s CCUS cluster sequencing programme is under way to identify the first CCUS clusters eligible for Government support. The first transport and storage licences will be granted through that process. The enduring regulatory regime will need a licence application process, and clause 9 provides for such a process to be set out in regulations. The process includes the procedure for licence applications, the conditions under which the applications may be made and the procedure for objecting to licence applications.
Kerry McCarthy (Bristol East) (Lab)
I was waiting for the Minister to mention the word “fee”, and he did not. I apologise for coming in right at the last moment, but clause 9 says that a fee would be payable. I know that the Minister spoke earlier about the need to avoid unnecessary burdens on some of the smaller companies that might come forwards. Does he envisage that the fee would be proportional to the size of the enterprise or would a fixed amount apply to everybody? Is that being considered?
Andrew Bowie
I can confirm that it is very much being considered. It will certainly be proportional to the size of the entity that might be applying for such a licence.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Competitive tenders for licences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Bowie
Clause 10 enables the future allocation of carbon dioxide transport and storage licences to be determined on a competitive basis. The Government’s current carbon capture, usage and storage cluster sequencing programme is a fair and transparent process. It determines which operators of carbon dioxide transport and storage projects are eligible to be granted a transport and storage licence and any associated Government support according to published criteria.
The future process for granting licences will need to balance a range of considerations and, depending on the evolution of the sector, it may be appropriate for it to be carried out according to competitive procedure. The power to make regulations in clause 10 enables that. It is a discretionary power; while a competitive approach may bring overall value for money and benefits for taxpayers and consumers—
Alan Brown
Can I ask about the overall sequencing? We have the track 1 costs at the moment, but we still do not have certainty on track 2. We are talking about future tenders and competitiveness. Clearly, at the moment only the ones in track 1 can effectively apply for licences. If we are looking for overall value for money, surely we need to completely open the field, as it were, so that we have more companies and projects competing and pushing each other on that competitive cost base as well.
Andrew Bowie
As the hon. Gentleman knows, we have launched a track 2 process; there will be an update on timings in the summer. Of course, we want to open up the process to as many companies and organisations seeking to get into this technology as possible, but it is really important that the appropriate steps are followed to get to that stage. That is why we are proceeding at pace with track 2 and why we will update everybody concerned with that in the summer.
Whether a competitive process is appropriate in the enduring regime will depend on how the CCUS market develops, including the anticipated number of market participants—that relates to the answer I just gave to the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun. Any regulations that may be made under the power would first be subject to consultation with the economic regulator and the devolved Administrations, and they would be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Dr Whitehead
This is a bit unsatisfactory, to be honest. I appreciate that the Minister has very carefully said that this is a discretionary power for the future and the Department may, as the CCUS market develops, consider making—I presume—some licences viable on a competitive basis, and that the Government may do that by regulation; I am pleased to hear that the regulation will be subject to the affirmative procedure, should the Government do that. Nevertheless, that seems to leave huge gaps in the procedure by which competitive licences might be determined. Is the determination based on, for example, how much money a company gives for the licence, and would the competitive licence mean that the highest bidder won the licence regardless of their suitability for the purpose?
Would the judgment on the creation of the licence be subsumed in other factors such as finances, or would the competitive licence be tendered on the basis of who is geographically most able to do something in terms of the viability of the body or company complying with a licence? Would there be a financial test? Once a competition has been entered into and the terms are not carefully set, we may get to a situation of “Beware your wishes; they may come true.” What we get as an outcome of a competitive tender may not be what we wanted to happen, but if we set it in train through the competitive process and have not defined it carefully enough, there will be no going back at that point.
It will be necessary to think through this way of doing things very carefully before proceeding, even with discretion being exercised. I am concerned that there is not enough in the legislation to guide us on how that thinking process might be carried out. Perhaps the Minister will give us a little guidance on the sort of things that would be to the fore should the competitiveness process be undertaken, and indeed the things that he would not consider in such a process. I am delighted to see that he has received bit of guidance on the matter. That may well help us all.
Andrew Bowie
I thank the hon. Member, and completely understand his concerns and where he is coming from. Ultimately, however, the appropriateness of a competitive approach to licence allocation will be considered, taking into account the learning from both the track 1 and the ongoing track 2 licence allocation processes, as well as the wider developments in CCUS markets and technology. This is not without precedent. In gas and electricity, Ofgem runs different processes for allocating different licence types. Some are allocations that are run competitively, such as offshore transmission licences, and other licence types are not.
The power in clause 8 also enables consequential amendments to be made to the Bill should they be considered necessary to facilitate the making of different licence types, but as the hon. Member pointed out, and as I said, the power is discretionary, and it should be for the Secretary of State to choose whether to exercise such powers.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Conditions of licences: general
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Bowie
Clause 11 makes general provisions regarding the conditions of transport and storage economic licences. The licence allows an operator to charge network users for delivering and operating the network. The licence conditions will set out the allowed revenue that the licence holder is entitled to receive, which will reflect its efficient cost and a reasonable return on its capital investment. The conditions of the licence will also include requirements on the licence holder that they must comply with or consent to.
In order that the economic regulator may cover the cost of administering the licence, the clause additionally confirms that the licence may contain conditions requiring a payment to be made to the economic regulator during the term of the licence. Any money received by the economic regulator pursuant to the conditions must be paid into the consolidated fund.
Alan Brown
I thank the Minister for giving way; I noticed an eye-roll, though.
Alan Brown
The Minister referred to the regulator assessing the allowable rate of returns in a fair chance model. How does that square with the interim period when the Secretary of State will grant licences? How do you make that assessment of value for money and fair returns, and will there be any scope to revisit that? If we look at networks and transmission systems, Ofgem had to reduce the allowable rate of returns in the next investment period, because it had been allowing network companies to make too much money. What safeguards are there to ensure that there is a review following an initial assessment of what would be a fair rate of return?
Andrew Bowie
The hon. Gentleman makes reasonable and sensible points. He is right that we have to ensure that the same regulations that will apply to Ofgem when it administers the process in future apply also to the Secretary of State and the Department when administering it in the interim. He is right, too, that there need to be safeguards and that Parliament overall will have responsibility for holding the Department to account—as it does the Government, in every respect, when it comes to making such decisions. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Standard conditions of licences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Bowie
A number of conditions will be appropriate to include as standard in all licences of the relevant type. The power in clause 12 enables the Secretary of State to specify what those standards are. The Secretary of State will be required to publish the standard conditions in an appropriate manner once they have been determined, and they will then be automatically included when a licence is granted.
To allow for the possibility that the standard conditions may need to be tailored to the circumstances of a particular licensee, the clause also enables standard conditions to be either excluded or amended in an individual licence. That can be done only if both the licence holder in question and other holders of the same licence type would not be unduly disadvantaged as a result.
Notice must be given of the intent to modify or exclude standard conditions in an individual licence, setting out the proposed modifications or omissions and the reasons for them, with sufficient opportunity for representations or objections to be made. Any objections or representations must be fully considered. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Whitehead
The Minister has set out what the standard conditions of licences are likely to be and how they are going to be determined by the Secretary of State, but the clause goes a bit further than that. It says in subsection (2) that
“the Secretary of State must”
—that is a good thing—
“publish any standard conditions determined under subsection (1)”,
which says:
“The Secretary of State may determine the conditions that are to be the standard conditions of licences”,
and subsection (2) then says the Secretary of State must publish the conditions
“in whatever manner the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”
That is a bit of an odd formulation. I am more used to the idea that the Secretary of State must publish any standard conditions determined under subsection (1)—full stop.
The question of publication has always been important when conditions are to be published that licence applicants will be expected to look at and know about. The onus is, or should be, on the Department to publish those conditions as widely as possible, whereas this power appears to narrow that substantially. I am not suggesting that in any way the Minister would seek to restrict the public’s free access to information, but under this formulation it is possible that, just as publications are set up specifically for the purpose of obscuring the publication of various things from the general public, the Secretary of State could decide to publish the conditions in something like The Competitors Journal. Indeed, they could be published as—I don’t know—a TikTok video, as I mentioned earlier, or in some other way that is inappropriate to the circumstances under which their publication should appear, which should give those who apply for licences the maximum amount of, and ease of access to, the information that would be necessary to inform their application.
We have not moved an amendment to strike out the second part of subsection (2), but I would like from the Minister at least an assurance that he will place an emphasis on the first part, which requires the Secretary of State to publish the conditions, and that, in pretty much all circumstances, “publish” means that the publication is widespread and easily accessible in the public domain, so that it can be digested and read by all concerned.
Andrew Bowie
I am happy to give that assurance that the information will be published, widespread and easily accessible while that power resides with the Secretary of State. Of course, as has already been said, it will be up to Parliament—as is the case with every other piece of legislation—to hold the Government and the Secretary of State, whoever may be in that post at the time, to account when that time arises.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Modification of conditions of licences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Bowie
Clauses 13 to 15 relate to the modification of licences for carbon dioxide transport and storage.
Clause 13 enables the economic regulator to modify the conditions of a licence after it has been granted. That is to ensure that licence conditions can keep pace with the evolution of the market. It also enables the economic regulator to undertake periodic reviews of the amount of allowed revenue an operator can receive, which will then be set out in the licence. In economically regulated sectors, price controls are a method of setting the amount of allowed revenue that can be earned by network companies over the length of a given period. Regulated companies then recover their allowed revenues through the charges they set.
Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that clause 13 is about precisely what I was touching on earlier? It is important to have the flexibility in the legislation to adapt as technology and innovation adapt too.
Andrew Bowie
Yes, I agree with my right hon. Friend. It is precisely about what he was touching on earlier: we are able to provide in the legislation the flexibility to allow the technologies for which we are legislating the space to grow, develop and become commercially viable. That is why it is essential to strike the balance between regulation and ensuring freedom for companies to operate. That is exactly why we would like the clause to stand part of the Bill.
As I was saying, allowed revenues must be set at a level that covers the companies’ costs and allows them to earn a reasonable return, subject to their delivering value for consumers, behaving efficiently and achieving their targets as set by the economic regulator. The amount of allowed revenue that an operator is able earn is set out in the licence conditions, which will need to be updated to reflect the outcomes of the periodic regulatory reviews and to keep pace with the evolution of the market more broadly. The power provides for the economic regulator to make such licence modifications, subject to an appropriate consultation process.
Before making any modifications to licence conditions, the economic regulator must give notice of the proposed modifications, the rationale for them, and an appropriate timeframe within which representations may be made. Any representations that are made must be duly considered. As Exchequer support will be available to certain users of the networks, the Secretary of State must be consulted on licence modification proposals and retains the power to direct that a modification may not be made.
Should the Secretary of State object to a particular modification, the economic regulator would need to consider whether to pursue the modification in an alternative form, which would require restarting the process of notifying and consulting on the new proposals. As is the case in other regulated sectors, licensees should have the right of appeal regarding modifications that are made to licences after they have been granted. The Bill provides for that later in chapter 1.
Clause 14 requires that, where the economic regulator has made a licence modification under clause 13 to a standard licence condition, the standard conditions of all future licences of that type should similarly be modified. That ensures a consistent approach to standard conditions across licences of the same type.
Clause 15 makes provisions for the Competition and Markets Authority or, as may be the case, the Secretary of State, to modify licence conditions in specific circumstances in relation to company mergers. Where there is a merger between licensed entities, that may necessitate licence modifications to ensure compliance with competition law. The power enables the CMA or the Secretary of State to modify licence conditions accordingly. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Dr Whitehead
I have a question more than anything. Will the Minister state on the record this afternoon who the economic regulator actually is? The reason why I ask is that there does not seem to be any definition in the Bill of who the economic regulator is. It appears to be the CMA, but it might not be, because clause 20, on “Appeal to the CMA”, is under the heading “Appeal from decisions of the economic regulator”, so those do not appear to be the same thing in the Bill’s construction. It is not further defined, so perhaps the Minister will clarify that for us.
Andrew Bowie
I am happy to clarify that the economic regulator to which I and the Bill refer is of course Ofgem. Appeal to the CMA relates to what I have just discussed: occasions when there is a merger between two licensed entities, which may necessitate modifications. That is where the CMA comes into it. To be absolutely clear, Ofgem is the economic regulator.
Dr Whitehead
I point out, therefore, that there are inconsistent references to Ofgem, to the CMA and to the economic regulator. They are one and the same but referred to in different ways in different parts of the Bill. That might be a drafting issue more than anything else.
Andrew Bowie
I have just been reminded by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield that clause 1 sets out that the economic regulator to which we refer is Ofgem.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 14 and 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Interim power of Secretary of State to grant licences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 2.
That schedule 1 be the First schedule to the Bill.
Andrew Bowie
The clause and schedule 1 provide the Secretary of State with the power to grant carbon dioxide transport and storage licences during an interim period, as has been discussed already this afternoon.
In the enduring regulatory regime, we expect the economic regulator to take decisions on who should be granted a carbon dioxide transport and storage licence. That is provided for by clause 7. However, it is the Secretary of State who will determine the first carbon dioxide transport and storage networks to be granted a licence—through the Government’s CCUS cluster sequencing programme—and the terms and conditions of those licences. That is appropriate given the Exchequer support available to the first CCUS clusters.
The CCUS cluster sequencing process is specifically designed for first-of-a-kind projects. The interim period during which the Secretary of State has the power to award licences will end on a date to be set in regulations, once the industry is sufficiently mature. After that interim period, the economic regulator will have sole power to grant licences.
Government amendment 2 corrects a cross-reference and renumbers a subsection in schedule 1 to ensure that the schedule is read correctly. Schedule 1 provides the Secretary of State with the power to grant carbon dioxide transport and storage licences during an interim period. The interim period during which the Secretary of State has the power to award licences will end on a date to be set in regulations made under schedule 1, once the industry is sufficiently mature. I think that answers some of the questions asked by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun earlier. After that interim period, the economic regulator, Ofgem, will have sole power to grant licences. I commend the clause and the schedule to the Committee.
Dr Whitehead
The clause itself is brief, but refers to schedule 1 and to the interim power of the Secretary to State to grant licences. As the Minister said, that power will come to an end on a date to be determined at a point when the industry is well established and the Secretary of State therefore no longer has to exercise the interim power. Who decides when the industry is well established? If that is the Secretary of State, is it not a rather circular way of bringing to an end the power of the Secretary of State to grant licences on an interim basis? If the Secretary of State decides that the industry is not that well established, he or she will presumably continue to grant interim licences forever.
Presumably, we want to reach a point when the Secretary of State does not grant licences in his or her own right and Ofgem or the economic regulator does, but we do not appear to have any mechanism in the Bill, other than something to be determined at a particular date, whereby the Secretary of State switches off his or her own power and switches on an Ofgem power. It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify that. There may be something in the legislation that I have not noticed, but it appears from schedule 1 and the clause that there is not a clear switch-off mechanism, other than the intention to do so when the market is mature.
Alan Brown
To follow on from that point, and the point that I made earlier, I know that the Minister said that he would write to us, but I am interested in how he envisages the sequencing and the interim period coming to an end. Although he said that in terms of value for money it is up to Parliament, and us as parliamentarians, to hold the Government to account, if the interim period goes on for a long while and individual licences are granted effectively on an ad hoc basis, it will be almost impossible for parliamentarians to hold the Secretary of State to account. We will continually be told that the information is commercially sensitive, so we will be unable to access it. I want a bit more clarity on how this will all come together in a more transparent manner.
Andrew Bowie
To address the points made by the hon. Members for Southampton, Test and for Kilmarnock and Loudoun, we recognise that visibility and clarity are of the utmost importance when talking to industry and, indeed, the wider country about where we are headed regarding CCUS. I can think of nothing that the Secretary of State, whoever that might be, would like more than to be able to give the power to Ofgem to determine licences. However, that depends on just how mature the sector is and the stage at which the Secretary of State determines it to be right.
The point about clarity, which I have just mentioned, is important. That is why my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingswood (Chris Skidmore) mentioned in his net zero review in March the need for a road map for CCUS. The Department agrees that that is important. We have committed to setting out a vision for the CCUS sector. That work is ongoing, and we will keep stakeholders and parliamentarians updated as we work up our road map and increase the clarity on where we are headed, and to what timescale, and when we expect such a transition period, during which the Secretary of State will hold that power, to come to end.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
Interim power of Secretary of State to grant licences
Amendment made: 2, in schedule 1, page 245, line 31, leave out from beginning to second “the” in line 32 and insert—
“(d) after subsection (10) insert—
‘(10A) For the purposes of subsection (5)’”.—(Andrew Bowie.)
This amendment corrects a cross-reference and renumbers a subsection.
Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 17
Termination of licence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Bowie
The terms and conditions of the economic licence will set out the circumstances in which the regulator would revoke or terminate a carbon dioxide transport and storage licence. Such circumstances may include those where a licence holder has contravened or failed to comply with enforcement orders, ceased to carry on as a transport and storage business, or sadly become insolvent.
The clause requires that where a licence termination scenario has arisen, or is likely to arise, the regulator must notify those who are most likely to be affected by a decision to terminate a licence. That will include notifying the relevant carbon storage licensing authority—which may be either the North Sea Transition Authority or Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers, or the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland—where a storage licence is also in place.
It also includes notifying the Secretary of State who, depending on the circumstances, may consider it to be in the public interest to use the powers in chapters 4 or 5 of the Bill to secure the continued operation of the network. Those powers enable the Secretary of State to enact a statutory transfer scheme to transfer the licence and its associated property and rights to another operator to maintain ongoing operations.
If the licence is to be terminated due to company insolvency, the Secretary of State has the option to apply to the courts for a special administration order. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Whitehead
The clause concerns termination events, stating:
“If the economic regulator considers that a termination event has arisen, or is likely to arise, the economic regulator must notify the persons mentioned in subsection (2) as soon as reasonably practicable.”
The Minister has given company insolvency as an example of a possible termination event, but I am sure he will agree that there are a number of others.
Subsection (5) says that a
“‘termination event’ means a state of affairs in which the economic regulator is authorised to revoke the licence.”
That explains precisely nothing; it does not give examples of termination events or explain the circumstances in which the economic regulator is authorised to revoke a licence. It does not take us very far.
Is there a roster of termination events? Is there a list of likely termination events that the Minister could put into a menu? Insolvency is one such event, but I can think of a number of other circumstances in which termination may take place either voluntarily or involuntarily. For example, a company may request that the regulator terminate its licence, stating that it cannot carry on with its licence arrangement for reasons other than insolvency.
The clause does not list any circumstances that could constitute a termination event. Is the Minister satisfied that the rather circular definition in the clause is sufficient? Or does he think that more clarity on what a termination event could constitute and how one might be dealt with is required?
Andrew Bowie
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point. However, I think it is fairly well recognised and understood within the industry that the termination of a licence will come in the event that a licence holder ceases to carry on as a transport and storage business and therefore no longer requires a licence; if it becomes insolvent; or if it contravenes or fails to comply with enforcement orders made by the economic regulator or, in certain situations, the courts. I am not sure what would be added by setting that out in the Bill. I suspect that it is fairly well understood across the industry.
To answer the question of what would happen in the event of licence termination, the Bill provides certain step-in rights for the Secretary of State in a licence termination scenario to be able to transfer the ongoing operation of the transport and storage network to another operator or, where that is not possible, to ensure the safe decommissioning of the infrastructure. If a licence is terminated because of the insolvency of a transport and storage company, the Bill enables the application of a special administration regime to support the ongoing operation of the transport and storage network, prioritising its rescue as a going concern and securing the ongoing safety and security of the network. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that a great deal of consideration has gone into this specific element of the Bill, and we are happy that it is clear in its intent.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Transfer of licences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Bowie
We are powering our way through this afternoon. Clause 18 enables carbon dioxide transport and storage licences to be transferred from one legal entity to another, subject to the consent of the economic regulator, Ofgem. Carbon dioxide transport and storage licences will be granted to a legal entity, and they cannot be bought or sold separate from that legal entity. Circumstances may arise in which it is appropriate or necessary to transfer a licence to another legal entity, and the clause provides for that. For example, a licence may need to be transferred as a result of a company merger or acquisition, or a company restructuring, where the legal entity that is proposed to carry on the licensable activity is not the same legal entity to which the licence was awarded. A transfer may relate to the whole or any part of the licence. The regulator’s consent is required for any licence transfer.
Clause 19 sets out the process that the economic regulator must follow before giving consent to any transfer. That includes public notice of the regulator’s intent to consent to a licence transfer, the reasons for it, any conditions to be attached to the consent to transfer, and a time period within which objections or representations can be made. The economic regulator must also notify the Secretary of State of an intended transfer, and the Secretary of State has the right to direct that a transfer may not be consented to. That is appropriate, as there may have been contractual financial support agreements in place between the Secretary of State and the current licence holder pursuant to the licence.
Dr Whitehead
The clauses deal with transfer of licences when, as mentioned in the previous clause, a termination event takes place. Subsequent to such an event, the licence will have to be put into action again and will be transferred. I am interested to see whether I can get the words “termination event” into common language, so that I can say to people, “That is a bit of a termination event”. However, I will not do that this afternoon.
The transfer of licences under such circumstances, as we have emphasised, needs to be put under the general heading of “fit and proper people”, whether we explicitly say that or not. A termination event may have occurred because someone has proven not to be a fit and proper person—for example, if they were gambling the company’s proceeds on local casinos—and therefore the company or person has been determined not to be able to carry out the term of the licence. The licence therefore needs to be transferred at least to a better kind of person.
Will the Minister expatiate briefly on the circumstances under which transfers will be judged? We need to be sure that when a licence needs to be transferred after a termination event, no one can say, “You over there—you will do. We are in a bit of a fix as far as the licence is concerned, so you get on with it.” I am sure that that is the last thing on the Minister’s mind, but it could conceivably happen if someone wished to cut corners and keep a licensed line of activity going. If the Minister could give an assurance about how licences will be transferred, that would be helpful.
Andrew Bowie
I am glad that we are not going to focus too much on termination or even extermination events during our debate. Indeed, it is to be hoped that we will not need to refer to this aspect of the Bill very much, if at all. However, we have to legislate in the expectation that at some point, there may be termination events for a licensed entity. That is why we have set out the provision for a licence transfer in the Bill.
The hon. Member for Southampton, Test referred to his earlier point regarding the inclusion of the phrase “fit and proper person”. As I said, we believe that the Bill sets out exactly how the Government will determine that a company or an individual is well placed to be a licence holder and carry out their duties as they relate to the Bill. However, let us say that they are not—we hope that that will not be the case—and a transfer takes place. A new licensee will be found, and if they intend to commence the licensable activity shortly after consent is granted, the regulator—Ofgem, in this case—may ask them to demonstrate, for example, that arrangements to accede to relevant codes by the proposed transfer date are in place. I understand why the hon. Member asks these questions, and it is right to do so. It is right that we state on the record today exactly what we expect in the event that a termination event takes place in regard to a licensed entity.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Appeal to the CMA
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 21 stand part.
That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.
Clauses 22 to 25 stand part.
Andrew Bowie
I will now speak to clauses 20 to 25, which relate to appeals in relation to licence modification decisions made by the economic regulator for carbon dioxide transport and storage. I will start with clause 20. To ensure that sufficient safeguards for licensees are in place, this provision of the Bill provides for licence modification decisions to be appealable to the Competition and Markets Authority. That is consistent with the CMA’s role in appeals in other economically regulated sectors, including gas and electricity. The CMA’s permission is required to bring an appeal, and the specific grounds on which the CMA may refuse to allow an appeal are set out in the clause. They include, for example, grounds for appeal that are “trivial or vexatious”.
Clauses 21 to 25 and schedule 2 set out the process and procedures for appeals to the CMA. Schedule 2 sets out the detailed process by which appeals to the CMA regarding licence modification decisions must be made, including matters to be considered by the CMA and timeframes within which the CMA must determine outcomes. To ensure a fair process and in order that the CMA may make a fully informed decision, schedule 2 establishes a right for the CMA to require the production of documents and written statements, and for persons to attend to give oral evidence. It establishes an offence of failure to comply with a notice to provide information, and it allows the CMA to make a costs order relating to the appeal. The provisions of schedule 2 are consistent with the process and provisions for appeals to the CMA in relation to gas and electricity licence modification decisions made by Ofgem.
Clause 22 sets out the matters to which the CMA must have regard when determining an appeal against a licence modification decision. It also sets out the circumstances in which the CMA may allow an appeal. In determining an appeal, the CMA must have regard to the same matters to which the economic regulator must have regard in carrying out its principal objectives and statutory duties in relation to carbon dioxide transport and storage. The CMA may allow the appeal if it considers that the decision being appealed does not sufficiently have regard to, or give sufficient weight to, matters covered by the principal objectives and statutory duties set out in clause 1; is legally wrong; is based on a factual error; or does not achieve its stated objectives. If the CMA does not allow the appeal on any of those grounds, the original decision made by the economic regulator stands.
Clause 23 sets out the powers of the CMA to remedy a licence modification decision where an appeal has been allowed. Where an appeal has been allowed, the CMA can quash the decision or require the economic regulator to reconsider it. If the appeal relates to a price control decision, the CMA additionally has the option to substitute its own decision for the economic regulator’s decision. These powers mirror those that exist for the CMA in gas and electricity licence modification appeals.
Clause 24 sets out time limits within which an appeal to the CMA must be determined. An appeal against a licence modification decision must be determined by the CMA within a period of four months from the date on which permission to bring the appeal was given. For appeals against price control decisions, the CMA has a period of six months to make a determination. Where representations on timing are made and the CMA considers that there are special reasons why the time limits cannot be met, it may have an extra month for its decision. In such circumstances, the CMA must inform the parties of the time limit and publish it in such a manner as it considers appropriate to bring it to the attention of parties who may be affected by the determination.
Bim Afolami (Hitchin and Harpenden) (Con)
I want to add a note of caution in relation to this set of clauses—a word for those on the Treasury Bench and the Minister, who is a good friend and a good parliamentarian, and who is doing a fantastic job on the Bill and in his role.
There is a hidden danger in the Secretary of State and, indeed, the Department not having the ability, outside of an interim period, to intervene at all in the process vis-à-vis licences. If I have misunderstood anything, I stand corrected, but as I understand it, once we have gone past the interim period—in peacetime, so to speak—the regulator, Ofgem, will make a decision. That decision can be, rightly and very understandably, scrutinised. Appeals can be made to the CMA, which is the right place, but there is no provision for the Secretary of State to involve themselves in that process.
If my understanding is right, and it may be wrong, there is no ability for the Secretary of State to intervene in that process. That strikes me as dangerous in the event that there is an emergency, the economic situation changes hugely or the broader political environment changes to the point that the regulator has a very different view of the issue from that of the Department. I should have referred Members at the beginning to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests: I am chair of the Regulatory Reform Group.
My point is not a dry, technical one that has no real political or economic bearing; it could be hugely significant over the coming years. I urge the Minister and his officials to consider whether we should retain some ability for the Secretary of State to intervene directly in the process if that were required, although I suspect that most of the time it would not be.
Dr Whitehead
I was going to make a slightly different point from that made by the hon. Member for—
Dr Whitehead
I remembered the Hitchin bit, but I could not remember the Harpenden bit; I am sure that the hon. Member treats both parts of his constituency with equal reverence.
Dr Whitehead
I was tempted to refer the hon. Member to the Energy Prices Act 2022, which was recently passed—I think, to paraphrase the Minister, not on his watch. The Act allows the Secretary of State to do pretty much anything that he or she wants in the energy sphere. I do not know whether that applies to the circumstances that the hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden suggested, but we are particularly concerned about the powers in that Act, and whether they need to be rowed back a little in this Bill.
I draw the Committee’s attention to the process of appeal from the economic regulator to the CMA. It appears to be a linear process. The appeal is set up by the CMA, effectively, and there is no going back afterwards. There is not a circumstance in which the economic regulator can say, “Actually, we think the CMA didn’t work as well it should in terms of casting that appeal. Can we appeal the appeal—not necessarily the substance of the appeal, but the way in which it has been carried out?”
What is apparent in terms of the CMA’s powers regarding appeals is that they give the CMA a lot of ability to misstep. Clause 20(4) states:
“The CMA may refuse permission to bring an appeal only on one of the following grounds”.
The CMA, actually on fairly wide grounds, can therefore refuse to bring an appeal. It appears to have pretty widespread powers to make a determination without any comeback. For example, clause 22(4) states:
“The CMA may allow the appeal only to the extent that it is satisfied that the decision appealed against was wrong on”
various grounds, including, among others,
“that the decision was based, wholly or partly, on an error of fact”.
Various things in the clauses emphasise the linear nature of the appeal process—that is, the CMA decides, and no one is looking at what the CMA is doing in terms of its appeal processes. I would like to hear whether the Minister thinks that that is adequate or whether a little more attention ought to be paid to what the CMA is doing in those circumstances, and whether the relationship between the CMA and the economic regulator under those circumstances is as good as it could be.
Andrew Bowie
Turning first to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden, who does treat both parts of his constituency with equal diligence—having visited, I have seen that at first hand—he is right: the Secretary of State does not have the power to directly modify licence conditions once they are granted, but he does have a veto over Ofgem decisions. That is set out in clause 13(6).
I genuinely understand the concerns of the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, but the provisions and procedures directly mirror the appeals process in respect of electricity and gas licence modification, set out in the Gas Act 1986 and the Electricity Act 1989. We believe that it will ensure consistency of approach for the economic regulator Ofgem and, indeed, the Competition and Markets Authority, which will provide confidence for the sector, and indeed sectors, as we move forward.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clauses 22 to 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Provision of information to or by the economic regulator
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Bowie
Clause 26 allows the economic regulator to request information from, and provide information to, other bodies with carbon capture, usage and storage regulatory or statutory functions, in circumstances where the sharing of information may be appropriate to facilitate the effective functioning of the respective regulatory regimes.
The clause permits the sharing of information between the economic regulator and the relevant bodies with statutory functions in respect of CCUS listed at subsection (2). The clause also allows for sharing of information with any other person the economic regulator considers appropriate if they have statutory powers or duties that the economic regulator considers relevant to the exercise of its functions. That could include, for example, the counterparty to any contracts providing consumer or taxpayer support for associated carbon capture activities. The clause limits information requests to those that the economic regulator considers necessary to facilitate the exercise of its functions.
These information-sharing provisions are intended to enable information to be shared between relevant regulatory authorities, not to permit public disclosure. Information shared with the economic regulator will remain protected under the Data Protection Act.
Alan Brown
What happens if any of the bodies do not give information to the economic regulator in the requested timeframe?
Andrew Bowie
They would be subject to the same stringent actions as have been set out, and in the interim the Secretary of State would determine what action should be taken in that respect.
Clause 27 gives the Secretary of State a power to require information directly from a carbon dioxide transport and storage licence holder, to ensure that he has access to information needed to support the effective conduct of his CCUS functions. The clause does not enable the Secretary of State to share or publish the information. To ensure protection of sensitive information, information provided to the Secretary of State will remain protected under the Data Protection Act, and an information request cannot be made to obtain information protected by legal professional privilege or, in Scotland, confidentiality of communications.
Dr Whitehead
The Minister’s final few words appear to show—the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun may have a few things to say about this—that there are different conditions for disclosure or production in legal proceedings in England and Wales and in Scotland. I am not a lawyer, so I do not know exactly what the difference is likely to be, but it appears that there is greater protection for the licence holder with respect to information provision in Scotland than in England and Wales. Perhaps I am reading that wrong. Is it the case that, in effect, the two conditions are the same and the wording of the Bill just bows in the direction of the formulation in Scotland, or is there a material difference?
Andrew Bowie
There is no material difference at all. As the hon. Member suggests, it is just a reference to the different regulations that apply in Scotland and in England and Wales, as a result of the devolved legislature in Edinburgh legislating slightly differently from the way that we have for the rest of the United Kingdom. That is the only difference. As this is a pan-UK Bill that affects each area of the United Kingdom, we have to make clear in the Bill the different regulations that will have to be conformed to. That is why the language of clause 27 is as it is.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28
Monitoring, information gathering etc
Andrew Bowie
Thank you very much, Mr Gray. I fear that you will be hearing my voice in your sleep tonight.
Andrew Bowie
Clauses 28 to 31 relate to other functions of the economic regulator. Starting with clause 28, as I have already said, carbon capture, transport and storage are nascent industries in the UK and, indeed, globally.
The economic regulation framework for carbon dioxide transport and storage, established by part 1 of the Bill, is focused on the transport of carbon by pipeline for the purposes of geological storage. Through that framework, our aim is to both provide certainty for investors and protect user interests.
As the CCUS market becomes established, we may need to keep the framework under review—for example, on how it is applied to non-pipeline forms of carbon transportation and the most appropriate licensing structure for different types of onshore and offshore infrastructure. To help inform such considerations, clause 28 requires the economic regulator to keep the carbon dioxide transport and storage market under review.
The economic regulator may collect information for the carrying out of such monitoring functions. The regulator is also obliged to share relevant information with the Secretary of State or the CMA if requested to do so, to assist their competition and market functions. Clause 29 establishes the procedure for requesting such information and establishes a penalty if a licence holder does not comply with a request for relevant information.
Where the economic regulator is considering implementing proposals that may have a significant impact on licence holders, on others who are involved in related CCUS activities, on the general public or on the environment, clause 30 requires that the economic regulator carries out an impact assessment ahead of implementing the proposals. The economic regulator is required to carry out and publish an assessment of the likely impact of implementing the proposal or set out why it considers it unnecessary to carry out such an assessment.
An impact assessment for a proposal must be published in an appropriate manner and provide an opportunity for those who are likely to be significantly affected by the proposal’s implementation to make representations. In its annual report, the economic regulator must report on the impact assessments undertaken in the relevant financial year and the decisions taken as a result of those assessments.
Lastly, to ensure transparency of decision making, clause 31 establishes that, for certain decisions, the economic regulator and the Secretary of State must give reasons for the decisions taken. The reasons must be set out in the published notice and sent to the relevant licence holder. Before publishing a notice, the economic regulator or the Secretary of State must give regard to the need to exclude information that could seriously and prejudicially affect the interests of an individual or body.
Dr Whitehead
I must say that these passages are so dry that I may be hearing the Minister’s voice in my sleep this afternoon, rather than tonight. Having said that, I assure you, Mr Gray, that I am wide awake and listening to what is being said.
When considering any piece of legislation, I always think that the first thing we should look at is the impact assessments, because they have to tell the truth about what is going on. It is, therefore, always useful to have impact assessments. Indeed, it is important that an impact assessment is available as often as possible both for Bill Committees and for secondary legislation.
Clause 30, however, appears to be rather vague about whether impact assessments should actually be undertaken. On the duty to carry out impact assessment, it states that
“the economic regulator is proposing to do anything for the purposes of, or in connection with, the carrying out of any function exercisable by it under or by virtue of this Part, and…it appears to the economic regulator that the proposal is important”,
but the clause does not specify what is meant by “important”. It goes on to say:
“but this section does not apply if it appears to the economic regulator that the urgency of the matter makes it impracticable or inappropriate for the economic regulator to comply with the requirements of this section.”
In other words, if the economic regulator thinks that an issue has some significance—subjectively judged, I assume, by the economic regulator—it may carry out an impact assessment. On the other hand, if there is no time to do it or it does not appear to be terribly appropriate to the economic regulator, it does not have to do it anyway. Therefore, we might get an impact assessment, or we might not.
There are a number of grounds in the process under which the impact assessment can be voided or avoided. Although subsection (2) attempts to define what “important” means in connection with a proposal, it also states:
“A proposal is important for the purposes of this section only if its implementation would be likely to do one or more of the following”.
and thereby further downgrades the question of what is still a rather subjective view of what constitutes importance.
I assume that the Minister shares my view that impact assessments are really important not just for important subjects but for most things. Although we have not tabled an amendment, will the Minister consider tightening the wording so as to ensure that carrying out impact assessments is the norm and not something to be decided by the regulator? To use the word “important” again, it is important that we are clear about impact assessments. Indeed, that has been set out in guidance to Ministers, who should seek to undertake impact assessments at all times, where possible, and should not hide behind speed issues or other circumstances in order to avoid them. However, it appears that that is not the case for the economic regulator, and that is not satisfactory.
Andrew Bowie
The Government are always open to suggestions and ideas about how we can improve legislation. As I said earlier, it is important for the industry, nascent as it is, that there is as much clarity as possible about how it is governed and about the regulatory process that it must follow. We must also understand that, as the market and the technology grow, evolve and develop, we will need to keep that under review. However, I am happy to give a commitment to the hon. Member that we will consider whether it is possible to tighten up the language so that exactly what is meant is made clear to industry.
Kerry McCarthy
As we have heard, there could be subjective interpretations regarding the importance and urgency of an impact assessment, and questions raised over whether one is appropriate or impracticable. I think the Minister will share my concern that the broadly worded clause could result in people seeking judicial review if they feel that the economic regulator should have carried out an impact assessment. I do not know what the process would be for bringing such a review, but does he share my concern that the vaguer the language, the more open it is to challenge?
Andrew Bowie
I also do not know the exact procedure that would lead to a judicial review in this instance, but I agree that we need to be clear and give certainty to the industry. Where we can, we should look at what we can do to tidy up the language so as to ensure that we do not end up in that situation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 29 to 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Joy Morrissey (Beaconsfield) (Con)
I beg to move, that further consideration be now adjourned—or, as one might say, be a termination event. [Laughter.]
The Chair
That is, of course, entirely out of order.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Joy Morrissey.)