Criminal Justice Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Tuesday 23rd January 2024
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 View all Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2024 - (23 Jan 2024)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary announcements. Members should send their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
On a point of order, Sir Robert. I am sorry to interrupt the proceedings, but I had a discussion with the Opposition Front Benchers, and we wondered whether—with your consent—we might start this afternoon’s session at 3 o’clock rather than 2 o’clock. I have consulted the Clerk but, of course, wanted to get your consent first.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
indicated assent.
Ordered,
That the Order of the Committee of 12 December 2023 be amended in paragraph 1(f) of the Order, by substituting “3.00 pm” for “2.00 pm”.—(Chris Philp.)
Clause 38
Nuisance begging directions
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 140, in clause 38, page 39, line 23, at end insert—
“(c) any interference with the person’s attendance at substance abuse support services, mental or physical health support services, or places of worship.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 139, in clause 38, page 39, line 36, at end insert—
“(10) The Secretary of State must lay an annual report before Parliament on the application of the provisions introduced by this section.”
Clause stand part.
Alex Norris
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Robert.
Clause 38 brings us to the provisions that concern nuisance begging. This clause, and subsequent clauses on homelessness, are closely tied to the repeal of the Vagrancy Act 1824 by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The 2022 Act will repeal the Vagrancy Act once the relevant provisions have been commenced, but the Government have said that they will commence those provisions only when replacement legislation is in place. For better or for worse, the clauses in front of us are that replacement legislation.
The repeal of the Vagrancy Act was a momentous victory for campaigners, because it effectively decriminalised rough sleeping and begging. The repeal had cross-party support, and many in the House shared the view that those who are destitute and living on the street should not be criminalised or threatened but offered support and assistance. Subsequently, the Government consulted on replacing the Vagrancy Act and set out new offences and powers regarding, for example, the prohibition of organised begging, which is what we are discussing and which is often facilitated by criminal gangs, and the prohibition of begging where it causes a public nuisance, such as next to cashpoints or in shop doorways.
Clause 38 gives effect to some of the Government’s proposals by introducing the power for a constable or local authority to issue a move-on direction to a person if they are engaging in, have engaged in or are likely to engage in nuisance begging. In this context, it is important that we differentiate between nuisance begging and nuisance homelessness, which we will come to. We strongly object to the provisions on nuisance homelessness, but the issue of nuisance begging is more nuanced. We know that some organised criminal gangs use begging for their own ends. They often use begging strategies that are aggressive and antisocial, and they often exploit challenged people to gain illicit private profit off the back of the characteristic kindness of the British people. That is wrong, and we therefore support powers that can tackle organised nuisance begging, but we think the provisions require greater humanity to protect those who are being exploited and those who are genuinely destitute.
The risk is that clause 38 and related clauses will target anyone, regardless of the nature of the harm. As Crisis has said, an effective blanket ban on begging risks pushing vulnerable people into dangerous places where they may be subject to greater abuse or violence. Someone simply sat alongside a cap or a cup could fall foul of the definition. That would be a mistake and risk harming some of the most vulnerable people in society. Many people become homeless and resort to begging through no fault of their own but because of situations such as trauma or family breakdown. They should not be doubly punished for falling through the cracks of a welfare system that is creaking under the strain of widespread poverty in our society. We are concerned that the Government have not quite landed the provision right.
Clause 38 allows for an authorised person—in this case, a constable or someone from the relevant local authority, which is defined in clause 64—to give a nuisance begging direction to someone over 18 who they think is engaging, has engaged or will engage in nuisance begging. The written direction will require the person to leave a certain place and not return for up to 72 hours. We do not, in principle, object to the police or local authority having tools to disrupt highly organised nuisance begging operations, which we know are active, but we fear that the provision will sweep up others along the way.
Amendments 139 and 140 seek to introduce safeguards. Amendment 140 seeks to ensure that, where nuisance begging directions are used, they should not interfere with a person’s attendance at substance abuse support services, mental or physical health support services, or their place of worship. Clause 38(5) states that a direction cannot interfere with a person’s work, their education or a court order. That is wise, but adding substance abuse support services, health services and someone’s place of worship would complete the picture. The amendment is straightforward and reasonable. Its intention is to protect the support and assistance provided to people who might be forced into begging, and to ensure that the Government’s nuisance begging directions do not cut across or undermine that support.
The nuisance begging powers are significant and could have unintended consequences, and amendment 139 is an attempt to maintain some parliamentary oversight. It would require the Secretary of State to lay an annual report before Parliament on the application of the provisions in clause 38, which we think would be an important check to ensure that they are not causing unintended harms, to give Members a mechanism to raise concerns, and to give a degree of parliamentary accountability. I do not think the amendment is particularly onerous. I would like to think—I would be concerned if this was not the case—that the Government will be monitoring the application of the powers and have a sense of how they work and whether they are dealing with the problem that they want them to deal with.
If that is not the Government’s approach, I hope that the Minister will talk a little about what assessment has been made of the possible risks, particularly for those who are facing genuine destitution and may fall foul of the legislation. For example, what will be the impact of imposing a one-month prison sentence or a £2,500 fine on someone in breach of these provisions, when they are already almost certainly in severe financial difficulties? We will get to appeal provisions, but will those who are facing these challenges be likely to be able to use those provisions? Is there not a risk of rather unequal justice? Further, having made such an assessment, what steps will the Government take to introduce mitigation?
My amendments suggest a way to put in some safe-guarding. I hope that the Minister can give us assurances, at least, about the Government’s understanding of how they will differentiate between the genuine, criminal, organised nuisance operations and people who are just in a dire personal situation. It is important that the Committee is mindful of that.
Chris Philp
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Robert—I think for the first time, though I hope it is the first of many. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for explaining his two amendments to clause 38, which provides for nuisance begging directions. Before I respond to his amendments, let me provide a little wider context for clauses 38 to 64, which the Committee will be relieved to hear I do not propose to repeat at the beginning of our debate on each clause.
These clauses will replace the Vagrancy Act 1824, which was prospectively repealed by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, as the shadow Minister said. The hon. Member for Stockton North and I fondly remember our extensive debates on that subject some years ago. This package includes directions, notices and orders where someone is nuisance begging or nuisance rough sleeping; offences for nuisance begging and for facilitating organised begging; and a replacement offence for being found on enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose.
The Government and, I think, the House as a whole take the view that nobody should be criminalised simply for being destitute or homeless. That is why we are committed to bringing into force the repeal of the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824, using regulation-making powers under the PCSC Act—a Henry VIII power to which I presume the shadow Minister does not object. We have put in place a substantial package of support for people who are genuinely homeless, sleeping rough or at risk of doing so. Engagement and offers of support must continue to be the starting point in helping those who are begging genuinely or sleeping rough to move away from a life on the streets and into accommodation. However, we have heard from frontline local authority partners and police that there is still a role for enforcement where that engagement does not work.
It is important not to conflate begging and rough sleeping—although of course the two can be linked—which is why we treat them separately in the Bill. The Government consulted on replacing the Vagrancy Act in 2022 and the majority of respondents were in favour of introducing replacement begging offences, recognising the harm that it causes. We set out our plans in more detail in the antisocial behaviour action plan, published in March 2023.
Accordingly, clause 38 provides that where an authorised person, defined in subsection (7) as a police constable or the relevant local authority, is
“satisfied on reasonable grounds that the person is engaging, has engaged, or is likely to engage, in nuisance begging”,
they can issue a direction to move on. We will come on to the definition of nuisance begging, which is set out in clause 49. Such a direction will require the person to leave the specified location and not to return for up to a maximum of 72 hours, giving respite to those who are negatively impacted by the nuisance. It can also include a requirement for the person to take their belongings, and any litter they have been responsible for, with them. The direction must be given in writing, and it is an offence not to comply with it. The penalty for failing to comply is up to one month’s imprisonment or a level 4 fine, which is up to £2,500, or both.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
Can the Minister tell me how somebody looks likely to beg?
Chris Philp
That is a facts-specific determination, but it might, for example, be that someone is carrying a sign soliciting funds, has positioned themselves in a particular location with a receptacle for collecting money, or is positioned near an ATM. It might be that someone has been begging and, although they have not been observed doing so by a police officer, there is a reasonable suspicion that they might do so in the future.
The meaning of nuisance begging is not any begging; it is quite precisely defined in clause 49, which we will come to. Begging in general is not being criminalised. That was the purpose of repealing the 1824 Act, which was very wide in its scope. We are defining nuisance begging in this Bill to be quite precise and targeted. Obviously, we will discuss that in detail, probably in the next hour or so.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I note that clause 38(9) refers to one month’s imprisonment. Can the Minister explain how he reconciles that new sentence with the Sentencing Bill’s presumption against short sentences? These people may never go to prison.
Chris Philp
The hon. Gentleman asks an excellent question. There is in the Sentencing Bill a presumption against short sentences, defined as under 12 months. However—as he knows, as a shadow Justice Minister—that presumption does not apply where the offender is already subject to an order of the court. For a first offence, where the offender is not subject to an order of the court, he is quite right: there would be a statutory presumption—a strong presumption—against a sentence of less than 12 months. If some other kind of court order has been issued for a first offence, the provisions of the Sentencing Bill—in particular the presumption against short sentences—will not apply on any subsequent appearance that the offender makes before the magistrate for a later offence, for so long as that order of the court is in force. That is how the two provisions interact, but that was a very good and fair question. I trust that my answer deals with the point that he raised.
Chris Philp
The hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position that it does not, but it does. I explained how if the offender is subject to an order of the court following a first offence, then the presumption against a short sentence does not apply for a second or subsequent offence. That is how the two interact. The disapplication would apply only on the first occasion; if a court order is made, the disapplication will not apply to subsequent offences for so long as that court order is in force. I think that is a relatively clear and coherent position.
Clause 38(5) provides that a direction must, so far as is practicable, avoid interfering with a person’s attendance at work or education, or with any requirements of a court order—as I have just mentioned—to which the person is subject. Amendment 140 seeks to augment that provision to avoid a direction interfering with the person’s attendance at a substance abuse support service centre, mental or physical health services or a place of worship.
On the face of it, those things sound broadly reasonable, because there are numerous circumstances in which a person subject to a nuisance begging direction may want to enter an area to access those services. It is worth saying that a direction will have a maximum duration of 72 hours, so we are not talking about long periods. Directions must also be proportionate and reasonable. We expect those exercising these powers—a constable or the relevant local authority—to take a joined-up approach and consider their exercise on a case-by-case basis. There is a lot of good practice in multi-agency working to build on, to ensure that people can access appropriate support services.
Chris Philp
I am looking forward to repeating it.
There are many parliamentary mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of Bills, not least parliamentary questions, scrutiny by Select Committees and, critically, the normal process of post-legislative review, which takes place between three and five years after Royal Assent. I hope on that basis that the shadow Minister will forbear from pressing amendments 140 and 139. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Alex Norris
I am grateful to the Minister for his answer and for saying that the Government believe that, for nuisance begging and nuisance rough sleeping, support is the starting point. That is an important message. I also share his view that they are not the same thing, and our treatment of the two are different for that reason. I also agree that there is a place for enforcement, particularly for nuisance begging, although I think the case is weaker for rough sleeping. However, he also said that this is not about just any begging. Although I do not want to pre-empt our discussion of clause 49, which we will debate in due course, the way it is drawn up means that there will not be much left, frankly.
One theme that I will return to—particularly when we come to the homelessness provisions and the point my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made about whether someone looks “likely”—is that this will be in the eye of the beholder. That will be a challenge, particularly for rough sleeping, but also in this area, so it is right that there should be anxieties.
I am grateful for the Minister’s comments on amendment 140. As he says, the list is probably not comprehensive, but I am glad that he said it was reasonable in spirit, which is definitely the kindest thing he has said to me in our four months together so far—I will take that as the strongest affirmation that I am likely to get. He has committed to address this issue through guidance, which is perhaps a better way to do it, so I am happy to withdraw the amendment on that basis.
Similarly, on amendment 139 and this point about post-legislative reviews, that is obviously not something we feel in this place. I suspect it is something that is more internal to Departments. There is a point here about how well we do or do not monitor the impact of legislation three or five years after we have passed it. We do not—we move on and do not really learn anything from it. However, we have had that argument on previous clauses, and I will not rehearse it again. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
Nuisance begging prevention notices
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 142, in clause 39, page 40, line 12, leave out “3 years” and insert “1 year”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 138, in clause 39, page 40, line 31, at end insert—
“(9) Where a person has been served a nuisance begging notice the serving authority must refer that person to their local authority who must provide guidance relating to welfare rights or any other associated issue the person faces.”
This amendment would require the local council to offer support for people given nuisance begging notices.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 141, in clause 40, page 41, line 5, at end insert—
“(c) any interference with the person’s attendance at substance abuse support services, mental or physical health support services, or places of worship.”
Clause 40 stand part.
Clause 41 stand part.
Clause 42 stand part.
Alex Norris
Clauses 39 to 42 relate to nuisance begging notices, which will be a step up from the nuisance begging directions discussed previously. Clause 39 sets out new powers for an authorised person to give a nuisance begging prevention notice to a person appearing to be aged 18 or over if satisfied on reasonable grounds that the person is engaging, or has engaged, in nuisance begging. This is a notice that will prohibit the person from engaging in a specified behaviour for a specified period of time, or require them to do specific things, within specific times and in—or not in—certain places. Clause 39 (3) provides that the maximum duration of any requirement is three years. That is a significant period of time. Subsections (7) and (8) make it an offence to fail to comply with a nuisance begging prevention notice without reasonable excuse, the maximum penalty being one month imprisonment—I would be exceptionally surprised if that is how it is intended to be used—or a fine of up to £2,500, or both. That is a punishment that is likely to be difficult to enforce.
The powers contained in these clauses are substantial. They place stringent requirements on individuals not to engage in certain behaviour. Of course, that can also be used positively to ensure an individual engages with support services. As in clause 38, an authorised person is defined as a police constable or someone from the relevant local authority. We know that police officers up and down the country already contend with heavy workloads and are not necessarily experts in nuisance begging or homelessness. I would be interested to hear from the Minister about how that might be covered in guidance, but there is a real risk that these new powers send the signal that begging is a criminal justice issue and that it is the police’s job to sort. In some cases it might be, but in many if not most it will not be. I hope to hear the Minister say that he does not think this is an issue we can police our way out of. Yes, we need to break organised criminal gangs, but beyond that the reasons for people ending up destitute and begging for money are service failure or their engagement with services across the piece all the way to the final stage of sitting next to a cap or a cup. It is wrong to say that that is simply a criminal justice issue.
Alex Cunningham
We had this problem in Stockton with nuisance begging, with people aggressively approaching customers sitting outside a café having a coffee. The local authority and the police force worked together on a solution and have put the resources in, but I am concerned that it could become just a police matter, as my hon. Friend has outlined. Can he think of any way we can get round that, such as resources for local authorities?
Alex Norris
I am grateful for that intervention. The case for resources for local authorities is one that we cannot make enough. My hon. Friend gives a good example of partnership working that has not just turned to criminal justice outcomes and told the police, “Well, this is now your problem to deal with.” We need that good faith partnership working and I hope that my amendments help to promote that to some degree.
Amendment 138 seeks to mitigate those challenges by inserting a new subsection so that
“Where a person has been served a nuisance begging notice the serving authority must refer that person to their local authority who must provide guidance relating to welfare rights or any other associated issue the person faces.”
The amendment seeks to ensure that someone who receives a nuisance begging notice is referred to the right support services and can liaise with the right qualified individuals on the matter. That would move away from criminalising the person and towards making sure that they get support to make a change in their life. My amendment is one way to do that and I would be interested in hearing about other ways from the Minister. In a previous debate, the Minister said it would be “support first”, and this is a way to make that real.
Clause 40 governs what can and cannot be required in the prevention notice. I have sought to amend that with amendment 141, which mirrors what I said in the previous debate. I will not repeat those arguments or press this to a Division, on the basis of what the Minister offered.
Amendment 142 would reduce the period that a prevention notice may be in place from three years to one year. Three years is a lengthy period for which—we will discuss this in relation to clause 49—someone could be told that they cannot attend their local town centre or high street. That could be based on the judgment of quite a junior officer, with minimal oversight, on pain of a month in prison or a fine of £2,500. Setting to one side those who are in genuine destitution, who I cannot believe we would want to banish from their town centres, part of the risk is that criminal gangs will cycle through the vulnerable people that they are exploiting. It will not matter a jot to those gangs that that person has to deal with a very difficult consequence for their life; they will move on to someone else. Amendment 42 would reduce the period of the notice down to one year. I hope that the Minister can explain the rationale for choosing three years.
Clause 41 is about the appeals process. We support an appeals process being included in the Bill, but I have significant concerns, which will be mirrored in the debates relating to homelessness, about access to justice and about whether the most destitute will be able to engage with the magistrates court to try to get a notice lifted. I would not challenge the power in clause 42 to vary notices, as I suspect there will be moments when they will be revised down.
Those are some ideas to try and soften some of the provisions. I am interested in the Minister’s views.
Chris Philp
As the shadow Minister explained, his amendments are to clauses that provide for nuisance begging prevention notices. The notices are a further tool that would be made available to police and local authorities to tackle nuisance begging, where it arises. The nuisance begging prevention notices that are set out in this and subsequent clauses follow the structure of existing notices such as community protection notices, which the police and local authorities are already familiar with using.
The nuisance begging prevention notice builds on the move-on direction in clause 38, allowing for an escalated approach, and can be tied in with relevant offers of support. The notice will prohibit the relevant nuisance begging behaviours and help to direct the person into the relevant support where it is necessary to do so in order to prevent the nuisance behaviour. For example, the notice may state that the individual must not beg close to cashpoints or that they must not approach people to ask for money, and also that they should attend a drug treatment centre so that their support needs can be assessed. In that way, the public would be protected and any relevant underlying drivers causing the nuisance begging could be addressed.
In relation to the point that the shadow Minister raised, I can confirm that the intention is absolutely to support people. We want to help address the underlying causes of begging and rough sleeping, which may be related to mental health problems or drug problems. I will give the shadow Minister a sense of the thinking on this. In drafting the Bill, there was extensive debate about whether we could go further and actually require people to have drug treatment, mental health treatment or whatever, or to attend a refuge or a shelter. There is evidence that people do not always want to accept those offers of help, so we considered whether we could introduce a power to essentially require them to do it. Having taken legal advice, it was suggested that that would not be lawful, and that is why this is constructed in the way it is. However, hopefully that illustrates that the Government’s thinking is that we want to offer more assistance and to get more people who are sleeping rough or begging into mental health treatment, drug treatment and alcohol treatment. We thought of going further, but for legal reasons that are principally connected to the European convention on human rights, we were not able to do so. Hopefully that illustrates the thinking on these issues.
Amendment 142 seeks to reduce the maximum duration of a nuisance begging prevention notice from three years to one year. I should start by stressing that the three years provided for in the Bill is the maximum period over which the notice can be enforced, and, naturally, where appropriate, a shorter timeframe can be specified. It is for the authorised person, which will very often be a local authority officer, not just a police constable, to consider the individual circumstances—all the relevant information about the person’s circum-stances—to decide what is appropriate, reasonable and proportionate.
Jess Phillips
What concerns me, regarding certainty of referral, is if there are cases where people—where I live in Birmingham, the biggest problem in nuisance begging is Romanian women who are clearly being trafficked; there are no two ways about that. I fear their criminalisation more so than their traffickers’ criminalisation, which is nil. I wonder whether there could be a mechanism for referral directly to the national referral mechanism. Both the police and local authorities act as first responders in the national referral mechanism already, so that would not need a change in the law. Maybe that is a compulsory referral that could be made.
Chris Philp
The hon. Lady raises an important point. As she says, first responders, among others, are already under an obligation—I think a statutory obligation—to make referrals into the national referral mechanism. I suspect that it was the Modern Slavery Act 2015—I am looking to my colleague, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury, for assistance; it probably is that Act—that enacted our obligations under the ECAT, or Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, treaty. So, those obligations already exist. I would certainly agree with the hon. Lady that, if first responders—either the police or indeed local authorities—think that someone is a victim of trafficking or modern slavery, they should certainly make the referral into the national referral mechanism.
In terms of potential prosecution, obviously there are provisions in the Modern Slavery Act 2015, where someone is the victim of trafficking, that provide protection in those circumstances. I would also say that there are some circumstances in which referrals into support are not necessary. There are many cases—probably the majority of cases—where they are necessary, and I would expect that to happen in those, whether it is the police or a local authority, but there are also circumstances in which it is not necessary, or where the help has been repeatedly refused in the past. I therefore think that a blanket requirement on the face of the Bill, as per the amendment, probably is not appropriate.
However, again, I agree with the spirit enshrined in the shadow Minister’s amendment, and I would like to put it on record that the expectation from the Government, as well as, I suspect, from the Opposition, is that, where somebody needs support—mental health support, drug treatment support, alcohol treatment support, domestic abuse support, or protection from trafficking and other vulnerabilities—the police and local authorities will make the appropriate referral. But that will not necessarily apply in all cases, whereas the amendment, as drafted, covers everyone, regardless of whether there is a need or not.
Amendment 141 is similar to amendment 140, which was in the previous group. As I said then, I am not sure that it is possible or desirable to set out all the possible circumstances in which an individual may need access, so guidance is the right place to put that.
Jess Phillips
The expectation, rather than necessarily the duty in law, is a referral. Beyond a referral, what happens if a woman nuisance begs in the 1,000 days that it takes to get referral through the national referral mechanism? It takes women 1,000 days to get a conclusive grounds decision, and it takes men 500. Or what if someone is waiting for a mental health referral? As I think every Member will know, you might as well wee in the wind. What happens if they nuisance beg in the 1,000 days, or a year, from when they are first helped to when they can get counselling in a domestic abuse service? What happens in the gap?
Chris Philp
If someone is given a nuisance begging prevention notice, the expectation will be that they comply with it. If there is any prosecution for a breach, it may be that the protections in the Modern Slavery Act would apply. Again, if a police officer or local authority officer thinks there is a problem with trafficking, it may well be that they think it inappropriate to make the prevention order. It is a power, not an obligation; they do not have to give the notice. We would expect the officer to have regard to the circumstances of the individual, which might include those the hon. Lady described. The national referral mechanism can take quite a while, although it is speeding up, but it may be that other support is available much more quickly than the support that follows an NRM reasonable grounds decision.
To repeat the point, the expectation is that support is made available where it is necessary, but support could be provided hand in hand with a nuisance begging prevention notice. The authorities could seek to prevent nuisance begging, which is bad for the wider public, by using the notices and other powers, while at the same time ensuring appropriate safeguarding. The two are not mutually exclusive; it is possible to do both at the same time. I also draw the Committee’s attention to clause 39(7), which is relevant to the intervention. It says it is only an offence to breach the conditions “without reasonable excuse”. For example, if someone has been coerced into behaviour that results in a breach, that coercion could—it would be for the court to determine—be a reasonable excuse, and therefore a defence.
I hope that that explains the purpose of clauses 39 to 42. Although I understand and agree with the spirit of the amendments, they are not necessarily the right way to achieve the objectives that the shadow Minister set out.
Alex Norris
I am grateful for the Minister’s response. The “reasonable excuse” provision in clause 39(7) gives a degree of comfort, but the reality is that, particularly in the trafficking cases mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, individuals will not say that they have been coerced into nuisance begging. Instead, they will take the punishment; they will not be able to proffer what would be considered a reasonable excuse. That is our concern.
The debate on amendment 141 mirrored previous debates, and I am happy not to move it on the basis of the answers I have had. On amendment 142, I hear what the Minister said about the three-year duration being a maximum, not a target, but I fear that because it is in the Bill, it will become a magnet. With regards to police constables, we know about their training and codes of practice, so we can be confident about the criteria that they are expected to apply, but we are concerned that the Bill is—for good reason—drafted in such a way that very junior local authority officers could be making that decision.
Alex Norris
Who do not know anything about the national referral mechanism and have no criteria to make a judgment against. Frankly, an authorised person who works frequently in a town centre or on a high street might just really not like someone. This power would be available to them, with minimal oversight, and there would be little recourse against it, which is why I think that three years is too much. I will push the amendment to a Division as a result.
I am grateful for what the Minister said about amendment 138 and support first; I completely take him at face value, and that is clearly what he said. My anxiety, as we enter the final year of this Session of Parliament, is that I have done lots of these Bills, and Ministers change. I thought that I had a really good concession from a Minister on the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, and the next day the Minister changed; I have learned from that. What is in the Bill is important, and I am really keen that that message be in it, so I will also push amendment 138 to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 43, page 42, line 21, after “application” insert “by complaint”.
This amendment provides for applications for nuisance begging prevention orders to be made by complaint.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 44 stand part.
Government amendments 71 to 75.
Amendment 143, in clause 45, page 44, line 16, leave out “5 years” and insert “1 year”.
Government amendment 76.
Clauses 45 to 47 stand part.
Chris Philp
Clauses 43 to 47 introduce nuisance begging prevention orders. Alongside nuisance begging directions and nuisance begging prevention notices, these orders—the third tier of escalation—are designed to be an additional tool available to local authorities and the police to keep communities safe. They are not about criminalising the vulnerable or the destitute, but rather acknowledge the impact that nuisance begging can have on individuals and communities, and empower local partners to deal with it in the most appropriate way.
Alex Norris
I will not repeat a lot of what I have said so far. Clause 43 concerns nuisance begging prevention orders, the most severe of the three tiers of powers that the Bill covers. I think it makes sense to align these tiers, as the Minister said in a previous debate, with other civil-type powers, so that they are easy to understand. As defined in clause 43, an authorised person can obtain the order on application to a magistrates court. If the court is satisfied that someone aged 18 or over has engaged in nuisance begging, and has failed to comply with the move-on direction and a notice, this seems like a reasonable escalation of the process for them to face.
My concern is mainly with the duration of such orders; clause 45(4) states that their duration may not exceed five years. That is quite a long period. Is that a proportionate response to the challenge that we are trying to tackle, which is serious and organised nuisance begging and aggressive and antisocial nuisance begging? Is a five-year exclusion the right thing to do, or, again, will it harm vulnerable people? We know that gangs will move on to new people, and the others will be left with the consequences.
There is a degree of comfort in the fact that we are talking about magistrates courts, so I have less anxiety about the measures than I did about the previous provisions, in which case I really think that three years will become a magnet. We can have confidence that a magistrates court will look at the full picture when considering an order of up to five years, but I am keen to know why the five years is being written in sand. Through amendment 143, I seek to reduce the period to one year, as a way of finding a balance between protecting vulnerable people and disrupting organised activity. An appeals process is set out in these clauses, and although this issue is of greater concern in the next part of the Bill, I think there is an access to justice issue for the people we are talking about. How well will they be able to use the legal processes that are there to protect them, and what support will they get to do so? I will stop there, but I am particularly keen to know why five years was the chosen duration of the orders.
Chris Philp
Briefly, five years was chosen—an increase from the three years in the previous provisions—because, as the shadow Minister said, the order is supervised by a court. That duration is a maximum, rather than a target. Courts are very well used to dealing with maximum durations, particularly in the context of sentencing. For example, the prison sentences handed down are often a great deal shorter than the maximum set out. As a matter of evidence and practice, courts often go a long way below the maximum—although we in Parliament might wish they went closer to the maximum in some cases. The duration is set at five years because courts have discretion and are used to working with maximum durations; but the court does have to look at all the relevant information and evidence before deciding. Description of person Time when order takes effect A person who has been remanded in custody, or committed to custody, by an order of a court From the beginning of the day on which the person is released from custody A person subject to a custodial sentence Immediately after the person ceases to be subject to a custodial sentence”
Finally, in relation to the positive requirements imposed, we have offered further safeguards, in that nuisance begging prevention orders can be varied or discharged, should circumstances change during the period. I hope the shadow Minister accepts that giving a court that flexibility is reasonable. We do it the whole time with criminal sentencing, and there is evidence that courts use that power with a great deal of restraint sometimes. I hope that explains the Government’s thinking on the issue.
Amendment 70 agreed to.
Clause 43, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Duration of nuisance begging prevention orders
Amendments made: 71, in clause 45, page 44, line 8, leave out “on the day” and insert
“at the beginning of the day after the day on which”.
This amendment provides for a nuisance begging prevention order to take effect at the beginning of the day after the day on which it is made.
Amendment 72, in clause 45, page 44, line 9, leave out “subsection (2)” and insert “subsections (2) and (2A)”.
This amendment and amendments 74 and 76 provide that where a nuisance begging prevention order is made in respect of certain offenders, the order may take effect from a later time described in the table inserted by amendment 74.
Amendment 73, in clause 45, page 44, line 12, leave out
“be made so as to take”
and insert “provide that it takes”.
This is a drafting change.
Amendment 74, in clause 45, page 44, line 13, at end insert—
“(2A) If a nuisance begging prevention order is made in respect of a person described in the first column of the following table, the order may provide that it takes effect as mentioned in the second column.
See the statement for amendment 72.
Amendment 75, in clause 45, page 44, line 16, leave out “not exceed” and insert
“be a fixed period not exceeding”.
This amendment clarifies that the specified period for an order must be a fixed period.
Amendment 76, in clause 45, page 44, line 19, after “section” insert
“—
“custodial sentence” means—
(a) a sentence of imprisonment or any other sentence or order mentioned in section 222 of the Sentencing Code or section 76(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, or
(b) a sentence or order which corresponds to a sentence or order within paragraph (a) and which was imposed or made under an earlier enactment;”—(Chris Philp.)
See the statement for amendment 72.
Clause 45, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 46 and 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 48
Offence of engaging in nuisance begging
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I would like to deal first with clause 49, which defines, as I said earlier, the concept of nuisance begging, which underpins the behaviours being targeted in the preceding clauses that we have debated this morning.
The definition has two parts. First, subsection (2) defines a number of specific locations where begging will automatically be considered to constitute nuisance begging. These are locations where people are likely to be handling money or are less likely to be able to get away from the person begging. The locations include forms of public transport, including bus, tram and train stations, buses, trams and trains, taxi ranks, outside an area of business, near an ATM, near the entrance or exit of retail premises, and the common parts of any buildings.
Subsection (3) provides that it will also be considered to be nuisance begging when a person begs in a way that causes or is likely to cause: harassment, alarm or distress to another person; a person to reasonably believe that they or anyone else may be harmed or that the property may be damaged; disorder; and a risk to health and safety. Where necessary, those terms are further defined in subsection (4).
Distress includes distress caused by the use of threatening, intimidating, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour, or the display of any writing, sign or visible representation that is threatening, intimidating, abusive or insulting. That can include asking for money in an intimidating way or abusing people who refuse to give money, all of which I hope hon. Members will agree are behaviours that should not be tolerated on our streets and to which people should not be subject.
Jess Phillips
This is quite an exhaustive list, but much of the law is often London-centric. One of the problems where I live, certainly as a woman driving late at night, is people stopping traffic at road intersections. The feeling of intimidation can differ from person to person, but as a woman on her own at a crossroads in Birmingham, it feels intimidating to have people standing outside my car. How can we deal with that particular issue?
Chris Philp
I recognise the hon. Lady’s point that we need to legislate for the whole country, not just London, and I say that as a London MP. We want to look after the entire country. I accept and agree with her that being approached in one’s car when in stationary traffic or at a junction can be very alarming and worrying for everyone, but particularly for women. There are two things in the Bill that I think may assist. Clause 49(2)(e) specifically references a carriageway, which is defined in subsection (4) as having the meaning given by the Highways Act 1980, and I think that includes a road, so that would be covered.
Secondly, and more generally, clause 49(3) provides that the nuisance begging definition is engaged, or the test is met, if the person begging does so in a way that has caused or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. That means that there is a “likely to cause” protection as well. I think that the combination of those two provisions—but especially the first, which expressly references a carriageway, meaning road, as defined in the 1980 Act—expressly addresses the point that the hon. Lady has reasonably raised.
To return to the substance of the clauses, it is important to include in the definition of nuisance begging behaviours that constitute a health and safety risk. There are many instances, exactly as the hon. Lady has just said, where people approach cars stopped at traffic lights. In addition to being on a carriageway, as caught under clause 49(2)(e), and in addition to potentially causing or being likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, as caught under clause 49(3)(a), it may also be the case that they are causing a road traffic risk. Moreover, they could be causing a health and safety risk if they are blocking fire exits or routes that emergency services may need to pass down. I hope that shows that we have thought about this quite carefully.
Alex Norris
Again, I will not speak in great detail, because we have covered most of the arguments under previous clauses. Clause 48 creates an offence of nuisance begging, with a punishment of up to a month in prison or a fine up to level 4 on the standard scale. I just want to understand a little more why the Minister thinks that the crime is needed as well as the three orders—the three different civil powers—in the legislation. Presumably, he would assume that those steps would be taken before this measure would be used and someone would not be sent straight to prison. It is really important to say that we do not think, particularly in the case of people with substance abuse or mental health issues, that a merry-go-round of short-term prison sentences is likely to prove effective, because it never has done previously.
Clause 49 is a particularly interesting one, because it gives the definition of nuisance begging and tests the Minister’s point that the intent or the effect of the legislation is not to criminalise or prohibit all begging. That is a challenging argument to make, because if we look at subsection (2), on the locations where nuisance begging is engaged, and if we take those 10 locations together—in aggregate—that is a huge winnowing of the public space; indeed, it is virtually the entire town centre or high street. I think that that is by design rather than by accident. I think that if we talked to the public about those locations, they would think that they are the right ones. This is not an argument against it, but it is about understanding that the effect of the decision being taken here will be a prohibition on begging in the entirety of an amenity, because all that is left after 5 metres is taken from the entrance or exit of a retail premises is just a little bit of curtilage or carriageway—but, actually, the carriageway itself is excluded, as the Minister said, so after that there really is not very much left.
Alex Norris
As my hon. Friend says, there would just be fields.
I am keen to understand from the Minister that subsection (3) is an “or” provision to subsection (2) and not an “and” provision—[Interruption.] The Minister nods. Subsection (3) is therefore a significant increase, in the sense that the locations cease to matter quite quickly so long as the nuisance begging
“has caused, or is likely to cause”—
has yet to cause, but may well cause—harassment, possible harm or damage, or a risk to health or safety. This is a very broad and subjective test. I understand what training we could give to a constable, but I am interested to hear from the Minister about what training we can give to local authorities, or at least what guidance he intends to produce regarding the application of this subjective test. We do not intend to oppose this clause but, combined with the clauses before it, the total effect will be that the distinction between begging and nuisance begging, about which the Minister made a point, will not exist in any practical sense. The provisions are drawn broadly enough to apply in virtually any case where an individual wants to beg. We need to know what criteria the authorities are supposed to be working against, so I am keen to hear the Minister’s answer.
Chris Philp
In relation to the first question about why the offence is set out in the clause when we already have the notices, orders and directions—three interventions—that we have discussed already, there may be some particularly egregious or persistent cases where the criminal sanction is necessary.
Of course, it is for the court to decide what is appro-priate. We have already discussed that there is now a presumption—or there will be shortly, once the Sentencing Bill passes—against short sentences for those people not already subject to a supervision order from the court, so a custodial sentence is very unlikely to occur for a first conviction in any case. For offences of this nature, it is open to the court to impose a non-custodial sentence, even for subsequent offences where there is already a supervision order from the court in place. That might include a mental health or alcohol treatment requirement, a drug rehabilitation requirement and so on. It does not follow that the court having the power to impose custody will mean that it will necessarily choose to do so. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question. It is a last resort power, but it is important that the police have that available to them.
In relation to the definition of nuisance begging—to which no amendments have been proposed—we want to make sure that people are able to go about their daily business; the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley set out in her intervention how nuisance begging can cause intimidation. The list of locations is based on feedback received from local authorities, business improvement districts, and retail associations and their members, based on their own practical experience. That feedback came from the consultation we conducted in 2022 and subsequently, and it is why the list of locations has been constructed in that way that it has.
Jess Phillips
As the Minister has said, I have outlined the places where I do feel intimidated. There was a homeless man—he died recently—who used to sit outside the local Asda where I live. He was a lovely man who chatted to everybody, and he was not intimidating at all. Would this definition account for him? He did not do anything wrong and I do not think he caused anyone any offence. Would he have fallen under this definition?
Chris Philp
Well, if he was sitting within 5 metres of the retail entrance, then yes, he would have come under this definition. However, I would point out that he would also have come under the definition set out in the current Vagrancy Act 1824; indeed, under that Act, he would have been in scope wherever he sat. If he was begging at the Asda entrance, then he was already breaking the existing law. This change is narrowing the definition a great deal. The fact that he was technically infringing the current Vagrancy Act, but was not arrested or enforced upon, probably illustrates the point that the police and local authority officers do exercise reasonable judgment. If they were not, he would have been arrested.
I hope that what would happen in such cases is as we discussed earlier; if someone like that man needs assistance of some kind—with mental health support, alcohol support, or whatever the issue may be—the expectation of the Government, and probably the Opposition, is that that intervention will happen. It would be interesting to find out if any attempt was made by the local authority in Yardley to assist that gentleman with whatever issue or challenge he may have been struggling with. To repeat the point, the provisions in this clause significantly narrow the scope of criminalisation in the law as it has stood for the last 200 years.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Arranging or facilitating begging for gain
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I hope that the clause is relatively uncontentious and commands unanimous agreement across the Committee. It creates a new criminal offence for any person to arrange or facilitate another person’s begging for gain, relating to the kind of exploitation that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley referred to in an earlier intervention. Organised begging is often run by criminal gangs, sometimes with links to trafficking and other serious crimes. It exploits vulnerable individuals, causes nuisance to others and undermines the public’s sense of safety. It benefits no one, and it exploits the vulnerable by making money off them.
The clause outlaws this despicable practice, making it unlawful for anyone to organise others to beg for gain. That can be anything from recruiting vulnerable people to take part in organised begging to driving them to places for them to beg. I am sure we have all seen, read about or heard about people getting dropped off to beg and then being picked up in luxury cars or vans later in the day. None of us wants to see that activity tolerated. It helps to gather funds that not only arise from the exploitation of vulnerable people, but can be used to support organised criminal gangs and their other illicit activities. The offence rightly helps to shift the risk to the criminals who are organising the begging and exploiting the most vulnerable. To reflect the severity of the activity and the role it plays in criminal gangs, the maximum penalty upon summary conviction will be six months in prison, an unlimited fine or both.
Alex Norris
This is the best of all the clauses that we will debate today, so the Minister will have the unanimity that he seeks. The real criminals are the ones who cause or arrange for people to beg on our streets in order to extract money for themselves. Those are the real villains, and it is right that there is an offence and a sanction. We hope to see it used, although I have slight anxiety about that. I am also glad that it is more severe than the sanction facing the individuals who themselves have been forced to beg. That is the right balance.
I am keen to understand one point. It is certainly my belief, and I think also the technical definition, that forced begging is a form of modern slavery. Therefore, presumably the Government’s point is that this offence is not covered, or insufficiently covered, under modern slavery legislation. I am interested in the Minister’s rationale there.
Similarly, we have to see it in that context. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley knows well from her work, there has been a retrenchment in recent years of the focus on modern slavery. The important provisions in the Modern Slavery Act 2015, particularly the referral mechanism, obviously have not worked as intended. People who are supposed to be waiting for 45 days for a decision are actually waiting closer to 600 or 700 days in many cases, and certainly multiple hundreds in virtually all of them. There has also been a sign from the Home Office, and from the Prime Minister himself, that in some ways modern slavery provisions are not compatible with the public’s desire for a controlled migration system. That is not our view; we do not believe that that is right, but there is a slight disconnect between this provision and the 2015 provisions, and some of the national rhetoric. I am keen to understand the Minister’s view on the interrelationship between this clause and the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
Chris Philp
I shall respond briefly to the question about the interaction of this clause with the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The Modern Slavery Act applies where someone is coerced, forced, tricked or deceived into labour of some kind, whereas people who are engaged in organised begging might sometimes do so voluntarily. This clause covers the cases where either they have agreed to it voluntarily or it is not possible to produce the evidence that they have been coerced, so it fills those two lacunae.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Nuisance rough sleeping directions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I reiterate a point I have made already: nobody should be criminalised simply for being destitute or homeless. That is why we are committed to bringing into force the provisions to repeal the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824. Rough sleeping can cause harm to the individual involved, with increased risks of physical and mental ill health the longer somebody lives on the street.
Jess Phillips
I feel differently about begging compared with nuisance rough sleeping. I have taken the words of my later mother on board. My brother lived on the streets for about six years in total, on and off, while he was in and out of various institutions. He used to annoy me. I did not like the trouble that he brought to my family’s door. He was, without a shadow of a doubt, a nuisance. I remember my mum saying to me, “Would you swap places with him? You seem to want to rail against him. Do you want his life? Would you prefer to be sleeping outside, desperate for a fix of something because of traumas you have suffered? Would you want to swap places with him?” When I hear the view that people like my brother are merely a nuisance to businesses, all I have to say is, “Walk a mile in his shoes.”
Do not get me wrong—my brother was not perfect. He was a nuisance to my family; indeed, he was much more than that. Having worked for years with homeless people—actual homeless people—I find that Ministers often try to mix up the definitions of “rough sleepers” and “homeless people”. The issue of homelessness in our country is massive. For example, at any one moment there are at least 116 people in my constituency living in hotel accommodation. They are the kind of people who end up on the streets in the end, and we seem to mix up rough sleeping, rooflessness and homelessness quite badly.
In my years of working with both the roofless and the homeless, I have never met a person who would not move on. They might have been asleep. They might even have been off their faces and physically not capable of moving on when a copper, or even a shopkeeper, came up to them and said, “Look, mate, can you shove out the way?”
While waiting for a train at Leeds station after a music festival, I myself have slept in front of the WH Smith there. When they opened the barrier behind me and said, “Could you shift it?”, I got up and shifted it. That is also my experience with homeless people. What I find frightening is the idea that we may go on to problematically criminalise them further, making their situation much more complicated. The Minister speaks with verve about the Government’s commitment to tackle rough sleeping, but that is a triumph of hope over experience. If we go to any street in any city, or even town, we will see that rough sleeping is on the up. Anyone who has worked in this area will know of the ridiculous headcounts that are done but that do not account for the actual reality of homelessness. The figures are totally, completely and utterly fudged. They do not, for example, take account of women who are sofa-surfing because they are being sexually exploited by men. The data is total nonsense.
A single man on the housing waiting list in Birmingham has to wait a minimum of three years to get a property. They are put in terrible temporary accommodation, which the Government refuse to regulate, despite the fact that they are paying millions of pounds to landlords who are literally exploiting both the taxpayer and the homeless person. They will be off the street, but if people want to talk about them being picked up in luxury cars, they should knock themselves out by looking at some of the exempt accommodation, which the Government refuse repeatedly to regulate.
It is no wonder that Leonard in my constituency knocks on the door of my office week in, week out, asking for a sandwich, because he cannot bear to go back to the exempt accommodation that he shares with drug addicts. He is an elderly man, so he goes out and sits and begs again. Yes, the Government figures might say that he is off the streets, but let me say to all Members present that those people are in dangerous, unsafe accommodation.
Alex Norris
This part of the Bill, on nuisance rough sleeping provisions, is certainly the most contentious part, and probably the most interesting to the public as well. I rise to speak with a degree of sadness. I agreed with so much of the first half of the Minister’s speech; the problem is that the first half, which set out the Government’s intent, belief and policy, was not the right counterpart to the second half, which simply is not in service of those goals. We therefore oppose these measures and will, I am afraid, oppose every group of this debate.
The nuisance rough sleeping directions in clause 51 give an authorised person, which, according to subsection (7), is a police constable or someone from the local council, the power to move on a person if the rough sleeping condition, which we will debate at clause 61, has been or, indeed,
“is likely to be, met.”
That is a significant phrase. Subsection (2) sets out what that will mean: that person will be moved on and not allowed to return to that area for 72 hours. Subsection (3) states that that person will have to pack up and take all their belongings and any litter with them. If they fail to comply, they will have committed an offence and may go to prison for a month or be subject to a £2,500 fine.
As I say, we oppose these provisions. I take the same view as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley: I understand that nuisance rough sleeping is different from nuisance begging, which can have its roots in organised crime, but even where it is solely a venture by individuals, it can often be intimidating, disruptive and not fair on either businesses or individuals going about their daily lives. It is, of course, right for local authorities and the police to have some degree of power and control over nuisance begging, but rough sleeping is different. There is certainly no evidence that anyone is sleeping rough for profit. As a result, the Government’s rationale for these provisions does not hit the mark.
The repeal of the Vagrancy Act 1824 was a landmark moment for campaigners, including many Members of this House who had worked towards it for a long time. The same people who were elated at that success are now rightly shocked that the Government are opting to pursue this path. We heard on Second Reading—although not from the Minister, I do not think—that it is contingent in law, and certainly in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, that there must be some replacement for the Vagrancy Act lest those provisions cannot be ended. First, I am not sure that is true beyond a de minimis meeting of that legislation, and secondly, that is not a case for what is in this Bill. We have heard that there must be a change, but we do not hear why this change is necessary—why private property laws or health and safety laws cannot be used.
On Second Reading, a Member—possibly a member of this Committee, though I dare not mention the name in case I get it wrong—raised an instance of dangerous rough sleeping in their constituency, where a fire exit was being blocked. The Government cannot tell me that either there are not the right powers on the statute books or we could not have drawn narrow powers to meet that case. Under those circumstances, we would have supported them.
I have drawn significantly on the explanatory notes throughout the considerations of the Bill, and I think it is telling that the policy background element, which is detailed on everything else, essentially gives up on homelessness. I do not think there is a very strong case to be made for these provisions. We should not lose sight of the fact that rough sleeping is a symptom of other failures, particularly Government failures on housing, poverty and mental healthcare provision. I am not sure how criminalising those who then end up with the sharpest repercussions of those failures will in any way move us closer to resolving their individual circumstances or the collective ones.
Chris Philp
I did set out the Government’s commitment to ending rough sleeping and the £2 billion being invested to achieve that objective. The shadow Minister is setting out why he does not agree with these provisions as drafted. He is, if I hear him correctly, implying that no replacement statutory provisions are needed at all. Does he accept that, if customers will not go into shop because a large number of people are camped or sleeping rough outside it, which happens in some areas, to the point that the business is being undermined, there should as a last resort be some hard-edged sanction to protect the business owner in those circumstances? The argument that he advances seems to suggest that there should be no protection at all for that business owner.
Alex Norris
No, the phrase I used was “de minimis”. I believe that there could be some degree of power in that instance—which, I must say, I am not sure is that common, likely or foreseeable across the country. In those extreme circumstances a lower-level power could be set but that is not what we have in the Bill, which is much broader and risks drawing lots of vulnerable people into the criminal justice system. The idea that we could in some way meet the compulsions for a month in prison or, indeed, that those individuals could meet the £2,500 fine is rather for the birds.
We are likely to see something more like what the Minister said in the previous debate to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley—some sort of common-sense application of the laws as they are, with people being moved on and getting a tap on the shoulder. Actually, how will we then have moved on from where we were? The point was not that the Vagrancy Act was not really being used, but that it really should not have been on the statute book and had to go. We are just going to replace it with a range of measures that, similarly, will not be used—or will be exceptionally damaging where they are used. I direct hon. Members to the joint briefing sent by Crisis, Shelter, St Mungo’s, the YMCA, Centrepoint, the National Housing Federation and many more:
“enforcement is far more likely to physically displace people to less safe areas and prevent them from accessing vital services that support them to move away from the streets, entrenching the issue in a way that makes it harder to solve.”
It goes on to say that that can
“push people into other riskier behaviour to secure an income such as shoplifting or street-based sex work.”
It is a critical failure of the Bill that those who know of what we speak fear that those are the sorts of vulnerabilities that people will be pushed into.
Another point of difference between us and the Government—we will get on to this in clause 61—is that the definition is very broad. The Minister raised a specific case in a small set of circumstances, and the answer to that is a broad set of powers in a broad range of circumstances. That seems unwise, particularly as the issue is not even about sleeping rough; it is about the act of “intending to sleep rough”. All sorts of consequences flow from that definition, which we will talk about in clause 61. However, we have heard concerns from the Salvation Army about feeding existing prejudices about those who sleep rough.
Ultimately, the most vulnerable and destitute need support into suitable accommodation, not criminalisation. Clause 51 and the associated clauses will only exacerbate the problems that they face; it may offer a bit of short-term respite for the community, but in reality it will cause greater issues and solve none of the underlying causes. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the clause is a triumph of hope over experience. For that reason, we cannot support it and will vote against its inclusion in the Bill.
Chris Philp
I will briefly respond by making two or three points. The first is that I hope the shadow Minister and others will acknowledge that the clause represents a dramatic reduction in the scope of the criminalisation of rough sleeping compared with the Act currently on the statute book, which is in force as we speak. It dramatically reduces the scope of people who will be caught by the provisions. The hon. Gentleman did not acknowledge that in his speech, but I hope that perhaps later in the debate he will acknowledge that the Bill dramatically shrinks the range of people caught by the provisions.
I made my second point in my intervention. The hon. Gentleman proposes voting against the clause, but he has not proposed any alternatives to it. He has not put down any amendments, and when I pushed him on what he thought should be done to protect shopkeepers, for example, he did not really have any clear answer.
Chris Philp
I will in a second. The Opposition are not proposing any constructive alternative to protect shopkeepers, for example. Both sides agree that the first step should always be support, that we need to end homelessness by tackling its causes and that, first of all, we need to support people to get off the streets and into accommodation. We should address underlying causes such as mental health issues, drug issues and alcohol issues. We agree on all that. However, if those interventions do not work, we need to make sure that there is some residual power as a backstop or last resort when a business premises or high street gets to the point of being adversely affected. That is what we are proposing here.
Some other jurisdictions—some American cities such as San Francisco, for example—have either ceased to apply rules like these or have completely abolished them. That has led to a proliferation of people sleeping in public places and has really undermined entire city centres. I understand the points that the Opposition are making, but we need something that will act as a backstop to protect communities and high streets. We have tried to construct the clause in a way that gets the balance right, and we will debate the details when we come to clause 61.
I will make a final point about moving people on before I give way to interventions and conclude. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley said that, often, if police or local authorities—she gave the example of people running a train station—ask people to move on, those people tend to comply. That is because of the sanctions in the 1824 Act. If we completely repeal that without there being anything to replace it—that is what the Opposition essentially seem to be suggesting—and an officer goes up to someone and says, “Would you mind moving on, please?” then that person could just say, “No, I don’t fancy moving on”. There would be no power to do anything. The officer, the person running the train station or the shopkeeper would have to say, “Look, I am asking you nicely: can you please move on?” If the person in question said, “No,” then nothing could be done at all.
The shadow Minister mentioned trespassing legislation, but the streets are public and that legislation applies to private property. It does not apply to a pavement. It would not apply outside a train station—maybe it would apply inside; I am not sure. I am just saying that, if the statute book were to be totally excised and someone was asked to please move on, there would be no ability to ensure that that happened. I accept that a balance needs to be struck, and we have tried to do that through a definition in clause 61, which we will debate.
I posed questions back to the Opposition, but, with respect, I do not think I heard the answers in the Opposition’s speech. I am sure that we will continue to debate the issue after lunch, particularly when we come to clause 61. We will no doubt get into the detail a bit more then. I had promised to give way to the hon. Member for Stockton North.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I did not know that the days of empire had returned and that we needed to consider ruling in San Francisco.
Alex Cunningham
I get complaints about aggressive begging and nuisance begging. Never in my life as a local councillor or a Member of Parliament have I had a property owner approach me to say, “I’ve got a real problem with this guy sleeping outside my shop every night”. I have never had that, and nobody else has told me that they have. The Minister thinks it a tremendous problem—that property owners are very worried and angry and that they want these people moved on. That idea is very new to me. The Minister needs to justify these measures more.
Chris Philp
I have a great deal of respect and affection for the hon. Gentleman; he knows that, having spent so many hours with me in Committee. With respect, the question to ask is not about the current situation—although there are examples; I will show him photographs after the meeting of tents on Tottenham Court Road that retailers do not particularly appreciate. The question to ask is about what would happen in the future as a consequence of a total repeal. That is the question that needs to be answered.
Chris Philp
We are about to hit the time limit, so maybe we can discuss further when we debate the other clauses.
The question is: what would happen if we were to repeal? To see what would happen as a result of what the Opposition propose, let us look at other cities around the world; I am not doing that because I have imperial designs, but as a case study. Other places such as San Francisco have done it, and the results have been terrible. That is why I am a bit wary of doing what the Opposition propose.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Leasehold and Freehold Reform Bill (Fifth sitting)
Tuesday 23rd January 2024
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Leasehold and Freehold Reform Bill 2023-24 View all Leasehold and Freehold Reform Bill 2023-24 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2024 - (23 Jan 2024)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted during sittings of the Committee, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk or, alternatively, pass their written speaking notes to the Hansard colleague in the room.
We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and shows how the selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or similar issue. Please note that decisions on amendments take place not in the order in which they are debated, but in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause to which the amendment relates. Decisions on new clauses will be taken once we have completed consideration of the Bill’s existing clauses. Members wishing to press a grouped amendment or new clause to a Division should indicate when speaking to it that they wish to do so.
Clause 1
Removal of qualifying period before enfranchisement and extension claims
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Minister for Housing, Planning and Building Safety (Lee Rowley)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. Today, we begin our line-by-line consideration. I first want to note and put on record my thanks to all the witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee last week. It was hugely useful to hear their insights, which will improve the Bill over the coming days and weeks ahead.
I am delighted to bring the Bill to Committee, and I look forward to the debate that will follow. Before we proceed, I quickly draw the Committee’s attention to a minor issue regarding the Bill’s explanatory notes. Paragraph 18 refers incorrectly to the right
“for an intermediate landlord to reduce (‘commute’) the rents that they pay”
following statutory lease extensions and ground rent buy-out claims. That is a drafting error as the clauses were not in the Bill when introduced. I have since tabled an amendment to introduce those clauses on intermediate leases, which we will debate shortly. I apologise for that minor drafting error and reassure the Committee that the explanatory notes will be updated to reflect the latest clauses before the Bill enters the other place.
I also want to make a small point in relation to legal language that I will use throughout the session. In existing legislation, leaseholders are referred to as “tenants”, which legally, they are. In everyday language, however, we often use the term “leaseholders” to differentiate long leaseholders from tenants holding shorter tenancies or those with less security of tenure. For simplicity, I will use the term “leaseholders”. Likewise, I will use the term “landlord” to mean both landlords and freeholders. In many cases, the landlord will be the freeholder, although that is not always the case. Where the provisions concern freeholders, I will use that term rather than “landlord”.
I now turn to part 1, which deals with leasehold enfranchisement and lease extension. When people buy a leasehold property, they will want to ensure that they have the long-term security and control they need to make it a home. They may have a short lease and wish to extend it, or they may have concerns about their landlord and wish to buy them out to have full ownership and control of that home.
The current requirement, where a homebuyer has to wait for two years before they can extend their lease or buy their freehold, is an obstacle for leaseholders and results in higher costs, as the price for enfranchising increases year on year. Furthermore, many investors take advantage of a loophole to avoid that requirement, while ordinary homeowners, who may be less familiar with the process, can find themselves in difficulties. There are also inconsistencies in the current law where, in certain circumstances, people can rely on a previous owner’s period of ownership to satisfy the requirement whereas others are unable to do so.
Clause 1 seeks to remove that barrier to leaseholders who wish to exercise their enfranchisement rights. It removes the requirement to have owned the lease of a house for at least two years before qualifying to buy their freehold or extend their lease. It also removes the requirement to own the lease of a flat for two years before extending the lease. This gives leaseholders the flexibility to make a claim immediately upon buying a leasehold property, and it will reduce their costs. It also resolves inconsistencies in the current law. The measures will remove an unnecessary restriction for leaseholders. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his explanation of clause 1. I add the Opposition’s thanks to the witnesses who gave evidence to us last week. It was extremely useful. Before I begin, I would like to declare an interest. My wife is joint chief executive of the Law Commission, whose work we will be debating extensively in the days to come.
It is a pleasure to start line-by-line consideration with you in the Chair, Mr Efford. It is a genuine privilege to serve on a Public Bill Committee comprised of hon. Members who have not only a real interest in the subject matter, but real expertise. It is my sincere wish that we draw on all of it in the days ahead to improve this legislation and, as much as the Government Whip may discourage it, that hon. Members on the Government Benches, including the hon. Members for Walsall North and for Redditch, as former Housing Ministers, take the opportunity to participate actively in our deliberations.
Having not had a suitable chance to put it on the record, I would like to take this opportunity to formally welcome the hon. Member for North East Derbyshire back to his place. He and I disagree politically, often viscerally, when it comes to many, many issues, but he is a hard-working, diligent and thoughtful Minister. I look forward to the robust and, on the whole, constructive debates we will have over the coming sessions.
Before I turn to the detail of clause 1, I want to put some brief general remarks on the record to frame what is to follow. As we made clear on Second Reading, we are fully in support of the principle of the Bill and the intent behind its provisions. The range of measures that the Committee will consider will, without question, provide a degree of relief to leasehold and freehold homeowners in England and Wales, by giving them greater rights, powers and protections over their homes. That is obviously to be welcomed. However, during Second Reading we also expressed our deep regret about the Bill’s lack of ambition and bemoaned the implications for leaseholders, who are being routinely gouged by freeholders under the present flawed system.
I want to be as clear as I possibly can with leaseholders who may be following our proceedings as to the Opposition’s approach to the Committee stage. While we welcome in principle the provisions contained in the Bill, we do have concerns about the efficacy of several of them, including clause 1. As such, we will seek to probe and rectify their various defects and deficiencies so as to ensure that they truly deliver for leaseholders. We will also engage constructively with the Government in relation to any significant new measures introduced into the Bill, not least the glaring omission of provisions designed to ban the sale of new build leasehold houses. We will introduce a number of specific targeted measures designed to give leaseholders a little more control over their future and strengthen the foundations on which future, bolder reform will be enacted.
What we do not intend to do is attempt to persuade the Government of the benefits of using this Bill to enact all, or even significantly more, of the hundreds of Law Commission recommendations on enfranchisement, right to manage and commonhold, which the Government have chosen not to include in this Bill. The Government had the opportunity to bring forward ambitious legislation and enact all the Law Commission’s recommendations from its three reports in 2020, thereby delivering on the promises that successive Ministers have made to leaseholders over the past years. They have made the political choice not to do so. Attempting to radically overhaul this piece of legislation by means of hundreds of amendments required to implement all those recommendations would not only be an onerous, perhaps impossible, undertaking, given its limited nature, but would delay the Bill’s passage and, with a general election in the months ahead still a distinct possibility, put it at risk entirely.
We want leaseholders to benefit from the measures in the Bill as soon as possible. We therefore wish to see it, albeit suitably strengthened, out of Committee as quickly as possible to maximise its chances of receiving Royal Assent. Make no mistake, Labour is committed to bringing the current iniquitous leasehold system to an end, overhauling it to the lasting benefit of leaseholders and reinvigorating commonhold to such an extent that it will ultimately become the default and render leasehold obsolete. Leaseholders across the country therefore have our firm commitment to finish the job in due course.
Turning to clause 1 and the rest of part 1, one of the reasons that the Bill can reasonably expect a speedy passage out of Committee is that parts 1 and 2, together with related schedules, implement a subset of Law Commission recommendations that are almost entirely uncontentious. Part 1 of the Bill, as the Minister has said, concerns leasehold enfranchisement and extension.
As I have said, the clauses in this part implement some but not all of the Law Commission’s recommendations designed to make it cheaper and easier for leaseholders in houses and flats to extend their lease or acquire their freehold. They include procedural changes as well as substantive ones that extend tenant rights and empower leaseholders by giving them greater control and value. There is in that respect, and as we touched on during the evidence sessions last week, an explicit and very welcome redistributive intent that underpins the legislation.
As the Law Commission exhaustively detailed in its final 2020 report on leasehold enfranchisement, the case for reforming the present enfranchisement regime is incontrovertible. It is not only incredibly complex but inconsistent. As a result, leaseholders face unnecessary litigation, uncertainty and costs when attempting to exercise their rights under it. The law in this area needs to be overhauled and we therefore welcome the objective that underpins each of the provisions in this part.
We wish to probe the Government further on various issues relating to the precise drafting of those provisions, as well as seeking to address the flaws of a limited number. As the Minister made clear, clause 1 removes the two-year qualifying period before enfranchisement and extension claims can proceed in respect of both houses and flats by amending the relevant sections of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 and the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993, which I will hereafter refer to simply as the 1967 and 1993 Acts.
Clause 1 implements recommendation 29 from the Law Commission’s final 2020 report on leasehold enfranchisement. We welcome the clause. A core objective of the Bill is to increase access to enfranchisement by rendering more leaseholders eligible for such rights. By liberalising this and other qualifying criteria, we are confident it will achieve that objective.
As the Committee is no doubt aware, the current two-year ownership requirement was designed primarily to prevent investors benefiting from enfranchisement rights intended for residential leaseholders. Yet it is patently not achieving that objective given the relatively simple workarounds that sophisticated commercial investors can and do take advantage of. Indeed, the requirement can fairly be said to have created a market designed explicitly to facilitate their doing so—a development entirely at odds with the rationale for the two-year ownership requirement. At the same time, that requirement presents a significant barrier to ordinary leaseholders exercising enfranchisement rights and, importantly, leads to rising premiums for many of them as a result of waiting for two years in which capital values may have increased or lease lengths reduced.
Abolishing the requirement for leaseholders to have owned premises for two years prior to exercising enfranchisement rights, so that they have the right to carry out an enfranchisement claim as soon as they acquire their lease, is an entirely sensible reform. It would also resolve the current inconsistency between the position of trustees in bankruptcy and of personal representatives, and avoid the technical, costly and error-prone workarounds that have been created involving the assignment of a benefit of notice.
Although the clause is entirely uncontentious from our perspective, I do have one question for the Minister: why have the Government chosen to include subsection (2)(c) and, consequential on that reform, subsection (3) in this clause? Subsection (3A) of section 39 of the 1993 Act concerning what happens in the event of the death of a qualifying tenant clearly needs to be overhauled to account for the removal of the two-year qualifying period, but surely the Government wish to ensure that the right of a tenant’s personal representative to exercise enfranchisement rights on their behalf in the event of their death is sustained? Will the Minister confirm whether I am right in believing that that is the Government’s wish?
If so, given that the right would not appear to be sustained as a result of the drafting of clause 1, is it maintained by means of other provisions in the Bill? If not, surely the Government must accept that the decision to simply omit the relevant subsection (3A) needs to be reconsidered to ensure that the right is maintained in future? The omission may affect only a small number of leaseholders going forward, but it is important that we ensure their personal representatives are conferred the rights that they would have enjoyed had they lived. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lee Rowley
First, let me echo the remarks of the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich. He said some kind words about me and I would like to say the same about him. He has always been extremely constructive and helpful. We share the aim of trying to improve the legislation and I am grateful to be working with him. I hope we can work in many areas and agree more than we disagree. He was right when he said that this is incredibly complicated. Having tried for the past two months to get into all the details, there may still be areas where I am unable to answer all the questions from hon. and right hon. Members today. I will do my best, but I will write to them if I am unable to answer anything.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for confirming that Labour will support this clause. On his specific point around where leaseholders have sadly passed away and there is a requirement for a personal representative or equivalent, it is not our intention to make that process any more difficult or to change the fundamental ability of people to make decisions about how to dispose or deal with properties that are left in the event of a death. Having spoken to officials and those involved in the drafting of this, my understanding is that the exemptions referred to in subsections (2)(c) and (3) become effectively moot. The removal of the two-year rule preventing a representative from taking action means that at the point they inherit the property—or whatever legal approach is taken to transfer it the estate to a new owner or representative—the problem goes away.
If, for some reason, we have missed something, I would be very happy to take anything from the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich or others, either now or in writing, which I can go away and look at. Our understanding is that this does not need to continue, hence why we have chosen to remove it within the clause.
Matthew Pennycook
I welcome that clarification from the Minister and his indication that it is the Government’s firm intent to ensure that personal representatives can exercise enfranchisement rights on behalf of a leaseholder who has died, because of the removal of the two-year rule. I urge the Minister or his officials to look at the precise wording of this clause, because we are worried that—his comments notwithstanding—it may not do this in practice, and there may be some ambiguity. I do, however, welcome the assurance he has given. On that basis, we will not oppose this clause standing part of the Bill.
Lee Rowley
To confirm, I am happy to double-check this, but I hope what I have just indicated stands.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Removal of restrictions on repeated enfranchisement and extension claims
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lee Rowley
Currently, the restrictions placed on leaseholders to make a claim to buy their freehold or extend their lease can be seen as excessively punitive. Leaseholders are prevented from making a claim to buy their freehold or extend their lease for 12 months, when a previous claim has failed even on a minor point. In addition, a claim for a lease extension on a house can be obtained only once, and we seek to remove those unnecessary barriers for leaseholders, which frustrate their ability to buy their freehold or extend their lease.
Clause 2 seeks to address this problem by removing the requirement to wait 12 months to submit a new claim if the previous one has failed. It will also remove the restriction on bringing a further claim where a lease extension has already been obtained for a house. This means that leaseholders will be able to put in a further claim to enfranchise or extend their lease as soon as they have resolved the issues with their failed claim. Leaseholders of houses will not be prevented from making a claim for a lease extension if one has already been obtained, preventing the landlord from being able to regain possession of the property from a leaseholder when the lease eventually comes to an end.
Clause 2 will also remove provisions that give courts powers to prevent new enfranchisement or lease extension claims for five years where a claim has failed, and the leaseholder did not act in good faith or attempted to misrepresent or conceal material facts. These powers are old and surplus to requirements, coming from the 1967 Act, which has been overtaken by developments in the law around civil restraint orders since then. These restraint orders are more flexible, better developed, subject to more rigorous checks, and may be fairer than the existing power. Therefore, the existing law and the Bill can still deal with meritless of abusive enfranchisement claims. The tribunal already has powers to award costs for such unreasonable behaviour. The removal of these should not change that; it is simply a tidying-up exercise, and a recognition that other parts of the law do this better. These measures will remove barriers to leaseholders being able to take up their right to enfranchise or extend their lease without unnecessary delays.
Matthew Pennycook
I welcome that explanation of the clause, which, as the Minister says, removes various restrictions on repeated enfranchisement and extension claims. It is our understanding that they include the provisions in the 1967 Act and the 1993 Act that prevent tenants from starting new enfranchisement or lease-extension claims within 12 months of an earlier claim failing to complete; the provisions of the 1967 Act that give courts the power to order compensation and prevent new enfranchisement or lease extension claims for five years after a claim has failed; and the provisions of the 1967 Act that prevent tenants from bringing a further lease extension claim where a lease extension has already been obtained under the Act.
Lee Rowley
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments and, again, for indicating his support for the intent of clause 2. On his question with regard to subsections (1)(c) and (d), I will write to him, given that it is a technical question about the specific description in the legislation. Hopefully, I will be able to provide the comfort he seeks.
As he indicated later in his remarks, we believe there is the ability for vexatious claimants, in whatever sense, to be accommodated by the existing legislation elsewhere, so there is no need to replicate that or to retain something that is very rarely used. That is the reason for removing it.
Finally, on his point about orders from a tribunal and the Law Commission’s recommendation, it goes back to the fact that we believe the process that is in place is already mature and very capable of responding to the legitimate points he highlights. Therefore, there is no need to create an additional process in the Bill, but I will write to him to absolutely clarify that point and make sure that we have everything we need.
Matthew Pennycook
I welcome that clarification from the Minister and look forward to any further detail that he might provide to the Committee via written correspondence.
Rachel Maclean (Redditch) (Con)
May I ask the Minister to confirm that clause 2(2) refers to schedule 7 to the Bill? In our evidence sessions last week, we heard from certain leaseholders who were concerned that they would not benefit from the provisions if their lease was less than a certain number of years. Paragraph 2(2)(a) of schedule 7 states that a lease will not qualify if
“the unexpired term of the lease is less than 150 years”.
There was some debate about that length. Will the Minister address those leaseholders’ concern that the period is too long and that there should not be that restriction? Or will he write to me later to address what considerations went into that provision? If we are excluding people from these welcome provisions, perhaps we should seek to otherwise widen the group of people who can benefit from having their leases converted to a peppercorn lease.
Lee Rowley
We will probably talk in detail about the 150-year decision—the Law Commission proposed 250 years—in relation to quite a number of areas later this morning, so I do not want to pre-empt that now. As I will explain later, the Government’s intention was that, if a lease is coming up in a reasonably short period of time, it is advantageous to align everything together, as opposed to doing just one thing, because there will be the potential for double costs and the like. I am happy to talk about that more when we get further into line-by-line consideration.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Change of non-residential limit on collective enfranchisement claims
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 3, page 2, line 19, at end insert—
“(2) After section 4(5) of the LRHUDA 1993, insert—
‘(6) The Secretary of State or the Welsh Ministers may by regulations amend this section to provide for a different description of premises falling within section 3(1) to which this Chapter does not apply.
(7) Regulations may not be made under subsection (6) unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before, and approved by resolution of—
(a) in the case of regulations made by the Secretary of State, both Houses of Parliament;
(b) in the case of regulations made by the Welsh Ministers, Senedd Cymru.’
(3) In section 100 of the LRHUDA 1993—
(a) in subsection (2), after ‘making’, insert ‘provision under section 4(6) or’;
(b) in subsection (3), after ‘making’, insert ‘provision under section 4(6) or’.”
This amendment would enable the Secretary of State or (in the case of Wales) the Welsh Ministers to change the description of premises which are excluded from collective enfranchisement rights. Such a change would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 3 makes changes to the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement claims. At present, section 4(1) of the 1993 Act excludes from the right to enfranchise buildings in which 25% or more of the internal floor area, excluding common parts, can be occupied or are intended to be occupied for non-residential use. The clause increases the non-residential use percentage to 50%.
We welcome the change, which enacts recommendation 38 of the Law Commission’s final report on leasehold enfranchisement and was suggested by, among others, the National Leasehold Campaign. The purpose of the non-residential limit is to confine enfranchisement to predominantly residential blocks, but as the Law Commission determined, the existing 25% limit
“does not achieve that purpose.”
There is a significant amount of evidence that it instead regularly prevents leaseholders from undertaking collective freehold acquisitions because a sizeable proportion of buildings fall slightly above it. As the Law Commission’s final report puts it,
“the 25% limit provides a significant bar to the ability of leaseholders to undertake a collective freehold acquisition”.
The Law Commission further argued that
“the arbitrary nature of the limit makes the bar to enfranchisement a source of considerable frustration for many leaseholders.”
Deciding where to draw the line in respect of the level of non-residential use permitted in a building before collective enfranchisement rights cease to be available is inherently difficult. There will always be outlying cases that approach or go beyond an increased limit. However, given that one of the explicit purposes of the Bill is to bring as many leaseholders as possible within the enfranchisement regime and, in respect of the non-residential limit, specifically to prevent developers building around it in order to exclude blocks of flats from enfranchisement rights, an incremental increase to 30%, 35% or even 40% does not, instinctively, feel sufficient.
The issue is inherently subjective, and the Law Commission recognised as much, but if enfranchisement rights should be enjoyed by buildings that are primarily residential in nature, a 50% threshold feels appropriate and fair, because it would ensure that the predominant form of ownership in such buildings remains residential. A 50% non-residential limit is likely to mean that the number of genuine cases that are excluded by it will be small, and it will inevitably reduce gaming by developers, because to exceed the 50% limit a building will have to be genuinely commercial in nature. At least, that is the hope.
We very much hope the clause serves to significantly boost enfranchisement rates and in due course to assist more leaseholders of mixed-use buildings to convert to commonhold. However, our reservation about the clause as drafted is that it provides no flexibility to further amend the non-residential limit. We believe it would be sensible to build in a degree of flexibility so that any future changes to the limit for collective enfranchisement rights do not require primary legislation but can instead be enacted through regulations.
One can imagine a number of scenarios that might lead to the effectiveness or reasonableness of the Government’s proposed 50% limit, which the Law Commission accepts is inescapably arbitrary, coming into question. For example, we might find in the years following its implementation that it does not manage to encompass a small but still unacceptable number of leaseholders in buildings that fall slightly above it, and we may wish to quickly take steps to allow them to exercise collective enfranchisement rights. Alternatively, a future Government may decide that they wish to use a criterion other than internal floor area to determine eligibility for such rights—for example, the percentage of the service charge paid by leaseholders. It is our understanding that, in both scenarios, new primary legislation would be required to make changes to the non-residential limit, either to increase the percentage of the internal floor area that can be occupied, or which is intended to be occupied, for non-residential use, or to entirely change the criteria upon which the limit is based. We therefore believe it would be preferable to give the Secretary of State the power, by means of regulations subject to the affirmative procedure, to vary the limit to account for changing circumstances. Amendment 1 would do so.
The amendment would amend clause 3, which itself amends section 4 of the 1993 Act by inserting new subsections into it. It would allow the Secretary of State to amend the whole of section 4 of the 1993 Act in any way they see fit to create a different description of a non-qualifying property. In short, it would hardwire flexibility in respect of the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement claims into the Bill. We believe it is a sensible and reasonable amendment, and I hope the Minister agrees and makes it clear that the Government are happy to accept it. One lives in hope—I have done more of these Committees than I care to admit, so I know that even if I am right the Minister will not accept the amendment and will bring back a proposal at a later stage, but I hope he accepts the principle.
Before I conclude, I want to raise a separate but related matter to the non-residential limit that this clause makes changes to: how we define a building for the purposes of freehold acquisitions and right to manage claims, which we will debate in due course, and specifically whether buildings need to be structurally detached, with parts vertically divided, in order to be eligible for such rights. As hon. Members will recall, concerns about structural detachment and shared services were raised by several witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee last week. The fear that they highlighted was that the existing rules around structural dependency, particularly for buildings with extensive levels of overhang, such as those that arise when multiple blocks of flats are built over a shared car park, would frustrate many legitimate enfranchisement claims otherwise made possible by clause 3 and other provisions in the Bill that liberalise qualifying criteria and remove obstacles to enfranchisement.
The counter argument would be that rules around structural detachment and their applicability to the non-residential limit are necessary to avoid the creation of so-called flying freeholds and the block management problems that arise in such cases, and that such buildings are eligible for enfranchisement by a single claim if the tenants of the various blocks proceed together. The Law Commission appear to have agreed. It recommended retaining the existing test but making a small tweak that would allow minor deviations from the strict vertical division otherwise required for a part of a building to be separately enfranchisable. Notwithstanding the Law Commission’s reasoning, we believe it is important to properly consider whether the structural detachment rules will limit the opportunities for leaseholders to enfranchise using the liberalised qualifying criteria that clause 3 provides for.
Our amendment does not directly probe that issue because it is concerned with providing future flexibility in respect of legal title rather than physical building exclusions, but it is important that this Committee considers the impact of structural detachment rules as they currently operate, and the extent to which they may frustrate the Bill’s objective to expand access to enfranchisement. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister can tell us whether the Government have considered whether the rules on structural detachment may indeed frustrate leaseholders in that respect and whether they consider that a problem. If not, and they are convinced that there is good reason for the existing tests to remain in place, will the Minister tell us why they chose not to implement recommendation 33 of the Law Commission’s final report on leasehold enfranchisement, which would have provided for a relaxation of the currently strict approach to the 1993 Act’s vertical division condition? I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)
I rise to support amendment 1. My hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich made an excellent speech in favour of it, and he is right to distinguish between this clause, dealing with enfranchisement, and later clauses on which we will look at the issues from the point of view of right to manage. Given the amount of reference to the Secretary of State in the Bill and that so much is left to him to decide afterwards, it is reasonable to ask the Minister why that has not been applied to this clause—otherwise, it looks as if the Government have considered the matter and ruled out any change in this area, which, as my hon. Friend suggests, is reasonable.
Mike Amesbury (Weaver Vale) (Lab)
I, too, rise to support this very generous amendment from my hon. Friend the shadow Minister. It is pragmatic, and it would power up the Secretary of State, whoever that might be, to ensure that leaseholders are able to take control in hopefully larger numbers through extended enfranchisement. I hope the Minister will give the amendment very strong consideration.
Rachel Maclean
May I throw the general issue of collective enfranchisement into the mix? The Minister may wish to come back on it at a later point if it suits him better. Many people in this situation have raised with me the sheer practicalities and difficulties of doing a collective enfranchisement. When people live in a huge block of flats with vast numbers of flats, they do not necessarily know who the other people are and certainly do not have their contact details. That, in and of itself, presents a barrier and an obstacle for some of these claims. We have heard evidence from groups affected by this situation—most notably the Free Leaseholders group, but there are many others—who have made this point repeatedly.
Matthew Pennycook
The hon. Member raises a very pertinent issue. Is she minded to support our new clauses 30 and 31, which deal precisely with it?
Rachel Maclean
The hon. Gentleman is a very persuasive orator in this Committee, as he is in many other fora, and I will definitely listen to those arguments when they are made. We all work in the spirit of improving this Bill. I very much hope that the Government will provide the explanations I have asked for, and specifically on this issue at this point.
Lee Rowley
I thank hon. Members and Friends for their contributions. I will take them in turn. On the amendment, I find myself in the slightly unusual place of arguing against a Henry VIII power, as they are occasionally called and as he referred to them. As indicated, there are a number of Henry VIII powers in the Bill, and I am sure that people will have views on them when we get to them. Our colleagues in the other place often have very strong views on such powers. It is an unusual place to be, but I happily take it up.
I absolutely understand the point that hon. Members have made and the reality of what they are trying to articulate. The fact that we are making a change indicates that there are times when it is proportionate and reasonable to make changes. The reason for the Government’s not taking powers in secondary legislation—which I know, joking aside, that hon. Members would accept—is that there is a continuum for drawing or not drawing lines, and we think that this does not necessarily need to be on the line of taking powers in order to do things in secondary legislation, simply because this is a substantial change. It is being actively debated; Members are debating whether it is sufficient and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Redditch asked, precisely how it will work to improve the situation in practice. I think the Government’s preference is to keep that discussion in primary legislation. We recognise that primary legislation is always more challenging in terms of timelines and space in this place, but it is a sufficiently important change that it should be able to be debated in the way we are doing today.
Eddie Hughes (Walsall North) (Con)
I understand that it is appropriate to future-proof legislation and allow for flexibility, but I agree with the Minister that a substantial change has already been made. Proportionately, we are talking about the number of buildings that have already been constructed, and therefore the people that we are helping. I fully appreciate that the shadow Minister is concerned about future developers gaming the system, but in terms of proportion, it is important that we focus our efforts on the buildings that have been built.
Lee Rowley
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for highlighting that. The shadow Minister expressed hope that the Government would agree with some of his amendments at some point. I am afraid that I will have to dash his hope on this one. We understand its purpose, but on the basis that I have articulated, we would prefer to keep this in primary legislation. I hope that the shadow Minister might consider withdrawing the amendment.
On clause 3, as it stands, we have been clear that we want to improve access to collective enfranchisement so that more leaseholders of flats can enjoy the benefit of freehold ownership. Many leaseholders in mixed-use but predominantly residential buildings are currently prevented from buying their freehold, as hon. Members have indicated. Clause 3 amends the 1993 Act to increase that limit from 25% to 50%. This has been consulted on widely and was recommended by the Law Commission. Where residential leaseholders take up the majority of the floor space in a building, it is our view that they should be able to access the long-term security and control that comes with freehold ownership, if they choose to do so.
We recognise that this change impacts freeholders. If the leaseholders choose to buy their freehold, the freeholder stands to lose ownership of individual buildings, and that may fragment ownership of some areas over a longer timeframe. We believe that impact to be justified not only because of the significant benefit to leaseholders but because freeholders will be compensated for that loss. We do not believe, as a principle, that the single contiguous ownership of space is absolutely necessary for buildings to be managed well.
We have also heard arguments from leaseholders that they will be unable to professionally manage mixed-use buildings. Although I understand their point, through, for example, the delegation of a building’s management to an agent, that should be overcome. I accept the points made and understand the shadow Minister’s point on the difficulty of ensuring that leaseholders can be engaged to the point where they pass the threshold, whatever the number—and all numbers are ultimately arbitrary. As he has indicated, I think the Committee will return to this, but we think the clause, as it stands, is the right approach. Therefore, we resist the amendment and hope that the shadow Minister will withdraw it.
Matthew Pennycook
First, on the Minister’s response, I am slightly reassured but not wholly convinced. I would like the opportunity to go away, look carefully at his remarks and consider whether we need to come back to this, and I reserve that right, Mr Efford.
On amendment 1, I am frankly not convinced by the arguments made by the Minister and the hon. Member for Walsall North. We well understand the concerns that they have both drawn attention to. As I have said, it is an inherently subjective decision as to where that threshold is drawn. We also accept that, when it comes to existing buildings, the number of leaseholders who are potentially excluded will be small in number. But we want to avoid a situation where our constituents are coming to us in buildings with a 51% or 52% rate and saying, “We can’t collectively enfranchise as you intended. We are frustrated by the powers in the Bill.” On the basis of the Minister’s argument, we will have to say to them, “You have to wait a good few years for another leasehold Bill—maybe many years based on the history of leasehold reform—for such a change to come forward.” It is a continuum; this a substantial change, and we are trying to build some flexibility into that change.
Barry Gardiner
Does my hon. Friend agree that this will probably affect the little people a lot more than the big, because of the likelihood of achieving 50% commercial within a leasehold block? Many of our town and city centres have buildings with commercial below and very few flats above. Therefore, it is much more likely that it will be a group of people—yes, a small group—living in that situation, rather than in the Shard, coming to us complaining.
Matthew Pennycook
My hon. Friend makes a good point: it is not just the number but the type of leaseholder who we are potentially excluding. All we are saying, as I argued in great detail, is that Ministers should have flexibility to change, if there is sufficient evidence to suggest that large numbers are being excluded or—I refer to the gaming point—we see developers building with a 51% area just to escape the threshold. We do not propose that the 50% change; we think it is an appropriate and fair starting point, but surely the Government need some flexibility in this area.
I must say to the Minister that this is the first time I have heard a Government Minister say no to Henry VIII powers, but I am afraid that his argument for saying no to them was, from my point of view, entirely expedient and not particularly well justified. I urge the Government to think again. I am minded, purely because of the way in which the Minister has responded, to push the amendment to a vote. If the Government are flatly refusing to look at the issue, we must make clear that we feel strongly about it.
Lee Rowley
Clause 4 introduces schedule 1, which repeals rights that enable landlords to block a lease extension or freehold acquisition claim for a house or flat where the landlord intends to redevelop or reoccupy the property. Where the blockers are used, compensation is only paid to leaseholders in houses, not those in flats. The blockers apply to a minority of leases that have not been extended and are very near to ending.
Although that means that, in practice, rights are rarely used, enfranchising leaseholders should have the opportunity to make their decisions about the need and scope of redevelopment once they own the freehold. Leaseholders with few years remaining on their lease should have the option of extending and securing their tenure. Where a lease is extended, landlords will continue to have statutory break rights that can terminate leases for redevelopment. We will consider break rights in schedule 6 and cover further details about the blockers when we come to consider schedule 1. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Matthew Pennycook
As the Minister has made clear, clause 4 concerns eligibility for enfranchisement and extension in specific cases. It gives effect to schedule 1, which repeals specific limitations on those rights under the 1967 and 1993 Acts. As the Minister has detailed, they include: the right of a landlord to defend a lease extension or collective enfranchisement claim on grounds of redevelopment; the right to defeat a freehold acquisition or lease extension claim for the purposes of retaking possession of the property for personal use; and the limitations that prevent a sublessee from claiming a lease extension if their sub-lease was granted by an intermediate leaseholder out of a lease that had been extended under the relevant Act.
We welcome the clause, which implements, although is not confined to, recommendation 98 of the Law Commission’s final report on leasehold enfranchisement. When considering the case for reform in this area, the Law Commission made clear that its proposal could reduce the value of the leaseholder’s lease as a result of the transfer of some enfranchisement rights from a leaseholder who has previously extended his or her lease pursuant to the legislation to the leaseholder to whom they had subsequently granted a sub-lease. However, the Law Commission ultimately determined that any such loss of value was overstated. Its reasoning was—assuming that I have understood the relevant technical arguments correctly—that there would be no difference in value between the sum that the intermediate leaseholders could expect to obtain if their lease was acquired in a collective freehold acquisition under the present law and the value of the intermediate leaseholder’s interest in the light of its proposal.
Lee Rowley
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. As he indicates, this is—I think by common consent—a rare issue in the first place, not that that diminishes the importance of ensuring that we get it right. It is very complicated, as he has indicated; different leases will have different elements within them and it is impossible to comment on every single case or every single instance, as has been indicated, because of the complexity. I am not aware that there is an indication that there is a general reduction in the value of leases for the very small number that this will cover. I will write to the Committee if what I have just said is incorrect or needs clarification in any way. I hope that, on that basis, we can make progress.
Matthew Pennycook
I welcome that clarification from the Minister and the offer to provide us with further details should they be needed.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
ELIGIBILITY FOR ENFRANCHISEMENT AND EXTENSION: SPECIFIC CASES
Lee Rowley
I beg to move amendment 57, in schedule 1, page 82, line 16, at end insert—
“Exception to enfranchisement for certified community housing providers
3A (1) The LRA 1967 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 1 (tenants eligible for enfranchisement and extension), after subsection (1B) insert—
‘(1C) This Part of this Act does not confer on a tenant a right to acquire the freehold of a house and premises if the landlord under the existing tenancy is a certified community housing provider (see section 4B).’
(3) After section 4A insert—
‘4B Meaning of “certified community housing provider’
(1) For the purposes of this Part of this Act, a person is a “certified community housing provider” if the appropriate tribunal has issued a community housing certificate in respect of the person.
(2) A community housing certificate is a certificate that the tribunal has determined that the person—
(a) is a community land trust within the meaning of section 2(7A) of the Leasehold Reform (Ground Rent) Act 2022, or
(b) is of a description, or satisfies conditions, specified for this purpose in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(3) The tribunal may issue a community housing certificate only in respect of a person that has made an application to the tribunal for the certificate.
(4) The tribunal may cancel a community housing certificate—
(a) on the application of the person in respect of which the certificate is issued, or
(b) on the application of a tenant affected by the certificate, if the tribunal considers that—
(i) the person in respect of which the certificate is issued does not fall within subsection (2)(a) or (b), or
(ii) the certificate was obtained by deception or fraud.
For this purpose a tenant is “affected by” a certificate if, by virtue of section 1(1C), the tenant does not have the right to acquire the freehold because the certificate is issued in respect of their landlord.
(5) The effect of the tribunal cancelling the certificate is that the person is not a certified community housing provider unless the tribunal issues a new community housing certificate.
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for—
(a) the procedure to be followed in connection with an application for a community housing certificate;
(b) the procedure to be followed for the cancellation of a community housing certificate (including in connection with an application for the cancellation);
(c) any matters to which the tribunal must have regard in deciding whether to issue or cancel a community housing certificate.
(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the application of this Part in circumstances where—
(a) a landlord’s application for a community housing certificate has not been concluded when a tenant gives notice of their desire to have the freehold of a house and premises under this Part, or
(b) a tenant’s claim to have the freehold of a house and premises under this Part has not been concluded when a landlord’s application for a community housing certificate is made.
(8) Regulations under subsection (7) may in particular provide for—
(a) the claim for the freehold to be paused or to have no effect;
(b) a time period for the purposes of this Part to be extended in connection with the application;
(c) the landlord to compensate a tenant or reversioner in respect of reasonable costs incurred in connection with a claim to acquire the freehold—
(i) if the tenant ceases to have the right to acquire the freehold because of the issue of a certificate under this section, or
(ii) if the costs are incurred as a result of the claim being suspended because of an application for a certificate under this section;
(d) enforcement by the appropriate tribunal of any of the requirements of the regulations;
(e) the appropriate tribunal to make orders that are supplementary to the issue of a community housing certificate.
(9) Regulations under this section—
(a) may make different provision for different purposes;
(b) are to be made by statutory instrument.
(10) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section (whether alone or with other provision) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.’
3B (1) The LRHUDA 1993 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 5 (qualifying tenants for enfranchisement), after subsection (2)(a) insert—
‘(aa) the immediate landlord under the lease is a certified community housing provider (see section 8B); or’
(3) Before section 9 insert—
‘8B Meaning of “certified community housing provider’
(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, a person is a “certified community housing provider” if the appropriate tribunal has issued a community housing certificate in respect of the person.
(2) A community housing certificate is a certificate that the tribunal has determined that the person—
(a) is a community land trust within the meaning of section 2(7A) of the Leasehold Reform (Ground Rent) Act 2022, or
(b) is of a description, or satisfies conditions, specified for this purpose in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(3) The tribunal may issue a community housing certificate only in respect of a person that has made an application to the tribunal for the certificate.
(4) The tribunal may cancel a community housing certificate—
(a) on the application of the person in respect of which the certificate is issued, or
(b) on the application of a leaseholder affected by the certificate, if the tribunal considers that—
(i) the person in respect of which the certificate is issued does not fall within subsection (2)(a) or (b), or
(ii) the certificate was obtained by deception or fraud.
For this purpose a leaseholder is “affected by” a certificate if, by virtue of section 5(2)(aa), the leaseholder is not a qualifying tenant because the certificate is issued in respect of their immediate landlord.
(5) The effect of the tribunal cancelling the certificate is that the person is not a certified community housing provider unless the tribunal issues a new community housing certificate.
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for—
(a) the procedure to be followed in connection with an application for a community housing certificate;
(b) the procedure to be followed for the cancellation of a community housing certificate (including in connection with an application for the cancellation);
(c) any matters to which the tribunal must have regard in deciding whether to issue or cancel a community housing certificate.
(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the application of this Chapter in circumstances where—
(a) a landlord’s application for a community housing certificate has not been concluded when a nominee purchaser gives notice under section 13 of a claim to exercise the right to collective enfranchisement, or
(b) a claim to exercise the right to collective enfranchisement has not been concluded when a landlord’s application for a community housing certificate is made.
(8) Regulations under subsection (7) may in particular provide for—
(a) the claim for the freehold to be paused or to have no effect;
(b) a time period for the purposes of this Chapter to be extended in connection with the application;
(c) the landlord to compensate the nominee purchaser, a tenant or a reversioner in respect of reasonable costs incurred in connection with a claim to exercise the right to collective enfranchisement—
(i) if a person ceases to be a participating tenant because of the issue of a certificate under this section (and in this case the compensation may relate to reasonable costs for which the person is liable that are incurred after the person ceases to be a participating tenant),
(ii) if the participating tenants cease to have the right to collective enfranchisement because of the issue of a certificate under this section, or
(iii) if the costs are incurred as a result of the claim being suspended because of an application for a certificate under this section;
(d) enforcement by the appropriate tribunal of any of the requirements of the regulations;
(e) the appropriate tribunal to make orders that are supplementary to the issue of a community housing certificate.’
(4) In section 39(3)(a) (qualifying tenants for extension), before ‘(5)’ insert ‘(2)(aa), ’.
(5) In section 100 (orders and regulations), after subsection (2) insert—
‘(2A) But a statutory instrument containing regulations under section 8B (whether alone or with other provision) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.’”
This amendment would provide for an exception to enfranchisement (but not extension) for tenants of certified community housing providers (persons certified as managing land for the benefit of local communities).
Lee Rowley
As we considered regarding clause 4, schedule 1 repeals blockers to enfranchisement claims. The schedule repeals blockers that enable landlords to block claims for lease extensions and freehold acquisitions where the landlord intends to redevelop a property. The rights apply to cases where leases are very near to ending and, again, are rarely used. Compensation is paid to leaseholders only where the blockers are used in houses, not flats.
The schedule also repeals blockers that apply to niche cases, including: a blocker allowing a landlord or their family to reoccupy a house, which now applies to very few leases, due to its criteria; a public authority development blocker that has fallen from use; and a blocker to sub-lease extensions, where they are granted out of a superior extended lease.
The schedule makes consequential amendments that are necessary because of the repeals that I have just described. Where a lease is extended, landlords continue to have statutory break rights, which we will consider in later deliberations, and they may continue to seek voluntary agreements to end a lease. Public landlords may also have access to compulsory purchase orders. I commend that measure to the Committee.
I will now speak to amendment 57 and the consequential amendments 30 and 32. While we want to encourage many more leaseholders to buy their freeholds, there are good reasons for certain properties to be exempt from freehold ownership. For instance, certain community-led developments, providing affordable housing for local people, wish to be exempt from freehold acquisition—that is not their original purpose and it should not become so—so that the homes can remain affordable for the benefit of the community in perpetuity.
These amendments exempt community land trusts, a form of community-led housing, from freehold acquisition, as that model of housing relies on land being held in single ownership to remain as community-led housing. The amendments also provide a power for the Secretary of State to define in regulations further types of community-led housing, should that be necessary in future.
The exemption will only apply to an organisation once it has obtained a certificate from the tribunal that it satisfies the definition of community-led housing. That ensures that the exemption is properly targeted and not misused. An organisation will cease to benefit from the exemption if the certificate is cancelled by the tribunal. That includes where the organisation no longer satisfies the definition of a community-led housing organisation, or where the organisation asks the tribunal to cancel the certificate.
These amendments will protect the benefits of genuine community-led housing schemes from being lost to future generations. I therefore commend them to the Committee.
Finally, I beg to move amendment 58 in my name.
The Chair
Order. Amendment 58 is in the next group. We are debating Government amendments 57, 30 and 32 to schedule 1.
Lee Rowley
My apologies, Mr Efford. I thought that we were debating these as a group. I will come to amendment 58 when we get to that group.
Matthew Pennycook
I rise briefly to speak to these four Government amendments and to make a wider comment on them and the other 116 amendments that have been tabled in the Minister’s name over recent days.
Having scrutinised these amendments as carefully as we could in the time available, we are as confident as we can be that none is problematic. Indeed, we very much welcomed the exemption provided for community-led housing.
As confirmed to the Committee by Professor Nick Hopkins, 18 of the 120 Government amendments tabled in Committee implement Law Commission policy that was not in the Bill as introduced and on which Law Commission staff have been involved in instructing parliamentary counsel. The vast majority of the other 102 amendments are merely technical in nature. Providing that the Minister sets out clearly their effect and rationale, as he just has in relation to this group of amendments, we do not intend to detain the Committee over the coming sessions by exploring the finer points of each.
However, I feel I must put on record our intense frustration at the fact that so many detailed Government amendments were tabled just days before commencement of line-by-line scrutiny began. The practice of significantly amending Bills as they progress through the House has become common practice for this Government and in our view it is not acceptable. Other Governments have done it, but it has become the norm under this Government. It impedes hon. Members in effectively scrutinising legislation and increases the likelihood that Acts of Parliament contain errors that subsequently need to be remedied, as happened with the Building Safety Act 2022; as the Minister will know, we have had to pass a number of regulations making technical corrections to that Act.
When it comes to this Bill, the Government have had the Law Commission’s recommendations for almost four years and access to Law Commission staff to aid parliamentary counsel with drafting. There really is no excuse for eleventh-hour amendments introducing Law Commission policy or technical amendments designed to clarify, correct mistakes, or ensure consistency across provisions.
Barry Gardiner
Is my hon. Friend as surprised as I was to find that a 133-page Bill has a 102-page amendment paper? As he says, this came late. It is not just Opposition Members who mind; it is hon. Members of all parties who want to adequately scrutinise the Bill. It makes life very difficult to go through detailed amendments, often amending previous legislation—therefore, we have to get that legislation and see what the impact of the changes is—and it impedes the work of Parliament in that respect. The Minister should explain why many of these amendments were tabled so late in the day.
Matthew Pennycook
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. I think I am justified in saying that it is frankly laughable that this has happened. We have an amendment paper that is almost—and may be, in due course—larger than the Bill itself. It reeks of a Government in disarray. Though I know that the Minister has picked up this Bill part-way through its development, I urge him not only to do what he can to ensure that when the Government publish any Bill it is broadly in the format they wish it to proceed in and see passed, but also to table any further amendments to this Bill in good time so that we can give them the level of scrutiny that leaseholders across the country rightfully expect.
Rachel Maclean
I will not detain the Committee for long. In response to those comments from the Opposition, I observe only that when they were last in government— in 2002, if I am correct—they had the opportunity to address the system and rectify the failures that we are now dealing with. It is now left to this Government to do it. On that note, I want to say to my hon. Friend the Minister how important it is that the community-led housing sector is excluded. I would not normally say that about any form of housing, but we have recently strengthened the national planning policy framework to encourage more of that type of housing. We know it is popular and often commands local support, while other types of housing sadly do not, and we need to see more of it built. The sector has had extensive discussions. This is a sensible amendment, which I support.
Lee Rowley
I thank my hon. Friend for confirmation of the importance of community-led housing, which we have spoken about previously. I absolutely agree about its importance.
I will not get into a broader conversation about the processes of government, other than to say that I note the concerns of the hon. Members for Brent North and for Greenwich and Woolwich. The intention is to give the Committee and the House as a whole as much scrutiny as possible. I am sure that the hon. Members will understand that, outside the bounds of the points that they are making, getting proposed legislation ready is often a complicated process—in particular ensuring that it is as correct as it can be. None the less, I have noted their points, but I hope to be grateful for their support for the underlying provision we are debating.
Amendment 57 agreed to.
Lee Rowley
I beg to move amendment 58, in schedule 1, page 82, line 28, at end insert—
“Eligibility of leases of National Trust property for extension
4A For section 32 of the LRA 1967 (saving for National Trust) substitute—
‘32 National Trust property
(1) Property is “inalienable National Trust property” for the purposes of this section if an interest in the property is vested inalienably in the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty under section 21 of the National Trust Act 1907.
(2) This Part does not prejudice the operation of section 21 of the National Trust Act 1907, and accordingly a tenant does not have the right under this Part to acquire the freehold of inalienable National Trust property.
(3) The right to an extended lease has effect subject to the following provisions of this section only if and to the extent that the existing tenancy demises inalienable National Trust property.
(4) In a case where the existing tenancy is a post-commencement protected National Trust tenancy, the tenant does not have the right to an extended lease.
(5) In a case where the existing tenancy is a pre-commencement protected National Trust tenancy, this Act is to have effect in relation to the right to an extended lease without the amendments made by the Leasehold and Freehold Reform Act 2024 (but without altering the effect of this subsection).
(6) In any other case, the right to an extended lease has effect subject to subsections (7) and (8).
(7) In determining whether the tenant has the right to an extended lease, the following requirements in section 1 do not apply—
(a) any requirement for the tenancy to be at a low rent;
(b) any requirement in section 1(1)(a)(i) or (ii) for the house and premises or the tenancy to be above a certain value.
(8) If the tenant exercises the right to an extended lease, the new tenancy must contain the buy-back term which is prescribed for this purpose in regulations made by the Secretary of State (the “prescribed buy-back term”).
(9) A “buy-back term” is a term which gives the National Trust the right to buy the whole or part of the extended lease if—
(a) it is proposed to make a disposal of the extended lease that is of a description specified in that term (which may be a disposal of the whole or a part of the property demised), or
(b) the National Trust exercises a prescribed buy-back term that is contained in a lease which is inferior to the extended lease.
(10) The prescribed buy-back term may, in particular, make provision about—
(a) the procedure where it is proposed to make a disposal that is of a description specified in the term;
(b) the procedure for exercising the right to buy;
(c) the price payable;
(d) the payment of costs incurred in connection with the operation of the term (including requirements for one person to pay costs incurred by another person);
(e) the operation of the term if the National Trust is not a party to the extended lease.
(11) If the National Trust is not the landlord under the extended lease, the National Trust may at any time apply to the appropriate tribunal for an order to secure that the extended lease is varied to contain (if or to the extent that it does not already do so) the prescribed buy-back term; and an order made on such an application may appoint a person who is not party to the extended lease to execute a variation of the lease.
32ZA Section 32: supplementary provision
(1) For the purposes of section 32, the existing tenancy is a “protected National Trust tenancy” if the tenancy is prescribed, or is of a description of tenancies prescribed, in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(2) Regulations may not provide for a tenancy to be a protected National Trust tenancy unless the tenancy is within case A or case B.
(3) Case A: some or all of the property let under the tenancy is—
(a) property to which the general public has access, or
(b) part of property to which the general public has access (whether or not the general public has access to any property let under the tenancy),
whether the arrangements for public access are managed by the National Trust, the tenant or another person.
(4) Case B: the existing tenancy was granted to—
(a) a former owner,
(b) a relative of a former owner, or
(c) the trustees of a trust whose beneficiaries are or include—
(i) a former owner, or
(ii) a relative of a former owner.
(5) Regulations under section 32 or this section—
(a) may make different provision for different purposes;
(b) are to be made by statutory instrument.
(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 32 or this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(7) In section 32 and this section—
“commencement” means the day on which paragraph 4A of Schedule 1 to the Leasehold and Freehold Reform Act 2024 comes into force;
“disposal” , in relation to an extended lease, includes—
(a) the grant of a sub-lease of property demised by the extended lease;
(b) a change in control of a body (whether or not incorporated) which owns the extended lease;
(c) the surrender of the extended lease;
(d) a disposal (of any kind) for no consideration;
“former owner” , in relation to inalienable National Trust property let under a tenancy, means—
(a) a person who transferred the freehold of the property to the National Trust,
(b) a person who owned the freehold of the property immediately before its transfer to the National Trust by, or at the direction of—
(i) the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs,
(ii) the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, or
(iii) the Treasury,
(c) a person whose executors transferred, or directed the transfer of, the freehold of the property to the National Trust, or
(d) a person who was a beneficiary under a trust whose trustees transferred, or directed the transfer of, the freehold of the property to the National Trust;
“post-commencement protected National Trust tenancy” means a tenancy which—
(a) was granted on or after commencement, unless it was granted under an agreement made before commencement, and
(b) is a protected National Trust tenancy;
“pre-commencement protected National Trust tenancy” means a tenancy which—
(a) was granted—
(i) before commencement, or
(ii) on or after commencement under an agreement made before commencement, and
(b) is a protected National Trust tenancy;
“relative” includes a person who is related by marriage or civil partnership;
“right to an extended lease” means the right under this Part to acquire an extended lease.’
4B For section 95 of the LRHUDA 1993 (saving for National Trust) substitute—
‘95 National Trust property
(1) Property is “inalienable National Trust property” for the purposes of this section if an interest in the property is vested inalienably in the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty under section 21 of the National Trust Act 1907.
(2) Chapter 1 does not prejudice the operation of section 21 of the National Trust Act 1907, and accordingly there is no right under Chapter 1 to acquire an interest in inalienable National Trust property.
(3) The right to a new lease has effect subject to the following provisions of this section only if and to the extent that the existing lease demises inalienable National Trust property.
(4) In a case where the existing lease is a protected National Trust tenancy, the tenant does not have the right to a new lease.
(5) If—
(a) the existing lease is not a protected National Trust Tenancy, and
(b) the tenant exercises the right to a new lease,
the new lease must contain the buy-back term which is prescribed in regulations made by the Secretary of State (the “prescribed buy-back term”).
(6) A “buy-back term” is a term which gives the National Trust the right to buy the whole or part of the new lease if—
(a) it is proposed to make a disposal of the new lease that is of a description specified in that term (which may be a disposal of the whole or a part of the property demised), or
(b) the National Trust exercises a prescribed buy-back term that is contained in a lease which is inferior to the extended lease.
(7) The prescribed buy-back term may, in particular, make provision about—
(a) the procedure where it is proposed to make a disposal that is of a description specified in the term;
(b) the procedure for exercising the right to buy;
(c) the price payable;
(d) the payment of costs incurred in connection with the operation of the term (including requirements for one person to pay costs incurred by another person);
(e) the operation of the term if the National Trust is not a party to the new lease.
(8) If the National Trust is not the landlord under the new lease, the National Trust may at any time apply to the appropriate tribunal for an order to secure that the new lease is varied to contain (if or to the extent that it does not already do so) the prescribed buy-back term; and an order made on such an application may appoint a person who is not party to the new lease to execute a variation of the lease.
95A Section 95: supplementary provision
(1) For the purposes of section 95, the existing lease is a “protected National Trust tenancy” if the lease is prescribed, or is of a description of leases prescribed, in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(2) Regulations may not provide for a lease to be a protected National Trust tenancy unless the lease is within case A or case B.
(3) Case A: some or all of the property let under the lease is—
(a) property to which the general public has access, or
(b) part of property to which the general public has access (whether or not the general public has access to any property let under the lease),
whether the arrangements for public access are managed by the National Trust, the tenant or another person.
(4) Case B: the existing lease was granted to—
(a) a former owner,
(b) a relative of a former owner, or
(c) the trustees of a trust whose beneficiaries are or include—
(i) a former owner, or
(ii) a relative of a former owner.
(5) Regulations under section 95 or this section—
(a) may make different provision for different purposes;
(b) are to be made by statutory instrument.
(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 95 or this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(7) In section 95 and this section—
“disposal” , in relation to a new lease, includes—
(a) the grant of a sub-lease of property demised by the new lease;
(b) a change in control of a body (whether or not incorporated) which owns the new lease;
(c) the surrender of the new lease;
(d) a disposal (of any kind) for no consideration;
“former owner” , in relation to inalienable National Trust property let under a tenancy, means—
(a) a person who transferred the freehold of the property to the National Trust,
(b) a person who owned the freehold of the property immediately before its transfer to the National Trust by, or at the direction of—
(i) the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs,
(ii) the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, or
(iii) the Treasury,
(c) a person whose executors transferred, or directed the transfer of, the freehold of the property to the National Trust, or
(d) a person who was a beneficiary under a trust whose trustees transferred, or directed the transfer of, the freehold of the property to the National Trust;
“relative” includes a person who is related by marriage or civil partnership;
“right to a new lease” means the right under Chapter 2 to a new lease.’”
This amendment would provide for tenants of National Trust properties to have the right to extension, subject to exceptions, and subject to a requirement to grant the National Trust the right to buy back the property in certain circumstances.
Lee Rowley
My enthusiasm for the amendment was such that I started to speak to it earlier, but I am now moving it in the correct place.
The National Trust play a big role in looking after the heritage of the nation. Inalienable National Trust land is held for the benefit of the nation, forever. In order to ensure that that land remains in national ownership for future generations, freehold acquisition is restricted on National Trust land. None the less, the Government want to see National Trust leaseholders’ rights improved.
The amendment means that National Trust leaseholders will benefit from the new lease extension rights in line with other leaseholders, so that the 990 years will apply in this instance. The new rights will be subject to a narrow exception for a small number of leases of specified visitor attraction properties and donor leases. That will allow the trust to make bespoke lease agreements when a noteworthy property comes into its ownership—for example, where a property could be opened to the public in whole or in part, or where arrangements have been made with family members when a property has been gifted to the state and the trust itself. Those limited exceptions will be set out in regulations made by the Secretary of State in due course. Those leaseholders will retain their existing lease extension rights where they already have them.
The amendment also makes provision for the National Trust to buy back an extended lease at market value, if the existing leaseholder chooses to dispose of their lease. That will allow the National Trust to manage the long-term use of its inalienable land on behalf of the nation. I commend the amendment to the Committee.
Amendment 58 agreed to.
Schedule 1, as amended, agreed.
Clause 5
Acquisition of intermediate interests in collective enfranchisement
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lee Rowley
The clause sets out how intermediate leases and leases of common parts are treated in collective enfranchisement claims for flats. In home ownership, intermediate leases are the middle rungs on a ladder between the freeholder at the top, and the leaseholder with rights at the end. Leases of common parts might cover parts of premises such as stairways.
The clause will introduce proposed new schedule A1 to the 1993 Act. The schedule sets out a series of gateways that require leaseholders to acquire certain interests, but also grants them further choices to reduce premiums. Qualifying leaseholders who participate in a claim must acquire all intermediate leases superior to their leases. They can, however, choose to leave in place the part of an intermediate lease superior to those qualifying leaseholders who are not participating. The intention is that this will help to reduce the premium where not all leaseholders wish to participate.
For example, leaseholders could leave the head lease in place above two out of eight flats, where the two are not participating. Where leaseholders acquire only part of a lease, they still need to acquire the relevant parts of leases above it in the chain to prevent a disrupted management structure.
The schedule sets out that leaseholders do not need to acquire a whole lease of common parts where certain legal tests are met, which will help to reduce premiums. The schedule prevents the acquisition of special cases of intermediate leases in collective enfranchisement. That includes qualifying leaseholders who own the immediately superior intermediate lease and landlords with enfranchisement rights over a flat. Those parts of leases can be retained by the owners to preserve their homes or tenure at the property. The schedule sets out various mechanisms for allowing leases to be left in place. That is done via an existing process called severing, and clause 16(6) gives the tribunal new powers to determine the terms of that.
The schedule preserves the necessary elements of the existing law that prevent ill effects arising from collective enfranchisement. Landlords can continue to require leaseholders to acquire interest, for instance where it would be impossible to maintain the premises. An exception that prevents the acquisition of interest held by public sector landlords continues. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 5 is extremely technical. It concerns the treatment of intermediate leases during a collective enfranchisement. I beg the Committee’s forgiveness for the level of complexity I am about to throw at the Minister; nevertheless, it is important to the leaseholders who stand to be affected. As the Minister said, the clause replaces section 2 of the 1993 Act on to the acquisition of leasehold interest, with a new schedule, A1, that will henceforth govern the acquisition of intermediate interests during a collective enfranchisement process.
New schedule A1 enacts part or all of five recommendations made by the Law Commission in chapter 13 of its 2020 report, and is uncontentious. However, when considering the treatment of intermediate leases and other leasehold interests in that chapter, the Law Commission recommended that a duty be imposed on the landlord dealing with the enfranchisement claim
“to act in good faith and with reasonable skill and care”
toward other landlords involved. Any such landlord should be able to apply for directions from the tribunal about the conduct of the response to the claim. It also recommended corresponding requirements for landlords who are not dealing with the claim to provide all necessary information and assistance to the landlord who is, and to contribute to the non-litigation costs of that landlord.
My reading of schedule A1 is that its effect will be that any settlement reached between a leaseholder and the landlord who is dealing with a claim, and any determination of that claim by the tribunal, will be binding on all other landlords. Assuming that I have interpreted the schedule correctly, can the Minister make clear why it does not appear to implement the duties and requirements that the Law Commission recommended should apply to landlords who are dealing with the claim and landlords who are not, respectively?
Finally, while I appreciate that we will consider the issue of valuation in more detail when we come to consider clauses 9, 10 and 11, I would be grateful if the Minister could also provide some clarification on how the Bill proposes to calculate enfranchisement premiums in instances where there are intermediate leases. Am I right in believing that schedule 2 treats intermediate leases as merged for the purposes of valuation?
On a related matter, the Minister will also be aware that the Law Commission set out the option of generally disregarding the existence of an intermediate lease when determining the premium payable on enfranchisement on the grounds that it would simplify the calculation and create greater fairness between leaseholders and between landlords, as premiums would not differ solely because of the existence or otherwise of one or more intermediate leases. It also recommended that on any individual lease extension claim, the rent payable by an intermediate landlord should be commuted on a pro rata basis.
If I have understood the relevant provisions correctly, neither proposal was incorporated into the Bill as first published. The second of those recommendations appears to be addressed by Government amendments 73 and 95. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether my reading of those amendments is correct in that regard—via correspondence, if he needs to, as I appreciate that these are extremely technical questions. Broadly, we would like the Minister to expand on his remarks and provide some clarity about the treatment of intermediate leases during collective enfranchisement and the extent to which this part of the Bill as a whole reflects the Law Commission’s proposals. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lee Rowley
My response is short. I will happily write to the hon. Gentleman and to the Committee in due course on the technicalities to ensure that is correct.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Right to require leaseback by freeholder after collective enfranchisement
Barry Gardiner
I beg to move amendment 127, in clause 6, page 9, line 42, at end insert—
“(3A) Any lease granted to the freeholder under paragraph 7A must contain a provision that any sub-lease created by the freeholder under their leaseback must contain a provision requiring the sub-lessee to contribute to the service charges reasonably incurred by the managing agent directly or indirectly appointed by the nominee purchaser.
(3B) The provision mentioned in subsection (3A) is implied into all pre-existing subordinate leases to a leaseback granted to a freeholder under paragraph 7A.”
Barry Gardiner
It is helpful to the Committee that we had the evidence session, because Liam Spender, the lawyer from Velitor Law, spoke directly about this matter.
We welcome leaseback because it is an important part of enabling tenants in commercial, or partly commercial, buildings to enfranchise. However, imagine that a person has just newly enfranchised, and some of the residents in that block have not participated in the enfranchisement process. It has been quite an acrimonious job debating and arguing with the landlord to get the enfranchisement to happen, but they finally have it. However, the landlord, or the former landlord, may not be happy about it. His capacity, now as the tenant, to cause problems is enhanced by the existing lease that those who have not enfranchised have with him. The moneys that need to be collected for the new landlord’s service charge do not come directly to them.
The whole point of the clause is to minimise those problems. There should be a condition in the leaseback to make it clear that any sub-lease that the former landlord gives, or retains, must contain a provision to say that the service charge is payable to the new landlord. Otherwise, we have a very torturous process in which those sums, which are required for the servicing of the building, may be delayed by a former landlord who feels aggrieved that he has lost control.
Matthew Pennycook
My hon. Friend raises an interesting point, which has value. However, if he will forgive me, I would like some more time to consider any unintended consequences before I determine whether we could support it. Perhaps we could come back to it at a later stage, but if he is determined to push it I will come up with a position from the Front-Bench team.
Clause 6 inserts into the 1993 Act a new leaseback right for tenants participating in a collective enfranchisement claim, enabling them to require their landlord to take a leaseback of particular flats or units in the building, other than flats let to a participating tenant. We welcome the clause, as my hon. Friend made clear, which implements recommendation 21 of the Law Commission’s final report on leasehold enfranchisement.
At present, leasebacks are mandatory in certain circumstances. A landlord can also require leaseholders to grant them a leaseback of any unit not let to a qualifying tenant, or any flat or unit occupied by them and of which they are the qualifying tenant. However, leaseholders do not enjoy the right to require their landlord to take a leaseback with the effect that, in instances where the landlord refuses a request for a leaseback, perhaps because they are deliberately seeking to frustrate the process entirely, the premium payable in an enfranchisement claim includes the value of that interest.
The new leaseback right introduced by the clause will ensure that premiums that leaseholders would otherwise have to pay will be reduced. Collective freehold acquisition will become a possibility for larger numbers of them because a key funding constraint—namely having to pay for the reversionary value of those flats and units as part of their claim—will have been removed, and in many cases, collective freehold acquisition claims will be made considerably more affordable as a result. It will also increase certainty by ensuring that leaseholders have a far more accurate estimate of the costs of a claim at the outset. Finally, it is essential to ensuring that the increase in the non-residential limit from 25% to 50%, which we debated earlier, is of practical benefit to leaseholders. Without a new leaseback right, many leaseholders who would otherwise be interested in collectively enfranchising would be deterred because the cost of purchasing the whole of a building containing up to 50% commercial space would be prohibitive.
I have two questions for the Minister. The first concerns intermediate leases, which we have just considered under the previous clause. As I believe may have been highlighted by some respondents to the Law Commission consultation, there will be circumstances in which a leaseback of some units to the landlord would not reduce the premium by any significant amount, because the majority of the value in the units in question will be held not by the landlord but by an intermediate interest. This obviously raises again the issue of how the Bill treats the calculation of enfranchisement premiums in instances in which there is an intermediate lease. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify whether the Bill seeks in any way to address the impact that intermediate leases might have on the benefits that leaseholders could otherwise expect to secure as a result of the new leaseback right.
My second question concerns the terms of the leaseback required under the new right. My understanding is that these will be for a term of 999 years at a peppercorn ground rent, as under the current law, but I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that that is the case and perhaps provide the Committee with any other important detail about leaseback terms that will apply to them.
Lee Rowley
I will turn first to the amendment from the hon. Member for Brent North. I appreciate the point that he has made, and he articulated it very well. He is rightly concerned that all those who have an interest in a building should need to pay for it. The amendment’s intent is to require any leases granted to include a requirement to make contributions to service charges, as he articulated. Our understanding—I have checked, following the introduction of his amendment—is that the existing law should sufficiently cover this and it should be unlikely that intermediate landlords will not ensure that their sub-lessees contribute to the service charges of a property. But I recognise that the hon. Gentleman has a lot of experience, knowledge and background in this area over many years, so if he wants to write to me separately, with examples of where we potentially have not understood the detail of the point that he is making, I will be happy to look at that in more detail.
Matthew Pennycook
I intervene just briefly so that I can put this on the record. One of my slight concerns about the amendment from my hon. Friend the Member for Brent North is that it could complicate pro rata charges for leaseholders. I just wonder whether the Government have given that any thought. In many ways, the amendment is entirely unproblematic, and we support the intention, but there are a couple of concerns, that being one. Is that part of the Government’s thinking on my hon. Friend’s amendment?
Lee Rowley
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for pointing that out. As indicated, this all needs to be considered in the round. Very few things come without trade-offs and without consideration of other implications. One reason why we are not able to support this amendment today is that we do not think that it is necessary. As a result, I hope that the hon. Member for Brent North will not push it to a vote but will withdraw it. If we have missed something, I will be happy to look at that separately. As the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich suggested, this is something that we do not think is necessary in the wider scheme of things, but if there is a thing that we have missed, I will happily take further information on it.
I will now turn to clause 6, which has been discussed already to some extent. The Government want to broaden access to collective enfranchisement, so that more leaseholders can buy their freehold. However, we recognise that increased access will remain theoretical if many leaseholders are unable to afford to buy their freehold. Therefore, this enfranchisement must be cheaper if leaseholders are to gain the benefits of the ownership that is being sought.
Clause 6 introduces a leaseback right for leaseholders that, if they elect to use it as part of a claim, will in some cases significantly reduce the up-front price that they must pay. “Leaseback”, as has been indicated, is the term commonly used to refer to an intermediate lease over part of a building that is granted to the outgoing freeholder as part of an enfranchisement claim. This leaseback covers the value of the unit, which is therefore retained by the outgoing freeholder and reduces the cost for leaseholders of buying the freehold. Currently, the outgoing freeholder can require the leaseholders taking forward a collective enfranchisement to grant the freeholder a leaseback of any non-qualifying units in a building. Clause 6 gives leaseholders an equivalent right to require the outgoing freeholder to take a 999-year leaseback, at a peppercorn rate, of any non-participating units in the building as part of the claim.
In mixed-use buildings, the question of affordability is even more acute, as leaseholders must pay for the freehold interest in non-residential parts of the building, which they have no existing financial interest in, as well as their flats, which they already partly own.
Barry Gardiner
I am grateful to the Minister for his remarks. It is clear that the Government do not feel that the amendment is necessary and that there will not be a problem with the newly enfranchised freeholder being able to obtain the service charge from all the leaseholders. If that is the case, I will be happy to withdraw the amendment.
I would, however, like the Minister to set out in writing to me and the Committee precisely why he believes that there is not a problem. If we still disagree, we can then bring the amendment back on Report and discuss it further. It would be really helpful to be clear about why the Government are confident that problems will not arise. We have made legislation on the basis of optimism before, and unfortunately our experience is that freeholders can often be quite vindictive.
Lee Rowley
I am happy to give the hon. Gentleman that assurance, and I will be happy to write to him.
Barry Gardiner
On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Longer lease extensions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lee Rowley
Currently, leaseholders of houses can claim a lease extension of 50 years, and leaseholders of flats can claim an extension of 90 years. Leaseholders of houses can only ever make one lease extension claim; leaseholders of flats will need to claim repeated extensions both within and between generations, with associated costs. Leaseholders often have to worry about the value of their lease falling as the term runs down.
Clause 7 will amend the lease extension term for houses in the 1967 Act, from 50 to 990 years, and for flats in the 1993 Act, from 90 to 990 years. There is no restriction on the number of claims that can be made, although with a 990-year extended term it is envisaged that only one extension will be necessary; 990 years is as long an extension as can be reasonably given while facilitating multiple periods of 90 years to allow for consistency with existing leases and redevelopment breaks.
Increasing to 990 years the term of the statutory lease extension right maximises the benefit to leaseholders and gives leaseholders much greater security in their homes. This is particularly important where leaseholders do not qualify or are not in a position to buy their freehold.
The increase in the extension term will mean that leaseholders do not have to claim repeated extensions, pay associated repeated transaction costs or worry about the value of their property falling as the lease runs down. Leaseholders of flats and houses will be able to obtain a lease extension of 990 years at a peppercorn ground rent, in exchange for a premium determined by the amended valuation scheme set out in clauses 9 to 11.
I turn to clause 8. Currently, a lease extension for a house under the 1967 Act is made without payment of a premium, but in return for a modern ground rent during the period of the extension, where that rent is similar to a market rent. Because we are increasing the extension term to 990 years at a peppercorn rent, landlords will need to be compensated by payment of a premium, as is the case for flats. The clause makes amendments to the 1967 Act to ensure that landlords will be sufficiently compensated when a 990-year lease extension at a peppercorn is granted for a house. A qualifying leaseholder can obtain an extension of 990 years at a peppercorn ground rent in exchange for a premium determined by the amended valuation scheme set out in clauses 9 to 11.
Matthew Pennycook
I will spend some time on the clauses, because they are important.
As the Minister set out, clause 7 changes the lease extension rights given to tenants of houses and tenants of flats by the 1967 and 1993 Acts, respectively, to provide for a 990-year lease extension rather than, as is currently the case, a 50-year extension under the 1967 Act and a 90-year extension under the 1993 Act. Clause 8 works in conjunction with clause 7 to that end, by making consequential amendments to the 1967 Act that are required to set ground rents under such extensions at a peppercorn and ensure that the premium payable is based on the amended valuation scheme set out in clauses 9 to 11, as the Minister made clear.
Taken together, the clauses not only provide for the standard lease extension term to increase to 990 years at a peppercorn rent, but ensure that the rights available to tenants under each of the Acts are made equivalent. This reform, which draws on recommendations 1 and 2 of the Law Commission’s final report on leasehold enfranchisement, is long overdue. The right to extend one’s lease is important for leaseholders who do not qualify for a right of freehold acquisition or who do enjoy such a right but, for whatever reason, either cannot or do not wish to purchase the freehold. It is particularly important for leaseholders who live in blocks of flats, as the vast majority do in constituencies such as mine, because it is the only enfranchisement right they can exercise when acting alone. However, both the 50-year lease extension available to leaseholders of houses under the 1967 Act and the 90-year extension available to leaseholders of flats under the 1993 Act are too short to provide adequate security of tenure.
The principle of a right to an extension of a considerably longer time is therefore the right one. As the Minister argued, it will particularly help to protect those leaseholders with short remaining lease terms at the point at which the extension is secured, and will avoid the need for a second extension to be sought and secured in short order. We also feel that the choice of a standard 990-year lease is the right one. Once the principle of a very long lease extension has been accepted, the case for taking the additional period as close to 999 years is watertight. A more modest extension, which the Law Commission did consider, would provide only temporary relief and would require many leaseholders to make a second claim in relatively quick succession. The proposed 990-year lease extension right will avoid the need for further lease extension claims in the future, will provide leaseholders with a substantially enhanced interest in their homes and will bring leaseholders extremely close to outright freehold ownership.
It is also right that we legislate to introduce a uniform right applicable and available to both leaseholders of houses and leaseholders of flats, so we support the alignment of the lease extension rights for which the clause provides. There is no justification for maintaining the discrepancy in the law as it stands, where the right to a lease extension for a house is considerably less favourable than the equivalent right to a lease extension for a flat. In sum, we fully support leaseholders who qualify for a lease extension under the 1967 or 1993 Act being given the right, on payment of an appropriate premium, to extend their lease and in so doing to secure a peppercorn rent.
I have five questions for the Minister about these important clauses. The first relates to redevelopment. In recommending that an additional period of 990 years should be added to the remaining term of the existing lease in the cases of both houses and flats, the Law Commission also proposed that redevelopment break rights should be maintained. These are rights accorded to a landlord to terminate a lease that has been extended and to regain possession of the property in order to carry out redevelopment work. The Law Commission recommended that they should be maintained during the last 12 months of the term of the original lease or the last five years of each period of 90 years after the commencement of the extended term.
We fully appreciate that many leaseholders will find the very notion of such break rights problematic, and the Law Commission recognises that maintaining rolling break rights, as under the 1967 Act, would create unnecessary uncertainty. However, difficulties relating to the lifespan of buildings are an issue we have to grapple with, not least because they will become more pressing over time when lease extensions become significantly longer by default. As the Law Commission’s recommendation on development break rights has not made it into the Bill, I would be grateful if the Minister explained the Government’s determination to omit it. Some would argue that there is a strong case, in a world in which 990-year lease extensions are the default, for the sensible provision of development break rights.
My second question concerns when the rights provided by clauses 7 and 8 will come into effect. The clauses present leaseholders who have recently obtained a lease extension, or who will be compelled to obtain one—for the purposes of moving home or mortgaging, say—before the commencement date, with a real dilemma, because the only way they will benefit from a 990-year extension and a peppercorn ground rent in instances where that is not already the case is by making a further extension claim in short order. The fact that any such leaseholders will have recently extended their lease with, in all likelihood, a peppercorn ground rent will mean that the premium payable will be low, but there will still be a cost.
I would be grateful if the Minister made it clear whether the Government have given any consideration to how to ensure that the premium in such cases is as low as possible, to avoid some leaseholders facing costs that others will not face, simply as a result of the sharp transition from one set of arrangements to another. Better still, could he outline precisely how commencement will operate in respect of the clauses? Will he tell us whether the Government might consider amending the Bill to ensure that the new rights come into force on, or very soon after, Royal Assent, so that they can be enjoyed by leaseholders confronting the need for an extension as quickly as possible?
My third question relates to ground rents. We will explore the issue in considerable detail when we consider clause 21, but I would be grateful if the Minister told us, in relation specifically to lease extensions, how clauses 7 and 8 will operate if the Government’s response to the consultation “Modern leasehold: restricting ground rent for existing leases”, which closed last week, is, as per the Secretary of State’s declared preference, to table amendments to enact option 1, namely capping ground rent at a peppercorn for all existing leases from a given date.
All we want to know is whether the ground rent provisions in clause 8 would be rendered irrelevant. In other words, are they unnecessary? If so, will the Government have to make further amendments to the clause to ensure that, in conjunction with clause 7, it provides only for a 990-year lease extension and does not make changes to ground rent provisions in any way? Presumably they will need to be abolished by further Government amendments that will potentially abolish ground rents for all existing leases.
My fourth question concerns the technical matter of who the competent landlord is for the purpose of lease extensions under the 1993 Act. The provisions within clauses 7 and 8 will mean that even in circumstances where there is a head lease of 999 years at a peppercorn rent, which is a fairly common occurrence, the owner will be entitled to all of the premium. Nevertheless, it is the freeholder, not the head lessee, who will have to handle the claim. That raises the obvious question of why a freeholder should engage with the process at all, given that it will leave them out of pocket.
Schedule 1 to the 1967 Act includes provisions designed to overcome the problem by providing that a long head lessee is the reversioner. Will the Minister tell us why a similar set of provisions is not being introduced to the 1993 Act to provide that a very long head lessee in a block of flats is to be regarded as the competent landlord, not the freeholder? If there is no justification for that omission, might the Government go away and consider whether it is necessary to overcome that problem?
My fifth and final question concerns the Government’s commitment to use the Bill to legislate for a ban on new leasehold houses. The Government amendments providing for such a ban have still not been tabled, so we cannot engage with the detail. However, given that it is the Government’s stated intention effectively to do away with leasehold houses, I would like to probe the Minister on the reasoning behind providing, by means of clauses 7 and 8, leaseholders in houses with a right to a 990-year lease extension at a peppercorn rent, for which the premium will be the same as if it were a freehold enfranchisement. Is this—I am being generous to the Minister—an example of muddled thinking on the Government’s part that might require review? I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Richard Fuller (North East Bedfordshire) (Con)
I want to speak briefly in support of the third point made by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, in which he addressed the interaction of the Bill with the Government’s ground rent consultation. If I heard him correctly, he was asking the Government at least to be clear as to how those recommendations will affect the Bill. He was asking the Government to be clear on their position; I will not go as far as that, because I think the Government have the discretion to decide when they want to announce that or not.
However, there is another issue that the Minister could perhaps consider: the impact assessment on the valuation, which we, as Members of Parliament, are being asked to address in this Bill. As we heard in the evidence sessions, the current impact assessment may potentially omit a significant amount of value that will be taken into account as part of the ground rent reform. If it is the Government’s intention to introduce amendments on that, as the shadow spokesman was asking, it would be useful to have clarity from the Minister on that, but we should also ask the Minister whether an updated impact assessment can be presented to incorporate what the value of those recommendations would be.
Rachel Maclean
I rise briefly to add my support for some of the comments and, most importantly, for the ability of leaseholders to extend their leases. As we know, this is one of the most egregious features of the current system: people buy properties that they then find have short leases, after which they are whacked with massive charges coming out of the blue; they do not understand how those charges are calculated, and they end up having to pay them because they have no choice. They are completely over a barrel. I know that leaseholders will massively welcome this change, which is one of the most important parts of the whole Bill.
Having said that, it is vital that we understand when we will see the Government’s response on the ground rent consultation, as my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire and the shadow spokesperson, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, have said. It will, of course, affect the calculations.
I also want to raise with the Committee the number of people who have sat in front of me and asked, “When will you bring this forward? I don’t know whether to extend my lease now or wait another year or for another consultation”. It is a huge number of people. I want to make this point to everybody: if we get this right, it will affect a lot of people very beneficially.
Barry Gardiner
I am glad that co-operation is breaking out across the aisle. It seems that this change is one of the really big issues of the Bill. Looking through the Bill, yes, there was disappointment that it does not go far enough and there is no commonhold, but this is a real change. It is something that Members on both sides of the Committee have welcomed, and we heard evidence from our witnesses about just how important it is. It is strange, therefore, that we do not now see the meat of it in the Bill. I will not go so far as to say that it is more than strange, as my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich suggested, but we do need it.
This provision will liberate a whole group of people who fear what we call the ground rent grazers. They are the ones—the freeholders—who have created a rentier structure over the past 15 years. It did not even exist 25 years ago. What people used to do 25 years ago, when the ground rent was payable, was write a cheque to the freeholder, and the freeholder would bin it. Then, three weeks later, the freeholder would send a lawyer’s letter to the tenant, saying that because they had not paid their ground rent on time, they were now being charged £625 for their legal fees in having to chase it, including the £25 ground rent. That is a bad practice that has evolved and the Government need to clamp down on it and get it sorted.
Lee Rowley
I thank hon. Members for their questions and comments, which I will try to address. There is obviously a desire to understand the interaction of the two clauses with the outcome of the consultation that closed last week. We saw to some extent in our deliberations last week, on the first two days in Committee, when we took evidence, that this is a contested area. As a result and notwithstanding the fact that by convention in this place we have the ability to speak freely, I hope the Committee will understand that I will limit my remarks.
I understand the eagerness, enthusiasm and legitimate desire of the Committee to understand the position that we will seek to provide. We will provide that to the Committee, and publicly, as soon as possible. It will not be possible for me to answer all the questions that were asked today. I accept the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire that there is a difference between process and decision, but some elements of the process could be impacted by the decision and it will therefore be difficult to engage in hypotheticals at this stage. However, we will respond to the legitimate points that the Committee has made as soon as we are able to do so.
I agree with the points made by the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich and by my hon. Friend the Member for Redditch about the importance of clarifying how quickly the provisions will come into force. Again, that is a difficult one to answer because we need to get through this process. We have no idea what the other place might or might not do or how quickly the process will go. Although we are all grateful for the confirmation from my Labour colleagues that we are seeking to move this as quickly as possible, it is difficult to be able to answer the question at this stage, but I hope to say more in due course.
On the fourth question posed by the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, about the competent landlord, my understanding is that we are not changing the law in that regard.
Richard Fuller
I am listening carefully to the Minister and sort of accept what he says, but may I make a couple of points? First, he has talked about how the Bill has to go through the House of Lords, but we are the democratically elected Chamber. The interaction of the two provisions represents substantial transfers in value between different parts of our community—rightly or wrongly. Decisions should correctly be made with the full information by this House. We should not go through a procedure when information is presented in the unelected House, which then comes back to the Commons. With our remit as Back-Bench Members of Parliament, we are very restricted in what we can do to amend that.
Secondly, the Minister talked about how the points about value are hypothetical. That is the case only because the Government have not made a decision. Once they make a decision, those points of value can be forecast. They are no longer hypothetical but judgmental, so it really is within the Minister’s remit to be able to move from hypothetical to his own forecast. Having said that, I fully accept what the Minister has said so far.
Lee Rowley
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his legitimate points. He is absolutely right that it is important that right hon. and hon. Members have an opportunity to debate at the earliest possible opportunity the complex interaction of what we may or may not choose to do with the consultation. I take his point about hypotheticals. My point was simply that there are a number of different options in the Bill. Some of them are substantially different, as my hon. Friend indicated in some of his questions last week. To go through all the elements of the potential outcomes in all of those different options would be a substantial amount of work and potentially not necessary on the basis that we are likely to choose some rather than all of them. None the less, where I have missed anything out, I will—
Eddie Hughes
The point being made is one of proportion. We are talking about a couple of a billion pounds versus up to £25 billion, £27 billion, which is a significant amount of money for the Government to be considering transferring, as my hon. Friend says, from one party to another. The size of the costs that might be incurred from one party to another makes it important for us to know as soon as possible.
Lee Rowley
I absolutely accept the potential significance of the quantum involved, which is why we all seek to be as clear as we can at the earliest opportunity.
Barry Gardiner
I am conscious that we are talking about the transfer of value as if it were neutral, but leaseholders have been telling us for a long time that this value has been unjustly acquired from them in the first place. The Government seek simply to remediate the position that the law has got itself into. When we consider this, we must understand the injustice that has been perpetrated on people who live in leasehold houses, and have been paying ground rents that have been racked up in an unconscionable way for far too long.
Lee Rowley
The hon. Gentleman is articulating his argument with passion, as he did last week on a similar point in some of the witness sessions. I reconfirm to the Committee that we seek to process the outcome of that consultation as quickly as we are able, and to provide hon. Members and the public with clarity at the earliest opportunity. None the less, while recognising the important interaction of clauses 7 and 8 with the consultation, I hope that underneath there is general consent for clauses 7 and 8. I hope I have covered most of the questions asked. I will write to the Committee in response to the question from the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich about redevelopment, because I need to obtain clarity on that.
Matthew Pennycook
I welcome the Minister’s response. He did not address—perhaps he will find time on another occasion—the Government’s potential inconsistency in, on the one hand, extending lease extension terms at peppercorn for houses, under the 1967 Act, and, on the other, seeking to ban leasehold houses in their entirety. The Government might want to explore that, to ensure the package as whole is consistent and working as intended. He is welcome to write to me on that point, as well as on redevelopment rights.
I take the Minister’s point on the competent landlord. My point was not whether the Bill is fine as drafted; it is the fact that we need to change the 1993Act to account for the set of circumstances I outlined. There is provision in the 1967 Act to cover that problem. As far as we can tell, this Bill does not amend the 1993 Act to account for it. I encourage him to look at that.
On the two substantive issues, there is inherent uncertainty about commencement. Of course, we want the Bill to progress and apply to as many leaseholders as possible. I was trying to stress to the Minister the need to look at the point at which the Bill kicks in. In some Bills, certain provisions come into force at First Reading. We are worried, as the Bill goes through Parliament, about a set of leaseholders being left out of these rights unfairly, given the time we have spent progressing the Law Commission’s recommendations. I encourage him to give some thought to that.
On ground rents, I understand entirely that the matter is commercially sensitive. I am not asking for an opinion from the Minister on the consultation, although we do need an indication of the Government’s thinking as soon as possible. We also need to understand, as I will come to when we debate clause 21, whether the Government intend to enact any recommendations from that consultation, via this Bill.
What I am looking for is clarity, which he should be able to give us at this stage, on this hypothetical point. If any proposals from that consultation are enacted, clauses 7, 8 and 21 are potentially redundant. We simply need to know whether the Government will further overhaul those clauses, if they take forward any of those recommendations. That is hypothetical, but the Minister should be able to answer. The Government have presumably thought, “Yes: if that scenario occurs and we take forward one of the five options, we will or will not have to revise the Bill.” That is the answer that I am simply looking for from the Minister. If he wants to take this opportunity to clarify that, I would welcome it.
Lee Rowley
The hon. Gentleman tempts me to go into hypotheticals. Let me at least dip my toe into that for a moment. Let us take some of the potential outcomes of the consultation discussed today, for example, and the question of whether they potentially will make redundant some of the clauses. In one of the instances, where there is a fear, concern or question, it would still be the case that potentially amendments to clause 8 would need to be introduced, for example, on ground rents, so depending on the scenario it would not make that entirely redundant. I will not go into hypotheticals to their logical and total extent, but I hope that that gives some assurance that consultation has been held and we will bring forward what is appropriate in due course.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Mr Mohindra.)
Criminal Justice Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Tuesday 23rd January 2024
(3 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 View all Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2024 - (23 Jan 2024)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham.
The nuisance rough sleeping direction in clause 51 was debated just before we adjourned this morning; it is one of a suite of tools that the Bill introduces to help local authorities and the police to tackle rough sleeping where it poses a nuisance. Clauses 52 to 55 additionally introduce nuisance rough sleeping prevention notices and outline how they will operate.
Although aimed at different behaviour, nuisance rough sleeping prevention notices will operate in a similar way to nuisance begging prevention notices, which we debated this morning. That being the case, I will not go into the detail of clauses 52 to 55, which largely mirror clauses 39 to 42, which we have already discussed. We also discussed at some length the substance of nuisance rough sleeping as part of the debate on clause 51. We may discuss what exactly constitutes nuisance rough sleeping when we come to clause 61, so I will leave my remarks there and simply respond to the shadow Minister or other colleagues as necessary.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
As the Minister says, we gave the issue a pretty thorough airing in the debate on clause 51 this morning. The Opposition are in the same place as we were this morning: we do not think that the provisions are good additions to the Bill and we will not support them.
Having had a chance to reflect on some of the Minister’s arguments, I might test some of them. He mentioned San Francisco frequently. I find it very hard to believe that what is standing between this country’s situation and that of San Francisco, whose challenges are well documented, is the Vagrancy Act 1824—not least because San Francisco never had such legislation, so repeal of legislation could not have led to its problems.
The Minister challenged me on what alternative measures could be used. Actually, I did not detect—certainly not in the debate earlier—much enthusiasm from the Minister for the provisions in the Bill; he was more interested in our view rather than in what the Government were putting forward. Having reflected on that, we will go on to talk about community protection notices—an important civil power, from the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, that the Government are very keen on. The Minister’s question was: if these clauses do not stand part of the Bill, what could be done if an individual sleeping in the doorway of a shop refused to move? I wondered about section 43 of the 2014 Act, which states that an authorised person would have the power to issue a community protection notice
“to an individual aged 16 or over, or a body, if satisfied on reasonable grounds that—
(a) the conduct of the individual or body is having a detrimental effect, of a persistent or continuing nature, on the quality of life of those in the locality, and
(b) the conduct is unreasonable.”
In the case that the Minister discussed, both those tests would be satisfied. They would provide the backstop without the need for any of the provisions that we are discussing. Using those section 43 powers would have the value, on the face of it, of not being targeted at rough sleepers. There would be a general power for use in the locality or amenity that would not require any of this dog and pony show. It would provide enough of a backstop and would pass the test that the Minister set us earlier.
I turn to the clauses themselves. The idea that a rough sleeping prevention notice could be handed, without any sense of adequate follow-up support, to someone sleeping rough, is, to me, for the birds—as if handing it to a person who has so little with them in the world would make any difference. Turning to clause 54, an appeals process would be an important part of such a regime, but we have a duty to be sure that what is written in a Bill in some way reflects the reality that we live in. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has made that point on multiple occasions.
We are talking about some of the most challenged people in society—the people with the fewest assets, and often those living with the most challenging mental health or substance abuse-related issues. I find it very difficult to believe that they will have the resources and support to lodge an appeal against their rough sleeping prevention notice and go to a magistrates court to uphold their rights.
We do not think that these measures are a good addition to legislation. I have given the Minister what is probably a better alternative. On that basis, we will vote against clause 52.
Chris Philp
First, I thank the shadow Minister for giving consideration to the comments I made before the lunch break. That was very helpful and perhaps facilitates a more thoughtful debate.
The shadow Minister referenced the comparison I have drawn with San Francisco and other cities on the American west coast and elsewhere. The point I was making was a slightly broader one. Essentially, some of those cities—Oakland, California is another on the bay—have adopted a very permissive approach to public drug consumption, antisocial behaviour, rough sleeping and things such as shoplifting, which we have debated previously.
A consequence of that very liberal approach has been widespread disorder on the streets of San Francisco and other cities. That has really undermined the quality of life in those places, and I do not think it has done any favours to the people who end up living those lifestyles either. There is no doubt that there is also a lack of treatment and support, but that very liberal approach has led to very bad outcomes. Some of those American cities, which are generally Democrat controlled, as the Committee can probably imagine, are beginning to reverse some of the measures on drug liberalisation, for example, because they have led to such bad outcomes. A complete removal of current laws would be a significant step in that direction, and that would concern me. That was the broader point that I was making.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
To go back to a conversation that we were having prior to the sitting about fentanyl in the US, does the Minister agree that the very strict rules about these sorts of things in various other US states have also led to terrible outcomes with regard to substance misuse?
Chris Philp
The tolerance of drug consumption in public places that we see in San Francisco and elsewhere has led to very bad outcomes. There are also serious problems with synthetic opioids in North America, which are, thankfully, not replicated in the UK. We are very anxious to prevent that from happening, as the hon. Lady can imagine.
The shadow Minister also suggested that there were other powers that could be used in some circumstances. He specifically referenced CPNs. We will debate those a bit more later, but they do not have the same powers as the notices that we are discussing. For example, a CPN does not allow for positive requirements to be set out—a requirement to attend treatment, for example—so it is not quite the same thing. CPNs also require individualised consideration. Many of the notices that we are discussing do too, which is fine, but they are quite intensive instruments to use.
Finally, the shadow Minister denigrated the approach taken in these clauses by saying that they simply criminalise rough sleeping without offering any support. They obviously do not do that. They criminalise nuisance rough sleeping, with “nuisance” defined in clause 61. [Interruption.] I can tell that he is eagerly anticipating our discussion of the precise provisions of clause 61.
On the support point, the purpose of some of these provisions is to help people into support. I think all of us would agree that the first step should be to support people with mental health issues, drug problems and alcohol problems, and to support them into housing. Everybody agrees that support should be the first step. That is what the police and local authorities should do initially, but if that fails and the rough sleeping is preventing a business from operating or adversely impacting other members of society, there needs to be some backstop power. That is the balance that we have tried to strike in these clauses, as we discussed before lunch.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 77, in clause 56, page 51, line 13, after “application” insert “by complaint”.
This amendment provides for applications for nuisance rough sleeping prevention orders to be made by complaint.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 57 stand part.
Government amendments 78 to 83.
Clauses 58 to 60 stand part.
Chris Philp
Clauses 56 to 60 provide a further tool for local authorities and the police to tackle nuisance—I stress the word “nuisance”—rough sleeping: namely, nuisance rough sleeping prevention orders. The clauses set out how the orders will work, specify the maximum time they can last and how they can be varied and discharged, and provide an avenue for appeals.
The clauses essentially mirror clauses 43 to 47 in relation to nuisance begging protection orders, so I will not repeat what I said about those clauses this morning. Similarly, amendments 77 to 83 mirror for nuisance rough sleeping prevention orders amendments 70 to 76 in respect of nuisance begging prevention orders, which we debated this morning. I will of course respond to any points raised by the shadow Minister.
Alex Norris
The Minister is right that we have already given these issues a run-out, so I will not rehash our earlier debate. With specific regard to these clauses, however, they give us at least some degree of comfort that this regime will be reliant on a magistrates court—an impartial arbiter. There is legitimate concern that a constable who might have had some training but not very much, or someone from the local authority—we will have very little sense of what training they have—could make profound judgments with respect to the first two tiers of powers, relating to directions and notices, with minimal oversight and recourse to justice. At least we will get an airing in a magistrates court. I suspect the magistrates will wonder why they are having to deal with the problem and why it was not dealt with by either an earlier intervention or a more positive intervention to help change someone’s behaviour.
Clause 58 allows a duration of five years for a nuisance rough sleeping prevention order. That is five years of not being allowed to go to a certain place or act in a certain way. There are now actually very few crimes, except the most serious, for which someone would be prevented from doing anything for five years. I wonder what the logic is for that duration. Most of what is in these clauses is a counterpart to what is in the clauses on nuisance begging, and the line drawn there is three years. I am interested in the difference.
Again, we will not support the lead clause in this group, clause 56, because we think that these clauses should not be in the Bill at all.
Chris Philp
I think that the maximum period for a nuisance begging prevention order, as opposed to notice, was five years, which mirrors this provision. The lengths of time match up. As we discussed this morning, the power is for the court to use, and it can use its discretion. It is a maximum duration; the court can use its discretion to hand down a shorter period. Courts often pass prison sentences that are lower than the maximum, and that may well be the case here as well.
Amendment 77 agreed to.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Description of person | Time when order takes effect |
|---|---|
A person who has been remanded in custody, or committed to custody, by an order of a court | From the beginning of the day on which the person is released from custody |
A person subject to a custodial sentence | Immediately after the person ceases to be subject to a custodial sentence” |
Chris Philp
Clause 61 is important; we referred to it during this morning’s proceedings. It sets out the conditions that need to be met for rough sleeping to be counted as a nuisance. To repeat my earlier point, the Government do not want to criminalise rough sleeping in general; that is why the Vagrancy Act 1824 is being repealed. However, there are some kinds of rough sleeping that cause nuisance to other people to the point that the general public’s own rights are unreasonably infringed. The definition tries to strike a balance. As I said, we do not want to criminalise rough sleeping in general, but we do want to define a threshold where the rough sleeping is unreasonably interfering with other members of society. The definition we have set out in the clause aims to strike that balance. I will be interested to hear Committee members’ views on it.
The clause sets out the behaviours accompanying rough sleeping that either cause or are capable of causing nuisance to others: damage, distress, disruption, harassment, creation of a health and safety or security risk, or prevention of the determination of whether there is such a health and safety risk.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I wonder whether three teenagers who grab their tent and decide to sleep at the end of a farmer’s field are causing a nuisance and will therefore fall under this law.
Chris Philp
That is obviously a fact-specific question. [Interruption.] Well it is, obviously. Every piece of behaviour, to assess whether it is criminal or not, needs to be measured against the relevant statute. It would obviously depend on whether it caused damage, disruption, harassment, distress and so on. But let me try to answer the hon. Gentleman’s question—it is quite a good case study, so let us have a look at it and see whether it meets the test.
First, if we look at subsection (4), does the behaviour cause damage? Well, if the teenagers are simply pitching a tent at the end of a track, it probably would not. On the other hand, if they threw a load of rubbish everywhere and trashed the farm, then it might. It depends whether their behaviour causes damage or not, but, as the hon. Gentleman described it, it sounds like it probably would not.
We then come to disruption, which is defined in subsection (5) as
“interference with…any lawful activity…or…a supply of water, energy or fuel”.
If the tent stopped the farmer bringing farm equipment in or out of the farmyard, that might count as interference, but if it did not, and if it did not interfere with water, energy or fuel, then that would not be disruption.
We then come to distress, the next limb of the test. If the people in the tent used
“threatening, intimidating, abusive or insulting words or behaviour,”
then the test might be met, but if their behaviour did not include any of those things—no threats, no intimidation, no abuse, no insulting words—then it would not be.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Stockton North for intervening, because this little illustration gives us an opportunity to demonstrate that it is only where those tests are met that the provisions of the clause become engaged. I hope that it was clear from the way I talked through that little case study that the measure is relatively reasonable. That is what I think, but I am interested to hear other views. The clause sets a threshold, and only when that threshold is crossed do its provisions become engaged.
Alex Norris
I do think that was a useful worked exercise. The problem is that the Minister only did half of it, because he only applied the test of whether something causes damage, disruption, harassment or distress. He missed the test of whether something is capable of causing damage, disruption, harassment or distress. Will he do the exercise again for the “capable” test?
Chris Philp
The behaviour concerned might actually cause damage, distress or disruption, but it might also be capable of doing so. For example, someone might set up a tented encampment in a place that blocks a business premises. Let us imagine that they set it up at 4 o’clock in the morning, when the business is closed and there is no one coming in or out. At that point, it is not actually causing disruption. Let us say that the business wants to open at 6 o’clock in the morning. Would we want the police to wait until the business opens and the customers or the employees try to come in, when disruption is actually caused and the provisions are engaged? The police might want the power to take action not when the disruption is actually caused, but when it becomes reasonably foreseeable that it will be—in this case, in advance of the business premises opening.
Members can imagine circumstances like the one I just outlined where, although disruption is not being caused at that moment, it is clear that it is capable of being caused, and it is reasonably foreseeable that such disruption will be caused.
Jess Phillips
I just wonder what else that is annoying that might be outside the front of someone’s business that we could criminalise. The bin lorry? It seems like there are loads of things. Cars get parked outside the front of businesses where I live, and it impedes the Warburtons van bringing in the loaves. The literally happens outside the corner shop right next to my house—bloody criminal! Why is it just homeless people that are a nuisance? I find cars to be a massive nuisance all the time. There are loads of things that are a nuisance. Kids going in and out of school? Nuisance. Criminalise ’em!
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Lady for her characteristically emollient intervention. We are defining precisely what “nuisance” means, not using it as a general term. It means damage, disruption, distress or a health, safety or security risk. We are being precise about what we mean. We are not using it in a general sense; we are being specific.
The hon. Lady mentions a car blocking the highway and asks whether we should criminalise that. I refer her to section 137 of the Highways Act 1980, with which she is no doubt intimately familiar, which does precisely that. It criminalises wilfully obstructing a highway. We are not just picking on people whose disruption is associated with rough sleeping. There are plenty of other things on the statute book, including wilful obstruction of the highway, that seek to do similar things. I do not think it is reasonable to say that this is a unique set of provisions that have no analogues anywhere else on the statute book. [Interruption.] Would the hon. Lady like to make another intervention?
Jess Phillips
Oh yes, absolutely. It seems to me that there is this idea that it would cause distress to somebody to see a homeless person in a tent. I have greater faith in the British public than that. They are not just immediately distressed by somebody who is down and out. I am not immediately distressed by homeless people; I am distressed that they are homeless, but my distress is directed at the Government—who, by the way, I also find to be quite a nuisance, but I am not for one second suggesting that we should criminalise the Minister.
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Lady for her forbearance. Of course we want to combat homelessness. That is why £2 billion is being spent for that purpose. On the serious point, the Government’s position is categorically not that homeless people—or rough speakers, to be precise—cause distress. That is not what the Bill says. Distress is defined in clause 61(5) as being caused by
“the use of threatening, intimidating, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour”.
The Bill is not saying that rough sleepers in general automatically cause distress. It is only saying that threatening, intimidating, abusive or insulting words are taken as causing distress. It is really important not to mischaracterise what the clause does. It is very precise and specific, and it is very limited, for all the reasons that the Opposition have been pointing out.
Jess Phillips
Just to push my example, if I am obstructed in my daily life by a group of schoolchildren doing exactly that—using abusive, insulting words, saying “bitch” and things when I walk past—why is that any different? Surely causing distress to people is already illegal, so we do not need to define it in terms of rough sleepers.
Chris Philp
The hon. Lady asked what happens if she was insulted in the way she describes, which I am sure rarely happens. There are provisions in the Public Order Act 1986, particularly sections 4, 4A and 5—
Chris Philp
I am not sure if Hansard is going to record that, but I will take it as a compliment. I do try to stay on top of the detail. There are provisions in that Act that would afford the hon. Lady some protection in those circumstances.
This definition is very important, and we are trying to strike a balance. We do not want to criminalise rough sleeping in general or make a generic assertion that rough sleeping causes distress automatically. It does not, and the Bill does not say that. We are trying to define some very precise circumstances for when this clause is engaged to ensure that if interventions to support people either do not work or get declined, there is some backstop power to ensure that members of wider society do not suffer adverse consequences. We are trying to achieve that protection, and this clause is carefully crafted to strike the right balance.
Jess Phillips
I will not speak for long. The Minister and I have had a back and forth, and for the benefit of Hansard, when I called him a geek it was definitely a compliment. He is without a doubt on top of the detail not only of this Bill but of how it interacts with other legislation. It is a pleasure to sit on a Committee with a Minister in that position. I am a massive geek about how all these nice subsections will actually pan out in reality.
My main problem with the clause, although I appreciate it is less specific than the one on begging that we debated this morning, is that I am still at a loss about why we need laws specifically about nuisances caused by the most vulnerable people in society. There are so many things in the public realm that cause me much more nuisance than homeless people or people rough sleeping, such as the sexism that women experience in the street all the time. I get that we have to replace the vagrancy law and that we need guidelines, but do we really need specific laws about those people? Absolutely we need the provisions in the Public Order Act 1980, the year before I was born—
Jess Phillips
Oh, 1986. I was actually five years old then. I was a big fan of it back then.
But why do we need a specific law about this group of people? Why can they not be covered by the laws on the nuisances, insults and harassment that we can all define easily? That is the bit that I find alarming. If people are shooting up in the street or are openly engaged in dangerous practices such as pimping people, we are talking about a different thing, but there are laws covering those things already. If only I were the Minister, I could tell the Committee which ones. I am not him, but I am fairly certain they exist.
My brother, who slept on the streets, said to me, “It isn’t the drugs that will kill me; it’s the stigma. The stigma is the thing that is going to kill me.” He has been clean for seven years, and he said that when he stands at the school gate to pick up his children, he feels like everyone knows he was a homeless drug addict. The idea that you are less—that you are a vagrant, a tramp—never leaves you. That is why I do not want to see people like my brother, who, as I said earlier, was a nuisance to me on many occasions—I just do not want to write that stigma into the law.
Andrew Jones (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (Con)
I rise to make a couple of points. The Minister made a very important point: we have to get the balance absolutely right here. We have a case in Harrogate at the moment concerning a pavilion in Crescent Gardens that was used by rough sleepers in a series of tents in September. They were there for two weeks, and it has been fenced off ever since.
I have absolutely no doubt that when the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley says that she and the British public are not distressed by homelessness, she is absolutely correct. People want to see homeless people supported into accommodation and the underlying causes tackled. At the same time, there was a significant number of complaints from local residents about antisocial behaviour coming from that group of tents. Getting the right balance between protecting communities and offering support to homeless people is very difficult. In our case, we have a very impressive homeless charity, Harrogate Homeless Project, which is next door to my office in the middle of my constituency.
I just want to make sure that the Minister is clear that the balance is critical. I have been much reassured by his words, but it is an important balance, and we are dealing with some of the most vulnerable people in our community.
Alex Norris
It has been a good debate, and I am glad to have the opportunity to contribute to it. As we finish this section of the Bill, I have more hope than when we started it, in the sense that I now genuinely believe that we are seeking to do the same thing. The Minister has explicitly said on the record that the Government do not wish to criminalise rough sleeping in general, which is very welcome. I will just say—and this is where the disagreement lies—that that is not reflected in the Bill. The Minister talked about the Bill having a precise, specific and limited definition of nuisance rough sleeping, so that it criminalises only nuisance rough sleeping and not rough sleeping in general. I would argue very strongly that that is not what clause 61 does. It is much broader than that, as I will do my best to demonstrate.
The clause is crucial. It contains the definition, and it makes or breaks whether the Minister’s case holds. The test is in subsection (2). The first limb, in paragraph (a), is that the person must be
“sleeping rough or…intending to sleep rough in a place”.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley talked about stigmatising and subjective language, and there is an issue on the point of someone’s “intending to sleep rough”. What is the judgment that an individual is being expected to make? Is it about someone’s appearance? Is it about what someone is carrying? If I am asked by a relevant person, who might be a reasonably junior member of the local authority, where I am sleeping that night and I cannot answer, am I intending to sleep rough? That test would be applied subjectively by a person who may not have very much training. If I looked dishevelled, would that be enough for me to be intending to sleep rough?
The reality is that we will see edge cases, but how will we test them? As I have said, the people we are talking about often have the least recourse to legal support. I would argue that there is nothing precise even about the point of someone’s “intending to sleep rough”. As the Minister said, subsection (2)(b) goes on to describe a person’s
“doing something that is a nuisance”.
Again, that is very much the crux of the debate.
Chris Philp
Just to make it clear, at the end of subsection (2)(a) there is the critical word “and”. It is not enough simply to be sleeping rough or intending to sleep rough; it needs to be clear in addition that a nuisance is being committed. The clause requires both conditions to be met; one alone is not enough.
Alex Norris
I appreciate that, and I was getting on to that part of my argument, but that does not dilute the impact of the language “intending to sleep rough”, which is a broad and subjective judgment that we will be asking people likely to have little or no training in this regard to make. The Minister says that the definition is precise. There is nothing precise about that.
As I said, subsection (2)(b) refers to nuisance. We are given a definition of nuisance that is not specific, precise or, I would argue, limited. The Minister half-applied his test to the example given by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North of the tent in the field. He was keen, and made a great display of going through the factors that could constitute having caused, or being in the act of causing, nuisance, but he did not address the factors that constituted being capable of causing it; he would not do that half of the exercise.
Chris Philp
Is the shadow Minister saying that if the words “capable of” were deleted, he would support the clause?
Alex Norris
It would be an improvement to the clause, but that is not what is in the Bill, and we would still have problems with “intending to sleep rough”. There are even issues with “causing” in subsection (5), which mean that we cannot support it. That subsection says,
“‘damage’ includes…damage to a place”,
and being capable of causing damage. If I sleep on a park bench, am I capable of damaging it? Well, I am using it for a purpose for which it was not intended, so, yes, presumably there is a risk of causing damage.
Chris Philp
With respect, I do not think that sleeping on a bench would cause damage to it, would it?
Alex Norris
Using anything for a purpose for which it was not intended risks damage, because the possibility of that damage has not been designed out. What if someone is sleeping on the bench persistently over a period? “Damage” could be breaking one of the wooden slats, but it could also be whittling down the paint or varnish. The Minister rolls his eyes. If he gave the commitment today that he personally will make all these decisions every day across the country, well, that might give me some comfort, but he clearly will not apply the test. It will be applied by possibly relatively junior members of staff with very little training. If the test is applied overly officiously, and there is a clear risk of that, then the damage to an individual could be considerable, and their recourse minimal. That is why this point matters, even in an extreme case.
Subsection (5)(c) refers to
“damage to the environment (including excessive noise, smells, litter or deposits of waste)”.
“Smells” is particularly problematic. That is part of the stigma relating to people who do not have a roof over their head. Smelling could be enough to make them a nuisance. That is a real problem. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley talked about the stigma test; the provision does not pass that test.
Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)
My hon. Friend makes a very passionate representation. Last November, on a very wet, cold night, I slept in a doorway. I went armed with a tarpaulin, a sleeping bag and cardboard. Homelessness is not a lifestyle choice. There were other people there who were obviously suffering from mental health issues, and some had been victims of sexual abuse. I had gone armed with equipment to be homeless, and to sleep on the streets. Does he not agree that under the rules in the Bill, I could have been arrested?
Alex Norris
My hon. Friend would certainly have passed the test of intending to sleep rough. A subjective decision would then have to be made on whether her behaviour caused damage, or even was capable of causing damage—the damage does not have to occur. She might also be found to have caused “disruption”, which is
“interference with…any lawful activity in, or use of, a place.”
It would not be very hard to pass that test. She is a fearsome opponent, so perhaps she is also a health and safety risk to others at times. So yes, she could in some way fail many, if not all, of the tests. [Interruption.] I think she will probably take that as a compliment.
Alex Cunningham
I am really interested in the sleeping rough bit. There are organisations across the country—business people—who opt to spend a night out, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East, to demonstrate their support for homeless people. They sleep in shop doorways and outside factories. It is a deliberate act. They raise lots of money for homeless people, which is great. Are they not criminalised by this law?
Alex Norris
That is an interesting case. I have absolutely no doubt that that is not the Government’s intention, but could this clause be applied to such a case? I would make a strong argument that a member of council staff could say that those people have left rubbish or are capable of it. They do not have to have done it, but by generating rubbish that perhaps blows away, they could cause deposits of waste. Could this clause be used to prevent that activity? Yes, it could. That brings us back to asking whether it is precise, specific and limited, and the answer is no: it fails all three of those tests.
That takes me to the important points made by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough. It is about finding a balance, because the public are sympathetic and want to see the issue tackled positively.
Alex Norris
As do the Government, as the hon. Gentleman says, but the question is whether that balance has been found. I do not see anything in the real-life example that he used that would not be covered by section 43 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. That notice could be used in that way. When I put that to the Minister in the previous debate, his only quibble, which I found a little hard to accept, was that these notices will give so much more support and that a reliance on section 43 would not provide enough help to homeless people. That does not chime with reality.
I am emerging from these discussions with much more hope than I had thought. I believe, much more than I did when the Bill was published, that the Government want to do something really limited in this space, but there is a significant landing zone for them to do more. We are interested in working on that point between stages. I understand how the mistake—the original sin—has happened. There is an elegance in trying to create a duplicate arrangement with nuisance begging, but actually that misses the point.
We will not be supporting the clause, for the reasons that we have given. Indeed, I am not sure how the Minister can support it, either, because it fails his own tests. We will have to divide the Committee. I think we can do much better than this, and, as I have said, there is a landing zone for that.
Chris Philp
I have made my points already, so I do not want to irritate the Committee by repeating them. The definition is pretty specific. As the shadow Minister has said, it is much more limited—and intentionally so—than the nuisance begging provisions that we debated this morning. However, if there are ways of ensuring that the right balance is struck, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough said, we are always willing to look at them. It is our intention to make this limited, narrow and specific. I think we have done that, but we are always open to ways of improving it.
The Chair
I am not permitted to have a view on these matters, but I will say how welcome it is to see displays of courtesy on the Committee.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I hope that we now sail into less contentious waters. This clause recreates, in modern terminology, the current offence from the Vagrancy Act 1824 of being on enclosed premises for unlawful purposes. While a great deal of the Vagrancy Act is outdated and needs either repealing or replacing, we know through engagement with the police and other stakeholders that this particular offence is still used. It is still useful when someone is found on premises where they should not be and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that they are intending to commit a crime. It could be any crime—it does not necessarily have to be linked to begging or rough sleeping, and is probably rarely, if ever, linked in that way. Accordingly, this clause makes it an offence for a person to trespass on any premises, which covers
“any building, part of a building or enclosed area”,
with the intention to commit any offence. The maximum penalty for this summary offence upon summary conviction is three months’ imprisonment, a level 3 fine, which is £1,000, or both.
I checked whether there had been convictions using the offence from the Vagrancy Act, and there have been quite a few in the last few years, numbering in the hundreds, so it is actually used by police. I was made aware of a case involving a former premier league footballer. Somebody was found on their residential premises. They had not stolen anything, but it was reasonably suspected that they might, and a conviction was secured using those provisions. The offence is useful for the police in some circumstances, which is why we are seeking to legislate here.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 63
Power to require person’s details
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clauses 63 and 64 make supplementary provision relating to earlier clauses on nuisance begging and, I hesitate to say, nuisance rough sleeping. Clause 63 enables an authorised person, defined as a constable or local authority, seeking to issue a direction or prevention notice, or to apply to a court for a prevention order, to require a person to provide specified personal details, specifically their name, date of birth and, if applicable, their address.
Failure to provide those details, or giving false information, will be an offence subject to a maximum penalty of one month’s imprisonment, a fine, or both. That is necessary because, otherwise, an individual who does not want to receive a direction notice or order could simply refuse to provide their details. Failure to comply with the process required to make the direction notice or order is a form of non-compliance and carries the same maximum penalty as failing to comply with the direction notice or order itself.
Clause 64 defines the terms “relevant local authority” and “local authority” for the purposes of clauses 38 to 63. In essence, the definition focuses primarily on the area in which the nuisance begging or nuisance rough sleeping occurred, or the area for which the relevant notice direction or order was given. On that basis, I commend clauses 63 and 64 to the Committee.
Alex Norris
I will be very brief, because I do not want to repeat the arguments that I have already made. Clause 64 defines “local authority” and addresses local councils. I have raised this issue a number of times, but have not asked a direct question. What guidance will be made available to enable local authority staff to apply the provisions in the way outlined by the Minister, as opposed to an overly officious, harmful and unhelpful way?
Chris Philp
Clause 64 relates to which local authority can issue the notice, which is a geographic question. The hon. Gentleman asks a different but valid question about the guidance. I repeat what I said earlier: the guidance will make clear that the first resort, as he and we would want, should always be to help people who are rough sleeping or having issues in their life that cause them to beg, whether that is support with mental health issues, drug treatment, alcohol treatment or support into housing. I reiterate what I said earlier: the guidance will emphasise support, help and treatment, if necessary, as the first action.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 65
Circumstances in which court may attach power of arrest to injunction
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 144, in clause 66, page 58, line 18, at end insert—
“in subsection (4), after ‘48 hours’ insert—
‘, unless—
(a) the individual has been issued with a direction under this section, relating to the same or a substantially similar or related location or behaviour, on one previous occasion, in which case the exclusion period may extend to seven days;
(b) the individual has been issued with a direction under this section, relating to the same or a substantially similar or related location or behaviour, on more than one previous occasion, in which case the exclusion period may extend to twenty-eight days.’”
This amendment would allow for longer exclusion periods under section 35 of the Anti-social behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 for individuals who receive more than one such direction.
Clauses 66 and 67 stand part.
Amendment 145, in clause 68, page 58, line 37, at end insert—
“(2) Within twelve months of Royal Assent to this Bill, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on police use of the power to make public spaces protection orders and expedited orders under Chapter 2 of Part 4 of the Anti-social behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (as amended by this Bill).”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to produce a report on the police’s use of PSPO powers.
Clause 68 stand part.
That schedule 6 be the Sixth schedule to the Bill.
Clause 69 stand part.
That schedule 7 be the Seventh schedule to the Bill.
Clause 70 stand part.
Government new clause 21—Dispersal powers: removal of senior police officer authorisation.
Government new clause 22—Dispersal powers: extension to local authorities.
Chris Philp
This is quite a large group of amendments, but I shall try to be concise. Before I turn to new clauses 21 and 22, which I have tabled with the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury, let me set out briefly why clauses 65 to 70 and schedules 6 and 7 should be included in the Bill.
The Government have a strong track record on tackling antisocial behaviour. In March 2023, we launched our antisocial behaviour action plan, which was backed by £160 million of new funding. The plan sets out a new framework for the Government, police forces, police and crime commissioners, local authorities and other partners, including housing associations and youth offending teams, to work together to prevent and tackle antisocial behaviour.
Off the back of the action plan, we launched the community safety partnership review and the antisocial behaviour powers consultation in March 2023. The consultation included a range of proposals to strengthen the powers in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The majority of respondents supported most of the proposals and, as a result, we are taking the opportunity presented by the Bill to back our police, local authorities and other partners to do even more to tackle the blight of antisocial behaviour.
Clauses 65 to 70 make provision for strengthened ASB powers as consulted on last year. Clause 65 provides that a power of arrest can be attached to any civil injunction by the court where it deems it appropriate. Clause 66 extends the period for which a dispersal direction can be in place from 48 hours to 72 hours and, following the issuing of a closure notice, extends from 48 hours to 72 hours the timeframe available to the relevant agency to apply to a magistrates court for a closure order.
Clause 67 amends community protection notices, to which the hon. Member for Nottingham North referred, to lower the age at which they can be given from 16 years to 10 years, bringing them in line with the criminal age of responsibility and the age at which civil injunctions might apply. Clause 68 and schedule 6 give police, in addition to local authorities, the power to issue public safety protection orders. Clause 69 and schedule 7 enable registered social housing providers to use both the closure notice and the closure order to quickly close premises that are being used, or are likely to be used, to commit nuisance or disorder. Clause 70 expands the community safety accreditation scheme so that CSAS officers can impose fixed penalty notices for a wider range of offences, and it increases the upper limit of the value of those FPNs from £100 to £500.
Finally, Government new clauses 20 and 21 build on those provisions by further reforming the dispersal powers provided for in part 3 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act. The powers will help the police and others, including local authorities, to tackle antisocial behaviour, and follow a consultation that we ran last year. On that basis, I hope that the Committee can accept the proposals.
Amendments 144 and 145 were tabled by the Opposition, so it would be courteous and appropriate to respond to them once the hon. Member for Nottingham North has had the opportunity to speak to them.
Alex Norris
Antisocial behaviour is a scourge on communities, and it is right that in legislation of this type we seek to ensure that police and local authorities have the correct tools to combat it. This is an issue about which our constituents have serious concerns and, like all right hon. and hon. Members, I have lots of conversations about this with people locally. Tackling antisocial behaviour is one of their top priorities, so we are broadly supportive of the measures in the Bill, although we might have gone a little further.
We have to ground this debate in a conversation about why we are where we are. We should test the effectiveness of the Government’s action on antisocial behaviour, but the roots of the challenges lie in a diminution of neighbourhood policing: there are still 10,000 fewer on the frontline, and our communities have suffered as a result. A move away from proper problem-solving, problem-oriented policing has led us to a lack of focus on the issue. That is why we have many more challenges than we would like.
Chris Philp
I will briefly reply to some of the points raised by the shadow Minister. On clause 21, and the removal of the requirement for an inspector to make the authorisation, any officer of any rank can make that authorisation to speed things up where necessary. In relation to his points regarding amendment 144, which I think extends the exclusion period from seven to 28 days—
Alex Norris
It is seven days for the second offence and 28 days for a subsequent offence.
Chris Philp
Yes. I understand the thinking behind the amendment, and obviously I have a great deal of sympathy for it, as he can probably imagine. The Government considered it, but we need to be cognisant of the restrictions imposed by various articles of the European convention on human rights, on which views around the House vary, to put it mildly. Clearly, if one goes beyond a certain point, one begins to stretch the ECHR articles, for example, concerning freedom of assembly. There is a balancing exercise between what is permitted in domestic law and those European convention rights, and they can conflict. That is why we have set the boundary where we have.
Alex Norris
That is an important answer, but I am conscious that nuisance begging prevention notices, for example, could mean that someone has to quit an area for a period as long as three years. Surely that could not be the case for people engaged in nuisance begging, but not for those who are engaging in antisocial behaviour.
Chris Philp
Clearly, it is at the maximum and will follow fact-specific consideration. A calibration exercise can be performed, and there will be guidance around it, which can ensure that that balance is appropriately struck.
In response to Opposition amendment 145, I will of course mention the regular mechanisms for reviewing legislation, including review three to five years after passage. The Government regularly review the use of police powers under the 2014 Act. In fact, in November last year, just a couple of months ago, the Government reviewed police perceptions of the powers in that Act. We published a report on gov.uk that included data and police perceptions of the use of the 2014 Act powers, including public spaces protection orders. I hope that illustrates that the review of these powers is not just a theoretical exercise that Ministers refer to in resisting Opposition amendments; it actually happens.
On the shadow Minister’s point about the interaction between police and crime commissioners and local councillors, he is right to say that the relationship between elected councillors and the council is a bit different from that between PCCs and the police. While a PCC sets the budget and strategic priorities and holds the police to account, they do not, for obvious reasons, have operational control over the police; they cannot direct the police. He is right to say that the relationships are a bit different; none the less the PCC has an important role to play in co-ordinating, convening and holding the police to account. Although there are slight differences, I think strengthening the role of the PCC in the system is useful and a good step forward. The public mostly know who the PCC is and hold them accountable for the delivery of public priorities on crime. I accept that the shadow Minister raises a fair point, but I think we should welcome the involvement of PCCs.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 66
Maximum period of certain directions, notices and orders
Amendment proposed: 144, in clause 66, page 58, line 18, at end insert—
“in subsection (4), after “48 hours” insert—
“, unless—
(a) the individual has been issued with a direction under this section, relating to the same or a substantially similar or related location or behaviour, on one previous occasion, in which case the exclusion period may extend to seven days;
(b) the individual has been issued with a direction under this section, relating to the same or a substantially similar or related location or behaviour, on more than one previous occasion, in which case the exclusion period may extend to twenty-eight days.””—(Alex Norris.)
This amendment would allow for longer exclusion periods under section 35 of the Anti-social behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 for individuals who receive more than one such direction.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 8.
New clause 42—Requirement for anti-social behaviour lead—
“(1) The chief officer of each police force in England and Wales must appoint a designated officer for each neighbourhood within the relevant force area to act as the force’s lead on work relating to anti-social behaviour in that neighbourhood area.”—(Alex Norris.)
This new clause would require each police force to appoint a designated officer for each neighbourhood area to lead work on anti-social behaviour in that area.
Chris Philp
As darkness falls over the Thames outside, I rise to speak to clause 71 and its associated schedule 8, along with new clause 42. Clause 71 and its associated schedule give effect to commitments made in part 2 of the police and crime commissioner review by expanding the ways in which local policing bodies work with relevant agencies to tackle antisocial behaviour.
The provisions also define the role of local policing bodies in the implementation of ASB case reviews, which afford a vital safety net for victims to request a review of their case. We recognise that no single agency has sole responsibility for antisocial behaviour. Preventing and tackling ASB depends on strong collaborative working between the police, local authorities, housing associations, health services and a range of other partners. Agencies must, however, collaborate and share information to create a full picture.
Government new clause 42 is—Sir Graham, I have just noticed that new clause 42 is, in fact, an Opposition new clause. I was just testing to see who is awake! I will not speak to the new clause, because I am looking forward to hearing the shadow Minister do so in a minute.
Alex Norris
I got really excited; I thought we would sneak one through! It would have been a good one, as well. I will be honest: new clause 42 is probably my favourite out of all of them. There is a certain cruelty in the fact that I am yet again to be disappointed.
I start briefly with clause 71, which we do support. I have to say that given the number of reporting requirements that I have sought to put on the Home Office, which, sadly, have been rebuffed on each occasion, I am very pleased and amused that the Minister himself is now putting reporting requirements into the Bill, in this case on local policing bodies.
Alex Norris
Exactly, on someone else. But those are important reporting requirements, actually. Having that evidence will be of interest to local communities. I think that transparency could, at times, be challenging for local policing bodies, but that would not be a bad thing.
There are, again, issues relating to antisocial behaviour reviews. We want them to be done properly. We do not want people to get through to the end of the process and feel that they have not been listened to—that would be a double insult, given what they would have already suffered. I do fear that the lessons have never really been learned on the failure of community trigger over the past decade. We do not want to see, particularly with regard to the statistics reviews, a desire to localise blame for failures that often happen at a national level. Nevertheless, that is an argument to have at a later point. We have no issues with the requirements at all.
I have sought to improve the Bill with new clause 42, and I hope the Minister will be minded to show his support for it in other ways, if not directly. If the new clause were to be agreed to, that would be a really important building block in restoring neighbourhood policing for communities across England and Wales, and it would be at the frontline of our battle against antisocial behaviour. As I have said, the diminution and denuding of community policing over 14 years has had a significant impact. That is why half the population now say they rarely ever see the police on the beat—a proportion that has doubled since 2010.
People feel powerless to deal with antisocial behaviour, even though it happens right on their doorstep. That is compounded by the reduction in drug intervention services, as we have discussed in previous debates. Youth service budgets have been cut by £1 billion. Community penalties have halved, and there is a backlog of millions of hours in community payback schemes. We are creating the challenges we face because we are not contesting public space, and we must do something about it. That is what clause 42 offers. It is not a silver bullet, but it would entail rebuilding the fundamentals of good policing: officers serving and protecting their community, which requires the restoration of neighbourhood policing. Communities should know their police officers and be able to approach them directly if they need to.
We know that putting in the hard yards and building relationships makes the difference, and new clause 42 would be the first step towards achieving this. It would introduce a requirement that the
“chief officer of each police force in England and Wales must appoint a designated officer for each neighbourhood…to act as the force’s lead on work relating to anti-social behaviour”.
In other words, there should be a named officer leading on antisocial behaviour in every community. No longer would members of the public feel that, when they report antisocial behaviour, nothing is done and it disappears into the ether. Perhaps they do not have any contact with the police, or perhaps they have to ring 101 and get promised a call-back that does not happen. Instead, an officer embedded in the community—a face and name they recognise—would act as the lead on antisocial behaviour.
That is what the new clause would do, and it does not take much to imagine how an officer could work in this way. They could visit schools, community groups and youth clubs, engage with young people, build trust, try to prevent youngsters from being drawn into antisocial behaviour, and build relationships with parents where there are early concerns. That is what policing used to be, and it is what policing could be: policing in the community and serving the community. I know that there is demand among police officers, who want to be doing this sort of policing. The new clause would be a real enhancement to the Bill, so I hope the Minister is minded to accept it.
Chris Philp
Let me respond to the shadow Minister’s comments on new clause 42. I sympathise with the intention behind it, which is to make sure that there is a named officer working on ASB issues, but we have an important principle: the operational independence of policing.
Neither the Government nor Parliament direct the police to operate or behave in a certain way; they are operationally independent. That separation of powers is a fundamental principle, and instructing the police on how to structure their operations probably crosses the line of operational independence. However, I am sure that police and crime commissioners and chief constables will have heard about the Government’s focus on antisocial behaviour via our ASB action plan. They will have heard our debates in Parliament, including this one, and will understand the significance that we attach to this particular issue.
On accountability and local connections, most forces have safer neighbourhood teams, who are typically attached to a council ward. We certainly have them in London, and they exist in many other places as well. Three or four months ago, we extracted from the police a commitment to always follow all reasonable lines of inquiry in relation to all crime, including where antisocial behaviour crosses the criminal threshold. That is a National Police Chiefs’ Council commitment and we expect all forces to deliver it, including for the criminal elements of ASB.
On local accountability, we also have police and crime commissioners. If the public want to make sure that the police are held to account for delivering the commitment to always follow up on criminal offences, including criminal ASB, they can contact the police and crime commissioner, who is elected. Their job is to hold the local police forces to account for doing exactly the kind of thing that the shadow Minister outlined.
Jess Phillips
The Minister has somewhat answered my question, but what happens if the police do not follow up on every line of inquiry? Let us be honest: we will all have cases in our constituencies where that has happened.
Chris Philp
That is a great question. We have reached this national commitment, and the National Police Chiefs’ Council has agreed to do this. But how will we know whether it happens? How can we ensure that the police deliver on that promise? First, we in the Home Office are following up via the National Policing Board. We have a meeting next week—I think it is on 30 or 31 January—and the first item on the agenda is investigations into crime. I will press the police chiefs particularly on the delivery of this commitment. Secondly, Chief Inspector of Constabulary Andy Cooke, former chief constable of Merseyside police, will conduct a thematic inspection of this issue in the spring, checking up on every police force in the country to ensure that they are actually doing this.
Thirdly, the commitment is being incorporated into the regular cycle of Peel inspections. Every couple of years, every police force is inspected. The commitment is going to be checked up on as part of that regular series of inspections. I also expect Members of Parliament and police and crime commissioners to hold the police to account. If we ever hear examples of the police not delivering this commitment, we should be asking the police about that.
The measure was inspired by the work done by Chief Constable Stephen Watson in Greater Manchester, which Sir Graham and I were discussing before the Committee started. He was appointed a couple of years ago and instituted this policy: always following up reasonable lines of inquiry for every criminal offence; no such thing as minor crime. That approach led to a 44% increase in arrests in Greater Manchester, and some previously closed down custody suites and magistrates courts had to be reopened because a load more people were being arrested. We are looking to apply that approach nationally. Of course, the police are never going to get it 100%, but it is the job of parliamentarians and the chief inspector to hold them to account and get as close to 100% as possible. We discussed facial recognition. CCTV evidence, for example, is a critical part of that for ASB and for all crime types.
Jess Phillips
The Minister’s story about Manchester was great and a delight to hear; I hope that is replicated elsewhere because of this scheme. Are the Government committing to opening magistrates courts that have been closed in order to deal with that capacity?
Chris Philp
Magistrates courts are, of course, a matter for the Ministry of Justice. I am sure my MOJ colleagues will do whatever is necessary to ensure appropriate arrangements are in place. I know that they labour night and day—“labour” meaning work—to make sure the right arrangements are in place. I fear I may be about to stretch Sir Graham’s patience in terms of scope.
I hope that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, will hear that I am in great sympathy with the spirit of the new clause. However, for reasons of police operational independence and because the police and crime commissioner has a role in terms of accountability, I do not think new clause 41 is appropriate. But I understand and appreciate its intent.
Alex Norris
I understand, Sir Graham, that I can have a second bite at the cherry; I think I am in order. Very briefly—I would not want to stretch your patience either—I am grateful for the Minister’s response, although I think that he is in danger of falling into a trap, as the Home Office sometimes does, when it comes to defending the status quo. Neighbourhood teams at the level of 10,000 people, which would be a council ward—that is not what we are talking about here. That is part of the public disconnect about scale.
Similarly, the point about accountability to the police and crime commissioner is very good; that is an important part of the democratic process. I have a lot more enthusiasm than perhaps others have expressed previously for that role and its importance. However, my police and crime commissioner has nearly a million people in her footprint—her footprint is by no means the biggest—so there is a challenge about operating at the right scale.
On the Minister’s point about all reasonable lines of enquiry—well, we will see. It very much remains to be seen whether that really is going to be meaningful beyond the rhetoric, but I am pleased to hear the Minister say that he thinks that applies more broadly. One of the most pernicious concepts is the idea of low-level antisocial behaviour; all sorts of problems are allowed to develop and a lot of misery is caused by looking at the issue in that way. That should not ever be the view we take.
The Minister’s point about operational independence is a good one and it is probably enough for me to resolve not to push my new clause to a vote. Perhaps I will come back with a different way of addressing the issue.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 71 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8 agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)