Asked by: Marie Rimmer (Labour - St Helens South and Whiston)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, with reference to the the Legal Advice Agency data breach in April 2025, whether his Department and the LAA had a prepared disaster recovery plan prior to the breach.
Answered by Sarah Sackman - Minister of State (Ministry of Justice)
We take the security of people’s personal data extremely seriously.
Firstly, to ensure transparency about the cyber- attack and that we reached as many potentially impacted individuals as possible, the Ministry of Justice published a notice shortly after it became aware of the criminal cyber-attack at 08:15 on 19 May on GOV.UK
The notice provided information about the cyber-attack and directed concerned members of the public to the National Cyber Security Centre’s webpage, which contained information on how to protect against the impact of a data breach.
The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) also set up dedicated Customer Services support via a telephone line and email for providers and clients who had concerns regarding the data breach. We did not write to all clients, to all the addresses that we had, because some of those addresses would no longer be current, and that would potentially create another data breach in itself.
The published statement referred to above sets out information about who may have been impacted and the nature of the information which may have been accessed. As far as we are aware, no data has been shared or put out in the public domain. An injunction has been put in place to prohibit sharing of this data. Anyone who does so could be sent to prison. If it is identified that a specific individual is at risk, action will be taken to try to contact them.
In the interests of security, we cannot confirm the method by which unauthorised access was gained to the LAA’s online digital systems or details about specific steps taken or measures implemented to protect LAA systems against any future cyber-attacks.
Security of the new systems has been paramount as we have rebuilt the LAA’s digital systems following the attack. The compromised digital portal has been replaced by a new, secure single sign-in tool for LAA online services (SiLAS). SiLAS has been designed and built in line with UK government and industry best practice for secure development. Security has been included from the ground up, including multi factor authentication, with independent testing activities to validate that the appropriate security controls are in place.
A dedicated team will monitor and update the service to ensure it evolves to remain resilient to emerging threats and is supported by a security operations capability. While no system can be entirely risk free, we are confident that we have taken the right steps to protect the service and its users.
Responsibility for disaster recovery planning for digital systems lies with Justice Digital rather than the LAA. Prior to the cyber- attack there was no digital disaster recovery plan in place. However, had we had a fully funded disaster recovery system, any immediate restoration would have simply restored the systems without resolving the vulnerabilities that enabled the cyber- attack to occur. Justice Digital now have a new Service Owner structure in place where clear Service Standards will be defined and monitored. This will include digital disaster recovery plans for each digital product.
Prior to the cyber- attack the LAA had in place prepared business continuity plans for business-critical processes and services to ensure that access to justice could be maintained in the event of a system outage. These plans were tried and tested, and we were confident that the measures would be effective for our initial response. These measures gave us sufficient time to design and implement longer term measures to meet the specific needs of the incident that were introduced in June 2025.
At every stage, we have acted to protect public access to justice and to support providers in delivering legal aid. We have achieved this without affecting court backlogs or police station activity.
Our business continuity planning was effective in maintaining access to justice from the outset of the attack and the need to have longer term options in place is one of the lessons that we have taken from this incident.
A formal lessons learned approach will systematically analyse lessons from the Ministry of Justice’s and LAA’s preparation for and response to the cyber-attack. This work will cover pre-incident risk management and the response to the incident itself. This will inform future resilience planning, governance improvement and risk mitigation strategies across the Ministry of Justice and its agencies.
Asked by: Marie Rimmer (Labour - St Helens South and Whiston)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what assessment he has made of the adequacy of disaster recovery planning at the Legal Aid Agency prior to the cyber-attack of April 2025.
Answered by Sarah Sackman - Minister of State (Ministry of Justice)
We take the security of people’s personal data extremely seriously.
Firstly, to ensure transparency about the cyber- attack and that we reached as many potentially impacted individuals as possible, the Ministry of Justice published a notice shortly after it became aware of the criminal cyber-attack at 08:15 on 19 May on GOV.UK
The notice provided information about the cyber-attack and directed concerned members of the public to the National Cyber Security Centre’s webpage, which contained information on how to protect against the impact of a data breach.
The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) also set up dedicated Customer Services support via a telephone line and email for providers and clients who had concerns regarding the data breach. We did not write to all clients, to all the addresses that we had, because some of those addresses would no longer be current, and that would potentially create another data breach in itself.
The published statement referred to above sets out information about who may have been impacted and the nature of the information which may have been accessed. As far as we are aware, no data has been shared or put out in the public domain. An injunction has been put in place to prohibit sharing of this data. Anyone who does so could be sent to prison. If it is identified that a specific individual is at risk, action will be taken to try to contact them.
In the interests of security, we cannot confirm the method by which unauthorised access was gained to the LAA’s online digital systems or details about specific steps taken or measures implemented to protect LAA systems against any future cyber-attacks.
Security of the new systems has been paramount as we have rebuilt the LAA’s digital systems following the attack. The compromised digital portal has been replaced by a new, secure single sign-in tool for LAA online services (SiLAS). SiLAS has been designed and built in line with UK government and industry best practice for secure development. Security has been included from the ground up, including multi factor authentication, with independent testing activities to validate that the appropriate security controls are in place.
A dedicated team will monitor and update the service to ensure it evolves to remain resilient to emerging threats and is supported by a security operations capability. While no system can be entirely risk free, we are confident that we have taken the right steps to protect the service and its users.
Responsibility for disaster recovery planning for digital systems lies with Justice Digital rather than the LAA. Prior to the cyber- attack there was no digital disaster recovery plan in place. However, had we had a fully funded disaster recovery system, any immediate restoration would have simply restored the systems without resolving the vulnerabilities that enabled the cyber- attack to occur. Justice Digital now have a new Service Owner structure in place where clear Service Standards will be defined and monitored. This will include digital disaster recovery plans for each digital product.
Prior to the cyber- attack the LAA had in place prepared business continuity plans for business-critical processes and services to ensure that access to justice could be maintained in the event of a system outage. These plans were tried and tested, and we were confident that the measures would be effective for our initial response. These measures gave us sufficient time to design and implement longer term measures to meet the specific needs of the incident that were introduced in June 2025.
At every stage, we have acted to protect public access to justice and to support providers in delivering legal aid. We have achieved this without affecting court backlogs or police station activity.
Our business continuity planning was effective in maintaining access to justice from the outset of the attack and the need to have longer term options in place is one of the lessons that we have taken from this incident.
A formal lessons learned approach will systematically analyse lessons from the Ministry of Justice’s and LAA’s preparation for and response to the cyber-attack. This work will cover pre-incident risk management and the response to the incident itself. This will inform future resilience planning, governance improvement and risk mitigation strategies across the Ministry of Justice and its agencies.
Asked by: Pam Cox (Labour - Colchester)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, how many prisons and Young Offender Institutions have (a) an ID and Banking Administrator and (b) an Employment Lead currently in post.
Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip
Prison Employment Leads (PELs) and ID and Banking Administrators (IDBAs) were introduced to 93 prisons across the estate in 2022 and have been effective in supporting prisoners to prepare for their reintegration into the community since then. Whilst these roles are supported nationally, they are managed and recruited to locally, so numbers of vacancies are not held centrally.
Asked by: Pam Cox (Labour - Colchester)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, how many prisoners are participating in higher education courses.
Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip
According to the Open University, as of 18 December 2025, there are 1,486 students who are currently in custody enrolled on Open University higher education programmes for the 2025/26 academic year, and a further 413 on licence in the community, totalling 1,899.
Additionally, some prisoners are taking level 4 courses, with 1,524 prisoners currently studying a course funded by the Prisoners’ Education Trust.
Asked by: Pam Cox (Labour - Colchester)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, how many Prison Transfer Agreements are currently in place.
Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip
The UK has Prisoner Transfer Agreements (PTAs) with over 110 countries. They allow for the transfer of Foreign National Offenders (FNOs) to their country of nationality to serve the remainder of their sentence, and the repatriation of British Citizens imprisoned overseas.
There are two types of PTA, compulsory meaning the FNO does not need to consent to transfer, and voluntary which means they do. In either case both countries must agree each transfer.
Asked by: Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Labour - Slough)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, who is the Chief Risk Officer for national security risks relating to the work of their Department.
Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip
Secretaries of State and Accounting Officers are ultimately responsible for all risks a Department owns. Each risk in the National Risk Register (NRR) has a designated Risk Owner, working within the Lead Government Department which is responsible for designated risk areas.
Asked by: Julian Smith (Conservative - Skipton and Ripon)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what assessment he has made of the compatibility of early releases with the principles of justice.
Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip
We must ensure that there are always sufficient prison places for dangerous offenders and those who pose a risk to the public. We are building 14,000 prison places and will have more prisoners by the time of the next election than the last. We take every possible step to mitigate risk, working in collaboration with partners across the Criminal Justice System. The introduction of the Sentencing Bill will bring an end to temporary early release measures and put the system back on a sustainable footing, ensuring sentences are served in a way that balances punishment, rehabilitation, and public safety.
We also recognise the importance of maintaining confidence in the justice system for victims and their families when designing these reforms and will continue to assess these impacts throughout implementation. Ministers and policy officials have been pleased to meet with victims’ stakeholders through a mix of individual meetings, roundtables and sector-wide engagement groups. We remain committed to continuing to engage with the victim sector to understand the impact of these changes.
Asked by: Julian Smith (Conservative - Skipton and Ripon)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what assessment he has made of the impact of early releases on (a) victims and (b) victims' families.
Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip
We must ensure that there are always sufficient prison places for dangerous offenders and those who pose a risk to the public. We are building 14,000 prison places and will have more prisoners by the time of the next election than the last. We take every possible step to mitigate risk, working in collaboration with partners across the Criminal Justice System. The introduction of the Sentencing Bill will bring an end to temporary early release measures and put the system back on a sustainable footing, ensuring sentences are served in a way that balances punishment, rehabilitation, and public safety.
We also recognise the importance of maintaining confidence in the justice system for victims and their families when designing these reforms and will continue to assess these impacts throughout implementation. Ministers and policy officials have been pleased to meet with victims’ stakeholders through a mix of individual meetings, roundtables and sector-wide engagement groups. We remain committed to continuing to engage with the victim sector to understand the impact of these changes.
Asked by: John Hayes (Conservative - South Holland and The Deepings)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, how many full-time equivalent staff in his Department have been employed for the purpose of making social media content in each of the past three years.
Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip
Due to the difficulty of disaggregating the number of staff who are employed to produce social media content from staff who are employed to work on a broader digital communications, it is not possible to report exact figures in response to this question.
Asked by: Nick Timothy (Conservative - West Suffolk)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what assessment he has made of the adequacy of government guidance regarding the statutory time limit of six months for summary offences.
Answered by Jake Richards - Assistant Whip
Proceedings for summary-only offences must be commenced within six months of the date of the offence. The Government is satisfied that that this time limit, as set out in Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, is an important safeguard which ensures that less serious offences are dealt with promptly. The limit applies to both criminal and civil proceedings, supporting the efficient operation of the courts and maintaining fairness for all parties.
Reviews are done for specific offences and exceptions have been carved out in statute where appropriate, for example for the common assault offence in domestic abuse cases. Where there is a clear need for flexibility, the Government has acted and will continue to act to introduce targeted exceptions, such as recent amendments to the Crime and Policing Bill, which extend the time limit for intimate image abuse. These changes recognise the particular challenges victims face in reporting such offences and ensure that perpetrators can still be brought to justice.
The Government’s Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy, published on 18 December 2025, includes a commitment to exploring options to improve access to justice for victims of domestic abuse, including reviewing the time limits for charging domestic abuse-related summary offences.
The Government is confident that the existing legislation clearly outlines when these limits apply. As a result, the Government does not intend to introduce further guidance at this time.