Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the author of a report, required by statute and published almost 10 years ago, on citizenship removal resulting in statelessness. It was a short report, since that power introduced by the Immigration Act 2014, which was always intended to be highly exceptional, had never been used at the time—there was therefore nothing to report on.

However, my crash course in citizenship deprivation—a concept with which this country seems notably more at ease than most of our European and North American neighbours, as the noble Lord, Lord German, said—prompted three reflections of a general nature that may still be relevant. First, the

“conducive to the public good”

threshold for citizenship deprivation—which, in 2006, replaced the previous threshold of

“seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom”—

is remarkably low. There is some comfort in the self-imposed guidance that governs the interpretation by government of this elastic and subjective phrase. However, that comfort may not survive the arrival of another Government less keen on self-imposed guidance. For my part, I hope that we will return someday to this threshold issue.

Secondly, as was pointed out by speakers as different as Kit Malthouse and Bell Ribeiro-Addy in Commons Committee, citizenship deprivation discriminates by its very nature against individuals and groups who have, or are entitled to, another citizenship. Jews and those born in Northern Ireland were mentioned, but of course there are also many others. The power to strip people of their citizenship, however sparingly used in practice, reminds naturalised citizens in particular that the citizenship that they went through so much to achieve is precarious in a way that my citizenship is not.

A few years back, in the Nationality and Borders Bill, the proposal to allow the removal of citizenship without notice was greeted with an outcry, including a petition signed by more than 300,000 people. That is a consequence not only of Clause 9 of that Bill but of the sense it conveyed to some people with dual heritage that they were second-class citizens. Thanks to your Lordships’ House, that outcry was channelled into the much-improved Section 10 of the Act.

Thirdly, there is a gap where review of citizenship deprivation should be. The Minister in the Commons pointed correctly to reviews by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration that were published in 2018 and 2024. But the purpose of those inspections was procedural, as it was described in the 2018 report, to examine

“the efficiency and effectiveness of the Home Office’s processes”.

Even that procedural exercise had its limits. The 2024 inspection looked only at the status review unit, which deals with deprivations prompted by fraud or related to serious organised crime. What were described as

“‘conducive’ cases where sensitive intelligence is relied upon to make a decision”

are handled by the special cases unit and were acknowledged by the independent chief inspector to be “out of scope”. Published figures are welcome, but do not answer all the pertinent questions. What was the intelligence case for the sudden surge of conducive deprivations from 14 in 2016 to 104 in the following year? What were the circumstances of those subjected to it, and why was deprivation used in preference to the many other tools in the counterterrorism and state threats armoury?

The reality is that deprivation of citizenship on conducive grounds is a power used for national security purposes. Like other such powers, its exercise should be reviewable by the security-cleared Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, as successive holders of that office, including me, have recommended.

Having got that off my chest, I turn to the Bill. It is one of a growing number of Bills that seek to change the law as it has recently been declared by the Supreme Court. Indeed, the next one will come along on Thursday: the Crime and Policing Bill. There is nothing constitutionally improper about that. The courts try to make sense of what we decide, which, in this field, has chopped and changed several times since 2002, as the Supreme Court’s judgment made clear.

It is also relevant, it seems to me, that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, after consideration of all factors, including the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, declared the law to be as the Government now seek to clarify it by means of the Bill.

The Supreme Court took what it described as a “middle position”, under which the Secretary of State is bound by the result of a successful appeal for all purposes

“other than in respect of the validity of immigration enforcement action taken on the basis of the deprivation order up to the time the appeal against it is allowed”.

By doing so, the Supreme Court sought to banish the unwelcome spectre of damages claims in respect of past immigration enforcement action, while requiring the individual to be treated as having always been a British citizen for all other purposes, including in the hard case that was before it, by passing that citizenship to any child born during the currency of the deprivation order.

I am persuaded by the Minister, and I thank him for his time and that of the Bill team, that there are good reasons for preventing a person from regaining their British citizenship, even following a first-instance victory in SIAC until such time as the Home Office has exhausted its appeal rights. These are, in summary, the prospect of empowering a person who endangers national security to enter the United Kingdom, possibly forever; the risk that the tactical renunciation of other citizenships will render deprivation of British citizenship impossible; and the desirability of having immigration powers, such as detention and immigration bail, pending the resolution of appeal rights. Those are reasons enough for me to support the thrust of the Bill.

The Bill might be considered tough on infant children, such as ZA in the Supreme Court case. For that reason in particular, I see the case for a limited judicial discretion along the lines proposed by Kit Malthouse in the Commons and I will listen carefully to the debate if a similar or narrower amendment is tabled here. But I am not as struck by this as the noble Lord, Lord German. There is surely consolation in the fact that the appeal process is finite and can be expedited by the courts, and that the child’s citizenship will still be recognised if the Home Office is unsuccessful at the end of the day.

The Bill is retrospective in its operation, resembling in that respect court rulings, including the judgment of the Supreme Court that it seeks, in effect, to reverse. The Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, asked the Government why retrospectivity applied across the board and could not be limited to “conducive” cases. The Minister’s answer, that deprivation orders on other grounds are not made until the person has exhausted their rights to appeal, with the result that the Bill does not apply to them, sounds pretty conclusive to me.

Finally, I have in mind the fact that people may have their citizenship removed when inside as well as outside this country and that views on deportation, including in this country, appear to be hardening in some quarters quite alarmingly. I expressed to the Minister my concern that a Government less scrupulous than this one might take advantage of the Bill to remove a person’s citizenship on conducive grounds and then take advantage of their new status as a non-national to deport them, even after SIAC had declared the removal of citizenship to be unlawful. I was told that this fear was unfounded, in summary, as I understand it, because a deportation order does not come into force until in-country appeal rights, including on human rights grounds, have been exhausted, and because Section 78 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 prohibits such a person from being removed while any in-country appeal is pending.

On the face of it, that is reassuring, at least for as long as we have the Human Rights Act. But I would welcome the Minister putting his detailed explanation on the record, either from the Dispatch Box or in writing, so that it can be scrutinised by those more expert than me. This is not something that would have seemed worth worrying about 10 or even five years ago. But I am sure that your Lordships would not wish to pass a Bill that could facilitate the future use of unlawful citizenship deprivation as a means of effecting the arbitrary or large-scale deportation of British citizens who are objectionable or unwelcome to the Government of the day. Subject to that clarification, the Bill has my support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have raised points in this Second Reading. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for their support from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition. I also welcome the broad support from the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile. I recognise that other noble Lords have made legitimate points, and I will try to respond to them.

I remind the House that the debate is about the very small amendment to the legislation. It is not about the principle or application of deprivation, or the numbers of people who have had their citizenship deprived. It is a response to the Supreme Court judgment and what that means in relation to individuals who could potentially return to or retain their status in the United Kingdom when the Government have, through the Home Secretary, determined, for whatever reason, that that individual needs to have their citizenship deprived. That is a very serious step for a Home Secretary to take. When the Supreme Court states, as it did in the recent case, that an individual can retain their citizenship during the appeal process, that means that the individual, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, just mentioned, will be free to remain a British citizen, with all the rights and privileges that brings, while the appeal is ongoing, unless this legislation is put in place.

The noble Lord, Lord German, in his introductory remarks, made a number of points about that. Essentially, I ask him whether he is willing to take the risk. That is the nub of the argument that we are putting to the House today—that the purpose of deprivation of citizenship being maintained during the course of the appeal procedure is so that the United Kingdom Government, the Home Secretary, accountable to the House of Commons, and me in this House, accountable for the Home Office, can take a decision and uphold it during the period of appeal. If the appeal is successful downstream then all bets are off and the individual’s citizenship is restored. For whatever reason it was originally removed, the Home Secretary’s decision has been overturned and the status quo for the individual remains. However, in the event of the individual remaining at the serious risk level that meant the Home Secretary brought forward the citizenship issue in the first place, that opens the United Kingdom to a risk until such time as the appeal is heard. This Bill deals solely with that issue. I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said on this matter, but I put it to them and to the noble Lord, Lord German that the issue is about the management of risk by the UK Government in a limited circumstance, which I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for raising.

This has been a fair debate about what we call the “Kit Malthouse amendments”, as a number of noble Lords have raised in their contributions. It is not appropriate to confer this discretion on the courts, because it is the Secretary of State who is accountable to this House and to Parliament, through the House of Commons, for matters of national security. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, mentioned, deprivation of citizenship and national security are matters for the Home Secretary. The Supreme Court itself emphasised that in its discussion and judgment. The Bill will align the approach to asylum and human rights appeals and extend it to appeals to the Supreme Court.

Decisions to deprive are taken in accordance with our international obligations and with consideration as to whether to give deprivation will expose the person to a real risk of mistreatment, which would constitute a breach of Articles 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Home Secretary is the person responsible for that decision. I hear what noble Lords have said but that is the reason why my noble friend in the Commons, Minister Jarvis, rejected the Kit Malthouse approach, and the reason why I do so today.

Valid points have been raised. The noble Lords, Lord Jay, Lord German, Lord Anderson and Lord Verdirame, mentioned citizenship and the impact on the child. I pay great tribute to the private discussions —which are now public discussions because we have talked about them—that I had with the noble Lord, Lord Jay, because they raised an important issue. We have looked at that and reflected on it, and I hope I can give a satisfactory response to all noble Lords who have raised this question with me. It is simply this: the Bill does not alter the existing situation in relation to children born to deprived individuals, which is already established in law.

Where a child holds British citizenship, the deprivation of the parent’s citizenship has no effect on the child’s nationality status. Again, those points were mentioned across the House today. In cases where a child is born after the parent was deprived of British citizenship—another issue that the noble Lord, Lord Jay, has mentioned privately and in the Chamber today—their entitlement to British citizenship will depend on a number of factors, including the status of the other parent. The consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in N3(ZA) is that if the child would have been British had their parent not been deprived then a successful appeal against deprivation by their parent means the child is automatically a British citizen. There are no changes in any of the principles that we have here, and I hope that reassures noble Lords on these points. Again, I am happy to reflect on that in due course.

The noble Lord, Lord Jay, made valid points on the question of the appeals procedure and the fast-track process that takes place. In answer to what I think was his pointed question to me, the Government are committed to supporting the expediting of these cases on a case-by-case basis, where appropriate, as quickly as possible. It is in no one’s interests to have long drawn-out appeals. What is the practical implication of that in relation to the courts determining the length of the appeal procedure where disagreements arise, now that courts have the power to order case management reviews to resolve issues? The current rules of court already permit the court to make directions to expedite cases if there are reasons for that to be done. The judiciary themselves are probably, dare I say it, better placed than the Home Secretary to determine and assess in each case how they can expedite those cases or not. All the factors that the noble Lord, Lord Jay, is concerned about are things that would potentially mean that a judge could determine, with “defence counsel”, that this needs to be done quickly. That is reasonable, and we want to see it over and done with as quickly as possible. We can look at the practical implications for the Government, but I hope I can reassure him on the principle.

Questions were asked about whether a person could be deported from the UK while they are appealing against the deprivation decision. In theory, it is possible for a person to be deprived of citizenship and deported before the deprivation appeal is resolved, but in practice that is going to be difficult because there will be the opportunity for people to make a human rights claim in response to the stage 1 deportation letter, and that means they would have an in-country right of appeal against the refusal of that claim if certified and a right of redress against the certification decision. It is a matter for the courts how those appeals are managed.

A number of other points were raised, including by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, about the role of the terrorism reviewer having oversight of these matters. The current situation is that the oversight for this aspect of public policy lies with the inspector of borders. They can determine their own inspection regime, if they wish to look at that. The terrorism reviewer does not currently have that role and responsibility—that is an argument the noble Lord might want to put down for debate. Should the inspector of borders wish to have an investigation on the performance of any matter to do with this—including the rights of the child, the length of the appeal procedure or the Home Secretary’s powers—they could do that, should they so wish, independently of government. So there is a sort of oversight there, but maybe not to the standard or type that the noble Lord wishes.

Ultimately, for this House—and, again, I am grateful for the support of His Majesty’s Opposition, in particular on this—it boils down to whether we are willing to take the risk. If the Home Secretary has taken advice from officials at a senior level and signed that order and taken the decision to deprive an individual of their citizenship, they have done that because there is a threat to the United Kingdom, in one form or another. If this Bill is not enacted, that threat will potentially materialise in another form as the individual will be able to restore their rights as a citizen when they appeal the original decision. This is the purpose of this Bill.

I recognise the range of points made by noble Lords from across the House on a range of issues, from the principle of deprivation in the first place to the numbers and so on, but that is the focus of the Bill and I put the question: are noble Lords willing to take that risk? I suggest that the Government are not and I am grateful to those Members who will support that position in this House today.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I have a question for the Minister about the possibility that perhaps in the future the deprivation of citizenship would be used as a prelude to deportation, even in circumstances where the first-instance tribunal had decided that the deprivation of citizenship was unlawful. It would be very helpful if the noble Lord could write to me about that.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I thought I had answered that, but if I have not answered that to the extent that I thought, I will reflect on what we have said in Hansard and will ensure that, before the next stage of this Bill, which I think is scheduled for a week today, a piece of paper in electronic or physical form lands on the noble Lord’s desk. With that, I commend the Bill to the House.