Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 8th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendments 146 and 147, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel.

At the heart of these amendments is the principle of conditionality. Where an individual is granted conditional leave to enter or remain in this country, that permission is given on very clear terms. We need to be clear that these conditions are not arbitrary or frivolous. They are carefully set out to protect the fundamental interests of our economy, the integrity of our communities and the sustainability of our public funds. If those conditions are broken then the privilege of remaining in the United Kingdom should be forfeited. To do otherwise would render the entire conditionality regime meaningless. Rules that cannot be enforced are not rules at all; they are invitations to abuse and exploitation, and they undermine the trust of the British people in our immigration system.

The amendments before us are common sense. They would require that, where an individual breached the conditions of their leave, a deportation order must follow. That is a proportionate consequence, one that would reinforce the principle that with the right to stay comes the responsibility to comply. This is also about fairness to those who abide by the rules—fairness to the taxpayer who shoulders the cost of our public services, and fairness to our communities who deserve confidence that immigration is properly managed.

These are key aspects of government administration. Without robust enforcement, our borders cannot be effectively controlled and our laws risk becoming toothless. Through these amendments, we are providing the Government with the tools they need to deliver on their own stated objective of a firm but fair immigration system. The amendments are practical, enforceable and just. They would ensure that our conditionality regime had meaning, that our rules had effect and that the British people could have confidence that their borders were being properly secured.

On the question that Clause 43 does not stand part of the Bill, we on these Benches must disagree with the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I do not need to go into great detail on the point. Clause 43 pertains to conditions on limited leave to enter or remain, but we on these Benches are clear that, where this status is granted, it is vital that strict conditions are both met and enforced, and that anyone found to have broken those conditions should be deported. The Government have a duty to control and manage immigration in the interests of our country. We say that removing those conditions undermines the Government’s ability to do that, so I cannot support it.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, raises an interesting point in reference to the Immigration Act 2016 on the process of being granted bail accommodation. I too would be grateful, alongside the noble Lord, to hear from the Minister what the Government’s assessment of this is, whether it is a problem that they have identified and what plans they have to mitigate it. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I have tabled a notice to oppose Clause 43, which has been signed by a former immigration Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

I have listened with great attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has just said, so I shall make it clear what the amendment is about. We are not trying to stop the Government doing what they say they need to do, but we are objecting to a means of doing it that is arguably unnecessary and which is certainly exorbitant—indeed, dangerously so.

The provision that Clause 43 would amend is Section 3(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, under the title:

“General provisions for regulation and control”.


Section 3(1) is indeed general in its scope. It provides for conditions to be imposed on any person who is given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. That includes those who are here on a student visa, a business visa or a spousal visa. The conditions that can currently be imposed on the grant of such visas do not appear in the amendment. I remind noble Lords what they are: they include the power to issue visas for certain types of work only, and the power to require visa holders to maintain themselves and their dependants without recourse to public funds. They are fair conditions, and they are well understood by those who are subject to them. Those people include—and I declare an interest—one of my sons-in-law, who is on the five-year pathway to indefinite leave to remain. The happy couple have settled in Norwich, but I try not to hold that against them.

Clause 43, if we were to pass it into law, would allow the Secretary of State to impose on any of these visa holders such conditions as the Secretary of State thinks fit. No limit of any kind is placed on this power, and its potential severity is shown by the illustrative restrictions given in Clause 43(2): electronic tagging, a curfew to operate in a place specified by the Secretary of State for unlimited periods of day or night, and requirements on individuals not to enter a specified area—exclusion zones—and not to leave a specified area, so-called inclusion zones.

Such conditions are not entirely without precedent in our law. They will be familiar to your Lordships from the terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or TPIMs, introduced in the TPIM Act 2011 and echoed in Part 2 of the National Security Act 2023, for those believed to be involved in foreign power threat activity. It might be thought extraordinary enough if this clause allowed individuals whose only crime is to have studied here or married a British citizen to be treated like terrorist suspects, but it is worse than that. Clause 43 would introduce a materially harsher regime than TPIMs in at least three respects.

First, there is the threshold for their use. TPIMs require a reasonable belief on the part of the Secretary of State that the subject is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. Clause 43, by contrast, is universal in its application. There is no threshold. Even the most blameless of migrants, whose only crime is to have come here for a wholly legitimate purpose, may in law be subject to its full rigour.

Secondly, there is the scope. The measures that appear in Clause 43(2) are all familiar from Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act, but the range of possible TPIMs is at least finite. Not even in respect of those believed to be terrorists did Parliament trust the Government with the unlimited power to impose, in the words of Clause 43,

“such other conditions as the Secretary of State thinks fit”.

Thirdly, there are the safeguards. TPIMs can be imposed only after the Home Secretary has obtained both the permission of the High Court and the confirmation of the CPS that it is not feasible to prosecute the subject for any criminal offence. No such safeguard exists in Clause 43, which would allow the severest restrictions on personal liberty to be imposed by the Executive without the intervention of a court on a potentially vast range of people, without any requirement for consultation, authorisation, automatic judicial review of the kind that exists for TPIMs, or oversight.

Clause 43 came late to this Bill. It was introduced in Committee in the Commons. No attempt was made to defend its breadth of application, but the Minister for Border Security and Asylum, Angela Eagle, did explain the limited circumstances in which the Government proposed to use the new powers for which they were asking. It was intended for use, she said:

“Where a person does not qualify for asylum or protection under the refugee convention but cannot be removed from the UK because of our obligations under domestic and international law”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 13/3/25; col. 265.]


It was intended to allow the same conditions to be placed on such persons as they might have been subjected to under immigration bail. She said:

“The powers will be used only in cases involving conduct such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, extremism or serious crime, or where the person poses a threat to national security or public safety”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 13/3/25; col. 268.]


Speaking for myself, that objective is entirely understandable, indeed defensible, though I pause to say that the definition of extremism is worryingly uncertain. Given the Government’s limited ambitions for the use of this clause, can the Minister explain why the existing powers to issue TPIMs, serious crime prevention orders and measures under Part 2 of the National Security Act 2023 are considered insufficient? They contain better safeguards and seem to meet precisely the cases that the Minister has in mind. Indeed, serious crime prevention orders are to be extended further by Part 3 of this Bill. If I am right about that, there is no need for Clause 43, but I am sure the Minister will explain.

Even if these existing powers are not sufficient, any new power must surely be tailored to its intended target, rather than to the vast range of innocent visa holders covered by Clause 43 in its current form. That is what the Constitution Committee had in mind when we recommended that the power be narrowed and that safeguards on its use be included in the Bill. The Joint Committee on Human Rights reported in similar terms. For anyone who is interested in more detail, I can recommend the useful briefings from Amnesty and the Public Law Project.

No one doubts for a moment the good faith of the Minister or his colleagues, but to legislate for unlimited powers and trust to assurances from the Dispatch Box about the narrow scope of their intended use would not just be poor legislative practice but an abandonment of parliamentary scrutiny at the very time when that scrutiny is most needed. The courts have no regard to ministerial assurances, save when the terms of an Act are ambiguous. That, as noble Lords know, is a rare eventuality.

No one who looks at the opinion polls can be confident that all possible future Governments would apply Clause 43 with the restraint to which this Government have committed. To enact Clause 43 would be a gift-wrapped present to any future Government who wished to threaten or erode the rights of immigrants across the board, without thresholds or oversight. If this clause is needed at all, I hope the Minister will agree that it should at least be confined in the Bill to the circumstances where that need arises.

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

I am very pleased to support the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and my name is on this amendment. I would just like to say to my noble friend Lord Davies that I was indeed the Immigration Minister, and I came forward with the term “being firm but fair” in relation to all immigration matters. I think that has stood the test of time. I have always believed in very strict conditions being attached not only to the Immigration Rules and their application but to our approach to those who seek asylum in this country.

My name is on this amendment because this is something of an example of a Government using a sledgehammer where it has been quite unnecessary to do so. This clause is so general and so wide in its effects that it seems to me to go against all propriety and balance. I will be very brief because I do not want to fall into the trap of repeating what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has said, but I want to tease the Minister out a little on those points.

We know that terrorism prevention and investigation measures, TPIMs, are already very effective, and as are serious crime prevention orders. They all have within them the necessary ingredients to be able to deal with virtually all the circumstances that we are debating in relation to this Bill. Therefore, I again suggest to the Minister that it is unnecessary for us to have these extra powers being sought by the Government. It is true that the Minister in the House of Commons gave a clear indication that the use would be only limited. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has given us the list of things where there might be interest here. However, in the circumstances, these intentions of the Minister do not necessarily make good law and I am sure he shares my concern that, if you allow extensions in this way, you are allowing future Governments to abuse the system and the situation unnecessarily.

Also, these new measures, unlike TPIMs or the SCPOs, do not seem to require any judicial approval. There is no such requirement, so far as I can see. As a fairly junior lawyer, but a lawyer nevertheless, I find that reprehensible and dangerous. I would like the Minister’s comments on that.

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If Members are not happy, there is an opportunity either now or, I suggest, on Report to determine this by a Division and the other place can respond with Home Office assessment, or they can put amendments down that meet the concerns that they have. It is the Government’s position, however, to use this to respond to very low numbers of cases where there are specific identified serious threats. It is important that we have the power to ensure that we can deal with this for the safety of the British public. If we did not have the power and if those individuals exercised the threats that they pose, Ministers would be in a severely compromised position to argue to the British public why we did not use the powers to take strong action against these individuals.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. He has really said just one thing, which is not in dispute across the House: he and his colleagues would use these powers on a case-by-case basis and in a very responsible way. However, with great respect, he has not answered either of the two points that were made to him in the debate. The first was the question of why serious crime prevention orders, TPIMS or prevention and investigation measures under the National Security Act 2023 would not be sufficient to deal with all the categories of people that Angela Eagle referred to. That is the question of whether Clause 43 is necessary at all.

Secondly—assuming he makes that case—how can he justify a power that is designed for such a narrow purpose being drafted in such an impossibly broad fashion? Although the Minister says, quite rightly, that we can put this to a Division on Report, I remind him that the TPIM Act, with all the safeguards that it contains, is 59 pages long. Drafting thresholds, proper provisions for scope, and safeguards is not a simple matter—not for a humble and unlettered Back-Bencher or Cross-Bencher such as myself.

I remember a similar case with the deprivation of citizenship, in which, under the last Government, a clause was put forward that allowed anyone who was subject to deprivation to be deprived of their citizenship without notice. It was seen that this was far broader than it needed be and the Government met with me and others and assisted with the drafting. We ended up with something much more tailored to the policy that the Government were seeking to advance, which nobody has questioned in this debate. Will the Minister meet with us in a constructive spirit and with a view to finding a clause that meets the Government’s policy but is not open to the sort of abuse to which the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and others have referred?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, knows from our 13 months or so of engagement with him that I am always open to meet with noble Lord and to have input into the legislative process to make sure that the Government’s objectives are workable and practicable. I will happily meet with him to reflect on those points. I have Members from the Official Opposition, the Liberal Democrats and the Cross Benches pressing me on this issue; it is important that I listen to those reflections with the policy Minister who has argued that case in the House of Commons.

Let us look at what has been said today in the cold light of day and reflect upon it. I will certainly arrange a meeting to hear his concerns further and look at the issues. The Government believe that Clause 43 is of sound policy and that it would be used in the limited circumstances that I have described. They believe that those circumstances can be defined and, even though new sub-paragraph (x) in Clause 43(2)(b) says

“other conditions as the Secretary of State thinks fit”,

I understand his concern on that matter. But I believe, again, that a responsible Secretary of State would be held to account, would have to explain and bring forward information on that, and would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, particularly in the House of Commons where votes from the governing party can take place, but also in this noble House.

So I say to the noble Lord: let us meet, but the Government have put forward a clause that they believe is appropriate. There are noble Lords in this Committee who believe it is not, so let us have that discussion in the cold light of day to reflect on those points.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

When the Minister goes back to the policy Minister, will he reassure her that nobody in this debate has questioned the policy that the Government are seeking to pursue? All we are questioning is the method they have chosen.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That point has been made, and I will discuss that with my colleagues in government. Clause 43 as drafted is before the Committee today, but there are opportunities to discuss it further if the noble Lord is not happy with any assurances that we can give outside the Committee to table amendments that can be debated and voted upon in due course. I will leave it at that.

Amendment 148 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bach seeks to clarify the eligibility criteria for bail accommodation under Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016. Under this provision, the Secretary of State has the power to provide accommodation to someone in exceptional circumstances only when they have been granted immigration bail and are subject to a residence condition that requires them to live at an address specified in that condition. The Home Office recognises that, where the Secretary of State is required to provide a person with accommodation to enable them to meet their bail conditions, a specified address cannot always be known at the time of the bail grant. Accordingly, it has been a long-standing policy position that bail can be granted with a residence condition to an address that is known at the time of the grant of immigration bail, or an address that is yet to be specified. In 2024, this was also set out explicitly in the relevant guidance. The policy is clear, and operational teams are already operating the legislation in this way, to ensure that someone can apply to the Home Office for bail accommodation without having been granted bail to a specific address. Therefore, the amendment—with its good intention—would make no material difference to the current operation of the legislation and is not necessary. I am happy to hear further from the noble Lord, but I invite him not to move his amendment.

On the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, Amendment 146 would require the Secretary of State to make a deportation order against persons who breach the conditions attached to their leave in the UK. Such breaches of conditions may already be addressed by cancelling that leave and removing the person from the UK without the need to seek a deportation order. Mandating deportation in such cases is not therefore necessary. It will provide no guarantee that a person’s removal from the UK could be enforced if they were to make a human rights or protection claim against their removal.

Finally, Amendment 147 would replace existing criminal sanctions for offences under Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 with a penalty of deportation. Overstayers and illegal entrants are already liable to removal from the UK. Where a person is convicted of an offence and sentenced to a period of imprisonment, consideration will be given to their deportation. With respect to the noble Lord, the amendment risks encouraging offending behaviour and would not result in an increase in removals from the UK.

This has been a serious debate that has raised a number of points. But I hope, given what I have said, that the noble Lord will not press his objection to Clause 43. I will meet noble Lords to discuss their objections further to understand their concerns better. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments so that we can examine the clause together.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Thursday 3rd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I will be brief. Invoking the terrorism laws has consequences and, although I do not object to invoking them in relation to any of these three groups, we need to understand properly what those consequences are. Many people want to speak, and I will make only one point, which is that the consequences of designation for individuals misguided enough to approve of, for example, Palestine Action are rather more draconian than the Explanatory Memorandum to this order suggests.

Paragraph 5.20 of that document states:

“It is a criminal offence for a person to belong to, or invite support for, a proscribed organisation. It is also a criminal offence to arrange a meeting to support a proscribed organisation”.


That is an accurate summary of Section 11 and Section 12(1) and (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000. If you are a member or a promoter of a proscribed organisation, you can face up to 14 years in prison.

However, since the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 introduced Section 12(1A) to the Terrorism Act 2000, you can also be looking at up to 14 years if you express

“an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation”,

without even needing an intention that your listener or listeners should agree—being reckless about that suffices. By our bringing Palestine Action, for example, within the ambit of the terrorism laws, anyone who is young and foolish enough to say that its heart is in the right place, or that the Government should listen to it, is committing a very serious offence for which they could be prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned as a terrorist. It is not their right to protest but the right of freedom of speech that is the issue here.

Does the Minister agree that this 2019 offence takes us on to more sensitive territory than the others? Can he tell us whether its potential impact was considered as part of the Government’s analysis of these decisions, even though it was not referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum? Might it be a good idea, for future proscription debates, to ensure that the Explanatory Memorandum template is updated to make reference to the full arsenal of proscribed organisation offences?

Product Regulation and Metrology Bill [HL]

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 26th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord Gardiner of Kimble)]

My Lords, I must inform the House that, if Amendment 2 is agreed to, I will not be able to call Amendments 3 and 4 by reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I rise not to support the noble Lord, although it is a pleasure to follow him, but to address government Amendments 44 and 61 in this group, which I have signed, together with government Amendment 55, which will be for another day.

The Constitution Committee has already been kindly mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt. As a member of that committee, I register my appreciation for the fact that the Government have not only listened to the committee’s concerns and to those developed with impressive persistence by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee but have reacted constructively to them. The Henry VIII powers have been greatly reduced in scope and a credible explanation has been given for the small remainder. While the Bill continues to contain uncomfortably wide ministerial powers to make significant policy decisions, the broad duty of consultation in Amendment 61 is a welcome mitigation. The third part of the package—an extension of the affirmative procedure—is another positive step.

It might have been possible to go further, as the Delegated Powers Committee has rightly said. But, for my part, I would not go so far as to support the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, in his—I am tempted to say “wrecking” —Amendment 2. How to avoid the unconstrained use of excessively broad delegated powers is a problem that will not go away. It was raised by this Bill in a particularly acute form. The Government have grappled with it conscientiously and they deserve credit for that.

I have one final thought. It is rather a dry one, I am afraid, but what do you expect from the Cross Benches? I hope that, some day, the relevant committees of this House might have occasion to discuss the constitutional issues around framework Bills and delegated powers with the Government, not only Bill by Bill, as we do at present, but in a more structured and strategic way. Such discussions would give proper weight to the constraints on government but could also draw on the guidance provided by our committees and bodies such as the Hansard Society over many years. Perhaps the Minister will agree, after his generous and productive engagement on this issue, that the goal of a more consistent and principled approach on both sides of the fence might at least be worth pursuing.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I shall speak to my Amendment 4 in this group, which, we are advised, would be pre-empted if Amendment 2 were to be passed, by reason of the deletion of the relevant provision in Clause 1(1), to which it would add an additional subsection. It would add to the overarching objective of making regulations, which is to secure safe products:

“In considering whether regulations should be made … the Secretary of State must have regard to the likelihood of the United Kingdom being seen as a favourable place in which to develop, manufacture or supply products”.


Of course, many of the debates that we have on the Bill will relate to the question of alignment, or otherwise. One of the reasons why we are considering this legislation is because there would be significant issues to do with the manufacture, distribution and supply of products in this country were we to diverge significantly from the standards that lie behind the CE marking from the European Union. Rather than continue, as we have done, with reliance on the retained EU law legislation, it is the Government’s intention, through this legislation, to enable us to accept CE marking. That is not necessarily on a dynamic basis—I agree that it is a matter of choice whether we do so—but the Bill’s structure is intended to enable that to happen. Because we seek to do that by reference to the adverse economic consequences that may flow from failing to be able to bring products here, which may drive some economic activity elsewhere, it seems important that Ministers making regulations under this legislation should consider whether, as a result, the UK is an attractive place in which to manufacture, distribute or supply products.

This is not a new concept. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, on the Government Front Bench will recall that the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 includes effectively the same provision in relation to medical devices. Medical devices are outside the scope of this Bill but it is relevant to a wide range of other industrial products. I do not understand why it should not be an essential part of the way that Ministers consider making regulations that have such an impact to have regard to the positive benefits that can accrue to business from ensuring that we have the right product regulatory framework for them, so I commend Amendment 4 to the House.

I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that Amendment 2 is a wrecking amendment. Why not? Because, if the first subsection were to be removed by that amendment, the regulation-making power would be removed from the Bill so the Government would have to think again. However, the noble Lord and the House will note that later in this group is government Amendment 44. The original formulation in the Bill was to have consequential amendments to Parts II, IV and V of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. In response to the suggestion from the Delegated Powers Committee, which was unhappy with the sweeping power to amend that Act, the Government have instead said, “We’re going to omit Parts II and IV now”. Part II is the bit I am interested in; it is the part of the Act that relates to product safety. The Government simply propose to remove Part II of that Act.

I say to the House and to my noble friend on the Front Bench that if Amendment 2 were to be passed the Bill would clearly have no further regulation-making power in it. However, if at the same time the House were to resist government Amendment 44 then there would continue to be powers in the Consumer Protection Act 1987 for the purpose of making regulations for product safety. The House will be reminded that Section 11(1) of the 1987 Act says:

“The Secretary of State may by regulations … make such provision as he considers appropriate for the purpose of securing … that goods to which this section applies are safe”.


More detail follows, including the respective ways in which provisions can be determined.

The Government should tell us either how they are going to legislate using the powers in the 1987 Act or, if they want to get rid of them, how they are going to replace them in detail. They have done neither of those things. I know we are going to come back to talk about legislation on product liability at a later stage. The Consumer Protection Act is nearly 40 years old and we know it needs updating, but the Government are not doing that; they are sweeping it away and not giving us anything like the detail that was in that Act as to how the powers are going to be used. Nearly 40 years’ worth of scrutiny of the Section 11 provisions on product safety will also be swept away, because the language in this Bill is not the same as in that Act.

The House will have to forgive me: I am slightly anticipating the next group and Amendment 3, because if Amendment 2 is passed, Amendment 3 will not be debated; it will have been pre-empted. I want to make it absolutely clear that although I support my noble friend’s criticisms of the way the Bill is constructed, there is a route available to maintain the powers for determining regulations for product safety. That would force the Government to come back and amend the Consumer Protection Act in ways that are more substantive and clearer than what the present Bill offers us.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th February 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

21: Clause 5, page 4, line 19, leave out subsections (4) to (6)
Member’s explanatory statement
This would remove a Henry VIII Clause which will otherwise give the Minister power by regulation to alter (including by making more onerous) the range of public protection procedures in subsection (3) which were decided upon after full consultation and will after passage of the Bill have been endorsed by Parliament.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to the four amendments in this group, with thanks to the noble Baronesses, Lady Suttie and Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who have variously signed them. I thank also the Minister, not only for being generous with his time but for his indication in Committee on Wednesday that he had some sympathy with these amendments. What form that sympathy will take we look forward to finding out.

Standing back, the Bill has two principal elements: it stipulates the capacity of events and premises that are subject to its provisions, and it stipulates the types of procedures and measures which must be followed by those responsible for such premises and events. Those things are not matters of detail—they define the policy that underlies Martyn’s law. We are asked, quite properly, to sign off on those provisions by giving our approval to Clauses 2 and 3 on capacity, and to Clauses 5 and 6 on procedures and measures.

The amendments in this group all relate to Henry VIII clauses: provisions in the Bill that allow the Minister, by the affirmative procedure, to amend provisions of statute. It is not just any statute: this statute, the one we are being asked to pass into law; and not just any provisions—the provisions in Clauses 2, 3, 5 and 6 that lie right at its heart.

Delegated powers are a fact of life and, although some of us may regret it, we are even seeing the normalisation of Henry VIII powers, which allow statutes to be amended in points of detail by regulation. But I suggest that these Henry VIII clauses simply go too far in giving Ministers the power to retake policy decisions that have been taken after much debate by Parliament.

The first pair of amendments in my name, Amendments 21 and 23, would remove the Henry VIII clauses in Clauses 5 and 6. These were singled out for concern by the Constitution Committee in the letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, to the Minister of 14 January. As a member of that committee, fortunate to serve under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, I will briefly explain why.

The lists at Clauses 5(3) and 6(3) dictate what may lawfully be required of those responsible for premises falling within scope. Clause 5(3) specifies the “Public protection procedures” to be followed if there is reason to suspect that an act of terrorism is occurring or about to occur. They are of limited scope: little more than procedures for evacuation and invacuation, barring entrances and providing information.

Clause 6(3) lists the public protection measures that must additionally be in place in enhanced duty premises or in qualifying events. These are potentially much more extensive: measures relating to monitoring, movement, the physical safety and security of the premises, and security of information. Unlike the public protection procedures that are the subject of Clause 5, they must be in place at all times and may have as their objective to reduce the vulnerability of the premises as well as risk to individuals.

Clauses 5(4) to (6), and 6(4) to (6), which these amendments would remove, allow both lists—the list of procedures and the list of measures—to be amended, not only by regulation but without meaningful precondition and without even the safeguard of consultation. What could that mean in practice? Take Clause 6, where the range of public protection measures is already almost limitlessly broad: anything relating to monitoring of a premises or event; anything relating to the physical safety or security of the premises; anything relating to the movement of individuals or the security of information. Clause 6(4) would allow yet further measures, not relating to the safety and security of the premises, monitoring, movement, and so on, to be introduced by regulations. What regulations could the Government have in mind? They sound as though they are well outside the normal range of protections that we might think useful and acceptable. If any such categories can be thought of, why can they not be brought forward and debated in the Bill? If they cannot be thought of, how can this power be justified?

The range of procedures in Clause 5 is much more limited, and understandably so, because these procedures are to be activated only once a terrorist attack is immediately anticipated or already under way, and because some of the venues to which they apply are relatively small. But, because the range is so limited, the potential for its expansion is commensurately large. What new and more onerous categories of procedure might be in prospect, what will be their additional cost and why are they not already in the Bill so that we can debate and decide on them now?

--- Later in debate ---

In conclusion, to the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, I offer a sort of half-concession discussion and further examination in due course on Amendment 38. With regard to the other powers that have been included in the Bill, I hope that noble Lords, having listened today and potentially having read Hansard, will not pursue the amendments that are listed and will allow me to discuss Amendment 38 further with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. I shall not try to summarise the excellent speeches that were made—they will come much more clearly in the form that they were made than they would from any summary of mine—but I will pick up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, who emphasised consultation. As I said at Second Reading, this Bill has in many ways been a model of careful consideration. Look at the work that the Home Affairs Select Committee did on it, the work that was done in another place, the way that this Government have listened, and the way that people right around the country were consulted before these measures, procedures and thresholds were reached. In previous groups, the Minister, quite rightly, has sought credit for the depth of that consultation and the care with which those crucial figures, procedures and measures were arrived at. So although I might not have used exactly the same words as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—she said that to introduce Henry VIII clauses and apply them to these central elements of the Bill when it has already been consulted on makes a mockery of it—I entirely understand where she is coming from.

I am very grateful to the Minister for what he has said. I think he described it as a half concession—and one must take what one can get—on Amendment 38 and the idea that changes to the thresholds should be motivated by a change to the terrorist threat. However, I urge him, while he is in that generous mood, to heed the very strong terms in which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, expressed himself on Amendment 39. If you were seeking a Henry VIII clause in these circumstances, and claiming as your model the Fire Safety Act 2021 which has a duty to consult—I might say a very weak duty to consult only such people as seem to the Secretary of State appropriate—why can that not be followed through into the text of this Bill?

The Minister gave an assurance from the Dispatch Box that there would be appropriate consultation—I think he said that; I do not want to put words into his mouth—although he did say that, on some minor issues, it might be internal consultation only. If the Minister is prepared to say that from the Dispatch Box, let us hope that all his successors are as well inclined to the idea of consultation. But is it really a great stretch to put those words into the Bill as well? I hope that, just as we reflect before Report, the Minister will reflect as well.

If the consultation power is too wide—and I think the Minister took the point that perhaps Amendment 39 applies to a whole range of changes—it could of course be narrowed. Amendment 38 is restricted to specific aspects of the Bill and it would be quite possible to redraft a consultation power that was equally narrow.

While I am on my feet and we are all beginning the process of reflection before Report, might the Minister consider applying the logic that he has brought to Amendment 38 to the lists in Clauses 5 and 6? After all, if reductions in the threshold, as the Minister seems minded to accept, require a change in the terrorist threat—or that there could at least be debate as to whether that is an appropriate precondition—why should not an expansion of the lists similarly require a change in the threat?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The reason I would put is that a change in the threshold would involve bringing a large number of other potential businesses and outlets into the scope of the provisions of the Bill. The changes in Clauses 5 and 6 may tweak or look at the protections available or what other support and training should be given, but they do not bring into scope further premises.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am grateful for that clarification and answer, but Amendments 38 and 39 are not just about a changing of the threat; they are also about consultation. While the Minister is thinking about consultation in relation to the thresholds, I wonder whether he might think about something similar in relation to changing the lists.

The Minister has offered me half a concession. What I was offering him just now was perhaps half an olive branch. It was a way of possibly coming back on Report with something slightly different from my amendments to Clauses 5 and 6. I think we all have reflecting to do. I am extremely grateful for what I think has been a most useful debate. For the moment at least, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 21 withdrawn.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, this Bill has been forged in reaction to a despicable terrorist attack, dignified by the name of one of its victims, promoted by his courageous mother and subject to a high degree of cross-party consensus. Those are all admirable things, but they also underline the need for serious and dispassionate parliamentary scrutiny.

It is sometimes said that the meaningful scrutiny of Bills is nowadays the province of this House only, and examples of that are not unknown. However, having followed the progress of this Bill through the Commons, with particular reference to the work of the Public Bill Committee and the Home Affairs Select Committee—the independence of which on this matter was notable— I have a lot of respect for the evidence they have taken and the work they have done. That is now reflected in the reformulated and, I must say, improved Bill. I particularly welcome the test of reasonable practicability, so familiar from health and safety legislation, and the changes to the lower threshold for qualifying premises, which is strongly supported by the National Association of Local Councils. It will take out of the scope of the Bill over 100,000 premises—including small parish churches, village halls and town centre cafes—that cannot reasonably be expected to host as many as 200 people.

I remember discussing with Tom Tugendhat, when he was the Security Minister responsible for the Bill, whether it was necessary to put the limit as low as a capacity of 100. He of course held the line at the time, but it was interesting to see that, once released from his responsibilities, he tabled an amendment in Committee that sought to raise the revised lower limit from 200 to 300.

I am grateful to the Minister for meeting with me on this issue. I hope he will forgive me if I remain slightly sceptical about the likely value of the obligations placed on the smallest standard duty premises. A £3,313 average cost over 10 years is not a trivial amount for a financially marginal business or a village hall struggling to raise funds. Yet compliance with the standard duty, as can be seen in Clause 1(1), is intended not to reduce the vulnerability of such premises to acts of terrorism, but to reduce only the risk of physical harm once an act of terrorism is imminent or has started. As the Minister covered in his opening speech, Clause 5(3) demonstrates what that will mean: guarding and locking doors, ensuring that people know where the exits are, and so on.

Bearing in mind the modest extent of the standard duty, I wonder how much the centrally available guidance, which operators are supposed to download, will add to the common sense of those who operate small venues and know them inside out, particularly when, as is thankfully the case in most places, the risk of a terrorist attack is almost vanishingly small. The Minister probably feels that by shifting the minimum threshold to 200 he has reached a widely acceptable compromise, and he may well be right.

However, I remain concerned by the ease by which, by affirmative regulation, 100,000 extra premises could be brought within the scope of the Bill, and many more made subject to the enhanced duties. After a terrorist attack, it can be tempting for any Government to be seen to take immediate action to tighten up the law. Of course, the noble Baroness, Lady May, to whom it was my great privilege to report as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, was made of stronger stuff, and so, I suspect, is the Minister. But others do succumb to temptation of this kind, and activating such a power would be an obvious and tempting response.

I make two suggestions. Just to concentrate minds a little, could the operation of Clause 32 not be made conditional on the Secretary of State being satisfied that changing the threshold is justified on the basis of the terrorist threat? That is in the Delegated Powers Committee memorandum; why not put it in the Bill? This would not prevent it being done, but it would make it more likely that it will be done for the right reasons. Secondly, the Delegated Powers Committee memorandum claims as a precedent for this power Section 2 of the Fire Safety Act 2021, which indeed provides for a similar affirmative power to change premises to which the fire safety order applies, but that section contains a statutory obligation to consult. Bearing in mind the extensive consultation that arrived at the figures of 200 and 800, surely at least some consultation would be appropriate before Ministers intervene to change them by regulation.

I have a couple of other points. Noble Lords will have seen a submission from LIVE, which describes itself as the live music industry body in the UK. LIVE makes the point that music festivals, venues and events are already regulated under the Licensing Act 2003, with, where appropriate, highly developed counter- terrorism measures secured by licence conditions. This is overseen, it says, by safety advisory groups which take advice from local police forces and local counterterrorism security co-ordinators. Is that a picture the Minister recognises and, if so, can he give us some more detail on what the regime in the Bill will add to what is described? I do not doubt it will add something. Will the mechanisms described by LIVE persist after Martyn’s law has entered into force? How will any overlap be dealt with, and how will the existing mechanisms be integrated into the approach of the SIA? It would be good to hear more about this since, as the Regulatory Policy Committee points out, the Bill’s impact assessment provides no evidence that a new regulator with national inspectors would be efficient compared with local authority compliance, and the new regulator is of course given very strong enforcement powers.

Finally, I noticed from Schedule 2 that certain premises are excluded from the Bill. Premises occupied by the devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are excluded, but those occupied by the United Kingdom Civil Service are not. I wonder if the Minister can tell us why. Also excluded from the Bill are premises occupied for the purposes of the devolved legislatures, the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I assume that these premises, or some of them, are considered to fall within Schedule 1; otherwise, no exclusion from the Bill would be necessary. No doubt other precautions are in place, but although we are frequently urged to do our fire safety training, I do not recall hearing anything about the threat of terrorism, which is perhaps rather greater here than it is in my village hall. I should be grateful if the Minister told us what difficulties there are in applying the standard and enhanced duties to Westminster as they are applied to Whitehall, and explained why parliamentary buildings are exempt.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Monday 22nd April 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this Bill has now been scrutinised a number of times. The Government have rejected this amendment several times, so we must now accept the will of the elected House, bring the debate on this last amendment to an end and get this Bill on to the statute book. Having now debated this issue on so many occasions, I will not repeat the same arguments but reiterate a few key points. The Bill’s provisions come into force when the treaty enters into force, which is when the parties have completed their internal procedures. We will ratify the treaty in the UK only once we agree with Rwanda that all necessary implementation is in place for both countries to comply with the obligations under the treaty.

I have set out the steps that have been taken to be ready for the treaty to be ratified, and I will remind noble Lords once again of the most recent step. Last Friday, 19 April, the Rwandan Parliament passed its domestic legislation to implement the new asylum system. Rwanda has a proven track record of working constructively with domestic and international partners, including the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration and other non-government organisations to process and support asylum seekers and the refugee population. As I have already set out this evening, the Government are satisfied that Rwanda is safe and has the right mechanisms in place should a situation ever arise that would change that view. The Government will respond as necessary, and this will include a range of options to respond to the circumstances, including any primary legislation if required.

The monitoring committee will undertake daily monitoring of the partnership for at least the first three months to ensure rapid identification of, and response to, any issues. This enhanced phase will ensure that comprehensive monitoring and reporting take place in real time. During the period of enhanced monitoring, the monitoring committee will report to the joint committee in accordance with an agreed action plan to include weekly and biweekly reporting, as required. The implementation of these provisions in practice will be kept under review by the independent monitoring committee, whose role was enhanced by the treaty, which will ensure compliance. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 3J in my name turned out to be the last one standing. Perhaps I may say just a few words at its funeral. It was not much, perhaps, compared with some of those amendments that had already been defeated. Indeed, it survived so long under the guidance of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who I am delighted to see back in his place, precisely because it was so modest and unthreatening to the Government’s policy. But it at least touched on a central disease of this Bill and perhaps of our body politic more generally: the imputation of decisions to Parliament to reduce the possibilities for challenge and the pretence that by asserting something to be true, even in the teeth of the evidence, one can not only make it true but keep it true for ever.

Many people, some of them perhaps still watching even now, will have wished us to keep on fighting, but without the threat of double insistence—which remains part of our constitutional armoury, but which did not command the necessary political support on this occasion—there would have been no point in doing so. The purpose of ping-pong is to persuade the Government, through force of argument, to come to the table and agree a compromise. They have refused pointedly to do so, and after four rounds of ping-pong, their control of the Commons remains as solid as ever.

The time has now come to acknowledge the primacy of the elected House and to withdraw from the fray. We do so secure at least in the knowledge that the so-called judgment of Parliament was not the judgment of this House, and that we tried our hardest to achieve something a little more sensible. We must take comfort from such assurances as the Minister has been able to give and hold the Government to them. This is the Government’s Bill, resolutely free of any outside influence. As a patriot, I can only hope—though I am afraid, without much optimism—that it will bring benefits, in some way, commensurate to its real and painful cost.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise with a heavy heart, given the lack of further amendment, to this dreadful, international law-busting Bill. I note that in the other place, the SNP twice used procedural Motions to delay it by 15 minutes each time. I applaud them for that, and I am not going to take up the same length, but I am going to take a moment to mark this historic occasion.

Your Lordships’ House has put a lot of work into trying to make the Bill comply with international law, with basic moral laws and with the principles of justice and fairness. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, earlier today said:

“Its costs will be measured not only in money but in principles debased—disregard for our international commitments, avoiding statutory protections for the vulnerable, and the removal of judicial scrutiny”.


Nothing has changed in the Bill in the last few hours.

I note that Amnesty International this evening warned airline companies that many members of the public take an extremely negative view of the content of the policy. Those were really unnecessary words, because no company of any repute whatsoever is going to take part in implementing this dreadful policy. That is a measure of the Bill and the disgraceful, despicable actions it represents.

I am disappointed to see the almost empty Benches around me. I note that the Liberal Democrat Benches are here, having played their part in trying to stop the Bill at Second Reading, and I commend them for that action that the Green group supported. They are still here to the bitter end.

We heard from the Minister, we will hear tonight, and no doubt will keep hearing in the coming days that “Well, we’re the unelected House”. That does not mean that this House is without moral or legal responsibilities. I have asked the House a number of times: if not now, when? What will it take to make this House say, “Here we take a stand”?

We have had the abomination of the Elections Act, the elements of a policing Act that targeted Gypsy, Roma and Traveller people explicitly. We have had multiple indefensible restrictions on the right to protest. Now, we are letting through an attack on some of the most vulnerable, desperate people on this planet. What more will we let through? I suggest to noble Lords as they leave this Chamber tonight to ask themselves that question.

With a desperate, flailing government party bereft of ideas and philosophy and without principles, this House will keep being tested. I ask these empty Benches: you might be waiting for an election, but what kind of a country will it be if you do not stand up now?

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Monday 22nd April 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 3J in lieu—

3J: Clause 1, page 2, line 31, at end insert—
“(7) The Republic of Rwanda may be treated as a safe country for the purposes of this Act only once the Secretary of State, having consulted the Monitoring Committee formed under Article 15 of the Rwanda Treaty, has made a statement to Parliament to that effect.
(8) The Republic of Rwanda must cease to be treated as a safe country for the purposes of this Act once the Secretary of State has made a statement to Parliament to that effect.””

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I beg to move Motion A1 as an amendment to Motion A. I do so in the unavoidable absence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who tabled the previous versions of Amendment 3 and has been good enough to approve this one.

We are in the endgame now. We will, this week, have a law that provides for the offshore processing and settlement of asylum seekers in Rwanda. Its benefits remain to be seen. Its costs will be measured not only in money but in principles debased—disregard for our international commitments, avoiding statutory protections for the vulnerable, and the removal of judicial scrutiny over the core issue of the safety of Rwanda. That is now a fact, and there is nothing more we can do about it.

But there is a further principle, as precious as any of those, to which we can still hold fast. One might call it the principle of honesty in lawmaking. I presume on your Lordships’ patience this evening because we have it in our power to reinstate that principle without damaging the purpose of this Bill or delaying its passage any further. We are concerned with the safety of Rwanda, both in the present and in the future. This Bill is honest about neither.

The present position is governed by Clause 1(2) of the Bill, which

“gives effect to the judgement of Parliament that the Republic of Rwanda is a safe country”,

yet there has been no statement even by the Government that Rwanda is currently a safe country, as defined in Clause 1(5). The Minister said just now—I noted his words; they are the same words he used last Wednesday—that

“we will ratify the treaty in the UK only once we agree with Rwanda that all necessary implementation is in place for both countries to comply with the obligations under the treaty”.—[Official Report, 17/4/24; col. 1033.]

This has not yet happened. Against the background of what the Supreme Court described on the evidence before it as

“the past and continuing practice of refoulement”,

those obligations include, by Article 10(3) of the treaty, the agreement of an “effective system” to ensure that refoulement no longer occurs. The Minister has repeatedly declined the invitations of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, to confirm that this system—a precondition for the safety of Rwanda—is fully set up and ready to go. Neither have we heard anything from the monitoring committee. While the Minister’s confidence is comforting up to a point, we are simply not in a position to make the judgment this Bill imputes to us.

The Bill’s treatment of the future is still further from reality. Parliament is asked to declare that Rwanda will always be a safe country, even if the progress made since the genocide of the 1990s—and one can only commend Rwanda on that—should ever falter or go into reverse. Decision-makers, immigration officials, courts and even the Secretary of State are bound by Clause 2 to treat Rwanda conclusively as safe in perpetuity.

Bluntly, we are asked to be complicit in a present-day untruth and a future fantasy, by making a factual judgment not backed by evidence, then by declaring that this judgment must stand for all time, irrespective of the true facts—this in the context not of some technical deeming provision in the tax code but of a factual determination on a matter of huge controversy on which the safety of human beings will depend. This is a post-truth Bill. To adapt a phrase we have often heard from the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, it takes the culture of justification, which is a trademark of this House, and replaces it with a culture of assertion. It takes hopes and rebadges them as facts. It uses the sovereign status of this Parliament as a shield from scrutiny, and it makes a mockery of this Bill.

My amendment addresses first the present and then the future. The first part, proposed new subsection (7), requires the Secretary of State to tell us when, in his judgment, Rwanda is safe. It is this statement, not the judgment we are supposed to be reaching tonight, that will determine when the flights may lawfully begin. He has the detailed evidence on this. Despite our best efforts, we have had only scraps.

In previous versions of the amendment, this ministerial statement on the safety of Rwanda has been conditional on a favourable opinion from the Government’s own monitoring committee, established under the treaty, which we are told is already operational and which is ideally placed to assess the evidence. It has been objected, on previous occasions, that the monitoring committee should have no more than an advisory role. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and I have listened and have revised this amendment, which now provides only for the monitoring committee to be consulted. The statement on safety would be purely for the Secretary of State.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, asked the Minister last Tuesday to confirm that

“before the Government are satisfied that Rwanda is a safe country, they will seek the views of the monitoring committee”.—[Official Report, 16/4/24; col. 900.]

No such assurance was forthcoming. I cannot say why not; perhaps we will get an assurance this evening. Failing that, this amendment would write one into law.

The second part of my amendment, proposed new subsection (8), deals with the future. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out the problem in these terms:

“no provision is made anywhere in the Bill for what should happen if the facts change and everyone can see that Rwanda is no longer safe”.—[Official Report, 16/4/24; col. 902.]

Sir Jeremy Wright, Sir Bob Neill, and Sir Robert Buckland—none of them lefty lawyers, the last time I checked—have made the same point in the Commons debates. The Minister indicated last week that if the Government thought Rwanda had become unsafe, there might be some unspecified “parliamentary occasion” to mark that development, but of course no such occasion, other than the passage of a full Act of Parliament, could do the trick. I think that was effectively acknowledged by the Minister in the Commons this afternoon.

This assumption of perpetual parliamentary infallibility is an embarrassment and a nonsense. Fortunately, there is an alternative, which presents not the slightest threat to what the Government are seeking to achieve. Proposed new subsection 8 would give the Secretary of State an untrammelled power to decide in the future that Rwanda is no longer a safe country. Such a decision would release all decision-makers, including himself, from a legal fiction that makes the law look like an ass and those who make it asses.

So there is a speedy and effective way to reinstate the principle of honesty in lawmaking. To quote the parting words of Sir Robert Buckland, who rebelled this afternoon, alongside Sir Jeremy Wright, “Sort this out now”. I persist in the hope that reason may yet break out in the Minister’s response. If it does not, I propose to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No, I will not. That is an operational matter; we are discussing the amendments in ping-pong.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to my Motion A1. Perhaps I may make two short points in response. First, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, who knows how much I appreciate the work he does in this House and its committees, that a vote for this amendment is not a vote for delay. It simply gives the Secretary of State a power to declare Rwanda safe, having consulted his monitoring committee. He could do that tomorrow if he had the evidence for it. If he does not have the evidence for it, how can he expect us to do it tonight?

Secondly, I thank the Minister for his measured response, not to mention the best laugh of the evening, and for the additional scrap of information concerning the Rwandan law, I assume the asylum law, that he says was passed on Friday. I am afraid that it is the first I have heard of that. I do not know how many of us in the House have had an opportunity to study that law. He knows that these scraps fall far short of the comprehensive picture that we would need if we were seriously to make our own judgement that Rwanda is safe and that the concerns identified by the Supreme Court and our own International Agreements Committee in great detail, only in January, have been satisfied.

In a less frenetic political environment, this common-sense amendment or something like it could, I am sure, have been hammered out between sensible people around a table. Sadly, that does not appear to be the world that we are in. I am afraid that I see no alternative to pressing Motion A1 and testing the opinion of the House.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 4th March 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

9: Clause 2, page 2, line 34, at end insert “unless presented with credible evidence to the contrary”
Member's explanatory statement
The amendments to Clause 2 in the name of Lord Anderson of Ipswich would allow the presumption that Rwanda is a safe country to be rebutted by credible evidence presented to decision-makers, including courts and tribunals.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 9 and address Amendment 12 in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Carlile, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and the noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham. I will be brief, because the equivalent amendments were discussed in detail in Committee. I am also very grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead for how he has dealt with pre-emption, which, your Lordships willing, may allow both groups of amendments to stay alive.

Amendment 9 would allow Ministers, officials and courts to depart from the presumption that Rwanda is safe when presented with credible evidence that it is not. Amendment 12 would remove various detailed barriers to that course. Their combined effect is to reverse two of the most revolutionary—I do not use that word in a positive sense— aspects of the Bill. They are the requirement for decision-makers, including courts, to stop their ears to any evidence that does not agree with the Government’s position and the requirement that they should do so for an indefinite period, even if things in Rwanda—as we all hope that they do not—take a turn for the worse.

If noble Lords are in any doubt about how truly remarkable Clause 2 is, I invite them to look at subsection (4). It does not matter how compelling your evidence is of what could happen to you and people like you when you get to Rwanda, it must not even be considered if it questions the proposition that Rwanda is safe.

Subsection (5) sets out the legal principles that have to be ignored to make this clause work—not just the Human Rights Act and international law but

“any other provision or rule of domestic law (including any common law)”—

an insight into the sheer range of legal protections, ancient and modern, that may have to be disregarded in the interests of avoiding the impartial scrutiny of the courts.

If Rwanda is safe, as the Government would have us declare, it has nothing to fear from such scrutiny, yet we are invited to adopt a fiction, to wrap it in the cloak of parliamentary sovereignty and to grant it permanent immunity from challenge—to tell an untruth and call it truth. Why would we go along with that? Clause 2 takes us for fools. Subject to anything that the Minister may say, when these amendments are called, I fully expect to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I am glad that this evening I have started to understand the processes of the House of Lords, having been here only eight years. Therefore, I will not speak to Amendment 6, which had to be withdrawn in order to vote on Amendment 7, even though Amendment 6 was in group three, but there we go.

I can be even briefer than I intended to be, by just saying that when something is a nonsense, it remains a nonsense at whatever stage we happen to be voting on it. Crucially, in terms of what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has rightly said, when circumstances change, most people change their minds. If minds are not allowed to be changed when circumstances change, then we are all extremely foolish.

I heard the noble Lord, Lord Howard, on the radio this morning explaining in great detail why Parliament had primacy over the courts. In many respects, as with the doctrines of Lord Jonathan Sumption, I agree. However, when the Government step outside the norms of international conventions which Parliament has ratified and signed up to, then the courts obviously continue to have a substantial role, because those are the checks and balances we have built in.

This evening, we are trying to make sense of a nonsensical piece of legislation. No doubt the House of Commons will just nod through the Government’s rejection of these amendments, but in times to come, when historians look back, I think they will ask: “Where were you and what did you do?” If you cannot answer that in a way that makes you comfortable about your grandchildren seeing it, then do not do it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I was about to answer the noble Baroness’s questions, because safeguarding arrangements are set out in detail in the standard operating procedure on identifying and safeguarding vulnerability, which states that, at any stage in the refugee’s status determination and integration process, officials may encounter and should have due regard to the physical and psychological signs that can indicate that a person is vulnerable. The SOP sets out the process for identifying vulnerable persons and, where appropriate, making safeguarding referrals to the relevant protection team.

Screening interviews to identify vulnerability will be conducted by protection officers who have received the relevant training and are equipped to competently handle safeguarding referrals. The protection team may trigger follow-up assessments and/or treatment as appropriate. In addition, protection officers may support an individual to engage in the asylum process and advise relevant officials of any support needs or adjustments to enable the individual to engage with the process. Where appropriate, the protection team may refer vulnerable individuals for external support, which may include medical and/or psycho-social support or support with their accommodation. Where possible, this should be with the informed consent of the individual.

As regards capacity, of course it will be in place. The policy statement sets out at paragraph 135:

“In line with our obligations under the Refugee Convention and to ensure compliance with international human rights standards, each Relocated Individual will have access to quality preventative and curative primary and secondary healthcare services that are at least of the standard available to Rwandan nationals. This is provided through a comprehensive agreement between the Government of Rwanda and medical insurance companies for the duration of 5 years and through MoUs with hospitals in Kigali”.


I also say at this point that it would be in the best mental health interests of those seeking asylum who are victims to seek asylum in the first safe country that they come to. Why would they risk their health and mental health crossing the channel in much more grave circumstances than they need to?

Noble Lords will know that over 135,000 refugees and asylum seekers have already successfully found safety in Rwanda. International organisations including the UNHCR chose Rwanda to host these individuals. We are committed to delivering this partnership. With the treaty and published evidence pack, we are satisfied that Rwanda can be deemed a safe country through this legislation. I would ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this fast-paced debate, and for the generous and constructive contributions that we have heard from all corners of this House. I shall not dwell on them individually, but I will single out the contributions that we heard from the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady D’Souza, and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, on the subject of torture. Although my amendments are broader than theirs, theirs serve as a reminder that even evidence of widespread torture would be off limits if Clause 2 were not amended as they and I wish.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Murray, that I am delighted by what he says he has seen in Rwanda. However, with great respect to him, the points that he makes in no way remove the desirability of ensuring that, should protections not prove to be adequate—including, for example, protections against the risk of refoulement contrary to the terms of an agreement, as we saw when the Rwanda/Israel agreement was in force—the decision-makers and courts should be able to take those matters into account. That is all that these amendments contend for.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Horam, that it is operational measures that will make the difference; he must be right about that. Those are the sorts of measures that were identified by the International Agreements Committee in its list of nine or 10, and in Article 10(3) of the treaty. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, pointed out, these will be unfinished business even when the treaty is ratified. The purpose of the courts is simply to check that those measures meet the minimum thresholds laid down by law.

The Minister made the point that the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court were limited to specific issues regarding refoulement and suggested that, had they not been resolved already, those issues would be easily resolved in the near future. The Minister asks us to take a good deal on trust. I understand that a letter has been circulated this afternoon; it certainly did not reach me. Whether that includes, for example, full details relating to the Rwanda asylum Bill, which nobody seemed to have seen when we debated this in Committee, and whether it contains full details of the arrangements to ensure non-refoulement, which are referred to in Article 10(3) of the treaty, I cannot say.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

Speaking for myself, I would just say in answer to the noble Lord’s questions that the answer is no.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am grateful. I should say in fairness to the Minister that I did have a letter about Northern Ireland. It did not touch on those issues.

I acknowledge the confidence with which the Minister defended the position on the ground in Rwanda. This is all the more reason to accept these amendments. The more confident the Government are in the safety of Rwanda, the less they have to fear. For these reasons, I am minded to test the opinion of the House on my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

12: Clause 2, page 2, line 41, leave out subsections (3) to (5)
Member’s explanatory statement
The amendments to Clause 2 in the name of Lord Anderson of Ipswich would allow the presumption that Rwanda is a safe country to be rebutted by credible evidence presented to decision-makers, including courts and tribunals.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to test the opinion of the House.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 30th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, first, I thank the Minister and his team for the liaison and the work we did together to try to meet all our concerns about the Bill. I also thank him for giving me the excitement of my life in that I had an amendment accepted—for the first time in 14 years. That is a pretty good strike rate, is it not? I was pleased about that as well.

We on the ISC are very happy that the Bill is needed. However, as the Minister knows, we are still concerned that there is insufficient acceptance of the fact that parliamentary scrutiny is required by the ISC more broadly in this and a number of other areas. I am sure this will be brought up in the other place; otherwise, I am pleased that we have moved this Bill forward at pace.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I echo all the thanks that came from the Minister. I do not think I can add to his list, but I certainly endorse everything he said.

Bills of this nature can be controversial. We are seeing this in some other parts of the world at the moment. That was not the case in your Lordships’ House. That is testimony to the care with which the Bill was prepared, the civilised way in which it was debated and the openness of the Government to some of the important points made during our debates. I single out in particular the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee for the great scrutiny that it applied to it.

If I may, I will depart briefly from the studied impartiality associated with the Cross Benches. With the Government and Opposition so closely aligned on a Bill, it was particularly useful that we heard from the Liberal Democrats—with their sometimes annoying but rather necessary process of probing amendments. They caused everyone to think carefully about what we were doing. All in all, it was a happy experience for me. I hope that this is a good model for future Home Office Bills.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, having been cleared to annoy your Lordships’ House, I will do my best to do so.

This Bill started in your Lordships’ House and now heads to the Commons. Its primary purpose of enabling the intelligence services to better build their data models and teach their AI systems has been left completely unmolested by your Lordships. However, other parts of the Bill have attracted a fanfare of concern from certain external parties—particularly the large platforms. Whether the Government and Apple are at cross purposes or the Minister really is out to get it, we in your Lordships’ House were unable to muster sufficient traction to find out or clarify. It is now up to the MPs if they choose to pick up that particular baton.

There was also an unresolved issue around the triple lock and the Prime Minister’s role when they might be in conflict. Again, this has moved from our orbit. I hope the tenacity of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, might still be involved somehow between here and the other place. The Minister raised the important issue of legislative consent. I hope he is successful in these negotiations.

I echo what other noble Lords have said. This has been a well-mannered and constructive process of discussion, with everybody moving in the same direction, albeit at different speeds.

I thank the Minister and the team he named for their time, availability and openness in our discussions. I also thank all the many external organisations and individuals who took time either to meet and brief or to send information which helped inform our debate. The discussion was greatly enhanced by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Ponsonby, from the Front Bench, and by colleagues on their Benches, as well as the Cross Benchers. They played a pivotal role in our discussions.

Finally, I thank the home team: my colleague, my noble friend Lord Strasburger, and, most of all, Elizabeth Plummer in the Lib Dem Whips’ Office, without whom nothing is possible.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, the policy of offshoring asylum seekers for assessment and resettlement abroad will indeed be costly, to judge from the down payment already made. Its likely deterrent effect is at best uncertain. However, as a lawyer, I start by acknowledging three things. The policy was given statutory force in the Illegal Migration Act, which we passed last year. It is consistent in principle with the refugee convention, which does not oblige us to settle asylum seekers here, but only to avoid sending them to places where their lives or freedoms are threatened. The principle was not called into question by the Supreme Court’s recent ruling.

The only issue that remains is safety. This Bill, said the Minister in the Commons,

“puts beyond … doubt the safety of Rwanda”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/12/23; col. 751.]

How could it? The Supreme Court has already found that Rwanda operates a profoundly dysfunctional asylum system. We know from our own International Agreements Committee, whose conclusions we supported last Monday, that work still needs to be done to build institutions, change attitudes and monitor compliance. A solution may be within our grasp, but it is not a legal fiction, still less a legal fantasy. A way must be found of determining whether Rwanda is and will remain safe in reality.

When we are concerned about the safety of a country, we often consult the Foreign Office travel advice. Expertly informed and responsive to events, it is a valuable resource. However, in expecting Parliament to come to a judgment, in the words of the Bill,

“that the Republic of Rwanda is a safe country”,

the Bill makes no provision for expert scrutiny, second thoughts or revision of that judgment. Flattering as it may be for some of us to be treated as infallible, to cast Parliament as decision-maker in this changeable and fact-specific context is fraught with constitutional danger. If we are persuaded to take on that role, we will surely need, at least—as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has hinted—an independent body on the ground to tell us when the deficiencies already identified have been remedied, and a mechanism for ensuring that, when conditions change, the verdict can change.

Ouster clauses—even partial ousters such as those in Clause 4—are among the most fundamental attacks on the rule of law because they challenge, as the noble Lord, Lord German, said, Dicey’s first principle. Indeed, more impressively still in my book, they challenge the first principle of my noble friend Lord Hennessey that nobody—not even the Government—is above the law. However, the very seriousness of these issues means that we owe the Commons the courtesy of our careful consideration of them. For that reason, I will not support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German, tonight.

Finally, I turn to Clause 5, with its proposed exclusion of the right to seek interim measures from the Strasbourg court. I view with dismay the proposal to defy successive rulings of the court, whose opinion on the matter is decisive under Article 32 of the ECHR, to the effect that these measures are binding on the states party to the convention. As we acknowledge in our own legal systems, and have previously acknowledged in this context too, the effective adjudication of any case can depend on a workable system of interim measures. Perhaps the Minister will tell us whether interim measures will be a feature of the new Rwandan asylum law, which, as far as I am aware, no one has yet seen.

We did, it is true, in the end accept Section 55 of the Illegal Migration Act, but that was presented as a negotiating ploy—perhaps a productive one, since the court is now in the course of improving its procedures for interim measures. This clause, however, is different. No such conditions are mentioned in it. The crocodile, having devoured the bun offered by the international court, now proposes to kick it into the water with a casual swipe of its tail. Some will say that this pass is sold, but I hope that, if only out of self-respect, your Lordships will push back hard at this casual dismantling of international protections that are as necessary now as they ever were.