Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Callanan Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 5th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, Amendment 26 standing in my name states that:

“Sections 2 to 4 come into force only when the Secretary of State has assessed … the impact of the termination of all rights granted by the Treaty to the United Kingdom with respect to the entire Chagos Archipelago through Article 15 of the Treaty”


and

“the impact of the arrangements in Article 15 on the leverage opportunities at the Secretary of State’s disposal in negotiating with Mauritius after ratification”.

Article 15(1)(a) of the Mauritius treaty states that Mauritius can terminate the Mauritius Treaty in the event of

“a failure by the United Kingdom to make payment as required by Article 11”.

This means that if a payment is more than 22 days late, the entire Mauritius treaty is terminated, subject of course to the fact that sovereignty over the Chagos Islands will be in the hands of Mauritius. In that event, we would lose absolutely everything, and if the United States wanted to keep its Diego Garcia base, it would probably have to do so by force. While the United Kingdom could no doubt seek to achieve this, China, Russia and other countries could protest very loudly and have international law on their side. It would provide an excuse for any other power to try to take Diego Garcia and could lead to a major war.

Of course, the Government can respond by saying that this will not happen if we pay on time—and, no doubt, they will assure that we will pay. While we are protected from this eventuality by dutifully paying up completely and always on time, Article 15(1)(a) places the United Kingdom, and by extension the United States, in a formally intolerable, weak position.

To understand the problems arising from the very weak footing on which the treaty places us when negotiating with Mauritius, we must appreciate the huge concerns about what happens in relation to the Chagos Islands beyond Diego Garcia. Mauritius has a clear incentive, arising from the income stream we have promised, to seek additional income streams for leasing other islands or parts of islands. The Government have sought to make much of the fact that we have a veto on the deployment of security and defence forces beyond Diego Garcia, but the problem is that the real threats do not announce themselves as deployment of security and defence forces and are much more subtle. Something that begins as a non-security and defence deployment, in relation to which we have no veto, can evolve into something very different—an emergent risk, over which the treaty affords us no right of veto but only a right to object. The right to object can be resolved only on a consensual basis within the joint committee between the UK and Mauritius proposed by the Mauritius treaty and could no doubt take a long time if Mauritius wanted it to. It is here that our complete lack of leverage provided by paragraph 1(a) of Article 15 is a particular cause for concern.

Mauritius could generally adopt a very unco-operative approach on the joint committee, knowing that, if it resists one of our concerns and we counter by threatening to withhold payment, subject to satisfactory resolution, that will serve simply to renounce all our remaining rights in relation to the Chagos Islands, giving them completely to Mauritius. Of course, if ever a deployment of non-security and defence personnel from another country becomes an emergent risk, and one wherein those concerned in effect become security and defence personnel, the UK would have a right of veto. However, the difficulty is that, by that stage, they will be established in place, and if they did not want to leave, they could be removed only by force, threatening war and international instability.

If we look at other categories of emergent risk, in relation to which we have powers only to lodge objections on the joint committee, we are further confronted by the way in which the terms of the Mauritius treaty—especially paragraph 1(a) of Article 15—rob us of leverage. These risks would all be avoided if the UK did the right thing and corrected the historic wrong of the forced removal of the Chagossians from their islands and afforded them self-determination. While it is plain that not all would vote to be a separate jurisdiction from Mauritius—in the same way that not everyone on the Ellice Islands voted to become a separate jurisdiction from the Gilbert Islands—polling suggests that a majority would vote to become a resettled, largely self-governing British Overseas Territory, legitimately under British sovereignty. In that event, none of the above difficulties would arise.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, as we begin our proceedings on Report, let me reiterate our view, as the Official Opposition, that the treaty that the Government have agreed with Mauritius puts the interests of the British people last. It is an abject surrender that we would never have agreed to. It was mentioned nowhere in the Government’s election manifesto, and it stands in stark contrast to their manifesto commitment to protect the British Overseas Territories. The British people were not consulted on the treaty, yet it will see over £34 billion-worth of taxpayers’ money paid to the Government of Mauritius over the treaty’s lifetime. That is a political decision by this Government at a time when taxes to the British public are being hiked to an all-time high.

In stark contrast, the Mauritian Prime Minister said that the money from the Chagos deal will fund debt repayments and tax cuts as part of a budget package that will see 80% of Mauritian workers exempted completely from income tax.

However, it is, of course, not just the British people who have not been consulted but the Chagossians themselves, who have suffered so much over many years and have not had their voice heard in this process either.

I am pleased to say that the Government have rightly shared some more details about the Chagossian Contact Group they have set up, but it should not have taken forceful pressure from the Opposition to deliver that transparency. Even with those details, the Chagossian people have not been formally consulted by the British Government on this treaty. We have only to look at the recent report from the International Relations and Defence Committee on the opinion of Chagossians to know exactly what they think of this treaty.

In the other place, we opposed the Bill at Third Reading, and we still oppose it. But, of course, now that we are on Report, we will work constructively with noble Lords across the House to seek to improve the Bill today.

My Amendment 6 would require the Secretary of State to seek to negotiate a right to extend the length of the treaty beyond 99 years before it can be ratified. When we suggested this in Committee, the Minister explained that Article 13 of the treaty establishes the process by which the treaty would be extended up to a limit of 40 years. One of the problems with that process is that it would require a renegotiation, possibly including additional payments, leaving the British taxpayer exposed to potentially even higher bills at the end of this period.

Ministers tell us that the UK will have the right of first refusal of the terms offered to any third party for the use of Diego Garcia following the expiry or termination of the treaty, but how can the UK ensure that those terms are reasonable? We therefore seek clarity from the Government on what happens at the end of this 99-year period. I hope that this time, the Minister will be able to provide us with more information on the Government’s exact understanding of the workability of Article 13 of the treaty.

My Amendment 40 would require the Government to clarify their understanding of the status of the Chagos Islands should the treaty be terminated. In Committee, the Minister emphasised that the circumstances in which Mauritius can unilaterally terminate the treaty are extremely limited, and we accept that. She also told the Committee that it is

“highly unrealistic that Mauritius would agree to a reversion to British sovereignty in the event of termination”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 781.]

That leaves open the question of who might agree to a transfer of sovereignty with the Government of Mauritius. In a circumstance where Mauritius is sovereign and the treaty is no longer in effect, is there a risk that the Mauritian Government may choose to transfer sovereignty to a third party? What guarantees have the Government sought from Mauritius on this? Again, I hope the Minister will be able to provide us with some more detail on those points at this stage in our legislative process.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, for his excellent amendment in this group. He is right to continue to press the Government on this point, and we share his concerns about the position should the treaty be terminated. I look forward to hearing the replies from the Minister on these points.

Finally, I turn to the amendments in the name of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, which is supported by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond—two well-respected Members of the House. It is unconscionable that British taxpayers should be forced to continue to fund the Mauritian Government under the terms of the treaty in circumstances where the military base, which the treaty relates to and secures, has therefore become inoperable. Therefore, we firmly support this amendment and, should the noble and gallant Lord wish to test the opinion of the House, we on these Benches would support him in that.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, one criterion which the House may like to have in mind as we consider the amendments before us is whether they would prevent the Government ratifying the treaty. We have to pass the Bill before the treaty can be ratified, and some of these amendments would ensure that ratification could not take place until there had been some renegotiation or a new negotiation.

The House decided, at the end of June, that it wanted to ratify the treaty. The House voted for ratification; the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, argued that it should not do so, but it chose to follow the advice of its International Agreements Committee and voted for the ratification of the treaty. Consistent with the view we have held up to now, I believe that, today, we should not pass any amendments that would require renegotiation.

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Moved by

[Lord Callanan]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert
“, subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Section 4 comes into force only when the Secretary of State has undertaken a consultation of the Chagossian community and laid a report of that consultation before both Houses of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent the provisions of this Bill relating to citizenship from coming into force unless the Secretary of State has undertaken a consultation of the Chagossian community.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, throughout our debates on the Bill, we have heard time and again from noble Lords across your Lordships’ House that the Chagossian people have not been properly consulted by the Government. That is a view with which I heartily agree. They should be formally consulted on the whole treaty and I will come to that point when we address the amendments relating to a referendum of the Chagossian people. However, my Amendment 2 sets out an absolute bare minimum of consultation that the Government should surely undertake.

The Bill changes Chagossian citizens’ rights. That is a fundamental change in their lives and will result in profound changes to their rights. Can the Minister set out what consultation the Government intend to undertake before the provisions relating to Chagossian citizenship rights come into effect? Can she also confirm whether these provisions have been discussed with the Chagossian contact group? What concerns, if any, were raised by its members?

Many Chagossians want to return to their homeland. I tabled Amendment 4 to give the Government the opportunity to go further than the treaty and take positive steps to ensure that Chagossians will be able to return to their homeland should they wish to.

My Amendment 5 relates to illegal migration and asylum seekers. In Committee, the Minister helpfully clarified that Mauritius will be responsible for any illegal migrants who arrive at Diego Garcia. But the terms of Annex 2 of the treaty qualify the exercise of jurisdiction by Mauritius in respect of illegal migration by stating that this applies only

“provided such exercise of jurisdiction is in conformity with the requirements of this Agreement”.

Can the Minister therefore explain the Government’s understanding of that qualification? Can she categorically rule out the possibility that the UK might be responsible for any illegal migrants or asylum seekers arriving at the Chagos Islands, including Diego Garcia?

As noble Lords will be aware, on 8 December 2025, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination released a report that expressed deep concern about the UK’s treaty with Mauritius. I hope that the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Hannay, have taken the time to read that report, as they are so keen to know what the UN thinks.

We are told that the Government’s motivation for agreeing the treaty is to address the advisory judgments of international courts. Therefore, can the Minister set out how the UK Government intend to respond to the UN committee? What steps will Ministers take to address its concerns and implement its conclusions? Can the Minister give the House an assurance that the Government are satisfied that the treaty they have agreed with the Mauritian Government will prevent further legal uncertainty in future? They have spent all their time telling us that the reason for the treaty is to resolve any legal concerns, yet additional ones have now been raised by the UN about this very agreement.

I turn now to my Amendments 45 and 46, in respect of the Chagossian trust fund board. I am delighted that the Government have now come forward with further detail on how the board will operate. Greater transparency about the operation of the trust fund was one of the key requests that we made of the Government last year and we are pleased to have been able to secure greater transparency for the Chagossians. In particular, the confirmation that Chagossians will have fair representation on the board is crucial. It is vital that board members champion the rights and interests of Chagossian people. Can the Minister confirm that the Chagossians on the board will not be linked, either through employment or other means, to the Mauritian Government? Can she also confirm that the fund will be open to all Chagossians, including those who are not Mauritian citizens but wish to be Mauritian citizens, and who are not resident in Mauritius?

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

They are very different things. I encourage the noble Lord to investigate this a little further and am happy to work with him on that. The fact is that this particular committee does not speak on behalf of the UN and there are many equivalent committees across the UN that also do not speak on behalf of member states. If noble Lords want to verify that, it is entirely up to them to do so, but that is the situation.

To continue, the Government’s priority remains the protection of the British people, including British Chagossians. As the location of a military base with sensitive capabilities and assets vital to the UK’s national security, it would not be appropriate for Diego Garcia to be included in Mauritius’s programme of resettlement. However, both the UK and the Republic of Mauritius remain committed to facilitating a programme of heritage visits to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. Chagossians will also retain the opportunity to work on Diego Garcia through contracted employment at the base.

In respect of Amendments 9, 16, 24 and 48 concerning the 2 December decision by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Government’s position is clear. The CERD is an independent body of experts that—I am repeating myself, but I want to make it absolutely clear for noble Lords—does not speak on behalf of the United Nations or of UN member states. The UK does not agree with the approach that the CERD has taken. The UN Secretary-General and the African Union chairperson have both welcomed the agreement. The treaty protects the base and our national security, which is why it has also been welcomed by the US, our Five Eyes partners and other important partners who appreciate the strategic importance of the base. Mauritius has also firmly and categorically rejected the CERD decision, and the Government therefore reject the tabled amendments.

Amendment 5 on migrants and asylum, from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is not necessary and therefore we do not accept it. The treaty already ensures Mauritian responsibility for and jurisdiction over all migrants arriving to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. The treaty closes a potential illegal migration route to the UK. The UK Government are already in the process of agreeing with Mauritius the separate arrangements referenced in paragraph 10 of annex 2 of the treaty to assess and facilitate that exercise of Mauritian jurisdiction. There are ongoing negotiations; I will not provide a running commentary, but both Mauritius and the UK agree that it would be for Mauritius to take responsibility for any migrants, including for any asylum or international protection claims. There is therefore no need for the Government to provide a report on the negotiations through an amendment to the Bill. I hope that answers noble Lords’ queries about that issue at this stage and that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate. I thank the Minister for her response, but it seems to me that she still has not answered the fundamental question that many of my colleagues and others have posed to her: why are some UN advisory tribunals to be obeyed without question? They should not be questioned and we have to do exactly what they say, but others can apparently be safely ignored when it does not suit the Government’s case. She tells us that Mauritius was against the conclusion, and I bet it was, but apparently—this is what I have read and I hope it is correct—Mauritius is also actually a member of the tribunal that found against the treaty and recommended that it be disposed of.

We have heard some fantastic contributions, but of course we have not heard the opinion of the FCDO mandarinate on the Cross Benches, who are normally so keen to tell us that international tribunals have to be respected without question—but apparently not this one.

Nevertheless, I am proud to speak alongside every noble Lord who has spoken up for the Chagossian people and outlined how they have been so ill-treated and for so long ignored. The Minister has said a number of times that there is a diversity of opinion within the Chagossian community. I am sure she is right, which is why we need a referendum to determine the absolute view of what those opinions are. I pay particular tribute to my noble friend Lord De Mauley and his committee for the sterling job that it has done in attempting, in so brief a period, to provide at least some information on what the Chagossian community think. The fact that so many of them responded so quickly in the period before Christmas underlines the concerns that many of them have about this agreement.

We also share my noble friend Lord Lilley’s concerns about the reparations. It seems reasonable that, once Mauritius has sovereignty over the islands, it would bear the burden of any future claims for reparations. I am also grateful to the Minister for her clarification about the legal position on asylum seekers.

I will not detain the House any further. I reiterate our firm support for Amendment 19 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. It might be only half a loaf but we are grateful for that half. Still, we will also seek to be greedy and support the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, on the remainder of the loaf when those Divisions are finally called. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 2 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Callanan]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert
“, subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force only when the duties outlined in section (Chagos marine protected area) have been discharged.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent the provisions from coming into force until the Government has published its plan to ensure the long-term protection of the Chagos Marine Protected Area.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I will briefly move Amendment 3 in my name. I will also speak about the other amendments in my name in this group, but I will not seek to pre-empt the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, when he gets around to proposing his amendments.

The ocean around the Chagos Islands is a uniquely rich and biodiverse environment. It is home to the UK’s greatest marine biodiversity, with unique species, major sea-bird populations and healthy reefs. As the custodians of that biodiversity, the UK has a proud record of increasing marine biodiversity. I know the Government have ambitions to continue that record, which we support. But by transferring sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to the Mauritian Government, Ministers are putting the future of that MPA in an uncertain position. Yes, the treaty provides for Mauritius to maintain the MPA, but what tools do the Mauritian Government have at their disposal to discharge those responsibilities? I do not doubt their commitment, but I doubt their ability to actually enforce it.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

She said it, not me. That is why you can buy technical assistance; it is why technical assistance exists. We have a technical assistance partnership with many countries. It is a much better way, working alongside countries to make sure that environmental improvements happen. That is the approach the Government have taken, and it is in the treaty.

I hope that noble Lords will consider withdrawing and not pressing their amendments.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister’s remark to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, was a little uncalled for.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I was joking.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

The Minister may say that she was joking, but it was not a very good joke.

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. In Committee, noble Lords across the Chamber set out their profound concerns about the practical ability of the Mauritian Government to deliver on their commitments. As I said, nobody doubts what they have said and the statements they have made; however, I think we all doubt their ability to enforce this crucial MPA.

I do not need to repeat all the excellent points that have been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, my noble friend Lord Goldsmith and others in their contributions to this debate; they very closely reflect our concerns. Given the critical importance of the ocean around the archipelago for global diversity, we believe that it is necessary to press the Government on this, so that we can have a formal statement of the Government’s expectations of Mauritius under Article 5 of the treaty. We also believe that we need clarity on what steps Ministers will be willing to take to ensure the maintenance of the MPA in perpetuity by the Mauritian Government. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Callanan]

7: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert
“, subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force only when the duties outlined in section (Cost of the Treaty) have been discharged.”

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, we have had lengthy debates on the cost of the treaty. The Government have consistently told us that their estimates tell us that the treaty will cost only £3.4 billion, with payments averaging £101 million per annum over the 99-year life of the treaty. We fundamentally disagree with that.

My noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham forensically picked apart the Government’s figures in Committee, leaving us in a position of serious and damaging uncertainty. It is unacceptable that we are being asked to approve a Bill enabling a treaty without a clear assessment of the cost of compliance with that treaty. While the Government continue to repeat the figure of £3.4 billion, we now know, using other accountancy mechanisms, that it will cost something approaching £34 billion.

As I said in the debate on a previous group, we are heading towards the highest taxes ever. The Government show no appetite for bringing spending under control, but apparently it is fine to hand over £34 billion to Mauritius for islands we already own. The treaty is a stark example of the Government’s fiscal imprudence. We know that the treaty was not necessary in law and that it was a political choice—and we would never have agreed to it. That is £34 billion the Government could have chosen to spend in other ways. That money should be in the pockets of British taxpayers; it certainly should not be used to fund tax cuts in Mauritius. However, that is the position that Ministers, advised by their international lawyer friends, have put us in.

My Amendment 39 would require the Government to publish a schedule of payments to Mauritius, including the planned dates of those payments, so that independent experts can make their own assessment of the true cost of the treaty to British taxpayers.

The Government, who seem so keen to defend the treaty, must surely think it is good value for money. It follows, therefore, that the Minister should have no problem at all in setting out in full what the schedule of payments is so that we can examine it. I hope the Minister will be able to give that commitment today.

With Amendment 47, we are asking the Government to publish the real cost of this treaty. The details provided in the Explanatory Memorandum which accompanied the publication of the treaty were helpful, and the Minister referred to those details in Committee. But we still have vastly contrasting estimates which show that the treaty could cost as much as 10 times more than the Government claim. We need to see more detail from the Government on these costings to ensure transparency for the hard-working British taxpayer. I beg to move.

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Finally, proposed new subsection (4) in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, would infringe the prerogative power of making and unmaking treaties. It is not wise to impose any immoveable requirements about a hypothetical set of circumstances that might arise in the future. This provision would seem to risk requiring the Government to breach the UK’s obligations under a treaty. It is clearly preferable that all options should be open to a future Government to deal with whatever the future may bring in the UK’s best interests, taking into account all the circumstances that exist at the time. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, this has been brief but fruitful debate and I am grateful to all who have contributed. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, for his Amendment 50, which expresses our shared concerns about the unacceptable uncertainty over the costs of the commitments made under the treaty. If he presses it to a Division, I will support him. We share the noble Lord’s desire to see greater transparency and proper accountability for the Government’s spending under this treaty.

As my noble friend Lady Noakes made clear, we are very concerned about the way the Government have handled the calculation of the costs of the treaty, and we think the British people deserve to know more about the process by which the Government reached the figures that they have published so far. My Amendment 47 would deliver greater transparency by requiring the publication of the methodologies used by the OBR, the Government Actuary’s Department and the Treasury when making their own calculations of the costs of the treaty, as well as requiring the publication of the justification of the methodology used.

We surely cannot proceed with the Bill when there is such uncertainty and debate about the costs and scale of the commitment that the Government have entered into. I therefore give notice of my intention to divide the House on my Amendment 47 when it is called. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 7.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Callanan]

8: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert
“, subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force only when the Secretary of State has published a statement setting out that the Secretary of State is satisfied that— (a) the government of Mauritius is not unduly influenced by hostile state actors, and(b) there will be no interference by hostile state actors in the operation of the base.”

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment seeks to require the Government to publish a statement stating that they are satisfied that the state of Mauritius is not unduly influenced by hostile state actors and that those actors will not interfere with the operation of the military base. In our increasingly unstable world, where hostile actors are using increasingly unconventional measures to interfere with our activities both at home and abroad, we must be alive to the risks posed by those states.

China’s ambassador to Mauritius has applauded the treaty, and Mauritius has recently released public statements in support of China’s “One China” policy. So could the Minister set out what steps were taken by Ministers and officials to assess the impact of the treaty on the influence that hostile countries will be able to have on the Mauritian Government and the military base? Were any concerns raised with Ministers about the influence of hostile state actors during the negotiations, and have any concerns been raised since?

My Amendment 44 focuses on the notification of the Mauritian Government. I was pleased that we were able to clarify in Committee that the Mauritian Government will not in fact receive prior notice of operations launched from Diego Garcia. Could the Minister go further and confirm that they will not receive prior notification of any other activities at the base, such as maintenance, upgrades, visits by foreign forces and so on? I would be grateful if the Minister could take the opportunity to provide a little more clarity on these points today.

On the wider issue of long-term security, the question we must ask ourselves is: does the Bill actually preserve our long-term security or does it make that security even more uncertain? For example, we have profound concerns about the relationship between Mauritius and China. It is clearly worrying that China’s representatives in Mauritius applauded this deal.

The concerns raised by my noble friend Lord Lilley around the Pelindaba treaty, to which the Mauritian Government is a signatory, have also not been satisfactorily answered by Ministers. The Minister was very cautious, perhaps understandably so, in the language he used in Committee, but we welcome his assurance that the Diego Garcia military base will continue to operate as it does now under the new treaty. However, that does not explain how Mauritius could fulfil its obligations under the Pelindaba treaty.

I do not want to push the Minister any further to put sensitive information in the public domain, but any way in which he can go further to reassure us that the operational capacities of the base will remain completely unchanged under the treaty would be welcomed by the House—particularly by noble Lords on this side.

I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for her amendment. It raises the valid question of the UK’s ability to shape developments on the Chagos Islands beyond Diego Garcia where those activities have defence and security implications. This is an important question, and I hope that the Minister can address it in his reply. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will refer briefly to my Amendments 17 and 49. I tabled one of them in Committee and want to probe a little further on some of the questions to which I did not get satisfactory answers.

What can we do, how do we know and what can the Government do if a country leases an island ostensibly for a non-security or defence purpose but then gradually introduces security and defence functions from Mauritius? In other words, what power do we have over what Mauritius does to the islands once we have given up our capacity other than for Diego Garcia?

Turning to the deployment of security and defence personnel on islands on the Chagos Archipelago beyond Diego Garcia, what UK approval is required? I have raised this before, but I want to know the detail. Given the announcement on 12 September that India had paid Mauritius to secure a defence presence on a Chagos island, would the Minister please tell the House today whether the Republic of Mauritius asked the UK Government ahead of doing that deal with India? If they did not bother to ask, this provides a good reason for not ratifying the treaty at this stage. If the Republic of Mauritius sought UK approval and it was given, why did the UK Government agree? Surely it was completely inappropriate for the Republic of Mauritius to enter deals on what will happen to the islands in the future when the UK Parliament had not yet agreed to the transfer of sovereignty of the Chagos Islands, as the treaty is still not ratified. Many of us in this place hope that it never will be.

I have no intention of moving my amendments to a vote. I would just welcome the Minister’s response on those two points.

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I hope I have answered the points noble Lords have raised, even if not to their total satisfaction. I will ensure that a letter is ready for your Lordships on the important point regarding the Pelindaba treaty before Third Reading and placed in the Library. With that, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his comprehensive response. I know that my noble friend Lady Goldie would like to thank him for agreeing to write. We await this letter with interest. He has tremendous respect from across the House for the view he takes on defence; I think he knows that. Nevertheless, I am sure he would be the first to recognise that he has not explained the disparity between what the Pelindaba treaty actually says and what we would like to use the base for. I totally understand that he is not able to go into sensitive matters, but I suspect that what has actually been agreed will for ever remain a mystery. In the meantime, I withdraw my Amendment 8.

Amendment 8 withdrawn.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, the argument that the treaty was necessary because of the advisory judgment of international courts is something that we have debated at length. But, as my noble friend Lord Lilley has consistently demonstrated, the reality is that the Government had a political choice and they could have not entered into the agreement. In the meantime, though, as the hour is getting late, it remains only for me to say that, if my noble friend presses his amendment to a vote, we will support him. Sorry, I spoke in the wrong place there.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for responding to my points. I still do not think she has explained why a delay would weaken our negotiating position when that position has been based on the fact that we would face a binding ruling. If that happens, our negotiating position is no worse, and if it does not happen, it is much stronger. Still, I do not want to cause a vote if that is going to delay more important votes where we might win.

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I hope that the Minister will reply by suggesting that we come back to this at Third Reading with a view to considering that proposal as well as the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee, which are in Amendments 34, 35 and 36. I hope that I might get that positive response but, subject to that, I ask the House to consider, if necessary, supporting the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee in Amendment 34 and the consequential Amendments 35 and 36. For the moment, I beg to move.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for the amendments in this group. Throughout the passage of the Bill, we have had some interesting debates on the future of the prerogative. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has made its recommendations on this point, and I understand why my noble friend has therefore tabled his amendment. The Constitution Committee has drawn Clause 5 to the attention of the House but fell short of matching the recommendations made by the DPRRC. We on the Opposition Front Bench have read carefully the Government’s response to the DPRRC’s report, which we believe has some merit. That said, we will not seek to oppose my noble friend should he choose to divide the House on this matter.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 34 to 37 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, seek to amend Clause 5 of the Bill. I appreciate that Amendments 34 to 36 would implement the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The Government have carefully considered the committee’s report on the Bill and responded to it but, on this occasion, we do not accept those recommendations.

I note what the noble Lord said about Third Reading. I am grateful to him for his detailed engagement with these provisions. I want to clarify one point about which noble Lords might not be entirely clear. The effect of the Bill is that there will be two powers. One is the prerogative power to legislate for Diego Garcia only, which is preserved under Clause 3. We seem to have some agreement on that point. The other power is a new statutory power conferred by Clause 5. Orders in Council made under Clause 5 will be statutory instruments. The Bill currently provides that those will be subject to the negative procedure where they amend primary legislation, and otherwise to no procedure. That is not because we argue that they are prerogative orders but because it is appropriate given their subject matter.

So far as the power to amend primary legislation is concerned, we have been clear that the negative procedure is appropriate, given that the changes to be made to legislation will in very large part be technical in nature. The purpose of the power is to ensure that the Government can bring the domestic statute book into conformity with both the purpose and effect of the treaty, making consequential changes as necessary. That works hand in hand with Clause 3, which provides a default position of continuity of the law. The Clause 5 powers will be necessary to make amendments to that law to adapt it to the treaty and the new status of Diego Garcia. This is not just about the law of Diego Garcia; UK legislation which refers to BIOT needs to be brought into line.

Applying the negative procedure here is consistent with the Cyprus Act 1960, which the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, referred to. Section 3 of the Cyprus Act also provides for the law of the UK in relation to Cyprus or the sovereign base areas to continue and for statutory Orders in Council to be made under the negative procedure to make further adaptations as required.

The Hong Kong Act 1985 also provides for the negative procedure for statutory Orders in Council under Schedule 3, amending the law of the UK or of other British possessions.

The Government’s position is that it is appropriate that no procedure applies when the Clause 5 power is used other than to amend primary legislation. The operation of the base on Diego Garcia and the treaty as a whole are in the realm of international relations, defence and security, as the noble Lord said. Given the subject matter, it is appropriate for those instruments to be subject to no parliamentary procedure.

There will, of course, be statutory instruments, which will be registered and published in the usual way. It is not uncommon for Orders in Council which relate to the overseas territories to have no procedure attached to them. I am happy, and I think it would be a good idea, to continue to discuss this with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, ahead of Third Reading. I would be very happy to do that. I hope he withdraws his amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Callanan]

47: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“Cost of the TreatyThe Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out— (a) the total real terms cost of payments to be made to Mauritius under the Treaty; (b) the full methodology and justification of the discount mechanism used to calculate the total cost;(c) the methodology used to calculate the total cost of the Treaty by—(i) the Office for Budget Responsibility,(ii) the Government Actuary’s Department, and(iii) the Treasury.”

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendment 51 addresses an issue that I raised in Committee: that there should be an ongoing representation of the Chagossian community, including its members living in the UK as joint nationals, and a means by which the parliaments of the UK and Mauritius can have dialogue on the operation and implementation of the treaty.

I set out the justification for that in Committee, so I do not need to repeat any of those comments and do not wish to detain the House any further. I was grateful to both Minister Doughty and the Minister in this House for engaging in discussions with me since Committee. Ministers have been very open, and I appreciate that. I hope that that openness will encourage them to give supportive words at the Dispatch Box for this proposal, so I am keen to hear what the Minister has to say. I am very happy to continue having discussions on this issue and to hear from the Government. I do not need to say anything else at this stage. I beg to move.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has chosen to re-table amendments on an inter-parliamentary committee to monitor and assess the implementation and operation of the treaty. We have been seriously concerned about the ongoing assessment of the success of the treaty, and this is just one mechanism that could be used to deliver that ongoing monitoring.

We are pleased that we have so far secured a number of significant concessions from the Government on the detail of how the treaty’s implementation will be monitored, including, for example, the release of much more detailed information about the contact group and how it operates. I am pleased also that, towards the end of last year, the Government released some further information about the trust fund board. We have heard today about the legislation in Mauritius on the establishment of that trust fund board, which is all very positive. These are important organisations that will have a role in holding both the UK and Mauritius to account as the treaty is implemented.

Delivering greater clarity during the progress of the Bill in your Lordships’ House shows the impact that parliamentary scrutiny can have. So, in light of those facts and the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I would be grateful if the Minister, when she replies, can confirm what further opportunities Parliament will have to discuss and scrutinise the implementation of the treaty. As I said before, I do not believe that it bodes well that the Government refused to allow a substantive Motion in the other place on the treaty under the CRaG procedures, so can she give the House a cast-iron assurance that Parliament will be granted the opportunity to debate the implementation of the treaty at regular intervals, should it be implemented?