Transforming Rehabilitation
Lord McNally Excerpts(13 years, 1 month ago)
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice.
“This Government are committed to an ambitious programme of social reform, even at a time of financial constraints. Major changes have already been delivered in welfare and education to tackle the challenge of endemic welfare dependence and educational underperformance, particularly in deprived areas. In the coalition agreement, the Government also promised to introduce a ‘rehabilitation revolution’ to tackle the unacceptable cycle of reoffending, and today I am publishing a consultation paper entitled Transforming Rehabilitation: a revolution in the way we manage offenders. We need a tough but intelligent criminal justice system that both punishes people properly when they break the law and also supports them to get their lives back on track so that they do not commit crime again in the future.
Despite significant increases in government spending on offender management during the past decade, reoffending remains consistently and unacceptably high. In 2010 nearly half of prisoners were reconvicted within a year of release. This rate is even higher for short-sentenced prisoners, the great majority of whom currently receive little or no support.
Failing to divert offenders away from crime has a wide impact. The Ministry of Justice alone spent more than £4 billion on prisons and offender management in 2011-12 and the wider cost of this failure is considerable. The National Audit Office estimated that the economic cost of reoffending by recent ex-prisoners was as much as £13 billion in 2007-8. I am clear that we cannot continue as before. In difficult economic times, delivering real reform requires a dramatically different approach. We cannot afford not to do this.
My proposals seek a new emphasis on life management and mentoring support for offenders in order to address the problems that lead them to turn to crime again and again. For the first time, all offenders, including those serving less than 12 months, will be subject to mandatory supervision and tailored rehabilitation on release from prison. These offenders have some of the highest reoffending rates but currently no statutory provision after the halfway point of their sentence. I want to ensure that persistent offenders do not walk out of the prison gates with £46 in their pockets and little or nothing else.
My vision is very simple. When someone leaves prison, I want them already to have a mentor in place. I want them to be met at the prison gate, have a place to live sorted out and to have a package of support set up, be it training or drug treatment or an employability course. I also want them to have someone they can turn to as a wise friend as they try to turn their lives around.
I intend to open up the market for probation services so that we can combine the expertise that exists within the public sector probation service with the innovation and dynamism of private and voluntary providers. These radical reforms are underpinned by the principles of the big society. Enabling voluntary sector organisations fully to participate in transforming rehabilitation, harnessing their expertise and making the most of existing local links will be vital to delivering the reoffending reductions we need to see.
Providers will be commissioned to deliver community orders and licence requirements for the majority of offenders and will be paid by results to reduce reoffending. They will be expected to tackle the causes of reoffending and help offenders to turn their lives around. And through the introduction of payment by results, providers from all sectors will have a clear incentive to rehabilitate offenders. We will pay in full only for services that successfully reduce reoffending.
Services will be commissioned nationally and delivered across broader geographical areas. I am committed that the new system will continue to make best use of local expertise and to integrate into existing local structures. Potential providers will have to be clear as to how they would sustain local partnerships in contracts and commissioning which will be informed by local intelligence.
Extending rehabilitation to more offenders will introduce new costs to the system and I believe that these can be balanced by drawing more providers into the system. Through increased use of competition we can generate efficiency savings and drive down unit costs across the system, allowing our funding to go further.
The public sector probation service does an important job in protecting the public and the Government are very clear about the value and expertise it brings. We want to use that expertise as we transform our approach to rehabilitation. There will be a continuing critical role for the public sector, which will include advising the courts and assessing the risk an offender poses to the public. Offenders who pose the highest risk of serious harm to the public will continue to be managed directly by the public sector and the public sector will retain ultimate responsibility for public protection.
These proposals will make a significant change to the system, delivering the Government’s commitment to real reform. They will fulfil the coalition commitment to introduce a ‘rehabilitation revolution’ and will realise our ambition to apply payment by results across offender rehabilitation services by the end of 2015.
Transforming rehabilitation will help to ensure that all those sentenced to prison or community sentences are properly punished while being supported to turn their backs on crime for good, meaning lower crime, fewer victims and safer communities. I commend this Statement to the House”.
Lord McNally
My Lords, first, I thank the noble Lord for those closing remarks of welcome for the initiative. As he quite rightly said, the devil will be in the detail and it is quite right that now and subsequently the House and the public will probe and test these proposals.
The word “professionalise” was in no way a pejorative statement by my right honourable friend—quite the contrary. I think I have mentioned before in the House that I would like the probation service and its work to be recognised as a profession, perhaps ultimately by a chartered institute of probation. It was in that context that the Secretary of State was talking about a professionalised service—the recognition of probation work as a proper profession, which indeed it is.
I took on board points that should be recognised: we are building on existing patterns of partnership that were first established by the previous Government, both in the legislation that we are using—the 2007 Act—and the various pilots that they initiated in their closing years. This question of pilots is very difficult. On my first day in office in 2010, I was told about the Peterborough and Doncaster pilots. Two years later, whenever one was asked about progress in these areas, one would say: “Well, we are still piloting”. There is a danger in policy development that you pilot for ever. You learn lessons as they go along, but at some time there is a need for Ministers to take a decision and develop a policy, and that is what we are doing here.
There is always a kind of elephant trap in any programme of reform. If you claim that there is a need for reform, are you being condemnatory about those who are carrying out the existing policy? The answer is no, as the noble Lord said, and I have been on record in this House about my admiration for the probation service as it is and the work that it does. My noble friend has proposed changes that we believe will bring a combination of greater efficiency and effectiveness and new ideas into the treatment of offenders. That is the thrust of the policy. Whether offenders who are taken under the wing of private and voluntary sector providers have committed “burglary and domestic violence” or something else, what is certain is that whoever comes within that assessment, their risk assessment will have been carefully carried out by professionals before they move into that sector. That risk assessment will be part of the ongoing role of the professional probation service and will be taken into account when it is decided whether a person is suitable for rehabilitation work that involves payment by results.
The noble Lord also asked whether existing resources would be used. The answer is yes; this is the plan, this is the whole point. As I pointed out, we are spending £4 billion—no small amount—per year on keeping people in prison and in keeping people supervised by probation. What the document suggests—and we hope that the debate that it initiates will develop this—that the £4 billion will be spent a lot more effectively than at the moment. We can do so more effectively within prisons and more effectively outside prisons.
One of the things that the Secretary of State was very much influenced by was his work at the DWP—the noble Lord referred to that experience. The DWP was one of the first government departments to take the initiative of going into prisons to enable prisoners to prepare for release and to go on to the Work Programme. That certainly convinced my noble friend that what are termed “through the gate” policies are extremely effective in making rehabilitation possible.
I remember talking to a young ex-offender on her rehabilitation programme in Birmingham, who said to me, “Lord McNally, you cannot imagine the feeling of fear and foreboding when you stand at the prison gates, the gates close behind you, and you have £46 in your pocket and nowhere to go and no friends and you don’t know what to do next”. It is not surprising that we get this high rate of offending.
One thing that has struck me in the two and a half years that I have been in this job is that, when you go around prisons, you find lots of initiatives and ideas that work—for example, a small charity going into prison and helping prisoners to find accommodation before their release, banks being willing to help prisoners to get their finances right, and private sector employers who are willing to put training programmes into place in prisons and then offer work when prisoners are released. It has been put to me before that the best guarantees against reoffending are somewhere to live, a job and a relationship. In a way, what we are trying to do in a holistic way is to bring in other departments to meet those needs and to make sure that there are alternatives.
On freedom of information, the Secretary of State made it clear in answering questions that it will be the providers’ responsibility to set out in contracts a clear commitment to transparency, but this will be considered as part of the consultation. In that respect, the noble Lord made a very valid point.
As I have said before, I hope that the probation service remains intact as a key part of our offender management arrangements, with responsibility for the most serious offenders and with oversight of the performance of those from the private and voluntary sectors who will be involved in this. I hope that the service will see it not as a threat but as an opportunity for it to play an important role in rehabilitation and to work in the kind of partnerships that the noble Lord referred to, bringing out the best of both the voluntary and private sectors and the qualities that already exist within our public sector.
I hope that the House and indeed the country will take this document as an invitation to have a serious debate about a serious problem. I have always believed that prison works but so do a lot of other things, and it is ridiculous for us as a country to spend £40,000 a year on keeping people in prison and for that to be a revolving door process whereby they go back into prison time and again. That is what this document and this debate will be about.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, a major contributor to reoffending in the past has been the lack of support for prisoners on release, who at present often come out with very little money, as my noble friend has pointed out, nowhere to go and usually no work to do. Will the Minister ensure that the really welcome new commitment to mentoring and support for all prisoners on release is quickly implemented, properly resourced and thoroughly monitored by government?
Lord McNally
Yes, I hope so. I hope that one thing that is seen as a real breakthrough in these proposals is that we will be extending support services to those sentenced to less than 12 months. As many studies have shown, those short sentences have often been the source of most reoffending. Again, to make the point that there is a more holistic approach than that, in the Crime and Courts Bill we are trying to make community sentencing more acceptable to the public by putting a kind of punishment element into them so that they are not seen as the soft option to prison. That is another part of what we are trying to do, as is involving other departments such as the DWP and those dealing with health and social services. It is clear that a more holistic approach to rehabilitation is going to get the most results.
Lord Morgan
The statement very properly deals with some very important issues in our society, such as the high rate of reoffending. The great bulk of offences are committed by people who have already offended and this is adding to the pressure in our prisons; there is also the absence of an integrated system to deal with offenders who, as the noble Lord has said, are immediately thrust back into the community with £46 and no other help and very often no hope. The proposals have important merits which we should recognise right across the House. There is a programme for the rehabilitation of prisoners when they are released; they are not just thrown into the community. There is also an integrated proposal for mentoring them in relation to their problems and particular needs; for example, dealing with drugs or alcohol. There are already examples of this kind of approach, notably the Parc prison in Bridgend, south Wales, and this is very welcome.
I would like to ask the Minister two general questions. The policy of payments by results by private institutions is not one, as my noble friend said, that has been universally successful or indeed effective. Perhaps we could be told a bit more about these geographical regions which will be used to assess whether or not the policy of rehabilitation has been successful. Will there be any uniformity of definition about these regions? What will be deemed a successful result? If someone committing a very serious crime is then back in prison for committing a somewhat lesser crime, is that a successful result or not? I would also ask for reassurance for the probation service at a time when it is experiencing great dislocation and demoralisation. Thank you.
Lord McNally
I thank the noble Lord for those questions. He is quite right: of the three parts of this initiative that attract me most, one is the idea of a proper mentoring programme; another is a real acceptance of “through the gate” as a concept of dealing with prisoners; and the other relates to how to deal with prisoners with less than one year’s sentence. This is a consultation; the actual size and shape of the geographic regions have still to be determined, and will be determined in part by the outcome of the consultation. I suspect that my right honourable friend has in mind some fairly large regions to ensure that we get the kind of benefits of scale that large regions can provide. I cannot be firmer on that but we already have some experience of commissioning in London, where a community services contract has recently been signed that is over a four-year period and £20 million less than the existing contract. I think that they will be largish regions but we are open to consultation.
What is success? This is partly a testing of the market to see what kind of organisations are interested and what problems they foresee. It is not easy; is it one year free from reoffending, is it never reoffending and how do you prove that? It is not so simple but that is part of what the consultation process is about.
The Lord Bishop of Liverpool
My Lords, we on these Benches very much welcome the engagement of what is described in the Statement as the voluntary and community services. As the Minister knows, faith groups are already very involved in the rehabilitation of offenders, both inside and outside prison. Can the Minister tell us how the Government will ensure that, by opening up the probation services to the market, the local, voluntary and community sectors will not be eclipsed by the private sector with its much greater resources?
Lord McNally
First, I pay tribute to the right relevant Prelat for both the leadership and the contribution that the churches make to prison chaplaincies and for their support in the wider community. In previous debates I have referred to visits I have made to St Albans and Norwich, where the cathedrals are the centre of community efforts in rehabilitation. He makes a very relevant point about the voluntary sector. A new commitment within the group is that we will make available £500,000 of seed corn to help voluntary groups prepare proper business cases for participation. We will also build into the system for awarding contracts that organisations which include voluntary and local groups, and can clearly demonstrate that they are making full use of their expertise, will probably have a much better chance of winning contracts.
I hope that those two parts of the package—help in preparing a proper business case and a contractual advantage if they are included in bids by larger groupings—will ensure that local and voluntary organisations have a proper participation. Indeed, we would be disappointed if this was not one of the results of what we are doing. We want the ideas, initiatives and commitment that voluntary and local groups can bring to this as part of what we have termed a revolution.
Lord Ramsbotham
My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I welcome the commitment to reducing the dreadful rate of reoffending. As an aside, I notice that the Minister did not add to his list of the factors that prevent reoffending the one that is said to mean most—a 30th birthday.
I would like to take up two points; first, the point that the Minister made at the end of the Statement—namely, that this is a very serious subject and needs a very serious debate. Will the Government be prepared to allow that debate? So far, we have not had an opportunity to debate the previous consultation which is swept up in this one. There is so much involved that it is terribly important that the issues contained in this should be properly debated in the House, whether at the end of this consultation period or not. I ask him for that.
Secondly, this business of “through the gate” and picking people up is not new. The previous Government introduced a programme called custody plus which was designed to do exactly that, but it was dropped because of fears that it would result in too many people being given short sentences which would be accompanied by this sort of follow-up. I wonder whether that same sum has been done here. The figures at present show an 8.3% success rate above the short sentence in prison rate being achieved by the probation service with short-sentence prisoners, but what we are seeing is a proposal for a complete change, not the reinforcement of success.
My second question to the Minister is this. We are dealing with offenders and offenders are dealt with by people, so offender management must be made the responsibility of someone. We have talked about responsibility for high-risk offenders and the fact that the probation service will be responsible for the initial risk assessment, but we have not had any indication of what will happen during the sentence if a medium or low-risk offender changes the level of risk. Who will be responsible for that? Will the probation service remain responsible throughout this process for the overall management of offenders on community sentences?
Lord McNally
I thank the noble Lord for those questions. I will certainly have a look at what he refers to as the “through the gate” experience and if the Minister responsible is now in this House, I might ask him or her about their experience. Nevertheless, there is overwhelming evidence that through-the-gate help and preparation before prison, along with being met at the gate and helped afterwards, has an impact.
The probation service will continue to have oversight across the piece. Part of the consultation will be about how light-touch that will be in terms of the day-to-day management of offenders, but we are conscious of the evidence that risk can change during the process of supervision and that there may well be a need to move certain individuals from the areas being managed by the private and voluntary sectors back into the public sector. However, that will be built into the oversight provisions that are to be part of the outcome of these consultations.
On the question of a debate, it is a matter for the usual channels, but if the Government prove difficult to persuade, I am sure that my noble friend Lord Dholakia will be able to persuade the Liberal Democrats to give one of their debate days to such a discussion. One way or another, we will have a debate in this House on this matter.
Lord Faulks
I welcome this Statement, particularly its focus on those with sentences of less than 12 months and its identification of that period of vulnerability as young offenders leave prison. One of the particular areas of vulnerability is those offenders who have a previous history of drug addiction who are then prone to taking large doses of drugs which can result in death. I therefore welcome the role of a mentor, although I recognise what the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has said about the perception of custody plus because I was sitting as a recorder at the time. However, the role of a mentor seems to me to be potentially very important. Can the Minister help the House by identifying who exactly is going to perform this mentoring role and what its scope might be so as to assist in avoiding those traps that I have attempted to identify?
Lord McNally
My Lords, as part of the consultation, we will be looking at the structure of mentoring. However, in the specific terms that my noble friend has referred to—in relation to those who leave prison with problems still associated with drug addiction—one thing we are trying to do, with the co-operation of the health service, is to make sure that people who are on programmes in prison continue to receive those programmes when they leave. One of the barmier aspects of the current system is that people who have been on treatment leave prison and, surprise, surprise, their addiction returns. Part of the programme of release will be to continue programmes like that.
As for mentoring, we will just have to wait to see the response, what kind of organisations come forward with suggestions, and where we build into any mentoring programme the proper training that will enable mentors to be effective in their work.
Baroness Corston
My Lords, given that we are in nearly the third year of this Government and still have no published strategy for women offenders and those at risk of offending, I ask the Minister a short question and hope that his answer will be both short and positive. Will he confirm that the current network of women’s centres, which have done such splendid work in turning women’s lives around and which have spectacular results in reducing reoffending as well as working well with probation trusts, will be an acknowledged part of the new system which he is describing today?
The Earl of Listowel
My Lords, in relation to the question of the right reverend Prelate and also regarding mentors, will the Minister recognise the concern about the continuity of care for these people, and consider whether in his consultation there might be preferred providers? For instance, if a small voluntary body proves to have a good track record, they would not have to renegotiate after three years and spend a lot of money and time to keep that ability. The mentors that they develop would also be kept on and not left in suspense as to whether their contract will be renewed in a year or so. Certainly, in my experience, good mentors can be undermined by the lack of certainty about their future and the future contract for their organisation.
Lord McNally
I take that very wise advice and will do my best to ensure that there is continuity.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, will my noble friend give an assurance to the House that in the consultation—for which we are all very grateful—the Government will be open-minded about the issue of the private sector, and the notion that it is appropriate that this extremely difficult task be dealt with by competition and the profit motive? Are the Government open-minded to the prospect that after the consultation this be omitted from the new scheme?
Lord McNally
That is always a possibility. In a way, we are all on payment by results, even Ministers—fortunately, we have to wait until 2015. Obviously, we are bringing forward a programme which builds on initiatives from the last Government and which suggests that some kind of payment-by-results incentive programme encourages efficiency and innovation. We do not bring forward proposals with the anticipation that they are either going to be rejected or are going to fail. I hope that they will bring forward really constructive responses. There has been a good and constructive response from the Opposition today. I am sorry that we squeezed out the noble Lord, Lord Myners, because I am delighted that he is the new chairman of the Howard League and I look forward to working with him on this and other areas. As always, almost by default as a Liberal Democrat, I enter this period of consultation with optimism.
Charging Orders (Orders for Sale: Financial Thresholds) Regulations 2012
Lord McNally Excerpts(13 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord McNally
That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Charging Orders (Orders for Sale: Financial Thresholds) Regulations 2012.
Relevant document: 13th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, the purpose of this draft order is to introduce a financial threshold of £1,000 for the enforcement of charging orders by an order for sale where the charging order was made to secure the payment of money owed under an agreement regulated under the Consumer Credit Act 1974. A charging order made in such cases may not be enforced by way of an order for sale where the amount owing, including interest, is less than £1,000.
Before I go into greater detail about the order, let me briefly provide background on charging orders and orders for sale. When a creditor has not received payment for a court judgment, they may apply to the court to enforce that judgment. They have several enforcement options open to them, including applying for a charging order on a debtor’s property or asset. While the majority of charging orders are made against property, the provisions themselves also cover land and stocks and shares.
The purpose of the charging order is to secure the debt. It does not, in itself, lead to repayment of the debt until the debtor sells their asset. The creditor may also choose to pursue other enforcement options or make a further, separate application for an order for sale. This application seeks the court’s permission to enforce the existing charging order by ordering the sale of the property, or other asset, either immediately or at some point in the future if a suspended order is made.
Both the application for a charging order and the further application for an order for sale are always listed for hearing before a judge and so are subject to case-by-case judicial discretion and case law. In each case the judge will consider, among other things, the proportionality of the debt as set against each of the parties’ assets and commitments; whether—if it is a property in question—it is the primary residence of the debtor or a secondary residence or a commercial property; who else may reside within the property, including children; the balance of rights between the creditor and the debtor; and whether the debtor should be granted additional time to pay, resulting in a suspended order.
Evidence shows that under the existing arrangements only a very small proportion of charging orders—some 0.5%—result in an order for sale, and some of these may be suspended orders. This is in part due to the fact that the process of applying for, calculating potential equity in and administrating the sale of a debtor’s property is economically risky for creditors. This, together with case-by-case judicial discretion, means that it is very rare for debtors to lose their homes as a result of a charging order.
With that background, I turn to the reason for the regulations before us today. Although it is indeed very rare for debtors to lose their homes as a result of a charging order, it is important that the Government ensure that all appropriate safeguards are in place to ensure that this does not happen as a result of what might have originally been relatively small, unsecured borrowing. The coalition commitment to introduce a threshold for orders for sale applications reflects this. However, it is also essential that protection for debtors is balanced against the rights of creditors. The Government believe that responsible creditors who are owed money and have gained a judgment in court have the right to enforce that judgment. Without effective enforcement we risk jeopardising the authority of the courts and public confidence in our justice system, as well as there being a negative impact on the economy if lenders are not confident that they can recoup money that is rightly owed to them.
Following extensive public consultation, we intend to introduce a £1,000 financial threshold, as set out in the draft regulations. While this differs from the £25,000 threshold set out in the coalition agreement, it was concluded to be the most appropriate level at which the necessary balance between the rights of debtors and the rights of creditors could be most effectively struck. While stakeholder opinion was, perhaps predictably, split between creditors and debtors, there were other groups who also held strong opinions—for example, the legal profession and the judiciary.
A number of arguments against a high financial threshold, or even any threshold, were given. With a high threshold, such as £25,000, there is a risk that creditors may seek to recover their debt by initiating bankruptcy proceedings as an alternative to enforcement. This would be a more draconian outcome for debtors than an order for sale. As many noble Lords will be aware, bankruptcy often results in debtors losing their homes, whereas the protections which are already in place within the enforcement system—and which will continue to be in place if these draft regulations are approved—protect most debtors from losing their homes.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for that constructive response. I know from our exchanges during the Crime and Courts Bill of his long-standing interest in this area and I understand why he continues to probe on the matter. The Government remain committed to providing more protection for debtors and we are taking appropriate action to ensure that that happens. When we debated this on the Floor of the House, and again today, the noble Lord pointed out that the coalition agreement talked about a £25,000 limit and we now talk of £1,000. I suppose that the honest answer is that that was the outcome of the consultation. We now feel that the balance of what we wanted to do is better met by the guideline of £1,000 rather than £25,000, not least because we were advised that the higher limit could steer creditors more in the direction of bankruptcy solutions, with the impact that I indicated on house ownership, rather than a settlement under these regulations.
We were also very much influenced by the judiciary, which believes that a very low threshold, with a great deal of judicial discretion, provides a far more guaranteed protection for the creditor than the protection afforded by a higher level—
Lord McNally
For the debtor, yes; I am sorry.
With these things it is always a matter of judgment. The judgment that we have come to, and the level we have set it at, is the result of consultation, with the aim of striking a right and proportionate balance that will give power and flexibility to the judiciary and a degree of protection for the lower levels of debt.
The noble Lord asked about early enforcement of parts of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Following the Solving Disputes consultation paper we implemented Section 93 of the TCE Act. It closes an existing loophole, providing a greater degree of security to creditors and encouraging debtors who are in financial trouble to make more reasonable yet affordable offers to pay.
The Government consulted on introducing this section in 2010 in their Solving Disputes in the County Courts paper. Some 74% of respondents supported its introduction, arguing that it offers protection both for creditors, for whom a charging order is often the only effective long-term solution to recovering a liability, and for the debtor. By commencing Section 93 of the Act we have given creditors a certain ability to convert unsecured loans to secured loans. I am sorry—I had better clarify that. One of the criticisms that has been made is that we have given creditors the ability to convert unsecured loans to secured loans by extending the use of charging orders in this way. We do not believe that that is true. Charging orders are used to secure an unpaid judgment debt, not a loan. Legitimate judgment creditors who have obtained a valid judgment through the courts should have the right to enforce the judgment by the most appropriate means available.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify a couple of matters. He referred to the order allowing charging orders to be applied for, but is he aware that under the regulations enacted last October it would be possible to do that without the debtor having at that stage defaulted? That would seem to convert an unsecured loan into a secured one.
My second question relates to responses. Am I right in thinking that the balance of responses reflects the fact that most of those responding were creditors rather than debtors, their representatives or organisations interested on behalf of debtors?
Lord McNally
My Lords, the balance reflected the interests of the responders. The noble Lord is quite right: the creditors had one set of priorities and those speaking out of concern for debtors had others. That is the nature of consultations, as the noble Lord will be aware. I also pray in aid the strong view of the judiciary that it wants to retain as much judicial discretion as possible. In my remarks I listed the clear considerations that a judge takes and the fact that these matters come before a judge.
On the issue of whether it is pre-emptive, as it were, under the measures that we took last October, as I explained, it gives debtors who are in financial trouble the opportunity to make more reasonable and affordable offers to pay. The noble Lord appears to be saying that adjustments can be made only after disaster has struck, but that is not my reading. If I am not right in my interpretation I will write to the noble Lord. However, it seems to me that it provides an opportunity to intervene in a constructive way when people are running into difficulty.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. However, as I understand it, the order does not require the debtor to be in any difficulty or to have made any default at all before the charging order can be applied for. That does not mean, of course, that the order for sale would automatically follow, but it is a precursor to that and can arise even before any default has taken place. We are unable to take this much further today, but I invite the Minister to look at the situation in due course.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Amendment of Schedule 1) Order 2012
Lord McNally Excerpts(13 years, 1 month ago)
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, as I made clear before the House voted on 3 December, if the fatal Motion was carried, the LASPO Act would not provide legal aid in the cases specified in the rejected statutory instrument. That remains the case.
Lord Bach
Does the Minister understand that that Answer is entirely unsatisfactory and does no credit to the Government? This House declined to accept the order because it represented a breach of a government undertaking given to another place to get the legal aid Bill through and because what it offered was too mean. Why are the Government taking absolutely no notice of the will of this House of Parliament? Are they not behaving more like a spoilt child than a mature, responsible Government, protecting the legal rights of some of the poorest citizens under their care, including many with disabilities?
Lord McNally
Well, we have had heard it over two years and both Houses have come to decisions on the LASPO Bill. As regards fatal Motions, I can speak from experience. I was part of engineering a fatal Motion on the casino Bill. That fatal Motion was carried by the House. The Government of the day did nothing further on the casino matter. If I may coin a phrase, as it says on the tin, fatal Motions mean what they say.
Lord Pannick
Given that the House rejected as inadequate the limited concession on legal aid in First-tier Tribunals, is it not truly perverse for the Government to respond by withdrawing even that?
Lord McNally
The Government have not withdrawn that concession. This House passed a fatal Motion meaning that that concession was no longer part of the Bill. That was the decision of the House. If I may so in the presence of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and of all those who voted for it, I made that very clear to the House before the vote.
Lord Howarth of Newport
Instead of continuing to sulk, would it not be proper for the Government to bring forward another order, in which they honour the commitment rightly given to Parliament by the previous Lord Chancellor?
Lord McNally
I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, again alleged that that commitment was made. It was not made by the previous Lord Chancellor. The commitment was to examine the case for the First-tier Tribunals. As I have reported back to the House on numerous occasions, the decision was that in the circumstances it was far too expensive. It would be nice to have fatal Motions as yet another round in the legislation process, but I ask the House and the Official Opposition to think carefully. If fatal Motions are going to be used in this way, they have great repercussions, not least on our relationship with the other place.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, can the Minister confirm that legal aid remains available for advice on appeal from the First-tier Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal in welfare cases? Can he also confirm that where there is a point of law on which an appellant has a reasonable prospect of success, legal aid is and will remain available for the preparation and presentation of an appeal to the Upper Tribunal?
Lord McNally
Yes, that is case. It is also worth making the point that some of the noises from the other side make it sound as though the Government have been totally unfeeling and refusing to listen.
Lord McNally
Well, it is worth reminding noble Lords that when the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill was published the initial idea was that legal aid was not required in any welfare benefit cases, other than for judicial review or for a small number cases based on the Equality Act 2010. Throughout the course of the LASPO Bill the Government were urged to rethink their position on removing legal aid for onward appeals to the Upper Tribunal, which had to be on a point of law.
The Government listened to these concerns and offered concessions during the passage of the Bill to bring into the scope of legal aid advice and assistance for welfare benefit appeals on a point of law in the Upper Tribunal, Court of Appeal, Supreme Court, and representation for the welfare benefit appeals in the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. These were concessions in which my noble friends played a considerable part in achieving. The idea of an unlistening and unfeeling Government is simply not true. If the House forces through fatal Motions, it must take the consequences.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
Does the noble Lord not understand that the initial position put forward in the LASPO Bill was totally untenable? That is why it was amended. Does he not also accept that after the House has spoken on this fatal Motion, the Government are obliged to listen—and by “listen” I mean do something in response?
Lord McNally
The noble and learned Baroness suggests that the Government, as if in some game of poker, have to produce another offer in response to a fatal Motion. A fatal Motion is what it says—it is fatal. As I have pointed out, there was the example of the casino Bill in the previous Parliament. One of the reasons why successive Oppositions have thought long and hard about using fatal Motions is that they have implications about where and when the arguments and discussions about a Bill come to an end and how that relates to the relationship between the two Houses. Such Motions can be very toxic. I warned the House and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, of that, but he pressed ahead. A fatal Motion was passed and it has been fatal.
Lord Grocott
My Lords, the Minister’s whole approach in answering questions today gives the House a great deal of explanation for why he sometimes finds it difficult to get Motions, including fatal Motions, through. He clearly misunderstands the procedure, which is as follows. Yes, an order can be defeated by a fatal Motion, but a Minister given to conciliatory thinking—something that apparently does not appeal to him—should then go to the opponents of the order and suggest to them various possibilities for ways in which an order could be put before the House and might then pass. Such negotiations may or may not be successful, but the Minister at least owes it to the House to tell us precisely what efforts he has made to ensure that an amended Motion can be put to the House that might command its support.
Lord McNally
I am making no efforts to make such a proposal. The fatal Motion is fatal—that is the end. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, has gone around this track, but in a parliamentary process there must come a point when a Bill becomes an Act and a law is passed. If the Opposition’s plan, and it would be interesting to know this, is to use fatal Motions on a regular basis to try to keep alive issues that have been decided by both Houses through proper Bill procedures, then we are going into new territory. I am sorry but the House heard my warning and ignored it, and the Bill is now an Act.
Defamation Bill
Lord McNally Excerpts(13 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord McNally
“(b) the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest.”
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, this is the first opportunity for me to associate myself with the apology that my noble friend extended to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and I do so. The noble and learned Lord has indicated that we can move on, but perhaps I should say that when one of the observers of this Committee asked me the other day what my intention was, I felt a little like Metternich’s reaction when Talleyrand died: “Well, what does he mean by this?”. I repeat again for the benefit of the Committee that my objective is that by the end of the Committee, we will be able to bring forward a better Bill. That is the only intention I have. I have no secret orders or red lines. I want a Bill that clarifies the law, gets the balance right between reputation and freedom of speech and puts the law in a better place than when we started this journey. I am, of course, absolutely grateful to the many noble and learned Lords who are contributing to our deliberations. I would only urge on them this humility: the noble Lord, Lord Browne, made the point at the beginning of our debate that British libel law—or the English law of defamation, I am being corrected—is not in good repute. That is why we are bringing forward legislation. I humbly say that the various judgments over the years have not brought us to a good place. That is why we are here and that is my sole intention.
As someone who has some knowledge of the history of the trade union movement, the trade union solidarity show by my learned friends is very impressive, but I hope that we will get a Bill—to take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd—that the textbooks can take guidance from and that will give people some better clarity and assurance. However, as people always tell me, even when we have finished our work, it will be tested by a judge and we may then find out how good it is. That is my mission statement and I hope we can all join in that. I will certainly make sure that we try to respond to the points raised in Committee and that we have a Committee stage that gets the Bill into good shape. People have been telling me that Clause 4 is the heart of the Bill, and getting it right will be the test of how good a Bill it is. The fact is that we have tried in this process and been advised on several responses—particularly as to whether we should have lists or general principles. I should make it clear that I will listen carefully to the legal and other expertise around the table on whether we have got this right. In this approach, I am considering not only legal opinion but I want to be sure that academics, scientists and the general public know what we are about and where the thresholds are that we are trying to set.
In moving the amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment 16 and 21. These amendments respond to concerns that were expressed during the Second Reading debate in this House and in the other place about the way in which the public interest defence in Clause 4 is currently articulated.
At Second Reading, a number of noble Lords were concerned that Clause 4 as drafted might not adequately reflect the current law in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision earlier this year in Flood v Times Newspapers. Some noble Lords also took the view that including a non-exhaustive list of factors to which the courts can have regard in considering the defence could risk creating a rigid checklist approach and add to the evidence that would need to be gathered and to the expense of running the defence.
From a different perspective, some stakeholders have called for a radical shift in the clause towards the interests of defendants by introducing a requirement for the claimant to show malice in order to secure any remedy beyond publication of an explanation or correction. Let me say at the outset that the Government do not believe that this approach, which changes the burden of proof, would provide appropriate protection for people who have been defamed.
However, we are grateful for the many contributions that have been made to the debate in this House and elsewhere, and we accept that the clause can be improved. Our amendments make changes which recast the defence in a number of respects. First, Amendment 14 replaces the requirement for the defendant to show that he acted responsibly in publishing the statement complained of with a requirement for him to show that he reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest. Consideration of whether a publication was “responsible” involved both subjective and objective elements. “Reasonable belief” also does this, but we believe that it brings out more clearly the subjective element in the test—what the defendant believed at the time rather than what a judge believes some weeks or months later—while retaining the objective element of whether the belief was a reasonable one for the defendant to hold. The courts will need to look at the conduct of the publisher in deciding that question.
Amendment 21 inserts a new subsection requiring the court, in considering whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable, to make such allowance for editorial judgment as it considers appropriate. This expressly recognises the question of editorial discretion which has featured in recent cases, in particular in the Flood judgment. Although this provision is likely to be most relevant in journalism cases, it has been drafted in a way that does not limit it to that context.
Amendment 16 removes the list of factors which the clause currently invites the court to consider. This is a difficult issue. Although we do not believe that the courts would apply the list of factors, based on those in Reynolds, as a checklist, we have responded to strongly expressed concerns that the use of a list may be likely to lead in practice to litigants and practitioners adopting a risk-averse approach and gathering detailed evidence on all the factors listed, in case the court were ultimately to consider them relevant.
Lord McNally
I would have to take advice on those matters. In a room full of lawyers, I am not going to make comments ex cathedra, ad hoc, on the hoof, or whatever description they might say. Why not ask your questions? By the time I come to reply I might even give you an answer.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend and sympathise with his predicament. In the light of what he has said, and as we have an opportunity to discuss this at a further stage, I will not move Amendment 15 at this time.
Lord McNally
My Lords, my first thought is about the wish that Sir Brian Neill, having just been released from hospital, should follow closely our proceedings. If you are, Sir Brian, please switch off. It is not conducive to recuperation.
I said at the beginning that this clause is at the very heart of the Bill and the contributions have been extremely useful. Since noble Lords have been dishing compliments around, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Browne, for the attitude that he and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, have taken. Of course, in our system, the job of the Opposition is to oppose, and we understand that. However, I think that the more we can produce a Bill that is the result of all-party work and contributions, the better we get something that sticks. This is not an area for party games. When there is a campaign such as the Libel Reform Campaign, it is sometimes tempting for opposition parties simply to espouse the campaign and go down to the last with them. I appreciate where the noble Lord, Lord Browne, has been willing to tell the campaign that it cannot deliver. As we keep on saying, we are trying to get a balance between the right to free speech and the proper protection of reputation. If I can send a message to the Libel Reform Campaign, it is not to indulge in an exercise in impossibilism. We are trying to get this right. As the noble Lord, Lord Browne, and others who have had these responsibilities know, for every concession I make and every amendment that is carried, I have to write to Cabinet colleagues, not all of whom are as enthusiastic about reform as perhaps I am. That is the nature of things, and the way that this Committee is approaching it is helpful in that respect.
As to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Browne, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, has just said that he does not support it. I fear that that is part of the dilemma. However, I will think about it. As a layman, I tend towards thinking that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in writing the bleeding obvious into a Bill. I understand when people say, “Well, it’s covered in another Bill or elsewhere in this Bill et cetera”, but it is reassuring if the public can read very simply what we intend.
The noble Lord, Lord Browne, made the point that within the Bill there are a suite of defences. It is also worth reminding ourselves—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, has just reminded us of it very clearly—that in the end we will be subject to interpretation by judges. We had a short debate yesterday about it, and that is what the separation of powers is all about. Of course this will be tested, and that is the challenge to the work we do. We will have a look at the phrase, “all the circumstances”. We have quite a long time until we meet again, and perhaps we can have some further talks about it.
Lord Mawhinney
Before my noble friend leaves this point, who are the Cabinet Ministers who fail the McNally test of enthusiasm?
Lord McNally
I will publish them on the MoJ website. Even better, I will tweet them. No, I will not. Now I am trying to run through in my head who they are.
It is interesting that the recently departed Solicitor-General, who was and is a practising libel lawyer, thought that this was entirely irrelevant, unneeded and so on, and argued very strongly against it. He felt strongly about it, although that is not the reason why he is now an ex-Solicitor-General.
Lord May of Oxford
Would the Minister’s decision have been difficult if a huge sum of money had hinged upon it?
Lord McNally
I was just going to pay the noble Lord, Lord May, a compliment. When he spoke about the fact that some of our colleagues are noble and learned, I was thinking that that goes with the rations, whereas I think that he is extremely learned, and that goes with reputation. I am not sure who he was thinking would take such a sum of money.
Lord May of Oxford
It is a question of solving the Simon Singh problem. However well we draft the legislation, if the hurdle is not high enough to justify—
Lord McNally
This is interesting. There is a suite of protections in this legislation, and I want to test it. I have had Simon Singh say to me, “Oh, this wouldn’t have protected me”. First, I have been here long enough to realise that you cannot draft law for one particular case, nor can you deal with particular circumstances that may have ratcheted up. However, what I want to do, and I mean this absolutely sincerely—I look particularly at the noble Lords, Lord May and Lord Bew—is to be able to meet senior academics and scientists and for them to say, “Yes, this does help”. This is the process that we are going through now. I hope that what the noble Lord, Lord Brown, referred to as the suite of protections that are built into the Bill will give a lot more protection to what we are doing.
To clarify the editorial matter, editorial discretion is not just about editors. The courts have used the term to refer to matters of judgment about how a story is presented, its tone and its timing. The courts recognise that there may be legitimately different views about this and that some allowances may be necessary but we do not think that publishers’ discretion is any clearer. Under the Government’s amendment, the courts will already need to look at the reasonable belief of the publisher. The reason we also proposed amendments referring to “editorial judgment” was to put this in the Bill to respond to concerns that we were not sufficiently reflecting Flood. It is better to use the language of Flood. At the same time, I can assure the Committee of our view that the term “editorial” is not limited to editors or newspapers. It is a more flexible term that leaves it open to the court to develop as necessary.
The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, wanted a clarification of “reasonable belief”. That phrase brings out more clearly the subjective element of what the defendant believed at the time, while retaining the objective element of whether the belief was a reasonable one to hold. I hope that that clarifies the matter; I shall read through it a few times myself over Christmas.
However, let us also be clear. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, referred to us introducing a liberalising defence, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, made this point. Yes, we are lifting the bar or moving the goal posts, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, helpfully explained as regards his thinking in the Flood judgment. There is a lot of talk about attempts to shackle the press; a lot of it is misguided. However, Clause 4 is a genuine attempt to strengthen freedom of speech and should be seen as such. The noble Lord, Lord Triesman, among others, raised important issues about the public interest. It remains the case that it will be for the court to determine the first limb of the test; that is, whether the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a statement which was a matter of public interest. Again, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, helpfully let us into his thoughts on this matter.
That is a matter that we must think of. The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, explained to us what the responsible journalist does in these matters. The noble Lord, Lord Triesman, rightly reminded us of the question of what to do when the intention of the publisher or owner is to destroy a reputation. Do we give impunity to that? That is why, when our friends in the Libel Reform Campaign come close to asking for a blank cheque, I have to say that we cannot give it to them. We also have a responsibility, as well as a recognition that there is irresponsible publication.
We are moving on to new media, and my noble friend Lord Lucas will be pleased to know that that is another hospital pass that I have left for my noble friend Lord Ahmad. I would say to Twitterers the Twittering equivalent of “caveat emptor”: “Twitterer beware”. Twittering is not beyond the law. We somehow got the idea that new media is a law-free area. People are going to find that it is not.
Lord McNally
The Earl of Erroll
I intervene with great temerity given this incredibly legal provision. However, as an outsider, I cannot understand why the courts should not be allowed to determine whether or not someone has behaved responsibly. If a large organisation is involved, it should have to verify the information or take some reasonable steps before repeating an appalling slander, libel or whatever it may be. I cannot see why we should restrict the courts’ ability to look at all the circumstances by retaining the relevant measure. Therefore, I support Amendment 18 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lester.
Lord McNally
My Lords, when both the noble Lord, Lord Browne, and the noble Lord, Lord Lester, tell me that we are getting this matter wrong, I have to think very hard. However, I shall respond to it and then provide some further thoughts.
Amendment 19 is a government amendment and is grouped with Amendments 18 and 20, as we have heard. Amendment 19 makes drafting changes to bring the provisions on reportage, which were previously in subsections (3) and (4) of the clause, into one subsection in order to improve the overall clarity of the clause. It makes changes to refer to the test of “reasonable belief”, to which I spoke in the previous group of amendments.
“Reportage” has been described by the courts as,
“a convenient word to describe the neutral reporting of attributed allegations rather than their adoption by the newspaper”.
Clause 4 is intended to catch the core elements of reportage as articulated by the courts. These are that where the defendant publishes an accurate and impartial account of a dispute between two or more parties, the defendant does not need to have verified the information reported before publication. This would not, however, absolve the defendant from the need to satisfy the court that, in all the other circumstances of the case, it was reasonable to believe that the publication was in the public interest.
Amendment 18 would remove the provisions relating to reportage. Conversely, Amendment 20 would extend their application. We do not consider that removal of the reportage provision altogether would be desirable, as is proposed by my noble friend Lord Lester in his amendment. As I indicated in speaking to Amendment 14 in the previous group of amendments, for the operation of Clause 4 generally, in assessing the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that publication was in the public interest, the court will be looking at the conduct of the publisher. Often that will include examination of the steps the publisher took to verify the information. We would not want the clause’s silence on the matter to suggest that there may in future be a need to verify in reportage cases whereas now there is not.
However, nor do the Government think it right to extend reportage more widely, as is proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, in Amendment 20. We consider that it should, as now, be limited to circumstances where the claimant is a party to the dispute. The reason that we adopted this approach is because if the claimant is a party, for the account to be “accurate and impartial”, his side of the story would be likely to have been reflected in the published article. On the other hand, where the claimant is not a party, that would not necessarily be the case. We believe, on balance, that where the claimant is a third party, the defendant should have to satisfy the court that in all the circumstances of the case it was reasonable to believe that publication was in the public interest. This should properly include consideration of steps taken to verify, should the court decide that is relevant. That point was made latterly by my noble friend. On this basis I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.
I am not sure which noble Lords made the accusations that the amendment will cause confusion, is unnecessary because the common law is already developing or overly restrictive, but I shall look at those criticisms. I hope that my noble friend will withdraw his amendment and that he and the noble Lord will allow the government amendment to stand. I will look very carefully at this amendment, and the points that have been made. I give an assurance that I will take another look between now and Report.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. The criteria in Clause 4, as it now stands, are objective public interest and reasonable belief, and I simply do not understand why those criteria are not sufficient to deal with reportage publication, as with any other publication. I am not clear as to what we are trying to save by putting these words in and I quite understand the point of view of the noble Lord, Lord Browne, which does accord with developing common law. All of this is unnecessary and I enthusiastically withdraw my amendment, knowing that all this will be thought about during the Christmas holiday of the noble Lord, Lord McNally.
Lord McNally
“( ) If the statement complained of was, or formed part of, an accurate and impartial account of a dispute to which the claimant was a party, the court must in determining whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that publishing the statement was in the public interest disregard any omission of the defendant to take steps to verify the truth of the imputation conveyed by it.”
Lord McNally
“( ) In determining whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest, the court must make such allowance for editorial judgement as it considers appropriate.”
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord McNally Excerpts(13 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Beecham
My Lords, I raised the issue of bailiffs at Second Reading. I followed it up with a Written Question which asked when the Government would respond to consultation. I was told, as I have reminded the House before, that it would be some time in the autumn. Autumn is now safely past us and we do not yet have a response. I spoke in Committee and subscribed to the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, on Report. I would have been very happy to subscribe to today’s amendment had it not been for the fact that there were already four signatures on it, which would have left me as a fifth wheel on the coach of the noble Baroness.
I strongly support her amendment because it is important to get some movement here. As my noble friend Lady Smith has pointed out, the Government have introduced three substantial new proposals to the Bill at a late stage. Two of them were at least subject to the recommitment procedure, and followed consultations—consultations, incidentally, which began after the consultation closed on the whole issue of bailiffs, on which the Government consulted last winter and spring. The third amendment, which deals with self-defence, was of course tabled two days before Report, with no apparent consultation with anybody at all beforehand.
I entirely subscribe to and share the views of noble Lords who believe that the Minister is absolutely genuine in his concern about this matter, but why has it taken his department so long to consult all relevant bodies? There was an extensive consultation period; seven months have now passed. What further consultations, if any, have taken place—that is a legitimate question to ask—and with what result? The Minister indicated, in answer to previous questions, that he hoped that there would be a response by the end of November. We are now past that date, and there is still nothing to be seen. As the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, has pointed out, time is not running out completely, but it is running out fast against a particular deadline.
Incidentally, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, will consider another aspect of the coalition agreement, to which I have made previous reference during the passage of this Bill, namely the part of that agreement which indicated that the Government would introduce a threshold of £25,000, below which it would not be possible to obtain charging orders. On the first day back in January we will have in Grand Committee regulations prescribing a £1,000, instead of a £25,000, threshold. No doubt we will have an opportunity to debate that on a subsequent occasion.
In respect of this matter, the noble Baroness’s amendment is, as she put it, almost the least that could be done to get some progress quickly on this matter. If the Government do not accede to this request and if we are looking to another Bill to come forward—I do not know how many Ministry of Justice Bills we can expect to see in the next Session of Parliament—it clearly will take a long time. In the mean time, as other noble Lords have pointed out, there will be the potential for substantial suffering on the part of far too many people—not merely adults because children would be affected as well, including children in the most vulnerable and difficult of circumstances. It is simply unforgiveable that the department has let down the Minister, which is the fair way to put it, in progressing this matter. I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to accept the noble Baroness’s amendment. If not, I certainly shall advise my colleagues on these Benches to join her in the Lobby.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, perhaps it will at least allow the Whips to send out the necessary message that I can make no commitment to the noble Baroness beyond what I have said in meetings and at various stages of this Bill. I will briefly try to explain why not. I have listened to this debate and I have listened to the concern of the House. Yes, the House can send messages but, in truth, the matter is being dealt with. I note that my noble friend Lord Lucas said that the matter had been being discussed for the past 33 years and that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, referred to merely the past 20 years. Therefore, I am not too apologetic that the department is taking a little time to take this matter forward.
The consultation paper sets out the objectives, including providing more protection against aggressive bailiffs while spelling out the need for effective enforcement; a fair, transparent and sustainable costs regime that provides adequate remuneration; and minimising excessive regulation on business while ensuring effective protection for the vulnerable. That is the balance that we are trying to get right.
In previous stages of the Bill, I have outlined that the Government are clear that aggressive bailiff action is unacceptable. We remain committed to bringing forward reforms which will protect the public from this and ensure that enforcement action is proportionate. We have a firm commitment in the coalition agreement to effect this and we will not falter. The Government understand that bailiff action can be, by its nature, a deeply unpleasant experience for those in debt. We also understand how this can be exacerbated by unnecessarily aggressive and threatening behaviour by some bailiffs. Those who are subject to bailiff action are often the most vulnerable people in society, as has been repeated on a number of occasions in this debate. We will not stand by and allow them to be subject to needless bullying, which can have a very real and significant effect on their well-being.
However, as I have highlighted previously, the Government are looking to tackle problem bailiffs in a number of ways. These are set out in the wide package of proposals within our Transforming Bailiff Action consultation paper. This package of proposals will focus on the root causes of many complaints. Among other proposed reforms, it will improve clarity so that everyone knows where they stand by stipulating when and how a bailiff can enter a property, what they can take and, not least, what they can charge.
The noble Baroness’s amendment will not address these issues, nor will it supply debtors with an independent complaints process which will meet their needs. The Legal Services Act contemplates a service relationship between professionals, such as solicitors and their clients, which is not present between bailiffs and debtors. Under this amendment, debtors would not be able to complain to the Legal Ombudsman because the bailiff is not providing them with a service as required for complaints under the Act. It is therefore neither appropriate nor sensible to try to force the regulation of bailiffs into this framework which is not constructed to address the circumstances in question.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
Yes, I remember those arguments well. The issue is to what extent the Government—the Executive—should have an interest in this matter. I think that the arrangements that were introduced protect the independence of the Supreme Court and the judiciary, and I would not want to change them.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I often think how well served we are by the depth and richness of the judicial talent that serves here in the House of Lords. I often think it, but perhaps not tonight.
This has been an interesting debate, full of mea culpas. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, cannot quite remember how he let this through the committee on which he was serving; the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, must have nodded when it went through; and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said that the previous Government did not get it perfectly right. The fact is that this is an Act of Parliament carried by the previous Administration. I was very pleased to find out the intentions of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, at the last minute, although they did not really surprise me, but it seems strange that we should be discussing this.
Let me make my position perfectly clear. One of the things of which I am most proud in my parliamentary life is the steadfastness with which the Liberal Democrats delivered the votes in this House to carry through the reform that delivered us the Supreme Court. I have been a strong believer in the Supreme Court from that time—I think a little ahead of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, in devotion to the separation of powers—and that should stand in the record about my attitude to this amendment.
Of course it is possible for your Lordships to send strong messages to the other place. Let us remember that very shortly another place will be debating this Bill. However, I urge noble Lords to ponder whether it is the best way to send such a message. The Lord Chancellor can read, and I will make sure that part of his Christmas reading is the Hansard of this debate, but negotiations are going on. The noble Baroness, Lady Jay, asked whether the discussions have run into the ground. No, there has been discussion at official level in the two weeks since this issue was raised, and the letter that was quoted was from the Lord Chancellor to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, pointing out that the Government are still considering this matter.
Let me clarify for the record that the Government do not have any concerns about the accountability of the UK Supreme Court. While there is no doubt that the Executive has a legitimate interest in the effective and efficient administration of all courts—a point that the noble Lord, Lord Butler, made very eloquently—the Government fully respect the independence of the judiciary and our duty to uphold that independence.
The amendment tabled reflects concerns about the present arrangements concerning the appointment of the chief executive, the staffing arrangements for the court and the ramifications of those arrangements for the independence of the court. This is a matter of great constitutional importance—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I emphasise that it is a matter of great constitutional importance, so when the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, with the impetuosity of a young solicitor says, “Why can’t this be handled?”, it is because it is a matter of great constitutional importance. It has been raised by a former president of the Supreme Court. It has been raised today by former high office holders—Attorneys-General, Lord Chief Justices and other Supreme Court justices. Nobody is underestimating its importance. However, I most humbly say—I am beginning to learn how lawyers manage to insult each other with the most exquisite politeness—that on a matter of this constitutional importance, where the Lord Chancellor of the day is saying that he is in negotiations and discussions with the president of the Supreme Court, it is not particularly helpful for this House to pass an amendment on the hoof in this way.
Lord McNally
I do not wish to pre-empt or shorten the debate, but it might help if I were to say something here. I hope that my noble friend Lord Marks will withdraw Amendment 6 as it is overtaken by the subsequent amendment. I will respond first to my noble friend’s Amendment 7, which seeks to apply a tipping-point principle to appointments to the UK Supreme Court.
The Government’s position has always been that a tipping-point principle should apply to the Supreme Court and we believed, as he said, that the tipping point in Section 159 of the Equality Act 2010 already applied to such appointments. However, as my noble friend Lord Marks explained, there could be a contrary legal view and I can see that there may be merit in the argument that this matter should be put beyond doubt. Therefore, I am happy to say that my right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor is content for me to take this amendment away for consideration with a view to returning to the matter when the Bill goes to the other place.
Amendment 8 concerns whether the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice should be under a statutory duty to encourage judicial diversity. Following the debate on this issue on Report, I agreed to discuss the matter further with the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice in order to reflect the strength of feeling expressed by the House. Amendment 8 is in response to that further consideration.
There is much agreement in the House about the importance of a diverse judiciary that more closely reflects our society. There is also agreement that strong leadership is needed to bring about this change. Amendment 8 helps achieve that leadership by giving a clear declaration of the importance of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice promoting diversity. Therefore, as I explained, in view of the reasons and undertakings I have given, I hope that my noble friend Lord Marks will withdraw Amendment 6 and will not move Amendment 7. I commend to the House Amendment 8, relating to a diversity duty, and I thank the Constitution Committee and other noble Lords who made the case so strongly for an amendment of this sort. I emphasise again that I will take away Amendment 7 for suitable representation in the other place.
Baroness Jay of Paddington
My Lords, my name is not on this amendment but I have spoken several times on this subject during the course of the Bill. I welcome the Minister’s further discussions with the Lord Chancellor, and the government amendment. As he said, it reflects the Constitution Committee’s considerations of this matter which, as he mentioned in the discussion on a previous amendment, have been going on since the beginning of this year. I am delighted that he has taken the view that he has and that he is proposing Amendment 8.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, the Opposition are delighted to join in this outbreak of consensus and congratulate the Minister on a very statesmanlike response.
Lord McNally
Given those interventions, I wish only to quote somebody who never made it to this House and say that this is not the end of the beginning. I knew that I would get that wrong, but noble Lords know what I mean—it is the end of the beginning. Of course, the person I am quoting rehearsed these things much more than I do. However, I hope that this is the start of a real drive for diversity. Those who have just contributed to the debate have played a major part in that. However, as we sometimes find in other debates in this House, there is battle still to be joined in this area.
Lord Beecham
Perhaps the Minister would care to fortify himself before these debates in the same way that Mr Churchill did.
Lord McNally
“Encouraging diversity9A In Part 6 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (other provisions relating to the judiciary) after section 137 insert—
“137A Encouragement of diversity
Each of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales must take such steps as that office-holder considers appropriate for the purpose of encouraging judicial diversity.””
Lord McNally
My Lords, we are soon to be passing the three-hour limit for these debates at Third Reading. A reoccurring theme in all the debates on the Bill has been the straying into what I would describe as Second Reading speeches and an attempt to rerun cases that have been made. I respectfully say to the House that if this is going to be the norm, we may well have to talk to the Opposition about how we handle Third Readings. I am not talking about whose amendment it is, I am talking about the usual channels. If we continually have complete reruns of debates, it does make business management extremely difficult. Sometimes I think that noble Lords overemphasise winning votes in this House; making things happen. I actually think that what has the greater influence is the well argued debate rather than the vote, but perhaps that is because I am getting used to being beaten at this Dispatch Box.
We had an informed and extensive debate about female and young adult offenders on recommital and Report. I would also say that sometimes the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, make it sound as though nothing has happened in the past 17 years. Successive Governments have grappled with this, and certainly during my term of office I have fought very hard to put the specific problems of female prisoners to the forefront. I fully accept the points that were made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy. I am disappointed that the noble Baroness, Lady Corston, thinks that nothing has been done with her report. We expect to publish in January, and I make no apologies for the delay; I would rather get something right than meet an artificial deadline. I hope that when we publish in the new year noble Lords will see the work that Helen Grant has been carrying out with the support of the Lord Chancellor. As I have said before, do not belittle the fact that a Conservative Lord Chancellor has openly said that he sees the necessity of giving priority to women prisoners, as he said today at Questions in the House of Commons. Hopefully in the new year we will put that strategy into place, and I am sure that we will have a good opportunity to debate that.
Equally with young adults, it is not a matter of carving out from one Government to another on this. I read the report that was published today about young people in care with a sense of collective shame at how these things are being dealt with. However, as those who have previously had those responsibilities know, it is often a matter of convincing colleagues in government, and finding resources when there is competition from other departments that have equally strong arguments. I do not think there is any doubt that we believe that the rehabilitation of both groups is important. We strongly agree with the arguments that have been employed, and that is why we are already investing significant effort and resource to ensure that female and young adult offenders receive the right support.
In the previous debate, I gave examples of the many projects, including those in Lancashire, Durham and Derbyshire, that trusts are running for female offenders. For young adults, likewise, many probation trusts are already coming up with innovative approaches to supporting this group. For example, in London the trust is working on an imaginative project by which some staff will work in both the youth offending team and the trust. This is to ensure that the transition between the youth and adult estate works effectively. In the east of England, probation staff have been developing closer links with leaving care services to ensure that the particular needs of these young adults are being met.
I hope, therefore, that noble Lords will recognise the Government’s strong commitment to providing the right support for women and young adult offenders. There is agreement across this House that we need to do so. What we are debating is the mechanism for delivering that support, not whether we should deliver it. It is important to be clear here that the projects I mention have not been centrally imposed. They have been delivered from the ground up, by committed and passionate staff in probation trusts, to respond to the needs of women and young adults in the area.
Local innovation is critical if we are to have effective services for these groups. I believe the system we already have strikes a good balance between local innovation and central support. I do not believe that a statutory duty is necessary to deliver this.
The relationship between NOMS and probation trusts already gives a framework that ensures these groups are prioritised. For example, trusts are already required by the NOMS Commissioning Intentions document to make appropriate provision for women in the community. Trusts are currently discussing their proposals for services for female offenders in 2013-14 with commissioning experts at NOMS, and will be challenged where these do not appear to be sufficiently robust.
Similarly, I have already mentioned on Report that the operating manual on unpaid work requires that women should be allocated to work placements which take account of their needs. This sets out a presumption that female offenders will not be required to work alongside male offenders.
On young adults, our current system balances local delivery with central support. As with female offenders, trusts are required by NOMS to commission or deliver an appropriate range of services to address the causes of young adults’ offending. To support this, NOMS has provided trusts with information on the specific needs of young adults that will help them and other providers take an evidence-based, effective approach to tackling re-offending. This system allows for local decision-making on how best to meet the needs of these groups.
In short, I wholeheartedly agree with the arguments that noble Lords have made about improving outcomes for female and young adult offenders. I hope that I have reassured noble Lords that NOMS and probation trusts are already taking a tailored approach to supporting them. However, our focus should be on supporting local areas to make further improvements. The system that we have already allows for this. Creating new statutory duties for trusts is not the right way to bring about the improvements that we want for these two groups.
In light of these assurances, I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, will agree not to press their amendments. Perhaps I may give just one little bit of encouragement to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. Yes, we did have lots of talks about restorative justice, and restorative justice is in this Bill, but getting it into the Bill took lots of talks between and within departments, letters to various Cabinet committees et cetera. Some of these things take time, but there should be no doubt that young offenders and women offenders are on the Government’s radar. Ministers at the MoJ, and particularly my colleague, Helen Grant, are working very hard to make progress in these areas. With those assurances, I hope that noble Lords will agree not to press their amendments.
Lord Woolf
My Lords, I thank those who have spoken in favour of the amendment and all those who have taken part in this debate, and I thank the Minister for his response. I hope that he will accept from me that I have no reservations in accepting that he sincerely believes what he has just said to the House.
However, there is a difference between the approach of the Minister and that which I was urging upon the House. I say that the situation with regard to women in the criminal justice system is one where there is a crying need for there to appear in the statute something which speaks of Parliament’s concern.
I have great sympathy for my noble friend Lady Corston in her feeling of frustration at a lack of action in respect of her report, which was welcomed so warmly. It seems to me that, in view of the issue between us and because the Minister has not sought to identify any possible prejudice that could come—
Lord McNally
I can only make one last appeal to the noble and learned Lord. Does he really think that it will advance one inch the cause that he espouses if we have a Division at this point, where people who have not been in the debate will come in and be told, “Oh, you’re voting in favour of women or voting against women.”?
Lord McNally
It is no use saying “shame”. There is no division between us, and to suggest that there is does not further the cause.
Lord Woolf
Well, of course, I listen very attentively to what the Minister says, but perhaps he will forgive me if I bring the agony to an end by indicating that, as I see it, there is nothing in the proposed provision which can harm the Government’s good intentions. I think that there is a difference of view here: between those who feel that the statute should contain a statement of recognition of the special position of women in the criminal justice system and those who do not. In those circumstances, I seek the opinion of the House in respect of my amendment.
Magna Carta: 800th Anniversary
Lord McNally Excerpts(13 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Mitchell
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. In doing so, I confess to an error I made, because the date should be 15 June, not 18 June.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, I understand there are a lot of anniversaries in 2015. We plan to celebrate the 800th anniversary of the sealing of Magna Carta in June 2015. Work is being co-ordinated by the Magna Carta 800th Committee of the Magna Carta Trust, an independent organisation chaired by Sir Robert Worcester. I keep in close contact with the trust and its plans.
Lord Mitchell
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. Some interesting things are happening, but maybe we can do even better. The late Lord Denning called the Magna Carta,
“the greatest constitutional document of all time—the foundation of the freedom of the individual against the arbitrary authority of the despot”.
The great charter is the very essence of what we are as a people. Its octocentenary should be celebrated with all pomp and international ceremony. I have a suggestion for the Government. Why not exhibit all four remaining original documents in one location? It would be the first time that they have come together since they were sealed at Runnymede in 1215. Maybe that location should be here, in Westminster Hall. Why not invite the world to London to celebrate this magnificent anniversary and all it stands for?
Lord McNally
My Lords, I am sure that Sir Robert welcomes all suggestions. That sounds like a very good one. In addition, a lot of work is being done, not least by the towns and cities of the United Kingdom which have historic relations with the Magna Carta, and in other parts of the Commonwealth and English-speaking world. The noble Lord is right: the 800th anniversary will be a great celebration and work is well under way to make it so.
Lord Howell of Guildford
My Lords, is the Minister aware that at about the same time or maybe sooner, what might be called a maxima carta will be signed and sealed, upholding the rights of 2 billion citizens across the entire Commonwealth network? Will he ensure that when it is signed, quite shortly, it also gets appropriate commemoration and possibly full approval and validation in this House?
Lord McNally
Again, I sincerely hope so. I also know that the Magna Carta committee is determined that the celebration of the 800th anniversary will be a Commonwealth celebration, since Magna Carta means so much to so many Commonwealth countries.
The Lord Bishop of Lichfield
My Lords, as Archbishop Stephen Langton largely wrote the Magna Carta, and as the freedom of the church to serve the nation is such a prominent theme in the great charter, will the Government approach the right reverend Prelates Archbishops of Canterbury and York to see how church and state might work happily together on this important anniversary?
Lord McNally
Most certainly. However, as a resident of St Albans, I understand that the Magna Carta was much drafted in the Abbey of St Albans. One of the advantages of the charter may be illustrated by the fact that celebrations are planned in St Albans, Bury St Edmunds, London, Canterbury, Oxford, Hereford, Salisbury and Durham. It seems to have been a rather peripatetic document, with quite a few claims to authorship. However, I am absolutely sure that preparations to be part of the celebrations are already well in hand in Lincoln and Salisbury, led by the cathedrals in those two great cities.
Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale
My Lords, does the Minister agree that it might be appropriate if this House cleaned the figures of the signatories to the Magna Carta? That would be a nice gesture, would it not?
Lord McNally
For one minute, I thought that I was going to be dragged into Scottish politics. My brief tells me that Scotland did not sign the Magna Carta—neither did King John, before anyone corrects me on that. Every time we have this Question on the Order Paper, another good suggestion comes forward. I must say that the suggestion of the cleaning is an excellent one.
Lord Elystan-Morgan
My Lords, does the Minister accept that although, at the request of King John, three months after the sealing of Magna Carta, the charter was annulled by His Holiness the Pope, it nevertheless remains one of the most noble documents of human history, representing as it does the interface between principle and power and, indeed, the challenge of the rule of law to raw authority; and that, in that respect, it has much in common with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights?
Lord McNally
I like the definition of the late Lord Bingham, which was that the great thing about Magna Carta was not so much the absolute political detail—yes, it was repealed about three months afterwards—but that it remained part of the DNA of this country for 800 years. People know what we mean by Magna Carta. When Eleanor Roosevelt announced the UN Declaration of Human Rights, she said that it was a Magna Carta for all mankind, and “all mankind” did not need a translation; she knew what it meant. I share the views of the noble Lord about the European Convention on Human Rights.
Defamation Bill
Lord McNally Excerpts(13 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Lester of Herne Hill
I was not going to speak until I heard the noble Lord, Lord May, just now. He is identifying one of the main problems that the Bill is designed to tackle—it arises in the other parts of the Bill—on the way one approaches the defence of truth, honest opinion and privilege. The Bill seeks to take care of all of those. The cost matters are being dealt with separately and are very important.
All we are concerned with here is the initial hurdle to get rid of the trivial cases. We must not set the hurdle too high, because that would be unfair to claimants; nor too low, because that would be unfair to publishers. My own view is that one word in the English language is better than three. For that reason, I hope that the Government will stick to “serious” rather than giving the judges the headache of deciding how “serious” differs from “substantial”. They are perfectly capable, it seems to me, of interpreting an ordinary word in the English language. In that respect, I agree with my noble friend Lord Faulks.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, I shall begin with my usual disclaimer. I am not a lawyer. As I often say about my friends in this House who are lawyers, we are in their debt because if we had to pay them we could not afford them. We get the benefit of considerable legal expertise. The only problem is that it does not always point in the same direction. Nevertheless, it is welcome—as is the approach of the various groups that have become involved in this Bill. I pay tribute to my colleague and noble friend Lord Lester, who launched us on this path with his Private Member’s Bill, and the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, and his group, who in the pre-legislative scrutiny committee were extremely thorough. I also pay tribute to the Opposition, who played a very constructive role, and the various lobby groups that have come in. As has been said, it is a task of achieving balance.
I am grateful for the comments made about my own attitude. I take the view, particularly on this Bill, of President Harry Truman, who when asked whether the Marshall plan should be called the Marshall plan or the Truman plan said that it should be called the Marshall plan, as it is amazing how far you will get if you share a little of the credit.
I want to share the credit because my sole aim and intention in taking this Bill through is to leave us with a piece of useful legislation which will address some of the problems to which the noble Lord, Lord May of Oxford, has just referred of us having an unwelcome reputation for libel tourism, and to address some of the unfairness of costs.
As my noble friend Lord Lester indicated, we will be returning to this matter but I draw the Committee’s attention to my letter of 10 October, which is in the Library of the House and informs noble Lords that we were referring the matter of costs to the Civil Justice Council, an independent advisory body chaired by the Master of the Rolls, to advise us on this matter by the end of March 2013. As Members of the Committee may have noticed, the Government have subsequently announced that they have accepted Lord Justice Leveson’s recommendation that cost protection should be extended to defamation and privacy cases. Therefore, one of the matters which has been commented on most often, costs, is being addressed as this Bill moves forward. Whether we get the balance right is a matter for—
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am sorry to interrupt but I am trying to be helpful to my noble friend. I think that he just referred to a letter of 10 October.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am most grateful, because I have a letter from 8 October.
Lord McNally
It was my fault. I thank my noble friend for drawing my attention to that. I hope that that sets a pattern whereby his interventions will be entirely helpful—as they always are. Before I dig deeper, I should turn to the amendments before us. In the light of requests from a number of noble Lords for information on what the serious harm test is intended to encapsulate, it may be helpful for me to explain as fully as possible the Government’s thinking behind Clause 1.
The introduction of a serious harm test reflects the Government’s view that there is merit in legislating to ensure that trivial and unfounded actions do not proceed. It is the first time that there has been a statutory threshold of this nature in defamation proceedings. In the draft Bill, we consulted on the following provision. It said:
“A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause substantial harm to the reputation of the claimant”.
In formulating this provision, we examined a series of cases over the past century in which the courts have considered the question of what is sufficient to establish that a statement is defamatory. A recent example is Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd, in which an earlier House of Lords decision on Sim v Stretch was identified as authority for the existence of a “threshold of seriousness”. In Jameel v Dow Jones and Co, it was established that there needed to be a “real and substantial tort” in the jurisdiction for a claim to be able to proceed. The claim which failed that test was struck out as an abuse of process. The “substantial harm” clause aims to encapsulate the tests applied in these and other cases. Our view at that point, which we expressed to the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, was that this would reflect and strengthen the current law. Establishing in statute a substantial harm test for the first time would give this requirement a new prominence and would help to discourage trivial and unfounded claims being brought.
In its report, the Joint Committee on the draft Bill took the view that a stricter test was appropriate and that,
“a threshold test that focuses on the seriousness of the allegation would raise the bar in a meaningful way and give greater confidence to publishers that statements which do not cause significant harm, including jokes, parody, and irreverent criticism, do not put them at risk of losing a libel claim”.
It recommended a test of serious and substantial harm.
Lord Mawhinney
Two things seem to be beyond dispute. One is that powers already exist for the courts to exercise their judgment over timing and that costs are escalating beyond the ability of most people to turn to the law for the defence that they are entitled to expect from the law. Given that those are both facts that I know my noble friend is relying on, how can he explain that not changing the first is likely to address the second?
Lord McNally
First, I have already pointed out that my noble friend’s concerns about costs are being addressed in parallel with the Bill. Secondly, as we go through the Bill, we need to look at it as a cohesive whole. There are other factors and proposals that deal with some of the problems he is concerned about. It may help the Committee, and the way that I want the Committee to work—we are in the Moses Room and so we will not divide at the end of these debates—if I say that I will listen very carefully to the contributions made by Members, look at the legal advice, whether unanimous or conflicting, and take the advice of my advisers. I see that as the best and most fruitful way of using this Committee. At this stage, I am trying to give the Committee an idea of the Government’s thinking thus far and what the background is to any particular proposal. That is not the final word on these matters, although it should not be taken as an encouragement that there is a concession in the offing. As an old hand, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Browne, approves of the balance and that it will encourage my noble friend Lord Mawhinney, although not too much. We will see how these debates unfold.
The courts already have the power under Rule 3.4 of the Civil Procedure Rules which permits them to strike out all or part of a claim where there is no reasonable ground for bringing it or they consider it to be an abuse of process. The courts are very familiar with that power, and we have no doubt that they will use it more when this is in place.
Other lawyers have said to me that this will all be tested in the courts. Indeed it will but, to answer a point made earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, we are trying to lift the hurdle but are consciously trying to keep the balance right in what we are doing. I hope that noble Lords will be prepared to withdraw the amendment in accordance with the procedure for Committees in this Room. To take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, once people have had a chance to look at Hansard and at our thinking on any particular area, if they want further clarification, I would be very happy to talk to them. I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, with all respect—a phrase that lawyers use when they have no respect—to all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords and to the Minister who boasts that he is not a lawyer rather than disclaims that he is, the most important contribution to our short debate, for which I am very grateful, was by the noble Lord, Lord May of Oxford. He reminded us that we are changing the law and that will significantly affect the way in which lawyers, be they judges, barristers or solicitors, work in advising. We have set ourselves the task of trying to make the law in this area clear to affect the way in which people behave. Most of those people are not lawyers, and nor should they have to be lawyers in order to understand the limits of behaviour that will put them at risk.
With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who knows that I have an enormous degree of admiration for him, his response to the intervention by the noble Lord, Lord May of Oxford, was—I hate using this phrase—technically correct, but it missed the point. The point I am trying to make in this part of the debate is that we have an opportunity to give an explanation of what we think we are achieving here. We have a perfect example in this short debate because of the very concise and helpful interventions by a number of lawyers about just how that could be confused. I am extremely grateful for that. In a simple sentence, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, supported my amendments and then made well made point that was not in any way undermined by the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, because neither he nor I—and I support his amendment for the purpose that I explained—think that judges are incapable of doing this. We know that judges are capable of looking at this test and applying it to the facts, having listened to the legal argument. We know because—although I have never practised in England, I have had to bone up on the procedure—there is a process whereby the issues in dispute become apparent by the process of pleading and the exchange of arguments and facts. I do not think that any of us have any doubt that judges will be able to do that.
Actually, if that is the point at which decisions are made in relation to the tests that we set, we will have failed because we want these decisions to be made much earlier in the activity. We do not want people to have to go to the court at all, if that can be avoided. We do not want people to have to run off to very expensive lawyers who are capable of doing what we lawyers have just done in this debate, which is taking the advice of a former Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who we all admire, which is that there is a distinction between “substantial” and “serious”. However, we had a very clear, lucid and believable explanation of why “serious” includes “substantial” from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, using his experience and practice in the law. He was supported by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who said that this simpler, one-word test is the most appropriate way to move forward because the justice system can cope with it much better.
Lord Scott of Foscote
My Lords, perhaps I may add to what has been said. The inability to bring an action for defamation on behalf someone who is deceased does not prevent action being taken to prevent repetition of the untrue allegations that are being made if it can be shown that their repetition is likely to cause a breach of the peace. I came across such a case when I was a barrister and was once instructed to do something to stop lies, as I was told, being told about a deceased public figure. I said that defamation was not a runner but that one could get an injunction, not damages, to stop a repetition if there was a real likelihood of a breach of the peace. However, for that purpose, one had to get the consent of the Attorney-General. I applied to the Attorney-General, who refused to give his consent, and that was the end of the matter.
Lord McNally
My Lords, again we are indebted to my learned friends for enlightening this debate. Dealing with the reputation of the dead is a difficult matter. I recently had to answer a Question in the Lords about a pardon for Dr Alan Turing, and I answered by referring to the strict letter of the law as it now stands. I then found that someone had added a line to my entry in Wikipedia that stated that I was strongly opposed to giving a pardon to Alan Turing.
The issue is very difficult. As my noble friend Lord Hunt said, I saw Mr and Mrs Watson, and anyone who meets them cannot but be moved by the grief that they continue to feel. When I saw them in October 2010, the draft Bill was already starting its slow process down the slipway, and I suggested that they give evidence to the public consultation, which subsequently involved the pre-legislative scrutiny committee. Mr and Mrs Watson gave evidence and argued that the Government should allow proceedings to be brought in respect of defamed homicide victims. However, they were the only respondents who raised this issue, and neither the specific issue of defamation of homicide victims nor defamation of the dead more generally arose in evidence to the Joint Committee.
However, as has been said, the Watsons, who live in Glasgow, have raised this issue in Scotland, where it is a devolved matter subject to Scottish Law. The Scottish Government published in January 2011 a consultation paper, Death of a Good Name—Defamation and the Deceased. Analysis of that response has been published by the Scottish Government, but they have yet to indicate whether they are minded to propose any change to their law in this area.
I say again, as I said to Mr and Mrs Watson, that they should also cling to the judgment of the judge. That is the most sound and tested opinion of their daughter’s reputation, and it was clear and unequivocal in a way that I had hoped would have given them some of the comfort that they sought. However, I can imagine—and it does not apply just to famous people—that when things are said about loved ones after their death it must be extremely hurtful to those who have been close to them. Perhaps I should gently lob the ball back to my noble friend Lord Hunt in the hope that the handiwork he is undertaking in terms of a media response to Lord Justice Leveson and a regulatory body with teeth that bite might be an area where the teeth might bite if the media behave in the way that the Watson family suggested.
However, this amendment seeks to change the law in relation to the rights of representatives of deceased persons to bring defamation actions. It is not a provision for the avoidance of doubt. It is a long-established principle of common law that a deceased person cannot be defamed because reputation is personal. A defamatory statement about a deceased person accordingly does not give rise to a civil action for defamation on behalf of his or her estate. Relatives of the deceased also have no right of action unless the words used reflect on their own reputation. That reflects the central principle in civil proceedings generally that a claim for damages can be brought only by the person who has suffered the injury, loss or, in this case, damage to his or her reputation as a result of an act of omission of another person.
The Government believe that there will be significant difficulties with attempting to allow representatives to bring defamation actions on behalf of deceased persons. For example, in the event of defamation proceedings being brought by a representative of the deceased person, it would not be possible to bar that defendant from using the defences that exist to a defamation action. That would result in arguments over the truth of negative allegations about the deceased’s character, which inevitably would be distressing for their family and which could not be put to proof by questioning of the deceased.
Also significantly, this amendment does not propose to put any time limit on the period after death during which such an action would be brought. That potentially creates huge difficulties for historians wishing to engage in historical analysis and debate, especially given that there is no definition of representatives, which means that it would not necessarily need to be a close family member who brought the action on behalf of the deceased person. That could lead to a situation where a historian published a biography of a significant historical figure many years after that person’s death. He could be sued by a law firm or an individual with no close tie to the deceased person who was the subject of the potentially defamatory statement.
In the second subsection of the amendment, it is not clear to which individual the serious harm would have to be caused nor is it immediately apparent how a defamatory statement could cause a breach of the peace. However, it is because of the very serious legal and practical difficulties that I have already highlighted that the Government cannot support this amendment. For all those reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw it.
Perhaps I may say to the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, that the BBC and the police are investigating the Savile matters, and I think that I should leave it there for the moment.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, I have said before that I am amazed how often when I ask about a certain thing in the Ministry of Justice, they say, “Well, they do this better in Scotland”. I do not know whether that is a tribute to the quality of Scottish law, but it will be interesting when it is faced with the very real dilemma of where you draw the line. The noble Lord suggested a year or so, but wherever the line is drawn, there will be those who are just on the other side of it. It is a difficult dilemma, and you cannot but feel sorrow for the grief of those who are affected by it. I think that the Government are right to hold the line where it is but, as ever, we will keep an eye on other examples.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, although I am sure Lord Mawhinney will respond, as he moved this group, I shall make one point on the amendment standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Browne. If a company was attacked on its ethical role, that would also show in its share price—those of my generation might remember Barclays selling arms to South Africa. This would not necessarily affect sales, but it could still substantially affect a company’s financial position because its share price would be affected. There are other ways of measuring financial loss, and this is similarly the case with very small companies. If a very small shop of the kind found in Kentish Town was accused of having rats in the cellar, that would immediately lead to a drop-off in the number of people shopping there, and therefore I think that would count as substantial loss. Concerning the specific drafting, once the Minister has accepted that he will move his own amendment on the arguments we have given, I am sure his officials will make sure that the drafting is perfect.
Lord McNally
I have known the noble Baroness so long that I know when she is tempting me into sin. However, this has again been a very useful, very helpful debate. I confess that when I started out on this one of the things I wanted to do was to address the problems that have been faced by academics and others in making legitimate criticism and legitimate comments. Having listened to a large number of individuals and interested parties, there is no doubt in my mind that this law can have a chilling effect, and it is used very ruthlessly to stifle debate. I hope that we can do something to address this as we progress this Bill.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has obviously been very kind to me, because she did not point out that when I gave evidence to her committee I said that in my opinion corporations should not be allowed to sue. The then Lord Chancellor, Ken Clarke, took me into a quiet room, sat me down and, with the persuasiveness for which he is renowned, convinced me that corporations do have reputations and what the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, described as an ethical identity. This is a serious point, which has come out in the debate. As we go through the Bill, we are continually trying to get the balance between defending reputation and defending free speech. They are continually in our mind.
Regarding costs, I again point out to the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, although he clearly has doubts about the way these things are done in government—I do not know whether that comes from personal experience—that we have tasked the Master of the Rolls with the job of looking at this matter within a specific timescale: by next March. Since then, we have had a clear statement by the Prime Minister that the Government accept the recommendation by Leveson that there should be a cost-transferring system in defamation. Any powers of influence I have will be used to try to ensure that this is not go into the long grass. I am quite sure that the Master of the Rolls, Lord Dyson, will understand the urgency and the expectation that comes from the work with which he has been tasked.
Lord Mawhinney
I am grateful to my noble friend. I understand the point that he makes and he understands that part of the purpose of the Committee is—as we cannot vote—to put a little encouragement in front of him to think again. Regarding that, will he tell the Committee what the Government have said to Lord Dyson that they wish to see covered in the recommendations that he brings forward in March?
Lord McNally
In terms of what was actually said to Lord Dyson, if it is on the record somewhere, I will make it available to the Committee by next Wednesday. There is lots of clustering behind me. Even after two and a half years, I am still in awe of what happens behind the Minister.
The Civil Justice Council has been asked,
“to identify whether there are meritorious actions for defamation and privacy, which could not properly be brought or defended without some form of costs protection … if so identified, to advise … in which types of cases (or stages of cases) some form of costs protection should apply; and … what options for costs protection might be considered, with their advantages and disadvantages”.
Since then, there has been the added rider of Lord Justice Leveson’s opinion that cost QOCS should be applied to defamation cases. Therefore, I am sure that my noble friend’s scepticism will be noted by Lord Dyson and he will see that eyes are on him while he does this important work. Likewise, on the question of process, I refer to my letter of 10 December on early resolution—I think that this time I have the month right. We have asked the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to consider in the new year:
“The main issues which we consider should be determined early where they are matters of dispute are: Whether the statement is defamatory (including whether it satisfies the new serious harm test) … What the actual meaning of the words complained of is … Whether the words complained of are a statement of fact or opinion”.
The letter continues:
“We propose to seek the Civil Procedure Rule Committee’s agreement to provisions enabling either party to make an application for a ruling on any (or all) of the three issues listed above at the time of service of the particulars of claim (or at any time thereafter)”.
I hope that those changes in procedure will address this problem that has been highlighted as part of the issue. When I met Simon Singh, he mentioned to me that these issues of definition ran up the costs long before the case got to court. We are not going to cure everything, but if we can tease out of the system delays that work against individuals, rack up costs and cause this chilling effect, we will certainly be going in the right direction. I believe that on inequality of arms, the chilling effect, costs and early resolution we are in the right ballpark, as our American cousins say.
Corporations are a matter where we will listen to the Committee, but I must tell the Committee that in other places and parts of government there is strong resistance to conceding on this point. Let me provide the Government’s position. We recognise the concerns that lie behind Amendments 4 and 8, and the arguments that have been made by the Joint Committee and others in favour of restricting corporations’ right to sue in defamation. However, the Government believe that in this area there is a difficult balance to be struck. Clearly, businesses are often powerful and it is undesirable that they should be able to bully individuals or organisations with much more limited means by bringing, or threatening to bring, defamation actions, simply in order to stifle debate. Equally, we must recognise that businesses have genuine reputations to protect. They can be subject to unfounded or spiteful allegations that harm not just the management but shareholders and employees. This Bill seeks to make it harder for corporations or wealthy individual claimants to intimidate defendants with limited resources, but without removing their ability to seek redress where their reputation is genuinely damaged. The new test of serious harm will provide an effective deterrent to trivial and vexatious claims, regardless of who the claimant is.
It is also important to bear in mind the fact that corporations are already unable to claim damages for certain types of harm, such as injury to feelings. This means that to satisfy the serious harm test, they are likely in practice to have to show sufficient actual or likely financial loss. The serious harm test and other provisions in the Bill, such as the simpler and clearer defences and the removal of the right to jury trial, together with the accompanying procedural changes that we propose will reduce the cost and complexity of proceedings to the benefit of anyone trying to defend a case. In this context, the Government do not consider that the introduction of a permission stage for corporations would be appropriate. As part of the procedural changes that we are proposing, the court will be able to deal with the key issues in dispute at as early a stage as possible. An additional permission stage for corporations would almost certainly add to the costs involved.
Importantly, we have recently announced our intention to introduce cost protection measures in defamation proceedings. I referred to them as regards the Civil Justice Council. This will help address concerns in respect of cases involving an inequality of arms and will ensure that claimants and defendants of limited means are not deterred from bringing or defending defamation claims where the other part is a corporation, newspaper or individual with substantially greater resources. All told, we consider that this represents a fair and balanced approach that gives defendants of limited means significantly better protection than they currently enjoy and lessens the likelihood of intimidatory tactics being used against them, while also ensuring that corporations can still bring legitimate claims where their business reputation has been seriously harmed by unfounded allegations.
I have no objections at all to my noble friend Lord Mawhinney continuing to prod me on these issues, but I believe that the approaches we have made to the Master of the Rolls and the Civil Justice Council are the best and quickest way of addressing them. However, his continuing scepticism will be a spur to us all.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Most of what the Minister has said is extremely persuasive, and certainly his criticism of Amendment 8, to which I have added my name, is understandable. With reference to Amendment 4, which is much less detailed, if, instead of just saying,
“unless its publication has caused substantial financial loss”,
it said, “has caused or is likely to cause substantial financial loss”, whereby the proposed new clause would read,
“The Statement is not defamatory”,
and so on, that would do little more than restate the existing common law. Would the noble Lord and his team consider something that would set out in the Bill the actual common law position without debarring corporations or creating new hurdles for them?
Lord McNally
Once again I shall use my ultimate defence: I am not a lawyer, so I am not going to say yes on the hoof. I also wonder whether the words “substantial financial loss” covers reputation, as was referred to by my noble friend Lord Phillips. However, as I have said throughout our debate, I am listening. When I go back to the Ministry of Justice, I will certainly sit down with my officials and talk about the points that have been made and ask whether any of them can substantially help what is still my objective, which is to deal with the real problems such as those that have been set out by the noble Lord, Lord May, and other noble Lords. These represent evidence of how, on the one hand, corporations can bully, intimidate and chill, while, on the other, they may have reputations that can and should be defended. That is the balance that we seek to strike. I will look at what my noble friend has suggested, and I look to my noble friend Lord Mawhinney to retain his scepticism, but to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Mawhinney
I accept without reservation the determination of my noble friend the Minister to face the real issues that surround this legislation. There is no doubt or scepticism in my mind about that. I am grateful to colleagues for what has been a good debate. Perhaps I may say to my noble friends Lord Faulks and Lord Phillips, and to the noble Lord, Lord May, that broadly I agree with everything they said. The committee decided very early on that we were not constituted to draft legislation. We did not have the ability, skills or the knowledge to do so and we did not think that that was what we were being asked to do. I accept that all three speeches made the point that the drafting could be improved.
How it is improved is, of course, a matter for the Government, not for the committee because the other thing that we were very careful to insist on was that we were not making the law but simply offering advice to the Government, and they would in due course present to Parliament what they thought the law should be, and Parliament would decide whether it agreed with the Government. Therefore, in all three cases, without going into the details of what was said, I accept generally the points that were made. I hope that my attitude of hitting the big issues and leaving the Government to do the drafting and fill the smaller cracks is the right way to proceed, although I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, for his phrase about wanting to encourage companies to re-enter the world of ethics. I am sure that he was speaking for the whole Committee when he said that.
I declare an unusual interest in that I am a life member of the Association of University Teachers. That interest is not often required to be mentioned. However, I mention it specifically in relation to the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Triesman. As one of those who were subject to his leadership, I want to put on the record how excellent that leadership was. That qualifies him and what he said to be taken seriously by this Committee. I hope that the Minister will reread the noble Lord’s contribution several times.
I could not agree more with my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill that certain things should be statutory and on the face of the Bill and that others should not be statutory and therefore not on the face of the Bill. I learnt through many a happy hour spent on the committee that case management was one of the things that should not be put on the face of the Bill, so I entirely agree with my noble friend. However, I have a caveat which he did not mention but which I should like to add to what he said: namely, we have to be confident that case management will be addressed non-statutorily and will be changed. I use the verb “changed” deliberately because the evidence was submitted to our committee over and over again that case management issues drove up cost, caused delay and huge irritation, and separated perhaps millions of our fellow citizens from the protection of the law. That is the case management that we have at the moment.
I am not being particularly critical and I do not have the skill or the knowledge to say what aspects of case management need to be changed but my committee was adamant that case management must be addressed. I add a rider. We did not suffer from delusions of grandeur. We did not believe for one moment that this was a penetrating shaft of light into our consciousness that had not occurred to anybody before. Indeed, if the Minister pushed me, I could probably find bits of evidence to support that statement.
That brings me back to reflections on Mawhinney’s scepticism. It is not arbitrary and capricious. It has a history, although not necessarily one that is identified with me personally. Our committee was delighted when it came to the conclusion, not least through the Minister’s personal efforts, that he wanted to take this subject seriously. I think that on the very first page of our report we welcome the fact that we thought he was taking it seriously because so many of his predecessors had danced round this maypole and then gone home and not taken any serious steps. So the Minister already has lots of brownie points in the bag. What we need to do now, with all good will, is to help him get across the finishing line. In reflecting what has been said on this amendment, I think that that will be helpful. Particularly at this time, we all recognise that there is a balance to be struck between defamation and taking measures that might inhibit economic growth, with all the benefit that that would produce.
However, I refer the Committee back to the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. It was he who introduced the concept of ethics, which is relevant to this conversation. I say to the Minister, we would all be saddened if there were nothing in the Bill that talked about corporations and their responsibilities. I mentioned earlier that we had a long debate about the values of codification as against writing new statute. The reason that we saw importance in codification from time to time was—a point made earlier by, I think, the noble Lord, Lord May, but if I am wrong, I hope to be forgiven—that ordinary people ought to be able to read the law of the land and understand broadly what it means.
The common law is hugely important but way beyond the understanding of the normal citizen, in terms of its actuality and potential change. It may therefore fail in some respect an important element of transparency that should characterise our laws. That is not—I repeat “not” in front of my noble and learned colleagues—an attack on the common law. This report does not attack the common law, which is hugely important in the way that we are governed and in the judgment, character and integrity of our judges. However, this is a case whereby putting some codification in Bill would send a message that corporations have responsibilities and that we are not impressed at the way that some of them occasionally discharge those responsibilities.
With that encouragement, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord May of Oxford
I commend very highly subsections (5)(c) and (d) of the new clause proposed under Amendment 7. This is the first mention that I have come across—although I have not read every word—of “public interest”. As many noble Lords will know, there has been a lot of pressure from many sectors of the outside community that the Bill does not do enough in looking at public interest as an offsetting factor. As regards subsection (5)(c), I wonder whether the words “complained of” are “a statement of fact or opinion”. If they are a statement of fact, it seems to me that, defamatory or not, or financially injurious or not, a fact is a fact and no one should be liable for stating a fact. Yet—I am becoming parrot-like in repeating again and again—I can give many examples where people have had huge pressure on their time and been put to ludicrous expense in defending a matter of fact. I hugely welcome those two proposals.
Lord McNally
My Lords, again, I want to be able to think about and to look at the arguments that have been deployed. As I have said, I am not so experienced in the law as to know where this balance is, particularly on case management. I know that the Select Committee and a lot of the evidence given by individuals and organisations as this Bill progressed emphasised that good case management was part of the key to dealing with early resolution and the problem of cost. Whether it is wise or even proper to try to write these matters into an Act of Parliament rather than trust the judiciary to deal with these matters, certainly I look forward to a meeting with the Master of the Rolls early in the new year and to talk to others about this.
In the mean time, let me put on record the responses to these two amendments. Amendment 5 would make it compulsory for the parties to use a form of alternative dispute resolution before a defamation claim could come before the court. The Government are firmly committed to reducing the costs of defamation proceedings and to resolving legal disputes by techniques other than litigation wherever possible. The overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules puts the onus on courts to encourage and facilitate the use of alternative dispute resolution, and the Pre-action Protocol for Defamation already requires parties to consider some form of alternative dispute resolution, including mediation or early neutral evaluation.
Lord Triesman
My Lords, I was loath to interrupt the Minister while he was in full flow, but if I have understood properly the point that he made, there is an unwillingness on the part of the Government to try and compel anyone to go through any other process if that person concludes that the only process they really want to go through is testing the case in a court, with all the consequences. Part of the argument is that by forcing people to go through another process, it might indeed add to the costs of the entirety of the case, rather than potentially to manage and reduce those costs.
If I have understood that argument properly, have the noble Lord and the Government considered whether some independent advice could be given, as is sometimes suggested in, for example, matrimonial cases, whereby people are guided as to whether proceeding through the court is likely to be helpful or appropriate, rather than just plunging in? I suggest that that would be done at relatively minimal cost and might be significantly beneficial.
Forgive me for putting this at any length at this stage in the debate, but one of the reasons why that might be beneficial is that on occasions—and I have seen this—you find that you are dealing with people whose normal place of residence is overseas. They are not United Kingdom nationals and may, none the less, be representatives of significant pools of wealth or of large corporations. They tend to say that they may not be able to follow our legal practice particularly carefully but they have great confidence in the ability of our courts to take on cases and deal with them. By that stage, those people are then on one course, rather than another, with considerable costs, rather than otherwise—and I understand the point that has been made about management of processes in order to reduce costs. I ask the Minister and the Government to consider whether there is some way not of compelling people to take a particular course of action but to seek advice about the likelihood of one route working more successfully than another.
Lord McNally
Again, because I am not a lawyer, I will take that away and take advice on it. As regards wealthy individuals who want to test their cases before British judges, although we have been talking about judicial case management, we have a judiciary which is world renowned for its integrity and impartiality and we should not forget that. However, I will take that matter away.
Lord Faulks
Before the Minister finally sits down, I hope that I may ask him one further thing. This is something which I think arose out of Second Reading, and is consistent with what the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, said about trying to minimise expenditure: that is, the possibility of having these defamation actions heard in the county court as opposed to the High Court, which would automatically reduce the cost.
Lord McNally
Again, I will take that matter back. The noble Lord may be interested to know that my right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor who, like me, is not a lawyer, is much attracted by that idea. It is certainly worthy of consideration. Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is no longer in his place but if he and his colleagues come forward with some robust self-regulation for the media, mediation may well find its proper place in that area as well. A balance needs to be struck between the extent to which you can force mediation and the extent to which it can be readily available. I will certainly look at the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Triesman.
Lord Mawhinney
My Lords, I thank the Minister for putting on the record the Government’s reaction to these amendments. I understood the point made by my noble friend Lord Faulks, although I am not sure that I entirely buy it. Speaking on behalf of the committee, by putting forward these alternatives in this way we were trying to make the point that if something is on the face of the Bill it is not part of case management; it has to be done before case management actually starts. That goes back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, made, which we had in mind: that is, the possibility of something that is a lot quicker, a lot cheaper and which can speed up a solution one way or another. My noble friend Lord Faulks is right: it could be an expensive addition. I want to encourage him to believe that it does not have to be that way. Clearly, both of us would want the “does not have to be” rather than the “might be”.
I say to my noble friend the Minister that if the problem is simply one of legal requirement, I am guessing that my colleagues on the committee would settle for early resolution, whatever the form in which it was framed in order to make it happen. The early, quicker, cheaper resolution—where cheaper does not mean inferior—was sought by the committee but, more importantly, by all those who gave evidence to the committee. When my noble friend gives definitive responses to some of these issues on Report, I hope that he will bear in mind the perhaps totally unfair perception which might linger that it is more important to the Government not to do anything that might cause even a tremor in the judiciary than to look for positive ways to solve the real problems to which he committed himself. Because I believe that he has committed himself to those real problems, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I may have been rather hasty in saying that the Lord Chancellor is in favour of county courts, but I am going to rush back to the MoJ and tell him to get it on the record quick because there seems to be so much support for them. It is an interesting point and again I can see the value in the recommendation as just read out by my noble friend Lord Mawhinney. Along with other matters, I will ponder on it. I did not say that we could not legislate for case management, but I want to hear the arguments. As for my noble friend’s suggestion that the Lord Chancellor might be afraid of doing this because of a fear of offending the judiciary, that is not something I have heard said about the Lord Chancellor very often in recent weeks.
Amendment 6 deals with the issue of strike-out. It would put a new strike-out power into the Bill that would require the courts to strike out actions that do not meet a certain threshold unless the interests of justice require otherwise. We do not consider that there is any need for this provision. As I indicated when responding to Amendment 3, the serious harm test in Clause 1 and the new early resolution procedures will ensure that the court has at the forefront of its mind the need to make sure that trivial and unfounded claims do not proceed. As the noble Lord, Lord Browne, anticipated, I will also argue that the courts already have a power in Rule 3.4 of the Civil Procedure Rules which permits them to strike out all or part of a claim where there are no reasonable grounds for bringing it or they consider it to be an abuse of process. The courts are very familiar with that power, and we have no doubt that they will use it more in defamation cases once the new higher threshold is in place. As I have said before, one of the aims of this Bill is to make the law simpler, so unnecessary duplication such as that proposed in this new clause would conflict with that aim.
As we have explained in the note recently provided to Peers, we intend to make changes through the Civil Procedure Rules to ensure that the key preliminary issues are determined at as early a stage in the proceedings as possible. Where the question of whether the claimant has suffered or is likely to suffer serious harm is in dispute, this is one of the main issues that the court could be asked to consider under the new procedure. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord will agree to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I shall do my best to get my words in the right order, something that I am learning to do every day in your Lordships’ House. I thank the Minister for a response which to a degree I anticipated when moving the amendment. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, for complicating quite considerably my deliberations on this issue. I think I understood his point about the absence of the serious harm test in his Bill, and I know that the Government have prayed that in aid as part of the reason it is not necessary to provide for a strike-out procedure in this Bill. I shall also interrogate the Lugano Convention argument to see whether it has a significant effect on the existing rules of court that the Government are also praying in aid as part of their argument for why this is not necessary.
I thank the Minister for the detail set out in his response, and as I have said before, I am willing to have faith in an holistic approach in our deliberations, as it has become known. If we can have some transparency in the other elements of the holistic approach and be satisfied that they will meet our collective desire to offer the opportunity for people to reach early resolution in disputes of this kind in an affordable way and in a timescale that makes sense in relation to the issues, I am content to beg leave to withdraw my amendment. However, I am sure that we will come back to this issue later, if not in the form of an amendment, at least as part of our further debate.
Charging Orders (Orders for Sale: Financial Thresholds) Regulations 2012
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Statute Law (Repeals) Bill [HL]
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, I understand that no amendments have been set down to this Bill and that no noble Lord has indicated a wish to move a manuscript amendment or to speak in Committee. Therefore, unless any noble Lord objects, I beg to move that the order of recommitment be discharged.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, I wonder if my noble friend will give way. I want to intervene now because what I am going to say will help the shape of the debate. I realise that my noble friend and a number of noble and learned Lords may wish to contribute. I in no way want to cut short or pre-empt that debate, but I hope that my comments will establish the context for them to comment on what the Government intend to do.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, told us, we considered a similar amendment to this in Committee in July. I said that the Government were sympathetic to the concerns raised about the offence of scandalising the judiciary but we wished to consider the issue further and to consult others. In particular, before moving to reform or abolish this offence, we wished to consider whether such a step could result in a gap in the law or have an unwanted side-effect.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, told us, in this we had the benefit of the work of the Law Commission, which was and is currently reviewing the law on contempt of court. As the noble Lord said, it kindly brought forward the element of its review considering scandalising the court and published a paper for public consultation in August. The commission considered three options in its consultation paper—to retain, abolish or replace the offence—and it has concluded that the offence should be abolished without replacement. Its analysis was in-depth, examining the human rights aspects and considering the arguments for and against the various options.
The consultation closed in October, and the commission published a summary of responses last month and a summary of its conclusions yesterday. I was pleased to see that several noble Lords responded with their views, and that members of the judiciary and other legal professions were also well represented. Of 46 responses, some from organisations, 32 were in favour of abolition. The remainder expressed a variety of views, most favouring a replacement offence, but I note that only two favoured retaining the offence in England and Wales, at least for now.
We have also noted other views, such as those expressed by noble Lords in Committee, and have concluded that it is right that this offence should be abolished. We therefore support the amendment. However, we also noted the Law Commission’s observation in its paper that:
“It may be necessary to clarify that the abolition of this offence does not affect liability for behaviour in court or conduct that may prejudice or impede particular proceedings”.
We support that view that abuse of a judge in the face of the court, or behaviour that otherwise interferes with particular proceedings, should remain a contempt. The new clause includes a provision that will ensure such behaviour will remain subject to proceedings for contempt of court.
In contrast to the amendment we debated in Committee, which extended to Northern Ireland, this amendment applies to England and Wales only, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained. In July, I said that we would be consulting the devolved Administrations; noble Lords must remember the criminal law is a devolved matter in both Northern Ireland and Scotland. Scandalising the judiciary is also a common law offence in Northern Ireland. As I have said, we consulted with the Minister of Justice, David Ford, who has confirmed that he does not wish the Westminster Parliament to legislate on behalf of the Northern Ireland Assembly on this offence. Similarly, the Scottish Government have also confirmed that they do not wish us to legislate on their similar common law offence of murmuring judges. Given that this is a devolved matter in both jurisdictions and under the terms of the Sewel Convention, we wish to respect the wishes of the Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Assembly in this matter.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lester and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for bringing this matter before the House. The Government are happy to support this amendment, and through it the abolition in England and Wales of the offence of scandalising the judiciary. I hope that my intervention at the start of the debate does not prevent other noble Lords and noble and learned Lords from making observations on where we are and where we are going.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I echo the remarks made by the Minister and by other noble Lords. We are entirely supportive of the amendment, and glad that the Government have agreed to take matters forward in the way that the noble Lord indicated.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I will clarify a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The Justice Committee in Northern Ireland recently agreed to proceed with an amendment to its Criminal Justice Bill that would see this offence repealed. I am sure that the words uttered by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, about his own experience will carry great weight. However, this is a devolved matter for Northern Ireland.
Lord Woolf
I also urge the Minister to do what has just been urged by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. It is the judge’s most important duty to ensure the fairness of the trial. However, the problem identified by the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater, is one that the judge simply cannot tackle himself. There needs to be hands-on assistance of the sort she indicates. Therefore, for the same reason, I ask the Minister to give careful consideration to this.
Lord McNally
My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, has just told us, it is the duty of the courts to ensure that defendants receive a fair trial. It therefore may be necessary to make particular efforts in the case of defendants whose understanding is limited. To some extent it will fall to the defendant’s legal adviser, or to the judge, to help meet the needs of these vulnerable defendants. From time to time courts have asserted the right to grant such defendants the assistance of an intermediary.
Statutory provision has in fact already been made in Section 104 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 for certain vulnerable defendants to be eligible for assistance from an intermediary when giving evidence. A defendant would benefit from this provision where their ability to participate effectively in the proceedings as a witness is compromised by a significant impairment of intelligence and social functioning; or where they are suffering from a mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983.
The Government made a decision to defer implementation of Section 104 until full consideration could be given to the practical arrangements and resource implications. Although there are no immediate plans to implement these provisions, we are continuing to monitor the situation and the resource implications of doing so. However, as I said earlier, judges have on occasion granted the use of an intermediary to assist vulnerable defendants to ensure a fair trial. In fact, guidance on the process for appointing intermediaries for defendants was issued nationally to all courts last year.
Furthermore, Part 3.30 of the Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction also provides guidance on a range of other types of support that a court may wish to offer, including that at the beginning of the proceedings the court should ensure that what is to take place has been explained to a vulnerable defendant in terms they can understand. Secondly, a trial should be conducted according to a timetable which takes full account of a vulnerable defendant’s ability to concentrate. Frequent and regular breaks will often be appropriate.
I have listened to what my noble friend said and to the interventions of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I do not want to raise expectations as I am not sure whether I can get clearance to take this forward at Third Reading. However, I assure my noble friend that, as I have said, we are continuing to monitor the situation and are looking at the practical arrangements and resource implications of bringing in Section 104. I certainly agree to take this measure away. If I cannot bring it back at Third Reading, I will write to the noble and learned Lord, the noble Lord and my noble friend to explain why I cannot do so and what we are doing to keep this matter under review. I hope that, with those assurances, my noble friend will agree to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Linklater of Butterstone
My Lords, I am heartily grateful to the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord who have supported what I had to say. That support, coming from two such distinguished sources, means a very great deal to me. I hope that the Government will also pay heed to it.
I heard what my noble friend the Minister said. It is moderately cold comfort. There is none the less the possibility of further recognition of what remains quite a major injustice that is built into our system. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McNally
“Self-defenceUse of force in self-defence at place of residence
(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (use of reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc) is amended as follows.
(2) Before subsection (6) (force not regarded as reasonable if it was disproportionate) insert—
“(5A) In a householder case, the degree of force used by D is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be if it was grossly disproportionate in those circumstances.”
(3) In subsection (6) at the beginning insert “In a case other than a householder case,”.
(4) After subsection (8) insert—
“(8A) For the purposes of this section “a householder case” is a case where—
(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence,(b) the force concerned is force used by D while in or partly in a building, or part of a building, that is a dwelling or is forces accommodation (or is both),(c) D is not a trespasser at the time the force is used, and(d) at that time D believed V to be in, or entering, the building or part as a trespasser.(8B) Where—
(a) a part of a building is a dwelling where D dwells,(b) another part of the building is a place of work for D or another person who dwells in the first part, and(c) that other part is internally accessible from the first part,that other part, and any internal means of access between the two parts, are each treated for the purposes of subsection (8A) as a part of a building that is a dwelling.(8C) Where—
(a) a part of a building is forces accommodation that is living or sleeping accommodation for D,(b) another part of the building is a place of work for D or another person for whom the first part is living or sleeping accommodation, and(c) that other part is internally accessible from the first part,that other part, and any internal means of access between the two parts, are each treated for the purposes of subsection (8A) as a part of a building that is forces accommodation.(8D) Subsections (4) and (5) apply for the purposes of subsection (8A)(d) as they apply for the purposes of subsection (3).
(8E) The fact that a person derives title from a trespasser, or has the permission of a trespasser, does not prevent the person from being a trespasser for the purposes of subsection (8A).
(8F) In subsections (8A) to (8C)—
“building” includes a vehicle or vessel, and“forces accommodation” means service living accommodation for the purposes of Part 3 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 by virtue of section 96(1)(a) or (b) of that Act.”(5) In subsection (9) (section intended to be clarificatory) after “This section” insert “, except so far as making different provision for householder cases,”.
(6) An amendment made by this section does not apply in respect of force used before the amendment comes into force.”
Lord McNally
My Lords, I was going to say that these were technical amendments, but I am advised that they are not.
It would be terrifying to be confronted by a burglar in your own home. Mercifully, it does not occur very often, but when such a situation arises most people would say that the law should be on the side of the householder. After all, they are the ones who may have been woken up in the dead of night, made to fear for their safety or the safety of their loved ones and compelled to use force to protect themselves in traumatic circumstances. If householders end up being arrested, prosecuted or convicted after injuring a burglar, this can give rise to a public perception that the criminal justice system does not support the real victims in all of this. These amendments are designed to shift the balance of the law further in favour of householders to ensure that they are treated first and foremost as the victims of crime.
The current law, as clarified in Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, already says that people can protect themselves or others, prevent crime or protect property using force that was reasonable in the circumstances as they believed them to be. However, it also says that the use of force which was disproportionate in the circumstances will never be reasonable. This means that a householder who has acted honestly and instinctively to protect himself or his loved ones from an intruder could end up being prosecuted if his actions are deemed to have been disproportionate when viewed in the cold light of day. The Government feel strongly that householders, acting in extreme circumstances to protect themselves or others, cannot be expected to weigh up exactly how much force is necessary to repel an intruder. There may be a fine line between actions that are proportionate in the circumstances and those which might be regarded as disproportionate. The Government think householders should be given the benefit of any doubt and that Section 76 of the 2008 Act should be amended accordingly. As long as householders have done only what they believed was reasonable in the circumstances, it should not matter if those actions were disproportionate when viewed with the benefit of hindsight.
I am aware of criticisms that these changes will amount to a vigilantes’ charter; the Government do not accept that argument. All we are saying is that if householders act in fear for their safety or the safety of others and in the heat of the moment use force which is reasonable in the circumstances but seems disproportionate when viewed in the cold light of day, they should not be treated as criminals. Force which was completely over the top—grossly disproportionate, in other words— will still not be permitted.
This is not about saying that it is open season on any intruder. It is rather saying that the law will look benevolently upon any householder who, faced in his own home with the terror of someone he believes to be a trespasser, acts in a way that is reasonable in the circumstances as he believed them to be, even if the force used was disproportionate.
Noble Lords will note that the amendments are limited to householders defending themselves or others from intruders in their dwellings. The Government believe that attacks by intruders in the home cause the greatest public concern. Our home is our haven and refuge—a place where we have every right to feel safe. That is why the Government believe that householders deserve special protection. However, the provision also extends to shopkeepers who live and work in the same premises and Armed Forces personnel who may live and work in buildings such as barracks for a period of time.
We recognise that there are a range of other circumstances in which people might be required to use force—for example, to defend themselves from attack on the street, to intervene to stop crimes being committed or to protect their property. The new provision does not extend to those situations, but the current law on the use of reasonable force will continue to apply in those circumstances.
I recognise that some noble Lords might have a feeling of déjà vu as we debate these measures. We are returning to an area of the law that has been debated twice in recent years. While previous Bills clarified important aspects of the law on the use of force, the current proposals would make material changes to strengthen the rights of householders when defending themselves or others from intruders. Critics have said the changes are unnecessary because the current law provides adequate protection and householders who have defended themselves from burglars are hardly ever prosecuted. Clearly the Government take a very different view. Each case is different. Although the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to prosecute householders involved in recent cases, such as those in Leicestershire and Manchester, there might be occasions in the future where law-abiding householders benefit from these important provisions. I beg to move.
Lord Beecham
No, I want to speak now if that is all right. Thank you. Burglary is a serious crime and a particularly distressing one. The forced invasion of one’s home adds a further dimension to the effect on its occupiers. I suspect several Members of the House will have shared my experience, at least in part. My home—which, incidentally, was built by the father of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, to whom I apologise for anticipating in this debate, for reasons that I shall give later—has been burgled and my office has also been burgled once. Fortunately, little damage was done; even more fortunately, no one was present at the time. Where the householder or other occupant is present, the impact of the crime transcends distress and, too often, becomes traumatic.
I say at once that we welcome the extension of the present law to non-residential premises, such as those of shopkeepers, to which the Minister has referred. However, in relation to domestic premises, while absolutely affirming the right of residents to defend themselves and their property, we have doubts about the Government’s proposals. The amendments have been spatchcocked into the Bill at virtually the last minute, almost, it would seem, as an initiation rite performed by the new Lord Chancellor. Unlike the proposals on community sentencing, we have not had the opportunity of a general debate under the recommittal procedure. I propose therefore to treat the debate on these amendments as, in effect, a Second Reading debate, which is why I sought to speak now rather than later.
Burglary is an offence against the person as well as against property, because a break-in destroys the victim’s peace of mind by violating the safe haven of their home. The householder is not in a position to exercise calm, cool judgment. The householder is entitled to use reasonable force to get rid of the burglar; and, in measuring whether the force is reasonable or not, you are not doing a paper exercise six months later:
“You have to put yourself in the position of the man or woman who has reacted to the presence of a burglar and has reacted with fury, with anxiety, with fear”.
These are not my words—although I concur with them—but the words of the Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, commenting on the recent case of two men jailed after raiding a remote cottage, when they were blasted with a shotgun. What is significant is that his words reflect the present state of the law. Although the victims in that case were questioned by police, their Member of Parliament, Alan Duncan MP—not, I think, generally known as a bleeding-heart liberal—said:
“The police did a very good job and investigated as thoroughly as they had to when a firearm is involved”.
The first question is what the government proposal adds to the present state of the law, as enshrined by the Labour Government’s Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and the present Government’s clarification, embodied in Section 148 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, passed only a few months ago. In my submission, it adds only confusion. It purports to allow the use of disproportionate force but not grossly disproportionate force. Can the Minister define, or even better exemplify, the difference between the two, especially bearing in mind the words of the Lord Chief Justice? What difference, if any, in his view would the amendment’s wording have had, for example, on the case of Tony Martin, who shot dead a burglar? What does the Minister make of the statement by Michael Wolkind QC, who represented Tony Martin? He said:
“The law already recognises that people react in a certain way in the heat of the moment”,
and argued that the law does not need changing.
The second element that the proposal might add to the Bill is, paradoxically and obviously unintentionally, a heightened risk to home owners. A study in Texas has demonstrated that the notorious “stand your ground” law, promoted by the US gun lobby and enacted in several US states, has led to more injuries and deaths being inflicted on householders and others by criminals, rather than fewer. Anyone who watched the recent TV programme on “stand your ground” would surely hesitate before opening the door to similar unintended consequences here, even allowing for the radically different gun culture that is such a blemish on American society.
There are other questions to be asked. Have the Government consulted the judiciary or the police on the proposed changes? If so, what responses have they received? If they have not consulted them, why not? Have they conducted an impact analysis? Your Lordships might think that a particularly fitting term in this instance for an assessment of the consequences of legislation. What is the evidence that the present state of the law, as defined by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is inadequate? The Minister has circulated what purports to be a fact sheet. Your Lordships might think that that document contains precious few facts and no evidence on which to base the Government’s proposals.
My right honourable friend Sadiq Khan sought information by means of Parliamentary Question on the number of home owners arrested or charged after defending their property against burglars since 1994. The answer was:
“The information on arrests is not collected centrally … It is not possible to match the arrests data to any subsequent outcomes”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/10/12; col. 641W.]
The Guardian recently reported, after a review by the CPS, that there were all of seven cases—I repeat, seven cases—between 1990 and 2005 in which a householder was prosecuted. In other words, there is simply no evidence to suggest that the problem the Government purport to be addressing is significant in terms of numbers, whereas it is clear that neither the police nor the courts are going to fall over themselves to prosecute householders who react in the way described by the Lord Chief Justice.
Is the Minister suggesting that where serious injury or death is inflicted on a burglar—or even someone such as the man featured in a recent BBC radio programme who was thought to be a burglar but was apparently just a confused man trying unsuccessfully to enter what he thought was his own home—the police should not investigate the situation in a proper manner, not least in the interests of those whom they interview? I wait to see not only what answers to these and other questions emerge from this debate but what transpires when this Bill goes to the House of Commons.
I have no doubt that the Lord Chancellor will seek to portray himself as the champion of the victims. It is a pretty hollow claim on the part of a Government who are both alienating and cutting the police force; undermining community policing; presiding over the reduction of community support officers, who provide invaluable back-up to front-line policing; and savagely slashing or altogether removing compensation for the victims of crime by their changes to the criminal injuries compensation scheme. Those changes, I might add, were forced through the House of Commons by the process of mugging several Conservative members of the relevant committee, including John Redwood MP, a senior former Minister, and substituting placemen in the form of Parliamentary Private Secretaries—not much consideration for victims of crime in that context.
I repeat that we are at one with the intention to protect the householder and punish the burglar. We remain to be convinced that the Government’s proposals are sound in law and safe, from the perspective of the very people they are supposed to protect.
Lord Martin of Springburn
My Lords, I speak as a layman who has represented communities in which the whole family cannot go out for a night’s entertainment because someone has to stay in for fear of being burgled. Like many noble Lords, I know what it is like to be burgled. You feel terrible when your home has been broken into. What worries me about the provision in this amendment is that in some historical cases firearms have been used. If this amendment is passed, many people who do not want their house to be broken into again will take precautions. In the countryside, people have firearms certificates for vermin and for recreational shooting, and I know that there are some firearms certificates in the city I represented because I had to sign certificates to say that the holder was a good, decent person. With this amendment, some people will want the same protection as someone living in the countryside and will apply for a firearms certificate just in case. That is a worry. There is a big difference between someone living on a small farm having a firearm and someone living in a tenement where it is much more dangerous.
I know from my experience in another place that Ministers, some of them the holders of the highest offices in the land, indulge in sound bites. They say to the press, “People are entitled to protect their homes”. Of course they are entitled to protect their homes, but we cannot have a situation where we give a licence to someone who will decide that he is going to take a shot at a burglar and will say that it was proportionate or that he did not think about it at the time.
Part of this amendment relates to Armed Forces accommodation—barrack rooms. We are talking not about shotguns but about far more lethal firearms. A soldier could say, “I was defending myself, and that’s why I shot this intruder”. I speak as a layman. I have no experience of standing in a court and putting a case or of listening to a case, as some noble Lords have, but I think this amendment is bad news.
Lord McNally
My Lords, this has been a very thoughtful debate, and people of great experience have put their views forward. I shall try again to explain where the Lord Chancellor is coming from and to reassure noble Lords on some of the points that have been made.
In bringing forward this amendment, the Lord Chancellor wants to clarify the situation and reassure the general public. Although the last contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Martin, was not in support of my proposal, it made the point that we are trying to deal with ordinary people dealing with situations in their lives. I understand lawyers making their points, but it is important that we see this from the public’s point of view. Although some recent cases have not led to prosecution and conviction, as I said, there may be cases in future which will benefit from the additional protection and clarification we are providing. Let me be very clear again, following on from what the noble Lord, Lord Martin, said, that this is not a vigilantes’ charter. In this country, there are still extremely strict rules about the possession and storage of guns which would still apply.
This is an attempt to recognise that people confronted by burglars, and acting in fear for their safety in the heat of the moment, cannot be expected to weigh up exactly how much force might be required. In these extreme circumstances, we think they should have greater legal protection. It is certainly not a licence to kill, whatever the circumstances. People will still be prosecuted if the use of force was unreasonable in the circumstances. The use of grossly disproportionate force will never be reasonable.
It will be for the courts to determine in each case what is disproportionate or grossly disproportionate. We want to make clear though that householders, who cannot always be expected to be thinking clearly if they are confronted by an intruder, will not be treated as criminals if they use a level of force which in the circumstances as they believed them to be is reasonable but turns out to have been disproportionate. We are clear that it is not open season for vicious attacks on anyone, even an intruder.
Let us also be clear, if somebody has been killed or seriously injured, an arrest may be necessary for the police to investigate thoroughly. A revised code of arrest for the police—PACE Code G—came into force on 12 November 2012 with new guidance on the circumstances in which an arrest may be necessary. The guidance also encourages the police to consider whether voluntary attendance at an interview might be a practicable alternative to a formal arrest. The changes we are making to the law will complement the improvements made to PACE Code G.
We are not changing the fundamental premise that a person can only use force that was reasonable in the circumstances as they believed them to be. The law on the use of force in other circumstances, for example, to defend oneself on the street, to prevent crime or to protect property will remain unchanged. We are trying to rebalance the law so that householders will not be thought of as criminals but, as I said at the beginning, quite properly as victims.
I am assured that we believe that the amendment is compatible with the ECHR and that we have recently published a memorandum in support of that view which I will put in the Library of the House.
Listening very carefully, I again pray in aid although I am not saying he is in support of this particular amendment, the Lord Chief Justice, who caught the mood behind the amendment at his press conference in September. He was reported as saying that,
“I am not talking about individual cases, but I know of cases, and I do read the newspapers occasionally”,
where,
“it looks as though the householder is the criminal”.
He then pointed out the circumstance of a householder facing a burglar.
“You are probably very cross and you are probably very frightened—a mixture of both—and your judgment of precisely what you should or should not do in the circumstances cannot, as another predecessor of mine (Lord Lane) said, you cannot measure it in a jeweller’s scale”.
The realisation that in such terrifying circumstances you cannot measure it in a jeweller’s scale led the Lord Chancellor to conclude that it would be better to clarify the law in a way which he believes will be more reassuring to the householder and give better guidance to the court.
Lord Pannick
Before the Minister sits down, have the Government consulted the Lord Chief Justice and the judiciary on this matter and, if so, what has been their response to the amendment?
Lord McNally
The amendment is a government amendment, and the Government stand by the amendment.
Baroness Linklater of Butterstone
My Lords, I add my voice in agreement with much of what has already been said. What my noble friend Lady Hamwee did in drawing our minds back to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 in particular was very helpful for the purposes of sentencing. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, speaks words of wisdom and we should pay serious heed to him. He pointed out that the overarching requirement of a sentence should be decided by the judge on what is appropriate. Ultimately, I suppose that it follows that it should prevent reoffending and if the punitive element fails to meet that test it is worthless. As was made clear when we debated this in Committee, every community order is a form of punishment so the punitive element that the Government seek is de facto present. Anything additional intended to be somehow more punitive for its own sake is unnecessary, except possibly as a political gesture, and it will fail the test of reducing reoffending anyway. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said in Committee, it is also “profoundly unattractive” as an idea. I liked that term very much.
The Minister has got it wrong if he believes that this is what the British public want to see happen. Indeed, there is ample evidence to show from polling that what the British public want from sentences, particularly expressed by those who have been victims of crime, is that it does not happen again. Retribution or vengeance is not sought. The Government maintain that the caveat of “exceptional circumstances”, when a specifically punitive order can be dispensed with, is tightly defined. Yet we have just spent the last 20 minutes realising that nobody can define what it is sought—the definition cannot be pinned down. This was emphasised by the noble and learned Lord who found in the past that use of “exceptional” caused nothing but confusion—he said so eloquently. For the large number of offenders for whom there is an additional punitive requirement, this may be inappropriate and even increase the likelihood of breach and so on.
The reality of a purely punitive requirement on its own principally represents the Government’s gesture of what Chris Grayling said was putting punishment back into sentencing. That is what it comes down to. It interferes with the freedom of sentencers to set an appropriate sentence based on the facts. That is a serious deficiency. We undermine judicial discretion at our peril. It also fails to safeguard those defendants with particular support needs, whether those are mental health, health needs, learning difficulties, drug addiction et cetera, to name but a few. Of course, the fact is that it is precisely this range of such support needs that represents the norm in the prison population. They are not exceptional at all—exactly what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, just said.
To impose a punitive requirement when the offender has these difficulties without also addressing the problems constructively would clearly be unjust. I could go on further but I will finish by saying that there was very important and interesting work done for the Government by Helen Bewley. She concluded that in fact punishment probably means a curfew, a fine or unpaid work. Her work demonstrates that punitive requirements on their own have no impact at all on the likelihood of reoffending but simply reduce the number of reoffences committed. The most effective outcome was from a combination of supervision with another requirement, with a punitive element added on. If the Government themselves acknowledge the risk that undermines the very rationale for such punitive orders, particularly if used on their own, how on earth can their use in every community order possibly be justified? Indeed, the likelihood instead is more offending, breaches and a generally less safe society—the very antithesis of what is intended.
Lord McNally
My Lords, sometimes I think that debates in this House are like two flotillas of ships passing in fog and not noticing each other. Most of the debate we have heard tonight we heard at Second Reading and in Committee. I can only again express my surprise at noble Lords who I know are deeply committed to this area of the criminal justice system. We have a situation where a Conservative Prime Minister expresses his complete commitment to the concept of community sentencing and a Conservative Lord Chancellor commits himself entirely to the concept of rehabilitation and bringing those ideas into legislation. We have now had three long debates on these issues; I will again try to explain where the Government are coming from but, in the terms that noble Lords have put it, I fear I will fail to convince them again.
The concept of punishment is part of—not separate or left on its own from—what I believe is a very worthwhile package put forward in a flexible way that fully respects the independence and judgment of the court. We keep to the word “exceptional” because without it there would be the opportunity to ride a coach and horses through what we are trying to do, which is to create a tougher system of community sentences that will produce greater public confidence. Let me put that in context: in March, when these proposals were first announced and the Prime Minister announced his support for the concept, Mr Sadiq Kahn, Labour’s Shadow Justice Secretary, said,
“Cameron cannot claim these measures as his own. We support community sentences that effectively punish and reform appropriate offenders because we were legislating on tougher community sentencing long before David Cameron”.
It really is not fair to start trying to split the points that have been made about judicial discretion, which is there, nor are these free-standing punishments. It has been suggested that Part 1 of Schedule 16 is totally unnecessary and counterproductive to achieving the rehabilitation revolution. It has been suggested that there is no evidence to support requiring courts to impose punishment on offenders as part of community sentences. It is on the basis of such arguments that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, is again proposing that we do away with Part 1 of Schedule 16 entirely.
We are also considering Amendment 113GA. This would specify a list of requirements that courts might include in a community order as the punitive element. I am tempted to remind the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that, as I have said before, the Labour Party has claimed to have punishment in community orders as part of its programme long before David Cameron became a convert.
The evidence that underpins the provision comes from victims and members of the public. Time and again, surveys have found that victims and the public see punishment as a critical purpose for community orders to deliver. I will quote only two of many. An ICM survey of victims of non-violent crime, carried out for the Ministry of Justice in 2007, found that punishment is seen as the most important part of a sentence, followed by payback to the community and then rehabilitation. More recently, research on community orders carried out this year by Victim Support and Make Justice Work found that victims,
“believe strongly in punishment and public protection”,
as the purpose of sentencing.
However, the evidence shows that the public are not confident that community orders are effective at delivering that punishment. For example, a survey carried out by Policy Exchange in 2010 found that 38% of the public perceive community orders to be soft, and a further 22% believe they are “weak and undemanding”. Similarly, the Opposition’s 2008 review of crime and justice found that the public saw community orders as a soft option, and that 90% of the public agreed that community orders should involve paying back to the community.
I remind noble Lords, as I did when the House last considered these provisions, that many of those given community orders have not committed minor offences. Some will have narrowly avoided custody. Some will have caused significant physical or mental trauma to victims through assaults. Others will have caused financial or emotional damage through theft, burglary or fraud. As a matter of principle, this Government believe that offences serious enough to cross the community order threshold should result in punishment. That is a principle with which I believe victims and the public would entirely agree. However, I do not believe that the existing community order framework gives victims and the public confidence that community orders effectively punish offenders. That is the reason we are introducing this provision.
I turn to the second concern that noble Lords have raised, which is that the provision will put the rehabilitation of offenders at risk. This will allow me to respond to the Amendment 113GB, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, which would disapply the imposition of a punitive element if the court believed that this would reduce the likelihood of preventing reoffending. Again, I will start from what victims and the public say. Of course the public do not want community orders to focus solely on punishment. The research by Victim Support and Make Justice Work, for example, found that neither victims nor the public wanted punishment to exclude efforts to rehabilitate and reform offenders. There are two important points I want to make here. One is about the public legitimacy of community orders. If the public are not confident that community orders are effective at punishing offenders, we cannot expect them to support our efforts to make them more effective at rehabilitating offenders. The second is that the public clearly recognise that this is not an either/or question. Community orders need to tackle the causes of reoffending but they also need to provide punishment. It is entirely possible for them to do both. For that reason I would argue strongly against the suggestion that a focus on punishment will prevent us from delivering improvements in reoffending rates.