Black Women: Domestic Abuse

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Tuesday 30th June 2020 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

May I begin by thanking the hon. Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Meg Hillier) for a really thoughtful and obviously well-researched speech, which I know will have been heard beyond these walls? It was an extremely powerful contribution.

With the leave of the House, I will wind up the debate. As the hon. Lady has already indicated, I am standing in for the Minister for safeguarding, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), who is unable to be here. Although it is my pleasure to stand in her stead, I can say without fear of contradiction that she is personally deeply committed to this issue, and I know she would welcome the opportunity to speak to the hon. Lady further about the points she has helpfully raised this evening.

There is no dispute between the parties, I trust, that domestic abuse has a horrifying and devastating impact on individuals. The hon. Lady has spoken very powerfully about the stark and harrowing impacts it has on all people, but potentially in different ways, because we have to take account of the context—sometimes the cultural context—in which it takes place.

[Darren Henry (Broxtowe) (Con)]

I thank the hon. Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Meg Hillier) for bringing this debate to the House. She makes a really good point that BAME is a bit too much of an umbrella term for an issue such as this, so my point will be about black women. I have been to Midlands Women’s Aid in Broxtowe and was told that there is a culture of shame and stigma around victims of abuse in black communities. Will my hon. Friend the Minister put at the heart of the agenda empowering women to access support?

[Alex Chalk]

I thank my hon. Friend and commend him for the work that he is doing with Women’s Aid. He is absolutely right, because we hear of this stigma and what is so upsetting about that is that, all too often, it will mean that victims continue to be victims. They will not necessarily have the courage to break free. That is why we need to make sure that there are tailored services, which take account of the cultural issues so that we can truly protect all victims, whatever their background. I am very grateful to him for raising that issue as he has.

We focus on this issue because of the impact not just on the individuals themselves, but, of course, on the children. No child should have to grow up exposed to violence. We understand fine well the repercussions—often life-long repercussions—that that can have, so we must do everything we can to expose this hidden and often under-reported offending and eliminate it, and the Government are fully committed to doing that.

Over the past four years, we have provided £100 million of dedicated funding, working with local commissioners to deliver a secure future for rape support services, refuges, national helplines and critical services, and, as the hon. Lady adverted to, we have reintroduced the Domestic Abuse Bill—the third time of asking, I think—and that will offer strength, protection and support for victims of abuse for the long-term and help bring more perpetrators to justice.

Before I go onto the specific points that the hon. Lady raises, I wish to say a word or two about coronavirus, because we cannot really fail to mention it. Although home should be a safe place, we know that, for victims of abuse, it is often not, and facing enforced confinement with perpetrators and isolation from normal support networks must be especially harrowing for victims. She made a powerful point about the extent to which all people are able to pick up the phone, but in certain circumstances, particularly in close confinement, that is a conversation that is very difficult to have, and it is why, as I shall come on to in a moment, we have been at pains to ensure that there is a diversity of channels through which women—it is usually women—can access the support they need.

Let me provide a little more detail on the things that we are doing. Our national communication campaign, “You are not alone” has raised awareness of this issue across the general public and helped signpost victims to sources of help. Additional funding has gone to support the national helpline—the one run by Refuge, of course, is a very important one—and online services run by domestic abuse charities, including those offering specialist support to minority groups. The hon. Lady will be aware, as, I am sure, you are, Madam Deputy Speaker, that the Treasury has provided £750 million to the charitable sector, of which £76 million has been allocated to support victims of domestic and sexual abuse, vulnerable children and their families and victims of modern slavery.

I want to pick up a point that the hon. Lady made about community-based support, which she was right to stress. Some £20 million is allocated via the Ministry of Justice, via, in turn, police and crime commissioners for precisely this. One of the encouraging things, if there is any silver lining within this horrible cloud of coronavirus, is that we are better able now to monitor where that money is going and to do so by considering protected characteristics. In other words, we can make sure that a police and crime commissioner for area A is taking proper steps to ensure that those under-represented communities get their fair slice of cake. That is putting it very simply.

We have also allocated money to the FLOWS charity, for example, which finds legal options for women survivors. I am taking this opportunity as a Minister of Justice to say that, sometimes, the potent weapon that the victim needs to defend themselves will be a legal weapon—be that an occupation order, a non-molestation order or a domestic violence protection order—and providing that legal support is critically important.

Let me quickly mention the Hidden Harms summit that was chaired by the Prime Minister.  That was an opportunity to shine a light on domestic abuse issues, and I hope the hon. Lady will also welcome the strong focus on sustainability: we cannot simply patch the demand, very generously and appropriately, in respect of coronavirus; we have to ensure that it is sustainable into the future.

I turn to BAME and domestic abuse statistics. I echo the point made by the hon. Lady. BAME is a pretty clumsy expression, for the reasons that she powerfully expressed. It covers all sorts of cultures, traditions, needs and a whole diversity of experiences. I recognise that it is not a homogenous group, but simply a convenient shorthand. I hope that the House will not consider my usage a discourtesy.

Domestic abuse affects a wide and disparate group of people across all backgrounds. One size does not fit all, and a particular approach would not be appropriate for all victims. That is particularly important when we are working to protect and support victims of domestic abuse with specific needs and vulnerabilities, including victims from marginalised ethnic groups.

The hon. Lady made an extremely powerful point, which might have sounded trivial, but is anything but. It matters if somebody from a certain background goes to a refuge and it does not have the basic toiletries or whatever to give them that human dignity. Wanting to look right is about feeling human, and recovering a sense of dignity and self-esteem. It is not a trivial matter—although I did wonder whether hair products might not make quite the difference to the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon). For some people, this really does matter.

According to the crime survey for England and Wales, in the year ending March 2019 an estimated 10.4% of black British women aged 16 to 74 had experienced domestic abuse in the last year, compared to 7.2% of white women. Now, there is a statistic to conjure with. The figure rose to 20% for women aged 16 to 74 who identified as mixed ethnicity. From research and reporting, there is evidence to suggest that black and minority ethnic women put up with abuse for a longer period—the point that I was making to my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Darren Henry)—and are more reluctant to access services. One estimate puts the time period before leaving a violent relationship at an average of 10 years—10 brutal, wasted years. We need to do everything possible to bring that figure down.

It is vital that we ensure that specialist services continue to be available to black and minority ethnic women, and find ways to break down any perceived barriers to accessing available services. In this context, we need an approach that brings in all the relevant agencies. Yes, of course the Home Office does its bit, as does the Ministry of Justice, but one of the key messages that we have had from the sector is to ensure that this is a cross-Government fight; and it is. I am pleased to say that I now have regular meetings with my hon. Friend the Minister for Safeguarding and with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. That is very important. It is something that the sector has asked for and which we have been pleased to deliver.

The hon. Lady said that we need to present avenues for support in a context that is accessible for people. She referred to provisions being presented on television or whatever; there need to be different avenues. May I take a moment to plug the gov.uk website as a resource for accessing support, particularly legal support? People might visit the site for passport renewal and so on, but it often contains very good advice and support.

I completely endorse the hon. Lady’s central point. She said that there should be no decisions about black women without black women. That is what I want to come to now. We need to ensure that all Government Departments are diverse in terms of both ethnicity and experiences. Things have improved really quite dramatically and I pay tribute to those in the civil service who have pushed this agenda, but ethnic minorities are still under-represented at senior levels across the public sector, apart from NHS consultants, so there is further to go. There is much more that I could say about that, but I want to move on to some other points, if I may.

The Domestic Abuse Bill sets out a statutory definition of domestic abuse in legislation for the first time.  It ensures that there can be no excuse for or hiding from abusive behaviour. The definition makes it clear that domestic abuse is not confined to violent or sexual abuse, but includes controlling or coercive behaviour, psychological abuse and economic abuse. That is critically important, because one of the barriers to that woman who has been experiencing it for 10 years might be the economic abuse. She needs to be able to say to a police officer or the authorities, “Well, hang on; this is not trivial just because it is invisible.” That is a really important point.

The hon. Lady also referred to the domestic abuse commissioner, which is one of the single most important innovations of the Bill. She has the ability—she has made an excellent start—to speak truth to power, to shine a light on the issues and, crucially, to ensure that there is co-ordination and coherence in this space, which could otherwise quite easily become fragmented, as well as proper representation and a proper slice of the cake for those from minority communities.

I am fast running out of time. There is more I wanted to say in respect to funding and so on, but I will close by recognising that this is not a subject for a single debate. This is a subject for an ongoing conversation. As I said, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle, wants to continue that conversation. She will be reading the hon. Lady’s speech and will be reflecting on the contributions in this debate. She remains committed to continuing to strengthen our collective approach.

Ensuring that we are truly inclusive of all sectors and working closely with expert organisations is how we tackle the scourge of domestic abuse. I am determined to ensure that we build such partnerships, safeguard the most vulnerable in our society and bring perpetrators to justice.

Question put and agreed to.

Expert Panel on Harm in the Family Courts and Implementation Plan

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Thursday 25th June 2020 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

In May 2019, the Ministry of Justice established a panel of experts to lead a review into how the family courts deal with risk of harm to children and parents in private law children cases involving domestic abuse and other serious offences. The panel held a call for evidence over the summer of 2019, which received submissions from over 1,200 individuals and organisations with experience of the family justice system. As well as receiving testimonies through written submissions, the panel held a series of focus groups and roundtables across England and Wales. It is due to the wealth of evidence gathered that the panel took the necessary time to evaluate and discuss their findings, which I now present to the House.

I would first like to acknowledge the dedication of all those who work in the family justice system. I have seen first-hand how they have to make difficult decisions about the best interests of the child with the information available to them. It is a challenging job at the centre of an often painful dispute between two parents, and I hope that our implementation plan will reassure them that we value their commitment and will support them in their roles.

But there is more to do. I welcome the panel’s report, and am incredibly grateful to all panel members for their time and expertise. I have carefully considered their conclusions and am determined to take action to improve the experience of survivors of domestic abuse in our family courts.

This report lays bare many hard truths about long-standing failings in the family justice system, especially in protecting the survivors of abuse and their children from harm. It is not a comfortable read. The testimonies in the report show that there are some fundamental issues that we must address in order to improve the experience and ensure the safety of all participants in the family justice system.

I want to make it clear that this is not acceptable, and that while these issues largely predate this Government, we have a strong and unwavering commitment to ensure domestic abuse survivors are better protected. This is not only to help those who have been directly affected, but also for their children, who should always be at the heart of any decision made in the family court.

The publication of this report provides a unique opportunity for the family justice system to reform how it manages cases involving children. The report is the springboard for the actions we will take to better protect and support children and domestic abuse victims throughout private family law proceedings.

The Domestic Abuse Bill will enable us to make some of the immediate changes called for in the panel’s report, alongside other measures which will help to ensure that victims have the confidence to come forward and report their experiences. As recommended by the panel, we will use the Bill to extend automatic eligibility for special measures to victims of domestic abuse in the family courts. The Bill will also ban cross-examination by perpetrators of domestic abuse in the family courts.

We also have committed to investing more widely in support for victims of domestic abuse, including £35 million announced alongside the Bill to support victims and their children, and an additional £76 million of extra funding that we announced to support survivors of domestic abuse, sexual violence, modern slavery and vulnerable children and their families during the current pandemic.

However, we acknowledge that, in light of the panel’s findings, this does not go far enough, and that is why we are publishing an implementation plan alongside this report. This details the first steps we will take across the family justice system to take forward the recommendations of the panel and make the changes that are needed.

In response to hearing that the adversarial nature of the family courts can contribute to further harm to victims of abuse or their children, I am pleased to announce that we will trial a different “investigative” approach within our forthcoming pilot of integrated domestic abuse courts. This approach will seek to ensure that all parties in proceedings are safe and able to provide evidence on an equal footing, without the retraumatising effects of being in court with an abusive ex-partner.

We are committed to making it easier for judges to apply “barring orders”, under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989, to prevent abusive ex-partners repeatedly dragging a victim back to court.

We will also look to improve how the family courts gather the wishes and feelings of the children at the heart of proceedings, to ensure no child is overlooked during the process. Alongside this, I acknowledge the panel’s conclusion that the presumption of parental involvement can detract from the child’s welfare and safety, and so will review this urgently.

Finally, we are working with colleagues across the family justice system to improve training on domestic abuse, to address gaps where appropriate, and to provide professionals with the tools to effectively support vulnerable parties.

The report is built upon the direct experiences of hundreds of victims of domestic abuse who responded to our call for evidence. There will be many others who were unable to speak out, and I want to thank each person who came forward and provided their testimony to the panel. Each had a unique experience, but together they showed that this is a problem that thousands of people experience. Thanks to them, we have a unique opportunity now to address these issues in a meaningful and long-lasting way.

The report and implementation plan can be found at the following link:

https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/assessing-risk-of-harm-to-children-and-parents-in-private-law-children-cases.

[HCWS313]

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [Lords]

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Committee stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 17th June 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir John Hayes]

Yes, that is certainly true. Relationships do decline over time. Of course, my hon. Friend is right that in some cases the process of beginning a divorce will not be the start, but a fingerpost to a destination that had been established long before. In some other cases, however, a divorce will come as a complete surprise, because the Bill moves the emphasis towards the person who initiates the divorce and away from the respondent to such a degree that the respondent—usually, in my judgment, a woman—will be profoundly disadvantaged by this legislation.

Mr Evans, what a delight to have you in the Chair and to speak under your benevolent guidance. Finally, let me deal with the matter of family breakdown and children. A lot has been made of that in this debate. We know from all the evidence—I saw my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) in his place a few moments ago—and in particular the evidence from the Centre for Social Justice, that typically children do considerably worse in broken families. In broken families, children tend to do worse educationally and in all kinds of other ways. It is our job as a society to build strong and stable communities which comprise strong and stable families, and the Bill just will not support that objective. We want a better society. That is why we are all here across the House. Marriage is a key component in building that more wholesome and better society which will allow us to bring up children in a responsible and dutiful way to be the citizens of tomorrow.

The Bill undermines marriage, weakens families and risks weakening social solidarity. It is being rushed through the House by Ministers who refuse to listen to measured and moderate argument. If hon. Members do not agree with any of that, they can vote for it. On the other hand, if hon Members think that any of what I have said is meaningful, they should certainly vote against it. In doing so, they will be sending a signal from this House to the people that we care about marriage and, because we care about marriage, we want fewer people to be divorced.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

It has been a genuine privilege to hear the speeches today. They have been powerful, poignant and humorous, but above all, on every single occasion, principled. From whichever point of view people have approached this argument, it has been from a position of principle. As I say, it has been an enormous privilege to have heard it.



Before I respond to the amendments and new clauses, let me make some brief introductory remarks. First, there is a suggestion that the Government are somehow diffident about marriage; that is not so. We recognise—and we are not diffident about saying it—that marriages and civil partnerships are vital to society. Why? It is because they are a way in which couples can not only formally express their commitment to each other but, yes, contribute, through stable relationships, to stable communities. I support marriage and the Government support marriage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Girvan (South Antrim) (DUP)]

On speedy divorce, the difficulty is that there is a statistic available that states that in 50% of divorces that have taken place—that is quite a high percentage—people regret going through the divorce process. The Bill will just make it all the more easy for it to happen.

[Alex Chalk]

If that is right—I do not suggest that the hon. Gentleman is wrong about the statistics, although I have not seen the study—surely if we are in favour of reconciliation, we should be in favour of a process that does not so irretrievably toxify relations, so that there may be the chance of reconciliation. Instead, we are accessories to a system that encourages people to sling mud—mud that ultimately they cannot substantiate, which means that people can end up branded as unreasonable without the court having made a finding to that effect. That, in and of itself, reduces the chances of reconciliation.

[Sir John Hayes]

I say this in the spirit of generosity that characterises my view of the Minister, but we conceded that point about fault. The amendment suggests that the Government support reconciliation, irrespective of the fact that the Bill gets rid of fault. The amendments are incredibly measured and moderate—the Minister must know that.

[Alex Chalk]

I do not suggest that any of the amendments are improper or immoderate, but not all of them would have the impact that my right hon. Friend calls for.

[Alexander Stafford (Rother Valley) (Con)]

The Minister knows my grave concerns with the Bill, especially about the quickie nature of divorce. Will he reassure me that the Bill does not undermine the sacred marriage vows that I, and so many hon. Members, have taken?

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

My hon. Friend is another example of an extremely principled individual who I know has misgivings about this Bill. I can give him that assurance, but I want to deal with that point specifically in the course of my remarks. He has spoken to me; he has principled objections that I have listened to carefully.

On amendment 1, let me begin by noting what appears to be common ground between all parties—namely, all are agreed that introducing a minimum period before someone can apply for a conditional order is a sensible way forward. Currently—this bears some emphasis—there is no minimum period. Using the online service, a divorce can currently be secured in a matter of weeks—it is currently an average of 17 weeks up to the conditional order, which the Government think is too short. That is why we have prescribed a minimum period of 20 weeks before the conditional order, and six months in total, to allow time to reflect and, in appropriate circumstances, to think again. Crucially, however, as a result of the Bill, that reflection need not take place in an atmosphere that is toxified by hurtful accusations.

I also stress the word “minimum”, because issuing an application does not start a sort of countdown clock, or a ticking bomb that proceeds remorselessly to the dissolution of a marriage; no, it simply imposes a minimum period which, on expiry, changes nothing. The court makes no order, until such time as the further active step is taken to apply for a conditional order. At that point, the marriage still endures, and a further minimum period is triggered. Once again, at the end of that period the marriage does not automatically dissolve; it persists until such time as a further active step is taken to apply for a final order. In other words, it takes three active steps before a marriage can be dissolved. It is no wonder that the impact assessment prepared in advance of this Bill—here I am in the unhappy position of gently disagreeing with my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West (Sir David Amess) who gave such a brilliant speech—indicated that around 80% of divorces are expected to take longer as a result of these measures. I respectfully suggest that that gives the lie to the “quickie divorce” label.

My hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) wishes to extend the 20-week element to 46 weeks, so that a marriage cannot be legally ended until more than a year after the initial application, averring that it has irretrievably broken down. My first concern is that the amendment would not affect civil partners—that cannot be right, although I do not suppose it was deliberate. On the wider issue of the appropriate minimum period, to make a fair judgment we need an appreciation of the state of relations between the parties that typically prevails at the time a petition is issued—my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison) made this point. Is it the case, as my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton said, that applications—which, by the way, cost £550—tend to be issued in a fit of pique after a row, or as she powerfully put it, on the “spur of the moment”, or does the issuing of a petition tend to come at the end of many months, or even years, of sorrow, pain, periods of separation and attempts at reconciliation, counselling, or all of the above? Overwhelmingly, I respectfully submit, it will be the latter. The solemn and grave decision to seek a petition is rarely taken lightly or impetuously. That assessment does not only reflect our lived experience of the world that we bring to these proceedings; it also reflects empirical evidence from the 2017 study by the Nuffield Foundation, which is the only recent large-scale study on this issue in England and Wales.

[Fiona Bruce]

I do not believe that I gave the impression, and if I did I wish to correct it, that the majority of cases would be issued on the spur of the moment, but I did say that I believed that some would be.

[Alex Chalk]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend.

On that issue, though, the 2017 Nuffield study noted that for people who have come to the hard decision to divorce and have begun the legal process of divorce, only one of 300 cases was known to have ended in attempted reconciliation. We believe that a total minimum period of six months, mindful of the circumstances that prevail at the time that it starts, is the proper—difficult, but proper—balance. We should bear in mind, too, that for those applicants who take the step after years of domestic abuse—again something that we have not really considered in this debate—six months may feel markedly or even unfairly onerous. Some people need to move on with their lives. Let us not forget the point made by the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham)—that 12 months would be especially harsh for couples who had already been separated for any length of time, not least because of the potential financial hardship. That, as I say, has a particular application for victims of domestic abuse, as they may be left in dire financial straits. Put simply, until they can sort out the divorce—until they can finish the process—how can they then move on with their lives, fund their lives, and fund the lives of their children?

Amendment 2 talks about joint applications. I will not go into that because I simply do not have time, but let me talk about sole applications. This is a really important point, and I have enormous sympathy with it. My hon. Friend the Member for Congleton effectively says that we should start the period when notice of proceedings has been received by the other party. I absolutely get this point. We entirely understand that no one wants to see respondents being ambushed; it would be nonsensical. I listened very carefully to what she said about this so powerfully on Second Reading. I will return shortly to the measures to address the risk. In fact, I will have to do it now because I am running out of time. In short compass, I spoke to the chair of the Family Procedure Rule Committee only this week. We would like, through that committee, to ensure that timings are imposed when people should serve these notices. That is a really good thing.

I anticipate that my hon. Friend will say, “Well, that’s very interesting, but why didn’t you put it on the face of the Bill?” My simple point about that is that overwhelmingly, whether in the criminal jurisdiction, the civil jurisdiction or the family jurisdiction, it is left to the rule committees to provide these rules. Indeed, there are rules for service of claim forms, particulars of claim and so on. It would create a strange imbalance if we had some rules in statute and some in the rules. It would create inconsistency that would be difficult for practitioners as well as, most importantly, for the individuals concerned. However, we entirely sympathise with the point and would want to see it addressed.

Amendment 3 seeks to prevent either party to a sole application for divorce from making any financial applications, pending suit, if the other party agrees to a financial application during the 20-week minimum period. While acknowledging the intention behind the amendment, such a restriction would introduce the scope for significant adverse financial impact on one or both of the parties, and, most importantly, on any children.

There is so much that I would love to go into, but I cannot, and I will have to write to my hon. Friends to give time for my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton to respond. We are unable to accept the amendments or new clauses. The points have been made very powerfully, but we are left with the position that this Bill, in the words of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom), will be pro-happiness because it is anti-bitterness. I commend it to the Committee.

[Fiona Bruce]

I thank the Minister for his comments about addressing with the Family Procedure Rule Committee the very great concerns that I have regarding shortage of notice. I look forward to hearing from him as to how that issue will be addressed. Obviously I would have preferred it to have been in the Bill, but I thank him for his assurance.

I am sure that the Minister will have heard the grave and fundamental concerns about this Bill, particularly among Conservative Members. By my reckoning, more than half of today’s speakers have spoken with deep concern about the implications of the Bill. Given, in particular, the weight and volume of opposition during this debate on the shortage of funding support for relationships, for marriage and for reconciliation, I am minded to test the will of the House on that issue and, in due course, to press new clause 1 to a vote. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 11th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 17th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Peter Kyle (Hove) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is great to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Bone—welcome back to the Committee. I rise to speak to new clause 25, on the repeal of provisions about defence for controlling or coercive behaviour offence.

Domestic abuse against disabled people is simply not discussed enough. They are hidden victims. When abuse against disabled people is raised, it is usually in the context of adult safeguarding processes, which labels disabled people as vulnerable adults and which disabled survivors and specialists in the field tell us is failing them.

The new clause reflects 10 years’ worth of casework by Stay Safe East, one of only two organisations in England and Wales led by disabled women supporting disabled survivors, and its partner organisations, in an advisory group on domestic abuse and disability. That is two specialist disability and deaf services for a disabled population of 10 million people.

The data on abuse against disabled people is grim. Disabled adults are at least 1.5 times more likely to be a victim or survivor of violence than non-disabled adults. Disabled women are at least three times more likely to experience domestic abuse from family members, be that their partner, parents, siblings, adult children or other family members. Some of the abusers will also be the person’s carer. It is highly likely that those figures are an underestimate, as the only example—the crime survey—is not in an accessible format for deaf and disabled people to participate in, and many survivors cannot access external help.

The rate of domestic abuse against disabled men is also higher than against non-disabled men, but disabled women are more likely to experience repeated, sustained and more violent abuse than disabled men. Disabled children, and particularly disabled girl children, are more likely to experience sexual violence and physical abuse than non-disabled children. What is more, disabled people may have other people in their lives who have a level of control, whether that is unpaid carers or paid carers from an agency, or a personal assistant.

This is the case for disabled women across all communities, of all ages and all backgrounds. Disabled women face specific forms of abuse at the hands of partners, family members and paid or unpaid carers: control of communication; control of medication; restricting access to disability support; using a person’s impairment to control them—for example, playing on their mental health or taking advantage of the fact that they have learning disabilities—forced marriage on the grounds that the partner “will look after you when I am gone”; and constantly abusing women because of their impairment. That, in itself, is a form of hate crime.

Abusers hold the very real threat that, “They will take your kids away from you” over a disabled woman. In the experience of both Stay Safe East and SignHealth, a deaf-led service for deaf survivors of domestic abuse, deaf or disabled mothers are at much higher risk of losing their children through the courts or other domestic abuse. In some cases, the courts opt to place children in the care of an abusive father rather than letting them live with a disabled mother, who is considered a poor parent for reasons simply of her disability, and providing support to keep the children with her.

Unfortunately, disabled victims who are able to speak out against this face multiple barriers to gaining safety and justice. Poor access to refuges or emergency accommodation; voice phone-only contact with many services, which excludes deaf women and those without speech; services not set up to deal with victims who need long-term support; a lack of quality, accessible information or British Sign Language interpreters; no access to counselling—the list is very, very long.

Worst of all is not being believed by police, social workers or health workers because they are disabled women, which is something that is frequently reported by deaf and disabled women who approach the two specialist organisations. A little-known clause, now subsections 76(8) and (9) of the Serious Crime Act 2015, introduced what has been dubbed “the carers’ defence” by disabled survivor groups. It introduced a worrying caveat into what was a piece of legislation to protect victims of abuse, by allowing an abuser who is facing charges of coercive control to claim that they were acting in the best interests of the victim.

That provision was originally brought to the attention of legislators through the efforts of Sisters of Frida, a disabled women’s collective, and Stay Safe East, but it became part of the 2015 Act. Although the clause may have been introduced with the best of intentions, to avoid unnecessary prosecution of carers who were, for example, preventing somebody with dementia from going out alone because they were at risk, there is a real risk that it could be used by abusers to claim that they are acting in the best interests of somebody they are controlling with malicious intent.

That is especially true of people who might be seen to have capacity issues, such as deaf people, people without speech, people with cognitive issues as a result of a stroke, people with learning difficulties and people with mental health challenges. That, of course, is a substantial number of potential victims among those who face the greatest barriers to safety and getting justice.

For example, the parents of a young woman with mild learning disabilities stopped her going out alone, only letting her go to college with a chaperone, on the grounds that she was at risk from strange men. The parents had failed to teach their daughter about safe relationships, had removed her from personal, social, health and economic education lessons in school, and had controlled her friendships with her peer group. The family claimed that they were protecting her. The young woman initially believed that her parents were doing their best for her, but as she grew up she came to realise that she could make her own decisions. It subsequently emerged that, on top of all the coercive control, the family were taking the young woman’s benefits, and there was also physical abuse.

The section gives a clear message to disabled survivors and victims generally: “Your decisions are not your own, and abusers can claim to be acting in your best interests.” “For her own good” is an expression we often hear abusers using, even if they are abusing that very interest, and the courts will let them get away with exercising abuse of power over their victims.

In a context where disabled survivors are the least likely to speak out, and where, if a case does go to court, the chance of a successful outcome for the victim is very low, especially for disabled victims, that is not the message that we want legislation on domestic abuse to give to survivors or, for that matter, the police, the Crown Prosecution Service or abusers. The Care Act 2014 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 both provide sufficient protection for genuine carers who face malicious allegations. A law to protect victims is not the place for a clause that protects potential abusers.

All too often, concerns about disabled victims are ignored. The Government now have a real opportunity to listen, and we urge the Minister to take full advantage of that opportunity. We are talking about a group with many intersectional and very complex challenges, which provide additional areas for abusers to exert control and abuse.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

This is the first of two debates on different aspects of the controlling or coercive behaviour offence in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. As the hon. Member for Hove has indicated, new clause 25 seeks to repeal the defence in section 76(8), which has been labelled by some as the “carers’ defence”.

Currently, the coercive or controlling behaviour offence allows for such a limited defence if the accused believes that they were acting in the best interests of the victim. It is important to note that the accused would also need to demonstrate to the court that in all the circumstances of the case their behaviour, while apparently controlling, was reasonable. This defence is intended to cover cases, for instance, in which the accused was the carer for a disabled spouse, and for medical reasons had to compel their partner to take medication or to stay at home for their own protection.

It is worth taking a moment to consider the sorts of circumstances in which that defence might apply. Imagine a situation in which neighbours walk past a home and see someone who wants to get out of the front garden and on to the road, and is in some distress at not being able to do so. That neighbour calls the police, and the police then investigate. It emerges that the person trying to get on to the road is, very sadly, suffering from dementia, and their partner is a person of unimpeachable integrity and good character—a decent, loving partner of many years’ standing who has shown nothing but care and compassion for that individual, but who is concerned that if they get out on to the road, they will be a danger to themselves and others. Is it seriously to be suggested that that person should be at risk of conviction, punishment and disgrace?

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

That is not what has been outlined. It has already been clearly stated that provisions in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 would allow for that exact defence. Also, can the Minister not imagine a situation in which if a victim in that exact circumstance says she is a victim of domestic abuse, that might be the case?

[Alex Chalk]

Of course it might be the case, but the important thing is that this defence allows a proper opportunity for a tribunal of fact to consider that, and I think it is absolutely right that it should do so. It is worth noting that under section 76 the burden is on the individual to advance that defence, and for a tribunal of fact to then consider whether it has been disproved. In other words, if that individual advances something that is utterly implausible, a jury—or indeed a bench of magistrates—would have little difficulty in exposing it as such.

[Peter Kyle]

It is important to note that we are leaping straight from a hypothetical, in which a woman with dementia is trying to climb over a fence, to court. However, between those two stages we have the first responders. Having experienced the training, care, compassion and expertise of the frontline responders in the prevention team of Sussex police, I would find it extraordinary if a frontline responder could not tell the difference between these scenarios, or certainly determine whether there is enough evidence to pursue the kind of prosecution that the Minister is describing.

[Alex Chalk]

We have to be very clear about this. If an individual does not have that defence, considering the elements of section 76, we would be left with a person who is apparently being caused some distress—as would be evident to the first responder, or indeed to a police officer, who might have to effect an arrest—and the distress would appear to have been caused by that person’s liberty having been restricted. In those circumstances, unless the individual has the defence that they were exercising proper control in the interests of the other person, they are at risk of being arrested and prosecuted. That would be a serious concern, would it not?

I should also add—I do not think this point is controversial—that there is an exemption within section 76 concerning under-16s. In other words, where people are in a position of responsibility for somebody who is under the age of 16 and may have to inhibit that person’s liberty, that is considered perfectly understandable and justified. The argument would therefore be this: why is it that in circumstances where, sadly, an individual is at risk and vulnerable, it should not be open to that carer—who everyone accepts is loving, decent and caring—to say that this was in the interests of the individual?

I accept the hon. Gentleman’s premise that it is possible that some people would seek to advance an unmeritorious defence. That is absolutely right, but I respectfully say to him that when he says, “The courts let them get away with it,” he is unfairly labelling the courts. In my opinion, the courts have shown themselves well able to see through a spurious defence. The carer who seeks to try it on and to abuse this proper defence will be given short shrift by a bench of magistrates, or indeed by a jury. We should trust juries and courts to do justice in each case.

[Jess Phillips]

Why does the Minister not think that the courts and juries can be trusted on the rough sex defence?

[Alex Chalk]

Because juries have to have a rough sex defence to consider. That is our job. Our job is to create the statute.

[Jess Phillips]

It is the same.

[Alex Chalk]

No, it is not the same at all. If the hon. Lady will listen for a moment, the point is that there is, on the face of a statute, a defence that the jury can consider. They get to consider it only if a judge is satisfied that there is a prima facie defence—in other words, if what the defendant is advancing is patently and transparently unmeritorious, it may well not even go to a jury. A judge might say, “This is such a load of old nonsense that it doesn’t even cross the threshold for a jury to decide.” It is simply where there is a prima facie case. We should trust juries to say, “Is there something in that, or is there not?” It is not for us to adjudicate in every single case. Trust juries; trust the people. It is different from the point that the hon. Lady was making about rough sex, because there was a lacuna in the law. Our job is to fill the lacuna and then leave it to juries, who have shown for many centuries that they are well placed to do justice in a specific case.

I will make a final point on this issue, because I do not want to dwell too long on it. If the policy were not in place, there is a danger that the same people that the hon. Member for Hove quite properly wants to stand up for, and who we want to stand up for—namely, people with disabilities—could be disadvantaged if people take the view of, “Hold on a moment. By doing what I think is genuinely and objectively in the best interests of an individual, I am at risk of conviction, punishment and disgrace. Do you know what? Why on earth should I be doing that? Why should I be putting myself at risk in that way.” We have to ensure that we do not inadvertently, and despite the best intentions, find ourselves making life more difficult for the people we want to support.

[Peter Kyle]

The Minister is a very effective advocate, but the bottom line is that all the agencies representing frontline victims and survivors are speaking with unanimity. They want the law changed and the new clause struck off, because they say it is affecting their service users. There is no organisation out there working with service users that is defending the clause; it is only him.

[Alex Chalk]

With respect, that is not a fair characterisation. Parliament had the opportunity to consider the Bill in 2015. It went through Committee stage in this House, and it went through the House of Lords. It was Parliament’s will that it should exist. What is now being suggested, less than five years later, is that we should sweep away something that was there in the past. In my respectful submission, the case for that has not been made.

Of course, all matters are considered with care, particularly matters of this kind of sensitivity, but we have to be alive to the fact that sometimes, if we remove such a defence, we risk making the position far worse for the people we want to protect. We see that time and again when people are concerned that if they are not given the opportunity to advance their defence and simply to say, “Listen, you decide whether I have got this wrong.” If they do not have the option at least to put forward their defence so that 12 people who have no prior knowledge can make a fair decision, it would be unfair on them and would risk unfairness to people with disabilities.

The final point that I want to make is that the equivalent domestic abuse offence in Scotland contains a similar defence, under section 6 of the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, as does the proposed new domestic abuse offence in Northern Ireland, which is clause 12 of the Domestic Abuse and Family Proceedings Bill, currently before the Northern Ireland Assembly. This is not an outlier provision, I respectfully submit.

Notwithstanding the very proper concerns expressed by the hon. Gentleman, I invite him to consider that, set in a wider context, seeking to exclude the provision is not necessary. In the light of my explanation, I invite him to withdraw the new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

I will discuss some of the potential foibles of the 2015 Act, which we have already mentioned. I say graciously before I start that Parliament does not always get everything right, and I loathe the culture in which we have to call something a U-turn, when actually evidence and other things change, different things come to light and people change their minds. That is okay, but we are not allowed to do that in politics without it being labelled a certain thing. I totally support the legislation but, specifically in the coercive control measures, there are some errors. In reality, only time and test ever measure these things.

In discussing the new clause, I will focus on post-separation abuse, but I will first talk briefly about economic abuse by way of context, as they are closely linked in this instance. I welcome the inclusion of economic abuse in the definition of domestic abuse in the Bill, recognising how that is often hidden but incredibly destructive as a form of abuse. The Bill now acknowledges and names the experience of the victims and their families, supporting them to find justice by holding a perpetrator to account across a full range of abusive behaviours.

That move has been hugely welcomed, particularly by organisations that work with victims and see day in, day out how perpetrators use economic abuse to exert control, whether to trap the victim so that they cannot afford to leave, or to force them into destitution after they have left, so that they are unable to move on and rebuild their lives. One of those organisations is the UK charity Surviving Economic Abuse, which exists solely to raise awareness of economic abuse and to transform the responses to it.

The term “economic abuse” may be new to domestic abuse legislation, but that form of abuse is certainly not new. One in five women in the UK report having experienced economic abuse from a current or former intimate partner, and 95% of domestic abuse victims report that they have suffered economic abuse. It is widespread.

Economic abuse makes the victim dependent on the perpetrator and limits their choices and their ability to leave. The behaviour is insidious and might not be recognised by the victim. The perpetrator might introduce it as an offer to help, or to take away the worry and burden of dealing with finances, seemingly in a caring way, or they might have simply assumed control through force, threats and coercion.

Through economic exploitation, the perpetrator looks to benefit from the victim’s economic resources and, in so doing, sabotages their economic independence. That exploitation may consist of things such as demanding that the victim alone pays the household bills, while the perpetrator spends their own money on whatever they like. The perpetrator may also build up debt in the victim’s name, through coercion or fraud, or steal or damage the victim’s property, which then has to be replaced. In my experience, the thing that is seen the most is the build-up of debt in someone’s name; certainly that is the thing that people struggle to live with thereafter.

This all has a hugely destabilising impact on the victim’s economic wellbeing and, again, limits their choices and ability to leave. Economic abuse can leave victims trapped and destitute, either while in a relationship with the perpetrator or post separation as they navigate life with inescapable debt, insecure housing and financial hardship. Economic safety underpins physical safety. Building an independent life can, for many victims of economic abuse, feel impossible.

Why is the new clause vital? To answer that question, I want to talk about economic abuse following the end of intimate partner relationships. Economic abuse does not simply stop when the relationship ends. Control continues through joint resources, and in fact the perpetrator can still sabotage the victim’s resources even if they do not know where the victim is. An abuser might wipe out money in a joint account that a victim relies on, or refuse to pay an overdraft so that penalties build up and the victim cannot afford to continue paying it. The end of a relationship does not prevent the abuser from taking away a victim’s home, interfering with their ability to work and earn money, or constantly taking the victim to court in connection with their children. It also does not mean that the abuser suddenly forgets the victim’s personal information, which can be used to apply for credit in their name.

In reality, economic abuse can continue, escalate or even start after separation. Research has shown that economic abuse is actually more prevalent post separation. It is clear why: when other forms of control may have been removed, controlling an ex-partner’s access to economic resources, such as by refusing to pay child maintenance, which we heard about yesterday, or refusing to sell a jointly owned home to free up much-needed money, may be the only way in which the abuser can continue to control the victim—and what powerful and destructive control that can be.

Victims can be left with such significant debts and poor credit ratings that they are unable to move on or rebuild their lives, yet at present legislation does not afford victims the protection that they need. The link between economic abuse and controlling and coercive behaviour is stark. Analysis by Surviving Economic Abuse of successful prosecutions for the controlling or coercive behaviour offence shows that six in 10 involve economic abuse, yet limitations within the controlling or coercive behaviour offence mean that, at present, victims of economic abuse post separation are unable to seek justice.

As a result, the perpetrator can continue to control their ex-partner for years and even decades. That is because, for the abuser’s actions to fall within the controlling or coercive behaviour offence, perpetrator and victim must have been “personally connected”, as defined in the Serious Crime Act, and that definition differs from what we have in the Domestic Abuse Bill, which clearly states that someone has been in a relationship or is no longer. That is clearly outlined in this new and better definition.

Under the Serious Crime Act, two people will be considered as personally connected if they are in an intimate relationship with each other, or they live together and either are family members or have previously been in an intimate relationship with each other. The result is that where a couple are no longer in an intimate relationship and they do not live together, behaviour by one of them towards the other cannot fall within the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour.

That is why the new clause is vital. We know from research and what we have heard throughout the progress of the Bill that coercive control continues after the victim’s relationship with the perpetrator has ended and they are no longer living together. That is particularly true of forms of abuse that do not rely on physical proximity or the continuation of intimate relationships with the perpetrator, economic abuse being the key example.

Surviving Economic Abuse has shared the story of a woman in this position, and I want to share it with Members. Layla—not her real name—was married for more than 20 years to her abuser and has three children. Throughout the marriage, her husband was controlling and coercive, both economically and emotionally. He would do things such as pressure her to transfer money into his bank account and force her to let him use her credit card. He ran up debt on her credit card and, after separation, forced her to release hundreds of thousands of pounds of equity from the mortgage. Layla continues to pay the debts that he has put in her name, including bank loans of £70,000. He continues to use her contact details rather than his own, so she is being regularly chased by creditors for money. She has also been regularly visited by bailiffs demanding payment of the abuser’s debts, which she has to pay.

Layla has been to the police, but they said that

“the continuing economic abuse cannot be considered under the coercive control offence as the perpetrator had left her.”

Where is the justice in that? We must change that and bring the definition of “personally connected” as it is defined in the Serious Crime Act in line with what we have in the Bill, so that victims such as Layla no longer face the possibility of being a victim of economic abuse going unchallenged for the rest of their lives.

The Bill recognises that abuse can continue post separation and that it does not require the abuser and victim to be in an ongoing relationship or living together. Through the new clause, which has been called for by Surviving Economic Abuse and which has support from SafeLives and many other organisations in the violence against women and girls sector, we can bring those definitions in line with each other so that the intentions of the Bill are not undermined by other legislation, and victims are protected by law and can seek justice. The new clause does that by removing the requirement for intimate partners or family members to be living together for the abuser’s actions to fall under the controlling and coercive behaviour offence.

[Alex Chalk]

I thank the hon. Lady for her excellent and helpful representations. The context is that I entirely agree with the premise of her point. If I can crystallise it, she is in effect saying, “Look, one of the most pernicious ways you can abuse another individual is through economic abuse.” It is worth stepping back for a second to say that, although we recognise that in this room, if we went back as little as 15 years ago, that might have been a moot point. People have come to realise that this is a particularly potent and cruel weapon to use, and that acknowledgement is a thread that is increasingly starting to run through the law.

The hon. Lady rightly points out that the Serious Crime Act 2015 creates the offence of coercive control, but the definition of domestic abuse in this Bill is one reason why it is it such an important piece of legislation. If someone had been asked what domestic abuse was 15 years ago, they would probably have said, “Domestic abuse is domestic violence, isn’t it?” No, because clause 1(3) says:

“Behaviour is “abusive” if it consists of any of the following—

(a) physical or sexual abuse;

(b) violent or threatening behaviour;

(c) controlling or coercive behaviour;

(d) economic abuse (see subsection (4));”

When we turn to subsection (4), it says:

“‘Economic abuse’ means any behaviour that has a substantial adverse effect

on B’s ability to—

(a) acquire, use or maintain money or other property, or

(b) obtain goods or services.”

I wanted to take stock of where we have come to, because that will inform some of the points that I make in response.

The final thing that I will say by way of context is that the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill, which I am taking through the Committee of the whole House this afternoon, considers precisely this issue. When we say that a minimum of six months is the appropriate period for people to move on from a relationship, where some have said that it should be longer, one of the important rebuttal points is, “Hold on a minute. If someone needs to move on with their lives, potentially from an abusive relationship, they need to make sure that it can happen within a reasonable period so that the economic abuse cannot be perpetuated.” We absolutely get that point, and I would say—I hope not immodestly—that we have spearheaded it.

I entirely agree with the Surviving Economic Abuse charity raising the issue, and it has done an important public service in doing so. To turn to the specific point, as we have heard, the new clause seeks to address another aspect of controlling or coercive behaviour. As the hon. Lady indicated, there have been calls from Surviving Economic Abuse and other domestic abuse charities and victims to expand the offence under section 76 of the 2015 Act by removing the living together requirement for former partners. As the offence stands, it applies only to controlling or coercive behaviour between intimate partners or former partners and family members who are living together.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Kyle]

Speak for yourself!

[Alex Chalk]

I am sure that hon. Gentleman does look at it.

The 1997 Act was amended to include section 2A, which deals with the “Offence of stalking”. Section 2A says:

“A person is guilty of an offence if… the person pursues a course of conduct… and… the course of conduct amounts to stalking.”

Then, however—this is what I think is brilliant—the 2012 Act goes on to look at the sorts of behaviour that might constitute stalking. Subsection (3) says:

“The following are examples of acts or omissions which, in particular circumstances, are ones associated with stalking… following a person… contacting, or attempting to contact, a person by any means… publishing any statement”

relating to that person. It continues:

“monitoring the use… of the internet… loitering in any place… interfering with any property in the possession of a person… watching or spying on a person.”

The reason why that is important is that it sets out the sorts of behaviour that could be stalking, but it is not exhaustive.

The reason why I say of all that is that if someone at the end of a relationship, when the two people are no longer living together, engages in a course of conduct that, to the man or woman on the Clapham omnibus, is a bit like stalking—whether or not that means trying to exert economic control—there is the potential for offences there, and I will come on to them while I am still sympathetic to the point made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley.

I am particularly mindful of that because in my own county of Gloucestershire—the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle has already mentioned this—Hollie Gazzard was brutally murdered. Those who have been victims of stalking say that it is like murder in slow motion, because of so much of what precedes it in terms of stalking behaviour. My point is that that can include economic abuse as well.

However, Surviving Economic Abuse argues further that stalking and harassment offences, although relevant, are not designed specifically to prosecute the sort of behaviour we are discussing. I accept that, but it is also fair to point out that, because of the way that stalking offences are drafted, it is not beyond the wit of man or woman to conceive of how they could be included, based on the facts of a specific case.

In addition, the new statutory definition of domestic abuse includes ex-partners among those defined as “personally connected” and does not have a “living together” requirement. Therefore, an amendment to the controlling or coercive behaviour offence could be seen as conforming within the definition in clause 1.

However, the case is not clearcut, given that the offence is still relatively new, and there is currently limited data available in support of a change. Because the case is not clearcut, the Government committed, in response to our 2018 consultation on domestic abuse, to conduct a review of the offence, as the hon. Lady is aware.

[Jess Phillips]

I love a review.

[Alex Chalk]

The hon. Lady loves a review, she says sotto voce.

Although Home Office officials have made good progress with the review, I am afraid that it has been one of the casualties of the covid-19 pandemic, which has meant that focus has had to be reapplied to supporting victims of domestic abuse at this time. However, the review is in place, and I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her acknowledgement and understanding of the situation.

We hope to conclude the review by the early autumn, because it is important that we have a sound evidence base for any changes to the offence, but we have heard what the hon. Lady says; the points she made are not improper or unmeritorious, and we invite her to await the outcome of the review. I hope that, in the light of my explanation, and on the understanding that we aim to complete the review by early autumn, the hon. Lady will see her way to withdrawing the new clause.

[Jess Phillips]

Absolutely, and I feel that I have the ear of the Minister in this particular regard. The case is quite clear to me; in the circumstances he has outlined, he is absolutely right. If he thinks that people do not read the statute here, I should say that they certainly do not in Stechford Police Station.

The reality is, what would the charge be? I find it difficult to think that the copper, in reality, on the ground, is going to say, “Actually, I think this will be a stalking charge.”

[Alex Chalk]

I grappled with this as a Back Bencher when we wanted to increase the maximum sentence, and for precisely that reason—would a police officer, or the CPS, think it was worth the powder and shot to charge someone with stalking when the maximum sentence was only five years? It is now 10 years, because of the private Member’s Bill. If someone engages in a course of conduct that seriously damages an individual, be it by economic abuse, or by hanging around outside the school gates or whatever, the courts have the power to impose what lawyers pompously refer to as “condign punishment”. That provides a powerful incentive for police officers, who want to do justice in the case, to reach for the lever available to them.

[Jess Phillips]

I appreciate that, and I hope that that would happen in these cases. However, the cases that I am sure will inform the review that the Minister talks about show people often left without an option, rather than with a plethora of different statutory instruments that they could use. The reality is that lots of people simply get sent away with no further action. However, I take on board what the Minister has said about the review. As everyone knows, I absolutely love a review—for the benefit of Hansard readers, I am being sarcastic. I will await the autumn. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 29

Domestic Abuse: immigration and nationality legal aid

“(1) The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is amended as follows: in Part 1 of Schedule 1, delete paragraphs 28 and 29 and insert—

‘Immigration and nationality: victims of domestic abuse

27A (1) Civil legal services provided to a victim of domestic abuse in relation to rights to enter, and to remain in, the United Kingdom and to British citizenship, but only in circumstances arising from that abuse.

27B (2) Sub-paragraph (1) is subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of this Schedule.

27B (3) The services described in sub-paragraph (1) do not include attendance at an interview conducted on behalf of the Secretary of State with a view to reaching a decision on an application.

27B (4) In this paragraph—

“domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020;

“victim” includes the dependent child of a person who is a victim of domestic abuse.’” —(Jess Phillips.)

This new clause would provide for legal aid for survivors of domestic abuse (and their dependent children) in relation to their immigration or nationality status or rights insofar as the need for legal aid arises from the abuse’

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

The severe cuts to legal aid in the last round mean that it often takes longer than three months for migrant survivors to access legal aid and immigration advice. Cuts to legal aid have created a shortage of specialist immigration advisers, who would typically help with the domestic violence rule application. We have revered lawyers a lot in this Committee.

[Alex Chalk]

Hear, hear.

[Jess Phillips]

I am not wholly sure that we will be hearing from all the immigration solicitors that I have come across in my life. I think there is a definite problem in the system with regard to some immigration advice that I get to see being charged for and paid for.

[Alex Chalk]

I thank the hon. Lady for making that incredibly important point. When somebody is prosecuted by the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner, it is a serious issue of unscrupulous, unqualified, unethical individuals giving legal advice, and that is a particularly shabby thing to do when know the impact on the victim is known.

[Jess Phillips]

It certainly is. In these circumstances, people turning up to my office, having forked out £5,000 for a form that they could definitely have filled in by themselves, even if English is not their first language, is a phenomenon. I am afraid to say, I even have some come to my office and ask me to refer people directly to them, as if, like a quid pro quo, they will give free legal advice if we send people. It is a wild west situation.

That brings me to new clause 29, which seeks to provide migrant survivors with legal aid. Often, the cases are complex and it cannot be left to specialist BAME organisations to provide that legal advice. As I mentioned, there is already a deficit in specialist BAME services. Failure to protect all migrant women from abuse has wide-ranging financial and societal consequences —consequences that exceed the cost of extending eligibility of the DV rule and the DDVC.

The economic cost of supporting migrant women with NRPF is often borne out. We might not be paying for it at the Home Office, but it is often borne out by local children’s services, local councils, health and education services, the police and the criminal justice system, as well as by non-statutory agencies. Many women rely on section 17 support under the Children’s Act 1989, which would not be the case if they were eligible for the DV rule and the DDVC. We end up somehow paying for it with either lives lost or some other scheme somewhere along the line.

In its briefing paper on migrant women, Southall Black Sisters highlighted that London boroughs in 2017-18 supported 2,881 households with no recourse to public funds, at a cost of £53.7 million. That was primarily linked to the discharge of their duties under the Children’s Act 1989. The average duration of local authority support is under two and half years, with 30% of families being made dependent for 1,000 days or longer, often because of Home Office delays in resolving immigration claims. One of the primary groups referred to local authorities with NRPF is single mothers who are subject to domestic abuse. The majority of households no longer require local authority support when they are granted leave to remain, because they go on to find work. Surely that is what we all want to see happening.

What assessment have the Government made of how much it would cost to extend the domestic violence rule to all migrant victims? I guess it would cost less than the millions run up by the statutory and non-statutory services to support migrant women. It would be cheaper, and it would certainly be kinder. Although it would perhaps not be so ideologically pure, it would be the right thing to do. Furthermore, by hindering access to life-saving support, there are wider implications for the Government’s international human rights commitments and obligations to combat violence against women and girls.

In their October 2019 report on the ratification of the Istanbul convention, the Government amended the status of their progress on article 4.3, which is the non-discriminatory section, and on article 59, which includes measures to protect victims whose residency status is dependent on a partner, from “compliant” to “under review”—going backwards. As a consequence of their inadequate response to migrant victims of domestic abuse, the Government must now use the opportunity provided by the Bill to ensure meaningful protection for all women.

I am nearly done—worry not—because I want the Minister to have plenty of time to respond. In the evidence session, the hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle talked about the national referral mechanism after it was raised by another Member. In fact, a victim of domestic violence was asked during the evidence session whether she had been referred to the national referral mechanism. As somebody who used to be one of the people administering the national referral mechanism and who ran one of the trafficking services for many years—in fact, I helped to set it up with the Salvation Army as one of the sub-contractors—I want to express, for the benefit of the Committee, some concerns about the cross-over with the national referral mechanism in such cases.

The national referral mechanism has never been used to deal with cases of domestic abuse; that was never its intention. I read the guidance during the weekend after the evidence session. The only mention of domestic abuse in the thousands of pages of guidance suggests that when people identify a victim, they should use some of their experiences with victims of domestic abuse, because victims might react similarly and might not want to talk. That is literally the only mention.

There is some mention of forced marriage and sham marriage in the guidance. However, I have been speaking to the providers this week and have been asking them about how many cases they have seen where those are factors. It is vanishingly rare. Lots of the providers offer both domestic violence services and trafficking services. There is Ashiana Sheffield and Black Country Women’s Aid, where I used to work. They provide both domestic violence services and trafficking services, which are completely distinct. There has never been any suggestion that migrant victims with no recourse to public funds would be able to get through the NRM. As someone who has taken referrals through the NRM, I can tell Members that if a person tried to take these cases through that mechanism—probably with some immigration lawyer helping them to do so—it would count against them. It would look as if they were gaming the system, because these cases inevitably would not get through the NRM. Almost no migrant women on non-spousal visas would be able to access the NRM: it is not for them. They have not been exploited, there are not means, and there are not the three main things that are needed to make a trafficking referral.

However, well over five days ago, I tabled some named day questions to the Home Office. I have not had a response, but I have chased them again this morning; maybe the Minister can answer some of those questions. I asked whether the Secretary of State for the Home Department would

“publish all correspondence between her Department and the contract provider for the Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract on the inclusion within that contract of support services for victims of domestic abuse with no recourse to public funds.”

I also asked the Secretary of State

“how many applications to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) made reference to forced marriage in the last full reporting year; of those how many people were (a) accepted into the NRM and (b) had their application declined.”

Southall Black Sisters, working with a number of other agencies, has circulated a pretty comprehensive guide to why these particular victims would not qualify. That is not to say that the NRM is not a good system; these victims just would not qualify for it, and it is quite laborious to try to put them through it, so I am not sure why we are currently wagering on the NRM.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Eighth sitting)

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 11th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Julie Marson]

Absolutely; I completely agree. We cannot legislate for everything you can do in a court—every courtroom is set out differently. I have seen a lady with two teenage daughters, with the husband, and some really clever dynamics were needed to keep everyone separate, including in the toilets. In my experience, such measures have been very positive. There have been specialist domestic violence courts. Everyone is keenly aware of what is needed and is trying to think ahead for the kinds of measures that can make justice effective and make sure that justice is done. Such measures are all part of that.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

I am delighted to see you in the Chair once again, Ms Buck. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford for her excellent contribution. It speaks to the strength of the Committee that its members have real-world experience and can apply it to the important matters that we are here to discuss.

Before turning to the amendment and new clause, it is worth taking stock of where we are in terms of the court process and the framework in which the amendment and new clause sit. Over the last 10 years or so—probably a bit longer—the environment for victims and witnesses has been completely transformed. It was not so long ago that a complainant in a case of serious violence or a serious sexual allegation had to turn up at court and eyeball the defendant. It required an extraordinary effort of will, and a lot of people just thought, “This isn’t worth the candle.”

Legislation was introduced that provided the opportunity for screens and giving evidence via live link. At the time, that was considered utterly revolutionary. People were clutching their pearls, saying, “That’s it; justice is dead in our country; there is no opportunity for people to get a fair trial” and so on. The culture has changed. Now, at plea and trial preparation hearings such orders are routinely made and, lo and behold, juries—indeed, benches of magistrates as well—seem to find it perfectly straightforward to make a judgment in the interests of justice on the facts in front of them.

Setting that context helps to bring us up to the situation at the moment. Let us imagine some facts for a moment. The allegation is one of sexual assault on the London Underground. At that early hearing, before the Crown court, long before the trial has even been scheduled, the judge will ask the prosecutor, “Are there any applications for a special measures direction?” The prosecutor will stand up and say, “Yes, there is a complainant in this case and it is an allegation of a sexual nature, so I will be inviting the court to make a special measures direction in the normal way.” That is precisely what will happen, because it will be automatic.

I pause to note one further point. If the complainant says, “Forget this. I don’t want a screen, and I don’t want to give evidence on a live link; I want to be there in the well of the court, because that is how I feel I will get justice”, that will be accommodated as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

The Minister says that the report will be published in the coming weeks. Does he expect that we will see it prior to Report stage of the Bill, or potentially prior to Committee stage in the Lords, as he has leaned on for one particular review? I ask only because I am seeking to understand what will be given to me as I consider whether to push new clause 45 to a Division.

[Alex Chalk]

I invite the hon. Lady to listen to the end of my remarks. If I can put it in these terms, the words I will use at the end are carefully phrased. I invite her to listen to those and then decide. A huge amount of work has gone into this panel, and getting to a place where we are ready to publish is the stuff of enormous effort. We are moving as quickly as we can, and it will be published as quickly as possible.

On the civil courts, there are no specific provisions in the civil procedure rules that deal with vulnerable parties or witnesses. However, judges have an inherent power, where the court is alerted to vulnerability, to make a number of directions or take steps to facilitate the progression or defending of a claim or the giving of evidence by a vulnerable party.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

To summarise considerably, I am sure that the Minister is aware that the Civil Justice Council returned earlier this year with the civil procedure rule committee. One of its recommendations was a new practice direction to address vulnerability. I wonder whether he could consider that.

[Alex Chalk]

The hon. Lady must have a copy of my speech, because I will come to that point in just a moment.

The directions that a civil court can make include, but are not limited to, giving evidence via video link, by deposition, by the use of other technology or through an intermediary or interpreter. On the hon. Lady’s point, following the April 2018 publication of the interim report and recommendations of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, the Ministry of Justice commissioned the Civil Justice Council—an advisory body responsible for overseeing and co-ordinating modernisation of the civil justice system—to consider the issues raised by these recommendations, and to compile a report that was not to be restricted only to victims and survivors of child sexual abuse.

The CJC published its report, “Vulnerable witnesses and parties within civil proceedings: current position and recommendations for change”, in February 2020. It made a number of recommendations, as the hon. Lady rightly points out. On special measures, the CJC report concluded that, in the civil jurisdiction, the issue is one of awareness and training, rather than lack of legal powers or framework. This goes back to my point on the role of this place in promoting awareness while recognising that discretion should be available to the court. That was the CJC’s conclusion. Its suggestion was that special measures were best left to the flexibility of court rules. The Government are considering how the recommendations in the independent report should be taken forward.

What is evident from the evidence received by the family panel and the Civil Justice Council is that the current position is unsatisfactory. The question is how best to improve the situation and ensure that vulnerable witnesses in the family and civil courts receive assistance to give their best evidence, in a way analogous to what the Bill already provides for in the criminal courts. We have the report from the Civil Justice Council to guide us but do not yet have the report of the family panel. However, I hope and expect that we will have it shortly, and it is right that we should consider the panel’s findings before legislating.

I am sympathetic to the intention behind these proposals. If the hon. Member for Edinburgh West would agree to withdraw her amendment I can give her and the shadow Minister an assurance that, between now and Report, we will carefully consider both proposals, and how best to proceed. If they are not satisfied with the conclusions the Government reach, they are of course perfectly entitled to bring amendments back on Report.

[Christine Jardine]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Prohibition of cross-examination in person in family proceedings

Amendment made: 37, in clause 59, page 39, line 32, at end insert—

“(aa) section 80 of the Sentencing Code;” —(Alex Chalk.)

See the explanatory statement for amendment 31.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

Let me say a little about clause 59. In fact, the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd was starting to talk about it, so I will set out some context. The clause contains provisions to prevent unrepresented perpetrators of abuse from cross-examining their victims in person in family proceedings. It also makes provision to give family courts the power to appoint a qualified legal representative to undertake the cross-examination instead, where necessary.

The Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill, which undertook pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, recommended that the automatic prohibition of cross-examination be extended so that it would apply when the victim could provide evidence of abuse, as in the legal aid regime. We have accepted the recommendation in full, and the clause now gives full effect to it.

Some of the most vulnerable members of society come before the family courts, and we are determined to offer them every protection and to ensure that every vulnerable victim or witness coming to the family courts has confidence that the court will not be used to perpetrate further abuse against them. Currently, family judges have a range of powers to make sure that difficult courtroom situations are handled sensitively for vulnerable witnesses. In proceedings where both parties are litigants in person and concerns of domestic abuse have been raised, that may include carrying out cross-examination by way of the judge or the justices’ legal advisers putting questions to the parties themselves. Alternatively, the judge can decide that an alternative form of evidence, such as pre-recorded cross-examination from criminal proceedings, is sufficient.

However, there are cases in which those alternative forms of evidence or cross-examination will not be sufficient to test the evidence in the case thoroughly. We must recognise that for the judge to step into the arena to ask those questions is often—how can I put it politely?—suboptimal. In those instances, the court currently has no power to appoint an advocate to carry out the cross-examination in place of the parties themselves. That can lead to situations in which the court is powerless to prevent a victim from being cross-examined in person by their abuser.

I am sure we would all feel uncomfortable about a situation in which evidence was not challenged. The whole point of an adversarial process is to tease out inconsistencies and omissions in the evidence. If that is not happening, the proceedings are not fair, so it is important that there should be scope within the trial process for frailties in the evidence to be ruthlessly exposed.

We recognise that the issue has been the subject of close attention in the House and among experts in the field. Victims have told us that being subject to cross-examination in person in this way can be retraumatising, and judges have told us that the situation is an impossible one for them to manage. I entirely sympathise. We are determined that the court should never be used as a forum to perpetuate further abuse, and that it should have sufficient powers in all cases to prevent abuse from being perpetrated through court processes.

The purpose of the clause is therefore to introduce a prohibition on victims being cross-examined in person in specified circumstances. In addition, the clause gives the court the power to appoint an advocate, paid for from central funds, for the purpose of cross-examination where there are no satisfactory means to cross-examine the witness or to obtain the evidence, where the party does not appoint a legal representative or themselves to do so, and where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

I welcome what the Minister is saying, but on the specific instances he is outlining of who exactly would be able to assess this, does he foresee an element of the judge’s discretion also allowing them to go to central funds where they believe enough that cross-examination would cause distress, regardless of whether there may previously have been a conviction or an order in place? As we all know, there is a disparity between conviction and order rates on the one hand, and domestic violence rates on the other.

[Alex Chalk]

Courts have a common law discretion to manage their own proceedings, but it will be important for us to assist the them as much as possible by setting out the categories that should trigger the exemption. Although courts can act of their own motion, it is none the less important to prescribe to an extent that the provision applies in circumstances where somebody has been convicted, charged or cautioned. I will develop that point in the following passage.

In the light of the recommendation from the Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill, the clause now makes provision that the automatic ban will also apply in other cases where a witness has adduced specified evidence of domestic abuse. The evidence will be specified in regulations and, as recommended by the Joint Committee, we intend for this evidence to broadly replicate that which is used to access civil legal aid. That is probably the point that the hon. Lady was driving at.

The prohibitions also apply reciprocally, to prevent a victim from having to cross-examine their abuser in person. Where the automatic ban does not apply, the clause also gives the court a discretion to prohibit cross-examination in person where it would be likely to diminish the quality of the witness’s evidence or cause significant distress to the witness or the party. That is the point about a court’s discretion: the judge has the individuals in front of them, can hear from them and can make a decision based on that.

In any case where cross-examination in person is prohibited, either under the automatic prohibition or at the discretion of the court, the judge must consider whether there is a satisfactory alternative means by which the witness can be cross-examined or the evidence can be obtained. That would include means that already fall under the judge’s general case management powers, such as putting the questions to the witness themselves or via a legal adviser, or by accepting pre-recorded cross-examination. I suppose one might imagine cases where the things that need to be cross-examined on are so narrow in scope that it would not be worth the aggravation of instructing independent counsel if the judge can do it and do justice in that way. It is important that the court can act of its own motion and flexibly, and the clause retains that flexibility.

If there are no satisfactory alternative means, the court must invite the prohibited party to appoint a legal representative to carry out cross-examination on their behalf. If they choose not to, or are unable to, the clause gives the court the power to appoint a legal representative—an advocate—for the sole purpose of conducting the cross-examination in the interests of the prohibited party. The court must appoint an advocate where it considers this to be necessary in the interests of justice.

There could be circumstances where it is not possible to protect the prohibited party’s rights to access to justice and/or a family life without the appointment of such an advocate. This might be in circumstances, for example, where the evidence that needs to be tested by cross-examination is complicated, because it is complex medical or other expert evidence, or because it is complex or confused factual evidence, say from a vulnerable witness. The clause also confers power on the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance in connection with the role of that advocate.

The clause also confers power on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the fees and costs of a court-appointed advocate to be met from central funds. We understand the particular skill and care that is needed to carry out cross-examination of a vulnerable witness effectively. We will be designing a full fee scheme to support these provisions, in consultation with the sector and interested parties, prior to the implementation of the Bill.

This clause seeks to ensure that, in future, no victim of domestic abuse has to endure the trauma of being questioned in person by their abuser as part of ongoing family proceedings. It makes a big difference, and I commend it to the Committee.

[Peter Kyle]

It is rare but pleasing when one agrees so fully with the person one shadows, and I am grateful to him. I do not want to shock the Minister—I do not want him to be clutching his pearls as I say such words—but it is certainly the situation we find ourselves in on this clause. We are not opposing or seeking to amend the clause; we agree fully with it and what it seeks to achieve.

However, I want to spend a bit of time explaining how we got to where we are, because it is important. It is important that we make sure the record reflects the situation that this clause seeks to rectify and the impact that the cross-examination by perpetrators of victims has had on people. In so doing, I speak on behalf of a great number of advocates, both in Parliament and outside, over a great period of time. I can speak for myself on this issue, but I am very aware of the fact that I am also speaking on behalf of a lot of other people.

I had personal experience of this issue very soon after getting elected in 2015. Soon after the election, I was sitting on the floor of my campaign office among the detritus of a very vigorous campaign, sorting through things and trying to figure things out, when a very fragile, very vulnerable and very damaged woman suddenly appeared in the doorway. She came in to see me, and said, “Are you the new MP?” I said yes, and she said, “I saw your leaflets. You look like a friendly person. I am now going to flee my relationship, and I will only speak to you about it.” We sat in the corner of the office, and this woman was bruised and bleeding. She had literally escaped from the relationship, and I, as an MP of a few days, was thinking on the inside, “Oh my God, what do I do in this situation? How do I help this extraordinarily vulnerable person?” I just did the best I possibly could, and that involved brokering a relationship between her and the police, about which she was terrified. She was scared of the authorities because the authorities had let her down so many times, repeatedly. I supported that woman, and she went into a protective programme. She now has a new identity and a new life, and although she will never ever be able to escape the horrors of what she went through, she certainly has an opportunity to discover new, more fruitful aspects of life, which she was prevented from doing before.

One of the aspects I experienced very soon after the process of supporting her began was the experience of the family court. I could not believe what I heard when she came to see me after some hearings in the family court, where she was made to share the space of the person she had fled. Having seen her on the day she fled her relationship, it was horrendous to hear that she was forced into the same waiting room as this person, had to be in the same space when their relationship was discussed and, crucially, was cross-examined by him.

At the same time, another constituent came to see me in my surgery. She had just been cross-examined by her abusive partner for the third time. She had previously been hospitalised; the perpetrator had broken more than a dozen or her bones and repeatedly raped her. On the third appearance in the family court, she was shaking so violently that she needed assistance to get to the taxi afterwards. On the journey home, the taxi driver had to stop and help her out of the taxi so that she could vomit on the pavement.

That was happening to people who I was sitting with and who I represented in Parliament. I could not understand that the very institutions that existed to protect people like them were facilitating the abuse—in front of judges, in a room with police officers, abuse was happening, and nobody was offering support. To my shame, I could not quite believe that this was possible in 21st-century Britain. When I came back to Parliament, I sought out my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) and asked him about it. I said, “I am hearing this thing, but I can’t believe it is possible.” He, as the former Director of Public Prosecutions, said, “It is happening, and there is a big campaign out there to try and change it.”

I could not believe that it was still happening, so I went to speak to Ministers. Repeatedly, Minister after Minister told me that a cultural change was needed in the criminal justice system, not a legislative change. I could not accept that. Having gone to speak to judges to understand why change was not happening, and having repeatedly spoken to Ministers, I found it incredibly hard to believe that the Government were not seeing or understanding the abuse. Of course, they were seeing it, but they were refusing to change. There are many lessons here, and I hope Back Benchers realise that persistence is one of them.

On 15 September 2016, I secured a Backbench debate that was led by Angela Smith, the then Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge. We had gone with a cross-party group to get a Backbench debate. There were several Tories in the group, and we worked as a formidable team. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley was not part of the group that went to the Backbench Business Committee, because she sat on the Committee and was supposed to be impartial, but it was clear from her facial expressions where she stood on the issue.

During the debate itself, I was able to put on record the most shocking example of this abuse that I have ever come across. In the eight or nine months leading up to the debate, I met dozens of women who had gone through such abuse. The most shocking case was that of Jane Clough—some people in this room will be aware of her case. I am not the sort of person who normally quotes himself, but in going through all the different debates that have taken place in Parliament in the last five years on this issue, I read some of the examples I put on record, and I want to quote directly from one debate. My reason for doing so is that I want Members to realise, and I want the record to reflect, that this example has been on the House of Commons record for almost four years.

--- Later in debate ---

My aim with those two points is to put them on the record and to wonder whether Ministers will consider them. Are they significant loopholes and, if so, how will they address them?

[Alex Chalk]

Before turning to the specific point, I listened carefully to what the hon. Member for Hove said, and it was clear that he has taken a close interest in the issue. I thank him for the energy that he has clearly applied to it. As I was listening to him, I heard about Bills that had fallen, elections that had come and UQs that had happened, and I was reminded of Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor, who said: “Laws are like sausages; it is best not to watch them being made.”

That is absolutely right and I felt it about this. Inevitably—not inevitably, but not uncommonly—it can take time to get there, but we are absolutely delighted with where we have arrived at with this important legislation. It is important to note, too, that it takes place in the context of other important legislation that it was possible to get over the line earlier, such as on coercive control or modern slavery. The Bill sits within that wider context in which we take some pride.

I will first address the issue of spent convictions, friends and so on, and that will allow me to go back to a point made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, when she in effect said, “What happens in circumstances where it is not necessarily a conviction or a caution, but something else?” If hon. Members turn to page 40 of the Bill, that is the relevant part of clause 59, which deals with how the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 will be amended. The clause having dealt specifically with issues of conviction and caution, proposed new section 31U—“Direction for prohibition of cross-examination in person: other cases”— states:

“In family proceedings, the court may give a direction prohibiting a party to the proceedings from cross-examining…a witness in person if…none of sections 31R to 31T operates to prevent the party from cross-examining the witness”—

that relates to people protected by injunctions, convictions or other matters—and

“it appears to the court that—

(i) the quality condition or the significant distress condition is met, and

(ii) it would not be contrary to the interests of justice to give the direction.”

In other words, it would be open to the party to indicate to the court: “Yes, I don’t automatically qualify, but I’m going to provide a statement that indicates that it would adversely affect the quality of the evidence I can give were I to be cross-examined by the other party.” I hope that that will give the courts confidence that flexibility is deliberately built into the system.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

To return to my concern about the lack of communication between jurisdictions, on spent convictions we are going quite a long way down the road as to what communication is necessary. Is the Minister confident that there is sufficient communication, or that there will be in the wake of the legislation, to ensure that such situations are safeguarded against?

[Alex Chalk]

Yes, I am confident, but it goes back to the earlier point that we were making about culture. If, by dint of the legislation, the family judges, when deciding whether to make one of the orders, are alive to the fact that they will need to consider whether someone has a conviction or a caution, that will, in and of itself, encourage and require the co-operation of the police. In other words, the court will have to find out what is on the police national computer in respect of the other party.

I am confident that courts will see their way to ensuring that those lines of communication are in place. Quite apart from anything else, if a judge finds himself, or herself, in a situation where he cannot make the order because he has not been provided with the information he needs, we can be very sure that he is likely to say something about that. That will, I am sure, elicit change in the fullness of time, so the short answer to the hon. Lady’s question is yes.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 59, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 60 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 61

Offences against the person committed outside the UK: Northern Ireland

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 61 extends the jurisdiction of the criminal courts in Northern Ireland in the same terms as clause 60 extends the jurisdiction of the criminal courts in England and Wales. We did not go into clause 60 in any detail, but that is what it is about.

Clause 61 gives effect in Northern Ireland to our obligations under article 44 of the Istanbul convention, as it applies to article 35, which covers physical violence, and article 39, which covers forced abortion and forced sterilisation. Like clause 60, it does so by extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to certain offences against the person, including actual or grievous bodily harm and murder and manslaughter, in circumstances where the courts do not already have such jurisdiction. That will mean that a UK national or a person habitually resident in Northern Ireland who commits one of the offences outside the UK can, exceptionally, stand trial for the offence in Northern Ireland.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 61 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 62

Amendments relating to offences committed outside the UK

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will convenient to discuss schedule 2 stand part.

[Alex Chalk]

The clause simply reintroduces schedule 2, which contains amendments relating to offences committed outside the UK. As with clauses 60 and 61, the amendments are necessary to ensure compliance with article 44 of the Istanbul convention. Part 1 of schedule 2 contains amendments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences other than those set out in clause 60 under the law of England and Wales. Part 2 of schedule 2 contains amendments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences under the law of Scotland. Part 3 of schedule 2 contains amendments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences not including those set out in clause 61 under the law of Northern Ireland.

Schedule 2 contains amendments to a number of enactments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences under the law of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Together with clauses 60 and 61 and provisions in the Domestic Abuse and Family Proceedings Bill currently before the Northern Ireland Assembly that give extraterritorial effect to the new domestic abuse offence in Northern Ireland, schedule 2 will ensure that the UK complies with the jurisdiction requirements of article 44 of the Istanbul convention.

Part 1 of the schedule covers England and Wales and gives effect to the UK’s obligations under article 44 as it applies to article 33, which covers psychological violence, article 34, which covers stalking, and article 36, which covers sexual violence, including rape. It does so by extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to offences under sections 4 and 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where the victim of the offence is aged 18 or over, and section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which is about coercive control. It will mean that a UK national or a person habitually resident in England and Wales who commits one of these offences outside the UK can, exceptionally, stand trial for the offence in England and Wales. Where the offence involves a course of conduct, the offence may be committed wholly or partly outside the UK.

Part 2 of the schedule covers Scotland and gives effect to the UK’s obligations under article 44 as it applies to articles 33 to 36 and article 39. It does so by extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to the common law offence of assault, to offences under sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 where the victim of the offence is aged 18 or over, and to the offence of stalking under section 39 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010.

That will mean that a UK national or person habitually resident in Scotland who commits one of these offences outside the UK can, exceptionally, stand trial for the offence in Scotland. Where the offence involves a course of conduct, the offence may be committed wholly or partly outside the UK.

Part 3 of the schedule, as the Committee will be cottoning on to by now, covers Northern Ireland and gives effect to the UK’s obligations under article 44 as it applies to article 34 and 36. It does so by extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to offences under article 6 of the Protection from Harassment (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 and part 2 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, again where the victim of the offence is aged 18 or over. It will mean that a UK national or person habitually resident in Northern Ireland who commits one of these offences outside the UK can, exceptionally, stand trial for the offence in Northern Ireland. Where the offence involves a course of conduct, the offence may be committed wholly or partly outside the UK.

[Jess Phillips]

I simply want to welcome specifically the terminology of “habitual resident” within the UK. The Minister and I have met a number of different families over the years who have suffered violence, and I am afraid to say that those cases we get to see usually involve murder in a different country. Where the perpetrator of the crime was back here in Britain and was not a British citizen but was habitually resident in this country, the authorities had found that their hands were tied. While the measures seem perfunctory and were a lot of words for the Minister to say, to families they mean a huge amount, so I welcome them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 63

Polygraph conditions for offenders released on licence

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

This clause is about polygraph conditions. It is an important clause that relates to conditions for offenders released on licence. It is one of a number of measures in the Bill directed at strengthening the effective management of domestic abuse perpetrators. It allows the Secretary of State for Justice to introduce mandatory polygraph examinations as a licence condition for offenders convicted of a relevant domestic abuse-related offence. The relevant offences include murder, specified violent offences and the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour under the Serious Crime Act 2015. Necessarily, this is a new departure to some extent, but it is kept within tight limits, as members of the Committee would expect.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Sixth sitting)

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 10th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Hon. Members]

Hear, hear!

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

Thank you very much.

[Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)]

Resign!

[Alex Chalk]

I am glad that all hon. Members are taking this seriously. It is a pleasure to serve under your expert chairmanship, Mr Bone, and to be one of the Ministers leading on this Bill. When I was a Back Bencher, together with another Member of Parliament, I ended up doing some work on stalking laws to try to increase the maximum sentence for stalking, so if I could have chosen any Bill to be a Minister on, it would have been this one. It is a real pleasure to be here. I am delighted to see my shadow, the hon. Member for Hove, and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. We share a common endeavour in wanting to make this the best piece of legislation.

Clause 27 is a procedural clause that sets out how long a person can be held on remand if they are arrested for breach of a police-issued domestic abuse protection notice and the magistrates court adjourns that hearing. A magistrates court can normally remand a person for up to eight days, but clause 27 sets out that the court can also remand the person if a medical report is required. In such cases, a person can be remanded for only up to three weeks at a time if they are remanded in custody, or up to four weeks at a time if they are remanded on bail.

If the person is suffering from a mental disorder and a report is needed on their mental condition, they may be remanded to hospital so that such a report can be produced. That can be for up to a maximum of 28 days at a time or a total of 12 weeks if there are multiple stays in hospital.

If the court decides to remand a person on bail, it can attach any conditions necessary to prevent the person from obstructing the course of justice—for example, interfering with witnesses. These are standard provisions that largely replicate the approach taken for remand following breaches of other types of protective orders, such as non-molestation orders, occupation orders and antisocial behaviour injunctions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Domestic abuse protection orders otherwise than on application

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 28 makes provision for the court to make a domestic abuse protection order of its own volition during other ongoing proceedings that do not have to be domestic abuse-related. It is an important provision that shows the flexibility of the legislation.

The family court will have the power to do so in cases where both the victim and the alleged abuser are parties to the proceedings, which means that the family court will be able to make an order in other ongoing proceedings where the court becomes aware that an order would be beneficial. For example, if an issue of domestic abuse is raised during ongoing child contact proceedings, the victim would not have to make a separate application to the court to obtain an order. Instead, the court can make an order of its own volition as it sees necessary. That is an important element of flexibility, and indeed robustness, built into the legislation.

In criminal courts—I am conscious that we have expertise here in the form of a former magistrate, which is excellent—as with the current restraining order, the court will be able to make a domestic abuse protection order on either conviction or acquittal. To that extent it is similar to a restraining order, which can also apply in the event of an acquittal. Importantly, however, the DAPO is an improvement on the current restraining order because it can impose positive requirements as well as prohibitions on the perpetrator. All Committee members will recognise that, although we of course want to protect victims first and foremost, we also want to stop further abuse happening, so anything that can be done to ensure that people are rehabilitated and see the error of their ways is a positive thing for society as well as, of course, for the victim.

In the case of a conviction, that will allow the court to, for example, set an order with a longer duration than the sentence passed, to ensure that the victim receives the protection they need beyond the length of their sentence. In the case of an acquittal, it will ensure that the victim still receives protection if the court thinks that is necessary.

The court will also be able to make a DAPO of its own volition during other ongoing civil proceedings where both the victim and the alleged abuser are parties to the proceedings.

We will specify the type of civil proceedings in regulations, but initially we expect it to cover civil proceedings in which issues of domestic abuse are most likely to be raised or revealed in evidence, such as housing-related proceedings.

[Jess Phillips]

I feel that, now Minister Chalk is on his feet, I should have some things to say; I do not want to leave him out.

I cannot say how important the idea that the court can put in place an order on acquittal in these circumstances is to somebody like me, who has watched many cases fall apart over the years. I am always slightly jealous of the Scottish system of not proven, because in too many cases in the area of violence against women and girls, it may well be that the balance of evidence needed cannot be provided either at the magistrates court or at the Crown court in these circumstances, but there is still gross fear among all involved that the fact that it is not proven does not mean that it did not happen.

The idea that, on acquittal, courts could put these orders in place is a huge step forward, ideologically and politically speaking. My concern—I am almost doing myself an injustice on what I am going to say about some of the amendments later—is what the Ministry of Justice foresees as a review mechanism to ensure where this is going, how it is working and how regularly the family courts are dishing out such orders.

If everybody was like Essex police force, I would be jumping for joy. I do not hope for this, but maybe one day somebody will perpetrate a crime against me in Essex and I will see how brilliant the force is at orders, as we heard from the evidence earlier. What worries me is whose responsibility it will be, after a year or two years—even after the pilot scheme—between the Ministry of Justice, the head of the family courts structure and the chief prosecutor at the head of the Crown Prosecution Service, to see how readily these orders are being used in our courts.

I have already said this once today, but often people like me put in annoying questions to people like the Minister, such as, “Can you tell me how many times this has been used in these circumstances?”, and very often the answer that we receive back is, “We do not collect this data nationally”, or, “We do not hold this data in the Department.” I want a sense of how we are going to monitor this, because while I know this just looks like words on paper, to people like me it is deeply, deeply important that the courts could take this role.

However, I have seen too many times that, even the powers that the courts have—certainly the family courts, which no doubt we will come on to tomorrow—are not always used wisely and well, so I want an understanding of how specifically we are going to monitor the use of the courts giving out the orders, which is new in this instance. How are we going to test that it is working and try to improve its use? I would be very interested in even just a basic data gathering each year of how many were done on acquittal, how many were done on conviction and how many were done in family court proceedings where both parties were part of proceedings.

With regard to the family court, and in fact in all these circumstances—whether it is a notice or an order; whether a police officer has to make a decision there on the doorstep or we are talking about orders—how are we going to deal with some of the “he said, she said”? I have seen an awful lot of counter-claims in the family courts. Often somebody will talk about being victimised as part of domestic abuse, and it becomes: “Well, actually, she was domestically abusing me,” or, “He was domestically abusing me.” I wonder whether any thought has been given to how, in giving out DAPOs in a family court, we do not end up with potentially two people, both with an order against each other—or maybe that could happen.

[Alex Chalk]

I will say a couple of things. First, I completely agree with the hon. Lady’s observation that the powers are very stark but very welcome. It is important to note why they are in place. It is not uncommon that cases cannot necessarily be proven to the criminal standard: beyond reasonable doubt. The tribunal has to be satisfied that it is sure; however, there can be serious lingering concerns that, were it to apply a test of the balance of probabilities, it would have no difficulty in finding that the abuse had taken place.

It is to cater for those circumstances that the courts can now impose really quite robust measures to ensure the protection of complainants and the rehabilitation of perpetrators. They are important powers, and benches and courts will want to exercise them wisely. Inevitably, they apply to individuals who have not been convicted of any offence. The courts will therefore need to tread carefully to ensure that justice is done, but they have shown themselves well able to do that for many centuries.

[Peter Kyle]

My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made the point very well that, for some of the issues that we are tackling with the legislation, the powers already existed in other pieces of legislation, but the courts, in their conservatism, refused to exercise them. As my hon. Friend asked, will the Minister ensure that his Department gives the right steer to the courts, which the president of the family division can translate into something that is actionable on the front line in family courts up and down the country?

[Alex Chalk]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Ultimately, he will understand why I say that a very proper distinction exists between the legislature, the Executive and the judiciary. The judiciary are proudly and profoundly independent, and they will take their course and impose the orders if they think that it is in in the interest of justice to do so. Of course, we must ensure that courts are properly aware of the powers available to them. I have no doubt that the president of the family division, and indeed the Lord Chief Justice in the criminal sphere, will use their good offices to ensure that that takes place.

On the point that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley made about whether we can look after the event to check that the powers are being used, first, there is, as she knows, the issue of the pilot. That provides a significant period to establish whether the orders are being taken up. Secondly, the Office for National Statistics has an annual publication of DA statistics that includes the different orders, so we will be able to get a sense of the extent to which they are being applied.

I hope that this will not sound overly fastidious, but one should not necessarily automatically read reluctance into a low level of use in one part of the country compared with others. It may be, because each case turns on the facts, that it was not appropriate in those circumstances. However, as a general observation, we will keep an eye on it, and there will be data on which the hon. Lady will no doubt robustly hold the Government to account. I beg to move.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

For the benefit of the Committee, and perhaps for the Minister, I should say that you do not need to beg to move stand part clauses, because they are already in the Bill; the only thing that you have to move are the amendments—but you, sir, are one of many Ministers who make that mistake.

Clause 29

Conditions for making an order

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

Thank you, Mr Bone—that’s my career over.

Clause 29 sets out two conditions that must be met before the court may make a domestic abuse protection order. The first is that the court must be satisfied—on the balance of probability, as I have indicated—that the person has been abusive towards the victim. Our intention with the DAPO is to bring together the strongest elements of the existing protective order regime.

One of the key benefits of existing civil protection orders is that if a victim who needs protection from abuse is not able to gather sufficient evidence to meet a criminal standard of proof, they can still apply to the courts for protection. We have ensured that that will be the case for the DAPO as well by explicitly providing for a civil standard of proof: on the balance of probabilities. The Joint Committee in examining the draft Bill were content with the application of the civil standard.

In the Bill, we have made it clear that domestic abuse includes many different types of abusive behaviour, as we have heard, including physical and sexual, as well as controlling, economic and emotional abuse. That is a novel and important departure. That means the court will be able to take into account all the abuse present in the case when deciding whether to make an order.

That is a step forward compared to current domestic violence protection orders, which require either violence or the threat of violence before a notice can be issued or an order made; we understand that this is currently interpreted to mean physical violence only. Members of the Committee will immediately see the extent to which the ambit has been broadened.

The second condition is that the court must be satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to make the order to protect the victims of domestic abuse or those at risk of domestic abuse. Once the threshold is met, the court may impose only those requirements that it considers are necessary to protect the victim. Incidentally, that necessary threshold is important in ensuring that the measure is compliant with our responsibilities under the European convention on human rights.

The clause also specifies that an order can be made only against a person who is 18 or over. We recognise that younger people can be involved in abusive relationships, which is why we have included 16 and 17-year-olds in the new statutory definition of domestic abuse. There is, however, a balance to strike. We do not want to rush to criminalise young people, in line with our youth justice guidelines, as DAPOs carry a criminal penalty for breach, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both.

Pausing on that, it is important to recognise that DAPOs will be imposed on somebody who is not guilty of any crime, yet breach of them is punishable by imprisonment: these are robust powers, and that is why we have circumscribed them carefully in the way that we have. I do not need to beg to move, so I shall just sit down.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30

Matters to be considered before making an order

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

This clause concerns matters to be considered before making an order. Similar to the provisions at clause 21 in relation to a notice, clause 30 sets up particular matters, which the court must consider before making a domestic abuse protection order.

First, the court must consider the welfare of any person under the age of 18, whose interests the court considers relevant, in order to ensure that any safeguarding concerns can be appropriately addressed. The person does not have to be personally connected to the perpetrator and could, therefore, for example, be the victim’s child from a previous relationship.

The court must also consider the opinion of the victim as to whether the order should be made. As set out, however, in subsection (3), the court does not have to obtain the victim’s consent in order to make an order. We have already discussed why that is desirable. It enables the court to protect victims who may be coerced into withholding their consent, or who are fearful of the consequences should they appear to be supporting action against the perpetrator.

Where the order includes conditions in relation to premises lived in by the victim, the court must consider the opinion of any other person who lives in the premises and is personally connected to the victim or, if the perpetrator also lives in the premises, to the perpetrator. For example, if the perpetrator has caring responsibilities for a family member, the court would need to consider the family member’s opinion on the making of an order excluding the perpetrator from the premises.

[Jess Phillips]

I wonder whether the Government foresee a child being included in that instance. If it was an elderly relative, that is reasonable. But are we saying here—or perhaps it will be in the much-awaited guidance—that if a child was living in the house, their opinion might be sought?

[Alex Chalk]

Yes, I think it would be and I think that is appropriate. One thing that certainly the criminal law has done over the last 20 years is start to recognise that people under the age of 18 have views that are sometimes worth hearing. In the past, they were almost kept out of court, but now of course we try to facilitate their giving evidence. I would imagine that that would be the case in these circumstances and that a court would want to hear that.

It will be for the court to weigh up the different factors to come to its decision on whether a DAPO is necessary and proportionate in order to protect the victim from domestic abuse or the risk of it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31

Making of orders without notice

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 31 makes provisions for making an order without giving prior notice to the person who is alleged to have been abusive. These are standard provisions and consistent with existing protection orders. Before making an order, a court would normally inform the relevant person of the hearing taking place. However, as with existing orders, we recognise that in some cases an order may be urgently required. Clause 31 enables the court to make an order without notice in those cases where it is just and convenient to do so.

When deciding whether to make an order without notice, a court must first consider the risk to the victim if the order is not made immediately and the risk that the victim would be deterred from pursuing the application if the order were not made immediately. This measure also allows the court to take action in cases where it believes that the person alleged to have been abusive is aware of the proceedings but deliberately evading service, in order to ensure that the victim can still receive the protection that they need. In other words, it provides scope to the court, if it thinks that an individual is seeking to frustrate justice, simply to go ahead in the normal way and ensure that the protection is put in place.

If an order is made without notice, the court must schedule a return hearing as soon as is just and convenient, to allow the affected person to make representations about the order. That is in line with the usual procedures for current protective orders, and you may feel, Mr Bone, that it is in the interests of justice. If an order is made without notice, the individual who is subject to it should have the opportunity to make representations as soon as is just and convenient.

It is worth mentioning that subsection (2) of clause 34, which makes further provision about electronic monitoring requirements, provides that an electronic monitoring or tagging requirement may not be imposed on a person in their absence. I trust that the reason for that is obvious, but if anyone wants to ask me about it, they can.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Provision that may be made by orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 32 concerns provision that may be made by orders. The Committee will recall that we heard earlier about provision that may be made by notices. This is the twin in respect of orders.

Clause 32 provides courts with the flexibility to impose in respect of a DAPO not only restrictions but positive requirements, depending on what is necessary in each case to protect the victim from all forms of abusive behaviour. Subsections (4) to (6) provide examples of the kinds of conditions that could be imposed by a DAPO, but subsection (3) expressly provides that those are not exhaustive.

It is up to the court carefully to tailor the conditions of the DAPO to meet the needs of the individual victim and take into account the behaviour of the perpetrator. The reason is that circumstances are varied and it is important to ensure that the court considers each case on its merits, and the circumstances as they apply, and ensures that the conditions are tailored accordingly.

[Jess Phillips]

Specifically with regard to what we were discussing earlier in relation to workplaces, does the Minister foresee that that could be one of those issues that could be discussed in the court—that there would be an allowance for the workplace to be included, with leave of the court?

[Alex Chalk]

Absolutely; I do not see why not at all. In fact, when the hon. Lady was making those points in respect of notices, I did fast-forward to clause 32, and it is deliberately broadly cast. Clause 32(2) says:

“The court must, in particular, consider what requirements (if any) may be necessary to protect the person for whose protection the order is made from different kinds of abusive behaviour.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

It is very pleasing to hear that—it is reassuring. I urge that the point is made explicitly in the guidance that will go along with all the orders. I wanted that on the public record.

[Alex Chalk]

It may be in the guidance but, I respectfully suggest, does not necessarily need to be in it. When a court comes to consider what it will or will not do, it may look at this measure and say, “Are we precluded from banning him from her workplace? If the answer to that is no, we will go ahead and do it, regardless of what is in the guidance.” It may be that it will be in there anyway, but I am confident that, as the Bill is set out, it is drafted sufficiently widely—deliberately so—for the courts to see their way to do justice and impose protections as they see fit.

[Peter Kyle]

One benefit of this approach to legislation is that it allows scope for creativity in the individual court to tailor to a specific circumstance that might not be predictable. In such circumstances, how can other courts learn from that innovation? It is obviously the responsibility of the judiciary, including the president of the family division of the High Court, but we have learnt from bitter experience that some courts and judges are almost impervious to change—I speak with respect to the former one before us. How does the Department seek to use innovation on the frontline in family courts to ensure that family courts in other parts of the country benefit?

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

May I gently push back on that? I understand the hon. Gentleman’s observations about the need to ensure that one modernises and so on, but if we think for a second about the sorts of conditions that the court is likely to impose, those will be along the lines of conditions routinely imposed in respect of bail, for example—not to contact an individual, not to go within a certain a postcode, not to go to a school, not to visit the home or not to contact relatives directly or indirectly.

I am confident that the courts will be well able to impose those conditions without requiring any particular leap of imagination. They will welcome and embrace these powers, which are deliberately drawn widely, so that the courts may apply their everyday experience of the world to understanding what is required to do justice and to provide protection in an individual case.

On the issue of keeping an eye on this, there are data and statistics, which will be published in due course. It will be open to hon. Members, the domestic abuse commissioner and the Victims’ Commissioner to keep a close weather eye on that. I know that the hon. Member for Hove will do precisely that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33

Further provision about requirements that may be imposed by orders

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 33, page 21, line 3, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(2) A domestic abuse protection order that imposes a requirement to do something on a person (“P”) must—

(a) specify the person who is to be responsible for supervising compliance with that requirement; and

(b) meet the standard published by the Home Secretary for domestic abuse behaviour interventions, if the requirement is to attend an intervention specifically designed to address the use of abusive behaviour.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend’s contribution, and I entirely agree with its content. I think there is agreement across the House that we want credibility and consistency for perpetrator programmes to ensure that individuals who have been led into error by their behaviour do not continue to do so, at dramatic cost to both individuals and society more widely. We are absolutely clear that if we do not hold perpetrators to account for their actions, we will not be able to tackle the root cause of domestic abuse. We agree that it is essential for any perpetrator programme imposed as part of a DAPO to provide a high-quality, safe and effective intervention.

Although we support the aim of the amendments, we respectfully think that there is a better way of achieving the end result that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley seeks. At the heart of our response is the idea that quality assurance needs to be looked at in the round, in relation to all domestic abuse perpetrator programmes, not just those imposed by a DAPO, as is provided for in the amendments. Before I develop that point, I will say that consistency and credibility are important not just for the perpetrator or the victim, but for the courts themselves, so that they have confidence that when they impose orders, they will get results. Also, courts may not feel the need to lock someone up if they can reach for an order—whether a DAPO or a community order—in which they have confidence.

It is really important to note that not all domestic abuse perpetrator programmes come via a DAPO. First, a family court could make a referral into a perpetrator programme by, for example, imposing an activity, direction or condition in connection with a child arrangement order. Secondly, the police, probation service and local authorities could work together to impose a programme as part of an integrated offender management programme. Thirdly, there could even be self-referral: there may be individuals who have had a long, hard look at their behaviour and thought, “I need to address this. I am, off my own bat, going to seek a referral into such a programme.” Respect runs a helpline offering information and advice to people who have perpetrated abuse and want to stop.

I am at pains to emphasise that while we want to make sure any programmes delivered via the gateway of a DAPO achieve high standards and are consistent and credible, we should not forget that other programmes are being delivered outwith DAPOs, via different gateways, and we want to ensure that those programmes meet the same standard. Otherwise, we would end up in the perverse and unsatisfactory situation of having a DAPO gateway programme that is great, but other ones that are not.

We propose to take this work forward by using some of the £10 million announced by the Chancellor in this year’s Budget for the development of new interventions for domestic abuse perpetrators. We will work with the domestic abuse commissioner and specialist domestic abuse organisations—along the lines that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley indicated—to undertake mapping and evaluation of the range of perpetrator interventions currently available, and explore what works for different models of quality assurance for domestic abuse perpetrator behaviour change programmes.

By the way, there is already a wealth of promising evidence that we can draw on as part of this work. For example, the Government have already invested through the police transformation fund in a number of innovative approaches to managing perpetrators, including the Drive project led by Respect and SafeLives, to which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley alluded, as well as the whole-system approach to domestic abuse in Northumbria and the Women’s Aid “Make a Change” programme. There is a lot out there, and we need to draw the threads together.

We continue to support the important work of Respect, which is helping to ensure through its service standards that programmes targeted at a range of perpetrators are delivered safely and effectively. We will also draw on the ongoing work of the Ministry of Justice’s correctional services accreditation and advice panel, which accredits programmes for perpetrators who have been convicted of an offence.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Order. To get you out of a hole, Minister, I would say move on.

[Alex Chalk]

It is important to note that clause 66 contains important provisions that allow for exactly what we want to achieve.

Turning to new clause 27 on the perpetrator strategy, I reassure the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley that we have heard the call to action for a perpetrator strategy. We commend the work of the Drive partnership of Respect, SafeLifes and Social Finance, who have done so much to change the narrative and to shift the focus from, “Why doesn’t she leave?”, to, “Why doesn’t he stop?”.

I want to be absolutely clear that we fully recognise the need for increased focus on perpetrators and are ambitious in our aim to transform the response to those who have caused this appalling harm, but to have an increased focus on tackling perpetrators, we do not need to make inflexible provision in the Bill for a one-off strategy. We have made clear our commitment to this work through our allocation of £10 million in this year’s Budget for preventive work with perpetrators. Over the past three years, we have funded a range of innovative approaches to working with perpetrators and we are beginning to build a solid evidence base on what works through some of the programmes I have mentioned: Drive, a whole-system approach to tackling domestic abuse, and “Make a Change”.

We have undertaken work to improve the response to the perpetrators through the criminal justice system. As was set out in the consultation response published alongside the draft Bill, we are taking action to improve the identification and risk assessment of perpetrators. The College of Policing has published key principles for police on the management of serial and dangerous domestic abuse perpetrators, and we are expanding the range of interventions available to offenders serving community sentences.

We recognise the concerns; that is why we want to ensure that we develop and properly test a whole-system approach, in particular through the piloting of DAPOs. It might well prove counterproductive to develop a new strategy without awaiting the learning from those pilots. I hope that, in the light of our intention to work towards that fully comprehensive package of perpetrator programmes and our wider programme of work to confront and change perpetrator behaviours, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley will see her way to withdrawing the amendment.

[Jess Phillips]

I recognise what the Minister says about the fact that perpetrator programmes are used elsewhere. Very often in children’s services, I have seen people sent on perpetrator programmes that, I am afraid to say, are useless. If only everything was as perfect as it is in Westminster.

[Jess Phillips]

I apologise if I did not cover all the boroughs in London. I did not come up with the amendments all by myself; the specialist sector is working with us to ask for these things, and the reality is that, as sometimes happens in this place, we will say how something is on the ground and we will be told that that is not the case. We will be told, “Actually, no; it’s going to be fine because we are going to have a whole-system approach.”

What the Minister says about a whole-system approach is needed wherever perpetrator programmes are issued, rather than just in DAPOs. I could not agree with him more on that point. I shall allow him as many interventions as he likes, and I will speak for as long as it takes for him to get the answer. If he is saying to me that, at the other end of this very notable approach and funding that the Home Office and the Government are putting in place, we will end up with an accredited system that stops the bad practice and the poor commissioning of services, of course I will withdraw the amendment.

Is the Minister saying that we will work towards a standard that will have to be met and that will be compelled—not dissimilar to the standard that we will hopefully come on to tomorrow, where we compel local authorities with a duty? There, I believe, we will be writing a set of standards that the local authority in its commissioning process has to live by, so that it cannot just say, “We’re doing any old domestic abuse services.” There has long been talk at MHCLG about having standards to go with any duty. Is the Minister telling me that we will end up with an accreditation system, which is essentially what I seek?

[Alex Chalk]

The whole point of the approach we are taking is to seek standardisation across the piece. Words like “accreditation” can mean all sorts of things, but certainly it is the case that our absolute aim is to draw on the best practice that we have referred to and combine it with the experience we glean from the pilots to work out what we think is best practice, to clarify what that best practice is and to do everything we can to promulgate that best practice. One can use words like “accreditation” or “standardisation”, but we want to use the mechanisms within the Bill—pilot and guidance—to do precisely what the hon. Lady is aiming for. We recognise that clarity, consistency and credibility are the hallmarks of an effective order, and that is precisely what we want to achieve.

[Jess Phillips]

I welcome what the Minister says. I suppose the reality is that if that does not happen, I have no recourse beyond changing this Bill. Actually, I can just stand in this building and say, “Things aren’t working and we don’t have good perpetrator systems,” but it will largely fall on deaf ears. It might not—we cannot know which ears it will fall on—but, largely, when people come and say that things are not working in whatever we are talking about, it is very hard.

I have a Bill in front of me, and I can attempt to compel this to happen. However, on this occasion—because I would never describe the Minister as having deaf ears, and I am quite confident in my own ability to keep on raising the issue until the right thing happens—I accept and welcome what the Minister has outlined, and I look forward to working on it with him, the commissioner and the sector. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Further provision about electronic monitoring requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 34 sets out the circumstances in which a court can impose electronic monitoring requirements on a person as part of an order, and the nature of such requirements. The clause specifies that the electronic monitoring requirements may not be imposed if the person is not present at the hearing. The clause also specifies that, if there is a person other than the perpetrator who will need to co-operate with the monitoring requirements in order for them to be practicable, they will need to give their consent before the requirements can be imposed. That may include, for example, the occupier of the premises where the perpetrator lives. The court must also have been notified by the Secretary of State that electronic monitoring requirements are available in the area, and it must be satisfied that the provision can be made under the arrangements available. Any order that imposes electronic monitoring requirements must also specify the person who will be responsible for their monitoring.

Where electronic monitoring requirements are imposed, the person must submit to being fitted with the necessary apparatus and to the installation of any associated equipment, and they must co-operate with any inspection or repair that is required. They must not interfere with the apparatus, and they must keep it in working order—for example, by keeping it charged. I trust that the Committee will agree that proper procedures should be in place when a decision is made by the court that electronic monitoring is required.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36

Breach of order

[Alex Chalk]

I beg to move amendment 31, in clause 36, page 23, line 29, leave out

“section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003”

and insert

“paragraph 24(2) of Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020”.

This amendment, and amendments 32, 34, 35 and 37, update references to existing legislation in the Bill to refer to the equivalent provision made by the Sentencing Bill that was introduced into Parliament in March (which will introduce the new Sentencing Code).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Government amendments 32, 34, 35 and 37.

New clause 15—Consequential amendments of the Sentencing Code—

“(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.

(2) In section 80 (order for conditional discharge), in subsection (3), at the end insert—

‘(f) section 36(6) (breach of domestic abuse protection order).’

(3) In Chapter 6 of Part 11 (other behaviour orders), before section 379 (but after the heading ‘Other orders’) insert—

‘378A Domestic abuse protection orders

See Part 3 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020 (and in particular section 28(3) of that Act) for the power of a court to make a domestic abuse protection order when dealing with an offender for an offence.’”

This New Clause makes two consequential amendments to the Sentencing Code as a result of Part 3 of the Bill. The first adds a reference to clause 36(6) to the list of cases where an order for conditional discharge is not available. The second inserts a signpost to Part 3 of the Bill into Part 11 of the Sentencing Code, which deals with behaviour orders.

[Alex Chalk]

Am I permitted to speak to all the amendments? They are all quite technical.

[The Chair]

At this stage, we are debating all the amendments I referred to. You have to move only amendment 31 at this moment, but you can talk about them all.

[Alex Chalk]

That is eminently sensible.

These are minor and technical Government amendments. Clause 36 provides that a breach of a DAPO is a criminal offence. Where someone is convicted of such an offence, clause 36(6) provides that a conditional discharge is not an option open to the court in respect of the offence. As I am sure hon. Members are aware, a conditional discharge means that the offender is released and no further action is taken unless the offender commits another offence within the specified period, at which point they can be sentenced for the first offence at the same time as the new offence.

Misconduct by members of the armed forces and by civilians subject to service discipline, which is an offence in England and Wales—or would be, if it took place there—may also be charged as a service offence under the disciplinary regime of the Armed Forces Act 2006. It means that a breach of a DAPO may come before the court martial and other service courts.

Amendment 33 to clause 36—I will come to amendments 31 and 32 in a moment—makes equivalent provision to clause 36(6), whereas—

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

It is that kind of flexibility in the Chair that we have grown to love and admire. Thank you very much, Mr Bone.

I was saying that amendment 33 makes equivalent provision to clause 36(6). When a service court convicts someone of the offence of a breach of a DAPO, a conditional discharge is not an option that is open to the service court in respect of the offence. Amendments 38 and 39 would make consequential amendments to the extent clause—clause 71—to ensure that the extent of new clause 36(6)(a), inserted by amendment 33, aligns with the extent of the Armed Forces Act 2016. That is a long-winded way of saying that we need to make sure that this measure dovetails with the 2016 Act in respect of the conditional discharge implications.

Amendments 31, 32, 34, 35 and 37, which I hope are on your list Mr Bone, make amendments to part 3 of the Bill—as we know, part 3 provides for DAPOs—and clause 59—

“Prohibition of cross-examination in person in family proceedings”—

and are consequential on the sentencing code. In turn, new clause 15 makes two consequential amendments to the sentencing code as a result of part 3. The first adds a reference to clause 36(6) to the list of cases where an order for conditional discharge is not available. The second inserts a signpost to part 3 of the Bill into part 11 of the sentencing code, which deals with behaviour orders, such as a DAPO.

Members may be asking, “What on earth is the Sentencing Bill?” The Sentencing Bill, which was introduced in the House of Lords on 5 March 2020, provides for the new sentencing code. The new code, which will be transformational for practitioners, is a consolidation of the law governing sentencing procedure in England and Wales. It brings together the procedural provisions that sentencing courts need to rely on during the sentencing process, and in doing so it aims to ensure that the law relating to sentencing procedure is readily comprehensible, and operates within a clear framework and as efficiently as possible.

Amendment 31 agreed to.

Amendments made: 32, in clause 36, page 23, line 36, leave out from “under” to “(conditional” and insert “section 80 of the Sentencing Code”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 31.

Amendment 33, in clause 36, page 23, line 37, at end insert—

“(6A) If a person is convicted of an offence under section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales (within the meaning given by that section) is an offence under this section, it is not open to the service court that convicted the person to make, in respect of the offence, an order under section 185 of that Act (conditional discharge).

In this subsection “service court” means the Court Martial or the Service Civilian Court.”.—(Alex Chalk.)

Conduct that is an offence under the law of England and Wales (or would be if it took place there) may be charged as a service offence, so a breach of a domestic abuse protection order may be dealt with by a service court. This amendment therefore makes provision corresponding to that made by clause 36(6), prohibiting a service court from giving a person a conditional discharge for breaching an order.

Clause 36, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Arrest for breach of order

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to discuss schedule 1 stand part.

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 37 relates to arrest for breach of order and it makes provision for breach of a domestic abuse protection order to be dealt with as a civil matter— that is, as a contempt of court. A breach of an order is a criminal offence under clause 36, which we did not debate, whereby a police officer can make an arrest without a warrant under powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

However, we understand that some victims may be concerned about their partner or ex-partner being convicted of a criminal offence for breaching the order. Where an order is made by the High Court, the family court or the county court, clause 37 makes provision for the victim—the original applicant for the order—or any other person with leave of the judge to apply to the court for a warrant of arrest to be issued. That means that the court can then deal with the breach as a civil matter as a contempt of court. We consider that this allows effective action to be taken by the court following breach of an order, while still providing an option for victims who do not wish to criminalise their partner or ex-partner.

Schedule 1 makes further provision regarding remand under clause 37, where breach of a DAPO is being dealt with by the court as a civil matter. It sets out the procedure whereby the court may remand the person who has been arrested for breach. The process set out is consistent with existing law and replicates the approach the court already takes in regard to remand in such cases. It is sometimes necessary for the court to adjourn the hearing in order to allow for evidence to be prepared. In such cases, the court may decide to remand the person in custody or on bail.

Remand would usually only be used in cases where the court considers that the person arrested for breach is at a high risk of either committing further breaches or evading the return hearing. That may include, for example, if the court considers that person a flight risk.

Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 38

Notification requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 38 provides that all DAPOs will impose notification requirements on the perpetrator, requiring them to notify the police of certain personal details within three days, beginning with the day on which the order is made. The perpetrator will have to provide details of their name, together with any aliases that they use, their home address and any changes to those details. This will help to ensure the police have the right information at the right time in order to monitor the perpetrator’s whereabouts and the risk posed to the victim.

These provisions have been drafted to capture a number of different scenarios, including if the perpetrator has no one fixed address, leaves and then returns to the UK or becomes homeless, helping to ensure their compliance with the notification requirements. There is also a power for the Home Secretary to specify by regulations further notification requirements, which a court may attach to a DAPO on a case-by-case basis, as appropriate. For example, details of the perpetrator’s work place, whether they hold a firearms licence and details of new applications for a spousal visa.

We will use the pilot of the orders to assess whether the current provisions are sufficient or whether it is necessary for the police to be notified of additional information by the perpetrator in order to protect victims. If so, this can be set out in regulations at a later stage.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 39 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 40

Offences relating to notification

Amendment made: 34, in clause 40, page 26, line 22, leave out “section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003” and insert “paragraph 24(2) of Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020”.—(Alex Chalk.)

See the explanatory statement for amendment 31.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 40 simply provides that breach of the notification requirements without reasonable excuse is an offence carrying a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. Again, this sends a very strong message to perpetrators that the Government, as well as the courts, the agencies, the police and so on, take any breaches of these orders very seriously indeed.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 40, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 41

Variation and discharge of orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 41 is about the variation and discharge of orders. Another example of the DAPO’s flexibility is that the requirements imposed by the order can be varied so that the courts can respond to changes over time in the perpetrator’s abusive behaviour. That is important for the complainant, so to speak, as well as for the person who is subject to the perpetrator order. It is important that he—it will usually be a he—can come back to the court to seek to vary it if appropriate. That is why the clause is drafted as it is.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 42 to 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45

Nature of certain proceedings under this Part

Amendment made: 35, in clause 45, page 31, leave out line 15 and insert

“sections 79, 80 and 82 of the Sentencing Code”—(Alex Chalk.)

See the explanatory statement for amendment 31.

Clause 45, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

Special measures for witnesses

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 46 relates to special measures for witnesses. It ensures that victims in DAPO proceedings will be eligible for special measures when giving evidence. As some Members will know, special measures are used to assist vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to give their best evidence, and can include giving evidence from behind a screen, giving evidence remotely via a video link, giving pre-recorded evidence in chief, or giving evidence through an interpreter or another intermediary. Many witnesses in criminal and family proceedings already benefit from access to special measures when giving evidence, and we are strengthening those provisions for victims of domestic abuse in criminal proceedings through clause 58.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47

Guidance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 47— Review of domestic abuse protection orders and notices—

“(1) The Secretary of State must within 12 months of this Act being passed conduct a review into the operation and use of domestic abuse protection orders and notices.

(2) The review must take account of—

(a) the extent to which domestic abuse protection orders and notices have been used;

(b) data on the effectiveness of domestic abuse protection orders and notices in tackling and preventing domestic abuse;

(c) the views of those for whose protection orders and notices have been made.

(3) In designing and conducting the review, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Domestic Abuse Commissioner,

(b) the Welsh Ministers,

(c) organisations providing support to victims and perpetrators of domestic abuse,

(d) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) Upon completion of the review, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a report setting out—

(a) the findings of the review, and

(b) the action the Secretary of State proposes to take in response to the review.”

This new clause would ensure that both DAPOs and DAPNs are reviewed to ensure that they are operating effectively and serving the purpose that they were intended for.

[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 47 requires the Government to issue statutory guidance on the new notices and orders to the police, and to any third parties specified in regulations who may make a standalone application for an order. The recipients of that guidance must have regard to it when exercising their functions. The Government are also required to consult the commissioner before issuing or revising any guidance under the clause. This provision is crucial to help to ensure that frontline practitioners have the knowledge, understanding and confidence to use DAPOs effectively and consistently, in order to help victims and their children.

Topics to be covered by the guidance include how the different application pathways for a DAPO operate, when to consider applying for a DAPO and how to prepare robust application conditions, which may be included in a DAPO, and how to work with victims effectively, highlighting the importance of robust safety planning and referral to appropriate victim support services. We will develop the guidance in collaboration with the police and sector experts, ensuring that it is of high quality and relevant to the frontline practitioners using it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Powers to make other orders in proceedings under this Part

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

The clause relates to powers to make other orders in proceedings under this part. I will speak briefly on this, because it is important. Clause 49 makes provision for DAPO proceedings to be included in the definition of family proceedings in the Children Act 1989 and the Family Law Act 1996, if they are taking place in the family court or the family division of the high court. In practical terms, that will ensure that family judges have access to their powers under the Children Act and the Family Law Act in the course of DAPO proceedings.

For example, if a family judge is hearing an application to make or vary a DAPO, and concerns around child contact arrangements are raised, the judge will be able to make an order under the Children Act without a separate application having to be issued. We consider that that will provide clarity and flexibility to the court, as judges will be able to use their powers under the Children Act and the Family Law Act in any DAPO proceedings to best protect victims of domestic abuse and their children.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 50 to 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Rebecca Harris.)

Oral Answers to Questions

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Tuesday 9th June 2020 Commons Chamber

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

What steps he plans to take to help people who are bereaved after a public disaster.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

The Government are determined to ensure that those who are bereaved after a public disaster are treated with respect and compassion, and get answers. That is why the Government ran a consultation exercise on a proposal for an independent public advocate, and we will publish a response in due course. In addition, earlier this year the Government published a revised guide to coroner services to promote effective participation for bereaved people at inquests. On 23 March this year, the Prime Minister appointed Nick Hurd as an independent adviser working with Grenfell Tower communities to represent their views at the heart of Government.

[Maria Eagle]

I thank the Minister for that answer. He will know that under the ten-minute rule procedure in this House, I have introduced the Public Advocate Bill, which is informed by the experience of more than 30 years of campaigning by the Hillsborough families and survivors, and that Lord Michael Wills has introduced it in the other place. Next time the Minister gets a chance to speak to the Lord Chancellor, will he ask him if he will meet Lord Wills and me to see whether the proposals on which the Government have consulted can be strengthened to ensure that they meet the needs of those bereaved by public disasters, because thousands more of our fellow citizens could now benefit from us getting these provisions right?

[Alex Chalk]

I thank the hon. Lady for her question and pay tribute to her for the campaigning that she has done on this issue. I had the opportunity to speak to my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor just a few seconds ago; he will be happy to have the meeting that she requests.

[Mr Speaker]

I call acting shadow Minister Peter Kyle.

[Peter Kyle (Hove) (Lab)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

Disaster victims, just like victims of crime, deserve to have their rights enshrined in law. Only last week, a murderer was released on parole without the victim’s family even being informed, let alone consulted. Successive Governments have promised and pledged a victims law for the past 12 years. The Tory manifestos for the past three elections have promised a victims law. Will the Government commit to publish the draft Bill by this autumn?

[Alex Chalk]

This Government are absolutely determined to stand up for victims. We will be having a revised victims code and a revised victims law. That is built on a proud record of standing up for victims. [Interruption.] We will be publishing it as soon as possible.

[Andrew Jones (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (Con)]

What steps his Department is taking to increase the use of video and audio to conduct court proceedings during the covid-19 outbreak.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ms Karen Buck (Westminster North) (Lab)]

What steps his Department has taken to ensure access to justice during the covid-19 outbreak.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

The covid-19 outbreak has raised real challenges for the justice system, and we have taken rapid action where we can with the help of practitioners and the judiciary, who have been fantastic, to overcome those challenges and maintain access for all. Some 159 courts remained open across all jurisdictions, and a further 116 were staffed. On 18 May, we were able to restart jury trials, and we will be scaling them up in the weeks ahead.

[Jessica Morden]

As the Secretary of State said earlier, it is estimated that more than 41,000 criminal cases in England and Wales are in the backlog, including three murders in Gwent. There is a real risk that victims of the most serious crimes, including domestic abuse, will withdraw. Will the Minister therefore meet with Gwent MPs virtually to discuss what the Department is doing in our area, as there is a real fear that justice delayed is justice denied?

[Alex Chalk]

I thank the hon. Lady for the very proper concern that she expresses. I or one of my fellow Ministers would be happy to have a meeting. Every effort is being made to increase capacity to the fullest extent possible, but on the specific issue she raised about keeping victims and witnesses engaged, we are very much alive to that. I spend a great deal of time speaking to victims’ services, which do a wonderful job, together with the police, of making sure that victims remain informed, engaged and involved.

[Ms Buck]

The Law Society has highlighted how many legal aid providers are in danger of imminent collapse, because of the financial pressures of covid. They have had warm words from the Government, but no more. Will the Minister tell us what discussions he has had with the Treasury and when he last met it to discuss the plight of legal aid providers?

[Alex Chalk]

Legal aid is absolutely vital in a fair society. It is one of the vital bulwarks of our liberty, and we take extremely seriously the needs of legal aid providers. Steps have been taken to ensure that where there is money in the system—more than £400 million—that is more easily available for practitioners to draw down, so that they can be helped to weather the storm. That is of course over and above other schemes that apply to legal aid practitioners as to everyone else, whether that is the furlough scheme or the bounce-back loans scheme. Those measures are in place to keep these vital providers in business so that they can continue to do their important work.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle (Brighton, Kemptown) (Lab/Co-op)]

If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [Lords]

Alex Chalk Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons
Monday 8th June 2020 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

I am grateful to all Members who have contributed to this debate with such powerful speeches. A wealth of insight and poignant personal experience has been brought to bear, and this debate on such an important issue has been enriched by it. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Stoke-on-Trent North (Jonathan Gullis) and for North Norfolk (Duncan Baker) and the hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr Perkins) for sharing their experiences with the House.

Before responding to the points raised, let me make some brief introductory remarks. Marriages and civil partnerships are vital to society as a way in which couples can formally express their commitment to each other. I support marriage. The Government support marriage. This Bill is not anti-marriage; rather, it is anti-bitterness. In those sad cases where a marriage has irretrievably broken down, the Bill removes unnecessary and artificial flashpoints to reduce the scope for pain, recrimination and, crucially, harmful impact on children. We must accept the reality that some marriages do end. The Bill replaces a broken system which for decades has not operated as its framers intended. I note that it is supported by Resolution, which represents over 6,000 family justice professionals in England and Wales who have to grapple with the current framework every day.

One of the principal problems of the current statute is that it incentivises conflict. It does so in relation to those who wish to divorce before a two-year separation period because of the specific need to particularise the respondent’s unreasonable behaviour and to do so in a way that fits a 50-year-old statute’s prescriptive categories. The trouble is that words have consequences; they can do damage, so that where once there was grief, anger comes; where once there was sadness, bitter resentment follows. The academic study, “Finding Fault?” found that 43% of those identified by their spouse as being at fault disagreed with the reasons cited in the petition. That resentment is not just damaging for the parties themselves; others, particularly children, can be harmed by it too, because it toxifies the atmosphere in which a couple then approach negotiations over arrangements for children and finances. No wonder the president of the Law Society has said:

“For separating parents, it can be much more difficult to focus on the needs of their children when they have to prove a fault-based fact against their former partner… Introducing a ‘no-fault’ divorce…will change the way couples obtain a divorce—for the better.”

[Sir John Hayes]

Leaving aside the issue of fault, will my hon. Friend commit to looking, during the passage of this legislation, at increasing the six-month period, at dealing with the issue of both parties being notified at the outset of the divorce, and at ensuring that there is properly funded counselling and support for reconciliation? If he looks at those things, I think he will satisfy some of the critics of this Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his question, and I pay tribute to the characteristic clarity and eloquence with which he made his representations. Although I cannot give any commitment to specific points, he has made powerful points. On behalf of the Government, I commit to continuing the conversation in Committee.

Part of the problem is that the court has limited means to investigate the circumstances. Having marched the parties up to the top of the hill by requiring petitioners to make allegations, the system rarely inquires into whether those allegations are true. It simply does not have the means to do so. In fact, just 2% of cases are contested, and only a handful progress to a contested court hearing. For more than 40 years, English and Welsh courts have not routinely held divorce trials to prove the allegations set out. That is because most people nowadays recognise that marriage is a voluntary union. When consent disappears, so, too, does its legitimacy.

That lack of inquiry is a problem because allegations may bear little resemblance to reality, but they are presented as established facts. The scope for injustice is obvious. To satisfy the statutory provisions, minor incidents may have to be dredged up and artificially repackaged as a pattern of behaviour. A respondent who, in truth, is a perfectly reasonable individual will have their behaviour branded unreasonable. Conversely, a respondent may have behaved despicably—a point made by the Lord Chancellor —but because of the fear of repercussions, a petitioner may seek to rely on two years’ separation instead. At the end of it all, in the eyes of the law, the culpable respondent will never have been publicly rebuked, and will exit the relationship apparently blameless.

All too often, the law does not do what people think it does. That is not just the Government’s view. Sir Paul Coleridge, a former family judge and chair of the Marriage Foundation, no less, said that the current system

“is, and always has been, a sham”.

I think I may be the fifth person to quote him this evening, but Sir James Munby, former president of the family division, criticised the current law for being

“based on hypocrisy and lack of intellectual honesty”—

a point powerfully made by the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill). The same is true of academia. Professor Liz Trinder, who has conducted extensive research on the divorce process, has branded the current arrangements “a meaningless charade”.

I want to address the points that have been made with great force by my hon. Friends the Members for Cleethorpes (Martin Vickers) and for Devizes (Danny Kruger), and my right hon. Friends the Members for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne) and for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes). To paraphrase—I will not do justice to the way in which they expressed it—the concern that they have raised is that the Bill will undermine the institution of marriage by making divorce more attractive. That is an important argument, and it has to be addressed.

The point is that it is a very sad circumstance indeed when a marriage breaks down, but some marriages do end. The legal process of divorce is not the driver for a marriage breaking down; it is the consequence. That is the point that my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor was making about the telescope. Petitioners do not issue speculative applications for divorce. In the overwhelming majority of cases, they take that step only after reaching a settled conclusion. In those circumstances, we must do all we can to mitigate the pain experienced by the couple and their family, especially the children. We cannot have a system where the legal process works to exacerbate acrimony and suffering where divorce is simply the process of bringing a legal end to a personal relationship that has ceased to function for both parties.

The point that is so often made by practitioners is that very often, individuals are surprised by the convoluted and artificial process that they are presented with. International evidence shows that long-term divorce rates are not increased by removing fault from the process of obtaining a divorce. In short, divorce and dissolution are a sad reality, but one that is sometimes unavoidable. This Bill prevents hardship and misery, and it will help people at a vulnerable time. I commend this Bill to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Hon. Members should now be familiar with the Division process, but I ask all hon. Members other than Front Benchers and Tellers to leave the Chamber by the doors behind me. I will not give the instruction to lock the doors earlier than probably 28 minutes after I call the Division.

Question put, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

Prison Staff: Health and Safety

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Wednesday 18th March 2020 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson.

I thank the hon. Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill) for leading this debate and for starting it in such a helpful and comprehensive way. I also thank the hon. Member for Easington (Grahame Morris), in his absence, for securing it. I entirely agree that he is doing the right thing, as is the Minister for whom I am standing in, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer), who is also self-isolating.

The debate has been genuinely excellent. One of the points made early on was this business about “The Shawshank Redemption”—the extent to which in our constituency mailbags the conditions in prisons are not necessarily the No. 1 priority. However, everyone in this House recognises that the state of our prisons is a critically important aspect of a functioning and decent society. I am grateful to all those who have taken the trouble on this most difficult day to make their points as they have.

I will add my own perspective briefly. A meeting with a constituent that I will never forget was with an experienced prison officer from Cheltenham. He had been seriously injured by an inmate at HMP Bristol, and came to speak to me about what had happened. What was so striking was that, despite that ordeal, he remained in post, undaunted, unbowed and utterly committed to his job. He demonstrated the finest values of the Prison Service, to which I pay tribute—not just with the usual platitudes about dedication, but acknowledging the values of courage, compassion, judgment and professionalism. He also demonstrated what everyone in the debate recognises as important: the determination to root out what Winston Churchill referred to many years ago as the

“treasure in the heart of every man”.

As the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Patricia Gibson) said, being a prison officer can be a rewarding career for that very reason—being able to turn lives around.

Perhaps the most important point that I have taken away from this debate, made by both Government and Opposition Members, is that we need people like my constituent to stay in the Prison Service, because there can be few jobs in which experience is more important. Those senior officers provide leadership to others and set the culture of a successful prison. Equally, as my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) said, those governors who have been in post will make the difference too. That is just one reason why this debate is so timely and important, and I am grateful to the hon. Member for Easington for bringing it before the House.

I will set the context not by way of excuse but as a fact that we have to address. The prison population is more volatile than it was 10 years ago. That is partly down to drugs and partly down to various other social symptoms, I am sure, but that population is more volatile. That is part of the context.

Let me turn, however, to the issue of covid-19, which the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous), rightly raised. Covid-19 is testing, and will test further, every part of our national life. Our prisons will not be immune from that. The most careful thought and planning has gone into preparing our prisons. That work does not emerge from a clear blue sky, but is built on existing and well-developed policies and procedures to manage outbreaks of infectious diseases.

Prevention is of course better than cure, and basic hygiene practice has been rolled out in prisons, as one might expect. For those infected, prisons are well prepared to take action whenever cases or suspected cases are identified. Plans include isolating where necessary. Turning to the point about HMP Berwyn made by the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts), the issue of whether specific prison wings can be used is a matter, quite properly, for consultation with the governor. That may be the appropriate thing to do, but it is not a diktat from Whitehall. I am grateful to the right hon. Lady for raising the issue. The governor will need to be looped into any such decision.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

I seek from the Minister a response to the concern locally that Berwyn will continue to fill. Its population is currently about 1,800, so it is slightly under capacity. It has been filled slowly, deliberately. At this time, it is even more important that there is not a rush to fill that prison, because it has the potential to do very good work in other ways.

[Alex Chalk]

I take that point and leave it where it lies. I thank the right hon. Lady for making it.

There is a long-standing national partnership agreement with the Department of Health and Social Care and Public Health England for healthcare services for prisoners. Under that agreement, people in prison custody who become unwell do, as hon. Members know, have the benefit of on-site NHS healthcare services, which provide the first-line assessment and treatment response.

This second point is really important. We recognise the importance of prisoners maintaining contact with their family during this difficult period. Public Health England supports our desire to maintain normal regimes for as long as we can. If those cannot continue, well-worked-up plans are in place to ensure that that continues by other means, to the fullest extent possible.

Keeping people informed is also essential. We are issuing regular communications to staff and all the individuals in our care to explain the steps that we may need to take to protect them from the virus, to minimise anxiety and ensure maximum understanding and co-operation as the situation develops. That means providing regular updates via National Prison Radio, issuing guidance to staff and governors, providing posters and so on.

Let me turn to the staff impact. Staff have been and will be affected by this disease. We are moving swiftly to make additional staff available to establishments so that if current staff are unable to work because of infection, we can continue to run as normal a regime as possible. Some contingency planning may include the need to ask staff to work in a different place and potentially do different tasks; that will be to ensure that we can maintain frontline operational delivery to protect the public and robustly manage risks. In addition, as and when required, operational staff currently working in headquarters will be redeployed to prisons to support the service to maintain minimum staffing levels. May I take this opportunity to thank the unions, which are engaging proactively and co-operatively in this national endeavour? We are hugely grateful for that support.

The point was made about not penalising non-delivery of teaching hours. That seems to me eminently sensible. I hope that the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd understands why I cannot commit to anything, but I take that point in the spirit in which it was intended and I hope that it will be given appropriate consideration.

Let me turn to the fair point that was made that existing safety measures are necessary to tackle a threat that exists, notwithstanding covid-19. There has been significant investment in increasing staff numbers. We recruited more than 4,000 additional full-time equivalent prison officers between October 2016 and December 2019. A fair point was made on pay. In July 2019, the MOJ accepted the Prison Service Pay Review Body’s recommendations in full. The pay award was worth at least 2.2% for all prison staff, and there was a targeted 3% increase for band 3 prison officers on the frontline. It is the second year in a row that we have announced above-inflation pay rises, over 2%.

However, pay is only part of it. I completely recognise that conditions are critically important, too. How do we go about improving conditions so that experience is embedded in the Prison Service and those valuable officers will remain in place, providing the guidance, the culture and the leadership that a successful prison needs?

The first point is about the key worker role. This critically important initiative allows staff dedicated time to provide support to individual prisoners. That will help us to deal with emerging threats and improve safety, and of course it is important for those individuals to feel that they are being listened to and their concerns addressed. That helps them to feel valued, and of course helps the safety and stability of the prison. Key workers have a case load of about six prisoners. They have weekly one-to-one sessions with their prisoners to build constructive relationships and reduce levels of violence. That has started in all 92 prisons in the male closed estate, with 54 now delivering key work as part of their business as usual.

My hon. Friend the Member for Henley made an excellent point about purposeful activity and gave the useful example of what is happening in Germany and, I think, Denmark as well. That is exactly what we need to be getting to, and I commend him for making that powerful point.

The second point is serious offender intervention. We also have a range of capabilities to manage the risk that the most serious offenders pose in prison, including rehabilitative interventions and separation centres. Mental health was rightly raised. There are mental health facilities, but, as per the entirety of British society, mental health is a bigger issue now than it was in 2010. In fact, one of the bright lights, if I can use that expression, in the prison estate is the improving quality of mental health provision. That needs further strengthening, of course.

The third point is about equipping prison officers. We are committed to providing prison officers with the right support, training and tools. One essential matter is that we have started to roll out PAVA synthetic pepper spray for use by prison officers, but we want to ensure that PAVA defuses tensions, not creates them. All roads lead back to having established and experienced staff, because they will need to use their discretion in a sensible way to operate it.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

The association between PAVA and key workers is understandable, but when many staff are away from duty and dependent on bringing staff in on detached duty to another prison, prisons end up, I am told, without that critical number of key workers—there is a vicious circle and PAVA will not be able to be implemented. Will he commit his Department to looking at how PAVA can actually be brought into prisons? The association between key workers and PAVA at present is not working in all prisons.

[Alex Chalk]

I will certainly look at that and escalate it to the right hon. Lady.

[Patricia Gibson]

Time is slipping away. I appreciate all the Minister is saying about what the Government are doing to make prison officers feel more valued and safe, but I must press him on the issue of pension age. A lot of forceful points have been made today and we have little time left to address them. I ask him simply to say whether he is sympathetic.

[Alex Chalk]

I absolutely take the point that the hon. Lady and others raised. The reality is that whether a prison officer is 68, 67 or 66, there will be challenging circumstances. If there is a 25 year-old prisoner and a 52 year-old officer, that will present real challenges. I do not have a glib response for the hon. Lady, but I have heard the matters that she has raised. To solve the issue of our prisons we need to ensure that there are enough staff of the right level of experience to deal with these challenges. That will be the most important point and, frankly, that will make more difference than whether somebody is 68 or 67. The reality is that we need enough people of the right calibre and the right experience to manage volatile situations.

Time is against me and I want to leave the hon. Member for East Lothian time to respond. I could talk further about the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018, which addresses the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns), who is no longer in her place, raised. It means that those who assault emergency workers, including prison officers, feel the full force of the law.

We are supporting the emotional and social wellbeing of staff, which is critically important, as well as protecting them from violence. They have access to an occupational health service. We are rolling out TRiM—trauma risk management—that, as hon. Members will know, is being rolled out among police forces as well. There are post-incident care teams, occupational health support, cognitive behavioural therapy, and so much more.

The health and safety of our staff and those in our care remains the top priority for the Ministry of Justice, and we are making significant efforts to ensure that the safety challenges in prisons continue to be addressed. Covid-19 presents a new set of challenges. We are tackling them, informed by the best scientific evidence available, alongside the existing health and safety pressures we are facing in our prisons. I take this opportunity to thank prison staff. They are being tested and they are going to be tested. We value, admire and support them, and we are going to get through this.

Sports Coaches (Positions of Trust)

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2020 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Paisley.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Tracey Crouch) for securing this important debate and for her distinguished service as a Minister. Her speech was absolutely in the spirit of that distinguished service.

As my hon. Friend indicated, I have been in post for only a few short weeks, but it is already crystal clear to me that this is an extremely important issue which requires a clear, considered and decisive response. The Government have been reviewing the law in this area. I have said that we should urgently consider all options, including legislative change, and must be in a position to announce next steps by the end of May.

Turning to some basic principles, protecting children and young people from the scourge of sexual abuse and exploitation is a top priority for this Government. Ensuring that the law is effective in providing that protection is not just our priority, but our duty. As most stakeholders acknowledge, however, this area is not without complexity—that is not a reason not to tackle it, but we need to advert to it. I will set out some of the issues and explain why charting the way ahead requires careful thought.

It is worth taking a moment to summarise the state of the existing law. In a short debate, that can only be a brief overview. As we know, sexual activity with a child under 16 is of course always a serious criminal offence, regardless of consent, and non-consensual activity is a crime regardless of the age of the victim or the relationship between the victim and perpetrator.

Alongside those two offences, to turn to positions of trust, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 created a number of offences that specifically target any sexual activity between a 16 or 17-year-old young person and people who hold a defined “position of trust” in respect of that young person, even if such activity is consensual, as my hon. Friend indicated.

Those offences were designed to build on the general child sex offences in the 2003 Act, and are defined to target situations in which the young person has considerable dependency on the adult involved, often combined with an element of vulnerability of the young person. The offences are directed at those who are employed to look after young people under the age of 18, such as those providing care for a young person in a residential care home, a hospital or an educational institution. That particularly adverts to the fact that the state has a role in the child’s development or care.

As my hon. Friend made crystal clear, those offences do not cover all positions in which a person might have contact with, or a supervisory role of, a young person aged under 18. That was a deliberate decision by the Government of the day. In preparation for this debate, I looked up some of the relevant debates. The issue of scope was raised in the other place by Baroness Blatch, a Conservative, on 13 February 2003. She noted that she was “disappointed” that provision had not been made in the Bill to encompass those being supervised as scouts or in youth centres. Interestingly, when responding to her that same day, Lord Falconer said:

“I understand the noble Baroness’s argument, but a line has to be drawn somewhere and we think that is the right place”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 13 February 2003; Vol. 644, c. 878.]

My sense is that that judgment may well be wrong but, in fairness to the noble lord, it is not a straightforward one to make. What is at stake here is a need to balance the legal right, as prescribed by Parliament, for young persons aged 16 and over to consent to sexual activity, with the proper desire to protect vulnerable young people from manipulation.

Another complicating feature is the evolving case law in the area. In certain situations, the criminal division of the Court of Appeal has already been clear that supposed consent may be vitiated or even negated, thereby creating a criminal offence in any event. To put that in plain English and to give an example, in the case of McNally, deception by a defendant as to her sex—she falsely claimed she was a man—was held to vitiate the victim’s consent to intercourse.

That is important because, as the Crown Prosecution Service now indicates in its charging decisions, in certain circumstances that ruling could apply where perpetrators were in a position of power in which they could abuse their trust over a victim. If we look at the CPS charging decision—in other words, when making a decision about whether there truly was consent in a relationship—one of the matters that has to be considered is:

“Where the suspect was in a position of power where they could abuse their trust, especially because of their position or status—e.g. a family member, teacher, religious leader, employer, gang member, carer, doctor”.

The point is that it is no longer necessarily automatically good enough for the defendant to say, “Look, she consented”, if in fact that will was suborned in some way. That might well be a very proper reason why the CPS could conclude that there had been no consent.

[Richard Graham]

On that point, does the list of categories for the CPS to consider include or exclude—or is it neutral on—the issue of sports coaches, music teachers and driving instructors, for example?

[Alex Chalk]

My hon. Friend makes a characteristically pertinent point. That is a non-exhaustive list, which is an important consideration to bear in mind. The proper points that he made are not lost completely on some charging prosecutors, and that is an important part of the context.

[Tracey Crouch]

If that is the case, let us scrap section 21. Then there would be no prescribed list, and a definition of “position of trust”, which the CPS is clearly working on, could include sports coaches, driving instructors and music teachers.

[Alex Chalk]

An interesting balance has to be struck. On the one hand, this place properly might want to prescribe where that happens, allowing no discretion for the CPS, but on the other hand, there may be a relevant public policy interest in saying to prosecutors that in other cases there is wider discretion. I have already made the point that in 2003 Parliament decided to draw a distinction that appears to focus on circumstances in which the state has a particular role in caring for the individual. That is something to be considered.

In 2019 the Government, recognising the concerns powerfully and properly expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford, began a review of the law on such abuses of positions of trust. Notwithstanding the narrow focus of this debate—on sports coaches—concerns about scope range far wider, as indicated by my neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham). That is why the review also took account of the IICSA report—independent inquiry into child sexual abuse—on the Anglican Church, which focused on the diocese of Chichester and the response to allegations against Peter Ball, a former bishop who in 2015 pleaded guilty to a series of sex offences. Recommendation 3 of that report stated:

“The government should amend Section 21 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 so as to include clergy within the definition of a position of trust. This would criminalise under s16–s20 sexual activity between clergy and a person aged 16–18, over whom they exercise pastoral authority, involving the abuse of a position of trust.”

Other settings might conceivably be relevant, such as youth clubs and scouts—as Baroness Blatch pointed out in 2003—and drama groups, choirs, Army cadets and learner drivers, whom my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester has done such a good job of drawing to the attention of the House.

Ministry of Justice officials have engaged with a wide range of stakeholders across youth and criminal justice sectors, including, in the area of faith and religion, the Anglican dioceses of Chichester and Lincoln, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, Gardens of Peace, the Hindu Council UK, Marriage Care, the Sikh Council UK and St Philip’s Centre. In the sporting sector, the review team has heard from British Canoeing, British Fencing, British Gymnastics, the Football Association, the Lawn Tennis Association, the Royal Yachting Association, the Rugby Football League, the Rugby Football Union, Sport England and Swim England—I could go on.

A huge number of people have been consulted on this important issue. Officials have gone beyond those two areas to speak to youth organisations, including the National Citizen Service, the National Youth Agency, the Scouts and Volunteer Police Cadets. Those discussions were candid and wide ranging, and views were shared throughout the process. On behalf of the MOJ, I am extremely grateful to those who have given of their time for that important process.

A number of themes and suggestions emerged during the review, and it is right to note that many were non-legislative in nature. They included the better provision of education, the consideration of the effectiveness of the DBS system in practice, raising awareness and understanding of what grooming and genuine consent really look like, and the measures needed to protect young people from this type of abusive behaviour. Many measures can be taken alongside any potential changes to criminal law, which I am not ruling out at all—we will look at them very carefully. It is important to note that they deserve careful consideration.

[Christina Rees (Neath) (Lab/Co-op)]

As a former national coach for Squash Wales—I notice that squash was not on the Minister’s list—part of my role was to hold coaching courses and increase the number of coaches. There are clear guidelines in squash that coaches cannot form any sort of relationship with a person under their care. I do not think that is good enough. If I could say to those coaches that it is against the law to form a relationship, it is clear cut and definitive. That should be the ruling.

[Alex Chalk]

That is precisely the matter that we have to grapple with. I am grateful to the hon. Lady for expressing her point.

Returning, for completeness, to the exhaustive process of review, most stakeholders that the MOJ heard from felt that a change in the law was required. Most also agreed that any change or reform of the existing laws raised difficult and complicated issues. Some expressed concern that drafting the law too narrowly, or perhaps simply listing roles or jobs considered as a position of trust, risked creating loopholes or definitions that could be easily exploited or circumvented by abusers. Equally, others raised the point that any broad or wide-sweeping new definition could raise the age of consent by stealth.

If we do not get this right, it is not difficult to think of hard cases that would risk undermining confidence in the criminal justice system. One could imagine, as was imagined specifically by Lord Falconer in the 2003 debate, a consensual relationship between a 19-year-old coach and a 17-year-old footballer where no abuse of power or trust had taken place, and with no suggestion of any sort of bargain whereby sexual activity was traded for, say, team selection. In such circumstances, there might be proper public concern about criminalising that coach. Let us be clear: he or she would be at risk of conviction, punishment and disgrace, alongside a conviction that would remain on the police national computer for life. He or she may well be subject to stringent notification requirements. His or her life would be, to a large extent, ruined.

With that in mind, the Government are considering all options, including legislative change, and they are doing so with pace and care. As noted already, I have asked that that work be prioritised, and I will be in a position to announce next steps before the end of May.

This debate has offered a valuable contribution to the evaluation of these important issues. They are important because safeguarding young people in all situations, not just those limited to sport, is essential.

[Tracey Crouch]

Before the Minister concludes, will he give two guarantees? First, will he meet the NSPCC, which is asking not for guidance but for the legislative loophole to be closed? It is the country’s largest child protection charity and it ought to be listened to with respect for the campaign that it has run for a long time. Secondly, will he listen to some audio of former athletes who were abused or were in coercive relationships with their coaches? Once he has listened to their stories and the likes of Sport England and the Child Protection in Sport Unit, perhaps he will come to a different conclusion and take a different path.

[Alex Chalk]

Yes, of course I will be delighted to meet the NSPCC. Secondly, if my hon. Friend wants to send me footage to listen to, I will gladly listen to it. My door remains entirely open if she would like to take up these matters further with me.

I invite my hon. Friend not to presuppose what road the Ministry or I am on. In the short period that I have been seized of this matter, I have recognised its urgency and pressing nature. I have, I hope, properly adverted to the fact that there are complexities that needs to be ironed out. The singular injustice to any victims would be that, in a legitimate attempt to improve safeguarding, we undermine public confidence in it. That is why we have got to get this right—because, ultimately, safeguarding young people will remain a relentless focus of this Government.

Question put and agreed to.