Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting)

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Thursday 19th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Mullan]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer, and to open the first debate on the Bill in Committee as we begin line-by-line consideration. As you explained, Mr Stringer, I thought it might be useful to list the Bill’s measures to provide a wider context for the amendments as we consider them one by one.

First, the Bill will make provisions relating to victims’ experiences in the administration of justice. Secondly, it will create a statutory power for judges to order offenders to attend their sentencing hearings and, if they do not, to give out sanctions that take place in prison. Thirdly, it will restrict parental responsibility for child sex offenders who are sentenced for four years or more for an offence against a child for whom they hold parental responsibility. Fourthly, it will expand eligibility for the victim contact scheme, meaning more victims will be able to access it.

Fifthly, the Bill will strengthen the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers so that they can investigate individual cases in certain circumstances, request information from local authorities and social housing providers, and publish an annual report on compliance with the victims’ code. Sixthly, it will increase flexibility for the Director of Public Prosecutions in appointing Crown prosecutors, and set the rates at which prosecutor costs in private prosecutions can be recovered from central funds. Seventhly, it will amend the time limit within which the Attorney General can refer a sentence to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that it is unduly lenient. Finally, the Bill will amend magistrates court sentencing powers for six either-way offences, bringing them in line with other offences.

The Opposition have not sought to amend, and will not seek to oppose, a number of the Bill’s measures, and I am sure there will be cross-party support for many of them, but we wish to push the Government to go further in other areas.

The first group of amendments relates to the provisions that are meant to ensure that offenders attend their sentencing hearings. It is important to lay out the value of offenders attending such a hearing. Open and transparent justice is a cornerstone of our legal system. It is often said that it is important not just that justice should be done, but that it is seen to be done.

There is something tangible and direct about an offender being present in court to hear all the elements of the sentencing hearing at first hand, in front of victims and their friends and family, the offender’s own friends and family, and potentially the wider public and the press, who help to share what happens more widely. In particular, victims and their friends and family may want to see it happening. This will often be true of the sentence itself, and the remarks that reflect back some of the impact of a crime, but it will be particularly true for the parts of the sentencing hearing when we hear directly from those affected by a crime.

Victim personal statements, commonly known as victim impact statements, are a crucial reform of our justice system that tries to give a voice to victims and their friends and family. As we will consider later in proceedings, they might not be working as well as they could be, but they remain incredibly important. Many people want to see the offender hearing those statements, and want to know that the offender cannot escape the consequences of their actions or from hearing directly from the people they have impacted. The statements may be read out by the victim themselves or by their friends and family. The authors may or may not be present. We heard evidence from Paula Hudgell from Justice for Victims about the positive impact of victim personal statements in her experience of the judicial system.

I am sure we have all read and heard about recent examples of offenders having derailed the process, escaped accountability and robbed victims and their families of its healing power. In the evidence session the hon. Member for Knowsley spoke about the case of her constituent Olivia Pratt-Korbel, whose killer refused to attend the sentencing, and whose mother Cheryl has campaigned hard to right that wrong for others. I have met and spoken with Ayse Hussein, another member of Justice for Victims, who campaigned for something to be done in memory of her cousin Jan Mustafa. The Minister and I have met and spoken with other campaigners.

Kyle Clifford raped his former partner, Louise Hunt, who was 25, and used a crossbow to shoot both her and her sister Hannah, who was 28, having already fatally stabbed their mother, 61-year-old Carol, at the family home in Bushey. He was given a whole-life order—which I will return to—and refused to attend his sentencing.

As MPs, we know that behind every case reported in the media will be cases that are not. But the experiences of those people are no less important, which is why the previous Government committed to introducing powers to try to ensure that offenders attend their sentencing hearing. I am pleased that this Government have agreed with that in principle.

Although I welcome the aim, the shadow Justice team have looked afresh at how best to achieve the right outcome and tabled good-faith amendments to make it more likely that we achieve it. The shadow Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), and I are both committed to never being shackled by historical thinking and approaches when it comes to ensuring that we deliver for victims and their families, and we are doing that in two vital ways.

Amendments 13 and 14 would introduce a duty to consult the victim or their family as part of the enaction of the powers in clauses 1 and 2. I talked earlier about the different people and groups that derive a benefit from the offender attending the sentencing hearing, but of all those with an interest in seeing that happen, victims and their families can be considered the most important. Although the evidence we heard was clear that not every victim would want an offender to be there, and not every victim would want to see force used and risk the disruption of proceedings to make it happen, some would.

The representations we heard from victims groups almost universally supported the idea that the process should involve consultation with victims and their families. All agreed that it would be a welcome reform. Consultation is part and parcel of what the Government do day in, day out; I am sure the Minister has spent many hours reviewing and reading consultation results. The law often requires meaningful consultation before the Government or many arm’s length bodies make significant decisions. As MPs, we all undertake our own consultations, in which we give constituents the chance to let us know their views on something that affects them.

Surely a Bill about victims—named as it is—should reflect its commitment to delivering for victims and would want wherever possible to orientate its measures to victims. A measure on consultation would do just that. Specifically, the amendments would require consultation on occasions when a judge is minded to make a decision to deny victims and family members the opportunity to see the offender at the sentencing hearing. In that scenario, it is important that victims and family members can at least know for certain that the judge was not ignorant of how important it was to them and how they would feel should the judge decide not to compel the offender’s attendance. They would be able to explain their views to the judge directly. Victim personal statements were introduced to give a voice to victims when determining sentences; we are saying victims should also be given a voice on another important matter.

The proposed change is modest but important. Just like victim personal statements, it would not dictate the outcome—a right to be consulted does not constitute a right to decide—and it would not encroach on judicial independence, as the decision rests with the judge. The pain that can be caused when an offender refuses to attend sentencing is profound. Families can feel indirectly silenced, robbed of their moment to see justice done. We should at least ensure that victims are afforded the right to know that decisions about them are not taken without them. The amendments are about respect, participation and dignity. No decision that can have a profound impact on a victim should be taken without first simply speaking to them.

I ask Members of all parties to support our amendments, knowing that doing so will demonstrate a commitment to victims and their families, and ensure that their voices are heard as part of the process, as we seek to ensure that attendance at the sentencing hearing becomes as close to mandatory as we can possibly make it. I know that will be a commitment everybody shares.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairship today, Mr Stringer. I thank the shadow Justice Minister for introducing the amendments he tabled, and the Government appreciate his support of the Bill in principle. The amendments would place a statutory duty on judges to consult victims or their families before deciding whether to use their powers under the measures in clauses 1 and 2 to order an offender to attend their sentencing hearing.

I want to stress that victims and their families have been at the forefront of this legislation, and clause 1 will help to ensure that their voices and the impact of the crimes they have suffered are heard and understood by the perpetrators. We anticipate that, in making decisions, judges will take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including the wishes and views of the victims and their families. However, mandating a duty to consult victims risks undermining judicial discretion and the ability of judges to make decisions based on the facts in front of them.

Judges will of course consider any representations put to them by the prosecution on behalf of victims and their families, but they must also take into account the safety of prison and court staff, the efficiency and fairness of proceedings and the risks that a disruptive or resistant offender may cause further distress to victims and delays to justice. Retaining judicial discretion in such cases is therefore crucial to ensure that courts can make decisions in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including those of victims and their families. I therefore urge the shadow Minister to withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Mullan]

I understand the Minister’s desire to ensure that all the things she listed remain the purview of the judge, which is why the amendment makes it clear that they will. Nothing about consultation removes the judge’s ability to decide the factors that they wish to consider, to hear representation from others and to take in mind the safety and wellbeing of court staff and other people in the court. A duty to consult is simply that: a duty to ensure that victims are taken into account.

I draw the Minister’s attention back to victim personal statements. Prior to them being a statutory requirement, people would have made the same arguments. Of course, the judge would have provided an opportunity to consider what victims had to say, but we were clear that such an opportunity was too important, and that we needed to ensure, on a statutory basis, that the victims and their families had the opportunity to say what they wanted about the impact of the crime. I do not think this is any different. A consultation provision would guarantee that victims have a voice as part of the process, while retaining judicial independence to make the ultimate decision whether someone attends a sentencing hearing.

The Opposition will not withdraw the amendment. We think this issue is important, and I cannot reasonably think that Members will be able to explain to their constituents why they did not want to guarantee that a judge would simply have a conversation with a victim or their family about whether someone should be compelled to attend a sentencing hearing.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Amendments 15 and 16 would change the circumstances in which force may be used to bring an offender to court. They would effectively extend those circumstances to situations in which disproportionate—but not grossly disproportionate—force is required to secure attendance.

Based on the debate we have had, it might be beneficial if I explain how the system currently works. The use of force by prison officers is currently justified, and therefore lawful, only if it is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. We are quite deliberately legislating to permit the use of lawful force, which is a test that is well understood and used throughout the criminal justice system. I remind hon. Members that the previous Government used the same test in their attempt to get this measure passed.

Prison and prisoner escort staff are trained to employ the lawful use of force and are experienced in making judgments about the circumstances in which the use of force is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. They are also trained in the use of existing approved techniques for moving reluctant or resistant prisoners safely around the prison and court estate. In recent cases, such as that of Nicholas Prosper, we have seen how they effectively employ the same techniques to restrain offenders and bring them to court to hear justice being done.

Clearly defined boundaries for the use of force, which are well understood by custody officers, ensure that escorting staff are not subject to unreasonable or unmitigated risks when bringing offenders to court. Where it is deemed unsafe or unreasonable to use force, prisons will discuss with courts how best to proceed. Where attendance is considered necessary, the court can consider making a direction for the offender to appear via live video link. That option is more manageable for the prison to enforce and minimises the potential for impactful disruption to proceedings, which can, as we have heard, lead to a spectacle in the court.

An offender who is deemed too violent or disruptive to attend court in person or by live link would, under these measures, be found in contempt of court and subject to a further prison sentence or other punishment. We are going further than the previous Government and ensuring that, where offenders do not take responsibility and face victims’ families, they are punished.

Offenders should not be forced to attend court if it would risk the safety of custody officers or court users, or disrupt proceedings, causing undue distress and further delay to victims and their families. Our measures strike the right balance in requiring that the use of force must be proportionate, reasonable and necessary, ensuring the safety of all court users and minimum disruption to court proceedings.

Amendment 23 would give judges the power to order a disruptive offender to be restrained and gagged in court during their sentencing hearing. It would also introduce a duty on the court to consult victims or their families before making a decision to have the offender removed from the hearing instead. The Government appreciate that an offender’s refusal to attend their sentencing hearing, or their disruptive behaviour during that hearing, can cause anger and upset for victims and their families, and we heard that during the evidence sessions. That is why the measures in the Bill reinforce the expectation that offenders should attend their sentencing hearings and behave appropriately in court. They give judges the powers they need to do what is right in each individual case.

Decisions on the use of restraints to manage offender behaviour are a matter for prison officers and prison escort staff. They will make decisions about the use of force depending on the circumstances of each individual case. The use of force must be reasonable, necessary and proportionate, and restrained prisoners must be brought to court using approved techniques in our prison system for moving individuals safely. Gagging prisoners is not an approved technique in our prison system and is unlikely to be considered a lawful use of force in these circumstances. Its use may in fact increase the risk of violence or disruption to the point where officers would have no choice but to remove the offender from court. Amendment 23 is therefore unlikely to achieve its intended outcomes.

We will not allow offenders to achieve the outcomes they intend of continuing to traumatise victims and families or disrupting proceedings, by not attending court or causing a circus or spectacle. Should a judge deem it necessary, the offender will be removed and the judge can add an additional sanction to punish them properly. Forcing disruptive prisoners to remain in court at any cost would jeopardise officer safety and delay proceedings and could cause unnecessary distress for victims and their families. Is that what the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle intends with his amendments? They are unlikely to achieve the intended objective of the Bill, which is to ensure that offenders face up to their crimes and hear the impact of their actions on victims and their families. A more productive and realistic approach would be to punish the offender for disobeying the order to attend their hearing and failing to show any respect for victims and their families or the court.

The measures in the Bill were produced in consultation with families; they asked for them and we listened. Our measures give judges the option to punish any adult offender who, following an attendance order, becomes disruptive in court and is removed from the hearing, by ordering up to two additional years in prison, an unlimited fine and/or the imposition of numerous potential prison sanctions. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle to withdraw his amendment because of the risk of unintended consequences and the prevention of justice for victims and their families.

[Dr Mullan]

I thank the Minister for her response. She says that judges will have the powers they need. As I think I clearly explained, those powers might be helpful in some circumstances, but for the very worst offenders—the kind that have been in the news and have caused us to think more clearly about this issue, in particular those on whole-life orders, for whom a sentence extension means nothing—

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I implore the hon. Gentleman, in his efforts to ensure that offenders face families and justice, to explain why none of the additional measures that he proposes were in the previous Government’s Bill.

[Dr Mullan]

As I have said very clearly, I am a shadow Justice Minister now, and the new shadow Secretary of State and I make justice policy. I am not afraid to go further than previous Governments, and I will not be restrained by what they did. I did not make those previous policies; it was not my decision how they were enacted. I am confident that the public will respond positively to our attempts to go even further on these measures.

As I was saying, the worst offenders, who are in our minds when we consider these offences—those on a whole-life order, for example—do not care about a custody extension because they cannot have one. They are never getting out of prison, so they are never paying a fine. The Minister listed examples of sanctions, which included not being able to watch TV or go to the gym. Do we really think those are the sorts of measures that will have hardened, violent criminals quaking in their boots? I do not think they are.

The Minister said the measures in the Bill were developed in consultation with victims. I have absolutely no doubt that victims will welcome them—the sanctions, prison time extensions and fines. They are all welcome sanctions and will be appropriate for a whole range of victims, but some of the very same victims that she consulted—I spoke to two of them—would also welcome a further strengthening of the measures. If all a criminal has to do to get out of being in court is make noise—that is literally the test we are putting before ourselves today—there will be very many of them who are happy to do that in order to ensure that they do not have to face the accountability of the system.

The Minister talked about what is legal now. We are legislating—we are making the law—so it is up to us what is legal. We can make the decision that something is legal. I have given a concrete example of another jurisdiction where the sort of restraint that we propose is used successfully—it has not been tried and found not to work; it is used successfully. There is absolutely no reason not to assume that we can make it a success in certain situations in this country.

Our amendment 23 would not compel the judge to act—there is no compulsion. The judge would remain able to decide, but they would be given the clear power to act in this way if they think it is appropriate in all the circumstances. I am confident in the validity of the amendment and the positive impact it would have on victims and family members who were willing to see it used and felt that the potential disruption to the court proceedings was a price worth paying.

As the HMPPS staff member and the police officer we heard evidence from attested to, such a change in policy would take training and resource. Of course, we would expect the Government to develop training in support of the enactment of the measure. A lack of such training right now is no reason not to make the power available to judges.

I am conscious of the time, and the fact that we might wish to push this measure to a vote at a further stage, so I will not seek a Division today. However, we remain convinced of the legitimacy of this measure and will ensure that it is voted on at a later stage so that the public can understand which side Government Members are on. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Anneliese Midgley (Knowsley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I just want to say a few words about the provisions in this Bill on attending sentencing hearings and related prison sanctions, because this issue is incredibly personal to me. I do not think we would be sitting in this Committee today, with this Bill in our hands, without my constituents Cheryl Korbel and Antonia Elverson, who have fought hard to make this happen.

Many of us will know Cheryl’s story: just quickly, for the record, her nine-year-old daughter, Olivia Pratt-Korbel, was tragically shot and killed in their own home in 2022. As if that was not horrific enough, the man who killed her, Thomas Cashman, did not turn up to court and did not attend that sentencing hearing, which meant that Cheryl did not get to read her victim impact statement out to him. There was confusion at the court; she did not know what was happening, and it came very late in the day. This has been a source of pain, because she felt out of control and that she had a lack of agency.

In my first surgery, Antonia and Cheryl came in and told me about their case, and I have had the pleasure and the privilege of supporting them. I want to thank the Government and put on record today that I have been in every meeting with them, with the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor and this Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd. That was not just consultation; it was Antonia and Cheryl’s suggestion about sanctions and attending the sentencing hearing that put this measure in the Bill. I thank the Government for listening to and acting for people. I know that there were other families on the frontline who were listened to as well.

This measure is because of those family members, and I pay tribute to them. This is what a Government can do when they really listen to people and act in that reality. That is why we have this Bill today.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank my hon. Friend for that powerful speech. I place on the record my thanks to her and her constituents for all of the brilliant work that they have done in ensuring this measure becomes law, and to ensure that no other families have to face what her constituents and, sadly, many other families have had to face.

I will speak to both clauses 1 and 2 at the same time, as they are very much linked. In recent years, as we have heard, several murderers—most recently Lucy Letby and Kyle Clifford—have refused to attend their sentencing hearings. That causes victims’ families significant further distress. It can be seen as a final insult, denying the families the opportunity to see the full administration of justice for their loved ones and allowing offenders to avoid having to hear and confront the consequences of their horrific crimes. The provisions in clause 1 and 2 recognise the impact that such behaviour has on victims and their families in compounding their trauma.

Clause 1 inserts proposed new sections 41A and 41B into a new chapter 2A within part 3 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Proposed new section 41A introduces an express statutory power for the Crown court to order an offender to attend their sentencing hearing. It makes clear that an offender who refuses to attend their hearing without reasonable excuse commits a contempt of court, meaning that adult offenders are liable for an additional two years’ custody and/or an unlimited fine, or, in the case of a child offender, a maximum penalty of £2,500. That also applies to offenders who, following an order to attend, commit contempt by misbehaving or disrupting the proceedings and are removed as a result.

Proposed new section 41A makes it clear that, for adult offenders, reasonable force, where necessary and proportionate, can be used to give effect to the court’s order to deliver them for their sentencing hearing. The final decision on whether to use reasonable force will remain with the prison and escorting staff. Children will not be subject to reasonable force for this purpose, in line with existing policy.

The second part of clause 1, proposed new section 41B, goes further than ever before by introducing a new power for Crown court judges also to impose prison sanctions on any adult offender who is subject to an attendance order and commits a contempt of court by refusing, without reasonable excuse, to attend their sentencing hearing, or who attends, but is removed from the hearing because of their conduct. That can be instead of or alongside any other punishment imposed by the court.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

Does the Minister accept that, unamended, this measure will simply require an offender to make a lot of noise in order to get out of all the things that she is saying about them actually being at the hearing? Sanctions are there, but in terms of them actually being at the hearing, all they will have to do is make some noise.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome that intervention, but I disagree with the hon. Member. We have seen most recently cases in which offenders have been brought to court despite their reluctance. The prison officers and court staff have been able to get them there with the use of reasonable force. Then they have started to disrupt proceedings, but once the judge has explained to them some of the measures that are available currently—not these sanctions, because we have not yet made this law, but those measures that are currently available—that has resulted in the sentencing hearing being allowed to go ahead. What the hon. Member says is not always the case.

[Dr Mullan]

I absolutely accept that it will not always be the case, but does the Minister accept that some people will not be bothered by those measures and will be able simply to use noise to escape accountability?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

We need to be careful on what we deem as noise. If, as we have heard in the Committee’s evidence sessions, an offender is beginning to make the sentencing hearing a spectacle or a circus and that is causing more distress to the victims and their families and preventing the course of justice, the judge will have the power to remove the offender from the court. However, with our new measures, the judge will have the power to impose these sanctions on them in prison, issue the unlimited fine and impose more time in prison. That will still be a measure even if they attend, cause a spectacle and have to be removed. They will be punished, and that will be explained to them if they continue to carry on.

I go back to the Armed Forces Act and the effect that these new measures will also have on service courts, because that is important. We need to remember that justice is done in a number of courts in our country and not just in the Crown court. Offenders before service courts who commit a contempt are liable for a fine or 28 days’ service custody—or, alternatively, the offence may be considered by a civilian court for the purposes of contempt of court proceedings. Where an offender is ordered to attend a service court from prison, but fails to do so or—as the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle said—attends, but is removed from the hearing because of their conduct, they may similarly receive a prison sanctions order.

I recognise that these provisions may not guarantee that every offender will attend their sentencing hearing when so ordered or that they will not create a spectacle during the sentencing hearing. However, these measures reinforce the expectation that offenders should attend their sentencing hearing and behave appropriately. We need to ensure that justice is seen to be done by victims, their families and the wider public, to create trust in our justice system. The measures will ensure that offenders are appropriately punished for failing to do that. Judges will retain the discretion to make decisions based on the facts of the case in front of them. I therefore urge that clauses 1 and 2 stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Power to compel attendance at sentencing hearing: armed forces

Amendment proposed: 14, in clause 2, page 4, line 11, at end insert—

“(3A) If the court is minded not to make an order under subsection (2), the court has a duty to consult the victim and their family if they are deceased.”—(Dr Mullan.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

It is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments: amendment 8, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato); amendments 17 and 18, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle; amendment 24, tabled by the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde); and new clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromsgrove.

Amendments 17 and 24 seek to remove the four-year custodial threshold for the automatic restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility. The restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility is a serious and far-reaching measure. It must be applied with care and in a manner that is a legally robust, while also protecting the most vulnerable. The requirement for a four-year custodial sentence provides a defined marker of seriousness.

This thresholds aligns with existing sentencing frameworks. Section 244ZA and schedule 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 specify a list of serious offences, including child sexual offences, that are considered serious enough to warrant that the offender must serve at least two thirds of their sentence in custody, rather than the standard half when they are sentenced. The amendment would lower this threshold and require the Crown court to make the prohibited steps order when the offender is sentenced for any period of imprisonment or detention.

I want to be clear that any offence against a child is unacceptable and one of the most heinous crimes in society. Restricting the exercise of parental responsibility is a serious step and not a decision to be taken lightly. That predetermined marker of seriousness ensures that any order made by the Crown court happens automatically only where the offender has committed serious and grave offences against a child who they are supposed to look after.

[Dr Mullan]

The Minister has a wealth of colleagues around her who are covering these issues, including—as I understand it—the Home Office Minister responsible for safeguarding, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips). What does this Minister say to the Home Office Minister about her previous position that a provision of the kind that the Government have drafted was too narrow? Has this Minister spoken to her colleague about that, and does her colleague personally agree with the measure as currently drafted by the Government?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The hon. Gentleman will know, having been in Government before the election, how Government collective responsibility and consultation with other Government Departments work. The safeguarding Minister and I are responsible for the Government’s strategy on violence against women and girls, which commits to halving it within a decade. Of course, the family courts are playing an integral role in that, and we seek to build on it. I will talk more about that shortly. Where we need to go further, this Government will.

We have used the statutory framework because it reflects the Government’s view that the offences are exceptionally serious. It is therefore appropriate that the same threshold be used to determine when an automatic restriction on the exercise of parental responsibility should apply. I understand and appreciate the rationale but, because there are existing processes to seek the restriction of parental responsibility, it is essential that there is a threshold and a clear marker for it to happen automatically.

[Alex Brewer]

There are mechanisms in place, but they put undue onus on the non-offending parent. Does the Minister agree that the onus should be shifted to the offending parent?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I agree that the current situation in the family courts is difficult, and it can be traumatic for parents who are seeking to have a parental order removed. That is why we have taken the measure in the Bill. It is a new approach, through which we seek to remove parental responsibility on automatic conviction in the Crown court. As I said in oral evidence, this is not something we do lightly, but we feel that it is necessary in order to protect offenders’ and perpetrators’ own children from the most serious offences. I am happy to work with the hon. Member for North East Hampshire to consider what further work we can do to reform the family courts. The Department is working closely on that, and we know we need to get it right in order to protect all children from these crimes, whether or not restrictions to parental responsibility are sought via the family courts or automatically, with this measure, in the Crown court.

Amendments 18, 24 and 8 seek to expand the circumstances in which the Crown court should make a prohibited steps order to include cases in which the offences were committed against any child. Again, it is important to be clear that child sexual abuse is an abhorrent crime that leaves a lasting impact on victims and their families. Those affected have my deepest sympathies, and it is they who we must have in our minds when we debate the measure.

The current provision is carefully targeted. It ensures that automatic restrictions on the exercise of parental responsibility apply only when there is a direct and recognised relationship between the offender and the child victims. Our focus on offenders who have committed a serious child sexual abuse offence against a child for whom they hold parental responsibility is based on a desire to tackle the cases involving child sexual abuse with the highest direct harm to the perpetrator’s children. This is, as I have already said, a novel and untested change to the law, and the response from perpetrators is unpredictable. We know that perpetrators often seek to use the family courts, as we have already heard, to further traumatise victims, and they could therefore seek to appeal the removal of responsibility.

[Caroline Voaden]

Does the Minister agree that somebody who has been convicted of a serious child sexual offence against a child for whom they do not have parental responsibility still poses a danger to their own child?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I agree with that point. It is important that we recognise, as I have stated, that there are other measures to remove a person’s parental responsibility for their own child through the family courts. I stress that this is a novel approach. We need to look at the justice system as a whole; we cannot consider our various courts in isolation. The measure being carried out in the Crown court could make an impact on the delays that exist in the family courts, thanks to the backlog that we inherited from the previous Government. I do not wish to exacerbate that, or to traumatise any other children and families who are going through the family courts, by further increasing that backlog. For that reason, we wish to keep the measure quite small and novel, as it is untested at present; however, once we have seen how it works, there is the possibility perhaps to go further in the future.

[Dr Mullan]

We all recognise that this is a novel measure. I do not think that anyone is suggesting introducing a blanket measure. For example, we have used the custodial threshold as a narrowing measure and the Liberal Democrats have used a serious sexual offence as a narrowing measure. The Minister is talking about the balance that needs to be struck, but surely the balance is not being struck correctly when the decision is that only a child for whom someone has parental responsibility brings this measure into scope. Surely that is not the right balance, despite the weighing exercise that I appreciate the Minister has to undertake.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

It is important to note that a line does need to be drawn, as the hon. Member has recognised; there does have to be a balance. In the previous Government’s version of the Bill, there was a different threshold, which was child rape of any child. We have changed that.; in this version, the measure is any child sexual offence where there is four years or more in custody, but only of the offender’s own child. As a Government, we have determined that as the necessary threshold. That is different from the previous Government’s threshold, which was only child rape. I think that recognises the difficulty in drawing a balance here.

We need to take a more limited approach for the time being, especially initially, to ensure that, as I have already said, the family court is not overwhelmed by endless appeals from perpetrators causing even more traumatisation to victims, and especially children. This is essential so that other victims and families with cases in the family court are not detrimentally impacted.

Our intention with clause 3 is to tackle the cases with the highest direct harm to the perpetrator’s children. That is why we have chosen to focus the measure in the way that we have. It is important that we properly understand the impact any additional family court proceedings will have on the children and families involved. The cohort in scope of this measure is at the highest risk of immediate harm from the perpetrator, which is why we have chosen to focus on that cohort. This does not prevent an application being made to the family court for parental responsibility to be restricted in other circumstances, as is already available.

Amendment 8 suggests using the Crown court to gather evidence on the best interests of the child and the level of risk the offender poses to the child. Doing so would place a significant new burden on the criminal court, meaning less capacity to hear criminal cases and even longer waiting times for those seeking justice. The proper forum for that consideration to happen is the family court, where the judge can hear from all relevant professionals and have access to any necessary reports before making a decision that will always be based on the best interests of the children involved.

We are already going further than the previous Government did with their Criminal Justice Bill. Those proposals were limited to child rape; our measure includes not only child rape, but a broader range of child sexual offences. Most important of all, the previous Government talked of change, but failed to deliver. We will deliver this change to protect children. We all have a huge amount of sympathy for families in these circumstances, and I want to do all we can to support them in getting the right outcome for their children.

New clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromsgrove, seeks to expand the instances where the Crown court will be under a duty to restrict the exercise of a perpetrator’s parental responsibility at the point they are sentenced to 10 years or more for a serious sexual offence or violent offence committed against someone with whom they share parental responsibility for the child.

I reassure the hon. Member that there are already clear powers in the family court to restrict parental responsibility where it would be in the best interests of the children involved. If a parent or other interested party wishes to make an application, they can do so. Where relevant, the family court is able to and will remove parental responsibility or restrict it to the point that it cannot be exercised in any meaningful way.

The existing law is clear that in every case, the court’s paramount consideration must be what will be in the best interests of the child. We cannot rule out that sometimes it may not be in the child’s best interests for parental responsibility to be removed or restricted, particularly where the child is not the direct victim of the offence. However, as the Lord Chancellor and I have said, we look forward to working constructively across the House on this measure. While we cannot support new clause 13, we remain committed to ensuring that the law robustly protects children. I reassure hon. Members that the Government will continue to work to strike the right balance on this issue.

For the reasons I have outlined, I urge hon. Members to withdraw their amendments so that we can continue to develop this important legislation in a way that is principled and practical and gets the balance right for children.

[Alex Brewer]

I thank the Minister for her comments. While I understand that this is a novel approach and I welcome the measures in the Bill as a first step, we believe that they do not go far enough and still leave children at risk.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Brewer]

I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 3, page 6, line 19, after “justice” insert—

“or of a child and the non-offending parent”.

This amendment would mean that a judge could have discretion to decide not to make a prohibited steps order when it was not deemed in the interest of a child and the non-offending parent.

This is a small amendment that would continue to put children at the heart of this Bill. There are times when a court should not make a prohibited steps order in relation to a child. In the evidence session, we heard from many charities that children are not sufficiently heard as victims of crimes, and that their voices are not carried forward. We would like to include a small amendment that would put children and the non-offending parent at the heart of that decision making in the courts.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Amendment 25 was tabled by the hon. Member for Eastbourne, for whom I have much respect, and seeks to amend clause 3 to allow the Crown court discretion not to make a prohibited steps order in cases where it considers such an order not to be in the best interests of the child or the non-offending parent. Let me begin by acknowledging the intent behind this amendment. It is of course right that we consider the welfare of children and the rights of non-offending parents in all decisions made by the court. However, the Government cannot support this amendment for several reasons.

The clause as drafted already strikes a careful and considered balance between protecting children and respecting judicial oversight. We have included a narrowly defined exemption to allow the Crown court the flexibility not to make a prohibited steps order, which is a section 8 order under the Children Act 1989, where it would not be in the interests of justice to do so. That provision is intended to cover exceptional circumstances where the Crown court does not consider it to be in the interests of justice, which may arise from unusual facts or a case that is particularly complex. It ensures a degree of flexibility without undermining the core safeguarding purpose of the provision in the Bill.

The family court is the appropriate forum for determining what would be in the best interests of children and navigating the complexities of individual family circumstances. It is uniquely equipped to consider the full facts of each individual case, drawing on the expertise of all relevant professionals and supported by any necessary reports. That enables the judge to make a fully informed decision, one that is always guided by the paramount principle of the child’s best interests. The Crown court simply is not equipped to carry out that detailed consideration.

Legislation already provides a route for family members to bring an application to the family court, so it can consider whether the order should be varied or discharged and whether a more tailored order or other family court orders are required, and ensure that any order is consistent with the best interests of the child or children involved in the individual circumstances. This avenue is still open for families where the Crown court has made an order under the provisions of clause 4.

Alongside that existing route into the family court, we are also providing a clear new route in certain circumstances. If the offender is acquitted of the relevant offence, or their sentence is reduced to less than four years—I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify this point, because it was raised when I gave evidence to the Committee—the local authority is under a duty to bring the matter back before the family court. This ensures that decisions remain responsive to the best interests of the child, without compromising the initial safeguarding intent of the judge. The Government are committed to ensuring that the justice system protects children from further harm from such offenders. The provisions in clause 3 are a vital part of that commitment.

I also place on record the Government’s commitment to consulting on a new victims’ code, specifically with the intention of addressing concerns, raised by the hon. Member for North East Hampshire, regarding how we can ensure that child victims are at the centre of the justice system. As she has said, for the first time ever, children are considered victims in their own right for crimes such as domestic abuse, in law; but, as we know, in practice that sadly is not the reality for many child victims. Therefore this Government are determined to go further. Under our new consultation on the victims’ code, which we are hoping to launch later this year, we will make it a key focus to ensure that the code works for all victims, with a particular focus on children in mind.

I understand the reasons why the hon. Member for Eastbourne has tabled this amendment, but I hope that he and the hon. Member for North East Hampshire are reassured that there are already strong provisions in place to ensure that the family court can consider the interests of the children involved in these types of cases, and their families. As such, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw amendment 25.

[Alex Brewer]

I thank the Minister for her assurances. As with our previous amendment, I look forward to working with her on improving the family court. However, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, women’s and children’s charities, and victims strongly urged us all to ensure that children and non-offending parents are at the heart of the criminal justice system, so I believe that this is an important amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 3, page 6, line 20, leave out from “not” to end of line 25 and insert

“ceases to have effect if the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal.

(5A) A prohibited steps order made under this section does not cease to have effect if the sentence is reduced, on appeal, so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of 4 years or more.”

This amendment would ensure that a prohibited steps order would cease to have effect if the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal. It would also require that a prohibited steps order remain in effect where a sentence is reduced on appeal so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of four years or more.

I will keep my remarks brief. As we have said, these measures require balance and consideration for all parties concerned. We were surprised that the Government’s proposed measure would not cause a prohibited steps orders to automatically fall away if someone is acquitted of an offence. It might seem obvious to say this, but if someone is acquitted of an offence, they are innocent. They have not done anything in the eyes of the law, so I struggle to see why we would continue to insist that, if they are subject to a prohibited steps order, the onus is on them to get it removed.

On the other side of things, if a prohibited steps order is in place and has not been challenged, and someone remains guilty but is on a lesser sentence, the balance falls in the other direction and it should remain in place. Although she may tell me that this was our position in government too, I am interested in hearing from the Minister why the Government do not feel that it is appropriate for such an order to be removed if someone is acquitted.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The amendment seeks to amend the process in clause 3 if an offender has been acquitted or had their sentence reduced on appeal. The Bill provides a clear route for considering a prohibited steps order following an appeal that has resulted in an acquittal or a reduction in the offender’s sentence. In such cases, the relevant local authority will be under a duty to bring an application to the family court to consider whether the original order should be upheld, varied or discharged.

The drafting of the amendment is deficient and risks creating confusion. It would provide that any prohibited steps order made under proposed new section 10C of the Children Act 1989 would cease to have effect where a person is acquitted, effectively discharging the order. In practice, there would be no order in place to discharge the original prohibited steps order, and therefore no documentary evidence that the order had been discharged. Compounding that, the amendment would retain an obligation for the relevant local authority to make an application to the family court to consider the prohibited steps order, under proposed new section 10D(2), and yet there would be no order for the family court to consider, because it would have ceased to have effect.

In short, the amendment would not make sense in practice and would risk creating confusion in a context where clarity is particularly important.

[Dr Mullan]

I thank the Minister for that feedback. Perhaps we need to consider how the amendment is drafted, but does she accept the principle? There is no other example I can think of where someone is acquitted of an offence, because they are innocent, but they remain subject to any provisions whatever that were related to the conviction. Perhaps the amendment needs to be redrafted, but surely the Minister agrees in principle that someone should not be subjected to a consequence of a conviction that has been overturned.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

We need to remember that for a criminal case to have been brought, the child or another party will have made an allegation of serious sexual abuse committed against that child, and that will have been followed by criminal proceedings and an initial guilty verdict. The relationship between the child and the accused parent may have completely broken down during that process. When the family court reviews the case, the judge will undertake a holistic review of all the circumstances, including the acquittal, before deciding what is in the best interests of the child.

We must also remember that the prohibited steps order does not form part of the sentence when it is made by the Crown court. The order is not part of the punishment, or an additional punishment, for an offender; it is a tool to protect children who have been the victims of a dreadful crime, and their families. Even where the individual is acquitted—I have huge sympathy for those who are found innocent and acquitted—it is likely that the case will have gone through lengthy proceedings, and complex family dynamics will be involved. We must keep in mind the overarching aim of protecting children and doing what is best for them. That is why the order will not be automatically discharged following a successful appeal.

I think it is important that if there is a successful appeal, there is a clearly defined process during which the best interests of the children involved are considered, which is why we have put that measure in place. We understand that following a successful appeal, it is important that decisions about a prohibited steps order are made quickly. That is why the process already included in clause 3 requires the local authority to make the application within 30 days of the acquittal. By placing the duty to make the application on the local authority, we are reducing the burden on the families involved, at what will already be a difficult and potentially traumatic time. Moving the proceedings to the family court centres deliberations in the correct forum. The family court will consider whether varying, discharging or, indeed, upholding the order will be in the best interests of the children involved, which I am sure we can agree is what we all want.

[Mike Wood]

I am struggling to understand either the legal or the ethical distinction that says that someone who is acquitted at trial should be in a fundamentally different position from someone who is acquitted following an appeal and has their conviction overturned. Surely the practical results should be the same. In every other part of the criminal justice process that I have encountered, they are.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

That goes to the heart of why we have kept these measures as niche and tight as possible—because they are quite novel. We are restricting parental responsibility where an offender has been found guilty in a Crown court, with a jury and a judge, of any sexual offence against their own child for which they will be sentenced to four years or more in prison. That is incredibly traumatic for the child and family involved. The person will have already been found guilty. This is not similar to cases in which someone is acquitted and a prohibited steps order can be removed immediately. We have to consider the impact on the child. These are offences that the perpetrator will have been found guilty of, in a court of law, against their own child.

[Mike Wood]

As the Minister will be aware, where the Court of Appeal overturns a criminal conviction for a serious offence such as this, it will generally be because there was a serious flaw in the original trial that has left it invalid. Even in those circumstances, the Court of Appeal may grant a retrial rather than overturning the conviction. I understand the point the Minister is making about the trauma to the family and child, but would that not apply equally to someone who is acquitted at the original trial, in which case should the court not also be considering it in the event of a not guilty verdict? I really am struggling to understand why a conviction being overturned on appeal is substantively different from a not guilty verdict.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will happily answer that point. We are not saying that we would not remove the prohibited steps order; of course there will be a route to remove it. If the offender or alleged perpetrator is then acquitted through the Court of Appeal, there should always be a route to do that, and there will be within 30 days. However, the correct route for doing that is the family court, which will have all the reports available to determine the best interests of that child’s welfare, given everything they have been through, rather than the Crown court, which is not equipped to make that assessment.

[Dr Mullan]

Can the Minister give me any other example in our legal system where someone who has suffered a consequence directly as a result of a conviction that is then overturned is required to take further steps to unpick a consequence that flows from that overturned conviction? I cannot think of any. If someone is exonerated, everything falls away. This measure is specifically linked to someone being found guilty; if they are then essentially found not guilty, they will have to take further steps. Nobody else who is essentially found innocent has to do other things to get things removed from them.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The shadow Minister cannot think of any and, off the top of my head, stood here right now, I cannot think of any either, but that goes to the heart of the reason why we need to keep these novel measures quite tight—it is because of their potential impact. Primarily, my interest, and the interest of the Government, is to protect children and child victims, and I put my faith in the family court system to do what is in the best interest of the child following an acquittal, given everything that that child—that victim—has been through. We must remember that if the perpetrator is acquitted in the Court of Appeal, there is still a child victim and a crime that has been committed against that child.

[Dr Mullan]

With respect, there is not a victim. The person has been acquitted, and there is not a child that has suffered anything, any more than if the person was found not guilty in the first place. I respect the Minister’s comments on how the amendment might be better drafted, but the Government have to accept that they are introducing an extremely unusual interpretation of what happens to someone when they are found not guilty, compared with every other bit of the justice system that I am aware of. Someone who is found not guilty is innocent; the court has decided that the accusation made did not transpire.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

That is exactly why we have included a route to remove the prohibited steps order, and we feel the appropriate route for that is the family court. That is the measure in the Bill, and it still stands that that is the safest route to protect the welfare of the child in the circumstances, given what—I was going to say, “I can only imagine”, but I cannot even imagine it—will be an immensely traumatising and awful experience for everyone involved. For that reason, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Mullan]

The Minister made heroic efforts to explain the logic and context of how we ordinarily deal with these matters. We think the prohibited steps orders are an important enhancement for the safeguarding of children, but I cannot imagine a scenario, even in circumstances in which the offence has not been found proven, in which the children the Minister talks about will not have had the involvement of social services and other steps taken to ensure their wellbeing more generally.

This measure is specifically about parental responsibility, and I find it difficult to understand why the Government are setting a precedent that an innocent party should be required to take further steps to unpick a consequence that flows specifically from their conviction. I appreciate the feedback on the drafting of the amendment, and I will not press it to a vote, but the Government need to think very carefully about the precedent they are setting in relation to what happens to innocent people. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Samantha Dixon.)