(2 days, 13 hours ago)
Commons ChamberI welcome the hon. Lady’s question. The Government are committed to reforming the family court to improve support for adult and child victims of domestic abuse. The pathfinder model provides expert support to victims and doubles the proportion of children seen by social workers. A quarter of all relevant cases will follow this model by January, and we are determined to go further.
The Minister clearly knows that the backlog in the family court is causing real distress. I have one family who have waited over a year for a court hearing. A year is a long time for a child, and we know that others are waiting even longer. Will the Minister share what specific measures she is taking to ensure that cases involving children and vulnerable families are resolved more quickly?
The hon. Lady is right; the delays in our family court are untenable, and families, children particularly, are waiting too long for resolution. That is why we are determined to go further by rolling out our pathfinder model to ensure a child-centric approach to the family court. She will be aware that we are determined to repeal the presumption of parental involvement through our Victims and Courts Bill, which is going through the House. We are also determined to really get to grips with our family court. If the hon. Lady writes to me about that specific case, I will ensure that she gets a full response.
Irene Campbell (North Ayrshire and Arran) (Lab)
All misogyny is abhorrent, but we know that online misogyny is becoming increasingly pervasive. We have criminalised the creation of intimate deepfakes without consent, and we are creating new offences in the Crime and Policing Bill that will mean that perpetrators who take intimate images without consent face up to two years in prison. We will go further to ensure that we stamp out misogyny wherever it is—online or in the real world.
Irene Campbell
My constituent Dr Sam Rice has set up a grassroots charity called Kids For Now, which supports parents who want to delay smartphones for their children. There is much evidence to support that approach. For example, Ofsted has found that 80% of teenage girls are put under pressure to provide sexual images of themselves, which often end up online. Does the Minister agree that the effect that online misogyny has on children must be tackled?
I totally agree with my hon. Friend. Online misogyny radicalises our boys, pressures our girls, and fuels harmful attitudes. It must be tackled in order to protect all our children. The Government are acting through tougher laws, including the Online Safety Act 2023, and our upcoming violence against women and girls strategy will protect children from harm online. Prevention is fundamental, so we are supporting schools to teach children about respect, consent and healthy relationships. I can inform the House that the Secretary of State for Education is in Australia right now learning about the model used over there to see how we can best learn lessons from it and apply them here.
It is quite clear that it is important that we all work together across the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Indeed, we should take that a stage further and work together with the Republic of Ireland to ensure that we both can combat online misogyny. What discussions has the Minister had with the relevant Minister in the Northern Ireland Assembly on how we can do that work better in this United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland?
The hon. Gentleman will know that these crimes have no borders, especially online misogyny crimes. They do not take place in a silo, and it will take all of us to tackle them, including those of us in the England and Wales jurisdiction of the criminal justice system and those across our devolved counterparts in Scotland and Northern Ireland—and, as he states, in the Republic of Ireland too. We regularly meet with our counterparts to discuss these issues, and no stone will be left unturned when it comes to tackling misogyny.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
The Government take seriously concerns about the operation of this Hague convention in situations where domestic abuse is present. Internationally, the UK continues to work with other parties of the convention to ensure that it operates effectively, particularly in cases involving domestic abuse. We have been an active member of the steering committee for two international forums to discuss and share best practice on this issue, and we have contributed financially to support these events.
Lisa Smart
Two of my Hazel Grove constituents, who I will not name because they are going through active cases, have fled Australia and Poland with their children due to domestic abuse and coercive control from their partners. Many mothers in similar circumstances face the prospect of being compelled to return to the country from which they fled in order to accompany their children under the Hague convention. I had a very constructive meeting with the Minister back in June, since when the second forum on domestic violence and the 1980 child abduction convention has taken place in Brazil. Could the Minister update the House on what progress was made at that forum and whether the Government plan to bring forward proposals—legislative or otherwise—to strengthen legal protections for mothers and children fleeing abuse under the Hague convention?
I welcome the hon. Lady’s question and her continued engagement on this really important issue. The Government are now considering initiating further qualitative research on the operation of the 1980 Hague convention in cases relating to domestic abuse. I can confirm that this research will inform any future policy and ensure that reforms are grounded in robust evidence, improving outcomes for both children and survivors. I will endeavour to keep her updated and involved in the development of that.
Mr Andrew Snowden (Fylde) (Con)
Joe Morris (Hexham) (Lab)
At the beginning of December, a sapling from the Sycamore Gap tree was planted by Micala Trussler and her family to commemorate what would have been her daughter’s 18th birthday. Since Holly Newton’s tragic murder, Micala has campaigned tirelessly to reduce the age limit at which someone can legally be classified as a domestic abuse victim. Will the Secretary of State join me in recognising Micala’s tireless campaigning, and meet Micala and me in the new year to discuss age classification for victims of domestic abuse?
I thank my hon. Friend for raising this matter. I will, of course, be delighted to meet my hon. Friend and Micala, and I thank her for her tireless campaigning on this issue. I share the concerns about abuse in teenage relationships, and I am pleased to say that we are conducting a scoping review of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which will cover the age limit for victims, to ensure that it captures adolescent relationships. The upcoming violence against women and girls strategy will set out steps to tackle teenage relationship abuse. I look forward to meeting him and Micala.
Mark Sewards (Leeds South West and Morley) (Lab)
I thank my hon. Friend for that important question. It was an honour to meet him, victims and bereaved families who have been affected by this horrific situation. Our thoughts remain with those grieving families, who rightly expect their babies and the deceased to be treated with dignity and respect. That is the minimum that they deserve. We are committed to taking action. He might be aware that the Department of Health and Social Care today published its interim review into the Fuller inquiry. I look forward to reading that, and to working with him and others to ensure that the recommendations are followed.
Calum Miller (Bicester and Woodstock) (LD)
Paul Waugh (Rochdale) (Lab/Co-op)
In Rochdale, our police work closely with staff from the sexual assault referral centre in St Mary’s in Manchester, who help rape victims through every step of the legal process. For many rape victims, the most traumatic thing is facing their rapist in court, so will the Government explain how they will help stop victims being smeared by defence lawyers as money grabbers? How can we take evidence of previous domestic abuse into account in court?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is why we are determined to ensure that rape victims are treated with compassion and dignity throughout the entire criminal justice process. We are committed to implementing the Law Commission’s review on bad character evidence and to tackling those rape myths and stereotypes, and we are committed to our manifesto commitment of introducing independent legal advisers for adult rape victims to ensure that they get the support they desperately need.
Seamus Logan (Aberdeenshire North and Moray East) (SNP)
Ministers have responded helpfully to me on two previous occasions regarding the “68 is too late” campaign. On both occasions—last January and most recently in writing in September—the Government indicated that they were prepared to amend or at least review pension provisions. Indeed, a working group was established to examine similar terms currently in place within the Ministry of Defence. Can the Minister provide an update on the working group’s proposals and the Government’s intentions?
Alison Bennett (Mid Sussex) (LD)
Survivors’ Network supports all victims of sexual assault and abuse in Sussex. When my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller) and I met representatives of the network at the start of the month, they told us that, owing to the rising costs of national insurance contributions and inflation, £40,000 of its costs are now unfunded. Given the Government’s emphasis on driving down sexual violence, is this the right decision?
The hon. Lady may have missed the announcement that £550 million would be invested in victim support services, the biggest amount ever. I have met victim support services across England and Wales who have welcomed that announcement. The money will be transformational—it will change lives. However, victim support on its own is not enough, which is why we need to take every possible step to reform our criminal justice system, which this Government are doing.
Euan Stainbank (Falkirk) (Lab)
The Hillsborough law will deliver a generational strengthening of legal aid, but does the Minister share my constituents’ concern about the fact that the Scottish Government have yet to confirm that similar non-means-tested legal aid will be available to bereaved families in Scotland?
I can confirm that we have had positive conversations with the Scottish Government about extending the provision to Scotland. This is a matter for them, but we are engaging in positive conversations, and they have shown willing in wanting to adopt the same model that we will be adopting to provide non-means-tested legal aid for all bereaved families when there has been state involvement in the death of their loved ones.
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
Has the Ministry of Justice had any contact with the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland in relation to the looming crisis in criminal justice arising from the fact that on 5 January the criminal barristers will go on strike because there has not been an uplift in legal aid rates since 2005? If contact is made, will the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland be asked why, given her statutory duty to review the rates, she paused the last review in 2022, and why the interim uplift that she announced last year has never been paid?
Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)
I served on the Bill Committee for the Public Office (Accountability) Bill—better known as the Hillsborough law—and was very grateful to the Minister for agreeing to meet my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mr Morrison) and me to discuss 11 amendments, two new clauses and general points that came up in the line-by-line scrutiny. The Minister was very clear that she is a woman on a mission and that she wants the Bill to be on the statute book as soon as possible. May I seek an assurance that she will meet my colleague and me before the Bill is considered on Report?
The hon. Lady is right: I am a woman on a mission. I will meet her early in the new year, ahead of Report, to discuss her amendments and the Bill’s progress through the House.
(2 days, 13 hours ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts) for bringing this important debate to the House this evening. She will know that I am a proud Justice Minister, but I am also a very proud Welsh MP. I therefore recognise everything she said as a constituency MP. All my thoughts are with Gwenno’s family. I will happily meet Karen to answer her questions directly. I will ensure that the meeting happens.
Gwenno is a prime example of exactly how the criminal justice system is not working. It is exactly why we set up the women's justice board. It is exactly why we need to close the gaps and ensure that women like Gwenno are given the support that they need, rather than necessarily a prison sentence. It is why we have taken forward work looking at recommendations on short sentences, which serve no one, and potentially create better criminals, rather than better citizens. It is why there needs to be better wraparound support, and better support services available for women like Gwenno. It is a mission of this Government and of the Justice Department to ensure that we do not fail women like Gwenno going forward.
I also sincerely thank the right hon. Member for her continuing engagement on, and interest in, the justice system, not just in Wales but generally. She has been a tireless advocate. I welcome all engagement with her. It is not the first debate she has had on the matter, and I am sure that it will not be the last. She has tabled amendments to the Sentencing Bill, and has sought to change the probation landscape in Wales, which she also discussed. During a debate on the Sentencing Bill, she noted the impact that the Bill will have on probation in Wales; she mentioned it again this evening, as well as the work of the Thomas commission and the Brown report on the devolution of powers to Wales, which I have read closely. I know all too well about the interface between reserved and devolved services, as an MP representing a devolved constituency; she mentioned that jagged edge. She also noted the importance of using data to inform services and practices. This debate gives us a further opportunity to explore those issues in detail, and allows us to examine justice policy and the delivery landscape in Wales. I welcome that wholeheartedly.
First, I would like to deal with the commissions and reports that have considered justice and devolution in Wales, and the jagged edge that we have sadly heard so much about this evening. As the right hon. Lady noted, a number of commissions have looked into the wider devolution of powers to Wales, as well as the devolution of justice. The Thomas commission recognised the complex landscape when it comes to justice in Wales. It examined the interface between reserved and devolved responsibilities, and the delivery of many of the support services provided by devolved authorities on justice-related issues—a matter that the right hon. Lady mentioned. Yes, these interfaces exist, but it is not necessarily true that they cause problems in the delivery of justice in Wales. The Ministry of Justice, His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service all work together with the devolved authorities on a day-to-day basis to ensure that delivery meets the distinct needs of Wales.
The Ministry of Justice engages with the Welsh Government through several structured mechanisms aimed at co-ordinating justice delivery. These include: a formal concordat between the MOJ and the Welsh Government, which establishes principles for co-operation; a memorandum of understanding on offender education; the Criminal Justice Board for Wales, which co-ordinates across criminal justice agencies and partners to oversee work on cross-cutting challenges in justice delivery for Wales; the Justice in Wales Strategy Group, which acts as the senior strategic-level interface on justice issues between the Ministry of Justice, the Home Office and the Welsh Government on key areas of policy and reform; and the inter-ministerial group for justice, a cross-Government forum that enables formal and regular engagement on justice issues among the UK, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Governments, and which addresses matters of shared interest.
The Minister with responsibility for sentencing, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley (Jake Richards), met our devolved counterparts in the past week, and I have also recently met my counterpart in the Welsh Government to discuss cross-jurisdictional issues. We regularly meet and have collaborative conversations. This is in addition to the daily official-level engagement on a range of issues. As a result, I am pleased to inform the House that justice delivery in Wales is performing well. Prisons are, believe it or not, performing well. HMPPS in Wales has five public prisons: Cardiff, Swansea, Usk, Prescoed and Berwyn, and one private prison, Parc.
On the matter of courts, there has been much debate about the removal of jury trial in certain circumstances, but I am told that in Wales, we do not have those court backlogs, and that this is a problem in England that could be imposed on Wales. Is there not the potential to leave the status quo as it is in Wales? We could then see whether the proposal works by making a comparison between Wales and England. I am told that the courts in Wales are not in the same position as those in England, as regards backlogs, at all.
I would like to see the information that the right hon. Lady has, because the information I have had is that our court system in Wales has quite a severe backlog. Victims and survivors who I speak to in Wales daily have told me that they are waiting years for their case to get to trial. That backlog is very real. If the right hon. Lady has information to the contrary, I would welcome that. We know that the issue in our courts is quite severe at the moment.
Going back to our prisons, HMP Usk scored the highest possible score across all four areas of assessment. Despite a challenging time across the estates, HMPPS in Wales identified strengths in leadership and governance, along with collaborative working with the Welsh Government. It shows that this can be done well, and all our prisons have robust action plans in place to ensure continued improvement and ongoing development.
The right hon. Lady mentioned our Welsh courts. They are performing well. The Crown court performance in Wales is one of the best in the country. However, backlogs still exist. Also on backlogs in Welsh courts, there is concern about magistrates courts in Wales. Civil and family justice is performing well. Wales has seen successful initiatives, such as the pathfinder pilot, which is transforming private family law proceedings in Wales by offering a less adversarial process, focused on early intervention, especially for domestic abuse cases. I have seen that at first hand in Newport and Cardiff.
However, we must do more to continue to improve delivery. One recommendation of the Thomas commission was that justice data should be Wales-specific and more detailed, and that there should be disaggregated data, reflecting distinct Welsh needs. Such data is crucial to effective delivery in Wales. It is important to note that disaggregated, Wales-specific data is already collected and published. A comprehensive review of nearly 400 Welsh Government priority data requests found that 40% of the requested data had already been published, with clear signposting provided to aid navigation.
Notwithstanding that, the Government recognise the importance of specific data in policy development and operational delivery, so last month, Lord Timpson, the Minister in the other place, wrote to the Welsh Government to set out areas where we will now collect additional, disaggregated data for Wales. I will happily keep the right hon. Lady updated on that.
Over the past 18 months, the Ministry of Justice has worked collaboratively with Welsh Government officials and stakeholders, including Dr Robert Jones of the Wales Governance Centre, and has made significant steps forward in Welsh data collection and disaggregation. We have focused on improving transparency, accessibility and relevance of Welsh-specific justice data. We have developed and published a new Welsh-specific dataset, including the annual management information release on Welsh prisoner data, and a bespoke Welsh reoffending data release for the Equality and Social Justice Committee. Additional breakdowns, such as custody type by institution and deaths under probation supervision in approved premises, were published in the October 2025 offender management statistics quarterly release.
I welcome the disaggregated data. It has been quite a battle to get that, but it indicates that this is an area that the new Government are interested in. If a complete dataset shows us that there are certain tendencies from year to year, and that justice is not being served well in Wales, I hope the Government will consider the evidence put before them.
We will always be evidence-led. The right hon. Lady mentioned that the issue is not political. We will always look at what the data is telling us, and I will happily work with her and other colleagues on that.
We have also committed to publishing further data—for example, on homelessness by institution, and on the Welsh language. It is a severe concern to me that Welsh prisoners are not able to converse in their mother tongue, and it is important that we address that. We are committed to publishing that data when it is available. It is anticipated by the end of 2026. We are also supporting the development of a publicly available Welsh Government dashboard. We have facilitated data sharing agreements, including agreements on Welsh youth justice data.
In addition, substantial volumes of data are now accessible via the Office for National Statistics Secure Research Service and the Welsh Government-funded SAIL—secure anonymised information linkage—databank, and this will support evidence-based policy development. Officials will continue to enhance Welsh data provision when opportunities arise. We will promote awareness of existing datasets and maintain engagement with stakeholders to understand emerging priorities.
I turn to the impact of criminal justice initiatives on devolved services, which I know is an area of interest for the right hon. Lady. In our manifesto, we committed to undertaking a strategic review of probation, which will also cover devolution, and we are working constructively with the Welsh Government on this—I want to reassure her on that point. That includes developing a memorandum of understanding on co-commissioning and local working partnerships. That is still in development and, again, I will happily bring her into that, to ensure that we get this right, and that we do not just get a replica of Manchester, but instead do bespoke work for Wales that is Wales-specific.
However, the right hon. Lady will be aware that the criminal justice system faces acute and significant pressures, and we are taking action as a Government to remedy the situation. The Sentencing Bill and upcoming legislation to implement the recommendations of the independent review of the criminal courts are key components of that action, and we will need time to bed that in. It is important that we take time to get that right. Our priority is to ensure that the system is stabilised before we undertake any further review of the governance arrangements, but we will do so.
We will continue to ensure that the impact of this work on devolved services is considered carefully, and we will continue to work with the Welsh Government and devolved authorities to ensure that the system works effectively and sustainably in Wales. We have already had a number of discussions with the Welsh Government about this work and the impact on devolved authorities, and my ministerial colleagues and I will continue to engage with Welsh Government Ministers on all justice issues to ensure that they can inform policy development and delivery, and reflect the distinct and specific needs of the people of Wales.
To conclude, the justice system is, as we are all sadly aware, facing unprecedented challenges, particularly in the criminal justice space. The Government inherited a prison system on the verge of collapse, which would have left the courts unable to send offenders to prison and the police unable to arrest dangerous criminals. By working closely with our partners in Wales, we are delivering a system that is meeting the needs of Welsh users. The picture in Wales is positive, in the criminal, civil and family space, and we are striving to ensure that these partnerships continue to improve justice delivery in Wales.
Again, I extend a hand to the right hon. Lady and colleagues across the political divide, and offer to work with them to ensure that we get this right, because this is not political; this is about serving the needs of the people of Wales. When we came into office, we spoke of the difference that a Labour Government working at both ends of the M4 would have for Wales. This is that delivery in action. Diolch yn fawr iawn.
Question put and agreed to.
(2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesGood morning, Sir Roger. The offence of misleading the public is aimed at deterring wrongdoing related to the system, rather than to individual gain or loss, which is adequately covered by the offences under clauses 12 and 13. I feel that proof of harm is therefore inappropriate and will render clause 11 potentially ineffective in a number of contexts.
The provision of this new offence and of the clause 5 offence dealing with the duty to assist are vital in making a duty of candour practical and effective, rather than merely aspirational. It is important to recognise that they are different from the codified misconduct in public office or MIPO offences under clauses 12 and 13. The new offences will enforce the proper functioning of public authorities and official investigations, and prevent cover-ups. That is crucial to what we are trying to do with this legislation.
The MIPO offences deal with individual wrongdoing by the misuse of office for personal gain, or by causing detriment through gross negligence. The new clause 5 and clause 11 offences are therefore complementary to, but distinct from the MIPO offences, in practice and in principle. Subsection (3)(b) inappropriately and unnecessarily adds the ingredient of “harm” to a victim, but the fact that it is contrary to principle is not the central objection.
The real problem is that subsection (3)(b) significantly reduces the effectiveness of the provision, which aims to deter cover-ups rather than punish actual harm to identifiable individuals, although harm to victims may in fact be caused. In some cases, that will not be problematic, but it will negate the provision in other cases where it absolutely should apply: for example, the falsification of crime statistics or the false denial of something previously admitted by state agents to the media concerning a matter of substantial public interest—both actual, real-life cases. That is why I have moved the amendment, and I hope the Minister will recognise that.
It is a privilege to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Roger. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby for outlining his concerns. I hope I will be able to reassure him as to the Government’s intent.
Clause 1 of the Bill clearly sets out that public authorities and officials are expected to act with candour, transparency and frankness at all times. Criminal sanctions should be reserved for the most serious cases. The condition that an act has to have caused, or had the potential to cause harm will achieve that effect. It will not be a bar to prosecution in those cases, and I hope to explain why.
The definition of harm is broad. It includes physical harm, psychological harm, including distress, and economic loss. I reassure the Committee that distress was added on the suggestion of Hillsborough Law Now. That is a non-exhaustive list and it can include other types of harm. The condition includes harm or the potential for harm. The offence does not require there to be proof that the act has caused harm to an individual. In cases such as Hillsborough and Horizon, evidence of harm caused by cover-ups is clear and apparent. We have designed the offence with historical incidents of state failure in mind where, at a minimum, potential distress could be identified and in many cases much more serious harm.
The requirement for an act to have the potential to cause harm is a key condition to ensure that the offence applies only to serious cases. The harm threshold ensures that the public, the police and prosecutors are able to distinguish between those actions that meet the threshold for criminal sanctions and those that should be dealt with through other routes, such as an organisation’s complaints process, or covered by other aspects of the law. The nature of public life is that it is not uncommon for public officials or officeholders to be accused of being untruthful when going about their daily tasks. If it is used to trigger police investigations into vexatious claims, or to engage in political lawfare, rather than for the grave examples of state cover-ups that the Bill was meant to deal with, it risks undermining the offence itself, as well as the intention of the Bill.
The creation of an offence of this kind is a bold step. Hillsborough families spoke of the importance of individual accountability, and we listened. It is clear from our engagement across the public sector that such a strong new measure will—as drafted and when properly implemented—have a serious and real deterrent effect. We are confident that it and every other measure in the Bill will drive forward a culture of candour and truthfulness. I hope that reassures my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby, and I request that he withdraws his amendment.
On Second Reading, we had a very healthy debate on journalism and the impact of media in state failures. It has laid heavily with me. It was a big focus of the debate, and we have taken the issue forward with colleagues across Government and the media to look at how we can best support individuals—victims, especially—when the media has such a crucial role to play.
Amendment 30 seeks to remove the exemption in the offence of misleading the public for any acts done for the purposes of journalism. The purpose of the exemption is to avoid capturing journalistic activity by public service broadcasters that might otherwise meet the definition of a public authority. That is to ensure that the offence does not impinge on press freedom or existing regimes for media regulation. Although behaviour that meets the threshold for the scope of the offence would clearly be unacceptable, we do not believe that this offence is the appropriate vehicle for determining the veracity of media reporting. Without the exemption, only public service broadcasters would potentially be subject to this criminal offence for their journalistic activities and reporting, while other broadcasters would not. The approach ensures that PSBs are still captured in respect of their other public functions—for example, an incident that took place at the BBC itself—but excludes journalistic activity. I hope that that satisfies the concerns of the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills.
Seamus Logan
Before the Minister moves on, one needs to cast one’s mind back to events that took place many months ago, when newspaper and other media reports led to a hotel housing asylum seekers being attacked. One of the rioters sought to burn the hotel down, which could have led to great loss of life. That initially stemmed from media coverage. That is why it is important to try to articulate this provision in a more sensible way.
I totally agree with the hon. Gentleman. I have spoken about the need for responsible media reporting to prevent disinformation and misinformation. This provision, however, covers only public authorities. We are therefore capturing only public service broadcasters, so the types of journalism that the hon. Gentleman describes are totally out of scope of the Bill. We would effectively be restricting the BBC, but other journalists would not be captured by the legislation. We need to raise this more broadly with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and look at it across Government. I recognise his concerns, because I share some of them.
It is very important for the Bill to define what a “journalist” is. My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby, alongside colleagues at Hillsborough Law Now, has raised concerns that the exemption, as it is currently drafted, could be interpreted more broadly, which was certainly not our intention. He made a very important point about what defines journalistic activity.
In particular, there are concerns that the exemption might be considered to apply to officials who are not journalists themselves but who are involved with, for example, preparing journalistic materials, such as briefings or press releases by other public figures making public comment, who might improperly seek to use this exemption as a defence for their actions. That is certainly not our intention and I have tabled amendment 5 to provide more clarity.
Amendment 5 clarifies our intention that the exemption is limited to journalistic activity by public service broadcasters and those working for them. This is defined with reference to the Online Safety Act 2023. Because amendment 5 achieves the same aim as the amendment that my hon. Friend tabled and hopefully satisfies his concerns, I kindly request that he does not press his amendment to a vote.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Sir Roger.
As we all know, clause 11 creates the new offence of misleading the public, which is intended, quite rightly, to capture the most serious and culpable instances where public officials knowingly or recklessly provide false or misleading information to the public. The motivations behind the clause are entirely understandable. In the past, we have seen, through scandals and tragedies, how deeply harmful it can be when institutions withhold the truth or put out statements that they know to be false.
However, there is no doubt that, as the Minister herself said earlier, this is a new area of the law. She referred to the fact that politicians often debate what does or does not count as misleading information. Members of the Committee grumbled when I raised this issue at our first sitting, using the live example of what we have been going through in the last couple of weeks, but we have also heard how contentious legislating in this area can be in relation to the media and the role they play. This is a novel area and one that we have to tread carefully in, recognising that we are not able to anticipate fully how this offence will be used, not just by current prosecuting authorities but by different actors under a different regime, or by private citizens. We also know that there have been attempts to prosecute individual politicians for offences of misleading people, so this is very much a live issue. With an offence of this seriousness that is framed in this way, we must ensure that it is applied proportionately, fairly and with great care. That is the purpose of the amendment; it is to ensure that no prosecution under the clause can be brought without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Although clause 11 sets out a structured test for what counts as being “seriously improper”, and the explanatory notes make it clear that the offence is intended to target only the most egregious conduct, the reality is that the clause interfaces with the political environment in a way that few other offences do. “Misleading the public” is a phrase that, regrettably, is used daily in our political discourse. Accusations of “misleading the public”, made fairly or unfairly, are frequently levelled in debates, campaigns and correspondence. Therefore, we need to be absolutely certain that this new criminal offence cannot become a vehicle for politically motivated complaints, vexatious charges, over-zealous private prosecutions, or attempts to use the criminal law to litigate policy disagreements. Requiring the personal consent of the DPP is a well-established constitutional safeguard in precisely this kind of context. It would ensure that decisions to prosecute are taken objectively, independently and at the highest level.
It is not only political actors that we must consider. Senior public officials, regulators, police chiefs, NHS managers or anyone else in a position of public authority might find themselves being accused of misleading the public in complex and fast-moving situations. Often, such situations involve imperfect information, operational pressures or competing obligations. The clause rightly makes it clear that accidental or inadvertent misleading of the public should not be criminalised. However, we must ensure that establishing the threshold for a prosecution remains firmly under the control of the independent prosecuting authority, and not subject to either the ebb and flow of public anger or the risk of tactical litigation.
Some may reasonably argue that the CPS would in practice be involved by discontinuing prosecutions and bringing them under the Director of Public Prosecutions, but that in itself could create a storm for an individual subject to that action. That is why we think a tighter safeguard should be required.
It is not in the amendment, but I would like to ask the Minister about what thought has been given to whether prosecution should be subject to the Attorney General’s permission. Forgive me: I do not know if that is already part of the legislation; I do not think it is, but the Minister will know. For example, when it comes to public order offences—another potentially contentious area—we ask the Attorney General to give permission for prosecution to serve as a safeguard against the inappropriate use of measures.
My final, more general point about clause 11, which we touched on earlier, is about the maximum sentence of two years. What are the Minister’s thoughts on whether there have been any common law versions of a prosecution for this sort of thing in which someone was given a sentence of more than two years? Are the Government sure that this is not unnecessarily constrained compared with the current common law position, which is unlimited? I appreciate that the offences in question are normally more to do with misconduct rather than misleading, but it would still be helpful to get that reassurance.
I thank the shadow Minister for raising this important issue. We agree wholeheartedly with the intention behind the amendment, and I can assure him that the Bill achieves that intent. Schedule 3 makes further provision regarding clause 5 and clause 11 offences. Paragraph 2(2) sets out that,
“Proceedings for an offence under section 11 may be brought only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.”
With that clarification, I hope the shadow Minister will withdraw his amendment. Hopefully, I can answer some of his other queries as we move through the debate.
Clause 11 creates a new offence of misleading the public, which is designed to capture the most serious incidents of misleading the public, such as the behaviour seen after Hillsborough, where officials intentionally spread a false narrative to protect their reputation and caused harm as a result. That, as the shadow Minister rightly states, is punishable by up to two years in prison. We all know the harm that caused and how, three decades on, families are still fighting for justice and accountability for what the spreading of that narrative did. The Independent Office for Police Conduct report on Tuesday was clear: a lie was told; a false narrative was spread to protect reputations and avoid consequences. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that no family ever has to go through what those families went through and continue to go through. I can only imagine how hard that report was to read and the pain that they continue to feel.
The new offence will ensure that when a public official has misled the public, there is accountability. To have committed the offence, an authority or official must have acted with the intention to mislead the public or been reckless as to whether their actions would do so. By reckless, we mean a person acting with the knowledge that there is a risk that they might mislead the public and taking that risk without reasonable justification. It does not include accidental mistakes or inaccuracies. They must have known or ought to have known that their act is seriously improper.
It will be for the judge and the jury to determine whether that test has been met, but clause 11(3)(a) sets out minimum conditions that must be present: that the act—
“involved dishonesty that was significant or repeated…in respect of matters of significant concern to the public”.
That will avoid capturing minor instances of lying or misleading on trivial political or private matters. The act must have caused or have the potential to cause harm. Harm, as we have already discussed, is broadly defined, including economic, physical or psychological harm, including distress. The purpose of this is to avoid capturing inconsequential matters, such a Minister lying about where they went to university or competing in a chess tournament or a local government official overstating their council’s performance. Although these sorts of lies should entail professional consequences, we do not think they meet the bar for criminal sanctions. The individual must also have departed significantly from what would have been expected of them in carrying out their functions. This is to ensure that where it may be necessary to mislead someone as part of a person’s job—for example, as part of an undercover police operation—that is not captured.
This clause as introduced does not apply to devolved matters. We have written to all the devolved Governments to request that the offence be extended in their jurisdiction in line with the other provisions on duty of candour, which apply across the UK. The Northern Ireland Executive, the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government have all confirmed their agreement to extend the offence, and we will be extending the offences accordingly. We hope to bring forward amendments on the territorial extent on Report to ensure full coverage for the United Kingdom.
Subsection (4) also excludes any act done for the purposes of journalism. That is to avoid capturing public service broadcasters and those working for them who would otherwise meet the definition of a public official. That is to ensure that the offence does not impinge on press freedom or existing regimes for media regulation. Although behaviour that meets the threshold for the scope of the offence would clearly be unacceptable, we do not believe that this offence is the appropriate vehicle for determining the veracity of media reporting, as we have already discussed.
Subsection (6) includes a reasonable excuse defence, with specific defences for the exercise of functions by the intelligence services and armed forces on active service. That is necessary to make it clear that when officials can prove that they misled the public to protect national security or this country’s defence operations, they are not subject to criminal sanctions. I stress, however, that this will not prevent the successful prosecution of members of the security services or armed forces who mislead the public for any other purposes, such as personal gain or to protect their reputation.
This is a transformative offence that will ensure that when something goes wrong and public officials lie to the public, there are serious consequences. It will act as a powerful deterrent against the sorts of state cover-ups that we have sadly see all too often.
The hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle asked me about offences which potentially attract two or more years in prison. I will write to him on that and come back on the specifics, as well as on his question about the Attorney General. With that, I commend clause 11 to the Committee.
I thank the Minister for explaining the clause to us. She has provided the reassurance that we are looking for, and I look forward to receiving further material in writing. I recognise that the Government are attempting to craft an offence that has a high threshold and does not interfere with the wide range of situations that people might seek to apply it to, but I worry that we might end up seeing such questions tested in the courts repeatedly before there is a settled view on what they translate into in reality. I am not sure that it will be as simple as we might think in reality. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Offences under Part 2: related provision
Despite not relating directly to the Bill, the matter of pensions has come up in Committee a couple of times. We do need to explore that, because there are many situations where people walk off into the sunset. It seems to me that the one lever we still have over people is their pensions. Have the Government considered how such a provision might be used in the future? The Opposition will be looking at it.
I will happily raise that issue with the Pensions Minister in our discussions.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby for tabling the amendments. I hope to be able to provide some clarification. Amendments 56 and 57 seek to ensure the same extraterritorial extent applies for the offences of failure to comply with the duty of candour and assistance and the offence of misleading the public.
The intended effect of amendment 56 is already achieved in the Bill as drafted. In schedule 3, paragraph 1(1), the disapplication does not apply if any the criteria of sub-paragraph (1)(a) or (b) are met. It is already an “or” list, not an “and” list. That follows the standard parliamentary drafting convention. To add an unnecessary “or” between sub-sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), when that is already the meaning, would risk putting the position in doubt in other legislation across the statute book and could cause confusion.
Paragraph (1)(2) refers only to the clause 5 offence because the clause 11 offence applies only in England and Wales. A case could not be heard by a court in Scotland or Northern Ireland. However, as I confirmed earlier, we have in principle agreements to extend clause 11 offences to Scotland and Northern Ireland, and we are working with the devolved Governments to draft amendments, which we intend to bring forward on Report, so that the offence is UK-wide.
Yes, they are indeed.
Schedule 3 works alongside clauses 5 and 11 to make some additional provisions about the offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour and assistance and the offence of misleading the public. Paragraph 1 provides that an offence may be committed outside the UK only if the person who committed the offence is a UK national, an individual who habitually resides within the UK, or a body incorporated in the UK. In practice, that means that UK civil servants working abroad are captured, but country-based staff employed by UK embassies, who perform a range of predominantly administrative or maintenance roles are not. These are local staff subject to local laws and regulations instead and their exclusion is consistent with other precedents.
Paragraph 2 provides that consent from the Director of Public Prosecutions in England and Wales or from the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland is required before proceedings for the breach of duty of candour offence may be brought forward. I hope the shadow Minister is reassured on that point. The same consent is required in England and Wales for proceedings for the offence of misleading the public, which as I just said, currently only applies in England and Wales, but we are making provisions to apply it to the UK as a whole.
Paragraph 3 makes it clear that where a body commits an offence and a relevant person, for example a director, manager or partner, consented or connived, both the individual and the body are liable. Finally, paragraph 4 provides that where an offence relates to unincorporated bodies, proceedings must be brought against the name of the body.
I will speak to each of the clauses in turn. Clause 12 will introduce the first of two new statutory offences to replace the common law offence of misconduct in public office. In its 2020 report, the Law Commission recommended that the common law offence should be abolished and replaced with two new offences that broadly replicate the coverage of the common law offence. In acting on those recommendations, the Government do not intend to change significantly the type of conduct the criminal law will capture. Like the common law offence, the new offences are intended to capture only wrongdoing at the most serious level.
The clause establishes the new offence of seriously improper acts, and is designed to capture the conduct previously caught by the concept of wilful misconduct under the common law offence. The seriously improper acts offence is committed when a person who holds public office uses that office with the intent to obtain a benefit for themselves or another person, or to cause detriment to someone else. They must know or ought to have known that any reasonable person would regard their act as seriously improper.
The offence can capture a wide range of conduct. “Using” an office can include both acts and omissions. “Benefit” and “detriment” mean any benefit or detriment including, but not limited to, financial gain or loss, protection or enhancement of or damage to a person’s reputation, and benefits or detriments of a physical or sexual nature, whether temporary or permanent. When we talk about protection or enhancement of or damage to a person’s reputation, we intend to capture serious situations where someone uses their office in the way that we associate with the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster: the manipulation of evidence in order to protect the reputation of a person, including an organisation, or the spreading of allegations about other people, designed to damage their reputation.
The clause is about not the usual back and forth of everyday politics, but severe abuses of power that undermine the very basis of public service. An act is seriously improper if a reasonable person would consider it so. There is a list of factors that the jury must consider to make that determination, including the extent to which the act involved an intention to mislead or be dishonest by withholding, covering up or misusing information. A defence is available if the person can show that they had a reasonable excuse for their action—for example, a public office holder has to disregard one fraudulent benefits claim to uncover a more serious, larger scale benefits fraud. The offence is indictable and carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. That puts it on par with similar statutory offences, such as bribery and fraud.
The consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions will be required to bring a prosecution under the offence. That is to safeguard against the risk of spurious claims against public officials, including politicians. We have already heard examples of that. It will ensure that only cases that are serious in nature and justify criminalisation are prosecuted. It does not require the personal consent of the director—consent can be delegated—so it should not cause any undue administrative burden.
The clause will ensure that serious misconduct and corrupt behaviour by those in public office will continue to result in criminal sanctions, and that those who abuse positions of public trust are held to account for their actions. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Clause 13 establishes the new offence of breach of duty to prevent death or serious injury. It is designed to capture the conduct previously caught by the concept of wilful neglect of duty under the common law offence. The new offence is committed when a person who holds public office either causes or creates significant risk of causing someone else to suffer critical harm, in breach of a duty to prevent other people from suffering such harm. They must know that they are under such a duty, and their act must fall far below what could reasonably have been expected of them in the circumstances. The offence requires that the person be under a duty to prevent critical harm that arises by virtue of the public office that they hold. That means that the offence can be committed only by public office holders whose roles inherently involve a duty to prevent critical harm—for example, service personnel, firefighters and the police. It does not apply to public office holders whose roles do not put them under a duty to protect the public from critical harm.
The offence is made out only if the public official knows or ought to know that they are subject to that duty. The breach of duty must cause either critical harm or a significant risk of that harm materialising. It will not capture cases where a negligible or insignificant risk of harm is caused. The breach of duty must also have been intentional or reckless. These are both very high criminal thresholds. To act recklessly means to proceed in full awareness of the potential outcome and in circumstances where it is unreasonable to take the risk.
Only the most serious breaches of duty are captured by the offence. The requirement that the act must fall far below the standard that could reasonably be expected of the person in the circumstances ensures that minor or honest mistakes and legitimate but risky operational decisions made in challenging circumstances will not be captured. For example, a law enforcement officer having to decide in the moment whether to take a particular risky operational decision would be caught by the offence only if they intentionally recklessly breach the duty, their act falls far below the standards reasonably expected of them in those circumstances, and they have no reasonable excuse for their actions.
The offence will be triable on indictment only and will carry a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. That is commensurate with other offences where a failure of duty leads to serious or critical consequences, such as gross negligence manslaughter. As with the offence in clause 12, the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions will be required to bring a prosecution under the offence in clause 13. That is to guard against the risk of spurious claims being made against public officials in this position and to ensure that only the most serious cases are prosecuted.
Clause 14 clarifies the territorial application of the new offences in clauses 12 and 13. It makes clear that a public office holder can commit the seriously improper acts or breach of duty offences by their actions either within England and Wales, or in other UK territories such as Scotland or Northern Ireland. The offences in clauses 12 and 13 may also be committed by acts done outside the United Kingdom provided that, at the time of the act, the public office holder is either a UK national or habitually resident in England and Wales. The clause ensures conduct like this could be caught by the new offences.
I want to make some brief points. I welcome the maximum sentences, which are clearer and in a more natural range, and there is not the uncertainty that I think we still have with the misleading the public offence.
I want to ask the Minister about the role of MPs, however, because she will know that our privilege to speak in the Chamber, including to make allegations of defamation, is unfettered. We can say things that do damage people’s reputations and that cause all sorts of issues, but we are immune from civil procedure. I am not sure how the common law has dealt with equivalent sorts of scenarios, but I can imagine an MP trashing the reputation of a business and that business going under, causing huge harm to an individual who then feels as though they should be able to have a say through this route.
I think we all agree that, although it can be abused, that privilege is really important to the operation of our democracy. Even if not now—the Minister may not have considered this before—it would be helpful to have a written note on the Department’s view about the potential misuse of that privilege to say whatever we want in Parliament, without restriction.
Tessa Munt
I previously asked for some clarity on coroners. I accept the position on His Majesty’s chief coroner, and the Minister confirmed about His Majesty’s area coroner. I presume senior coroners are also included in that remit, but I want to be very clear, because they are the people who very often see exactly what is happening on the ground.
Yes, I can confirm that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 13 and 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Holders of public office
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient consider:
Government amendments 11 to 13.
Schedule 4.
All the Government amendments relate to our measures on the offences of misconduct in public office. Government amendment 11 adds members of the Parole Board to schedule 4 to the Bill, which sets out the list of those who are considered public office holders for the purposes of the new statutory offences in part 3 of the Bill: seriously improper acts and the breach of duty to prevent death or serious injury. The amendment is not being made because there has been a change in policy; rather we have determined that making explicit reference to the Parole Board is a clearer approach than relying on paragraph 21 of the schedule to capture this body. As the offences currently extend to England and Wales only, the reference added to the schedule is only to the parole board that operates in that jurisdiction.
Government amendment 12 ensures that all those carrying out the judicial functions of the coroner are included in schedule 4, regardless of how they are appointed. A deputy chief coroner can be appointed in two ways: those qualified by being a High Court or circuit judge are appointed by the Lord Chief Justice, and those qualified by being a senior coroner are appointed by the Lord Chancellor. The amendment makes it clear that we intend to capture both. It is not a policy change, merely a drafting refinement.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 17 stand part.
Schedule 5.
Clause 16 abolishes the common law offence of misconduct in public office, which our new statutory offences will replace. It also sets out arrangements for the transition to the new offences, ensuring that the common law offence will continue to apply to any acts done, or begun, before its abolition. The clause also makes it clear that we are not affecting other offences, or the civil tort of misfeasance in public office.
Clause 17 and schedule 5 amend existing legislation to reflect the abolition of the common law offence and the introduction of the new statutory offences. Schedule 5 sets out the specific—and minor—changes to three pieces of existing legislation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 18
Parity etc at inquiries and investigations
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 14 to 17.
Schedule 6.
New clause 5—Conduct of public authorities and access to legal aid for seriously injured survivors who are participating in inquests or inquiries—
“(1) Legal aid must be made available, without a means test, to seriously injured survivors who are participating in inquests or inquiries where there are reasonable grounds for believing the matter under investigation relates to the conduct of public authorities tasked with carrying out public functions, or public officials working for bodies in a public capacity, in connection with the discharge of their public duties.
(2) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the Act receiving Royal Assent, make regulations to—
(a) add civil legal services to Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 in connection with proceedings relating to seriously injured survivors who are participating in inquests or inquiries as under subsection (1);
(b) amend the Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013 (S.I. 2013/104) for the purposes of providing criteria for a determination for legal representation in respect of cases under subsection (1).
(3) This section comes into force on the day on which this Act is passed.”
This new clause would extend civil legal aid to seriously injured survivors who are participating in inquests or inquiries where the conduct of public bodies or public officials is in question.
Clause 18 and schedule 6 represent a milestone moment in addressing the disparity in power often faced by bereaved families and other affected persons in the inquest and inquiry system. They provide for non-means-tested legal aid for bereaved families at all inquests where a public authority is an interested person, the widest expansion of legal aid in a generation.
Douglas McAllister (West Dunbartonshire) (Lab)
Clause 18(e) provides for non-means-tested legal aid to bereaved family members at inquests. The Bill is intended to introduce UK-wide legislation. I understand that the Minister has engaged in positive talks with the Scottish Government over a number of months because of the devolved nature of Scottish legal aid at fatal accident inquiries. Are we any further forward with those talks? Will the Scottish people enjoy the same access to legal aid as the rest of the UK?
I can confirm to my hon. Friend that we have a strong and positive working relationship with the Scottish Government and all the devolved Governments about the Bill. The Scottish Government have written to ask us to extend the provision to Scotland. We are working with our colleagues in Holyrood and across the UK to see how we can best apply that. I will happily update my hon. Friend on those discussions, which are positive and ongoing.
The provisions in the Bill on legal aid go further, setting out a common framework of obligations and accountability for public authorities and their legal teams when they participate at public inquiries and coroner investigations. I will now get into the detail. Parts 1, 2 and 3 of schedule 6 impose a common framework of obligations on public authorities and their legal teams in respect of their participation across statutory public inquiries, non-statutory public inquiries and coroner investigations. The schedule inserts proposed new section 34A into the Inquiries Act 2005 and amends section 42 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 to provide that guidance may be issued by the Lord Chancellor to set out the principles that should guide the conduct of public authorities in respect of public inquiries and coroner investigations.
Schedule 6 inserts proposed new section 34B into the 2005 Act and proposed new section 42A into the 2009 Act to place a public authority that is a core participant at an inquiry, or an interested person at an inquest, under a duty to engage legal representatives to act for the authority only if, and in so far as—this is important—it is necessary and proportionate, and to take steps to ensure that those representatives conduct themselves in accordance with the guidance from the Lord Chancellor. In our evidence, we heard how bereaved families feel at an inquest when they turn up with their legal aid-appointed person—or are sometimes not even given a legal aid-appointed person—and the public authority has an army of barristers. This measure seeks to curtail that and to ensure equal representation and parity of arms.
The schedule amends section 41 of the 2005 Act and section 43 of the 2009 Act to make provision for an “overriding objective” to be created in an inquiry or inquest. In particular, that may include objectives for, or in connection with, ensuring that relevant affected persons are able to participate fully and effectively, maintaining the inquisitorial nature of proceedings, and that they are given sufficient information about proceedings.
The schedule also inserts proposed new section 34C into the 2005 Act and amends schedule 5 to the 2009 Act to create a power for an inquiry chair or coroner to raise concerns and report the matter to the person who has overall responsibility for the management of the public authority—or such other person who has power to take action—as to the conduct of a public authority or its legal representatives. A person to whom the report is made must give the inquiry chair or coroner a written response.
Part 3 of schedule 6 makes further modifications to schedule 5 to the 2009 Act to provide that where a report is made by a coroner, a copy must be sent to the chief coroner. Part 3 also amends section 36 of the 2009 Act to add those reports and their responses to the matters that must be summarised in the chief coroner’s annual report to the Lord Chancellor. It further amends section 43 of the 2009 Act to provide that regulations made under that section may make provision in respect of reports made by coroners in relation to concerns over the conduct of public authorities. Part 2 of schedule 6 makes it clear that changes made to the Inquires Act 2005 by part 1 of the schedule should apply to relevant non-statutory inquiries, albeit with certain modifications as set out in paragraph 2(3).
Part 4 of schedule 6 makes expanded provision for legal aid at inquests. It details a number of amendments to the legislation and regulations underpinning the legal aid system. Those, when taken together, keep applications to open or reopen an inquest in scope of legal aid; set out that, where a public authority is an interested person in the inquest, non-means-tested legal aid for the inquest can be accessed by families; and provide for conditions in relation to advocacy funding.
Part 4 begins with four amendments to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, known as LASPO. The first two amendments are technical and update references to “the Coroners Act 1988” to say “the Coroners and Justice Act 2009”, which has largely repealed and replaced the 1988 Act. The third amendment brings applications under section 13 of the 1988 Act into scope of civil legal services. Section 13 allows bereaved family members to submit a request to open or reopen inquest proceedings to the High Court. The Government recognise the importance of bringing such applications into scope of legal aid, and this amendment to LASPO delivers that. Unlike inquests, section 13 applications are adversarial court proceedings in the High Court. As per determinations for section 13 applications under current ECF—exceptional case funding—legal representation will be provided, rather than legal help and advocacy funding, and applications will be means-tested.
The fourth amendment to LASPO insert a new paragraph into part 3 of schedule 1 to the Act to set out the conditions under which an individual can access funded advocacy services at inquest proceedings. The conditions are that, first, a public authority must be an interested person at the inquest and, secondly, advocacy must not have already been made available to another family member of the deceased in relation to the same inquest or a linked inquest. Whether an inquest is linked—that is, whether it is investigating deaths stemming from the same incident—is a matter for the coroner hearing the case.
Part 4 of schedule 6 then turns to amendments to the supporting regulations. The first set of amendments are to the Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) Regulations 2013. There are three amendments to regulation 5, in particular sub-paragraph (m) and proposed new sub-paragraph (ma). Those sub-paragraphs allow for the financial means test to be disapplied when an individual applies for legal help or advocacy at an inquest where a public authority is an interested person. The third amendment at sub-paragraph (n) is a purely technical amendment that facilitates the changes. By disapplying the means test for legal aid at inquests where a public authority is an interested person, the changes will truly make a difference for the bereaved. This will be a key turning point in rebalancing the system.
Part 4 of schedule 6 also amends the Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013. The amendments ensure that not only legal help, advice and assistance but advocacy is available as an appropriate form of civil legal services at an inquest where a public authority is an interested person. They also ensure that legal representation is an appropriate form of civil legal service in an appeal to the High Court to open or reopen an inquest under section 13 of the Coroners Act 1988. The amendments will ensure that the bereaved have access to the appropriate form of legal aid for the proceedings that they are experiencing, ensuring that they are appropriately supported at each stage.
Finally, amendments 14 to 17 are minor technical amendments. They amend a reference in schedule 6 to a new paragraph inserted by the Bill into schedule 5 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, and relocate the position of a new paragraph inserted by the Bill into the same schedule to the 2009 Act. I commend the amendments, and the clause and schedule, to the Committee.
This is one area of the Bill where we need some clarity about how exactly it will operate. Before becoming an MP, I worked for a patient advocacy organisation, so I saw at first hand just how challenging inquests can be for patients’ relatives. I spoke to so many families who had to sit and watch while a portrayal of events, which they had no ability to challenge, was given at an inquest. I am sure that many Members have dealt with individuals who have had an experience with a coroner, outside of the big national scandals, that was not as they would want it to be. There is an underlying challenge that coroners are very different from other public bodies, agencies and office holders, because to some extent they can just do their own thing. That makes it very hard to achieve a consistent approach.
I have a number of questions. First, who exactly will decide whether the public authority’s costs are reasonable? The chief coroner was very clear that she felt that coroners were not equipped to do that, and even if they were, it would take time and resources. We all need to understand what the process will be. Importantly, will there be a mechanism for someone to challenge that? If the coroner is not personally engaged with everything that this Government are trying to do with the Bill—as we are sympathetic to—and they do not make any reasonable attempt to control a public body’s costs in line with what we are asking of them, what is the route for challenge?
I have heard concerns from people who work on the frontline of a public body. Sometimes, the reputation of the organisation is defended, but conversely, the reputation of an individual can be at risk in these sorts of situations—I go back to my experience in healthcare. We would not want a perverse scenario where the organisation throws an individual under the bus and makes no particular effort to ensure that their role is adequately explained and defended—accepting that we do not necessarily agree technically that it would be defending, but rather inquisitorial.
Complex family arrangements were raised in the evidence sessions. How exactly does it work if the parents are divorced? The Minister touched on that towards the end of her speech, and mentioned that another family member must not have applied for funding. Again, would there be a limit? Could every single individual family member get help? How would that be determined? The question that politicians always have to come back to is that of funding. Is this new funding that has been allocated to the Ministry of Justice outside of its existing budget, for what we imagine would be a significant increase in legal aid spending? Will the Minister reassure those people who have an interest in other areas of legal aid spending that they will not be reduced as a result of this new area of legal aid spending? I just want to understand where the money has come from.
I am grateful for those questions. On who will police the spend, it will not be for the coroner to police it; it will be for the public bodies themselves. They will be under an obligation, because they will also be funding the legal aid for the bereaved families, depending on which public authority or arm of government it comes under. If it is health, for example, that Department will fund the legal aid costs of the bereaved families; if it is the Prison Service, the funding will come from the Ministry of Justice; if it is police, it will be the Home Office, and so on.
No, there is no new money for this legislation. Therefore, we hope that the spending that public authorities carry out for inquests will match how much they have to fund for the bereaved families. We hope that this will also be a deterrent against arming up officials when going towards what should be an inquisitorial process.
Absolutely. My hon. Friend makes a good point. This is to encourage good behaviour. It is to encourage public authorities to not come armed with many barristers, and to discourage the David and Goliath story that we have heard far too many times.
On the shadow Minister’s point about individuals within a public authority potentially not being represented, that is not something that we want to curtail. For example, a frontline healthcare worker could have representation via their union and the public authority could have representation. This is about making sure that the family has adequate legal representation too. I will come back to his other points after I take another intervention.
Tessa Munt
Does the Minister feel that this provision might actually lead to some clarity about the amount of money that is spent by local authorities on defending themselves and their position, and the actions that they may have taken? It is almost impossible to get them to cough up. They just say, “Oh, well, it’s business as usual—that’s what we always do.” I am hoping that this measure will give clarity.
The hon. Lady is bang on the money, literally. I cannot tell her how frustrating it has been as a Minister trying to figure out a way forward on this—trying to figure out the cost to the public purse and the taxpayer—when we do not have that data. This will enable us to have the data on exactly how much is being spent by public authorities and Government Departments on legal aid.
This is taxpayers’ money. We heard evidence from the bereaved families that one of the biggest kicks in the teeth for them was that they as taxpayers were funding the legal support for the public authorities that were accused of having a hand in the death of their loved one. That is totally perverse and unacceptable.
I welcome that point. We have put new powers in the Bill for the coroner to challenge public authorities if they are acting inappropriately. What they bring forward has to be proportionate and reasonable. There are powers on the coroners there. They have to compile a report and complain to the relevant bodies or those individuals with the power to take action against the public authority for not acting in accordance with the guidance set out by the Lord Chancellor or the provisions in the Bill.
But that is kind of circular, because it takes us back to the coroners. Are the coroners in a position to do that? It is not something they have to do at the minute. As we heard in evidence, judges do that—it is part and parcel of their work—but it is not part of what coroners do. What are we doing in terms of support, information and guidance, and then monitoring that they actually do it?
I have a very close working relationship with the chief coroner, as the hon. Member would probably expect given my role. We work together very closely, and we have had significant conversations about how to work together going forward and about the implementation of the Bill, which will be crucial to its effectiveness. It is important to recognise that coroners, although distinct in their nature, are the judiciary. They are independent and they do have relevant expertise in this regard. I will be working closely with the chief coroner on implementation.
I am not sure whether the hon. Member heard what I said about annual reporting, but any experiences of a public authority failing to abide by the coroner’s instructions will have to be put into the annual report that the chief coroner will provide to the Lord Chancellor—all of this has to be captured—and we will not hesitate to name and shame those who are failing to abide by the duties in the Bill.
Seamus Logan
I may be misreading the evidence—if I am, I accept that—but I want to draw the Minister’s attention to the evidence given to us by Chris Minnoch and Richard Miller during the Committee’s second sitting, last Thursday afternoon. I came away from that sitting with a very distinct impression that those two witnesses were of the view that the legal aid system might need to be expanded. We find that view from Mr Minnoch, the chief executive of the Legal Aid Practitioners Group, at columns 60 and 61. He seemed to suggest that his expectation was that legal aid would be expanded in this context.
We are expanding legal aid. The provision of non-means-tested legal aid for bereaved families at an inquest or inquiry where there is a public authority as an interested person is the biggest expansion of legal aid for a generation.
Seamus Logan
That is fair enough, but the Minister stated earlier that there are no additional resources as a result of the application of the Bill.
That is correct. There is no new money for this; it has to be found out of existing Government Department budgets. This is in order to, as we have debated, figure out exactly how much is being spent by public authorities and by local government departments on legal aid and on their contribution to an inquest or an inquiry. We will be working with the legal aid providers very closely and we will be monitoring this, as I am sure will the Treasury, but that is the determination of this Bill and that is the mechanism by which we will be operating.
Seamus Logan
If I interpret the Minister correctly, what she is saying is that, through the application of the Bill, there may be a need to review the position in due course.
I can confirm that we are working very closely on a way forward on the framework for the legal aid mechanism of the Bill. I will happily update Members and the House as we progress on how that will be implemented, and we will be working with providers on that.
On the shadow Minister’s final point, about complex family relationships, we are alive to this issue and are working with organisations and officials to see how we can best approach it. We have made provision in the Bill for one advocate adviser per bereaved family, but we recognise that there are complex family arrangements, so there are provisions in the Bill for other family members or other interested people to make an application under LASPO to access more legal aid. However, we have heard the concerns raised in Committee, and we are looking to see what more we can do to support families.
Tessa Munt
I have had discussions with the Minister about the Bill’s relationship with the families of those who are deceased, and I am rather hopeful that she will consider new clause 5. It has been implied that people who are seriously injured or survivors are included in the Bill, but I would like to be very specific about that particular group. The new clause seeks to ensure that those who are seriously injured but are survivors have equal access to legal support, without means testing, as bereaved families when participating in inquests, inquiries, investigations and independent panels. Many survivors face really complex legal processes when dealing with trauma, and without non-means-tested legal aid they may be unable to engage effectively or have their interests represented. Extending legal aid to that group of people would remove financial barriers, ensure meaningful participation opportunities for them, and help to ensure that inquiries and inquests—in which I have been involved myself—can fully examine the conduct of public bodies and public officials, and promote accountability and justice. Will the Minister please address that?
As the hon. Member said, her new clause 5 seeks to extend civil legal aid to seriously injured survivors who are participating in inquests or inquiries where the conduct of public bodies or public officials is in question.
The Bill’s expansion of legal aid ensures that it is available to bereaved families in an inquest where a public authority is an interested person. It follows that a seriously injured survivor who is also a family member of the deceased will already be able to apply for legal aid under the Bill. Survivors of serious incidents are more likely to have active participation in an inquiry into what has happened more generally than in an inquest, where the coroner is seeking to determine facts around a death. However, injured survivors can apply for legal help and advocacy at inquests via the exceptional case funding scheme. Applicants may be eligible for that where not providing legal services would breach, or risk breaching, the applicant’s rights under the European convention on human rights. Alternatively, survivors may work with family members of the deceased receiving legal aid to contribute to the instruction of legally aided lawyers.
Section 40 of the Inquiries Act 2005 already gives the chair a specific power to award publicly funded legal representation to individuals or organisations involved in an inquiry, subject to the conditions set out by the sponsoring Minister. In recent inquiries, such as the Post Office Horizon IT inquiry and the Grenfell inquiry, chairs have used that power to ensure that all core participants are funded where that is fair, necessary and proportionate. It is therefore not necessary to expand the scope of civil legal aid to inquiries.
I also note that new clause 5 raises a significant practical and definitional challenge: it does not set out what constitutes “reasonable grounds for believing” that the matter relates to a public authority’s conduct, which would be necessary in order to make regulations implementing the measure and for operationalisation. It could also draw the scope of legal aid more widely than intended, such as by including the perpetrators of terrorist attacks.
In summary, the new clause is unnecessary in the light of existing routes to access legal help and advocacy. It would duplicate provisions already available for inquiries under the Inquiries Act by introducing legal aid for core participants for the first time, and, in doing so, would introduce complexities about who would fund those legal costs. That could lead to delays and make the scheme harder to operationalise and manage. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills not to move the new clause.
Tessa Munt
I seek a little clarity. The Minister made reference to somebody who is seriously injured. They might be part of the proceedings as a friend of the family of somebody who has died. We have seen fairly recently people being injured in a terrorist attack in which colleagues around them have died. They might have something very specific to add, but they might not be a friend of the family. I want to be really clear whether, if somebody was present and seriously injured, and had something to add, but was a colleague and not a family member, there would be any barrier to them being considered as helpful to the family in an inquest or investigation.
I recognise that, and I will happily engage with the hon. Lady further to ensure that we have no gaps.
Tessa Munt
I am very grateful to the Minister for that assurance.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6
Conduct of public authorities at inquiries and inquests
Amendments made: 14, in schedule 6, page 54, line 2, leave out from “paragraph” to “and” in line 3 and insert
“(d) insert—
‘(e) the matters reported under paragraph 7A of that Schedule’”.
This amendment is consequential on amendments 16 and 17.
Amendment 15, in schedule 6, page 55, line 24, leave out “2A and 7” and insert “7 and 7A”.
This amendment is consequential on amendments 16 and 17.
Amendment 16, in schedule 6, page 56, line 1, leave out “2” and insert “7”.
This amendment, together with amendment 17, relocates the position in which a new paragraph of Schedule 5 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 is inserted.
Amendment 17, in schedule 6, page 56, line 3, leave out “2A” and insert “7A”.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
See the explanatory statement for amendment 16.
Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.
New Clause 1
Post-legislative assessment of the legal duty of candour for public authorities and public officials
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report into—
(a) the impact of the Act’s provisions on increasing public confidence that public authorities’ internal processes are fit for purpose in identifying and investigating failures when they first arise following a major incident.
(b) the role of the standing public advocate in assessing public authorities’ responses to affected individuals and relatives of bereaved victims following a major incident or where there is a major public concern that public authorities may not be acting in the best interests of those affected by a major incident.
(2) The report must assess—
(a) extending the public advocate’s powers to facilitate the gathering of information from those people affected by a major incident to support official inquiries and investigations to help ensure that all public authorities and officials are acting in accordance with the duty of candour set out in this Act.
(b) the case for facilitating a mechanism whereby the public advocate can instigate an independent panel to collate evidence and information following a major incident to support the oversight of public authorities and officials’ responses to major incidents.
(c) the costs of establishing independent panels as compared to non-statutory inquiries, or statutory inquiries under the Inquiries Act 2005 in line with paragraph (b).
(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the Report before Parliament.”—(Ian Byrne.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Seamus Logan
I rise to support the new clause, the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston and the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby. I believe this to be an important proposal. If the new clause is adopted, would it actually result in a saving to the public purse?
I thank all Members who have spoken in the debate on the new clause, which seeks to provide for a post-legislative review of the duty of candour and to include an assessment of the role of the Independent Public Advocate.
As the Committee knows, Cindy Butts has now started as the first ever standing advocate of the independent public advocate. Hers is an excellent appointment. Sadly, she has already been deployed to support the victims of the horrific attack on Heaton Park synagogue. The IPA will bolster the support offer and amplify victims’ voices back to Government. The Deputy Prime Minister and I have been in direct contact with Cindy to discuss her early experiences in post, and we will continue to engage with her on the delivery of her role and to better understand the experiences of victims.
Under the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, the IPA has the power to produce reports, and has broad discretion on what matters relating to a major incident to include. Such reports may, for example, highlight concerns about a public authority not co-operating or not behaving with candour, or about the cost of what is entailed.
Additionally, the Act requires a statutory review of the independent public advocate’s role and its effectiveness, 18 months after its first deployment. That review period commenced on 3 October, following the attack at Heaton Park synagogue. The resulting report will be laid before Parliament, as required in legislation. It is right to allow the new role sufficient time to bed in. We will keep listening to victims’ experiences and will conduct the review before we consider any further changes. However, I am not taking those off the table—I reaffirm that commitment to the Committee.
The Prime Minister recently commissioned a new ethics and integrity commission to report on how public bodies can develop, distribute and enforce codes of ethics so that they effect meaningful cultural change and ensure that public officials act with honesty, integrity and candour at all times. On the publication of its report, and when the Hillsborough law has received Royal Assent, the commission will act as a centre of excellence on public sector codes of conduct, providing guidance and best practice to help all public bodies to put ethics and integrity at the heart of public service delivery.
Tessa Munt
I would be grateful if the Minister could include me in those discussions, because I am very keen that we get this right.
In the spirit of brevity, let me just say that the clauses contain standard provisions around Crown application. They confer powers to make consequential amendments as set out in the Bill’s regulation-making powers, they provide definitions throughout the Bill and they set out its territorial extent. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 20 to 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Commencement
Tessa Munt
I beg to move amendment 41, in clause 25, page 22, line 23, leave out subsections (1) to (8) and insert—
“This Act shall come into force on Royal Assent, save for sections 9, 10 and 18, which will come into force six months thereafter.”
This amendment clarifies that the Act should come into force straightaway except for those sections which require the provision of codes or guidance.
Tessa Munt
The amendment seeks to clarify that the Act should come into force straight away, except for clauses 9, 10 and 18, which require the provision of codes or guidance. I seek purely to ensure that the Hillsborough law comes into force as soon as possible, as families have been waiting so many years for justice.
I thank the hon. Lady and all Committee members for ensuring that our feet are held to the fire on our plans for implementation. We agree that the families have been waiting far too long and deserve implementation as swiftly as possible.
Amendment 41 seeks to amend the commencement provision in clause 25. It would provide that the Bill, with the exceptions of clauses 9, 10 and 18, would come into force immediately on Royal Assent. Clauses 9, 10 and 18 would then automatically come into force six months following Royal Assent. As I said, we agree that the families have waited long enough. The public deserve change and renewed confidence in the services that exist to protect and serve them.
Let me be clear: we will bring the measures into force as soon as is reasonably practical. However, we cannot prescribe commencement on the fact of the Bill. That is not the right approach and would create practical difficulties. Ultimately, implementing the legislation without the necessary frameworks and arrangements in place could result in unintended consequences and difficulties that cause further distress and disappointment. By retaining the power to commence regulations, steps can be taken to ensure a smooth transition, so that the provisions achieve their objective without negatively impacting ongoing proceedings.
I reassure the hon. Lady and all Committee members that we are not dragging our feet. We want to implement the Bill as swiftly as possible, and we will do so. We are working at pace to facilitate market readiness to expand legal aid rapidly. We are also working with coroner services to help them to prepare for the effects of an increase in the number of lawyers who will appear at inquests.
In addition, the major increase in demand will mean that we also need to look at making significant changes to the Legal Aid Agency’s operational and digital systems. I remind Members that this comes at a time when the agency is recovering from a major cyber incident, with all digital systems yet to be fully restored. Without sufficient time for the legal aid market and the Legal Aid Agency to prepare, there is a risk that bereaved families will be unable to find legal aid lawyers or to access legal aid funding at inquests, which could be delayed as a consequence. We do not want that. Our priority is to deliver the reforms as soon as possible while ensuring that the system is equipped to provide specialist advice to bereaved families from day one.
None the less, we recognise that the Hillsborough families, along with the wider public, deserve clarity on when the Bill will come into force, which is why, very soon, we will set out a clear plan, including the timelines for implementation and for the commencement of the Bill as a whole. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills to withdraw the amendment.
Clause 25 sets out when the Act will come into force. Part 5 of the Bill, which includes the technical provisions, including on regulation-making powers and territorial extent, will take effect immediately. The other parts of the Bill will come into force on a date specified by the relevant authority in regulations. I reaffirm that we will not delay bringing the Bill into force, and I look forward to updating the House very soon on the planned timeline for its implementation. Clause 26 simply provides the short title of the legislation. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Tessa Munt
I accept the Minister’s assurance that she is going to get her skates on, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
On a point of order, Sir Roger. I would appreciate the Committee indulging me briefly, because it is customary at this point to say a few brief words to mark the end of Committee deliberations. I thank the Opposition Front-Bench team, and I pay tribute to all the Members who have served on this really important and powerful Bill Committee. The Bill is better for having been scrutinised by them all, so I thank them.
I thank you, Sir Roger, for keeping us in very good order, especially at times when we all lost where we were. I also thank the Government Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Ossett and Denby Dale, on her birthday. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] I thank the Clerks. I want to say a huge thank you to the brilliant team at the Ministry of Justice and the Cabinet Office. That includes, but is not limited to, our officials Nikki Jones, Emily Dunn, Tom Blackburn, Sam Wright, May Wong, Sam Dayan, Georgina Rood, Terry Davies, Jonny Fitzpatrick, Catriona MacDonald, Naomi Sephton, John Smith, James Parker, Rachel Boylin and Rachel Bennion —both my Rachels. I thank the Hansard Reporters and the Doorkeepers, and I look forward to the debate on Report, which I am sure we will come to very soon.
The Chair
That was, of course, all strictly out of order and not a matter for the Chair. [Laughter.] While we are out of order, I add my thanks, on the Committee’s behalf, to the Officers of the House, without whom we could not do this job at all.
Exceptionally, I would like to say something else. This has been a highly sensitive and at times difficult piece of legislation to put through. It affects people whose lives are still affected many years after events. I hugely appreciate, and I know that Mr Dowd appreciates, the manner in which you have conducted yourselves. It has been exemplary. Thank you very much indeed.
Bill, as amended, to be reported.
(2 weeks, 1 day ago)
Written StatementsToday, I am pleased to announce that this Government will be bringing forward legislation to prevent the misuse of evidence in sexual offence prosecutions.
These changes follow a comprehensive report published by the Law Commission entitled “Evidence in sexual offences prosecutions: a final report”. This report specifically considered how myths and misconceptions about sexual violence permeate the trial process and influence jurors’ deliberations. Its recommendations aim to improve the treatment and experience of victims at court, while ensuring that defendants receive a fair trial. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Law Commission for its detailed work on this complex matter.
First, we will create a clear statutory threshold for admitting “victim bad character” evidence. Where a defendant seeks to rely on an allegation that a victim has previously lied about being a victim of a sexual offence, that allegation must have a proper evidential basis before it can be admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings. The fact that a previous allegation was not reported, or did not lead to charge or conviction, will not be sufficient to reach this threshold.
Secondly, we will introduce legislation providing a higher admissibility threshold for victims’ compensation claim evidence in trials concerning sexual offences, providing that this evidence cannot be admitted unless it has substantial probative value. The fact that a victim has made a claim, and the outcome of this claim, are not sufficient grounds to insinuate that someone is bringing a case for the purposes of financial gain. This measure recognises that all victims of crime have a right seek compensation, and should not be unfairly stigmatised for doing so.
Thirdly, we will amend the threshold for the admissibility of sexual behaviour evidence. We want to ensure that the legislative threshold is clear, and can be consistently applied. New legislation will continue to provide that SBE should not as a rule be admitted, but if it is to be, it must have substantial probative value or be important explanatory evidence. Legislation will also ask judges to consider factors such as the risk that the evidence relies on myths and misconceptions.
In addition, we know that domestic abuse can take many forms, can escalate within a relationship or can present differently with different victims. Currently, unlike with certain categories of offences, legislation does not specify that domestic abuse convictions of any kind can demonstrate a propensity to commit further domestic abuse offences—especially if the previous offence was not the same type of offence as that which they are currently charged with. It means that, for example, evidence of a previous common assault may not be brought before the jury in a sexual offence case, even if both are occasions of partner abuse. We do not think this is right in the context of domestic abuse. We will ensure that domestic abuse offences of any type can be admitted to demonstrate a propensity for further offending in a domestic abuse context, against any victim—whether that is a conviction of coercive control followed by sexual offending, or physical abuse turned to economic abuse.
Recognising how daunting it can be for victims to give evidence, we will further strengthen the support available at court by bringing forward legislation on the use of special measures. This will allow witnesses to be accompanied by a companion when giving evidence, and will clarify the circumstances in which the court can exclude intimidating individuals from the public gallery or combine special measures, so that witnesses can give their best evidence. Our reforms will also clarify courtroom screens’ role in shielding witnesses from view of the defendant when they give evidence, allow victims to use special measures when reading their victim personal statement and enshrine in law the court’s power to edit pre-recorded evidence so it is suitable for use in proceedings and free from inadmissible or irrelevant material.
I hope that these changes will give victims the confidence that they will be treated fairly in court, while preserving judicial independence and the right to a fair trial.
I would like to thank all of those who have campaigned on these issues over recent months and years. I look forward to bringing these important changes to legislation before the House.
[HCWS1124]
(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 2—Public interest—
“(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must define in regulations what constitutes the ‘public interest’ for the purposes of—
(a) Section 1(1)(a),
(b) Schedule 1(8)(b).
(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may not be made until a draft has been approved by both Houses.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to define public interest for the purposes of this Act by regulations.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Roger, on this historic and momentous Bill Committee. With your permission, I will say a few words about just how momentous this is.
Last week, this Committee heard evidence directly from the Hillsborough families about the Bill and what it means to them. I know that the Committee will agree that that was a huge privilege for us. The Bill is of great and national importance to so many people up and down the country, and we will not play politics with this legislation. I hope my colleagues in the Opposition will do the same. What we will do is listen: we will listen to the families, Hillsborough Law Now and the members of this Committee. It is right that they and the Committee push us and challenge us. They have my commitment that if we can find ways to improve the Bill, we will.
Finally, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby and my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston. They have each tirelessly campaigned for justice for the Hillsborough families, and played no small part in seeing this legislation brought forward. I am honoured to have them by my side in Committee.
Of course, we have all said this time and again, but we would absolutely not be here without the families. This is for them, and for those who have campaigned tirelessly for so long to seek justice and to ensure that no one ever has to go through what they went through. This is not just for the Hillsborough families, but for anyone who has experienced cover-up or had to fight for the truth, and for the memories of all those who are no longer with us.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. As we consider the clause and new clause 2, I want to be clear that the Opposition recognise the importance of the Bill’s overarching aims. Candour, transparency, frankness and, above all, the requirement that public officials act in the public interest are principles that I am sure Members from all parties support.
As we commented on during evidence sessions about the chief coroner, it would be quite wrong to portray good-faith efforts to ensure that we give due consideration to each and every possible implication of the Bill as in any way not giving due regard to its noble aims, in particular the considerable effort and good intentions of the many campaigners supporting it, including the ones we heard from during the evidence sessions. As the Minister commented, I do not think that anyone could have been anything but deeply moved and reflective on hearing the experiences that the witnesses went through in such appalling circumstances. They were a limited group, but one made up not just of those affected by Hillsborough but those affected by many other scandals in which the state and its bodies covered up and mistreated people.
Ultimately, even if we believe that the Bill could be improved, and we will hold the Government to account for any unintended consequences, we support the Bill and do not expect to oppose it on Third Reading. I hope that that is an important message for the campaigners supporting it. However, we want to probe the Government’s thinking and suggest possible improvements.
Before we come to the specifics of our new clause, I will comment on clause 1 as a whole, as it lays out the core purpose of the Bill and highlights just how far the political class as a whole has to come in delivering candour, and how contentious these matters can be. In the very weeks we have been considering this Bill, with the Government professing to want to drive further improvements in the candour and frankness of accountability, we have been having a heated and highly contested public debate about what constitutes candour and frankness. I raise that debate not to further discuss it in Committee—it would not be appropriate to engage in it for its merits—but just to highlight exactly how contentious such things are. We have a Chancellor who, in my view, has clearly failed to operate with candour and frankness, but I am sure that view is fiercely opposed by other members of the Committee.
Thank you for that further clarification, Sir Roger.
These issues are absolutely live and happening all the time—this week alone, we have seen examples of it—and we need to understand the implications of the Bill. I am far from alone in recognising the difficulty in defining terms such as “candour” and “public interest”. John Coggon, professor of law at the University of Bristol law school, writes:
“The public interest has no single, fixed definition. Even as a technical term of art its sense varies both for being context dependent and for being a question that may be settled by different sorts of institutional actor. It may, for instance, demand consideration of national security, national economic interest, protection of health, maintenance of a justice system, protection of fundamental rights. And determinations may be made by courts, politicians, legislators, executive agencies, and so on. Each can and will bring different forms and ranges of consideration to the process of determining what the public interest demands, and whether those demands are compelling.”
Anyone who has spent any time inside a public body—a police force, a regulator or a Government Department—knows that the public interest can mean very different things to different people. It is shaped by context, role, circumstance and sometimes professional norms. What one official believes to be in the public interest, a Minister, senior civil servant or statutory body might see very differently. That is not mere theory; it is the daily reality of modern governance.
Questions were raised during the evidence sessions about how the public interest might be used inappropriately in defence of an allegation of misconduct in public office. As new clause 2 points to, paragraph 1(8)(b) of schedule 1 specifically allows for the withholding of information in the public interest. Failing in that area could lead to both those we would wish not to be prosecuted being prosecuted and those we want to see prosecuted escaping justice. It is an important area of how the Bill will operate.
I am not so ambitious as to suggest that through the Bill the Committee will be able to create a perfect definition of public interest, but I speak in support of the new clause in an attempt to ensure that the Government recognise that they need to properly engage with that issue if the Bill is to be successful. A definition of the public interest need not be exhaustive, as I have said, but the wide-ranging ramifications of the Bill place an onus on the Government to ensure that the frontline civil servant of any kind has somewhere to look and turn to when wrestling with these matters—a starting point that might help them to structure their thinking and make decisions.
By failing to define the term at all, even in the most basic way, the Bill risks giving us a duty that is challenging to operate for a junior civil servant. It risks more uncertainty about compliance, inconsistency between institutions and even potential litigation where prosecutors or courts are left to decide after the fact what Parliament must have meant. The obvious challenging scenario is when officials need to consider situations where there are competing public interests—national security versus transparency, value for money versus speed of delivery, or personal privacy versus public accountability. Without more assistance for thinking those matters through, how does an official protect themselves from the—possibly criminal—allegation that their judgment call was not in the public interest among competing interests?
The new clause does not attempt to dictate exactly what public interest must mean; it simply requires the Secretary of State to set out a structure or framework in regulations, subject to approval by both Houses. Ultimately, if this legislation is to achieve the cultural change that the Government claim it will, the foundations must be clear and easy to understand. Public officials should not be left purely guessing what Parliament might have meant, or how we expected them to weigh these issues—Parliament should tell them. New clause 2 offers the Government the opportunity to do exactly that, and I hope they will take it.
Clause 1 sets out the purpose of the Bill as a whole to ensure that public authorities and public officials perform their functions at all times with candour, transparency and frankness, and in the public interest. As the clause describes, the Bill sets out those duties in the substantive provisions that follow. The clause does not have any separate legal effect itself; it is designed to set out clearly and simply the intention behind the Bill to assist those who will be subject to it and the general public in their understanding.
I thank the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for tabling new clause 2, which seeks to require the Secretary of State to define exactly what is meant by the term “public interest” in clause 1. Clause 1 is a purpose clause and does not have any legal effect in and of itself, separate from the other provisions in the Bill. It sets out the intention behind the Bill, and how the Bill achieves that intention by describing the relevant provisions.
In this context, acting in the public interest means fulfilling the obligations and duties in the remainder of the Bill that arise from it; it means being candid at inquiries and investigations; and it means that those working for public authorities must adhere to the codes and ethics required by the Bill. In general, “acting in the public interest” is usually not defined in legislation, as the hon. Gentleman said. This is because what is in the public interest will depend on the circumstance and context of that particular situation. Seeking to define what it means might have the effect of narrowing what could be considered to be in the public interest.
In schedule 1, the public interest is referred to in the context of public interest immunity. Public interest immunity is an established concept in law: it is a rule of evidence where documents are withheld if their disclosure would be injurious to the public interest. What is the “public interest” will be dependent on the particular circumstances, and we should not seek to constrain this or undermine a very long-established legal doctrine that is applied by the courts. The Inquiries Act 2005 and other legislation already contain provisions of this kind to ensure that appropriate protections are attached to sensitive information, which the Bill is replicating. I hope that clarifies the purpose of clause 1 and why defining “public interest” would not be appropriate and could actually hinder proceedings.
The Minister rightly describes how tightly the courts consider these matters in detail. As the Bill puts a whole range of very junior civil servants in the firing line, does she at least accept that guidance or materials might be helpful to assist a broader audience in how they approach these issues in their day-to-day work?
I welcome that intervention and the whole purpose of this legislation is to ensure exactly that. Obviously, there will be guidance in the codes of ethics that are produced, and public authorities will probably provide training for their individual public servants who will now be captured by the Bill, if, as I hope, it receives Royal Assent and becomes an Act. I am due to attend a session at the University of Liverpool to look at exactly how we can implement the Bill, should it become legislation and reach the statute book. All of that is being taken into consideration to advise everyone about what is expected of them under the duty of candour. Therefore, I urge the hon. Gentleman not to press new clause 2 to a vote, and I pledge to work with him on exactly that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
This is one of those moments when, should the hon. Gentleman wish to press new clause 2 to a vote, which he may not, it would not be called now; it would be called later in the proceedings, because all new clauses are voted on at the end of the consideration of the Bill.
We come now to amendment 31. This is one of those occasions when we are debating two separate groups of amendments to clause 2. We have the choice: the clause stand part debate can take place now or at the end, but not both. Let us bear that in mind.
Clause 2
Duty of candour and assistance
Tessa Munt
I thank the Minister. Amendment 32 would require public authorities or officials assisting an inquiry, investigation, inquest or independent panel to demonstrate that they have taken steps to ensure that relevant persons can safely disclose information relevant to that investigation. The amendment would require public authorities to take proactive steps to ensure that all relevant officials can safely disclose information. It would strengthen protections for those providing evidence, helping to prevent retaliation or intimidation, and ensure that inquiries and investigations have access to all relevant information for thorough scrutiny of public officials’ decision making.
I thank the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills for tabling these amendments. Amendment 31 seeks to ensure that, under the duty of candour and assistance, an inquiry or investigation, or, as she stated, a review panel, is notified by public authorities and officials of all relevant acts or information, including omissions or failures to act. We agree wholeheartedly, and I reassure the hon. Lady and all members of the Committee that the Bill already achieves the intent of the amendment.
Clause 23 provides definitions for terms used throughout the Bill. It specifies that an
“‘act’ includes an omission or a course of conduct”.
Therefore, in clause 2, “act” is to be read as including any omission or course of conduct that may be relevant, which could include approving the actions of others. To “have information” could include information that a person approved the actions of another person, or had knowledge of them and did not prevent them.
Amendment 42 would place a requirement on public authorities under the duty of candour and assistance to retain all relevant records, including digital records. Again, the Government agree with the intention behind the amendment, and believe that the provisions in the Bill are designed to achieve it in practice. Clause 2(4)(a) requires authorities and officials to provide information likely to be relevant to an inquiry or investigation if requested. They will not meet that obligation if they allow the information to be lost or destroyed when they ought to be providing it. In addition, the individual in charge of an authority has an obligation to take all reasonable steps to secure the authority’s compliance with that duty. That would necessarily involve ensuring that information is accessible within the authority, so that it can meet its obligations under the Bill.
Amendment 32 seeks to ensure that the Bill has adequate safeguards to protect those complying with the duty of candour and assistance. We agree that ensuring that public officials feel safe to disclose information is essential, and several aspects of the Bill speak to that point. The duty of candour and assistance provides appropriate safeguards for the protection of sensitive information and onward disclosure and ensures that officials can feel confident that the information they provide will be handled appropriately.
Tessa Munt
Can I ask the Minister for clarity? A lot of the proposed legislation seems to deal with when an investigation has been called for or set up. There may be a significant gap between that and when an authority knows that something has gone wrong and that an investigation, inquiry, inquest or independent panel is likely to follow. Is there is a way in which the duties can kick in the moment that somebody recognises that something will come of that rather than when an investigation is called for formally?
There are two versions of the duty of candour: the always-on duty of candour by which every public servant should have to act in their everyday life, and the duty of candour with criminal sanctions attached to it that kicks in when there is an investigation or inquiry. The whole point is that they will work hand-in-hand. The former will prevent the latter—that is the intention. The code of ethics and the guidance that we talked about in an earlier debate will assist, but that will require a significant culture change across the whole public sector; it will not be easy or happen overnight. I am not naive enough to believe that it will be fixed just because we have the legislation. It will take a momentous effort by all of us to ensure that the culture seeps down from the top. That is also the intention behind the implementation, which we will come to later in the debate.
I reassure the hon. Lady that part 2 of the Bill requires public authorities to set out the process for exactly how public officials can raise internal complaints, to promote a culture of internal challenge. It also requires public authorities to set out their whistleblowing procedures, drawing officials’ attention to any legal protections they may benefit from. Although we are sympathetic to the intent behind amendment 32, we do not think that it will provide sufficient clarity on what public authorities would be expected to do to ensure that officials feel safe to disclose information, nor how that would operate as part of their duty of candour and assistance, for which non-compliance entails criminal sanctions.
Given those assurances, I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Sir Roger. I just want to say a few words on this clause about why the duty of candour and assistance is so important, and why it means so much to Hillsborough families, some of whom are my constituents. We heard from a small number of them in the evidence sessions, but there are many more who could have told equally difficult stories about their own experience.
What happened at Hillsborough was a disaster. Nobody who worked for South Yorkshire police left their homes that morning intending to cause it, but the reality is that their gross negligence and inadequate organisation did cause it. Within four and a half months, the public inquiry had identified a loss of police control as the main cause of the disaster. Had our state been operating fully and correctly, we would have recognised that as a country and that would have been the end of the matter. There would have been accountability for those failings, lessons would have been learned, and the families could have grieved for their lost loved ones and moved on with their lives.
Instead, what happened was that the South Yorkshire police, aided and abetted by the West Midlands police, set about telling a story, intent only on deflecting blame for their own failings—even though those failings were then identified within four and a half months. One can understand, perhaps, why a police force faced with that disaster would have wanted to give their side of the story and understanding of what had happened. However, once the public inquiry—within four and a half months—had made findings that excoriated the police response to the disaster, accused a senior officer of telling a disgraceful lie and said in terms that the police would have been better advised to have accepted responsibility rather than sought to put forward a different story that was not credible, one would have expected that there would have been accountability, that the truth would have been accepted by the South Yorkshire police and that there would have been no more attempts to put forward a different narrative.
That did not happen. Instead, the then inquest proceedings—the longest in British legal history at that time, taking over a year—were used in terms by the South Yorkshire police to tell a different story: to put it in the public mind that they had not been at fault, as the public inquiry had clearly found, but that it had been the fans who had attended the match who had been at fault. It had been those who died who had contributed in some way to their own deaths. It had been the survivors of that terrible disaster who had somehow caused the problem. It had been hooliganism and drunkenness—it had been ticketless fans who had forced their way into the grounds.
That is the story that the police told, aided and abetted by the media of the day, some of which behaved disgracefully and suffer for it still on Merseyside, I might say. That story was told repeatedly. It was in every newspaper and all the mini-inquests for over a year of those inquest proceedings. At the end of it, the public perception about what had happened at Hillsborough was completely different from what the public inquiry had found. It was as if the public inquiry had never happened; yet it was right in almost every aspect, and within four and a half months of the disaster.
It is now 36 years since the disaster. In our evidence sessions, we heard from some of the families about the ongoing impact of the lies that were told and the story that has been repeatedly told by South Yorkshire police and those responsible for the disaster, who have been completely unable to accept their culpability. Even as late as the second inquest, they tried again to tell that same discredited story, so the importance of this clause cannot be overemphasised. It gets to the heart of why one might wish to call this a Hillsborough law, even though that is not the Bill’s short title. It might be known colloquially as that, because the fact is that, had those public authorities had the duties provided for in clause 2, there is no way they could have undertaken that campaign of lies, disinformation and propaganda against the wholly innocent families and wholly innocent survivors of that disaster.
It is for that reason that I think it is important that the duty of candour and assistance is an essential part of the Bill. If we enact it and implement it properly without any concerns or problems, that duty is one of the things that will enable us to say that this is a Hillsborough law because, had it been in place at the time, the South Yorkshire or West Midlands police could not have engaged in the disgraceful way that they did, simply to deflect the blame on to anybody else but them—even if that hurt those who had died, the families of those who had died, or the thousands and thousands of survivors. We forget that it was not only my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby who was at the match; thousands of people saw what happened. It was filmed and shown live on TV, so the idea that it could be distorted in the way that it has been—at great public expense and over decades—is a terrible disgrace to the way that our systems work.
If the Bill can put that right, it will have done our whole nation a service, and it will be right to call it a Hillsborough law. It will mean that those families can stop their campaigning and start to grieve and live what is left of their lives. Some 36 years on from what happened, surely they have a right to expect that.
I thank the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire North and Moray East for tabling amendments 18 to 20, which would require public officials and authorities to notify and provide information to any inquiry or investigation within 30 days. The Government agree entirely that public authorities and officials should provide assistance to inquiries and investigations as quickly as possible, and the Bill requires that. Clause 2(6) requires authorities and officials to act “expeditiously” when complying with the obligations placed on them. In some cases, it will be possible for officials and authorities to provide the assistance required within 30 days, but there may be times when it is not.
There will be situations where an inquiry or investigation requires an authority to provide a very large amount of information or data, requiring it to set staff and resources aside to search through potentially thousands of documents and assess their relevance, with all the necessary checks and verification that follow. We think it is important that authorities are given sufficient time to conduct thorough searches and provide accurate information, and that the inquiry or investigation will be best placed to set a reasonable timescale for that.
The duty would also apply to former officials who may have a different job or be retired—or have resigned, as we heard earlier—and there may be situations where it is impossible for them to provide the assistance required within a 30-day time limit. Although I totally agree with the sentiment, a degree of flexibility is therefore important so that we get all the information that inquiries and investigations need. I therefore urge the hon. Member not to press his amendments, but I agree to work with him on a way forward.
I now turn to clause 2. We heard powerfully from my hon. Friend the Member for Morecambe and Lunesdale and my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston exactly why the duty of candour in clause 2 is integral to the Bill. As has been rightly said, this is a Bill for the Hillsborough families, and it will be known colloquially as the Hillsborough law, but it is also a Bill for Ida, for the Grenfell families, for the Manchester Arena families and for anyone who has been wronged by the state.
Today, as well as this Committee, the Independent Office for Police Conduct report on Hillsborough is being published. Within that report, I think there is a recommendation that fully supports the Hillsborough law and says why, because there are officers there who would not have been. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston outlined, history would have been different if those officers had been held to account by clause 2 of the Bill.
I totally agree with my hon. Friend and that is exactly why the Bill is so important and integral. We have all heard the stories—the reality—of what the families, the bereaved and the survivors have been through. No one should ever have to go through that again. The intent behind clause 2 is to do just that: to ensure that no family has to go through the unimaginable again.
Clause 2 sets out the requirements of the duty of candour and assistance at inquiries and investigations; in short, what those under the duty need to do. As subsection (1) states:
“Public authorities and public officials must at all times act with candour, transparency and frankness in their dealings with inquiries and investigations.”
The duty has two stages to it. The first, in clause 2(3), is the requirement for public officials to come forward and make themselves known to an inquiry or investigation if they have reason to believe that their actions or information they hold might be relevant to it. The second, in clause 2(4), is to then provide any assistance that the inquiry or investigation requires.
Clause 2(4) lists the types of assistance that might involve—for example, drawing attention to information that is particularly significant and, for public authorities, to provide a position statement to an inquiry. The head of a public authority may be asked for information and assistance as an individual public official in their own right, where relevant, but subsection (5) places them under an additional obligation. When the authority that they manage is under the duty, they are personally required to take all reasonable steps to ensure that it complies. We believe that that is crucial to the success of the Bill and for the leaders of public authorities to feel personally accountable under the duty.
I emphasise that we need clarity on this. Those of us who were able to attend the meeting with the intelligence services will know that they seemed to provide quite a clear account of their individual personal responsibility and all the ways in which they thought the Bill would affect them. That was quite clearly contradicted in our evidence from other witnesses. I am grateful to the Minister for sending round a further note to Committee members this morning, and for our brief chat ahead of this sitting. Even that note raises further contradictions, however, because it says, and I quote, that “the individual public officials working for the UK intelligence services are capable of being caught by the offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour”. It lists some other ones, but it includes the duty of candour. Further down, it says, “the Bill specifies that the duty of candour and assistance can only be addressed to public authorities and not individual public officials”.
The Minister was able to give me a brief, informal explanation of that, but I do think this is extremely important. It may be that people are happy for the security services to be excluded to a certain extent, but we have to vote on a shared understanding of what exactly the Bill does in relation to them as entire organisations, as well as to the people who work for them and those who are in charge. I would be grateful if the Minister provided some clarity on that.
I thank hon. Members for raising those important points. In this Bill, we have aimed to ensure candour while protecting national security. As it stands, inquiries and investigations will be able to demand any information and assistance they require from the intelligence services. Where national security information is concerned, the agency as a whole will provide that assistance to the inquiry or investigation by complying with a compliance direction, rather than individuals directly in their own right.
To balance that, and to ensure that there are no gaps, carve-outs or exclusions, those in charge of the agencies are subject to specific requirements to put arrangements in place for individuals to maintain records of information relating to any acts that may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation, and to provide information to the authority to ensure that the duty is complied with as set out in clause 6. Rightly, a failure to have these arrangements in place will result in criminal sanctions.
Intelligence services obtain and retain sensitive security and intelligence information in order to protect the public from national security threats. Vital public interests, including national security, would be at real risk of harm from the unrestricted disclosure of this sensitive information. We all share the same aims here—ensuring that candour is in place while protecting national security and the public.
Taking on board the points raised by Hillsborough Law Now and others, we constructed clause 6 in such a way as to ensure that there is a secure process that the intelligence services can work through so that any information required by an inquiry or investigation reaches that place safely, so that there can be full candour. However, we have heard the concerns from Hillsborough Law Now and from members of this Committee about our provisions. I assure hon. Members that the Government have taken their points on board, and we will commit to working with them and others actively to consider steps to address this in time for Report.
I turn to the other amendments, which set out that the intelligence authorities are to be listed as a public authority for the purposes of the duty of candour and assistance, and the code of ethical conduct in schedule 2. Clause 6 already makes it clear that the duty applies to the intelligence services as it applies to all other public authorities; therefore, it is beyond doubt that they are included, as a public authority, in the Bill.
We have not set out an exhaustive list of public authorities in schedule 2 to avoid unintentionally excluding some bodies by failing to list them. No individual Department or arm’s length body of central Government is included in the list for that purpose. If we begin to list public bodies, there is a risk that we imply that those not listed are not covered, which could weaken the Bill. I urge the hon. Member for Cheadle to withdraw his amendment, but I reiterate my commitment to working with Members on a way forward to capture all the concerns raised both in the Committee and outside of it.
Mr Morrison
I thank the shadow Minister for the points that he made; he is spot on that the lack of clarity in the Bill, particularly surrounding what came out of the evidence sessions, raises more questions than answers. However, I am pleased that the Minister has said that the Government are happy to work with us on tightening those gaps before Report. This is not about unrestricted evidence; it is about getting to the truth, which must be our focus throughout. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Tessa Munt
I rise to support amendment 3, proposed by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle. I am also a co-signatory of amendment 1, and I thank the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston for her reference to it. I echo the comments that have been made about Primodos and many other things. We have investigations, inquiries, inquests, and independent panels—and no doubt something else will come up at some point. Will the Minister clarify that point and agree that we should have some common language to cover all those things? As has been mentioned, independent panels do come up quite often.
I seek clarity on investigations and inquiries that might be taking place already. My understanding is that the Bill will not affect them, so if someone has something that they want to raise, they will probably need to wait until the Bill has become law. That seems slightly perverse, in that there may be people who want something done within the next six months who are going to have to sit and wait. I would like some clarity on that.
I thank hon. Members for a useful debate getting into the detail the provisions—that is why we have Bill Committees. It would be beneficial for me to clarify exactly how the Bill applies to non-statutory inquiries, as outlined by my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston. The duty of candour and assistance will apply to all statutory and non-statutory inquiries and inquests described in schedule 1. Non-statutory inquiries are defined as those caused by a Minister; those that include the delivery of a report with a view to publication; and those that the Minister has confirmed in writing relate to matters of public concern.
This is the first time non-statutory inquiries have been set out in law, but we envisage that this category could include investigations held under other names, such as independent panels, provided the criteria set out are met. Amendment 1 would automatically extend the duty of candour and assistance to independent panels and reviews established by Ministers. The Bill includes a power to extend the duty to other categories of investigations, or to specific investigations via secondary legislation. It is therefore not the case that if an investigation is not covered in the Bill, the duty of candour can never apply.
Tessa Munt
To give an example, if the local authority children’s services department sets up an investigation into something or does one of its serious case reviews—or whatever they are called now—are that organisation, the people within it and the actors in the event that prompted it covered by the duty of candour? Can the Minister be really clear about that?
I am happy to confirm that they will be. They are not currently, but the Government are tabling an amendment to cover that point, and we will come to it later in Committee. Should that amendment be made, the Bill will cover those local authority investigations.
The Cabinet Office is undertaking further work to look at how we reform inquiries. As part of that, we will consider how the different types of inquiries, reviews and investigations could be more clearly defined, and when and how they could best be used. That will inform how the duty is used.
The duty of candour and assistance is a powerful tool to ensure co-operation with investigations, but it would not be useful in all circumstances. Most reviews focus on matters of policy or technical issues— for example, the curriculum and assessment review, the net zero review and the review of the future of women’s football. In those cases, applying the duty would be unnecessary and might risk making reviews more difficult to establish and slower to report. Where the duty is applied, it must be properly monitored and enforced, and therefore frameworks for compliance and the protection of information need to be in place. We must avoid unintentionally impeding or delaying certain types of investigations by introducing unnecessary and unhelpful processes and bureaucracy. We therefore think the Bill strikes the right balance in which investigations it applies to, with the power in the Bill providing us with the tools and flexibility we need to extend the duty where it could be useful.
I have spoken to my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden about how we move forward with her campaign. She has been an incredible and ferocious campaigner for the Primodos families for many years. I have met her and the Primodos families, and I am committed to working with her on a way forward to ensure that the duty of candour can assist.
Amendment 3 is designed to apply the duty of candour and assistance to inquiries that the Secretary of State has designated as local inquiries into grooming gangs. I thank the shadow Minister for raising this important issue. As he will be aware, we are moving at pace to establish a national inquiry into grooming gangs under the Inquiries Act 2005. It will be overseen by an independent commission with statutory powers to compel evidence and testimony so that institutions can be held to account for current and historic failures. The inquiry will be independent of Government and designed to command the confidence of victims and survivors and the wider public.
The Bill already applies the duty to statutory and non-statutory inquiries called by Ministers, including this new inquiry. To strengthen the Bill, we have also tabled an amendment extending the duty to inquiries called by local authorities, and we will debate that shortly. That amendment, combined with the existing provisions in the Bill, will enable the duty to apply to either local or national inquiries into grooming gangs. I therefore urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.
On amendment 1, I accept the Government’s intention to clarify further how these things will operate. On panels and non-statutory inquiries, although there is sometimes in Government a resistance to public inquiries for the wrong reasons, sometimes it is because they are expensive and time-consuming. The real opportunity for applying the duty of candour more widely is that if we can ensure that non-public inquiries get all the information they need, they are much more likely to be successful, thereby avoiding a future public inquiry with all the associated costs that lawyers make a huge amount of money from.
On amendment 3, although the Minister outlined the future public inquiry, the local inquiries have not been cancelled. There is clearly a view that they must also proceed. I cannot see any reason why we would not want them to proceed on the basis that they are subject to the duty of candour.
I am happy to reassure the shadow Minister that, should the Bill receive Royal Assent, its provisions will apply immediately to ongoing investigations and inquiries. That includes local inquiries, if we pass the amendment that the Government have tabled. We cannot allow that currently, because the Bill has not become law, but once it has done, it will cover existing ongoing inquiries and investigations and those that are yet to commence.
I beg to move amendment 6, in schedule 1, page 27, line 29, after “applies” insert
“by virtue of this paragraph”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 7.
As I stated previously, the Government have committed to only strengthening this Bill as it moves through Parliament. That is exactly what this group of amendments does. Provision of 2005 Act Extent of application Section 17(1) and (2) (evidence and procedure) Apply only in relation to procedure and conduct of inquiry so far as relating to requirements imposed under the duty of candour and assistance Sections 19 and 20 (restrictions on public access etc) Apply only in relation to restrictions imposed in respect of evidence etc given in compliance with the duty of candour and assistance Section 21(3) to (5) (contents of, and challenges to, notices) Apply to a compliance direction as they apply to a notice under section 21 of the 2005 Act Section 22(1) (privileged information etc) Applies in respect of evidence etc given under the duty of candour and assistance as it applies to evidence etc given under section 21 of the 2005 Act Section 22(2) (public interest immunity) Applies only in relation to evidence or documents that would otherwise be required to be produced under the duty of candour and assistance Section 36 (enforcement by High Court or Court of Session) Applies to a failure to comply etc with a compliance direction as it applies to a failure etc to comply with a notice under section 21 of the 2005 Act.
Before I move on, I want to say how severely disappointed I am that the Opposition pressed the previous amendment to a vote, given my assurances that those types of investigations and inquiries will of course be covered by the Bill. That seemed to fly in the face of the statements at the beginning of the Committee sitting, where we said that we would not play party politics with the Bill. It seems, sadly, that the Opposition do not have the same ambition in mind.
Amendment 7 extends the duty of candour and assistance to apply to local authorities and local authority inquiries into serious incidents called by combined, unitary, borough, county and district councils. We have prepared the amendment with previous local inquiries firmly in mind, such as the Kerslake review into the preparedness for and emergency response to the Manchester Arena attack and local grooming gangs inquiries. It would also cover the Edinburgh tram corruption inquiry mentioned by the Mayor of Greater Manchester in oral evidence.
For the duty to apply, inquiries must relate to matters in the local authority’s area and that are within a local authority’s competence or control. There must also have been a significant risk of causing death or serious physical or psychological harm to one or more persons or substantial economic loss to one or more persons as a result of conduct involving dishonesty, impropriety or a serious breach of ethical or professional standards. That ensures incidents that have caused a significant risk to life or corruption are rightfully brought into scope, with the appropriate threshold in place to avoid unintended pressures and inappropriate use.
The rest of the amendment replicates the provisions set out for statutory and non-statutory inquiries in part 1 and part 2 of schedule 1. Amendments 6 and 4 are consequential on amendment 7.
Amendment 6 agreed to.
Amendment made: 7, in schedule 1, page 30, line 18, at end insert—
“Part 2A
Local authority inquiries
3A (1) This paragraph applies where—
(a) a local authority in England has caused an inquiry (however described) to be established,
(b) the terms of reference of the inquiry do not require it to determine any fact, or make any recommendation, that is not wholly or primarily concerned with a local authority matter,
(c) the inquiry’s functions include the delivery of a report to the authority with a view to its publication, and
(d) the authority has given written confirmation to the person leading the inquiry (“the chair”) that it appears to the authority that the inquiry is established in connection with an event or series of events in respect of which the condition in sub-paragraph (2) is met.
(2) The condition is that the event (or series of events) caused, or created a significant risk of causing
(a) death or serious physical or psychological harm, or
(b) substantial economic loss to one or more persons as a result of conduct involving dishonesty, impropriety or a serious breach of ethical or professional standards.
(3) As soon as reasonably practicable after the start of the inquiry, the chair must (subject to sub-paragraph (11)) give a compliance direction—
(a) to a public authority or public official, or
(b) to a person who had a relevant public responsibility in connection with an incident to which the inquiry relates,
if it appears to the chair that the person’s acts are or may be relevant to the inquiry or that they otherwise have information likely to be relevant.
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not limit the power of the chair to give a compliance direction at any other time during the course of the inquiry.
(5) Where a compliance direction is given to a public authority or body within sub-paragraph (3)(b), a compliance direction must also be given to the individual appearing to the chair to be in charge of that authority or body.
(6) A “compliance direction” is a direction to comply with the obligations under the duty of candour and assistance imposed by—
(a) section 2(4), and
(b) in the case of a direction given to an individual under sub-paragraph (5), section 2(5).
(7) A compliance direction—
(a) must be given in writing;
(b) must set out the terms of reference of the inquiry;
(c) may specify particular requirements to be complied with (and for that purpose may specify the form and manner in which, and the period within which, those requirements are to be complied with);
(d) may be varied, supplemented or revoked by the giving of a further direction.
(8) In determining the objectives of the inquiry for the purposes of complying with the duty of candour and assistance under section 2(4), regard is to be had (in particular) to the terms of reference as set out in the compliance direction.
(9) The reference to a report in sub-paragraph (1)(c) is to a report that sets out—
(a) the facts determined by the chair, and
(b) the recommendations of the chair (where the purposes of the inquiry include the making of recommendations).
(10) The provisions of the Inquiries Act 2005 (“the 2005 Act”) listed in the first column of the Table apply, to the extent specified in the corresponding entry in the second column, to an inquiry in relation to which the duty of candour and assistance applies by virtue of this paragraph as they apply to an inquiry under the 2005 Act—
(11) A compliance direction—
(a) may be given only—
(i) in respect of evidence, documents or other things that are wholly or primarily concerned with a local authority matter, or
(ii) for the purpose of inquiring into something that is wholly or primarily a local authority matter;
(b) may not be given so as to require any evidence, document or other thing to be given, produced or provided by or on behalf of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers or a Northern Ireland Minister (including the First Minister and the deputy First Minister acting jointly);
(c) may not be given to a public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning given by section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and a public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this prohibition (but this paragraph otherwise applies to an intelligence service as it applies to other public authorities).
(12) A person ceases to be subject to the duty of candour and assistance when the inquiry to which it relates comes to an end.
(13) In determining when an inquiry established by a local authority comes to an end for the purposes of sub-paragraph (12), section 14 of the Inquiries Act 2005 applies as it applies to an inquiry under that Act as if—
(a) references in that section to the Minister were to the authority, and
(b) subsection (4)(b) of that section were omitted.
(14) In this paragraph—
(a) references to a local authority in England do not include a parish council;
(b) references to a “local authority matter”, in relation to a local authority, are to any matter—
(i) which relates to the area of the authority, and
(ii) in respect of which the authority exercises functions;
(c) “terms of reference”, in relation to an inquiry established by a local authority, means—
(i) the matters to which the inquiry relates;
(ii) any particular matters as to which the chair is to determine the facts;
(iii) whether the chair is to make recommendations;
(iv) any other matters relating to the scope of the inquiry that the local authority may specify;
(d) the reference to a person who had a relevant public responsibility in connection with an incident is to be read in accordance with section 4.
(15) Paragraph 3 applies to a compliance direction given under this paragraph as it applies to a compliance direction given under paragraph 2.”
This amendment extends the duty of candour and assistance, and the related power to give compliance directions, so as to include certain local authority inquiries in England.
I beg to move amendment 8, in schedule 1, page 30, line 33, after “of the” insert “senior”.
This is a drafting refinement.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 9 and 10.
Schedule 1.
These three amendments are minor and technical. Government amendments 8 and 9 update schedule 1 to refer to a “senior coroner”, thereby identifying the statutory office for consistency with the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and other legislation. Government amendment 10 replaces a reference to this “Schedule” in schedule 1, paragraph 4 with a reference to this “paragraph”. This is a drafting refinement to clarify that the definitions in new paragraph 2A of schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 apply only to that paragraph rather than to the entirety of schedule 5. I commend these amendments to the committee.
Tessa Munt
Might I seek some clarity on what happens with area coroners as opposed to senior coroners?
I can confirm that an area coroner, for the sake of the Bill and under the Coroners Act, is classed as a senior coroner.
Amendment 8 agreed to.
Amendments made: 9, in schedule 1, page 30, line 38, after “to the” insert “senior”.
This is a drafting refinement.
Amendment 10, in schedule 1, page 32, line 1, leave out “Schedule” and insert “paragraph”.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
This is a drafting refinement.
Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 3
Section 2: further provision
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3 works alongside clause 2 in making some more detailed provisions about the operation of the duty of candour and assistance at inquiries and investigations to ensure that they are practical, effective and proportionate. Clause 3(2) provides important flexibility for inquiries and investigations to alter or disapply the requirement for public officials and authorities to notify the inquiry or investigation if they have reason to believe they are relevant.
There may be situations where the requirement would be impractical or unhelpful for the inquiry itself. Clearly, it would have been impractical for every single NHS worker involved in the response to the pandemic to notify the covid-19 inquiry of their possible relevance, or an inquiry may wish to hear from those relevant to different subjects at different times and in different stages. Clause 3(3) reinforces clause 2 by requiring public officials and authorities to notify inquiries and investigations of their potential relevance as soon as is reasonably practicable. Subsections (4), (5), and (6) attach some procedure to the duty to make it practical, which schedule 1 builds on.
Inquiries and investigations will specify the assistance they require and what are called compliance directions in schedule 1. These give control to the inquiry or investigation to set out the assistance they actually require, and provide important clarity for those under the duty, so they know exactly what is expected of them. Clause 2 sets an expectation that public authorities will provide a position statement at inquiries. Such statements, made early on in proceedings can help inquiries to identify the key issues to investigate and to home in on the points of contention. In most cases, we expect these to be useful, but subsections (5) and (6) give inquiries the discretion to disapply that requirement if it would be contrary to the efficiency and effectiveness of the inquiry.
Seamus Logan
Could the Minister give an example to the Committee of such a circumstance?
Yes, of course. I have mentioned the covid-19 inquiry—it would have been impractical for every single worker to come forward to an inquiry—but I add that the chair of an inquiry must give reasons, publishing them and outlining why it would not be practical, or not helpful to the inquiry, not to bring forward a position statement.
Subsection (7) is vital to ensure that the duty of candour does not cut across existing laws, such as those on data protection or safeguarding.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Extension of duty to other persons with public responsibilities
Tessa Munt
I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 4, page 4, line 19, after “authority” insert—
“or any sub-contractor in any chain of provision to a service provider”.
This amendment ensures that any person involved in providing a service to a service provider which was subcontracted will fall under the duty to comply with the duty of candour and assistance to an inquiry or investigation.
I rise briefly to support the amendment and the points made by the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills. It is about not just existing contractual arrangements, but how there might be perverse incentives for people to create different structures if they think that, through contracting or subcontracting, they will escape the accountability under the Bill. I am keen to hear from the Minister.
Probably the example that everyone has in mind is the Post Office scandal. That was a direct contractor, but it could have had subcontractors and so on. When the Post Office was conducting its private investigations, it might have used subcontractors to do some of those investigations. That would not be an unusual step for an organisation to take, so it is important that we get clarity on this issue.
I thank hon. Members for their contributions. The amendment would apply the duty of candour to subcontractors as well as contractors of a public authority, as has been outlined. In the Bill, we have sought to extend the duty into the private sector in a manner that is proportionate and effective. The focus is, and must be, public authorities and public officials—those whose role is to serve the public. That has to be the starting point. The Bill then extends the obligations of the duty of candour and assistance to private bodies and individuals that either had a statutory health and safety obligation in connection with the incident under investigation or were a contractor to a public authority and, in that capacity, had a significant impact on members of the public in connection with the incident. As we have heard, these provisions are designed to capture the equivalents of Fujitsu in the Post Office inquiry.
I welcome that intervention. As I have stated, if there was a statutory health and safety obligation in connection with an incident under investigation, then, yes, those individuals would be captured by the Bill.
If there had been an investigation or inquiry into that then, yes, it would.
Subcontractors are one or more stages removed. They are responsible to the main or another contractor. Where relevant, we would expect a main contractor to account for the performance and actions of a subcontractor and be candid in doing so. Statutory inquiries and inquests already have the ability to compel evidence from such persons if necessary. Therefore, on balance, we do not think it necessary or proportionate to extend the duty to all subcontractors. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Tessa Munt
If subcontractors get contracted and know that they are working for a local authority or Government body, they just need to pass on that responsibility within the contractual terms. The difficulty comes the moment there is separation between the organisation that is subject to duty of candour and a subcontractor of a subcontractor. It is not difficult—we do these things with payment terms—so I plead with the Minister to make sure that we cover subcontractors. It will not be satisfactory for a subcontractor at tier 1 to speak for a subcontractor at tier 3. It will not happen. It will not be robust enough. I foresee all sorts of slippage, especially when there are whistleblowers two or three tiers down the contract. I plead with the Minister again to reconsider what she is saying.
Secondly, what happens when the senior body—the overarching organisation—is abroad? If I may use an example, Wessex Water—I am not picking on them for any particular reason—is owned by Pennon Group, which I understand is Malaysian. What happens when the head office is abroad?
I am happy to pick up both those points. On the first point, I will work with the hon. Lady to ensure that we find a way forward in terms of ensuring that there is no unintended gap and that we are not missing anything. A balance has to be struck between how far we go in the private sector before we are covering everybody with a duty of candour. However, we can find a way forward here.
That is a hugely important intervention. In Grenfell, many subcontractors did not fall under the scope. It is a real concern that we need to look at before Report to make sure that subcontractors are in scope. This is all about a change of culture. We need a change of culture within the building industry.
I agree. I am committed to working with hon. Members on a way forward.
On the point made by the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills about what happens if the head office is abroad, the Bill will provide the inquiry or investigation with the powers to obtain information from an individual wherever they are, even if they have retired, if they have resigned or if they now live abroad.
Tessa Munt
On the basis that we can all work together to make sure that we cover subcontractors, including the different tiers of subcontracting, I am happy to withdraw the amendment. I was going to press it to a vote, but the Minister has assured me that she will try to do something before Report and I recognise that we have support on both sides of the Committee. I thank the Minister very much indeed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Offence of failing to comply with duty
I beg to move amendment 54, in clause 5, page 5, line 18, after “objectives” insert:
“or are reckless as to whether it will do so,”.
This is simply a strengthening amendment that has come from the lawyers, and which I hope the Government will take on board. It is worth pointing out that we only have one shot at this. We need to ensure that there is no unfortunate language that perhaps does not allow the Bill to be as strong as we need it to be, so I hope the Government will accept the amendment.
The current wording in clause 5(1) sets the mental element of failing to discharge the duty as intent, and the mental elements of failing to provide the information in the duty as intent or recklessness—being cognisant of the risk and choosing to take it nevertheless. We feel, and I certainly feel, that this is a baseless distinction and an anomaly. The mental element should be the same, and the amendment would rectify that. It is simply a strengthening amendment to make sure that we shut any gaps.
I sincerely thank my hon. Friend for his amendment, which seeks to lower the mental standard threshold from intent to include recklessness for the purposes of the offence of failing to comply with the duty. Recklessness already applies to breaches of the obligations in clause 2(4) and (5), so the amendment would extend the application of recklessness to obligations in clause 2(3). As the Committee has heard, under clause 2(3), those whose acts or information may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation are obliged to make themselves known to the chair. We think there is uncertainty about what recklessness in this context would actually mean and therefore do not think it right for there to be uncertainty about the test for a criminal offence.
Conversely, it is straightforward and clear for the test to be that an individual or authority intends to impede the work of the inquiry or investigation by failing to make it known that they might be relevant. Once an individual or authority has received a compliance direction from the inquiry or investigation specifying the assistance that is required—the second stage of the duty—they will then know clearly what is required of them, so the test for the offence becomes either intention or recklessness. Recklessness in that context makes sense. I therefore urge my hon. Friend to withdraw the amendment, although I am happy to meet him to discuss these concerns.
I rise briefly to emphasise some of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby and urge the Minister to consider whether more can be done in that respect. The lesson of Hillsborough is that the organisations at fault set about using every pound they had available to defend themselves—and we will hear more in the IOPC report, to be published later today.
Those senior offices who made decisions to use the public money that they had in that way simply elongated and lengthened the amount of agony and pain. A corporate fine against an organisation may not be enough to deter that kind of behaviour, so I urge the Minister to consider what more might be done in terms of command responsibility.
I thank all hon. Members for tabling these amendments and for today’s debate. As we heard on Thursday, command responsibility is a priority for change and accountability, and I therefore hope I will be able to provide further clarity as to how our Bill ensures clear accountability right at the top. Hillsborough families were clear that there must be individual accountability, with those who have engaged in state cover-ups held responsible. Our Bill clearly delivers that.
Any individual who commits a duty of candour offence can be prosecuted. That includes chief executives or the equivalent. If a public authority breaches its duty of candour or misleads the public, anyone in a management position who consented or connived with that breach can also be prosecuted. As such, amendment 27 would duplicate the provisions in schedule 3(3). Given that clarification, I ask the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills to withdraw the amendment.
Our Bill is consistent with the approach taken in other legislation, including the Bribery Act 2010 and the Fraud Act 2006, where personal liability for offences committed by a corporate body relies on consent or connivance. Anyone in charge of a public authority has a legal obligation to take all reasonable steps to ensure that their authority complies with the duty of candour and assistance. If they fail to do so, they will face prosecution.
Amendments 33, 34, 44 and 45 would hold the chief executive personally responsible for offences committed by the public authority even if they did not have knowledge of the offence being committed, and even if—in the case of amendments 33 and 44—they had taken all reasonable steps to ensure the organisation’s compliance with the duty of candour. We do not believe that that is the intention of the amendments, and we do not think it fair to attach criminal responsibility in that way. We intend the duties to apply widely. For example, we plan to extend the duty of candour and assistance to NHS investigations. It would not be reasonable or realistic to expect the chief executive of an NHS trust to be across every single detail of every response in any investigation into an incident at that trust. Instead, we would expect them to have systems in place to ensure that the authority is complying, which is precisely what the Bill requires them to do.
Seamus Logan
To build on my point to the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby, the issue here is that the criminal responsibility focuses the mind of the person with command responsibility. It requires that person—the chief executive or otherwise—to ensure full compliance. That is the point.
I totally agree. I am absolutely reassured that the Bill, as drafted, does just that. It ensures that there is criminal liability on the head of a public authority to ensure that everything is covered. However, as I have already stated, when something goes wrong in an NHS setting and we know that something has gone wrong but are unable to find out exactly what, despite the head of that NHS trust having all the procedures in place for applying the duty of candour, it would not be fair or reasonable to put criminal sanctions on the head of that NHS executive.
Tessa Munt
Is not the point that, as the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire North and Moray East said, it focuses the mind of chief executives and very senior officers in an organisation if there is the possibility of punishment—of criminal sanction and imprisonment? I take the point made earlier about a fine probably being of absolutely no consequence to an organisation. So often we have heard that what people who have been offended against, in whatever way, really seek is a swift apology and acceptance that something has gone wrong. That is going to come from the duty of candour, but we need to have a sanction available against chief executives and senior officers so that they focus on making sure that their organisations comply and act in an appropriate way.
I genuinely do not think that we have crossed wires here. The intention of the Bill is the same as that of the amendments; it is just about how we are doing this. Our approach holds the heads of authorities and the heads of all public organisations accountable for the things that they can reasonably be expected to do or not do. There is no exemption here: it is about whether they have done it or not, and about what is reasonably to be expected of them. We are confident that such accountability, as drafted in the Bill, will drive positive cultural change. The amendments in this group would unintentionally have the potential to criminalise a chief executive even if they did not have knowledge of the offence being committed and they had taken all reasonable steps to ensure the compliance of the organisation. We can find no precedence for such an approach and are deeply concerned that it could have a chilling effect on recruiting public sector leaders.
I reassure the Committee that the Bill ensures accountability right at the top. I am happy to share further information with the Committee, setting that out exactly as it is, and I urge the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills to withdraw amendment 27.
(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI think the Minister can hear the concern from Members on both sides of the Committee that this will not be as effective if there is no individual responsibility, and if those who have done wrong can hide behind the corporate wall and ride off into the sunset with their full pensions, with no accountability or justice. Once the Minister listens to the evidence, and certainly the response of the families today, hopefully we can reflect on whether we feel this is a loophole that could be utilised by those who are responsible. It is our responsibility in this place to shut that down. I hope the Minister will listen to and reflect on what we have said today, and meet me after this sitting.
We talk about focusing minds. The Bill will clearly focus minds, because a chief executive can face criminal prosecution and potentially prison if they are not candid, if they consent or connive with someone not being candid, or if they fail to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the authority is candid. Those are three different and distinct routes to criminal prosecution that will sharply focus minds. We need to hold senior individuals to account for things that they can actually do. Clearly, they cannot personally verify the accuracy of potentially hundreds of thousands of documents.
The whole Bill is about creating a new culture and accountability. Whenever an individual fails in their duty, they should be held accountable—whoever they are—and that can carry up to two years’ imprisonment. It is a privilege to see you in the Chair, Mr Dowd, but in this morning’s session, before you were in the Chair, I said that this entire Bill Committee is about listening. It is about listening to the families, campaigners and those who have come before, and considering all the work they have done to get us to this place. It is about listening to them with regard to what it means for the Bill to be a Hillsborough law.
I have listened to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby and other Committee members today, and I am committed to meeting him and finding a way forward. If there are genuine concerns regarding command responsibility, and Members feel that we are not going far enough, I am committed to listening and working with my hon. Friend on a way forward.
Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)
I am delighted that the Minister is listening; that is helpful. I would be grateful if she could consider my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle and me to be part of the discussions with the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby. That would save me a great deal of trouble in quoting the questions from the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston in our evidence session last week. I was intending to read out a good deal of the further comments from Hillsborough Law Now and Pete Weatherby in my summing up. I do not know whether the Minister is up for this, but it might be helpful to invite that particular gentleman.
Tessa Munt
I am delighted to hear that he will be part of that discussion, because I think he has a good grip on everything, and it saves me reading the Minister a page and a half of his comments today.
Tessa Munt
I am sure the Minister has seen them, but I was going to quote them none the less. I have mentioned the Office for Budget Responsibility, which I know is an organisation with fewer than 100 people. There we have somebody—regardless of the fact that, I am sure, he is not all over the emails and all the rest of it; the work that his office does with his employees, those who work with him and so on—who took what might be considered an incredibly honourable stance and resigned his position over something that happened in the last week. That is absolutely laudable. He is an illustration of how command is absolutely at the centre of this issue.
I totally agree that there should be responsibility and accountability at the top of any organisation. We are not doubting that; that is the intention of the Bill. Does the hon. Lady believe that the head of the OBR should have potentially been subject to criminal sanctions in that instance? Resigning is one thing; going to prison for up to two years is very different.
Tessa Munt
No, but it might be difficult to quantify. There certainly was no danger of anyone losing their life or being very seriously injured, and I presume we would not be looking for whistleblowers in his organisation, because he has taken responsibility. I take the point, but he has done the right thing in that situation. Will the Minister clarify something that I raised earlier: what will happen with people who resign—by resigning, the head of the OBR has avoided any chance of going in front of the Treasury Committee today—and those who have retired? It is clear that people can remove themselves from the framework, currently. Does the Minister have something to say about that?
I believe that I stated this earlier, but should an official inquiry or investigation be called, the head of the OBR, who has now resigned, or the head of any organisation—we are speaking in hypotheticals here—who was involved in an inquiry or investigation and had resigned, retired or moved abroad would be compelled to come to give evidence under the duty of candour. They would not be excused.
Clause 5 sets out the offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour and assistance, as set out in clauses 2 to 4 of the Bill, so that the duty has bite. The offence is intended to provide a powerful deterrent effect to drive culture change. As I set out when covering clause 2, the duty has two stages: first, the requirement for public authorities and officials to make themselves known to an inquiry or investigation if their acts or information may be relevant; secondly, the requirement to provide any assistance as specified in a compliance direction from that inquiry or investigation. There is also a requirement for the public official in charge of the authority to take all reasonable steps to secure that the authority complies with the duty.
Clause 5 provides that an individual or authority
“commits an offence if…they fail to comply with the duty”
In relation to the first stage of the duty, the duty to notify, they must have intended to impede the inquiry or investigation by that failure. As for the second stage, the duty to comply with a compliance direction, they must have either intended to impede the inquiry or investigation or been reckless as to whether they would do so.
The intention and recklessness threshold also applies in relation to any breach of the duty on leaders of authorities that fail to put in measures to secure compliance with the duty by the authority and its officers. We have made this distinction in tests between the two stages because, in relation to the duty to notify, we do not want to criminalise someone for genuinely being unaware of an inquiry or investigation. Clause 5(2) sets out the penalties for those convicted of the offence, either on summary conviction at a magistrates court or on indictment at a Crown court. In the latter, the maximum prison sentence for this offence is imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine, or both.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Security and intelligence information
Seamus Logan
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. We have had an excellent debate on command responsibility, and I am heartened to see a very positive outcome from that discussion.
Clause 6 is separate and distinct because it applies to the intelligence services. We heard evidence about the provisions in clause 6 in the evidence session, as well as at a useful special meeting that some Committee members attended with two heads and a deputy head of the three intelligence services. As the shadow Minister pointed out, the evidence from that special meeting and the evidence session has highlighted that there are potentially some contradictory views. Nevertheless, my problem with clause 6(2)(a) is that it is basically a get-out clause; it allows the head of an intelligence service to opt out of the overall duty of candour where that would, according to the Bill, contravene the Official Secrets Act 1989.
I understand that there are special circumstances regarding the intelligence services, as was ably described to us by Sir Ken McCallum, when he said, “I don’t know who all my agents are, and I am not sure that I know all of their activities.” That is fair enough; one can readily understand why that might be the case. Nevertheless, there should be no overall escape clause for the intelligence services. Having said that, I understand that there will be circumstances in which it is necessary to maintain secrecy about certain aspects of what the intelligence services do.
My amendment would give a role to the Intelligence and Security Committee, which is a Committee of the House, by requiring the head of an intelligence service, in these specific circumstances, to make a report to the ISC on what the exception is. In even more exceptional circumstances, I understand that the ISC can also communicate with the Prime Minister alone—it has no obligation to do anything else.
I believe that that sensible mechanism would give us confidence, in drafting the Bill, that there is no get-out clause. Critically, it would also restore trust even within our intelligence community on how it operates. We do not need to go back over all the evidence that we heard from an employee of the BBC, for example. I hope the Minister can take on board the thrust of what I am saying in the amendment, and perhaps she can even see fit to endorse it.
I thank the hon. Member for his amendment. I will respond to amendment 21 and the other amendments in turn, before moving to the question that clause 6 stand part of the Bill.
As the hon. Gentleman stated, amendment 21 would ensure that when clause 2(3) of the duty applies to the intelligence services, the head of the intelligence service must give the Intelligence and Security Committee a summary of any relevant acts or information. The Government have taken his points on board, and we are actively considering options to be introduced on Report. I commit to continuing to engage with him, other Committee members and external stakeholders to make sure that we find a way forward that is fit for the Bill and fit for protecting national security.
Seamus Logan
I thank the Minister for that. Given she has said that we will see an amendment on Report, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)
Yes, sorry. In the last evidence session, we discussed a very similar situation when we heard from both Pete Weatherby and Daniel De Simone, one of whom is a KC trying to get to the truth through his work in the courts, and another of whom is a journalist trying to expose the truth, particularly around the Agent X story. We are not looking for a change to the Official Secrets Act or its operation. We simply want the Bill to encompass the security services explicitly.
There is a list of public authorities on the Bill. The security services are not on there, which begs the question, why? I thank the Minister for saying that further work will be done on that and that she will be engaging with all Members across the House before Report. On that basis, we are happy to withdraw the amendments.
I welcome the withdrawal of the amendments. We had a discussion earlier about why we have not listed organisations in the Bill. We did not want it to be an exhaustive list and to miss an organisation out unintentionally, which could lead them to think that the Bill does not apply to it. We have been extremely clear that intelligence services are covered by this Bill, including clause 6. I reaffirm that to reassure the hon. Gentleman.
Clause 6 sets out that the duties in the Bill apply to the intelligence services, but it requires that proper arrangements and protections are in place to safeguard national security. As subsection (2) states, the obligation in clause 2(3) for a person to notify the inquiry or investigation does not apply to
“a person who works for an intelligence service”,
or where doing so would result in the release of security or intelligence information.
To be clear, inquiries and investigations are able to demand assistance and information from the intelligence services under the obligation in clause 2(4), but appropriate arrangements need to be in place for an inquiry or investigation to receive that sensitive information, as is the norm now. Individuals revealing acts or information outside of those arrangements could be detrimental to national security, as I am sure all hon. Members would agree.
Subsection (3) places a requirement on the heads of the intelligence services to put in place internal arrangements to ensure that those who work for the service comply with the requirements to record any acts or any information that may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation. They must inform the service if they hold such information that is not already available to it. That ensures that the services have all the information they need to discharge their obligations under the duty as an authority. However, as I have already stated, I am committed to working with hon. Members, external stakeholders and the UK intelligence services to make sure that we have as a robust Bill as possible that fulfils the aims, objectives and intentions of us all.
Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Transitional provision in relation to this Chapter
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause provides that the duty of candour and assistance will apply to inquiries and investigations that are already ongoing at the time of commencement, as well as those that start afterwards. It may be necessary to set out further transitional provisions in the commencement regulations to ensure that ongoing inquiries and investigations can make effective use of the duty and are not delayed or forced to repeat stages by its procedural requirements if they are already far advanced.
Clause 8 sets out the meaning of key terms used in this chapter of the Bill, which deals with the duty of candour and assistance. Specifically, it defines “inquiry” as meaning
“an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005”
and a non-statutory inquiry meaning where
“paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 applies”.
Subsection (1) defines the terms “investigations”, “position statement”, “public official” and “public authority”, and references the appropriate Act or schedule from where the definitions are drawn. Clause 8(2) defines what the individual “in charge” of a public authority means. Clause 8(3) then defines “chief executive” as meaning an
“individual working for the authority who…is responsible under the immediate authority of the board of directors for the general functions of the authority.”
The clause is essential for allowing us and any future readers to interpret the key terms used throughout the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Amendment made: 4, in clause 8, page 6, line 32, at end insert—
“, or
(c) an inquiry to which paragraph 3A of that Schedule applies (local authority inquiries);”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 7.
Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Expected standards of ethical conduct
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for tabling these amendments. As we all heard last Thursday, true cultural change is a key part of implementing the Hillsborough law, and the professional duty of candour required by clause 9 is at the heart of that. Amendments 46 to 48 admirably seek to strengthen the duties imposed on public authorities to promote ethical conduct and adopt a code of ethical conduct.
As my hon. Friend will be aware, clause 9 places a duty on public authorities to promote and maintain high standards of ethical behaviour and conduct. Professional duties of candour will be tailored to the specific sector to which they apply, making them meaningful to staff and responsive to the needs of those who use that organisation’s services. While I am grateful to my hon. Friend for suggesting these amendments, we believe that our drafting achieves the same purpose as the proposed amendments and is sufficiently clear and robust.
Amendment 49 seeks to require public authorities to consult with recognised trade unions on the creation and maintenance of a code of ethics. I thank my hon. Friend for highlighting the issue of trade union engagement. I am a proud trade unionist myself—I refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests relating to the unions that I am a member of. I agree that if a code of ethics is to be truly successful, it is important that those working for the authority and their representatives, including trade unions, should have a proper opportunity to contribute to its development.
However, given the complexity and diversity of arrangements across the public sector, the Government’s view is that it would not be advisable to prescribe standard procedural arrangements for all public authorities in this Bill. Many organisations already have an existing code of conduct or a code of ethics. These exist in different forms and may have different underpinnings and links to other organisational governance arrangements. For example, the civil service code forms part of civil service contracts, and the code of ethics in policing is produced by the College of Policing, which does not directly employ individual officers.
Adapting and adopting a code of ethics will require different processes of development, engagement and consultation for each organisation and sector. This is not a one-size-fits-all approach, nor should it be. Public sector employees and employers will have existing arrangements and consultation with trade unions. Creating a specific requirement in the Bill could create confusion and usurp the existing processes and relationship arrangements between public authorities and their trade unions. I am keen to work with my hon. Friend to consider how we can encourage employees and their representatives to be engaged in the processes of developing the codes. In fact, we are already in discussions with trade unions on how we can best include them in the process through consultation and guidance to ensure that we have the most robust practices. With those assurances, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw his amendment.
Mr Morrison
We spoke this morning about the issues dealt with by amendment 43, but to clarify, WhatsApp messages formed a big part of the evidence in the recent covid inquiry—it seemed to be government by WhatsApp at the time—and yet many of them seem to have disappeared. The amendment would provide an extra way of ensuring that public authorities and those responsible are keeping proper records and preventing that from happening again.
New clause 3 would prevent the deliberate concealment of evidence that could obstruct investigations, hinder fact-finding and undermine public trust. I would like the Committee to consider the element of public trust here. How people perceive what happens in this place, and in the organisations and public authorities that surround us and the power structures that are there, is vital to the legitimacy that we have and that those public authorities also have. By criminalising such conduct, the clause would reinforce the obligation on public authorities and officials to maintain and safeguard records, ensuring that inquiries and inquests can access all the information necessary to understand what happened and hold the responsible parties to account. This is a way to make sure that the truth can be found in those areas and hopefully ensure that WhatsApp messages are not deleted in future.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising an important issue. Amendment 43 would, as he states, make authorities set expectations for staff on how to retain and disclose their digital records in accordance with the obligations under the duty of candour. Proper record keeping is important to ensure accountability and propriety in decisions made by public authorities. That applies where records are on paper or held digitally— for example, in a WhatsApp group—and it is important that organisations have policies and processes in place to manage these effectively.
However, the Government’s view is that the code of ethical conduct is not the correct vehicle for establishing those processes. The Public Records Act 1958 already places certain requirements on public authorities. Under that Act, the Keeper of Public Records issues guidance to supervise and guide the selection of historic records —including digital records—worthy of permanent preservation.
Disclosure to inquiries and inquests will require the detailed consideration of various factors, including the fact that the authority’s legal obligations include the duty of candour and assistance, the protection of personal or sensitive information, and the relevance to the inquiry’s terms of reference or the inquest. Authorities may also require specific legal advice. Separate and bespoke policies will therefore be required. The professional duty of candour established under clause 9 is intended to focus on what candour means for each public official going about their business in their day-to-day role. I therefore request that the hon. Member for Cheadle withdraws the amendment.
On the point about whether WhatsApp messages are covered, and specifically disappearing messages or those deleted in the course of work, as they sometimes are, the duty of candour and assistance requires all public officials and authorities to provide all relevant information. If a public official was part of a WhatsApp chat in which relevant information was exchanged, they would be obliged to inform the chair of that fact, and if disappearing messages had gone or the chats had been deleted, they would have to provide an account of what was discussed, to the best of their recollection, even if the messages had since been deleted or vanished.
Tessa Munt
I know that we dealt with this matter earlier, but I again put on the record my concerns about subcontractors in tiers 1, 2 and 3, who often hold key information. We need to find some way to make sure that they are within the scope of this provision.
I recognise that concern, which I share, and we are looking at that in terms of the passage of the Bill. As I have stated, the duty would be on the public authority, official or subcontractor to disclose all the information to the chair of the inquiry or investigation.
Perhaps the point the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills was making was that the Minister referred to a separate piece of legislation, the Public Records Act 1958, and I am not sure that that legislation includes things like contractors and subcontractors.
The information provided to the inquiry would be covered and, as per the provisions of this Bill, subcontractors would be caught under the duty of candour and would have to disclose any relevant information, as per the information disclosed in that Act. I hope that clarifies it.
Tessa Munt
How helpful has the existing law been in relation to the covid inquiry, which my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle mentioned? I am not sure that has quite got to the base of everything. Does the Minister have any suggestions about improving the Bill to be explicit about what we expect?
Again, I totally agree with the policy intention. If the Bill had become an Act when the covid inquiry was under way, might that inquiry have carried things out differently, or provided information in a new way or in a new light? We cannot answer that. All I can say is that the purpose and intention of the Bill is to ensure that any inquiries or investigations seek the whole truth and that all information is disclosed so that we are never put in that position again. That is the intention of the Bill, and we have made sure it is as robust as possible to provide for that.
I can understand why Members might feel a certain amount of scepticism about the idea that an obligation to try to remember disappearing messages might be adequate. I do not know how many messages other Committee members send, but I think we have all got into the habit of sending rather a lot. Could there not be an arrangement, either in the code of ethics or in the policies and procedures of organisations, to make sure that people do not use WhatsApp for official business? We could also make sure that whatever chat people do use—it might be an internal arrangement—messages are properly kept and we therefore do not have to rely on dodgy memories of disappearing messages to make sure that messages are preserved for any future inquiry.
My right hon. Friend makes a very important point: it is for each individual organisation to determine the policies and procedures for their record keeping. It might be wholly appropriate for one organisation, if it has a small number of employees, to use a WhatsApp group, but we would expect records to be kept appropriately and for employees not to turn on disappearing messages. That would be part of the terms and conditions in the guidance and practices for the employees.
It would be for each different organisation to determine what is right and appropriate. It is not for Government to tell any organisation how to run its business or manage its employees. However, we have set out the bare minimum that is expected: the Bill makes it explicitly clear that records of any information relevant to an inquiry or investigation should be kept, and that such information should be disclosed to the inquiry or investigation if requested.
Seamus Logan
I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 9, page 8, line 12, leave out “may” insert “must”.
I am aware that we have debated amendment 48, although perhaps not as fully as I would have liked. In the interests of getting our business done within the time available, I decided not to intervene in that debate. However, I believe that the particular change in amendment 24 is necessary. Where amendment 48 spoke to the duty of candour, amendment 24 speaks to the code of ethics.
There are legal minds in the room that are much better informed and trained on legal definitions than my own, but amendment 24 addresses the need to replace “may” with “must” in the code of ethics, as opposed to the duty of candour. I believe this is important given my experience in the health service, where there is a responsibility on individuals to report child abuse, or where a colleague might clearly be able to see that a surgeon carrying out procedures is repeatedly doing something injurious or harmful. By replacing the word “may” with “must”, we place a responsibility on anyone to blow the whistle on those particular issues.
In my working life I have experience, as might others present, of consultants who suppressed information relating to child abuse. We certainly heard similar evidence about surgeons during our evidence session. Colleagues will be able to think of many such examples, which is why it is important that the amendment replaces “may” with “must”.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling his amendment. The Government believe it is imperative to have policies and processes in place to enable officials and public servants to speak up when they see that something is wrong. If we are to address the culture change that we have heard about a hundred times, it is important to have that in place. That is why the Bill requires all public authorities to set out how a person can raise concerns if they think their colleagues are not acting in accordance with the code, and the process for making a protected disclosure, also known as whistleblowing.
The amendment would require individuals to take a particular course of action. This risks cutting across established disciplinary and whistleblowing regimes, with potentially significant implications for employees. I assure the hon. Gentleman that we are working across Government with the Department for Business and Trade on how we reform whistleblowing more generally, and as the Bill progresses we will be looking quite carefully at whistleblowing and protections for individuals. However, we do not think the amendment would have the intended consequences, and it might cause us more issues, so I request that the hon. Gentleman withdraw it.
Seamus Logan
I thank the Minister for that response, but I am at a loss to know how the responsibility suggested by the amendment would cut across any existing code of ethical conduct. If the legislation simply stated that the person who works for the authority must take steps if they believe that another person who works for the authority has failed to act in accordance with the code, I fail to see how that would cut across any existing procedures. It would simply make the provision more robust by saying “You must take that step” rather than “You may take that step”. That is what the amendment calls for; perhaps the Minister might like to expand on why she wishes me to withdraw it.
I will happily come back to the hon. Gentleman. Say, for example, that someone in the police force believes that a colleague is not acting in accordance with the code of ethics, but that individual may not be privy to the details of an undercover operation that their colleague is aware of and they are cutting across existing provisions in the police force. If that individual had to do as the hon. Gentleman intends with his amendment, they could hinder the investigation or cause unintended consequences.
With the Bill, we are saying that there must be a way of reporting. Every public organisation must have that built in but, as we have discussed, a one-size-fits-all approach does not work across all public sector authorities. What will work in the NHS will not work in the police or for probation. This all has to fit the specific authority. Therefore, there has to be a mechanism for reporting, but we are not designating a specific one.
Seamus Logan
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, which is helpful. Perhaps when the Minister and I, and others, meet to discuss other matters, we might explore this in more detail. If the Minister is willing to accept that, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
Seamus Logan
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Tessa Munt
I rise to speak to amendment 26, which has some similarities with what the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby just outlined. I am extremely keen to ensure that people are really clear about what they have to do when they wish to report. This relates to clause 9(5)(c) as well.
As has been mentioned, the Employment Rights Act 1996 tends to guide people towards the employment tribunal if something has happened. Currently, if something has gone wrong, that is where people can end up. As I mentioned last week, my understanding is that the employment tribunal has a backlog of 47,000 cases. My sense is that when the Bill comes into effect, which will not be very long, there will be masses more people who find themselves guided by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 to head for the employment tribunal, which does not seem to be an adequate place for people to deal with their complaints.
The employment tribunal is for those who are considered to be a worker, be that an employee or somebody acting in a voluntary capacity. Amendment 26 would require a public authority’s code of ethical conduct to include information on the person to whom someone can make a protected disclosure—what we know as whistleblowing —and how the person would be protected against detriment. It is incredibly important that the code of ethical conduct sets out clearly how individuals can make a protected disclosure and the protections available to them.
The amendment would strengthen the whistleblowing safeguards by providing staff with clear guidance on the safe reporting of wrongdoing. It should address some of the gaps in protection without creating a specific outside body. I have already spoken to the Minister about the idea of an office of the whistleblower; I understand that is outside the scope of the Bill, but it is really important that whistleblowers can come forward with confidence while remaining within the statutory framework, and that they have somewhere safe to go.
I thank Members for raising those important points. We discussed whistleblowers and the protections needed for them a lot in the oral evidence sessions. It is essential that if there is wrongdoing in an organisation, those working for the organisation can come forward and raise the alarm, and be confident that they will be protected when doing so.
Through the Bill, public authorities will be required to promote and maintain standards of ethical conduct, and their leaders will be held accountable for that. In doing so, leaders must ensure that their authority’s code of ethics contains information about any whistleblowing policies or procedures.
Tessa Munt
Does the Minister accept that a huge number of authorities, bodies and organisations may not, whether wittingly or not, recognise somebody as a whistleblower? There is a real danger in people believing that they are whistleblowing and that they will have protection, yet the companies not recording them as whistleblowing incidents. How does the Minister see that working?
The hon. Lady has pre-empted my next comments. The Bill will ensure that workers who are protected against retaliation by an employer for blowing the whistle about wrongdoing—known formally as making a protected disclosure under the Employment Rights Act 1996—are more aware of their rights.
We believe that certain elements of the amendments are unnecessary. For example, while we are absolutely sympathetic to its aims, amendment 26 would require employers to provide information on prescribed persons that is already online, on gov.uk. The amendments could also introduce confusion—
And that is the very confusion the hon. Lady mentioned. If she lets me finish my point, I will give way.
Amendment 50, for example, may lead some people who work for a public authority, but are not workers, to believe that their disclosure may qualify for whistleblowing protection under the Employment Rights Act 1996. We do not wish to cause that confusion. I point the hon. Lady to our work on whistleblowers across Government, which will of course inform work on the passage of this Bill.
Tessa Munt
I want to mention the huge number of occasions when I dealt with constituents and others, when people have been—I would say—entrapped into signing non-disclosure agreements or NDAs, which mean they feel that they cannot talk to anyone. They even fear talking to their MP. It is not clear to whom they can speak, and part of my desire is to ensure that each authority—I am not saying that the Minister should say what should be disclosed and to whom; this is for every organisation—should have someone identified. They should make public that safe place or safe person to whom anyone can report, be they in or outside the authority—that comes under the next subsection, I accept—as workers or employees. This business of NDAs needs to be sorted out once and for all, because it is pervasive and incredibly destructive.
The hon. Lady will be aware of the work we are doing on NDAs in the Victims and Courts Bill and the Employment Rights Bill. A lot of work is happening across Government on how we can protect individuals who are being forced to sign NDAs or those who feel unable to come forward and whistleblow. That work is being done holistically and is led by the Department for Business and Trade. I am happy to discuss her concerns more broadly in Committee, during the passage of the Bill, and outside the Committee.
I am happy to discuss our broader work on this and how we move forward on whistleblowers with the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills outside the Committee Room.
I am filled with confidence by the Minister’s response on whistleblowers. I know that she will be taking this seriously, because it goes to the heart of changing the culture of organisations that have failed us time and time again. This whistleblowers element is extremely important. I am happy to hear that Minister is up for engaging with us across the Benches to strengthen these provisions, which is desperately needed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Seamus Logan
Amendment 25 has already been covered in our discussions about “may” or “must”, and I am happy to take that discussion into further meetings with the Minister.
I thank both hon. Members for tabling the amendments in this group; I will respond to each in turn.
First, amendment 28 would require there to be a standard template for a code of ethics. The Government recognise the importance of supporting public authorities to develop their codes of ethical conduct, and we commit to doing so. Clause 10 confers a power on the Secretary of State and the devolved Governments to issue guidance that authorities will be required to have regard to when drawing up codes for their organisations.
The newly established Ethics and Integrity Commission will in time also have a role in supporting public bodies by making toolkits, best practice and guidance available for public sector bodies. Although we envisage that standard templates will be useful, as I have already said, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. We wish to retain the flexibility to allow each individual organisation and sector to consider what would work best for them, but support will of course be available for them in doing so.
Amendment 25 would require a public authority to modify its code for specified circumstances or for specified people who work for the authority. I want to reassure Members that clause 9(7) provides for public authorities to specify that their code may apply with modifications in specified circumstances or to people of a specified description who work for the authority.
The intention of clause 9(7) is to enable authorities to reflect different expectations or obligations that apply to different groups of employees—for example, a school’s code of conduct may apply differently to teachers and janitorial staff. It could also reflect different processes that apply in different situations, for example, in an emergency situation compared with everyday business as usual. The Government’s view is that it should be for the authority to determine whether and how it uses that flexibility, noting that it must set out the reasons for doing so—that is important. We do not think that authorities should be required to do so, which is what the effect of amendment 25 would be.
Amendment 23 would require the Secretary of State to ensure that adequate funding is available to public authorities to provide training to their officials on compliance with the code of ethical conduct. I again want to assure hon. and right hon. Members that the Government have an ambitious plan for the implementation of the Bill. The Bill is just one part of the puzzle; it needs to be implemented fully, workably and effectively. It is just part and start of the culture change that we want to see in public sector organisations. The plans will of course include training for public servants, as well as oversight of the codes themselves.
A number of public sector organisations are already working on cultural or leadership programmes, and implementation of the Bill may be undertaken alongside or as part of existing initiatives to ensure that the code is seen as central to driving change in the organisation’s culture on a sustainable basis. The Bill requires public authorities to promote and maintain standards of ethical conduct among those who work for the authority. The duty ensures public authorities will be accountable, while allowing flexibility for the practical arrangements that each authority might put in place. I hope that assures the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire North and Moray East, and I am happy to work with him and others on the implementation of the Bill as it goes forward.
Finally, new clause 4 would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent report setting out whether and how public authorities have complied with the duty of assistance and candour. The Government agree that it is essential that the duties in the Bill are properly upheld and enforced. That is why the Government are ensuring independent oversight of implementation of the Bill’s provisions. The Government have committed to commissioning an annual independent assessment report to ensure that public bodies are complaint with the codes of ethics requirement in the Bill. That report will make clear which parts of the public sector are rising to the challenge and which are failing to do so. We will not be afraid to name and shame who is abiding and who is not.
Compliance with the duty of candour and assistance at inquiries and investigations can, sadly, be judged only by the inquiry or investigation itself. They are responsible for monitoring compliance with the legal duty and for taking enforcement action, such as referring the case for criminal proceedings if necessary. I would like to assure all Committee members that the Government are absolutely committed to ensuring effective implementation of all the measures in the Bill and to achieving the cultural change that is so desperately needed. I therefore urge hon. Members not to press their amendments.
Tessa Munt
I am glad to hear what the Minister has to say. Sunlight is the best disinfectant; if anyone in the public can track through their complaint to something that is published on annual basis—I assume the Minister means annual—that will give people a lot more confidence that this being taken incredibly seriously.
Tessa Munt
I thank the Minister for her contribution. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Seamus Logan
In light of the Minister’s clarification, I am happy to withdraw amendment 25. However, with regard to amendment 23, I am still unclear as to what exactly the Minister is saying. Is she indicating that beyond the passage of the Bill there will be further clarifications to public bodies as to what training requirements there might be, and that resources will flow from that?
I am happy to get back to the hon. Gentleman—but yes, essentially. We will need to look at how we implement the Bill once it becomes an Act—hopefully it will become an Act—and at the requirements that will come from that. I will happily have those discussions with him and every other public authority on how best we do that. Should other resources be needed, that is something that the Government will consider.
Seamus Logan
Given the proceedings today are a matter of record, I am happy to withdraw amendment 23.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
To ensure that public sector culture changes for the better, clause 9 introduces a new duty on public authorities to promote and take steps to maintain high standards of ethical conduct at all times by people who work for the authority. This means acting in accordance with the seven principles of public life, known as the Nolan principles: honesty, integrity, objectivity, accountability, selflessness, openness and leadership.
Under the Bill, all public authorities will be required to adopt a code of ethical conduct. This will ensure comprehensive coverage across the public sector. It will not be enough to simply have a code; authorities will be legally required to publish their codes and take active steps to make their staff aware of the code, and the consequences of failing to comply with it.
Clause 9(4) and (5) set out minimum standards that all codes must meet. Each code must establish a professional duty of candour, and an expectation that those working for the authority will act with candour at all times. Professional duties of candour will be tailored to the sectors to which they apply; they will be meaningful to staff and responsive to the needs of those who use an organisation’s services. The code must set out the practical ways in which ethical standards should be upheld and the disciplinary consequences of failing to act in accordance with the code. This will ensure that the code acts as an aspirational document, setting out best practice, but also as an effective deterrent against unethical behaviour.
Ensuring there are routes where individuals can raise concerns about public institutions is essential for ensuring that issues are identified and addressed as early as possible. Clause 9(5) requires an authority’s code to set out: how staff can raise concerns if they think their colleagues are not acting in accordance with the code; how staff can make protected disclosures, including any whistleblowing policies; and a clear process for external complaints about the conduct of the authority or those working for it.
Recognising the diversity of the public sector, the Bill includes some flexibilities. A code can provide for its standards to apply differently in specific circumstances or to specific groups of people, but it must set out reasons for doing so. For example, it may not be appropriate to apply all of the same standards to doctors as to the cleaning staff in an NHS trust. The Bill allows a public authority to adopt a code produced by another body. For example, schools can adopt a code published by the Department for Education, or local authorities can adopt codes from the Local Government Association. This is to ensure consistency across sectors and will minimise the burdens on smaller organisations.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Non-statutory inquiries
I rise to speak to amendments 55 and 58 to 60, which would strengthen command responsibility. On amendment 55, schedule 2(5) appears to mean that responsibility for the actions of a Government Department is corporate only, and there is an exclusion for civil servants exercising their functions wholly outside the UK. Surely responsibility should lie with the chief executive of the Department, usually the Secretary of State, which I feel that amendment 55 would achieve.
Amendments 59 and 60 would once again strengthen the command responsibility. The purpose of deeming what was done by an office holder as being done by a Department itself is unclear. If those words are simply intended to avoid putting command responsibility on a Minister for the actions of their Department, with respect to the compliance with the duty of candour and assistance, it potentially goes too far.
Schedule 2(3)(6) excludes civil servants from inclusion as public officials if they exercise all their functions outside the UK. I do not see the reason for this exception, and I am seeking some clarification through amendments 59 and 60. I have also tabled amendment 58 for similar reasons to those I have stated for amending schedule 2(5), which would delete sub-paragraphs (3)(d) and (2).
I again thank my hon. Friend for tabling these amendments. I hope that I will provide him with some clarification and assurances on exactly why we have adopted this approach in our drafting. The provisions that amendment 55 would amend are typical in legislation. They provide that actions legally done by the Crown or the holder of a particular office, such as a Secretary of State, can be attributed to a Government Department.
The definition of a “public official” in schedule 2(3) includes an individual who
“holds office under a public authority”.
By removing the explicit reference to the holder of a particular office, the amended paragraph would actually, and no doubt unintentionally, narrow the scope of what can be attributed to a Government Department. Only actions that are strictly acts of the Crown could then be attributed to a Government Department for the purposes of the duty of candour provisions and associated offence, as well as the misleading the public offence, not those done legally in the name of the Secretary of State. In our view, this would actually weaken the Bill, and I therefore urge my hon. Friend to withdraw amendment 55.
Amendments 58 to 60 seek to apply the duty of candour and assistance, along with the misconduct in public office offences in part 3, to staff employed on local contracts overseas, including consular staff at embassies. My hon. Friend is correct to note that there are two examples of this exclusion in the Bill, one from the definition of “public official” in relation to the duty of candour, and one from the definition of “civil servant” in relation to part 3. They exclude what are known as country-based staff. These are, for example, locally engaged staff who are employed by an embassy or consulate generally to do administrative or support work, such as site maintenance.
While employed by the embassy or equivalent, these individuals are subject to the laws of the country in which they live, and they are supervised by United Kingdom civil servants who are subject to all parts of the Bill. In excluding locally employed staff from the provisions in the Bill, the Bill follows all precedented approaches relating to these staff, such as the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. To take a different approach would be a significant and unprecedented change. I hope my hon. Friend understands that clarification and is content not to press amendments 58 to 60 to a vote.
I turn to schedule 2 and clause 10. Many of the Bill’s substantive provisions apply to a public authority or public official. Schedule 2 defines those terms for the purposes of part 2 of the Bill. There are different definitions of “public authority” for different parts of the Bill, and I appreciate that this can be confusing, so I hope to clarify why. Part 2 of the schedule sets out the definitions of “public authority” and “public official” for the purposes of the duty of candour and assistance and the offence of misleading the public. These are broad definitions that are intended to capture anyone, including private companies, who exercises a public function.
Paragraph (2)(4) sets out that there are express reservations for the courts, Parliament and the devolved legislatures, reflecting long-standing constitutional conventions of self-regulation and independence. The north-south bodies established under the Good Friday agreement are also excluded to avoid capturing officials in the Irish Government.
Tessa Munt
In the interests of clarity, will the Minister explain whether the intelligence and security services are now captured by the list in part 2? Will she also explain what happens to regular or reserve forces when they are abroad, when they might be subject to devices such as the court martial? Those are two very specific things.
I am happy to clarify both those points, and I assure the hon. Lady that they are captured in this part of the Bill.
“Public official” is defined in schedule 2 as all of those who work for a public authority or hold office under a public authority—including those that the hon. Lady mentioned—and individuals who hold a relevant public office. That is defined to include offices that are established in legislation or by Ministers, where the UK or devolved Government are wholly or mainly constituted by appointment made by the Crown or Ministers, and they exercise functions of a public nature. Former public officials are also included in that—for example, retired civil servants and those who have resigned from the service. There are various exclusions, such as for individuals acting in a judicial capacity, non-executive elected members of a local authority who operate executive arrangements, and those in the private service of the Crown.
Part 3 of the schedule sets out the definition of “public authority” for the provisions on standards of ethical conduct, including the requirement to adopt a code of ethics. That definition of “public authority” is limited to the core public authorities, those commonly understood to be part of the state. The definition includes a list of named public authorities. That includes Government Departments, the devolved Governments, the armed forces, the police, local authorities, NHS bodies, schools, and any bodies that are both established by Ministers of the Crown and are wholly or mainly constituted by public appointments. That is intended to capture the wide range of arm’s length and other public bodies. The definition does, however, include the same exclusions for Parliament, the courts and those north-south bodies that were previously mentioned.
Tessa Munt
I again seek clarity. Are non-executive directors of an NHS trust, for example—who might be party to all sorts of information—within the scope of the Bill? I would also like to check whether school governors—and schools that are academies sometimes use different names, such as “partners”—are also picked up in the list.
Yes, I can confirm that. Those provisions of the Bill contain a power to allow the definition to also be extended by secondary legislation to private companies that exercise specified public functions. That would allow the code of ethics provisions to be extended to specified high-risk public functions by secondary legislation—for example, in privately run prisons.
Finally, I turn to clause 10, which provides that guidance can be issued by the national authority if it wishes to do so, for the purposes of chapter 2, which relates to the standards of ethical conduct. That means that the Secretary of State and the devolved Governments can issue guidance on how public authorities can fulfil their duty to maintain high standards of ethical conduct, including in drafting and adopting their codes of ethical conduct.
Clause 9 sets out minimum standards in law that all codes must legally meet. We have the option to use guidance under clause 10 to set out best practice in each of those areas, encouraging authorities to consider what arrangements they can put in place to ensure that the highest standards of ethical conduct are in place. However, as we have already discussed, given the diversity of the public sector, there is no one-size-fits-all approach, and any guidance that is issued will allow each authority to consider how those requirements in the Bill can best be implemented to serve them in a way that best suits them and the needs of their organisations and sectors. All public authorities will be legally required to have regard to the guidance.
UK Ministers will be responsible for guidance for UK and England-only bodies, and the devolved Governments will have powers to issue guidance that relates exclusively to devolved matters. That is to reflect the devolution settlement, and it ensures that the devolved Governments can provide guidance to the public authorities to which they are responsible and—speaking as a Member of Parliament for a devolved area—also that they could potentially also be bilingual, as they would have to be to comply in Wales.
We intend to work closely with our devolved colleagues on the development of any such guidance, and I again put on record my thanks to all the devolved Governments for their collaborative and collegiate approach to working with us on the Bill to ensure that we have a unified approach.
(3 weeks ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from Deborah Coles, executive director at INQUEST, and Professor Julia Waters.
I do not have any questions. We are short of time, so I would rather allow other members of the Committee to ask questions.
Q
Deborah Coles: Thank you for the question. It has been a long-standing campaign of ours to try and sort out what we perceive is a real inequality of arms. The best way to describe it is that it is a traumatic and distressing process to go through an inquest into the death of your loved one in any event, but to try and navigate those processes without your own individual legal representation, and even be expected to ask questions yourself or rely on the coroner to do so on your behalf, is not only extremely unfair but I think perpetuates the sense that the system is not working to get to the truth and to deliver the answers that you want as a bereaved person about how your loved one died.
I can think of so many examples since INQUEST was set up where families still today talk about the retraumatising nature of the inquest process. What legal representation can do as well is enhance the really important preventive function that an inquest can play in safeguarding lives in the future, but that is only where you have a family with the benefit of a lawyer to explore the areas of concern. In our experience, too often the default of state and corporate lawyers is to try and defend their reputations, to try and narrow the scope of the inquest process, and try and prevent consideration of the very serious issues that need exploring, particularly when we are talking here about how our work is predominantly around state-related deaths, where the state had a duty of care towards somebody. In our experience, it is only through legal representation and where families feel that they can play a meaningful and effective part in the process that the truth can come out.
I will write to you too, Jenni.
Jenni Hicks: Sorry, I am so aware that I only have 10 minutes.
The Chair
Thank you very much for your contribution. We have listened to everything you said and it really has been invaluable.
Jenni Hicks: Can I just say that you have still not answered my question on legal aid?
Tessa Munt
Q
Chief Constable Guildford: That often depends on who makes the allegation and whether it is criminal or conduct related. If it is a criminal matter, it is reported to a police force or the IOPC. If any criminal or conduct matter is reported and it involves a chief constable, it goes to the IOPC under the law. If it is anybody below that level, it goes to the professional standards department in each of the police forces. It is then independently assessed, and given to an investigator, who is trained and accredited, and independent of the people who are complained about and the complainant.
Q
Chief Constable Guildford: Having been consulted on the way through this, having thought about it quite considerably and having spoken to the director general of the IOPC, I think that the drafting at the moment is pitched at the right level, because it says that that harm needs to be of a serious nature. When it comes to setting out harm, it mentions phrases such as “departed significantly from”.
What will the impact of that be from my perspective? I think it will encourage leaders and individual officers to do the right thing. Initially, it may increase the likelihood that a narrative would be corrected earlier. Think back to some of the foundational pillars upon which this legislation rests, and a lot of the narrative that was, let us say, placed in the public domain around Hillsborough—and sometimes around other events where there is knowledge that is known to the police service and is able to be communicated, but which for whatever reason on occasions is not. Sometimes, in my opinion, that does not help with public confidence.
Going back to the question, I think this will encourage the clarification of issues at an earlier stage. But I suppose, on reflection, from a professional perspective, we have to balance some of that with an individual’s potential reluctance to say too much too early. Of course, the public quite rightly have an expectation that facts will be clarified and that information will be shared and placed in the public domain, and that is absolutely the right thing to do. That is the balancing act. It is important that it is pitched at the right level, which in my professional opinion it is. The “harm” is economic, physical or emotional, and I think it says it should be not inconsequential, which is important. On occasion—you will know this from your family perspective—we absolutely do get things wrong, but the legislation is designed to allow us to correct those things fairly expeditiously.
Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)
Q
Chief Constable Guildford: They obviously occur over a period of time. Certainly in my service—I have done over 30 years—they have come in the second half of my service, rather than the first. However, the way that we train them is very explicit: it is done on a values basis through initial training. We recruit and assess new candidates on the basis of values. We do recruit training, which in most forces happens over a period of 20 to 22 weeks, and recruits have a specific input on values-based decision making. We have something called the national decision model, which allows them to think about the consequences and the options they have in making their decisions.
The code of ethics absolutely underpins what we do. It sits in the middle of our decision-making circle. It is trained, really, from day one. I am trying to bring it to life a bit: this sits in the middle of all the specialist public order training, post Hillsborough, for commanders at public events, particularly football, and their accreditation and training. For all our bronze, silver and gold commanders, the code of ethics sits inside the wheel in which we make our decisions. To reinforce the point, the other aspect is that whenever there is a misconduct meeting or hearing for police officers, there is always reference to the code of ethics—the ethical behaviours that are expected of officers and staff.
The third bit of your question was about how we measure this. I would say that we measure it in three ways. The first is the training at the beginning. The second measure is around outcomes from our misconduct proceedings, as well as the proportionality of our misconduct proceedings and how they are used and referred to. The third measure —this is particularly important—is the measure of public opinion. As organisations, we respond to that, and we openly and candidly answer those questions.
In the consultation, we have gone through certain elements in relation to which we have said that, operationally, we may not express candour at certain times: for example, in a live situation in which we lawfully employed the services of, say, an undercover police officer or an undercover officer online; or in a live firearms operation, a live kidnap operation or a product contamination operation. In those cases we may seek to use a little bit of subterfuge to make sure we gain the lawful aim and the right public outcome for the victim at the end of it. Does that explain it?
Tessa Munt
Thank you. I invite you to pass your comments to the Chair in writing at some point, if that is possible, because I do not have time to ask you about that in detail now, but I am very interested in your views.
Richard Miller: I fully agree with what Mr Minnoch has said on that point. The Law Society would also be very happy to provide more detailed views on this issue in due course.
Q
Richard Miller: There are three areas that most need to be covered. First, what is the structure within which legal aid is delivered? We believe that the Bill does not go quite far enough here, in that it provides for legal help—the very lowest level of assistance—to families and it provides for advocacy. In most court proceedings, there is a middle level of legal representation that is provided. We think that level has benefits both for the Government and for the families concerned. For the Government, it provides greater control and greater quality control over the work. For the families—or, more to the point, for the firms representing the families—it means they are able to apply for payments on account in long-running cases, which is crucial to make this an economically viable expansion for firms.
You have to get the structure right in the first place. You then have to build up the capacity and you also have to make it attractive enough overall for lawyers who are not currently doing this work to want to come into it. Those are the three aspects that need to be addressed. Chris, do you want to expand on that a bit?
Chris Minnoch: Thank you, Richard. Minister, it is a very important question. I will start by saying how refreshing it is to come to a session such as this to talk about something positive in relation to the legal aid scheme—a positive expansion—after so many years of giving and submitting evidence to various Committees asking for these sorts of measures to be introduced. I give credit to the campaigning groups that have made this happen and to the Government for taking such a progressive step.
Richard is absolutely right that we have to see the expansion of legal aid in the context of the current civil legal aid system in particular, but you cannot dissociate that from the criminal legal aid system because there is an overlap between the two in terms of who is delivering the service. There are fundamental weaknesses in the sustainability and in the workforce, especially regarding recruitment and retention, that have been recognised by various recent Government-led reviews. There is lots of evidence there and I am sure that, as a Minister, you are fully aware of some of the challenges you face in trying to plug those.
Richard highlighted a really important point about the technical construction of the scheme. We are already in discussions, as is the Law Society, with the Ministry of Justice and the Legal Aid Agency about how we can improve that structure to make the work as sustainable as possible, and as attractive as possible, both to existing providers and new providers.
There is a really critical element, however, which was raised earlier today in some of the evidence that I heard, about which types of lawyers are best placed to deliver these services. Despite the challenges that the legal aid scheme has faced, particularly in the last 15 years or so, we are really lucky to have a core of incredibly experienced and expert lawyers who carry out this sort of work. Our advice to the Government would be to start there and then look to expand the capacity of those lawyers.
There is an issue around capacity, because inquest work takes such an emotional toll on the lawyers involved. There are elements of vicarious trauma that are involved in these sorts of cases, so it is very difficult for your entire caseload to be inquest work for 100% of your time. There are some natural capacity issues built in, even for lawyers doing that work currently, but those are the organisations—I think one of the earlier witnesses described them as human rights lawyers—where we need to start building up their capacity by making the system as attractive as possible, so that they themselves can recruit and develop the lawyers who can expand this work.
We are also already in talks with the Legal Aid Agency about separating out inquest work from the current categories of legal aid, so it is a separate category of legal aid with its own separate supervisor standards and its own separate accreditation process—those sorts of things. Richard, you might want to address the kind of training, development and accreditation issues arising from that.
Richard Miller: Indeed, yes. We are already having initial discussions with the Legal Aid Agency about what training might be required and whether accreditation would also be worthwhile in this area. The Law Society is well positioned to deliver training at scale, as would be needed here. One thing that we would like to explore is whether there is scope for Government assistance with the cost of that training to ensure that we can get the initial boost to capacity that will be urgently required.
On the question of accreditation, at the moment our preference is not to go that far, because we must be careful not to establish too many barriers to getting that expansion in place first. Down the line, it might be that accreditation would be worthwhile, but initially I think we need to make sure that the training is there and that lawyers are aware of their obligation not to deliver work beyond their competence. That should get the expansion of capacity that we need in the short term that we can then build on.
Q
Richard Miller: That is why we need to be starting those discussions right now, and we are. It is very difficult—it is a bit chicken and egg—because until the work is there, lawyers might not see that now is the time to incur the cost of developing plans to expand into the area. We need to get the legislation in place and be very clear as to when it is coming in, in order for the lawyers to be able to prepare for it.
We can never be absolutely certain, but with a combination of what we are starting to do already and building on the experience of the lawyers who are already working in this field, some of whom have said to us that they believe they can expand fairly quickly to mop up at least some of the additional demand, we can probably get to a tolerable position. It is going to involve work over a prolonged period of time to continue to build capacity, but delaying implementation simply does not help us to address the problem.
Chris Minnoch: To add to that, one of the difficulties with delaying implementation is that—this may come out in a later question from the Committee—the lawyers have a very important role to play in supporting bereaved families at inquests, but they also have a very important role in supporting the inquest itself and the coroner. They will probably play an important role in enabling or assisting the coroner to make determinations around the reasonableness and proportionality of public authority representation. You have heard already today about the extraordinary difficulties that unrepresented bereaved families face in accessing the information they need before the inquest proceedings or an inquiry begins, and that is another role the lawyers can play.
Delaying implementation on the basis of concerns about capacity might actually undermine some of the other elements of the Bill that are central to making it work and to the creation of the culture change that we have heard victims and bereaved families speak about so eloquently.
Douglas McAllister (West Dunbartonshire) (Lab)
Q
Secondly, if a public authority has a team of, for instance, one senior and two juniors, why should a bereaved family be represented by perhaps only one junior counsel? That really would not be parity of arms. The Bill talks about members of bereaved families, but how many members of that family are we talking about? Is it one specific next of kin? We heard evidence earlier from a witness who talked about a divorcing couple. Would they both be granted legal aid?
Chris Minnoch: On your first question, there is an issue around non-means-tested legal aid becoming available and so the case coming into scope at that stage, at the point at which the public authority is appointed as an interested party. Some of our members have expressed concerns that the appointment—the actual point at which an authority becomes an interested party—might be quite late in the process. It could be not when the inquest is opened, but perhaps closer to when the proceedings commence. An awful lot of work needs to be done in the intervening period, and that can last a long time. We are already talking to the Ministry of Justice about whether, although that is currently written into the Bill, it is the best way to determine the point at which non-means-tested legal aid is made available.
Of course, there are other situations in which means-tested legal aid will be made available, particularly when more than one family is involved who want representation, or at least preparation for the inquest rather than the advocacy itself.
At the moment, there is not a cap in respect of the preparation and advocacy aspects of work on inquest cases. That is probably right, because the system is already over-bureaucratic and underpaid. The creation of a cap, or people having to extend the level of legal aid they can access at different points in time in an inquest process, is just going to act as another barrier to ensuring adequate representation.
Parity is a really difficult question. I have been speaking about this to our members who are inquest specialists. One of the points they made, which was slightly surprising to me—I think Richard alluded to this earlier—was that they do not necessarily see parity as being about the number or seniority of the lawyers that represent either side in the inquisitorial process. Because of the completely different role that a bereaved family have in an inquest—as opposed to a public authority—it is probably understandable in many circumstances why a public authority might have a bigger legal team. If the duty of candour works in practice, and if public authorities genuinely want to assist the coroner to carry out their investigations, they may need a larger legal team to assist them properly. I would not say it is as simple as just numbers and seniority.
To build on one of the points mentioned earlier, the reasonableness and proportionality of legal representation will be linked to conduct, to a degree. The assessment by the coroner of whether the public authority’s level of representation is proportionate will very much flow from whether the coroner believes the public authority is acting and following their duty of candour and their duty to assist the investigation, and is being open, frank and transparent. If they are, there will be few concerns about their level of legal representation, but if they are not, there will be big concerns about their level of legal representation, because that will be seen as a mechanism to block rather than comply with their duties. Does that make sense?
(3 weeks, 3 days ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate the hon. Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) on securing this debate. This is an important issue that inspires much emotion from both sides of the debate, and it is vital that we handle it sensitively and with care.
Women make up only a very small proportion of those in custody, yet, as the hon. Member said, they often have some more complex needs than men. Some 68% of women in custody have reported experience of domestic abuse, and more than half have suffered abuse as a child.
As the Minister responsible for tackling violence against women and girls, I am very aware of these issues. It is for those reasons that I was delighted that the Government created the Women’s Justice Board, which will help to reduce the number of women in prison. That is also why I was proud that the Labour manifesto committed to continuing the support for single-sex exemptions available in the Equality Act.
Rachel Taylor
May I ask the Minister whether the violence experienced by women, in prison or not, is generally committed by cis men, not by transgender women? Does she agree that this is simply a way of fuelling culture wars and is not helpful in protecting women or any LGBT people, who are experiencing an increase in violent hate crime?
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention—it is important to put on record the nuance in this area. It is also important to recognise that levels of violence in prison are untenable and need addressing, whoever is committing that violence. The level of violence in the male estate is incredibly high and needs addressing, and my priority as the Minister for victims and for tackling violence against women and girls is getting on top of all this, because anyone who feels unsafe in prison needs our support. That is exactly what we are trying to ensure.
I listened to the speech made by the hon. Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul). Tackling violence against women in women’s prisons is on all of us, but a huge part of this debate is missing, which is the self-harm that women are inflicting on themselves. Some 20,000 incidents of self-harm have taken place in women’s prisons alone. How much of that is attributable to overcrowding in prisons, past experience of trauma and abuse, and a lack of training and resources for prison staff? If we are trying to tackle violence against women and girls, should our biggest priority not be the incidents that we see higher numbers of?
My hon. Friend, the Chair of the Women and Equalities Committee, is absolutely right. That is why, as I have outlined, this Government are committed to the work of the Women’s Justice Board, which is looking at how we can get women who should not necessarily be in prison out of prison, particularly mothers. That is not the right place for them. That is exactly what the Women’s Justice Board—led by my hon. Friend in the other place, the Minister for Prisons—is working on with the Lord Chancellor.
However, this evening’s debate is complex because, as we have heard, transgender women can have similar vulnerabilities. That does not necessarily mean that they need to be granted access to the space for biological women, but these matters require thought and tact if they are to be resolved in a fair and balanced way. His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service’s approach to allocating transgender women to prison has been through several iterations over the past decade. It balances the risk that transgender prisoners may pose to others if placed in a prison that aligns with their gender identity with the risk posed to and by them if they are placed in a prison that aligns with their biological sex.
Emily Darlington
Does the Minister think it is really important to understand the context? We have just talked about how many women are in prison because of the abuse that they have suffered, but many trans women are also put in those vulnerable positions, and they are even more likely than cis women to be victims of crime. Does the Minister agree that it would be useful for us to use the facts? Could she explain exactly what the position is at HMP Downview? Having some clarity on that, rather than just reiterating rumours that are being written about in newspapers, is probably a better way to deal with quite a sensitive issue, given that people can be both perpetrators of crime and victims of it.
My hon. Friend is right, and I hope to put on record some clarity and facts this evening, rather than just fuelling misinformation.
The current policy, which was brought in by the previous Government, is that no transgender woman charged with, or convicted of, either a sexual or a violent offence or who retains birth genitalia can be held in the general women’s estate, unless an exception is granted by a Minister. I would like to state this evening that no such exemptions have been granted under this Government.
Rebecca Paul
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I have just been accused of misinformation, and I want to make the point that the information and data I cited was obtained through written parliamentary questions. I can provide that data, so it is not misinformation; it is information that has come from the Ministry of Justice.
Minister, you may want to clarify that remark.
I will happily clarify it. I was not accusing the hon. Lady of misinformation; I was saying that there is a lot of misinformation out there regarding this issue, and that it is important that I put on record the facts of the case, which is what I am doing.
I want to reassert my last point: no exemptions have been granted under this Government. Exemptions that allow transgender women to be housed in the general women’s estate are recommended only when there is a compelling reason, such as a suicide or self-harm risk, or a risk to the prisoner from others, and where a specially trained multidisciplinary panel has carried out a comprehensive risk assessment that concludes that it has a high level of confidence that the prisoner poses a low risk to other prisoners. Again, though, no such exemption has been granted under this Government.
Rebecca Paul
The Minister mentions risk assessments. The independent monitoring board report seems to suggest that no such risk assessments have been provided. Can she put on the record that those risk assessments for every single biological male in HMP Downview are on file somewhere, and that she is comfortable that they exist?
I will ensure that the Minister responsible writes to the hon. Lady to inform her of that. In terms of managing the risk posed to biological women, these policies have been a success. There have been zero assaults and zero sexual assaults committed by transgender women in the women’s estate since 2019. To answer her point, there have been zero assaults.
Tracy Gilbert (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab)
I congratulate the hon. Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) on securing this important debate. The Minister may be aware that Scottish Ministers are waiting to see the Equality and Human Rights Commission guidance, following the Supreme Court ruling. Does she believe that it is tenable for Scottish Ministers to not implement the law as it is written, while waiting on the guidance, and can she give any advice on when it will be published?
It would not be appropriate for me to comment on the devolved competencies of another legislature—this is something for the Scottish Government to determine—but I can outline what will be doing as the Government responsible for England and Wales. More than 95% of transgender women are held in men’s prisons. Of the small number held in women’s prisons, the significant majority are held on E wing at HMP Downview, a women’s prison in the constituency of the hon. Member for Reigate. It is a stand-alone 16-bed unit, where the prisoners are accommodated completely separately from biological women, in a discrete building behind a gated fence.
Like the hon. Member, I have visited HMP Downview and E wing. I have spoken to the prisoners and the staff there. E wing was introduced by the previous Government in 2019. The reason it was created, and the function that it serves, links directly to the vulnerabilities of many transgender women. Those held in men’s prisons are disproportionately likely to self-harm, as we have already heard, and they face bullying and harassment. They are also disproportionately likely to be victims of sexual assault. Between 2016 and 2021, transgender women were victims in 3.4% of all sexual assaults reported in men’s prisons, despite never making up more than 0.3% of the population there.
I know the Minister is a reasonable person, and I am trying to find some common ground here. I could understand it, if the transgender males held in this particular unit had at least undergone reassignment surgery. They would definitely be vulnerable in a male prison. The argument for them to be held in a truly separate unit is strong. It seems from what we heard from my hon. Friend that the people who are causing concern are those who are biologically intact. In other words, they are any male who chooses to identify as a female.
I welcome the intervention by the right hon. Gentleman. He always tries to be helpful in debates, and I welcome that. Some of the prisoners held on E wing at HMP Downview have had full gender reassignment surgery. Some have not. However, full risk assessments are carried out before anyone is placed at HMP Downview. As I have stated, no prisoner has been placed there under this Government, and no exemptions have been made under this Government.
The allocation criteria rightly set a high bar for transgender women to be held in the general women’s estate. However, failing to meet that high bar does not mean that a transgender prisoner can necessarily be managed safely in a men’s prison. For those who are particularly vulnerable, such as those who have undergone full gender affirming surgery, E wing can, where appropriate, provide an important option.
David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)
The Minister may or may not be aware that prior to coming to this place, I ran a homelessness and support charity for the general population, including young women. It was always possible in that context, even as a charity, to find support and housing for transgender women, as well as to incorporate sex-segregated spaces for women, who had often gone through difficult experiences at the hands of biological males. Does she agree that it should always be possible, however it is done, to create provision in the prison estate for transgender women and for sex-segregated spaces?
I totally agree with that, and I thank my hon. Friend for his work, both inside and outside this House, to help women in incredibly vulnerable positions. He is correct, and we feel that HMP Downview, with the separate E wing, which is on the estate but not part of the general women’s estate, is the solution. It does work and it is working, as is shown in the data.
There has been no change in the requirement that E wing prisoners must remain under constant supervision at all times, but there has been a change in relation to who provides the supervision. Following that change, a dedicated prison officer now escorts E wing prisoners on and off the wing, and if the risk assessment deems it appropriate, the member of staff running the activities in which they participate must supervise them for the length of the activity. The prison implemented the change on the basis of a stringent local assessment of the risks to prisoners, and no risk concerns have been raised about the regime access of any E wing prisoners since the supervision policy changed. The prison will keep the arrangement under strict review, and we will make an operational decision to revoke that access if it is deemed necessary.
Kirsteen Sullivan (Bathgate and Linlithgow) (Lab/Co-op)
Will my hon. Friend give way?
Kirsteen Sullivan
I thank my hon. Friend, and I thank the hon. Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) for securing the debate. At the beginning of her speech, my hon. Friend said that there were many vulnerable women in prisons, that over half of them had experienced domestic violence, and that many had experienced emotional, physical or sexual abuse. That being the case, does she appreciate that having anyone other than biological females on the female estate risks re-traumatising already vulnerable women?
My priority is ensuring the safety of all prisoners on our estate. That requires a strict regime and a strict policy. I have met far too many female prisoners who—as my hon. Friend has rightly mentioned—are victims of crime themselves, who have been through the most horrific circumstances, and who have ended up in prison when they should not have been there. They should be in women’s centres, or work should be done in the community to prevent them from reoffending. Prison is not the right place for the vast majority of women, which is why the work of the Women’s Justice Board is so crucial.
I welcome the interest in this issue expressed by all the Members who have spoken, and recognise the importance of ensuring that prisons are operating safely and effectively. We will continue to keep the policy under review to ensure that it continues to be effective. As the Hon. Member for Reigate would expect, we are reviewing all aspects of transgender prisoner policy, following the For Women Scotland Supreme Court ruling handed down earlier this year. We need to ensure that our approach remains lawful, effective and fair. The ruling confirmed that references to “sex” in the Equality Act 2010 relate to biological sex, while making it clear that protections for transgender people remain. That landmark judgment brought much-needed clarity, but the hon. Member will understand that it is imperative for everyone that we get this right.
Following the Supreme Court ruling, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has submitted its draft updated code on single-sex spaces to the Government for approval. The Government are considering the draft updated code closely, and if a decision is made to approve it, the Minister for Women and Equalities will lay it before Parliament. While I recognise the frustration and the desire to expedite this process, we must bring clarity to service providers. The proposed code of practice is more than 300 pages long, and it is important that the correct process is followed. The hon. Member will appreciate that getting decisions wrong could carry potentially grave consequences, endangering either the safety of biological women or that of transgender women. The Ministry of Justice is working closely with the Office for Equality and Opportunity to understand the implications of the Supreme Court ruling, and we look forward to saying more in due course.
I thank all Members for taking part in the debate, but I particularly thank the hon. Member for Reigate. This is an important subject, and while I realise how emotive it can be, I hope that my setting out the facts and assuring Members of the policy directions that exist—along with the fact that there have been zero sexual or other assaults on any female prisoner by a transgender prisoner since 2019—has made clear the balance that we seek to strike in the way in which we allocate transgender prisoners, and has also helped to add some balance to this debate. I can assure the hon. Member for Reigate that as we continue our review of transgender prisoner policies, our approach will always be to seek to ensure the safety of all prisoners, and that I seek to work with her and anyone else with an interest in this important topic. The Government will provide an update once the review has ended.
Question put and agreed to.
(4 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Justice if he will make a statement on the implications for national security and the management of terrorist offenders following disruption to the separation centre regime.
The right hon. Gentleman raises a very important question. Separation centres are a vital part of our strategy to manage those who pose the most significant terrorist risk. Following the horrific attack at HMP Frankland in April this year, we took immediate action to ensure safety in our separation centres. Today, everyone is safe and a stringent regime remains in place.
Our prison officers are some of the hardest-working and bravest public servants in this country. It is right that they feel safe as they work to protect the public. That is why, following the attack at Frankland, we mandated the use of protective body armour in our highest-risk units, including our SCs, for the first time. The Deputy Prime Minister has recently announced a further £15 million investment in safety equipment, including to roll out up to 10,000 pieces of body armour to up to 500 staff trained in the use of Tasers.
The Abu judgment is very fact-specific and does not threaten the integrity of the separation centres themselves. This Government take the judgment and others that were referenced very seriously. We are clear that any decision regarding segregation must comply with prison rules and human rights obligations, including under the European convention on human rights. We are working to ensure that our referral process is robust and are strengthening our ability to defend against legal challenges. Specialist staff continue to assess referrals rigorously, and placements are made only where the criteria are met.
Let me be clear: the Government will always put national security first. Separation centres remain an essential operational tool, and we will continue to use these specialist units to protect the public from the most dangerous offenders.
I call the shadow Secretary of State.
Sahayb Abu is a danger to this country. This is an ISIS fanatic who bought a combat vest and a sword so that he could, in his own words, “shoot up a crowd”, yet this week the High Court ruled that keeping him apart from other prisoners to prevent him from radicalising them was a breach of his human rights. We have reached the perverse situation where a terrorist’s mental health is prioritised over national security and the protection of the very men and women in uniform who are targets for these dangerous individuals with very little to lose. Abu is now in line for a payout from the taxpayer.
This is not an isolated incident; it is the latest in a line, including the double murderer and extremist Fuad Awale and Denny De Silva. Every extremist housed in a separation centre may now be able to deploy this judgment to escape being housed in such a unit and to get a payout. Terrorists are weaponising the ECHR and the public sector equality duty to milk the state, and the Ministry of Justice is signing the cheques. I note that the Minister did not say that she would be appealing this judgment.
The separation centre regime was created to counter highly subversive terrorists recruiting inside jail and to ensure protection for prison officers, which is effectively collapsing. Prison governors are being paralysed just when there is a crisis of extremism and extreme violence in our prisons, necessitating more separation centres and more segregation.
Will the Minister finally publish Jonathan Hall KC’s review of separation centres, which was produced as evidence in court but which has not been published to this House or the country? Will she say that under no circumstances will any terrorist be rewarded in this manner, and bring forward emergency legislation to override this judgment, prevent payout, protect national security and protect our prison officers? I have said many times that it is only a matter of time before an officer gets killed by one of these monsters. Will the Minister bring forward this legislation? If she does, she will have the Opposition’s support; if she does not, we will do so.
The right hon. Gentleman will be well aware that I am unable to pre-empt decisions that are yet to be taken by the courts. The Government will always ensure that taxpayer money is used responsibly and effectively. On the most recent judicial review, announced just yesterday, the Government are considering all the available options, including the right to appeal. I want to put that on the record.
I find it quite disingenuous that the right hon. Gentleman—the almost Leader of the Opposition—talks about leaving the European convention on human rights. If he feels so strongly about this, why did his party do absolutely nothing on it when it was in government for 14 years? The Conservatives talk about action; this Labour Government are acting. We have been clear that we will not fail to act on reform of the ECHR; in fact, the sentencing Minister—the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley (Jake Richards)—is in Strasbourg right now having discussions with partners on a range of topics, including reform of the ECHR.
The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the findings of Jonathan Hall KC’s independent review of separation centres. The Government commissioned that following the attack at HMP Frankland, and Mr Hall’s report and our response will be published in due course. Let me just say, for the avoidance of any doubt, that it is the priority of this Government—as it should be of all Governments—to keep the public safe and to protect national security. This Government will always ensure that that is done.
I call the Chair of the Justice Committee.
May I thank the Minister for reaffirming the Government’s support—which it should not be necessary to do—for the rule of law and the ECHR? Will she concentrate on the key points here? The first is making sure that the most dangerous prisoners are held securely and the second is ensuring the safety of prison officers. Will she also say what the status of Jonathan Hall KC’s review is? I understand that it has been with the Lord Chancellor for some months. When will we see that and when will we implement the recommendations of the report?
As I have stated, the Government are committed to ensuring that separation centres continue to prevent those who pose the highest terrorist risk from influencing the wider prison population. That is precisely why we commissioned Jonathan Hall’s independent review following the appalling attack at HMP Frankland. Mr Hall has delivered his findings, which we and the Lord Chancellor are grateful for, and which we are considering very closely and with the utmost seriousness. We will publish the review and the Government response very shortly, but we are taking all relevant steps to ensure that our prisons and our prison staff are safe.
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)
What a sorry state of affairs. This case highlights the consequences of a prison system, which includes separation centres, that was overstretched and under-resourced by the last Conservative Government, of which the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) was a prominent member—he has now forgotten that.
Please will the Minister confirm what assessment the Ministry of Justice has made of the decade of Tory underfunding and overcrowding, which left prisons unable to safely manage violent extremists such as those we have been talking about? Will she also outline how Abu’s ideology and violent behaviour escalated the need for extreme segregation measures? Finally, violent attacks on prison staff are on the rise. We have seen high-profile cases of prisoners, including one from my constituency of Woking, being accidentally released. What assurances will the Minister give us, as MPs, that public safety and the protection of prison staff will be prioritised in the under-resourced prison system that the Government inherited from the Conservatives?
I thank the Liberal Democrat spokesperson for his questions and for the constructive way in which he asks them. He is right to highlight the chronic underfunding of our Prison Service and our criminal justice system over 14 years of Tory austerity. He is right that if there is a dereliction of the duty to look after our criminal justice system, this, sadly, is the result. We are slowly beginning to pick up the pieces of what was left of our criminal justice system when we came into office 18 months ago, and this is yet another example of how the previous Government failed to keep us safe and failed to invest in our Prison Service. This is the result.
We realise that more needs to be done and we are committed to doing it. I pay tribute again to the brilliant prison staff and prison officers who work in intolerable conditions. We are committed to investing in them to make sure they are safe, as I have stated, with effective body armour and better training. We are listening to them and to the governors of prisons directly about what they need, because they are the best people to identify the needs on the ground, and we are seeking to provide reassurance. I extend a hand across the aisle and offer to work with the Liberal Democrat spokesperson and his party to ensure that we get this right for the sake of everyone.
Warinder Juss (Wolverhampton West) (Lab)
The European convention on human rights has safeguarded the lives and rights of many people. Will the Minister please tell the House what the Law Society of England and Wales thinks about the Conservatives’ plans to leave the ECHR?
My hon. Friend makes a valid point. In the past, the convention has served the victims of John Worboys, the families of the 97 killed in the Hillsborough disaster and British troops who died in Iraq, and it underpins the Good Friday agreement. It is frankly astonishing that the Conservative party, after 14 years of failing to do anything on the ECHR, seeks for us to withdraw from it, when the only other country to do have done so is Russia under Vladimir Putin. Is that the company the Conservative party wants to keep?
We are working to ensure that our referral process is robust, and we are strengthening our ability to defend against any legal challenges. Specialist staff continue to assess referrals rigorously, and placements are made only when the criteria are met, but to answer my hon. Friend’s question specifically, the Conservative Government, as we have already heard, left our prisons at breaking point. They were at 99% capacity, and the Law Society of England and Wales has stated that the answer to that is not leaving the ECHR.
When it comes to terrorists, what is worrying a lot of us is the fact that people are pouring across the channel illegally and there is absolutely no check whatsoever on them. The Minister may not be able to answer this now, but I am interested in the state of the law. Surely it is a very risky thing for our nation that our enemies could be infiltrating our country in this way. Would it be possible under the refugee convention to detain all illegal migrants, do full background checks on them, and put them in separation centres or whatever, so that we can check that these people are actually safe?
We are working very closely with the Home Office on this, and on our proposals regarding reform of the ECHR. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, we are bringing forward legislation to clarify exactly how article 8 of the ECHR, the right to a private life, operates domestically in relation to immigration rules, to ensure an appropriate balance between the rights of individuals and the national interest. [Interruption.] The shadow Minister speaks from a sedentary position regarding article 3. Again, we are looking at the interpretation of article 3, so that varied prison conditions or access to healthcare is not a bar to extradition or deportation. I reiterate our commitment to do everything we can to keep our national security safe. I will happily write to the right hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) with more information and clarification on those points.
I thank the Minister for her response to the urgent question. The Frankland attack was awful. Given that body armour is crucial to the safety of prison staff, can she please tell us more about its procurement, so that prison staff are protected as best as possible, as soon as possible?
It is right that we equip our prison officers with the most robust security and protection possible. That is why we are working with them, with the unions and with governors to ensure that all steps are taken. I stress that it is also really important that prisoners’ mental health needs are taken into account. We have medical staff advising on the placement of prisoners within separation centres. I will happily write to my hon. Friend with further details on procurement, but I reassure him that we are doing all we can, working with our prison staff, who work in exceptional circumstances, to ensure that they feel reassured and safe.
Normally, I like the Minister’s can-do attitude. Is she really telling the House that this Government would rather make payouts to terrorists than disapply the ECHR?
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his question. I do have a can-do attitude, and I am willing to do everything we can as a Government to ensure that we get this right—that we keep our public and our prison officers safe, and keep dangerous criminals locked up where they belong. The right hon. Gentleman will be aware that the legal proceedings are still ongoing. I reiterate that we are looking at all options available, including the right to appeal, because we will be as responsible and effective with taxpayers’ money as possible.
Mr Andrew Snowden (Fylde) (Con)
Hashem Abedi was in a separation centre at HMP Frankland when he attacked three prison officers with hot cooking oil. Under these rulings and interventions by European courts, determining the human rights of convicted and violent terrorists, does the Minister really think that it would be appropriate for this individual to be given access to a kitchen?
I will not pre-empt the findings and outcome of Jonathan Hall’s review, but we believe in separation centres. They are a valuable tool, as the judgments state. We are ensuring that all our prison officers are kept safe, and once the recommendations of Jonathan Hall’s review are published and the Government have carefully considered them, I will happily speak with the hon. Gentleman, and work with him to ensure that they are followed through.
This terrorist was moved to a separation centre over concerns that he would use his extremist Islamist ideology to radicalise others, and yet the ruling says that this move was a breach of his right to a private life under the European convention. Should national security and prison officers’ safety not come first, and will she rule out paying any money to this terrorist?
I echo my previous comments: we cannot pre-empt the judicial decision and we are looking at all our rights, including the right to appeal. There are select criteria for prisoners to go into a separation centre. Prisoners will be selected only if all other options have been considered. This is not the case if it is the most desirable location. They are entitled to challenge their selection and raise complaints if needed; however, as I have stated, our priority remains the safety and security of our prisons, our prison staff and the general public.
The key issue is that making a decision about whether someone goes into a secluded area away from other prisoners is a judgment call. What assessment has the Minister made of the implications of the judgment on what will happen to terrorists who should be separated from other prisoners?
Separation centres were never intended for use with all terrorist offenders; they exist to separate the most pernicious radicalisers. We are achieving that aim successfully using the current separation centres’ capacity, which is kept under regular review. We are awaiting the findings of the Jonathan Hall review, and we will look closely at the judgment from yesterday’s decision to ensure that all steps are taken and that we are working with governors and prison officers on the best steps forward. We are determined to ensure that prisons are kept safe.
In Northern Ireland, we have dealt with the spread of extreme forms of paramilitarism in our prisons, and we have learned that the influence of the most hard-line prisoners spreads easily and completely; there are those who enter prison for, perhaps, petty crime and come out the other end with hatred they never felt before. Those with extremist views should not be able to proselytise and convert people —younger inmates in particular—to extremist views. Legislative change has been mentioned. Given what we have learned in Northern Ireland would it be helpful— I always try to be helpful—for the Minister to contact the prisons Minister in the Northern Ireland Assembly to get their ideas? Perhaps we can be helpful to each other.
I am grateful for the extension of an offer to help. I will ensure that that is followed up with our counterparts in Northern Ireland. We will follow the evidence and do what works to keep our prisons safe. We will assess the risks of any further radicalisation in our separation centres and our prisons to ensure that that is not happening, and we will keep under review whether any individuals pose a danger through extending their views to the prison population or to the public. I look forward to working with counterparts in Northern Ireland to share knowledge and expertise to ensure that we get this right for everyone across the United Kingdom.
I thank the Minister for her short, sharp answers—perhaps a masterclass for what is to follow. Business questions will run for an hour and no more.
(1 month ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 (Permitted Disclosures) Regulations 2025.
With your permission, Mr Dowd, I will make a brief statement on the sudden and tragic passing of Baroness Helen Newlove, the Victims’ Commissioner. Baroness Newlove was a formidable champion for victims, and her work will be carried on by many who have known her and who have had the privilege of working with her for so many years. It has been a genuine honour to work with her in my role as the Victims Minister. All my thoughts and, I am sure, those of the whole House are with her family and loved ones at this difficult time.
It is an honour to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Dowd. The draft statutory instrument amends section 17 of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. Section 17 was brought into force on 1 October this year, and makes it clear in statute that confidentiality clauses—also known as non-disclosure agreements, or NDAs—cannot be enforced in so far as they seek to prevent victims from reporting a crime to the police. Section 17 also extends that protection to certain other disclosures required for victims to obtain confidential advice and support essential to coping with, and recovering from, the effects of crime.
Now that section 17 is in force, NDAs entered into on or after 1 October 2025 will be legally unenforceable in so far as they attempt to prohibit such disclosures. That means that individuals who are a victim of crime, or who reasonably believe they are a victim of crime, are allowed to disclose information. That information must be to certain individuals for certain purposes related to the criminal conduct they have suffered. That is the case even if an NDA they have signed seeks to prevent them from disclosing that information.
Under the legislation, victims are permitted to make disclosures to the following bodies: the police or other bodies that investigate or prosecute crimes; qualified lawyers; regulated professionals, including regulated healthcare professionals; victim support services; regulators; and a victim’s close family. Those are known as the permitted disclosures. Disclosures to each of those bodies are permitted only if made for the relevant purpose for the body specified in the legislation, each of which relates to the criminal conduct. However, disclosures made for any other purpose, or to bodies not listed in the legislation, are not permitted, and the NDA may remain enforceable in such instances.
To ensure that section 17 comprehensively achieves the policy aim, this instrument makes three changes to it. The first is to add the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority to the list of bodies to which victims can make a permitted disclosure. That is for the purpose of pursuing a claim under the taxpayer-funded compensation schemes that it administers—the criminal injuries compensation scheme 2012 and the victims of overseas terrorism compensation scheme 2012.
Victims sometimes feel unable to tell the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority about settlement agreements they have signed related to the criminal conduct they are seeking compensation for, and that can be because of a confidentiality clause in such agreements. That hesitation can make it harder for the authority to assess their eligibility for compensation. It can also affect how much compensation they receive. Including the authority in the list of permitted disclosures will ensure victims can share relevant information with the authority for the purpose of a compensation claim related to the criminal conduct they have experienced, without fearing legal consequences under the NDA.
Flowing from that, the second change will amend section 17 to allow disclosures to courts and tribunals for the purpose of issuing or pursuing proceedings in relation to a decision by the authority on such claims. That makes it clear that appropriate disclosures are permitted throughout the entire legal process for pursing compensation from the schemes that the authority administers, including in the small number of cases where a compensation decision is challenged in the courts. It is vital that the Courts and Tribunals Service has access to all relevant information, and this amendment makes it clear that an NDA cannot be enforced against a victim sharing certain information with courts and tribunals in that context.
The third and final change the instrument introduces is an amendment to the definition of a qualified lawyer in section 17(6) of the 2024 Act. Currently under section 17, victims may disclose information to a qualified lawyer for the purpose of seeking legal advice about criminal conduct. However, the definition does not include registered foreign lawyers—those who qualified outside England and Wales, but are registered with and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority. Those lawyers can own and manage authorised law firms and, in certain circumstances, provide reserved legal services. The provision will ensure that victims can make disclosures to any regulated lawyer in England and Wales for the purpose of seeking legal advice about criminal conduct, without needing to verify where that lawyer qualified. That change removes unnecessary barriers and ensures that victims can seek legal advice without fear of breaching an NDA. If this instrument is approved by Parliament, the changes will apply to NDAs entered into on or after the date it comes into force.
As hon. Members may know, the Government are seeking to make further changes to NDAs through an amendment to the Victims and Courts Bill that was tabled on Report in the Commons in October. The amendment will void NDAs to the extent that they seek to prevent a victim of crime, or someone who reasonably believes they are a victim of crime, from speaking about the criminal conduct to anyone and for any purpose.
That measure complements an amendment to the Employment Rights Bill that provides similar protections for workers in relation to certain work-related harassment or discrimination. Once commenced, the Victims and Courts Bill measure will repeal and replace section 17 of the 2024 Act, including the changes proposed by this instrument. This is effectively a bridging measure. However, we recognise that the Victims and Courts Bill may take time to achieve Royal Assent and to be implemented. As such, commencing section 17 from 1 October 2025 and then taking forward the changes proposed under this instrument ensures that victims can benefit from these protections without delay while work continues on passing and implementing the Victims and Courts Bill.
This instrument seeks to make three technical changes to section 17 of the 2024 Act to ensure that it comprehensively achieves the policy aim. The changes would make sure that victims of crime are able to access appropriate support from the right agencies and professionals without the fear of legal consequences from an NDA, in order to cope with and recover from the impact of crime. They will pave the way for future reforms under the Employment Rights Bill and the Victims and Courts Bill. I therefore commend this instrument to the Committee.
I welcome the contribution from the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston, who did sterling cross-party work on the original legislation. I look forward to debating further measures relating to this issue when we look at the Victims and Courts Bill. I commend the draft regulations to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.