Points of Order

Chris Bryant Excerpts

1st reading: House of Commons
Thursday 13th July 2017 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I think that in a moment the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill will be presented. It has already been online on the parliamentary website for the last hour and a half. This is a complete breach of the Standing Orders of the House: the convention is that it is presented to the House before it is presented to anybody else. Also, we cannot get a copy of it in the Vote Office, but we can get a copy of it online. I hope that there will be an investigation into this matter.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for bringing this matter to the attention of the Chair, and I understand that indeed the text of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill has been located on the Parliament website this morning, in advance of its presentation. This should not have happened, and I can assure the hon. Gentleman and the House that an investigation is currently under way into this most regrettable matter.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Chris Bryant Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 11th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Peter Bone (Wellingborough) (Con)]

It is a great honour to follow the right hon. Member for Derby South (Margaret Beckett). She made a very thoughtful speech. One point on which I entirely agree is that, as this Bill passes through the House, we can look at better ways to scrutinise secondary legislation in particular. It seems that the Government are right that they will have to use secondary legislation, but it does not mean that all Delegated Legislation Committees must look the same. We do not have to have a one-and-a-half-hour DL on a technical matter of no importance whatsoever. However, if there is a Committee of some importance, why not extend the hours? Any Member can speak in a DL Committee, so there are ways we can improve scrutiny. That is what the Committee of the whole House should do when it considers the Bill.

I would be very surprised if the Bill finishes up in exactly the same format at the end as at the start. The Government would be well advised to accept reasonable amendments that improve the situation, but the principle of this Bill is quite simple.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

On delegated legislation, the hon. Gentleman seems to think that it is okay if something is debated in Committee, but the truth of the matter is that the only motion that can be considered in a delegated legislation Committee is whether the Committee has or has not considered the matter in hand. In other words, if every member of the Committee voted against, the legislation would none the less come into law. That is the danger of relying on secondary legislation.

[Mr Bone]

I think the hon. Gentleman would agree that if the affirmative mechanism were used, the whole House would vote on the matter, so I do not accept his argument.

This Bill is about a principle: I think it is called the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, and I think I introduced—

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[Mr Bone]

I thought that was the point I made: that this House could ultimately reject a DL. That is clearly what happened: we vote on it. I remember, and we vote on them all the time—my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford) mentioned at least eight times that they had been annulled.

[Chris Bryant]

Under the negative procedure, which is referred to regularly in the Bill, it is entirely up to the Government whether to allow a debate and a vote at all, and in the last 12 instances where the House has demanded a debate and a vote, including on very important issues, they have granted them on only four occasions.

[Mr Bone]

I entirely accept that point about the negative procedure. I want to move on to—

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[Mr Bone]

No!

Basically, this Bill is about the principle of ending EU control over this House and incorporating those laws. That is fine, and that is why every Member of the House should vote for it tonight. What they should then do is look in Committee, clause by clause, at how we are proposing to scrutinise, change and incorporate laws. I wholly accept that the negative SI procedure is probably not the best way of proceeding.

Another thing that has been mentioned—the right hon. Member for Derby South brought it up, and it is probably what I wanted to talk about most—is programme motions. As a principle, I am against programme motions. I accept entirely the answer she gave me, which is that it was a lot worse before. However, she did not go on to say that it is great now, and I do not think it has been. There have been a lot of problems with the Government deciding programming and the timing of scrutiny.

Now, this particular programme motion is one of the better ones, because the debate is eight days long, with eight hours’ protected time each day. I am fed up of sitting here waiting for a debate, only to find that there is statement after statement, which reduces the time we have for that debate. Thankfully, we are not doing that this time, and if there is a need for extra time, the Leader of the House would be well advised to grant it.

I was here at business questions on Thursday, and the shadow Leader of the House did not complain about the timetabling. [Interruption.] Well, I must have been deaf, because I was listening out for it. She moaned about a lot of things, but she did not complain about the length of time.

[Chris Bryant]

She did.

[Mr Bone]

Well, I will stand corrected if that is the case.

Anyway, the point I wanted to make is that it should not be up to the Government to timetable business in this House. By fortune, I have a ten-minute rule Bill tomorrow that introduces a business of the House commission. If that Bill was law, we would not be worrying about all of this now, because timetabling would be decided by the House, with a commission putting its recommendations to the House once a week to vote on. So we are having a row about something when we do not need to.

If only we had listened to David Cameron, the former Prime Minister, when he said in his “Fixing Broken Politics” speech—one of his best speeches ever—that we should have this House commission. It was, of course, also in the coalition Bible, and we guaranteed that we would have that House commission within three years of the coalition’s coming into power. I do not know why that did not happen; I assume it just got overlooked. It would be quite wrong of me to say that the two Whips Offices were absolutely opposed to losing their power—it could not possibly have been that.

All that I am doing tomorrow is, hopefully, reintroducing something that was the policy of the former Prime Minister, the Conservative party, the Liberal Democrats and the Wright reforms. If we had had that commission, all the arguments and worries on the Opposition side would have disappeared.

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[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

This Bill is utterly pernicious. It is dangerous, it is fundamentally un-British and it has at its heart a lie. It pretends to bring back power to this country, but it actually represents the biggest peacetime power grab by the Executive over the legislature, by the Government over Parliament, in 100 years. It allows the Government to drive through changes to any law by the simple fiat of a Minister. That includes the powers of the House of Lords, the date of the next general election, the composition of the House of Commons and the number of Ministers. In the most extreme instance of all, it allows Ministers to alter the very Bill itself. That is a dangerous spiral of autocracy. Some Members seem to think it is a compliment to refer to them as Henry VIII powers. I know that Henry VIII, in 1536, legislated to allow two MPs to come here from Calais, but on the whole the Tudor exercise was not a proud demonstration of democracy. These are clauses of which Erdoğan, Maduro and Putin would be proud.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way and I am sorry to interrupt his flow of eloquence. Is he conscious of schedule 7, in particular part 2, and especially paragraph 6, sub-paragraph 2, sub-sub-section (g), in which it is made perfectly clear that it is only by affirmative resolution, and not the fiat of Ministers, that amendments to Acts can be made?

[Chris Bryant]

I am perfectly aware of all the measures in schedule 7, but I merely point out to the right hon. Gentleman that, since the Bill itself can be changed by the Government, that is one of the elements the Government can change. What happens, even under the affirmative process—this is the problem with secondary legislation—is that, because there is no opportunity to amend, the Government will say, “Take it or leave it”. They will then suddenly say, “There is a real emergency and you’ve got to take it, because otherwise there will be chaos.” That is the sword of Damocles that Governments always hold over Parliament when a clause hands matters over to secondary legislation.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am doubly grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Will he withdraw his remark that it is by ministerial fiat, and resort instead to the argument that the drafting would enable the Government to exert some pressure on Parliament, which presumably he and his colleagues would resist?

[Chris Bryant]

No, I am not withdrawing it. The Bill, at several points, makes it quite clear that the Government will hold powers to bring in regulations under secondary legislation through the negative process. The whole point about the negative process is that the statutory instrument comes into law unless it has been annulled, and the only process by which it can be annulled is if the Government themselves allow time for us to debate the matter and to have a vote. I would be happy to trust the Government if in recent years—I do not know why the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) is looking up at that point; he never used to trust the Government until he became a Minister—they had been happy, since 2010 or 2015, to honour the traditional doctrine of the House, which is that if the Leader of the Opposition demands a vote and a debate in this Chamber there will be one. They have, however, consistently refused to do that. Enormous changes to our law, affecting student nurses and every student in the land, and affecting benefits for all our constituents, have been driven through via secondary legislation. It should never have been used for such measures, without us ever being able to insist on having a debate or a vote. The worst of it, to which I have already referred, is that when we do have a debate, the Government get to decide whether it should be in Committee or on the Floor of the House. If it is in Committee, all we get is a motion stating whether or not we have debated the matter in hand.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

I am not giving way to the right hon. Gentleman again. I am sure he will manage to catch your eye, Mr Speaker.

It is not as if the Government do not accept that they will have to introduce hundreds and hundreds of statutory instruments. What they should have done, before introducing the Bill, was suggest an alternative way of dealing with this process over the next two years, so that there can be proper triaging of genuinely technical and minor consequential amendments to legislation that need to happen, and significant measures where the whole House would want to take a view.

Since 1950, Parliament has rejected only 11 statutory instruments, so we know that this is an autocratic process, but let me get to a much bigger worry for me: clause 9. I am sure that hon. Members have read it. It states very clearly:

“Regulations under this section may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament (including modifying this Act).”

When I said last week in the House that this was truly exceptional, all sorts of Government Members, including Ministers, came up to me and said, “Oh no, there are hundreds of examples. I’ll give you examples by the weekend.” The first example I was given was the Scotland Act 1998, but it does not apply. Section 113(6)—I am sure the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) will know this subsection—states:

“But a power to modify enactments does not…extend to making modifications of this Act or subordinate legislation under it.”

In other words, the Minister who told me that had missed out the word “not”, rather conveniently.

Then the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) came up to me and said, “No, you’re completely and utterly wrong. The greatest constitutional expert in this country”—I think he might have meant himself—“tells me that section 75 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 gives the Government the right to change the Act itself by statutory instrument”. Unfortunately, he was wrong as well. It actually states:

“If…it appears to the Secretary of State…that…the enactment is capable of preventing the disclosure of information”—

in other words, gives the Government too much power to prevent disclosure—

“he may by order repeal or amend the enactment for the purpose of removing or relaxing the prohibition.”

It is a measure that gives the Government not more but less power. Even the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which applies to circumstances when by universal accord—probably—the Government would need emergency powers, and which builds on previous Acts of Parliament, states categorically, in section 23(5):

“Emergency regulations may not amend…this Part of this Act”—

in other words, all the major elements of the Act.

If hon. Members who are trying to cover their tracks by saying, “We think all this secondary legislation business is terribly worrying, and obviously we’ll change that in Committee”, really care about those matters, they should consider the Government’s track record. What have they done recently? They engaged in what I would call jiggery-pokery with the DUP to ensure a majority—and let us hope we have a vote on Estimates Day on the £1 billion for the DUP; they delayed setting up Select Committees until now to make it impossible for us to scrutinise many of the measures going through during the summer months; and tomorrow, they are trying to make sure that, for the first time in our history, a Government without a majority in the House have a majority on every single Committee. If that does not make one question the bona fides of this Government, nothing will, and that is why I say to hon. Members: do not sell your birthright for a mess of pottage; vote against this Bill!

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash]

I want to start by simply outlining that, contrary to what the hon. Member for North East Fife (Stephen Gethins) has just suggested about there being weak arguments for why we should leave the EU and repeal the European Communities Act 1972, it is absolutely essential that we do so if we are going to have a self-respecting, self-governing democratic country. The Bill and this whole issue are about one main question, namely democracy, which is what everything else necessarily flows from. All the economic arguments and questions relating to trade and other matters are ultimately dependent on the question of whether we have the right to govern ourselves in this sacred House of Commons. That is the basis on which the people of this country make decisions, of their own free choice, in general elections—whether it is to vote for the Labour party, the Liberal Democrats, the SNP or the Conservative party—and then a decision is made in this House as to how they will be governed.

I repeat what I have said: we have just had Remembrance Day. I simply want people to reflect for one moment on the fact that those millions of people who died in both world wars died for a reason. It was to do with sustaining the freedom and democracy of this House.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Does not democracy presume that a Government would listen to the will of the House of Commons, whose Members are individually elected by their constituencies? Would it not be slightly odd, therefore, to proceed with the Bill without taking out the Henry VIII powers?

[Sir William Cash]

Put simply, on the European Union Referendum Act 2015, which was a sovereign Act of this House—the point that the hon. Gentleman has just made—the House of Commons agreed, by six to one, that it would deliberately transfer to the people the decision whether to leave or remain in the European Union. Unless that Act is repealed, I do not believe that that decision should be returned to by the House.

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[Mr Grieve]

There is no doubt that some of the problems we have are not going to be helpful in our negotiation. Equally, it is right to say that the more we can have mature, considered and sensible debate in this House, the more we improve our ability to negotiate with our EU partners.

I have tabled a number of amendments. As with all amendments, some are multiple choice—we have to do this in this House, because it is how we go about looking at and examining legislation—and some are probing amendments. Some are, in my view, more important than others. I tabled the one that hon. Gentleman highlights because the Government did not really explain that they wanted multiple exit dates. I wanted to tease out why and to suggest that one exit date might be better because of the consequences for the use of Henry VIII powers thereafter, but there might actually be a justification for what the Government are doing. All that needs to be worked through in the legislation, and that is what I have sought to do.

I say to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench that over past weeks we have had some really sensible, constructive discussions on some of the areas covered by the amendments that I have tabled. I hope very much indeed that we can achieve some degree of consensus, in which case some of the amendments, whether on triage or the way we treat retained EU law, might not be required. I do not wish to get diverted into all that; I shall come back to it in later debates. The trouble is—I repeat this—that it all gets marred by events such as those last Friday, when extraordinary amendments are suddenly magicked out of the blue that simply do not make any sense at all.

When I read the amendments and those consequential on them, which I must say I saw only this morning, I saw another problem: as has already been highlighted, one of the consequentials seemed to me to totally undermine the purpose of the main amendment, to the point where the conspiracy theorist in me made me think it was a sort of double deceit or double bluff—that it was intended in some way to give the impression to some of my right hon. and hon. Friends who really worry about this that they were being offered this tablet of stone on our departure, but it was in fact teasingly capable of being shifted. My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General sent me a text earlier that said that I was mistaken and that that was not the intention—that it was the very reverse.

I am not a parliamentary draftsman, and I know that there are always different ways in which an amendment to a statute can be read. I remain of the view, though, that the wording is very peculiar indeed if the intention is to exclude the possibility of playing around with the exit date, which is being offered as a talisman. I must say to my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General that I did naughtily begin to wonder whether in fact the parliamentary draftsman was so appalled at the folly of what the Government were doing that he had sneakily altered amendment 383 to try to offer them a lifeline in case they came to regret what they had done. I am sure that that is being very unfair to the parliamentary draftsman, whom I know always does what is requested of him or her.

[Chris Bryant]

The tendency of any Government, especially when they have such a major project on their hands, is always to try to manage the project and to manage Parliament. Has the right hon. and learned Gentleman discovered over recent weeks that the sad truth of the matter is that there is a consensus in the House that embraces all those on the Opposition Benches and a significant number of Government Back Benchers? It actually embraces half the Government—I can see at least three, possibly four, Ministers sitting on the Front Bench who would sign up to his amendment. Would not it be far more rational for the Government simply to calm down about this process and try to establish a consensus that can carry the country forward?

[Mr Grieve]

I endorse what the hon. Gentleman says. That is precisely what I wanted to start suggesting to Ministers. There are a number of key areas in this debate this afternoon. The first is the recognition, belated but nevertheless I am grateful for it, that leaving the EU requires statutory authority from this House to make it part of the rule of the law of our land. It is a very important principle. Indeed, I detect that the Government also recognise that if, at some point in the future, we get beyond transition we will probably need another statute to alter the law of our land for any final agreement that we have with our EU partners. We will have to take it in a measured way, and the Government will have to accept that Parliament, being sovereign, must, at the end of the day, have the ability to support or reject this. There is no way around that.

Of course there are the hypothetical questions, such as “Well, there might be nothing to reject because we might be falling out of the European Union with no agreement.” Indeed, yes, but we will discover that when the time comes. In the meantime, the Government must get on with their negotiation, and we can carry on scrutinising them on that. At the end, we want a statute. That statute—I think that this has been acknowledged by the Secretary of State—has got to come before we leave.

That then brings us to a critical issue in this debate. The best point made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State yesterday was that, whereas moving into transition is a qualified majority decision, getting an extension to article 50 requires unanimity. Therefore, the Government may be living with legitimate anxiety that there could be circumstances in which, running up to the wire, there could be difficulty implementing the whole thing by statute. I personally think that that seems inherently improbable, because, on the face of it, if our partners agree a deal with us, why would they then decide to pull the rug from under our feet in such an extraordinary fashion—I know that they talk about “perfidious Albion”, and we probably think that they are all garlic eaters—to tell us that we cannot have an extension to article 50 for the necessary two or three months to take through our statutory processes while they have to take their processes through the EU Parliament?

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[Mr Jenkin]

That brings me to my next point. This debate is rerunning many of the arguments during the referendum campaign. The remain case was premised on the idea that it is a horrible, cruel world out there, that we cannot survive outside the EU, that it will be completely disastrous and that unless the EU give us permission and lots of help and support and agree to a whole lot of stuff we would like, we will be on our own in the cold. You know what? It is not true. Most countries are not in the EU and they are fine. This debate sometimes loses sight of that.

I wish to speak in favour of clause 1 standing part of the Bill. I agree so much with my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood). This is the most important Bill since we joined—more important, in fact, because after 45 years of membership it is so much more significant than it was. The principle of democracy is that Parliament legislates and Ministers obey and implement the law. The problem with the EU is that it turned our Ministers into legislators. They go to Brussels, sit in council, legislate and then bring back fait accompli legislation that is then imposed on this House. The 1972 Act is the greatest Henry VIII clause that has ever existed, and there is something a bit inconsistent —I understand why they are saying it—in complaining about Parliament not being treated properly, given that the whole principle of our membership of the EU requires the removal of the House’s right to make the laws of this country.

[Chris Bryant]

I note that the hon. Gentleman just said that it was wholly inappropriate for Ministers to go to Brussels and bring back a fait accompli. In relation to the EU negotiations, would it not be wholly inappropriate, therefore, for Ministers to go to Brussels, bring back a fait accompli and not give Parliament a proper opportunity to say, “You know what? You’ve got this wrong. You’ve got to renegotiate.”?

[Mr Jenkin]

I completely agree with the hon. Gentleman. The House should have the right to accept or reject the deal, and it will—it will have the right to reject or accept the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill; but that will not change the decision to leave the EU. That decision has been taken.

I turn to the date of our exit. The referendum said leave. We were all told that we had to use article 50. Article 50 says on the tin that it takes two years maximum. The date is already fixed. There is no choice about the date. The date has to be in the Bill, otherwise we will weaken our negotiating position.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Leslie]

I was trying my best to offer a hand of friendship across the Chamber and to say, “Let’s meet halfway and find a way of forging a consensus.” If the right hon. Lady wishes, there are other amendments today that ask for the charter of fundamental rights to be kept. I will certainly be voting for those, but she obviously knows that I would like to find a way, in the spirit of compromise, of reaching a consensus. I agree that a report is only a small step in that direction—hence the drafting of new clause 16—but I am massively impressed by her strength of commitment to the protection of rights in our country.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

One of the differences between the charter of fundamental rights and the European convention on human rights lies in article 8 of the charter, which relates to the protection of personal data. Is it not a particular irony that the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union relied on precisely that provision to sue the British Government?

[Mr Leslie]

It is probably time to elaborate on that example, because the Secretary of State—for it is he—sued the then Home Secretary, who hon. Members will know is now Prime Minister, to challenge the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 as being inconsistent with EU law. The Secretary of State himself used the argument in court that the charter of fundamental rights needed to be prayed in aid in that case. By the way, he was successful at that point in time.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Monday 4th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Is there not a really important point that the Government seem to forget? When they are negotiating about a border, or no border, or about divergence from or convergence with a regulatory framework on the island of Ireland, they must speak to the First Minister of Wales as well, because the vast majority of the exports from Ireland into the rest of the European Union go through Wales. There is no point in coming up with a Bill that simply ignores the devolved Administrations.

[Jenny Chapman]

My hon. Friend is right to highlight the fact that the Government seem to have acted in a rather high-handed way with all the devolved Administrations on a matter that is so fundamental to the future of the citizens of this country.

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[Mr Jenkin]

I will not give way again. I have said everything I want to say.

My Committee is continuing its inquiry. If any right hon. or hon. Member wants to have their say, they can always submit evidence to our Committee.

[Chris Bryant]

On a point of order, Sir David. I am not sure whether you were in the Chamber earlier, but Mr Speaker made it clear when asked that the Prime Minister intended to make a statement to the House tomorrow about the negotiations and discussions she has been having with the DUP and Europe.

I gather that Downing Street is notifying the press, not this House, that there will be no such statement tomorrow and that the Prime Minister does not intend to make a statement. Is there any way you can make sure that Mr Speaker is aware of this and, for that matter, that Downing Street is fully aware that if we are taking back control—I thought that was the whole point—this House should be kept fully and appropriately informed of the negotiations at every stage?

[The Temporary Chair (Sir David Crausby)]

I will certainly pass on your remarks to Mr Speaker but, in the meantime, you have made your point to the House.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Leslie]

Indeed, and there are good arguments for having independent provision of many of these assessments. We might feel that many regulatory activities currently undertaken by EU agencies need to be undertaken by our regulators here in the UK, rather than being brought into a Government departmental function, to give them that further arm’s-length independent status. I want to talk about some aspects of that shortly.

I want to make reference, too, to the Procedure Committee’s set of amendments that the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) and others have tabled to try to deal with what could be thousands of negative statutory instruments—orders by Ministers that do not automatically come up for a vote in the House of Commons. I totally respect the work of the Procedure Committee, and it is important that it has gone through this process, but I do not believe that the proposed committee would be an adequate safeguard. I do not believe that it would fulfil the concept of what a sifting committee ought to be.

We need a Committee of the House that can look through the hundreds of statutory instruments that are currently not for debate and be able to pick them out and bring them forward for an affirmative decision. The Procedure Committee’s amendments would not quite do that; they would simply create a committee able to voice its opinion about the designation of an order as a negative statutory instrument. That could be overruled or ignored by Ministers. Indeed, if a Minister were to designate such a negative statutory instrument as urgent, it would not even need to be referred to that committee. That is a pretty low threshold, and a pretty weak concession.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Is it my hon. Friend’s understanding that the committee would have an automatic Conservative party majority, because of the changes to Standing Orders?

[Mr Leslie]

I am not sure whether such a provision exists. Perhaps members of the Procedure Committee will have a view on that. I certainly think that that would be unfortunate.

[Mr Leslie]

That is true, but it deserves to be debated today as well. If we are creating a committee, it is perfectly legitimate to argue that we need to know whether it will have teeth and exercise bite, or whether it will be reluctant to do so. The question that my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) asked about its composition is perfectly reasonable.

[Chris Bryant]

For that matter, the Procedure Committee has regularly suggested changes to Standing Orders that the Government have refused to move forward. I have seen the right hon. Member for Broxbourne more furious than anyone else in the Chamber because the Government have refused to act on that, so it is inadequate to suggest that Standing Orders might make arrangements in this regard.

[Mr Leslie]

My hon. Friend’s point is well made. Again, it goes to show that if we are to assert ourselves as the House of Commons and create a committee to deal with this flood of negative statutory instruments, that needs to be done in a way that has teeth. We will debate the Bill and kick it around and it will go to the House of Lords, but we need to ensure that it has teeth when it comes back.

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[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

As always, I am lost in admiration for the extraordinary eloquence of the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie). It is unfortunate that he has a tendency, as he exhibited on this occasion, to be so carried away by his eloquence as to take arguments that many Government Members also consider important and extend them to the point where they become definitely untrue. This diminishes the force of those arguments. I believe that the Bill is over-drafted—for some of the reasons that he adduced, to give the Government greater scope for dealing with a whole series of problems, in a way that the civil service often recommends to Ministers—but it is not the case that it offers the unconstrained powers that he was suggesting. His world is a world without a Supreme Court, and without judgments of the meaning of deficiency. He alleged that the meaning of “appropriate” was entirely obscure and then used it, by my count, five times himself. We all knew what he meant and so would a court. One does not need to go to the extents to which he was going to point out that the Bill requires some amelioration in respect of the secondary legislation powers, a point which many Members on both sides of the Committee made during an earlier debate. He could have rested with that, which would have taken rather fewer minutes.

I look forward to hearing from my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker), the Chairman of the Procedure Committee, because unlike the hon. Member for Nottingham East I think that amendment 393—if I remember the number correctly—is carefully judged. I think it probably will provide—[Interruption.] I apologise for getting the number wrong; I was referring to amendment 397. In any case, the Procedure Committee’s amendment seems to be the right way to tackle the question of triage, and it is well judged and well drafted. I hope that Ministers will tell us in their responses from the Dispatch Box that recommendations from the Procedure Committee will in this instance always be respected in the House. I do not think that we need to worry about a completely separate set of Ministers dealing with the recommendations, because the recommendations will be made in the coming months. We need a combination of that amendment plus an assurance from the Dispatch Box that the Procedure Committee’s recommendations will be observed, and I think we could rest on that.

[Chris Bryant]

I just worry about this whole business of relying on the Government saying that they will always go by a recommendation that comes from a Committee. Several times I have heard Ministers stand in the Chamber and say that if the Opposition demand a vote on the annulment of a Standing Order, there will always be one. However, over the past few years, there have on repeated occasions been no debates or votes, even when demanded by the Opposition and a large number of Government Members. It is almost sweet of the right hon. Gentleman to place such confidence in Ministers, but they are sometimes not to be trusted. We just put temptation in their way.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

The hon. Gentleman is a doughty defender of his party interest and of the House of Commons. On this occasion, if such an assurance is given from the Dispatch Box and if the advice of the committee is not followed, people on both sides of the House will cause a sufficient fuss to ensure that the House does have the opportunity to debate instruments under the affirmative procedure.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

One of the most striking moments of hyperbole was when the hon. Member for Nottingham East asserted that the situation would last for many years. He will of course know, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) points out, that the provisions are sunsetted.

[Chris Bryant]

Unfortunately, that is not true because the Government are able to change the Act by statutory instrument.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Except of course it is, because if the amendment is accepted, as the Government intend, the committee will be empowered to make a recommendation to have something debated by the affirmative procedure in the House should such an eventuality arise. In those circumstances, if we have an assurance from the Dispatch Box that something will be so debated, the hon. Gentleman and I will be able to join forces to prevent such a thing from happening. That is a genuine lock, and this debate depends on whether we want to engage in party political games or whether we want a serious approach to ensuring ministerial accountability. Amendment 397 is serious, and my hon. Friends and I are keen to ensure that its changes are made. I note that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) has also put his name to the amendment, which gives me great comfort that it is a serious effort to cure the problem.

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to address a deficiency in retained EU law arising from withdrawal. I listened carefully to the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the hon. Member for Worcester (Mr Walker), last week when he defended this wording as it related to schedule 2, on the grounds that to replace “appropriate” with “necessary” or “essential” would be unduly restrictive, could be interpreted by a court to mean logically essential and would therefore limit the discretion Ministers need in cases where two or more choices on how to correct retained EU law are available. But Ministers must accept that the subjectivity inherent in the choice of the word “appropriate” remains a concern across this House and they need to further elaborate, not only on why its use would not render the power in clause 7 open-ended, but on why the Government chose to use the phrase “where necessary” in their White Paper on the Bill, published in March—this is at paragraph 3.7. We need to know why that has changed and why Ministers now believe that “appropriate” and not “necessary” is the right language to use in the Bill.

[Chris Bryant]

We might think that the most extreme legislation that would be on the statute book allowed for emergency powers. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 makes it absolutely clear that, when Henry VIII powers are to be used, the Minister must explain why they are important, why they are necessary and that they have met an appropriate level of proper jurisdiction beforehand, but none of that is available in the Bill. Is it not therefore important that we have measures such as amendment 17, which adds to the clause?

[Matthew Pennycook]

Absolutely. My hon. Friend spoke powerfully about this matter on Second Reading, and he is right in saying that the scope of the powers in this Bill is not narrow, as some Conservative Members have argued; these powers are extraordinarily wide and unprecedented in the post-war period. I struggle to find other examples of Acts that have drawn their powers this wide.

Secondly, and perhaps more concerning, clause 7(1) will allow Ministers to make such regulations as they consider appropriate for the purpose of preventing, remedying or mitigating

“(a) any failure of retained EU law to operate effectively, or

(b) any other deficiency in retained EU law”

arising from exit. What is meant by the entirely subjective phrase “operate effectively” is left entirely open, a point rightly highlighted by amendment 15, which stands in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and others. What is meant by deficiencies is more precisely defined, but clause 7(2) still only provides a non-exhaustive set of examples of what is considered to fall within this category. As such, it leaves Ministers with considerable latitude in determining when retained EU law contains a deficiency. The explanatory notes to the Bill seek to reassure us that the power could not be used by a Minister just because he or she considered the law in question to be flawed prior to exit. Today’s Minister will no doubt repeat that it is not the Government’s intention to use this Bill to make major policy changes or to establish new frameworks in the UK beyond those which are necessary to ensure we have a functioning statute book on exit day. But in the absence of a definitive criteria of what constitutes a deficiency, or, indeed, restrictions on how deficiencies might be addressed in the Bill, there is still scope for the Executive to enact substantive changes to policies in areas that were previously underpinned by EU law, whether by lowering permissible air quality levels or modifying crucial employment protections.

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[John Redwood]

This debate is very important. As someone who wants this Parliament to take back control on behalf of the sovereign British people who voted in that way in the referendum, I can see that there is an irony in this debate. We hear that a number of Opposition Members are very worried that Ministers will have too much power as a result of this legislation, but by the very act of our having this debate, and in due course the votes, on how we should proceed, I think that we are demonstrating that, indeed, Parliament is taking back control. The purpose of these debates today and tomorrow and the subsequent votes will be for Parliament to set a very clear framework within which Ministers will have to operate.

We are, after all, debating how we translate a very large burden of existing European law into good United Kingdom law in order to ensure continuity and no change at the point when we exit the European Union. This is a task that unites people of all political persuasions, whether they were in favour of leave or remain, around the need for legal certainty. We all see the need to guarantee that all that good European law under which we currently live will still be there and effective after we have left.

We also agree something else: some of us do want to change some of those laws. I want to change the fishing law very substantially, because we could have a much better system for fishing in this country if we designed one for ourselves. We will probably need to amend our trade and customs laws, because as we become an advocate for and an architect of wider free trade agreements around the world, that is clearly going to necessitate changes, which we think will be positive. I think we all agree that where we want to change policy—to amend and improve—we should do so through primary legislation. As I understand it, Ministers have agreed with that. I am sure that this House is quite up to the task of guaranteeing that Ministers will indeed have to proceed in that way, so that we know that when they wish to change—amend, improve or even repeal—policy, they will need to come through the full process of asking for permission through primary legislation.

Today we are talking about the adjustments, many of which are technical, that need to be made to ensure the continuity of European law when it passes from European jurisdiction to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom Parliament and courts. Ministers will obviously play up the fact that they think most of these matters will be very technical, such as taking out the fact that the UK is a member of the European Union when we exit and rewriting the legislation to point out that we are no longer a member of the European Union, or decreasing the number of members states by one from the current number if they are referred to in the regulation. More difficult will be the substitution of a UK-based body for a European body to ensure proper enforcement. Many of us see that as largely technical, although there may be wider issues. This Parliament is now properly debating how much scrutiny that kind of thing would require.

We have three possible models to ensure parliamentary sovereignty over any of these processes. The weakest is the negative resolution procedure, whereby Ministers will have to make a proposal for technical changes to the law, and Parliament will have to object and force a vote if it wishes to. The middle model is the affirmative resolution statutory instrument, whereby Parliament will have a debate and a vote; Ministers would make a proposal and we would have a vote. In some cases, we might even conclude that we need primary legislation, as it appears we are deciding with the issue of animal welfare. In that case, we wish not only to transfer the European law but to ensure that it is better in British law, so that will need primary legislation.

Today we are debating how to determine which of those processes are appropriate for each of the different matters that arise. A lot of items will definitely be in the technical area of rather minor changes just to ensure that things work smoothly, which is what I thought the Government were trying to capture in clause 7. We have heard from Opposition Members who think that the clause goes too far and will allow the Government to elide matters from the category of technical changes to the category where there are more substantial changes going on, and still leave us with the negative resolution procedure. I am not as worried as some Opposition Members. The power under the clause is a two-year power only, so it is clearly related to the translation and transition period, which I find reassuring. There are also clear restrictions in clause 7(6) on Ministers changing taxes, inventing criminal offences and all those kinds of things, because they would obviously require primary legislation. We need to continue our debate on whether those two lists—the list of permissive powers and the list of restrictions—are the right lists.

[Chris Bryant]

I have been listening very carefully to the right hon. Gentleman. He is resting on the word “technical”, which he has used repeatedly, but that is not what the Bill says. If the Government had come forward with something saying that they will only be able to use secondary legislation in technical changes, we might have been interested in looking at it. But that is not what it says; it is a widely drawn list. The right hon. Gentleman may well have perfect confidence in the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the hon. Member for Chipping Wycombe. Sorry, he is the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker)—[Laughter.] Well, the constituency used to be Chipping Wycombe. The right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) might have confidence in this particular Minister, but it may one day be another Minister. I suspect that the right hon. Gentleman thinks that the Leader of the Opposition is a Marxist revolutionary in a Venezuelan style. Well, he might yet be a Minister who will be making precisely these decisions, and that is why we should always legislate with caution.

[John Redwood]

I am intrigued to hear that characterisation of the hon. Gentleman’s leader; it is not a phrase that I have ever used in this House. I find that very interesting, but I do not want to take the conversation into that party political realm.

We are trying to explore the proper constraints and controls to put on Ministers through this primary legislation, which will drive our democratic processes for this transfer of law. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response because I want reassurances—of the kind I think he will be able to give me—that this power is well meant and is designed to prevent Parliament from being clogged up with literally hundreds of rather minor drafting changes. Such minor changes are simple consequences of going from being a member to being a non-member that we do not need to worry about too much, so we need somebody to do them for us. The Bill says that Ministers are going to do it for us. Various Members are a bit sceptical about that for some surprising and interesting reasons, such as that we have just heard. There is also a suggestion, which has a lot to recommend it, that there be a sifting mechanism so that Parliament is involved in the process and can say to Ministers, “We do think this matter is a bit more than technical, so we cannot have the negative resolution procedure. This has to be a proper debate and a proper vote in order to preserve parliamentary process.”

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[Mr Charles Walker (Broxbourne) (Con)]

I certainly will bear that in mind, Dame Rosie, and thank you for calling me.

I rise to speak to my amendments 392 to 398. I am not going to read out each one for the benefit of colleagues, because all colleagues can read. The amendments have been covered by various colleagues, from both sides of the House, so I shall stick to discussing the broad principles, but I will of course be happy to answer any questions or criticisms that colleagues may have.

First, may I thank the Procedure Committee for its hard work in producing the report published on 6 November? It is worth pointing out to colleagues how well Select Committees perform in this place. We are obsessed—or all too often we give the impression that we are obsessed—with partisan politics. Of course when people tune in on Wednesday at midday, that is what they see in this place. Our report was agreed unanimously by 15 Members of Parliament, six of whom are Government Members and nine of whom are Opposition Members. It is important to get that on the record. Also important is the fact that we did not let the pursuit of perfection get in the way of sensible compromise.

I can understand that a number of colleagues here today are somewhat disappointed, or remain dissatisfied, with what the Government have brought forward, but, as we have heard from Opposition Front Benchers, Opposition Back Benchers, Government Front Benchers and Government Back Benchers, including my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), there is broad acceptance that these amendments are a very positive step forward. As Chair of the Committee, I of course endorse that view.

Let us not underestimate the powers that the sifting committee will have. A Select Committee is like water: it gets in everywhere and all too often into places where it is not welcome. So I am certain that with a good and strong chairman who is respected by both sides of the House, a committee comprising experts—committed parliamentarians—will do the right thing by this place.

[Chris Bryant]

The thing is that the hon. Gentleman’s Committee is chaired by a man who is respected by both sides of the House and much loved by many people in all parts of this House, yet his Committee has regularly produced reports that have been completely and utterly ignored by the Government. That is the problem: he is still asking us to trust the Government in the end.

[Mr Walker]

I count the hon. Gentleman as a great friend, and say to him that yes, all too often I have come to this place in a state of high dudgeon, deeply depressed by the performance of my Government’s Front-Bench team, but on this occasion I assure him that the Government have accepted amendments and tabled draft Standing Orders, which are available today for all colleagues to read, so progress has been made. I also remind the hon. Gentleman that the report had the support of every member of the Procedure Committee.

The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) expressed concern about what teeth the sifting committee would have. It is absolutely right that, as he identified, the committee would not be able to insist that the Government change a negative statutory instrument into an affirmative one, because if it could, the committee could just turn around and say, “Right, we want every single negative SI to be affirmative, and that’s the end of it. Be on your way and we’ll see you in a couple of years’ time.” I do not think that would be sensible.

The political cost to my Front-Bench colleagues of going against a sifting committee recommendation would be significant. The committee will have to give a reason why it is in disagreement, the Minister will be summoned to explain his or her Department’s position, and it will be flagged up on the Order Paper if a particular SI has not been agreed between the sifting committee and the Government. That will result in a significant political cost, because what we do most effectively of all in this place is to generate political cost. When a Government fail, or even, indeed, when an Opposition fail, there is a cost to their credibility and reputation. It is important to highlight that.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

I think that there is a big difference between us on the word “meaningful”. I shall be happy to give way to the Minister again, but I think that he should clarify the position, and confirm that the only vote that we will have before the ratification of the treaty is a vote on a motion.

We are talking about a “take it or leave it” deal, and about a “take it or leave it” vote on the completed deal. That is the only thing that is there, even in the written ministerial statement; and there is no guarantee in the legislation, by the way. The Minister is not proposing to put that on the face of the Bill. Even if we take the written ministerial statement in good faith, and even if we rip up our commitment to putting things on the face of the Bill, all that the Minister has given us is the possibility of a vote on a motion, not a vote on primary legislation before the ratification of the treaty.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I would not take any consolation from what the Minister has said. The formal process of ratification of a treaty, under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, is that the treaty is laid before the House by a Minister, and if the House has not annulled it within 21 days, it goes ahead. However, we can only have a vote on annulment if the Government allow it, and in recent years they have regularly chosen not to do so. It is perfectly possible, consistent with what the Minister has just said, that the only vote we would have—and this may be what he means by a meaningful vote—is the vote on annulment, which is a “take it or leave it”, completely meaningless vote.

[Yvette Cooper]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and that goes to the heart of this: in the end, the power is still concentrated in the Executive’s hands, whether it is the power to give us a vote on the treaty at all or the power over the timing of any of these votes. That is all still in the Government’s hands, with no reassurances in the Bill, and then there is still only this proposal simply to have a vote on a motion, not a vote on statute with all the scrutiny that brings.

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[Yvette Cooper]

I agree: it is hugely important that this vote has the proper status in Parliament, as well as our being able to debate the detail.

[Chris Bryant]

The point about a potential difference between the House of Lords and the House of Commons again makes me concerned that the Government are toying with only allowing a vote on an annulment motion, presumably tabled by the Opposition rather than the Government, on the original treaty, because then they would have sanction under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which determines what happens if there is a difference between the Lords and the Commons. So, again, I spy a rat.

[Yvette Cooper]

My hon. Friend is right, and that again shows the importance of having these commitments in the Bill, so that there can be no doubt and no possibility of the Government using clause 9 to start implementing an agreement on which there has been no meaningful vote.

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[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Speaking personally, I do not think there would be anything very brutal about the Government deciding on Report that it would be sensible to not have clause 9 in the Bill, given that there will now be a separate piece of legislation to achieve the same effect.

[Chris Bryant]

I hope that means the right hon. Gentleman is now calling on the Government not to move that clause 9 stand part of the Bill, and that, if they do not do that and instead insist that clause 9 does stand part of the Bill, he will vote against it. That is the obvious logic of what he is saying.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

It was with some regret that I gave way to the hon. Gentleman. I have never known him to take a position that was not partisan and slightly ludicrous, and that was a classic example. Here am I irenically trying to achieve a result that would be in the interests of the nation—good legislation that has the effect my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield agrees he is trying to achieve, but which would not have the disadvantage of enabling the Opposition Front Benchers, the right hon. Member for Leeds Central and others, including the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), to achieve the meaningful vote they want to achieve. But what does he want to do? He wants to create some trouble. Well, that is fine—that is what happens in Parliament. My suggestion, however, is not that the Government should be defeated tonight or engage in some huge reversal, but that they should make the sort of change they often make in Committee and on Report—there is, after all, much time to consider the issue on Report if necessary. I want them either to make an adjustment to clause 9 or remove it. That would overcome the difficulty without creating a platform for ending our withdrawal, which is I think the subterranean motive of many on the Opposition Benches—although not, I stress, of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield.

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[Mr Vaizey]

The hon. Lady is entirely correct because Austria is an anti-nuclear state, and there is some suspicion that some difficulties may emerge if the matter is not wrapped up before the Austrian presidency.

The amendment’s purpose is to provide parliamentary scrutiny of the important process of replicating the effect of a treaty that nobody wanted to leave. My challenge to Ministers is to engage with the amendment, and I look forward to hearing from the Dispatch Box whether the amendment is acceptable or whether they have an alternative way of providing the House with a strategy. On that note, after 14 minutes, I will sit down.

[Chris Bryant]

Sir David—for you are indeed beknighted—it is good to take part in this debate immediately after the right hon. Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey). However, I am slightly saddened that he was so disparaging of all the Opposition Members who have signed his amendment. If we are just cast aside with such casual, reckless, gay abandon, we are never going to do that again, are we?

The British way in parliamentary matters has always been that we govern by consent, not by Government fiat, so Parliament should never be conceived of by a Government as an inconvenience that has to be avoided if possible. Parliament should be seen as an essential part of how we carry the whole nation with us. The Government should have more strength in Parliament than they do if they try to circumvent Parliament.

Getting the process right, as several hon. Members have already said, is absolutely essential. We are going to be deciding what many assume will be a long-term settlement for this country for generations to come. We cannot simply try to go ahead with a railroaded version of that settlement that only carries 52% of the country, or perhaps even less by then—who knows?—because we will in the end undermine the very institutions that people have been trying to say should be sovereign. I say to the Government that no amount of jiggery-pokery will sort things out. At the end of the day, parliamentary shenanigans will do far more harm to this country’s political institutions than we should countenance.

The Government already have phenomenal power and—I have used this figure before, but it is true—this is the first time in our history that more than half of Government Members are now either Ministers, trade envoys or Parliamentary Private Secretaries and are beholden unto the Government in some way or other. We have more Ministers than Italy, France and Germany put together, so the Government’s hold on Parliament in our system is already phenomenal, yet they have introduced clause 9, which is truly exceptional. I have tabled several amendments, which I will not address because I do not think there is any great point. The honest truth is that I would prefer to see the whole clause out of the Bill.

The moment I saw clause 9, I thought, “If there is a real reason for this, surely by now the Government would have argued why they have to have these powers.” Now the Government say a Bill will be introduced on the agreement and its implementation. If there really is a need for those powers, clause 9 should be in that Bill and not in this Bill at all.

I love all four of the Ministers sitting on the Government Front Bench to death, and obviously the safest thing to do today is for one of them to stand up—they could stand up one after another, as in “Spartacus”—and say, “We will not support this. We will not urge the Committee to consider taking on this clause as part of the Bill, because we know we do not really need it.”

People might ask, “If the Government do not really need clause 9, why does it matter if the clause is in the Bill at all?” The problem is that every single Government in the history of the world have always used every power they have to the umpteenth degree. It is a temptation, and we should take temptation out of the Government’s hands if they are not prepared to take it out of their own hands. Let us bear in mind that the Bill will allow the Government to change the Parliament Acts and the Representation of the People Acts. [Interruption.] The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice is standing up! Oh, he’s not.

Admittedly, changes to the Parliament Acts and the Representation of the People Acts by secondary legislation would have to be made via the affirmative process and there would be a vote in both Houses.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Chris Bryant]

I will give way to the 16th century, but I cannot imagine for an instant how the hon. Gentleman could support such a change.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

As I have said, I have my doubts about parts of clause 9, but it says that a Minister of the Crown may, “by regulations,” do things

“for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement”.

It is hard to see how that could change the Representation of the People Acts. The hon. Gentleman slightly overstates his case.

[Chris Bryant]

The hon. Gentleman entices me down the road of one of my amendments. Previous legislation allowing Governments such extensive powers, such as the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, has made it clear that, when tabling statutory instruments, Governments have to argue the case for why those statutory instruments are necessary. In this case, the Government have not even added that provision to the Bill, which is what makes me suspicious.

A doubting Thomas is a good man, but he should follow through on his doubts. I hope that means the hon. Gentleman will be joining us in the Lobby tonight, although I have a sneaking suspicion the smile that just crept across his face indicates that he has no intention of doing so.

There has been much talk about what is a meaningful vote. I read theology at university. My theology professor, John Macquarrie, was a wonderful man who had a rather strange half-American, half-Scottish accent. He was asked by a student, “What is the meaning of God?” And he answered, “You should not ask me, ‘What is the meaning of God?’ You should ask me, ‘What is the meaning of meaning?’” That is the kind of existential debate we are having today.

What does it mean to have a meaningful vote? First, I would say that the vote cannot simply be on a fait accompli. It is not meaningful to vote on something after it has already happened and it has already been decided. It cannot just be a vote on a treaty because, as I have already tried to explain, the provisions on treaties in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 state that the Government do not have to provide for a vote on treaties, because it is not an affirmative process. They merely state that, if the House says within 21 sitting days that the treaty should not be agreed, the Government have to have another go, if they want to. That is a problematic process for us.

In addition, a treaty is unamendable. One thing everybody has been arguing in this debate is that we need to be able to send the Government back to negotiate again if we think the deal is not good enough. This cannot be simply be on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. That is what Hobson, the 17th century stable owner said: “You can either take the horse closest to the door or you will not take a horse at all.” It is like Henry Ford’s saying:

“Any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long as it is black.”

My fear is that the Prime Minister will want to be a stable owner trying to persuade everybody to take the horse closest to the door, and I do not believe that will be a meaningful vote.

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[Philip Davies (Shipley) (Con)]

Does the hon. Gentleman not concede that there was a meaningful vote on 23 June 2016, when people voted to leave the European Union? The problem with the amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) is that it could be, and no doubt is designed to be, used to try to overturn and frustrate that meaningful vote. [Interruption.] My right hon. and learned Friend laughs, but it is a shame he does not have the courage of his convictions to admit that that is what his game is. If people in this House use that amendment for those purposes, the backlash from the British public will be like none seen before, and he should beware of that consequence.

[Chris Bryant]

Plenty of Members have plenty of courage about their convictions and have demonstrated it effectively in recent weeks. I do not think the hon. Gentleman should be deriding others because they have chosen to take a different direction. I am not sure whether he has been here for the whole debate—he might have missed a few minutes or indeed most of the hours. He is right that I am a remainer and I would prefer the country to remain in the EU—I admit that openly—but my constituents voted to leave and the country voted to leave, and we are going to leave. But we have to make sure we take the whole country with us, and we will not do that by a parliamentary process that gives far too much power to the Government and does not allow for proper scrutiny in this House.

[Wera Hobhouse (Bath) (LD)]

Will the hon. Gentleman join me in my call to the Secretary of State, which I have made in this House, to set out a timetable whereby we understand what the process is and how he conceives the process of decision making being? That would give us all some certainty about when we would have that meaningful vote and whether we could amend things.

[Chris Bryant]

I would love to, but the truth is that the Government do not have the foggiest idea when anything is going to happen. They have suggested that something might be available in October 2018—perhaps it will, but perhaps it will not. This reminds me of the hymn we used to sing:

“God is working his purpose out, as year succeeds to year”

The Government are trying to work out what their purpose is, day by day, hour by hour. They have no idea at the moment, which is why we have to make sure we get the process right before we engage in it; otherwise there is a danger that we will be railroaded without making proper, good decisions.

[Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman said earlier that he was focused on getting the best possible process. Should we not be focused on getting the best possible deal in our negotiations? We know the EU does not want us to leave, so if he puts a process in place where the EU can simply knock a deal back to this Parliament, does that not give the EU the incentive to give us the worst possible deal, on the basis that we are more likely to reject it? We will simply have endless negotiations.

[Chris Bryant]

That is where we disagree. I believe that we will get the best possible deal only if we have the best possible process; the two go hand in hand. Indeed, if the Government introduced a Bill to implement an agreement and they started to lose votes on individual elements, they would probably then go back to Brussels and say, “You know what? I cannot get this through Parliament, so you’re going to have to give me a better deal.” At that point, I think that our colleagues and friends in other countries in Europe would improve the deal. I believe we would end up with a better deal.

[Sir Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

Oh yeah right!

[Chris Bryant]

I am glad that the right hon. aristocrat agrees with me.

[Mrs Anne Main (St Albans) (Con)]

I am listening to the hon. Gentleman’s argument with great interest, because I was waiting for the “or”. He has just asserted what would happen if we did not have a good deal, Parliament rejected it and the negotiators were sent back, but then what? If it is felt that the best deal has been offered, what is his fall-back procedure? We would leave with no deal whatsoever.

[Chris Bryant]

Obviously, if the Government cannot get their deal through Parliament, they may be in trouble. That is a certain truth. However, if the Government get nearly all their deal but key amendments are carried by the House—for instance, on immigration, the financial deal or the rights of EU citizens in this country or elsewhere—we could help to strengthen the Government’s arm, not weaken it at all. When I was Europe Minister, my experience was that when something was on the table in Brussels that I disagreed with and did not want to see implemented, the strongest argument I had with Brussels was, “I won’t be able to get that through the British Parliament.” If we have a system in which a deal does not have to go through the British Parliament in line-by-line detail, the Government will be weakened in the negotiating process.

[Anna Soubry]

Is not that the whole point about what happened last week? After what happened on the Monday, when things all fell apart and were ghastly, we saw an absolute desire and it was clear that everybody, including the EU, came together to make sure that our Prime Minister got a deal. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that when we talk to people, we hear that it is now absolutely clear that the leaders and all the various other people from the other EU countries accept that we are leaving? They have heavy hearts about it, but they know that we are leaving and it is now simply a question of sorting out the deal. Of course, it is not as simple as all that, but they have accepted that we are leaving. People really have to stop the conspiracy stories and the myths.

[Chris Bryant]

I agree. As I have said before, I also believe that there is a significant degree of agreement among all parties in this House, and probably in the House of Lords as well, about what the final agreement should look like. If the Government abandoned the strategy that they have so far adopted and decided to search for that consensus—“We’re going to try to get 650 MPs through the Division Lobby in favour of the final deal”—they would stand a better chance of getting the best deal for Parliament.

[Philip Davies]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

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[Chris Bryant]

I am sorry, but I am not going to give way to the hon. Gentleman.

[Philip Davies]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

No. The hon. Gentleman can point and hail as many cabs as he wants, but I am not going to give way to him again because others wish to speak.

All too often, the Government have urged us to accept clause 9 and the related measures on the basis of trust alone. As has already been said, it is just too difficult to see how we can put that trust in their hands. For a start, they have systematically ignored resolutions of the House over the past seven years; they have regularly refused to allow annulment debates on statutory instruments so that they could be meaningful—they have refused to do that even when they have guaranteed at the Dispatch Box that they were going to do so; and they have insisted on having majorities on all Committees. I fear that if we allow the Government to have excessive powers, they will tend to use every single one of those powers. The truth is that they seem to want a carte blanche.

I wish the Government welcomed the role of Parliament in this process, but I just do not detect that. The devil will be in the detail. The Government cannot just bamboozle the people with verbiage that has absolutely no meaning whatsoever: “Brexit means Brexit”, “a red, white and blue Brexit”, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”, and all the rest of it. It is a denigration of the English language, let alone anything else.

What we actually need is a Bill, with words in it that have legal effect, because, in the end, this is an existential matter for Parliament. Are we really a sovereign Parliament if we surrender our power to the Government? Not really. Are we really a representative democracy if MPs are denied a truly meaningful role in the process? Not really. Are we really a United Kingdom Parliament if we carry only 52% of the country with us? Not really.

[Dominic Raab]

It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), who made some very serious constitutional points with great colour and eloquence. I am grateful to hon. and right hon. Members who have contributed to this debate through their various amendments and speeches. My approach over the course of my speech—I suspect that it will take me an hour to get through it—will be to take clause 9 first, and then to come on to clauses 16 and 17 as well as schedule 7.

It may be helpful to hon. Members who want to intervene to know that I will first explain the function of clause 9 and why it is necessary, and then set out some of the illustrations that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook) suggested were required. I will come on to talk about the limits, and then I will address the amendments, including amendment 7, which was tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). The key issue will come down to timing, so I will also touch on that, but first, let me set the scene.

Clause 9 highlights the interaction between diplomacy at the international level and the domestic legislative preparation for Brexit. The Government are committed to securing the best deal that we can with our EU partners for the whole United Kingdom against the very acute time pressure set out under the article 50 process imposed on us.

Clause 9 enables regulations to be made for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement. It is now, as hon. Members have said, a supplementary provision to give us agility in the negotiations and the flexibility of legislative procedure to deliver the best deal under time pressure. The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union announced to this House on 13 November the Government’s intention to bring forward new primary legislation in the form of the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill to give effect to the major elements of the withdrawal agreement. That will include citizens’ rights, the implementation period, the financial settlement and the other issues wrapped up within the exit negotiations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

What I am saying is that my hon. Friend has had an assurance, given by me at the Dispatch Box, that I hope addresses his concern. If hon. Members want to come back on Report with further amendments, I will continue to give them proper consideration. I think all hon. Members who have dealt with me directly have found that I have been true to that commitment.

[Chris Bryant]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dominic Raab]

No, I am not going to give way again.

Amendment 47, tabled by the Chair of the Exiting the European Union Committee, is slightly different in that it would make the use of clause 9 dependent on approval of the withdrawal agreement by both Houses without specifying statute. Similar timing concerns apply. We would need to retain the option to ready statutory instruments before such approval, but I have made clear, and I make clear again, that they would not enter into force until Parliament had held its meaningful vote.

New clause 68 replicates the provisions of amendment 47, with the addition that the Government must seek the approval of Parliament no later than three months before the date of exit. We cannot bind ourselves to such strict sequencing constraints when the latter stages of the negotiations remain unknown. To do so, in fact, would be irresponsible. It is also a vague and arguably defective new clause, I say with the greatest respect, because it is not clear whether by the “conclusion” of the agreement the hon. Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies) means finalisation of the text, signature, ratification or entry into force. For those reasons, I hope hon. Members will not press their new clauses and amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

As I said earlier, clause 9 retains the residual necessity to provide us with agility in these negotiations. I think that I have given the assurances on substance that Conservative Members and, I believe, some Opposition Members wished to hear. If other Members want to table amendments on Report, I will of course continue the dialogue in which I have engaged all along.

[Chris Bryant]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dominic Raab]

I am going to make some progress, because I have been on my feet for some time.

[Chris Bryant]

rose—

[Dominic Raab]

I will not give way to the hon. Gentleman, because I have given way to him already. I am going to make some progress.

[Chris Bryant]

rose—

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

Order. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) knows better—and he also knows better than to raise his eyebrows because I have called for order. He does it often enough, and it is not his job.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dominic Raab]

I welcome the chance to reiterate what has already been said and what is already set out in the written ministerial statement: we will guarantee that there will be a meaningful vote in this House, and that none of statutory instruments introduced under clause 9 will enter into force until we have had that meaningful vote. That squarely addresses the substantive issue that my right hon. and learned Friend is getting at. He criticises me for dealing with all the other amendments, but it is only fair in the proper course of parliamentary proceedings to ensure that all amendments from all hon. Members are fairly addressed.

[Chris Bryant]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dominic Raab]

I will not. I am going to finish, because I have been at it for well over an hour and I want to make my final points and give other Members the opportunity to have their say.

Orders under clause 7 will designate Ministers so that they can exercise the power in section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 to implement EU obligations. Once the 1972 Act is repealed, designation orders will be redundant, so we need to be able to tidy up such laws on the statute book. Hon. Members will know that consequential provisions are a standard part of many pieces of legislation, even legislation of constitutional importance such as the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 or the devolution Acts. Equally, transitional provisions are a standard way of smoothing the application of a change in the UK statute book.

The Bill already includes the lengthy schedule 8, which contains consequential amendments, but some more may be needed, and it will take time for departmental experts to identify and correctly resolve others. For example, the Bill amends the definition of “enactment” in the Interpretation Act 1978, and Departments will need to review all the references to “enactment” across the whole statute book to identify any that need amending as a consequence of the Bill. That is not a novel use of a consequential power, because the definition of “enactment” was inserted into the 1978 Act by the Scotland Act 1998, and the consequential power in the 1998 Act was then used to amend other references as a consequence. The Government are therefore taking a normal power to make these and other important but technical consequential amendments as they are identified.

Hon. Members will know that transitional, transitory and saving provisions are standard ways to smooth the introduction of change to the statute book. As with clause 9, it is important that we can provide legal certainty to everyone in the UK, from businesses to individual citizens. For example, the Bill removes the UK from the direct jurisdiction of the Luxembourg Court, but the UK will remain a full member of the EU up until the very moment of exit. The power could therefore make specific provision for court cases still before a court on exit day. Again, schedule 8 introduces some of those measures, but Government will need some residual flexibility to ensure that we do not create uncertainty as we leave. I can reassure the Committee that the Government cannot abuse such powers. Case law and an array of legal authorities provide a very narrow scope for the exercise of the powers, which are necessary to ensure that we can enable a process of exit from the EU that promotes maximum certainty. I commend clauses 16 and 17 and schedule 7 to the Committee.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

No, I wish to conclude.

In those circumstances, there is an issue that I cannot ignore. As the House will have noticed this afternoon, a statement was sent by the Secretary of State that will become a written ministerial statement tomorrow. The first part of it deals with the position of the Speaker and, if I may put it like this, the piquancy of this is that having on the one hand said that an unamendable motion to note is an unamendable motion to note in a statute, the fact is that it really has absolutely no force at all. The reality is that it is part of the Standing Orders of this House, and it is not open to any interpretation in any court and, ultimately, it will be entirely your responsibility, Mr Speaker, to decide what can or should not be treated as a neutral terms motion. Actually, the statement highlights the fact that, although this debate has been about trying to provide assurance—not just in this House, but to many members of the public outside who are worried about the end of this process and what might happen—the truth is that the assurance does not lie in the words of the statute, except in so far as the statute is the word of the Government. The assurance lies in the hands of this House and, in the first part of the statement, in the power of the Speaker.

I then insisted that a second piece be put into the statement, which I will read out. If I may say so, this ought to be blindingly obvious, but it says:

“The Government recognises that it is open for Ministers and members of the House of Commons to table motions on and debate matters of concern and that, as is the convention, parliamentary time will be provided for this.”

If this House chooses to debate matters, including matters on which it may wish to have multiple motions, the reality is that if we wish to exert our power to do that, we can. In the circumstances that might follow a “no deal”, which would undoubtedly be one of the biggest political crises in modern British history, if the House wishes to speak with one voice, or indeed with multiple voices, the House has the power to do so.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

The bit I do not understand is that many motions have been carried by this House in the past few years—motions tabled by the Backbench Business Committee, by the Opposition and by ordinary Members—but the Government have just let them go through and then completely ignored them. The only thing that has legislative effect is legislation. That is why we must have a meaningful vote, not a pretend one.

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, the hon. Gentleman is right, but if the Government were to concede to the amendment, as drafted in the Lords, for an amendable motion, the House must understand that the Government could ignore it. I can assure the House that it would not be enforceable in any court of law—[Interruption.] No, that really must be understood. It could not be enforceable in any court of law, because that would entirely undermine the rights and privileges of this place. It would be for us to enforce it. Of course, the ultimate sanction that this House has is a motion of no confidence but, short of that, there are other means by which the House can in fact bring its clear view to bear on the Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

There is just one fundamental point that I would like to make about this debate, which is that the decision that was taken in the European Union Referendum Act 2015—by six to one in the primacy of this House of Commons and in the House of Lords, which endorsed it—was to accept that the people of this country, not 650 Members of Parliament, would make the decision in the referendum. I need say only one word about this: our constitutional arrangements in this country operate under a system of parliamentary government, not government by Parliament.

[Chris Bryant]

When I was training to be a priest in the Church of England, my professor of systematic theology was called John Macquarrie. He would say that he was often asked by parishioners, “What is the meaning of God?”, but that actually the far more important question is, “What is the meaning of meaning?” To be honest, it feels as though that is what this afternoon’s debate and last week’s debate have been about: what is a meaningful vote?

The first point is that a meaningful vote is surely not one that is meaningless. We had a meaningless vote on Monday afternoon after the SO24 debate. It was meaningless because we were voting on whether this House had considered the matter of the Sewel convention, and even if every single Member of the House had voted against that, we would none the less have considered the matter. This is exactly what we do with statutory instruments as well: we vote on whether we have considered the matter. The Government’s motion will require the Government—not allow them but require them—to table a neutral motion.

I disagree with the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg), who said that the vote in 1940 was on the Adjournment. It was not—it was on whether this House should adjourn for a successive number of days, and it was an amendable motion that would have had effect—

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

I will not give way to the hon. Gentleman if he does not mind. [Interruption.] Oh, all right.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I said that the vote was on the Whitsun recess, so I think that I covered that point.

[Chris Bryant]

But the hon. Gentleman managed to elide the fact that it was an amendable motion that had effect.

The point is that if the Government do what their motion says they should do—namely, table a neutral motion—the written ministerial statement gives the Speaker no power whatever to decide that it is not neutral. Indeed, if a Speaker were to decide that a neutral motion was suddenly, somehow or other, not neutral and could be amended, we should remove him from the Chair because he would not be abiding by the Standing Orders of this House. So let us make it absolutely clear: if it is a neutral motion, it will be a motion that has no meaning whatever.

[Anna Soubry]

I am concerned that the editor of the Daily Mail has made a small doll that looks like me and is sticking pins in its throat, as every time I want to speak, I get this wretched infection. However, I want to make some very important points.

I completely agree with all the arguments advanced by my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach). History will recall what a remarkably brave woman she has been throughout all of this. I, too, will vote for the amendment, because I agree with much of what has been said: this needs to be in statute. I pay real tribute to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who has yet again shown outstanding leadership and courage, as indeed have many Members of the House of Lords. It is in tribute to them, if nothing else, that I shall vote for this amendment. But primarily I shall vote for it because it is in the interests of all my constituents. I was elected to come here to represent all of them, including the 53% who did not vote for me, and the 48% who voted to remain, who have been sidelined and abused. The big mistake that we have made, from the outset of all that has followed from the referendum result, is that we have not included them.

Finally, I say gently to my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) that he has to remember that some hon. Members will vote with the Government today as an act of faith and trust in the Prime Minister that the sort of comment he made will no longer exist in this party, and that we will be more united. It is her role, if I may say so, to make sure that we have more temperate speeches.