Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Third sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateIan Byrne
Main Page: Ian Byrne (Labour - Liverpool West Derby)Department Debates - View all Ian Byrne's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(1 day, 7 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire North and Moray East for tabling amendments 18 to 20, which would require public officials and authorities to notify and provide information to any inquiry or investigation within 30 days. The Government agree entirely that public authorities and officials should provide assistance to inquiries and investigations as quickly as possible, and the Bill requires that. Clause 2(6) requires authorities and officials to act “expeditiously” when complying with the obligations placed on them. In some cases, it will be possible for officials and authorities to provide the assistance required within 30 days, but there may be times when it is not.
There will be situations where an inquiry or investigation requires an authority to provide a very large amount of information or data, requiring it to set staff and resources aside to search through potentially thousands of documents and assess their relevance, with all the necessary checks and verification that follow. We think it is important that authorities are given sufficient time to conduct thorough searches and provide accurate information, and that the inquiry or investigation will be best placed to set a reasonable timescale for that.
The duty would also apply to former officials who may have a different job or be retired—or have resigned, as we heard earlier—and there may be situations where it is impossible for them to provide the assistance required within a 30-day time limit. Although I totally agree with the sentiment, a degree of flexibility is therefore important so that we get all the information that inquiries and investigations need. I therefore urge the hon. Member not to press his amendments, but I agree to work with him on a way forward.
I now turn to clause 2. We heard powerfully from my hon. Friend the Member for Morecambe and Lunesdale and my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston exactly why the duty of candour in clause 2 is integral to the Bill. As has been rightly said, this is a Bill for the Hillsborough families, and it will be known colloquially as the Hillsborough law, but it is also a Bill for Ida, for the Grenfell families, for the Manchester Arena families and for anyone who has been wronged by the state.
Today, as well as this Committee, the Independent Office for Police Conduct report on Hillsborough is being published. Within that report, I think there is a recommendation that fully supports the Hillsborough law and says why, because there are officers there who would not have been. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston outlined, history would have been different if those officers had been held to account by clause 2 of the Bill.
I totally agree with my hon. Friend and that is exactly why the Bill is so important and integral. We have all heard the stories—the reality—of what the families, the bereaved and the survivors have been through. No one should ever have to go through that again. The intent behind clause 2 is to do just that: to ensure that no family has to go through the unimaginable again.
Clause 2 sets out the requirements of the duty of candour and assistance at inquiries and investigations; in short, what those under the duty need to do. As subsection (1) states:
“Public authorities and public officials must at all times act with candour, transparency and frankness in their dealings with inquiries and investigations.”
The duty has two stages to it. The first, in clause 2(3), is the requirement for public officials to come forward and make themselves known to an inquiry or investigation if they have reason to believe that their actions or information they hold might be relevant to it. The second, in clause 2(4), is to then provide any assistance that the inquiry or investigation requires.
Clause 2(4) lists the types of assistance that might involve—for example, drawing attention to information that is particularly significant and, for public authorities, to provide a position statement to an inquiry. The head of a public authority may be asked for information and assistance as an individual public official in their own right, where relevant, but subsection (5) places them under an additional obligation. When the authority that they manage is under the duty, they are personally required to take all reasonable steps to ensure that it complies. We believe that that is crucial to the success of the Bill and for the leaders of public authorities to feel personally accountable under the duty.
I rise to support amendment 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden (Yasmin Qureshi), and supported by several other hon. Members, both on the Committee and outside it.
The amendment would ensure that the Bill’s duty of candour and duty to assist apply automatically to independent panels and reviews established by a Minister of the Crown. It makes a simple and technical addition to schedule 1 and, as it has been accepted, is within the scope of the Bill and does not therefore extend it. Hon. Members know that I have a particular interest in independent panels, but the amendment simply seeks to apply the duty of candour and assistance to independent panels that Ministers can set up at any time if they so wish. It would be an anomaly for it not to be included, particularly given that independent panels are becoming a more common way of trying to get to the truth about somewhat complex events.
Hon. Members may be aware that my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden is chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Primodos. I, too, have constituents who have been affected by Primodos. I think there was a particular penchant in the north-west for prescribing it as an oral pregnancy test. It was not a drug or a treatment as such; it was a diagnostic test to see whether someone was pregnant. There seems to have been a lot of it prescribed in the north-west of England.
Since the 1960s and 1970s, there have been campaigns to try to find out whether—and, latterly, to try to get it accepted that—Primodos, an oral hormone pregnancy test, caused life-changing and devastating congenital abnormalities, stillbirths and miscarriages. I have constituents who have been affected, both those whose children are still alive and those whose children are not. The all-party group has been campaigning for many years, under my hon. Friend’s chairmanship, to get some resolution for those families.
The all-party group has conducted investigations. There have been failed legal actions against the manufacturers of Primodos. In 2017, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency expert working group gave rise to great hope that there might be a way forward for those affected, but that was a disappointment. In fact, I think that if my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden were moving this amendment, she would say that it was quite clear that key evidence was minimised or discarded, that families were excluded from those considerations and that the conclusions appeared to go further than the remit that the working group was given.
I know Marie Lyon; I have met her on a number of occasions because I have constituents who are affected. She runs the Association for Children Damaged by Hormone Pregnancy Tests, and she has been the mainstay of the campaign, which has been going on since 1978, to try and get some resolution for these matters. I am happy to support my hon. Friend’s thanks to her.
One thing that could assist those families in respect of Primodos is an independent panel, which would go much further than the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency expert working group, and which would collect documents and approach the issue from a transparency point of view. Given that the families’ attempted legal actions have not succeeded, that seems to me a likely next way forward. But the reality is that if the Bill comes into force and independent panels are not specifically included, those families may feel as though they are in a disadvantageous position. It is on that basis that I seek to move amendment 1.
I am happy to pick up both those points. On the first point, I will work with the hon. Lady to ensure that we find a way forward in terms of ensuring that there is no unintended gap and that we are not missing anything. A balance has to be struck between how far we go in the private sector before we are covering everybody with a duty of candour. However, we can find a way forward here.
That is a hugely important intervention. In Grenfell, many subcontractors did not fall under the scope. It is a real concern that we need to look at before Report to make sure that subcontractors are in scope. This is all about a change of culture. We need a change of culture within the building industry.
I agree. I am committed to working with hon. Members on a way forward.
On the point made by the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills about what happens if the head office is abroad, the Bill will provide the inquiry or investigation with the powers to obtain information from an individual wherever they are, even if they have retired, if they have resigned or if they now live abroad.
Tessa Munt
On the basis that we can all work together to make sure that we cover subcontractors, including the different tiers of subcontracting, I am happy to withdraw the amendment. I was going to press it to a vote, but the Minister has assured me that she will try to do something before Report and I recognise that we have support on both sides of the Committee. I thank the Minister very much indeed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Offence of failing to comply with duty
I beg to move amendment 54, in clause 5, page 5, line 18, after “objectives” insert:
“or are reckless as to whether it will do so,”.
This is simply a strengthening amendment that has come from the lawyers, and which I hope the Government will take on board. It is worth pointing out that we only have one shot at this. We need to ensure that there is no unfortunate language that perhaps does not allow the Bill to be as strong as we need it to be, so I hope the Government will accept the amendment.
The current wording in clause 5(1) sets the mental element of failing to discharge the duty as intent, and the mental elements of failing to provide the information in the duty as intent or recklessness—being cognisant of the risk and choosing to take it nevertheless. We feel, and I certainly feel, that this is a baseless distinction and an anomaly. The mental element should be the same, and the amendment would rectify that. It is simply a strengthening amendment to make sure that we shut any gaps.
I sincerely thank my hon. Friend for his amendment, which seeks to lower the mental standard threshold from intent to include recklessness for the purposes of the offence of failing to comply with the duty. Recklessness already applies to breaches of the obligations in clause 2(4) and (5), so the amendment would extend the application of recklessness to obligations in clause 2(3). As the Committee has heard, under clause 2(3), those whose acts or information may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation are obliged to make themselves known to the chair. We think there is uncertainty about what recklessness in this context would actually mean and therefore do not think it right for there to be uncertainty about the test for a criminal offence.
Conversely, it is straightforward and clear for the test to be that an individual or authority intends to impede the work of the inquiry or investigation by failing to make it known that they might be relevant. Once an individual or authority has received a compliance direction from the inquiry or investigation specifying the assistance that is required—the second stage of the duty—they will then know clearly what is required of them, so the test for the offence becomes either intention or recklessness. Recklessness in that context makes sense. I therefore urge my hon. Friend to withdraw the amendment, although I am happy to meet him to discuss these concerns.
Mr Morrison
On a point of order, Sir Roger. I am not sure whether this is the right time to ask, but on the amendment paper, amendment 34 is down as a Liberal Democrat amendment, but on the groupings that were sent across to us, it was down as an SNP amendment. I just wanted to clarify where we are with that.
Tessa Munt
Thank you, Sir Roger.
Amendment 33 would place a personal responsibility on the chief officer, or the chief executive of a public authority or corporate body with public responsibility under clause 4, for an offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour or assistance. What is needed is clear personal accountability on the chief officer or chief executive for any failure to comply. That ensures that senior leaders cannot avoid responsibility for breaches within their organisation, and reinforces the expectation that those at the top maintain a culture of openness and co-operation.
Amendments 44 and 45 go to the heart of what we are trying to do regarding the Hillsborough law, which is about command responsibility. It is about cultural change. I got the briefing note from the Minister, which I am very thankful for, which outlines where we feel the Government are now, but I think there is a debate among many of us about whether we feel that is strong enough. I just want to outline why I feel that, and why I feel that these amendments are worthy of consideration by the Minister.
The duty of candour and assistance applies to both public authorities and individuals. Where the duty falls on an authority, responsibility for compliance and enforcement measures must land on individuals; otherwise, those measures are basically rendered ineffective. The clause 5 and clause 11 offences require intent or recklessness, a concept that is difficult to apply to a legal—rather than natural—person. Where the criminal law has corporate offences, including proof of intent or recklessness, liability is established by attributing the mental state of directing minds to the corporation. That may be appropriate in some contexts, but here, proof of wrongdoing or failure leads only to liability on the authority and a fine paid by the taxpayer. I just do not feel that goes far enough.
The original 2017 Public Authority (Accountability) Bill dealt with that by making the chief officer or chief executive responsible for the discharge of the corporate duty. We feel that that is both fair and practical, as it places the responsibility on the person with the ability to ensure that authorities are properly led, and a high hurdle of intent or subjective recklessness ensures that he or she does not get prosecuted for inadvertence, or if he or she is misled by others. That also provides an effective deterrent.
I go back to the fact that we are looking at cultural change here; I feel that understanding that they would be responsible would sharpen their minds. Prosecution of a corporation just means that the taxpayer pays a fine, and we have seen that before, with a slap on the wrist and no cultural change.
Anneliese Midgley (Knowsley) (Lab)
I thank my hon. Friend for tabling these amendments. I remind the Committee that, on Second Reading, the Prime Minister said from the Dispatch Box:
“This Bill will tackle that injustice so that when tragedy strikes and the state is called to account, in inquiries, inquests and other investigations, public officials—from police officers to the highest offices in the land—will be subject to that duty. That means that an injustice like this can never again hide in some dark corner of the state. Failure to comply—failure, therefore, to act with candour, transparency and frankness—will now carry criminal penalties, including being sent to prison.”—[Official Report, 3 November 2025; Vol. 774, c. 655.]
I just wanted to add that to this debate.
I thank my hon. Friend for that, and she is absolutely right; a commitment was made not to weaken that. Clause 2(5) of the Bill imposes a duty on the chief officer or chief executive to “take all reasonable steps” to ensure corporate compliance, but that is not command responsibility—I think that is a really important point. It is far weaker, and I feel it will be ineffective. Command responsibility is straightforward and places the responsibility for the discharge of the corporate duty on the head of the body.
Mr Morrison
Does the hon. Member agree that, when someone is in that position of power over a public body, they have a huge responsibility, not just for the culture but for the training, the personnel, the HR practices and the policies? With that responsibility, someone needs to ensure that that goes throughout the whole of the organisation, and command responsibility focuses the mind to ensure that everything below them is working to clock.
I agree wholeheartedly. I cannot envisage a circumstance where clause 2(5) would be enforced. All reasonable steps could include deferring to the authority lawyers or senior leadership teams.
We have seen exactly this example in the Kerslake inquiry following the Manchester Arena attack, where the former chief constable of Greater Manchester provided a false narrative regarding the police response. At the subsequent public inquiry, he accepted he had made a grave error but still blamed the senior leadership team and lawyers. It is unlikely that he would have risked misleading said inquiry if he had command responsibility, which goes to the absolute heart of this legislation.
Section 3 extends clauses 5 and 11 offences to officers within authorities, such as managers who deal with particular investigations or statements, but only when they can be identified as the wrongdoers. It is a welcome provision, but it is only complementary to command responsibility. It would catch all those contemplating a cover-up lower down the authority, but it does not impose command responsibility on those at the top. We saw that with the evidence last week with regard to the NHS. Healthcare regulations have been pretty ineffective in this regard, partly because enforcement applies only to the organisations, and not the command. That lies right at the heart of the Bill.
Seamus Logan
The hon. Member is making an important point, but am I right in thinking that his motivation—and the motivation of many people in this area—is about getting to the truth, rather than punishing people?
Absolutely. Many of us here have experience trying to get to the truth. What we tried to do will be highlighted in the Independent Office for Police Conduct report. Unfortunately, the people who should have been punished will not be punished, but that is a story for another day, I suppose.
A fine on a public body, paid by the taxpayer, does not concentrate minds in the way that personal responsibility does. In a recent joint inquest into three self-inflicted deaths at HMP Lowdham Grange, the hearing was adjourned twice due to the Ministry of Justice’s failure to comply with directions for disclosure.
The coroner’s court ultimately took the unusual step of fining the Ministry of Justice because of that. That example shows that existing powers to fine organisations that fail to comply with directions of disclosure do not effectively address the persistent lack of candour, duty and transparency from public bodies. That is why I feel the amendment is so important, and I really hope the Minister takes it onboard.
I rise briefly to emphasise some of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby and urge the Minister to consider whether more can be done in that respect. The lesson of Hillsborough is that the organisations at fault set about using every pound they had available to defend themselves—and we will hear more in the IOPC report, to be published later today.
Those senior offices who made decisions to use the public money that they had in that way simply elongated and lengthened the amount of agony and pain. A corporate fine against an organisation may not be enough to deter that kind of behaviour, so I urge the Minister to consider what more might be done in terms of command responsibility.