Health Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Karin Smyth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th July 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Thank you. That is a matter of record. Any other takers? No.

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

Clause 58 is about the time period for compliance with NICE recommendations on health and social care provision. As we have heard, it will enable that period to be determined by NICE or the Secretary of State.

NICE’s technology appraisals and highly specialised technology guidance play a vital role in ensuring that patients in England can access treatments that are clinically effective and a good use of NHS resources. When NICE recommends a new treatment, the NHS is usually required to make funding available within three months. That means that patients can consistently benefit from innovative treatment.

That said, there are cases where the three-month timeframe is just not realistic. That might be because of affordability pressures or practical challenges such as a stretched workforce. In those situations, a longer implementation period is needed to ensure that complex new treatments can be introduced in a safe way that does not disrupt services for other patients. For example, the period for NICE’s guidance on the drug Paxlovid for the treatment of covid was extended to 12 months to allow time for the NHS to put the necessary routine testing systems in place and train healthcare professionals.

I do not think the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham raised this issue, but the opposite is sometimes true, and the NHS issues guidance that provides swifter access to medicines and medical treatments. For example, cancer medicines can be funded from the point of a positive draft recommendation. At present, NHS England decides whether a NICE treatment is funded more quickly or in a shorter timeframe, while NICE determines whether the funding period should be extended, typically following a proposal from NHS England. The abolition of NHS England means that those roles and responsibilities will need to be reconsidered. The clause provides flexibility for the final decision on funding timelines to sit with either NICE or the Secretary of State, but it will not mandate which.

To the point raised by the hon. Member for North Shropshire, the Government intend to set out further details of these arrangements in regulations using the enabling power granted by this Bill. Importantly, the clause will not reduce NICE’s independent role in assessing the clinical and cost effectiveness of new treatments, nor will it weaken the NHS’s obligation to provide timely treatment. Instead, it will ensure that decisions on funding timelines remain flexible and sustainable, and that the system is equipped to respond effectively to future pressures.

I will now speak to amendment 78, which was moved by the hon. Member for North Shropshire. I recognise the vital role that NICE guidelines play in improving quality and consistency of care across the NHS. NICE’s guidance is developed by experts on the basis of rigorous assessment of the available evidence and provides an important benchmark for best practice, including for patients with myalgic encephalomyelitis. I know that the hon. Member intends to withdraw the amendment, but if she were to press it, the Government would not accept it.

To be clear—again, partly to the point of the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham—it is a long-standing and deliberate position that NICE guidance is not mandatory, which reflects the role it plays in supporting patient care. Crucially, guidelines do not override the professional judgment of clinicians, and it is essential that clinicians retain the flexibility to determine the most appropriate course of treatment for individual patients based on their specific circumstances. It is also important to recognise that NICE guidelines are often complex frameworks for care that must be adapted to local service configurations and patient need. Requiring full compliance with the NICE guideline would remove the ability of local service providers to ensure that ME services are appropriate to the needs of their local populations.

The hon. Member for North Shropshire made some important points about treatment of ME over the years, and many of us have encountered constituents with similar stories. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon for his work supporting constituents with the condition. To be clear, the Department fully recognises the need for more consistent implementation of the NICE guidelines on ME. That is why we are already taking forward practical measures. In particular, the Department and NHS England are developing a service template specification, aligned to NICE’s guidelines, to support commissioners and providers in delivering appropriate services for people with ME. We will continue to work with stakeholders, the industry and the NHS in doing that.

Those steps will help to drive improvement in care without undermining clinical judgment or imposing inflexible statutory requirements. With that, I commend clause 58 to the Committee.

[Helen Morgan]

I thank the Minister for her words, particularly on amendment 78. As I said, I will not press the amendment to a vote, but I hope that the Minister will continue to bear in mind that provision for people with ME is extremely patchy and that a number of our constituents are suffering in the long term. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Transfer of HSSIB’s functions to CQC

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 55, in schedule 8, page 110, line 23, at end insert—

“(10) If the Secretary of State certifies that it is in the interests of national security that the powers conferred by subsection (1)—

(a) should not be exercisable in relation to certain premises in which there is a Crown interest, or

(b) should not be exercisable in relation to certain specified premises for other purposes,

those powers are not exercisable in relation to those specified premises.

(7) In this section, ‘Crown interest’ means—

(a) an interest belonging to a government department or held in trust for His Majesty for the purposes of a government department;

(b) an interest belonging to His Majesty in right of the Crown;

(c) an interest belonging to His Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster;

(d) an interest belonging to the Duchy of Cornwall.”

This amendment makes provision for the Secretary of State to disapply investigation powers under subsection 51J(1) to the Health and Social Care Act 2008, inserted by Schedule 8 of this Bill.

Amendment 56, in schedule 8, page 116, line 8, leave out subsection (9).

This amendment would allow the Commission to recoup charges in excess of the costs incurred in providing assistance.

Amendment 5, in schedule 8, page 120, line 16, at end insert—

“(2A) After paragraph 6(8) insert—

‘(9) A committee of the Commission is to be appointed in accordance with regulations.

(10) The purpose of the committee is to oversee the health services safety investigation functions formerly conducted by HSSIB, transferred to the Care Quality Commission under the Health Act 2026.

(11) The committee is to be operationally independent from the Care Quality Commission.

(12) The committee is to consist of a chair appointed by the Secretary of State, and not less than six and not more than twelve other members appointed by the chair.

(13) A majority of the members of the committee must not be members of the Care Quality Commission.

(14) So far as is reasonably practicable, the persons appointed to the committee must include persons with knowledge or experience relevant to the discharge of functions under this paragraph.’”

This amendment would ensure that oversight of HSSIB’s functions would remain operationally independent of the Care Quality Commission (CQC) following the transfer of its functions to the CQC.

Schedule 8.

Clauses 60 and 61 stand part.

New clause 42—Funding for Care Quality Commission (CQC) investigations—

“The Secretary of State has a duty to make provision for adequate funding and resources for patient safety investigations conducted by the CQC, including some initiated by the CQC themselves.”

[Karin Smyth]

Clause 59 provides for the abolition of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body and the transfer of its functions to the Care Quality Commission.

Under the new arrangements, the Care Quality Commission will assume responsibility for carrying out investigations into incidents that have or may have implications for patient safety. It is really important to stress that the core purpose of that function remains unchanged: to identify systemic risks, support learning and drive improvements in the safety of health services, rather than determine blame or liability. It is a central measure in strengthening the framework for patient safety investigations and ensuring a more coherent and effective system for learning from incidents across health services.

With more than 70 types of channels or organisations through which patients or users can share feedback, the current landscape has led to fragmentation between investigation, regulation and improvement activity, thereby diluting the impact that insights from investigations might otherwise achieve. HSSIB has been isolated, undermining its efficacy. We will bring HSSIB into the mainstream as a core but distinct part of the CQC. That will enable HSSIB to use its functions more strategically, working in partnership with the national quality board. Clause 59 achieves that by conferring responsibility for those investigatory functions on to the Care Quality Commission through the provisions set out in schedule 8. In doing so, it embeds a comprehensive investigatory framework with an established statutory regulator.

The CQC will be one organisation with separate functions—a regulatory function and an investigative function—to preserve the integrity of each. Within the CQC, HSSIB will continue to operate as a discrete unit and retain its independence from providers, allowing it to identify learnings and take a no-blame approach.

[Janet Daby (Lewisham East) (Lab)]

The Minister will recall that in evidence, Dr Rosie Benneyworth, interim chief executive officer of HSSIB, spoke about the vital work of the organisation, especially with regard to investigations where vulnerable staff and workers do not feel confident about coming forward for fear of reprisal. HSSIB did great work in that area, and I am wondering whether the CQC will carry it on and take on board that learning.

[Karin Smyth]

I thank my hon. Friend for that point. I have met HSSIB and others on this issue, and it is a concern that staff are fearful of speaking up. That is obviously unacceptable, but we understand that it happens. That is absolutely the culture that we need to drive out, and we need to ensure that HSSIB’s learning about making sure there is a safe space to speak out, which I will come on to, is a core part of future work.

[Dr Peter Prinsley (Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket) (Lab)]

What we are talking about is not so much the safety of staff when they come forward, but the safety of patients, and whether we genuinely believe that the proposed modification to the arrangement will improve patient safety. That is the underlying point. Although the safety of staff is important, it is the safety of patients that we must bear in mind.

[Karin Smyth]

Of course, patient safety is what we need to get right. I will come on to that point, but there is a lot to get through with this clause. We can see its importance from the number of organisations and channels that exist. I have said that before, and I am sure we have all struggled as constituency MPs to support our constituents—either patients or staff—through the system and to understand the best route forward on patient safety. We all have the same aim, and we should be clear that the issue is how best to achieve that aim. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The test is about impact, learning and making the system and the culture change.

My hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East asked me about confidence, and the fear that staff sometimes have about speaking up, which is obviously an important part of that landscape. We want to make sure that we take forward the learning on both those points into the new body.

The new framework ensures that the essential characteristics of safety investigations are preserved. The commission will have a flexible power to investigate qualifying incidents that have or may have implications for patient safety, with a clear statutory purpose of identifying risks and improving systems and practices. We are maintaining the principle of safe space and introducing strong safeguards in the process, so that staff and the public can trust that they can speak of their experiences openly, without fear or favour, to provide learnings for the system.

We have included protections for safe space materials and restrictions on disclosure, including within the regulatory functions of the CQC, and limits on the use of reports in legal proceedings. That is designed to support openness and candour, and to provide confidence in the impartiality and independence of patient safety investigations. There are clear mechanisms for transparency and accountability, including the publication of reports, requirements to respond to recommendations, and oversight through a statutory review of the commission’s investigatory functions.

Clause 59 also provides the commission with the necessary powers to carry out investigations effectively, including powers to require information, enter premises and co-ordinate with other bodies while maintaining appropriate protections such as legal privilege and safeguards against self-incrimination. Although the commission will decide which incidents to investigate, the clause preserves a power for the Secretary of State to direct it to investigate a specific qualifying incident or category of incidents. That ensures that where issues of significant public concern arise, or where urgent scrutiny is needed or there is particular risk, there is a clear mechanism to ensure that issues are investigated.

The struggles of the Care Quality Commission have been well documented. We will only commence these provisions when we are satisfied that the CQC has improved. The CQC has been supported and held to account to recover its effectiveness, and we will continue to support it and work closely with the newly appointed chair on its journey to rebuild. We will work closely with the CQC to ensure its readiness to receive the investigations functions from the Health Services Safety Investigations Body. Maintaining a centre of excellence for investigations will be integral to the CQC’s culture. Without the clause, the opportunity to deliver the ambitions of the 10-year health plan would not be realised, nor would the broader patient safety landscape, as set out in the Dash review, be fully addressed. It is therefore a necessary and integral reform.

Clause 60 makes provision for the transfer of property rights and liabilities from the Health Services Safety Investigations Body to the Care Quality Commission in connection with the abolition of the former and the assumption of its functions by the latter. It is a key technical provision to ensure an orderly and legally complete transition between the two bodies. Where functions are transferred between public bodies, it is essential that all associated assets, obligations and legal arrangements are also transferred in a way that ensures continuity and legal certainty. The clause provides the statutory mechanism to achieve that.

The clause provides a flexible framework to enable the continuation of HSSIB’s actions and ongoing matters, including legal proceedings, and ensures that references to HSSIB in existing documents are treated as references to the Care Quality Commission to avoid legal uncertainty. The clause provides for staff protections equivalent to TUPE and allows for shared ownership or use of property where needed, supporting a smooth and effective transition.

The overall effect of the clause is to enable a smooth, comprehensive and legally robust transfer of HSSIB’s property rights and liabilities to the Care Quality Commission, ensuring continuity of function and avoiding disruption to ongoing operations. Without the provision, there would be risk of legal uncertainty and operational disruption during the transfer process.

Clause 61 is a necessary and practical provision. At its core, it provides a power through regulations for His Majesty’s Treasury to ensure that transfers made from HSSIB to the CQC are delivered smoothly and on a tax-neutral basis. Like the equivalent provision for the NHS England transfer in clause 3, it allows the Treasury, by regulations, to vary the way in which relevant tax legislation applies in relation to anything transferred under a transfer scheme or anything done in connection with such a transfer. That will ensure that the tax consequences of the transfer can be properly aligned with the policy intention of a smooth and orderly transition.

Importantly, the scope of the clause is limited to specified “relevant taxes”, including income tax, corporation tax, capital gains tax, VAT, stamp duty and stamp duty reserve tax. As with clause 3, without this power there is a risk that the transfers could trigger unintended tax liabilities that would divert public money away from frontline services and undermine the policy intent of the legislation. Clause 61 therefore protects value for money and ensures that organisational change does not come with avoidable fiscal cost.

Clauses 59 to 61 and schedule 8 are necessary to strengthen the framework for patient safety investigations and ensure a more coherent and, crucially, effective system for learning from incidents across health services to make all our constituents and patients safer. I therefore commend them to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

These clauses are about patient safety. As has been pointed out this morning, patient safety is the absolute key here: that is well recognised across the House, among the public and across the national health service. Before going any further, I declare an interest as a patient of the NHS, a member of the British Medical Association, a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health and a consultant paediatrician.

When I was interviewed in 2012 for my current consultant role, I was asked to deliver a presentation about how I could demonstrate to the trust board that the paediatric services in the hospital were safe. The first question I posed—Members will be pleased to know that I will not go through the whole presentation—was: “What is safe?” Are football stadiums safe? Is the London underground safe? Are aeroplanes safe? Broadly, yes, I think we would say they are safe, but they have not been without incident or safety issues.

Healthcare is similar. It involves millions of people, clinical judgment, human decision making and huge variability in the way that patients can present with different symptoms for different problems at different times. Is healthcare safe? Yes, it is safe. Again, however, we know from the many reports we have read that there is a long way to go to make it better and we need to prepare for that. We need to make sure that we design out room for error—that we design processes that limit the opportunities for error—use technology to limit the risk of error, and train people in a way that reduces the risk of error.

One of the key factors in that work is accepting that where there is human decision making, mistakes can happen, and that we need to identify and learn from those mistakes. One of the main ways of doing that is striking a balance between accountability and blame. If there is insufficient accountability, there can be an unclear escalation process, such that people do not know who to go to when they identify a problem. There can be a careless culture, which can develop in places where there is not enough accountability. However, if there is too much focus on fault and determining whose fault something is, we can get a blame culture. That can lead to a failure for people to come forward and therefore to a failure to learn from mistakes. It can lead to a culture of cover-up, whereby people try to avoid getting either themselves or their colleagues into trouble.

That is where HSSIB comes in because, like the air accidents investigation branch and the similar bodies for rail and shipping, it provides a safe space. That safe space is important in ensuring that people can speak up freely without fear, and know that we can get to the bottom of a problem and understand why and how something went wrong, because that is how we fix it.

At the time that HSSIB was established, there was consensus about it. The General Medical Council said:

“We support the creation of a ‘safe space’ approach to investigation. This is consistent with our guidance to doctors about their responsibilities to learn from mistakes and reflect on their practice, and their duty to take part in systems of quality assurance and quality improvement to promote patient safety.”

The British Medical Association told Parliament:

“We welcome the establishment of the HSSIB…Doctors must feel able to report errors and reflect on their own mistakes openly, without the fear of these reflections being used against them at a later stage. Only then can true improvements to patient safety be made.”

Similarly, NHS Providers told Parliament:

“NHS Providers welcomes the creation of the HSSIB as an opportunity to develop a just culture in the NHS and a focus on learning…For the HSSIB to succeed in contributing to improved patient safety, any investigations associated with it must be carried out independently and without conflict of interest, and be perceived as such.”

Indeed, the Minister for Secondary Care herself is on the record as having said:

“HSSIB is a really important new body…It must absolutely be built on the highest standards of trust when it comes to the wider system and the general public.”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2021; c. 564-565.]

I think that I have demonstrated that the creation of HSSIB was a matter of consensus and it was confirmed that it was the right thing to do.

In order to work, HSSIB needed to be independent and without conflict of interest. NHS staff backed it, the providers backed it, the patients backed it and even the Minister backed it. That is what makes the Government’s plans for HSSIB so perplexing. I am not aware of a single royal college or union that supports folding it into the CQC.

Essentially, Ministers have said that this is being done because of the Dash review. “The Dash review says so,” they argue, “so that’s what we’re going to do.” I have huge respect for people who say, “I’ve asked for some experts’ advice, and they have given it, and therefore I should follow it.” However, Ministers also commissioned the report by Lord Darzi, which said that

“a top-down reorganisation of NHS England and integrated care boards is neither necessary nor desirable”,

and yet here we are, doing exactly that. It is perfectly possible for Ministers to take one report as gospel and another as guidance. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain that.

The other reason given for this measure is that it will declutter the landscape, yet few people outside Government seem to think that HSSIB is responsible for cluttering the landscape. For example, the Health Foundation wrote in its submission that

“the government needs to do more to explain how the abolition of HSSIB and transfer of its functions to CQC will meet its aim of reducing complexity and, most importantly, maintain the essential focus on improving patient safety.”

Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Karin Smyth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th July 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Peter Prinsley (Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.

The question is what will make patients more safe. Does incorporating the department that looks at safety into the organisation that inspects the services help? It might. Safety is not an add-on; safety must be at the heart of absolutely everything that we do. Safety is not a separate matter; it depends on those who work in our NHS and all of us all the time. That must be the culture. Let us not rely so much on inspections and litigations. At a time when we are unable to find jobs for newly qualified midwives, we spend more on obstetric litigation and compensation than we spend on obstetrics. I applaud what our Government are trying to do and their intention to improve things.

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. This morning, we had really good and detailed exchanges about patient safety and learning the role of HSSIB.

Often politics is confrontational and divisive, but I want to be clear that I take at face value that every single Member who has spoken and who I have met with, including people who do not want to see this change, have the best of intentions. They want to understand patient safety—in the long term we can talk about safety and quality of service, but let us focus on the safety aspects here—and they are trying to navigate something. They are seeing a change, which is always difficult, and we need to ensure we get that right. It is absolutely right that we do that in Committee, on Report and in the House of Lords. We will continue to take note of all the points made and seek to address them. I fortunately had the lunch break to reflect and do that a bit more carefully.

For people here and those reading our deliberations, what is difficult about the Bill—we understand this as legislators—is that we are abolishing an organisation and moving functions. That stands within a wider framework of changes to the safety and quality landscape that the Government are seeking. When one focuses on things that are being abolished, it is very binary. I will try and locate some of that without veering too far from the matter in front of us.

Among all the discussions, there are a couple of key questions that I want to address, including why I do this. Through the passage of the Bill, many people in the wider landscape have said to me, “Why are you bothering having a row about this?” I find that quite shocking as a riposte, because the answer is simple in the context. It is too important to not attempt to get this right and make changes to something that clearly is not working. I do not think I have heard anybody say that the current system is working.

As the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston noted, I said during the passage of the Health and Care Act 2022 that the functions of HSSIB are really important and must be built to the highest standard. I absolutely stand by that. It is not working; that is why we are changing it, but also why we are preserving the function within a new system, which we will seek to improve.

[Joe Robertson]

Will the Minister give way?

[Karin Smyth]

I am going to try to go through these points because I have listened carefully to everybody’s contributions. If there is something outstanding, I will be happy to come back to it.

To answer some of the direct questions that were put to me about the Dash review, I do not recall anybody particularly disagreeing with its findings when it was published or when we put it forward in our 10-year plan last year. I do not expect everyone to agree with every single recommendation or point made in that review. To an earlier point that was made by the Opposition, it was informed by a broad range of evidence and perspectives from across the health and social care system, including engagement with commissioners, providers, patients, families, and people harmed by poor-quality care, as well as charities, academics and national organisations. It looked really closely at what has not worked and why. I encourage hon. Members to go back to the work that Penny Dash was asked to do and the wider report.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon and the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston asked why the review covered only six organisations. The then Secretary of State authorised the Dash review to look at six organisations in this space that were directly overseen by the Department. Many other organisations in this space are not directly overseen by the Department, so they were not in scope of that review as they had their own regulatory landscape ecologies and so on. That is why those six organisations, which we oversee, were looked at.

Last night at the Dispatch Box, the Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill), made it clear that the rationale for this change is not based on cost. It is not based on the recommendations being too expensive. Rather, as I am sure colleagues will agree, we have seen far too many recommendations regarding patient safety but too little action. Inaction is not helping to improve the patient landscape.

Opposition Members referenced the view from the longest-serving Health Secretary, the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt), that the NHS will not change or adopt the recommendations. That is a profoundly depressing prospect. We cannot predicate our laws and the health landscape on the basis that the culture in the NHS cannot and will not change. This is not a party-political point, but because of what has happened in the last decade, we must move from a defensive culture into a culture of learning while keeping a safe space in which people can speak up. We have heard a lot about “perception” today. I accept that there is a perception of negativity that is damaging to patient safety and people speaking up, but that is what our wider reforms are seeking to address.

[Dr Prinsley]

I listened carefully to what the Minister said about a change of culture. A change of culture can certainly happen. In the surgical world, we used to bring patients into the operating theatre, check that the patient was on the operating table and do the operation. Sometimes, we operated on the wrong patient and on the wrong part of the body. We then introduced the World Health Organisation checklist, which checked absolutely everything before we started. It was a complete change of culture in the operating department. We made sure that we had the right prosthesis, the right patient and that we were operating on the right part of the patient. Now, the WHO checklist is a universally adopted process. I am absolutely sure that the culture in the health service can change.

[Karin Smyth]

I thank my hon. Friend for that. He and others on both sides of the House with clinical experience, including the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, have shared live examples that can shock the layperson. It is important that those practices are changed clinically, and it is up to Government to make sure that the overarching legislative framework enables that.

[Dr Johnson]

Will the Minister give way?

[Karin Smyth]

I want to make some points first. I will pick up any outstanding points I do not cover.

The abolition of HSSIB and the transfer of its functions to CQC is being done to strengthen the link between patient safety investigations and the action being taken on the frontline to simplify the patient safety landscape. We want to align the recommendations with action.

Hon. Members quoted evidence that Dr Dash gave to the Committee. Let me remind the Committee of something else she told us, about how HSSIB’s functions can be better aligned as part of the CQC. She said:

“by bringing HSSIB into the CQC, you can align the work of the two.

For example, if the CQC is going round the country and spotting a particular problem with the way in which anaesthesia is being given or with managing patients post-surgery, the CQC could then say to HSSIB—that team of people with specific expertise—‘Can you go in and take a look at this? Can you do a detailed focus review of this particular area of care that we are spotting through our visits and which seem to be a particular challenge?’ It is that bit about enabling the CQC to identify a problem and then asking HSSIB to review it in detail, and HSSIB bringing its expertise in investigations into the CQC to enable the CQC to go deeper and then come back to the NHS”.––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 7, Q8.]

to enable best action. These organisations can learn better from each other.

Transferring investigation powers to the Care Quality Commission is an opportunity to strengthen the CQC. We have to move away from a defensive culture to a culture of shared learning if we are to improve patient care. The CQC can learn and improve from HSSIB best practice and take a more holistic approach to patient safety. Those executing the regulatory and investigatory functions can learn from each other and exchange skills, which would strengthen the links between learning, oversight and improvement, leading to real and sustained change across the system, driven by the CQC.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)]

On that point, will the Minister briefly give way?

[Karin Smyth]

No.

There will be no barrier to investigating whether CQC inspections are causing unintended harm. If they are, and the investigator feels that a recommendation for change should be made, they will make it. The insight gained from investigations will continue to inform recommendations concerning the CQC’s regulatory functions, and the Bill allows for the investigation function to make recommendations to the CQC in its report. The CQC would be legally required to respond to such recommendations. There will be no need for litigation through the courts. That is an important point. Again, I am addressing the points made by Opposition Members. We will continue to set this out more clearly for Members. I am happy to find different ways to do that.

I now turn to the wider point about whether both an investigatory and a regulatory function can reside in the same body. Many organisations have different functions and responsibilities that they have to discharge simultaneously; we have also heard a lot about the safety body, which of course is part of the Department for Transport. It happens across a lot of bodies. I totally accept that it would be helpful for the debate if we were clearer on what some of those bodies are, and we will come forward with more information on that.

[Joe Robertson]

Will the Minister give way?

[Karin Smyth]

I am going to persist on some of these arguments. I think I have addressed all the points made by the Opposition. It is the job of effective leadership to manage those interests and responsibilities, and that is what we expect of the CQC’s leadership.

I will now turn to the amendments on this topic, which I thank the hon. Members for Sleaford and North Hykeham and for North Shropshire for tabling. Amendment 55 would make provision for the Secretary of State to disapply investigation powers in certain circumstances. I recognise the importance of ensuring that investigatory powers are not exercised in relation to sensitive Crown or Government premises where there is a national security interest. I want to be clear: the Bill already provides for that.

The Bill already amends section 96 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 so that it applies to the new CQC investigatory function. Section 96 makes provision for the application of CQC legislation to the Crown, which means that the mechanism that the amendment is seeking to introduce is already in place within the existing legislative framework. Additionally, the Bill already provides for a power which enables the Secretary of State to disapply these investigatory powers in relation to Crown premises when it is in the interest of national security. The amendment would therefore duplicate an existing provision and would add unnecessary complexity to the legislation without delivering any additional benefit.

Amendment 56 would allow the Care Quality Commission to recover charges that are higher than the actual costs it incurs when providing assistance to anyone other than an NHS body or the Secretary of State. I understand the intention behind the amendment—to give the commission greater financial flexibility—but the Government do not think that it is necessary. The charging framework in the Bill is based on the clear principle of cost recovery. Removing subsection (9) of proposed new section 51R of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 would mean that the commission could charge more than it actually costs to provide a service, shifting away from recovering costs and towards allowing the commission to make a surplus through its charging powers.

[Dr Johnson]

My understanding is that, in the past, HSSIB has provided services to not only British health services but overseas health services, which were, in some cases, charged for that service, as it is a world-leading organisation. Why would the Minister not want that to continue?

[Karin Smyth]

I am happy to get back to the hon. Lady on that specific point, if that is the case. The charging framework is about recovering costs, not making a surplus, which is what the amendment would result in. If that is not the case, I will make sure that she receives a proper correction.

The Government do not think that there is a good case for the amendment, because, as I have said, the aim of the provision is to provide for fair and transparent cost recovery, not to raise extra income beyond cost. I am not sure whether the hon. Lady is suggesting that it might be good for the commission to create additional funding, but if that is not clear, I am happy to get back to her on it. The provision makes the recovery of costs more predictable and consistent for those who have to pay them. That is usual for public bodies.

New clause 42 relates to funding provisions for the CQC’s new investigation function. The Department already provides grant in aid to the CQC to provide adequate funding for investigations and special reviews; similarly, HSSIB’s budget is provided through grant in aid and is set each year. When the CQC takes on HSSIB’s functions, the funding streams will remain distinct, and the CQC will have to assure the Department that the amount allocated to the new investigation function is being used for that purpose.

Funding decisions for the investigation function will continue to be captured in wider departmental budget-planning processes and considered centrally. That provides assurance that business and strategic priorities for the investigation functions can be met. Robust financial oversight will require the CQC to demonstrate that grant in aid is used appropriately, and solely to support the investigation function, without the need to prescribe funding arrangements in legislation.

As there is already an operational mechanism for the Secretary of State to provide adequate funding and resources for investigations, the new clause is not needed. It would also be inappropriate to prescribe the form or level of funding in legislation. The new clause would reduce the Department’s ability to manage funding through the established spending review and estimates process; introduce unnecessary rigidity as the merged function evolves; and risk creating binding funding expectations that may not align with future fiscal constraints. A non-legislative approach ensures flexibility, scale and adaptive function while maintaining robust oversight.

I agree with the intention behind amendment 5, tabled by the hon. Member for North Shropshire, which is, as I understand it, to ensure that the Health Services Safety Investigations Body functions that are transferred to the CQC retain a high level of operational independence and continue to command the confidence—the Committee heard that word a lot this morning; I completely agree on its importance—of patients and their families, healthcare professionals and the wider public. Similarly, I understand that the objective of the amendment is to maximise the perception—again, that is a word I am coming back to; I tried to address the issue earlier—of independence in the CQC.

The Government have protected safe spaces in legislation, and we agree that operational independence of the investigation function is required, but our plans support and enable that. For that reason, we cannot support the amendment, which would impose a highly prescriptive governance structure on the CQC by requiring the creation of a separate statutory committee and setting out in primary legislation detailed requirements for its purpose, membership appointments and operational arrangements. While the Government fully agree that effective safety investigations must be conducted independently and objectively, we do not consider it necessary to put such detailed organisational arrangements in the Bill.

The Bill already provides a clear legislative framework for the transfer of those functions and enables the CQC to discharge them appropriately, within its broader statutory responsibilities. Furthermore, the CQC already operates within a robust statutory framework and is capable of establishing governance arrangements that support the effective delivery of its functions, including appropriate safeguards to protect investigative independence and the handling of safe-space material.

The amendment would reduce organisational flexibility by mandating a specific committee structure, and would constrain the CQC’s ability to adapt its governance arrangements over time in response to operational experience, changes in circumstances or future improvements in best practice. Under the amendment, governance arrangements would be fixed in statute, rather than having the capability to evolve as the organisation learns and develops.

Those additional administrative and governance requirements would increase bureaucracy and complexity, which the Government are looking to reduce. I re-emphasise that, in addition, a statutory committee would weaken the important links between learning and the action that the transfer of this organisation is intended to support. One of the key benefits of bringing these functions into the CQC is the opportunity to strengthen strategic oversight and ensure that learning from investigations can more readily inform improvement activity across the system.

[Dr Johnson]

The Minister seems to be saying that her reasoning for moving HSSIB into the CQC is to ensure that actions take place in response to the recommendations. But if HSSIB outwith the CQC makes recommendations that are delivered by the provider organisations, commissioned by the ICBs and overseen by Ministers, and then the CQC checks that as part of the regulation, why does HSSIB need to be within the CQC for that to happen?

[Karin Smyth]

We are probably not going to agree on this point. I have made the point several times—and we made it in the Dash review—about bringing these organisations together. As I said again in my opening comments, it is about the opportunity to get this right and share that learning and experience. It is not about the cost but about aligning the recommendations and the actions that follow through from them. That learning, and the opportunity to push that through, is something we should grasp.

Coming back to amendment 5, creating a separate statutory committee risks introducing additional layers of separation that could slow the flow of intelligence and impede timely action in response to emerging patient safety concerns. We believe the integration of investigatory functions can be secured through clear statutory functions and appropriate safeguards, rather than through organisational structures set out in primary legislation that are too rigid. Establishing detailed governance requirements in statute may also make future improvements more difficult to implement without legislative change.

I understand and respect the concerns that underpin the amendment, but the Government believe that the Bill already provides the necessary framework for the safe and effective delivery of health services’ safety investigations following their transfer to the CQC. We will of course work closely with both the CQC and HSSIB on their transition arrangements through a transition board, whether on the issues of ensuring operation independence of the investigation function and the ways in which that learning is shared, or, further to the Opposition spokesperson’s point, how we make sure that learning is shared and creates an impact, and where that is felt most clearly. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments, and I commend clauses 59, 60 and 61 to the Committee.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

Clause 62 underscores the importance that we place on special reviews and investigations, and it will maintain the Care Quality Commission’s ability to conduct them by ensuring that the CQC’s investigatory role remains properly aligned with its original statutory purpose. The CQC is the independent regulator of health and care providers, and in the case of commissioners, it has the powers to undertake a special review or investigation when requested to by the Secretary of State.

On 30 January 2024, the then Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), commissioned a section 48 review into mental health services in Nottinghamshire following the tragic events of June 2023. As we know, that revealed serious and systemic failings and led to strengthened oversight and a clear improvement plan. With NHS England being abolished and its functions being transferred to the Department and across the wider system, this clause will remove NHSE from the scope of section 48 and allow Ministers to set out, through regulations, the future scope of section 48.

NHS England’s commissioning functions will mostly transfer to the integrated care boards but, as we discussed previously, NHSE’s most specialised commissioning functions will transfer to the Secretary of State. In future, regulations will set out the specific commissioning functions that the Secretary of State will be responsible for and that the CQC may review or investigate. The scope of the special reviews and investigations will continue to apply only to commissioning functions under the National Health Service Act 2006 or section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983, which is the CQC’s existing remit.

This approach will ensure that the CQC’s investigatory powers will not be automatically extended to departmental functions, which would fundamentally change the relationship between an arm’s length body and a Government Department and would not align with the original intention of section 48 reviews. For that reason, the Bill will provide for scrutiny through secondary legislation. That will set out a transparent and accountable way to specify which commissioning functions are in scope, enabling parliamentary scrutiny and CQC oversight where it is genuinely relevant to patient safety and care quality.

This approach will also provide important flexibility: as commissioning arrangements change, the right function can be brought into scope without unnecessary delays. Taken together, this clause will protect the CQC’s independence, maintain accountability and provide a sensible framework for scrutiny where it adds real value for patient safety and care quality. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

I have just a couple of questions. Clause 62 will update the CQC’s power to conduct special reviews of NHS commissioning to cover ICBs and the Secretary of State’s commissioning functions, and the requirement for ministerial approval before the CQC can investigate will be retained. How will that apply when HSSIB is moved into the CQC? Is it the Minister’s intention that HSSIB will need the Secretary of State’s approval to complete investigations?

[Karin Smyth]

My understanding is that the clause will not change that particular power, but I will get back to the hon. Lady if I am wrong.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 63

Time limit for bringing proceedings

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

The 10-year health plan reaffirms the Government’s commitment to families affected by bereavement or serious harm, ensuring that lessons are learned from their experience and that more cases are fully reviewed and acted on. Families seek closure following serious harm to or the death of a loved one by wanting to understand what went wrong and what could be done to stop other families experiencing similar trauma, and by wanting to hold someone to account. Families often turn to the Care Quality Commission for help.

Clause 63 will extend the CQC’s power to bring proceedings against a health and social care provider for a serious breach of regulations from the existing limitation of three years from the date of the offence to five years. Let me be clear: extending the three-year limitation from the time of the offence will not alter the first requirement that the CQC should act within 12 months of sufficient evidence of a serious breach of regulations becoming available. That 12-month window for action once the regulator is aware of the offence will remain unchanged. Extending the limitation period to five years from the date of the offence will mean that fewer events that should be considered by the regulator will effectively time out and go beyond the reach of the regulator’s action.

The CQC is not the only body with an interest in investigating serious breaches of regulations that result in unnatural death; there are other investigatory bodies, such as the police, with equal interest and powers to investigate deaths for the purpose of pursuing criminal prosecution. The coronial process serves a different purpose. A coroner’s role is to establish facts surrounding an unnatural death rather than to find fault. In a complex case, a police investigation or a coroner’s inquest—sometimes both—can take time to conclude. Those independent processes are a useful source of information for the CQC to form a full picture of a breach of regulation.

A culture of learning from investigations, inquiries, errors and poor care should be the norm in the NHS. It is therefore expected that a service provider may also commission its own internal investigation to learn from an unnatural death. Furthermore, there are cases where the CQC is approached late with information after an offence may have been committed. For example, the CQC may only receive information about an offence two and half years after it was committed, leaving little time in the remaining six-month period to investigate. Extending the period to five years would help mitigate such circumstances, and that is why we are extending the statutory limitation period. This will ensure that the CQC has the ability in far more cases to address the serious regulatory failings that it should and must address, without risking falling foul of a time limitation. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

As the Minister said, clause 63 amends section 90(2) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 to extend the limit on proceedings relating to the registration of offences under part 1 from three to five years. The impact assessment talks a little about the time it takes to investigate these cases, but as the Minister said, the time to investigate is 12 months from the CQC being given enough evidence to consider whether the case is prosecutable. Why has she chosen not to change that too? Does she think people will have enough time to investigate? She is looking puzzled.

[Karin Smyth]

Apologies—I missed the exact question as to what needed to be changed. Could the hon. Lady repeat that?

[Dr Johnson]

The Minister talked about changing the time period in which proceedings can be effected from three to five years, but once the CQC is aware that an investigation could be brought and there is evidence that needs to be looked at, it will still get only 12 months. That has not been changed. I wonder what the rationale is for that. I am not criticising it; I am just asking the question.

The other issue is that clause 63 is prospective, so if an offence were committed immediately after the Act was passed, for the first three years things would effectively be as they are now; the change from three years to five would be relevant only after three years. Clause 71(2) on commencement provides that clause 63 will not come into force until two months after the Act is passed. I just wonder in practical terms why, given that it will take three years to come into effect in any case, it will not come into force on the day the Act receives Royal Assent.

The impact assessment talks about the CQC prosecuting two or three additional cases a year, and a cost of £4.3 million over 10 years with fines of £2.7 million over 10 years. Will the regulator keep the fines, or will they go back into the Treasury? Can the Minister guarantee that the additional funds that are estimated to be required for the additional cases under this new regulation will be provided so that the CQC can do the investigations that she is giving it the opportunity to do?

[Karin Smyth]

Put simply, the answer to the hon. Lady’s questions is that we are not seeking to change other aspects. The CQC wants to get to points as soon as possible, so the 12-month period has not been changed. The function of clause 63 is merely to recognise the issues around the three years and to change that to five years. We are not seeking to alter anything else in that regard. On her point about the commencement date, that is merely recognising what is considered to be parliamentary convention.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64

Abolition of Healthwatch England

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 9.

New Clause 74—Report on the abolition of Healthwatch England—

“(1) Within 12 months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay a report before both Houses of Parliament on the impact of the abolition of Healthwatch England and transfer of Healthwatch England's functions to ICBs.

(2) The report must consider—

(a) the effectiveness of escalation routes for complaints,

(b) the ability to receive responses to complaints from the relevant ICB officer,

(c) accountability of ICB CEOs for delivering new functions arising from the abolition of Healthwatch;

(d) independence in the delivery of patient surveys, and

(e) ability to investigate organisations from which the ICB commissions services.

(3) The report must make recommendations about how any issues identified under subsection (2) may be mitigated.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report within 12 months of the passage of this Act on the impact of the abolition of Healthwatch England and transfer of Healthwatch England's functions to ICBs.

New clause 78—Healthwatch funding—

“(1) The Secretary of State, must within 12 months of the passing of this act, enact a scheme to fund Healthwatch England and local Healthwatch organisations for the 2027/2028 financial year to the level estimated by the Department for Health and Social Care in 2013/14.

(2) The Secretary of State must consider uprating this funding with inflation for 2026/2027.”

This new clause would ensure that Healthwatch England and local Healthwatch organisations are funded to the level estimated by the Department for Health and Social Care in 2013/14.

[The Chair]

I call the Minister.

[Karin Smyth]

This is a popular clause, Ms Lewell—and rightly so. I recognise that this provision has elicited a lot of interest among our constituents and the wider public. I look forward to hearing Members’ contributions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Lewell. This is another example of the Government seeking to abolish an independent voice and merge its functions into an organisation that, frankly, will probably benefit to some extent from not having that independent scrutiny, but it is not for the betterment of patients or indeed the system. Healthwatch England is effective specifically because it is an independent voice for patients. We have not heard any compelling arguments for why, just because the system is not perfect, this change is better than leaving it alone.

The argument has been advanced that this brings patient voice closer to decision making, but I would hope that the directly elected Ministers who represent people are what bring the voice of the people closer to decision making in the Department of Health. They should be the ones bringing patient voice to the heart of decision making—I am sure that they do, of course—and there are other means by which the Department formulates policies and decisions; it does not need to remove an independent patient voice through Healthwatch England, which serves a different purpose, to enhance that.

That different purpose is this: some of the things that Healthwatch England advocates for and shines a light on are uncomfortable truths for decision makers and the Department of Health. It looks far too cosy to now bring that function into the decision-making process. Some of these issues need the light shedding on them that comes with an independent organisation providing patient voice. We have heard how the Select Committee and MPs, in their free-ranging Back-Bench function, benefit from hearing that voice through an independent organisation such as Healthwatch England, because it allows them to fulfil their scrutiny function. This is not just about decision making; it is also about scrutiny of decisions once they have been made. What will the Select Committee, MPs and journalists do when they no longer have the light shed by that independent voice?

As my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon has pointed out, representatives who are employees in the Department of Health and Social Care rightly have other overriding primary duties to the employer—the Department itself. Let us ensure that patient voice is articulated by those who do not have a primary obligation to their employer, but have an obligation to an independent organisation with functions that serve solely to amplify and project the voice of patients.

There are a number of issues with the abolition of local healthwatches, but I will save that for the next discussion. I want to make the wider point that there is a centralisation issue here too. Whether the Government like it or not, this measure will centralise powers into the Department; it will take outside powers from Healthwatch England and bring them in-house. That is nothing short of a centralising measure. The Minister needs to address the justification for that, because the more negatives there are to this decision, the more we need to understand the positives. So far, they are light indeed, or she has failed to articulate them. I think that there is a reason she has failed to articulate the positives: they simply do not exist.

I look forward to the Minister’s response. I urge her to take some more interventions, because the arguments she has given to the Committee in her speeches at the end of each discussion have tended to raise more questions than they have answered. We can only deal with that by intervening on what she says.

[Karin Smyth]

I think that the record will show that I have taken several interventions in recent days, and I will continue to do so. I have been very clear that we have some fundamental disagreements on philosophy and approach. I will desperately try not to veer into the next groups, but it may be tricky. I am sure that you will steer me through, Ms Lewell.

I want to pick up on some good, helpful points that have been made. I pay particular tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield for the comments he made. I appreciate that certain areas, particularly Mid Staffs, have elicited a lot of debate and concern. I commend him for following that through on behalf of his constituency. I know that other Members in Staffordshire want to understand how the Government’s future plans will address their very real concerns. That is also true of other areas that have experienced shocking scandals, as we call them. I take that very seriously.

I will pick up on the question of independence that we veered into before, which was mentioned by the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. She highlighted her concerns and the issues raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield, and I heard what she said. Independence was also raised by the hon. Member for Winchester and my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield. We therefore return to that point about independence and, as my hon. Friend said, about being in the room, making those decisions and changing the entire culture of the organisation to do something different.

The question is then whether bringing the functions of Healthwatch to the national level is the right method. Again, I commend work on that and the individuals involved in it. Hon. Members mentioned Jacob Lant of National Voices and the King’s Fund, which have worked with us very well to challenge us and try to make this legislation better. I really appreciate their work, and we will continue to talk with them.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon mentioned GIRFT. I cannot help but respond to his point, because he suggested that being inside NHS England has somehow made it less effective, and I could not disagree with him more. It is not because he has left and is here; his presence is obviously missed at GIRFT and welcomed here. To be serious, every meeting I have with NHS England and everything we are attempting to do in reforming outcomes for patients on the ground involves GIRFT. It is now at the very heart of what NHS England does. By coming inside the organisation, it has done exactly some of the things we want to do: drive cultural difference and change inside the organisation, rather than being outside of it. As I said before, this is a slightly philosophical argument and political argument. I appreciate that there are views on either side, but that is absolutely our intention.

On the patient experience directorate, we recognise that public trust will be crucial. We need to ensure that there is system learning across the piece. The patient experience directorate has to earn the trust of the public and parliamentarians, so we will design it to operate transparently and sit at the centre of decision making rather than at its margins. Ministers will be accountable for and answerable to Parliament on the work of the patient experience directorate. It has to focus on the voices that are too often overlooked. The central priority of the directorate will be to reach under-represented and seldom heard groups and to ensure that engagement is accessible, inclusive and proactive, so that the experiences of vulnerable people help inform and shape the decisions that affect their lives.

[Liz Twist (Blaydon and Consett) (Lab)]

I was flattered to hear my comments on Second Reading quoted by the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, but I think she has misunderstood me. My question to the Minister was and still is about how we maintain within the new arrangements the ability to speak up on behalf of others. Could the Minister comment on that?

[Karin Smyth]

I thank my hon. Friend for making the intention of her comments clear to the Committee. It is right that we need to build trust in patient voice and experience. We will pick up on that in our debate on local healthwatch branches, because that is perhaps where Members of Parliament are particularly important.

At a national level, there are many voices and organisations continuing to review the issue and challenge the Government, including through reports, meetings with Ministers and in Parliament, highlighting the good work that they do and numerous Committees. Health Ministers appear before the Public Accounts Committee, the Health and Social Care Committee and Lords Committees; I have appeared before the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee. That is an important way of ensuring that the Department and the new experience directorate will be accountable.

I recognise the important contribution that Healthwatch has made in capturing patient insight and informing the design and delivery of services, but we do not believe that new clause 78 is necessary. It is inconsistent with the purpose of the Bill. I am aware of the views of the hon. Member for North Shropshire, but the Government’s policy is to abolish Healthwatch and ensure that patient and public voice is more directly connected to decision making. It would therefore not be appropriate or consistent to legislate for a specific funding level for organisations that would no longer exist, or to constrain how funding is deployed to support the new arrangements.

[Helen Morgan]

For the record, I tabled amendments to delete those clauses, so there was consistency of intention.

[Karin Smyth]

I am just computing that in my brain. Can I seek clarification on that?

[Helen Morgan]

I tabled amendments to delete the clauses that will remove Healthwatch, but they have not been chosen for debate, because we can just vote against those clauses standing part. New clause 78, which would ensure that Healthwatch is funded properly, was tabled alongside amendments to ensure that Healthwatch is retained.

[Karin Smyth]

I understand. I am grateful to the hon. Member for that clarification, but her new clause represents an incomplete picture of Government funding for Healthwatch. A £14.15 million grant has been provided to local authorities for local healthwatches, and that is only part of the overall funding; a larger proportion is rolled into the wider local government financial settlement, and because that is not visible as a distinct line, headline figures often understate the total funding available. All of this funding is not ringfenced.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 10.

[Karin Smyth]

Clause 65 and schedule 10 will abolish the current local healthwatch arrangements and place responsibility for gathering the views of local people firmly with the bodies with the clearest levers to act: integrated care boards and local authorities.

At present, many organisations are gathering views, running engagement exercises and raising issues, often with the best of intentions, but the result can be duplication, variable coverage and uncertainty about who is accountable for responding. We can end up with lots of feedback but too little clarity on the action that follows. By placing those duties on integrated care boards and local authorities, we are ensuring that insight from patients, service users and communities feeds directly into where commissioning and service planning decisions are made for both health and care. As my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield said, the people are in the room. It makes it easier to connect lived experience to priorities, quality improvement and the tackling of inequalities, rather than leaving intelligence at arm’s length from decision makers.

This is about strengthening impact, not silencing criticism. Integrated care boards and local authorities will have a statutory duty to demonstrate how they have engaged with all people in their area, including seldom heard groups, and will be expected to have clear routes for people to raise concerns. We expect transparency about what people have told the system, what the system has done in response and how learning is shared across partners.

As I said in my evidence, many constituents in my Bristol South constituency are said to be hard to reach. They are not hard to reach, in my view. We know exactly where they live, who they are, how old they are and what sex they are. We know largely what diseases they have. We know their level of income. We know their levels of education and attainment, and how they impact their health outcomes. They are not hard to reach; the system is not set up to listen to them. That is what we are determined to change.

Dr Penny Dash’s review of patient safety described a cluttered landscape, with overlaps in how user experience and advocacy are organised. It described the burden that that can place on the frontline, producing multiple, poorly co-ordinated asks with limited impact. Bringing the patient and community voice closer to the organisations responsible for improvement—it is actually their job as commissioners—will help to make feedback more actionable, reduce confusion and support better services. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

As I understand it, the objectives of the Bill are to replace the local healthwatch with a less independent, internalised gatherer of patient experience feedback. The objectives appear to be featuring feedback more centrally in strategic decision making, getting people into the room and simplifying the patient landscape.

There are things that I do not understand about that. If the problem is that those who commission or deliver the services are not listening adequately to the people who gather the patient experience information, why not invite the independent individual who has gathered that information into the room? Why ask someone in the room to gather the information and risk the independence? Why not compel more listening?

The Minister talked about who is accountable for action. My understanding is that it is the healthwatches’ job to gather the patient experience and present it to Healthwatch England and the decision makers. It is not their job, as I understand it, to make decisions on how care is delivered or to deliver that care differently. Does the Minister intend that to change?

The Minister also talked about strengthening the impact of Healthwatch, but I do not understand how this change will do that. We have heard how its independence allows Healthwatch to go on telly, talk to Members of Parliament, Select Committees, radio stations and others, and publicise its findings. If it is within the Department, will it be able to do so as freely? I suggest that it will not.

The other thing that I do not really understand—perhaps the Minister can help us with this—is the organisation. At the moment, it is done in local authority areas. It will now become the job of the local authority and the ICB to commission feedback, but we have already heard how the 50% cuts to ICB budgets have led to ICBs merging into larger conglomerates. Those do not necessarily overlap with the strategic mayoral authorities in the way the Minister eventually wants. What geography does the Minister want the feedback to be gathered over? How does she see that working? Will it require further restructuring? The hon. Member for Lichfield talked about the importance of localism and how different areas of his constituency have different health needs. How does the Minister think that that will work under her new plans?

The Minister said that one benefit of the new process is reaching vulnerable individuals, but what is to stop Healthwatch doing that? Ultimately, if we have Healthwatch doing things now that are independent and respected across the House—I am sure your local healthwatch is also excellent, Ms Lewell; Lincolnshire’s certainly is—why not strengthen that voice? Why not say to those who are providing that service, “We’re going to give you more resources,” or “We’re going to ask you to deliver it in a slightly different way,” or “We’re going to ask you to focus on particular populations,” or even, “We’re going to invite you into the room with the ICBs so that they can hear you and listen carefully”?

Why not compel those making the decisions and delivering the services to listen to Healthwatch, rather than replacing it? It was not Healthwatch’s job to listen to them, but to gather the information and present it, and that is what it has done. Can the Minister explain how removing its independence is going to help? I simply do not understand it.

--- Later in debate ---

I am using my own patch as an example, and it is fairly unique, but there are many areas across the country, particularly coastal and rural ones, with their own unique challenges. At the moment, those are well-represented through small, independent local healthwatches. That uniqueness will be lost, not only because of the lack of independence of the patient voice that will result from merging healthwatches with ICBs, but because the patient voice will be merged with others, since ICBs cover far wider areas. Given the values that Labour says it stands by and gets elected on—patient choice, patient voice, improving healthcare outcomes—it surprises me that a Labour Government want to abolish that independent patient voice. No matter how much they want to make space for that voice within an ICB, they cannot argue that that voice is independent once it becomes part and parcel of the ICB.

[Karin Smyth]

Again, we have had an important discussion, particularly around the issue of independence; I accept that it is difficult and that there are arguments on both sides. We have heard a lot about Professor Croisdale-Appleby’s evidence on behalf of Healthwatch. I made this argument on Second Reading: we have had this arrangement for 52 years, and I think we can all agree that the situation is not good. It has not worked. As I said earlier, 20,000 reports add a lot of work. There is a lot of work in this landscape—well-intentioned work by good people. We can argue about whether Healthwatch was set up appropriately to do the job it has been asked to do.

I was pleased to hear the three examples from the Lib Dems and other individual examples of where light has been shone upon a closure, for example. It is good that that has been valued by local Members of Parliament. I would argue that nobody should be closing services without fully engaging with the local population and setting out clearly why that is being done. That is a failure of those local organisations, and we need to address the cause of that failure.

I am struck by the oral evidence to the Committee on those 20,000 reports in 52 years. It was suggested that it takes six months, as I think the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said when quoting the evidence, for somebody to “go out”—that is the phrase that is used: “Let’s go out and talk to people in these far-flung communities. What do they think? What is their experience? Who are they?” It constantly surprises me, as it did when I worked inside the system. These are not remote people. We know who they are and what is wrong with them. We know how remote they are from the system. That goes to the heart of why the taxpayer is so alienated in this country from public services and their poor functioning. That is what the Government want to change.

It is not a matter of ICBs adding a new function; the Opposition have fundamentally misunderstood that. It is about rewiring these organisations to do something very different. Their function as strategic commissioners is to understand and to use all the data and evidence, including direct voice. We can argue about how that direct voice is taken in, but that is fundamentally what a commissioner is—I say that, having been a commissioner. It is not being done well, and that is why we are changing the legislation. Under previous legislation, ICBs had multiple functions. We are changing that to force them to be commissioners, but it is not an add-on; it is fundamental to the commissioning process. It is a complete rewiring of the organisation to listen to patient voice, patient experience and the reality of health inequalities.

In my constituency, I am afraid have not seen examples of the independent voice really speaking on behalf of the people I serve—some of whom have the worst health inequalities in the country, largely as a result of the tobacco industry and its legacy—whereas their experiences and their health outcomes are very well known and should drive the necessary changes. That is why we are driving all the changes in the 10-year health plan: to meet the needs of communities. We will continue to have this debate, but I wanted to make that absolutely clear.

We assume that the independent voice is always clear, but it is not. We have heard that it is variable and fragmented. That is not the fault of anyone trying to provide it, but that is where it is. The system is supposed to listen and improve services, and it does not. Things need to be changed in order to achieve that, and that is what we intend to do. The changes will be supported by scrutiny, transparency and oversight arrangements. The alternative, which is maintaining a separate structure with limited levers to drive change, has not delivered, and it cannot continue to try.

We are not removing patient and user voice; we are embedding it at the heart of the new system. ICBs will be expected to carry out proactive, inclusive engagement, particularly with so-called seldom-heard groups, including carers, those who do not have access to digital platforms, those less proficient with technology and people for whom English is a second language. Crucially, ICBs will be accountable for demonstrating reach and impact, not simply how many reports or engagement exercises they have done. Impact is what we will be looking at.

As I have said, this is about moving from a model where voices can be collected but overlooked to one where they must be heard and acted upon. The new patient experience director in the Department will work closely with local systems to identify national themes and significant concerns, ensuring that patient experience informs policy and improvement at the national level. To answer a previous question, the Secretary of State will have the power to issue directions to ICBs and local authorities if they are failing to exercise that function.

As I have said in debates on previous groups, I understand that it is difficult when we are debating the abolition of something outwith the wider framework of the 10-year health plan, the Dash review, the patient experience directorate in the Department and changes to the national quality board. It is incumbent on the Government to make that architecture clear and to build confidence and trust. That is what we intend to do, and that is how this body will be taken forward.

All comments have been noted. There is a fundamental difference of approach. We are making those bodies fundamentally different and rewiring them to do something different. I understand the bumpy road—I have been part of that, with community health councils and links to Healthwatch, and it has been a long one. I think we will keep returning to this theme. Those organisations have not been changed to do what they are supposed to do, and that is the ambition of this Government.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

As the UK resilience action plan sets out, we are living through a period of profound change. Ensuring that our institutions are clear in what they must do to prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies is essential. With that mind, the clause is necessary. It clarifies the existing duties on NHS trusts under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004—the legislation that sets out how the UK prepares for, co-ordinates and responds to serious emergencies. Since the Civil Contingencies Act came into force, NHS trusts have been included as category 1 responders. That means that they have had specific legal duties to assess risks, plan for emergencies, maintain business continuity, warn and inform the public, and work together to co-ordinate an effective local response.

Due to changing policies by the previous Government, references to NHS trusts were removed from the Civil Contingencies Act, yet under transitionary powers in other legislation, they remain category 1 responders. This has meant that their role has seemed unclear for some other responders and the public. I want to be clear that the clause does not change the position of NHS trusts, nor their duties or functions under the Civil Contingencies Act; instead, it simply clarifies the legislation, making their place and role clear. That is vital so that NHS trusts and other responders know exactly what is required of them during and after an emergency. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 67

Minor and consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 20 to 24 and 83.

Schedule 11.

[Karin Smyth]

These are minor and technical amendments. Government amendments 20 to 22 make changes to the Armed Forces Act 2006 to remove references to NHS England, reflecting that NHS England will be abolished. Those amendments are consequential to the Armed Forces Bill 2026. Government amendment 83 makes changes to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026 to remove reference to NHS England and update a reference to NHS trusts to take account of the new conversion procedure created by clause 35 of the Bill. Government amendments 23 and 24 both amend the NHS Act 2006 by removing unnecessary consequential amendments to that Act.

Clause 67 inserts schedule 11, which makes minor and consequential amendments that are required as a consequence of the provision made in other clauses of the Bill. They mostly result from the abolition of NHS England, the conferral of NHS England’s functions on others—primarily the Secretary of State and integrated care boards—and the changes made to the NHS provider landscape. Those minor and consequential changes are made to a large number of enactments, but notably a significant number of such consequential changes are made to: the Mental Health Act 1983, the NHS Act 2006, the Health and Social Care Act 2008, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021. The changes are necessary to ensure the proper operation of the statute book and reflect the substantive changes being made elsewhere in the Bill. I commend clause 67 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 11

Minor and consequential amendments

Amendments made: 20, in schedule 11, page 140, line 16, at end insert—

“91A The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows.”

This amendment and amendments 21 and 22 remove a reference to NHS England from section 343AZB of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (to be inserted by the Armed Forces Bill).

Amendment 21, in schedule 11, page 140, line 17, leave out

“of the Armed Forces Act 2006”.

See explanatory statement for amendment 20.

Amendment 22, in schedule 11, page 140, line 18, at end insert—

“92A In section 343AZB (inserted by the Armed Forces Act 2026), in subsection (5)(a) omit sub-paragraph (i).”

See explanatory statement for amendment 20.

Amendment 23, in schedule 11, page 144, line 5, leave out paragraph 118.

This removes an unnecessary consequential amendment to section 12E of the NHS Act 2006 (that section is replaced in its entirety by clause 10 of the Bill).

Amendment 24, in schedule 11, page 148, line 9, leave out paragraph 139.

This removes an unnecessary consequential amendment to a heading that is replaced by clause 11.

Amendment 83, in schedule 11, page 191, line 35, at end insert—

“Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026

400 In Schedule 1 to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026 (relevant authorities)—

(a) omit paragraph 9;

(b) in paragraph 12, omit ‘section 25 of’.”—(Karin Smyth.)

This is a consequential amendment to Schedule 1 to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026, which would remove a reference to NHS England and update a reference to NHS trusts to take account of the new conversion procedure created by clause 35 of the Bill.

Schedule 11, as amended, agreed to.

New Clause 20

Arrangements between NHS bodies and local authorities

“(1) Section 75 of the National Health Service Act 2006 (arrangements between NHS bodies and local authorities) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (6), for the words from ‘consultation’ to the end substitute ‘the making of arrangements by virtue of this section’.

(3) Omit subsections (7A) to (7L).

(4) In subsection (8), at the appropriate place insert—

‘“local authority” includes—

(a) a combined authority,

(b) a combined county authority, and

(c) the Greater London Authority;’.”—(Karin Smyth.)

This enables combined authorities, combined county authorities and the Greater London Authority to enter into arrangements with NHS bodies under section 75 of the NHS Act 2006 in relation to any of their functions, replacing the current different and more limited provision about combined authorities and combined county authorities.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 21

Dispensing medical practitioners etc

“(1) The National Health Service Act 2006 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 132 (persons authorised to provide pharmaceutical services)—

(a) for subsection (1) substitute—

‘(1) Except as may be provided for by or under regulations, no arrangements may be made by an integrated care board with a person providing primary medical services under Part 4 to provide pharmaceutical services.’;

(b) in subsection (3), for ‘medical practitioners’ substitute ‘persons providing primary medical services under Part 4’;

(c) in subsection (4)—

(i) for paragraph (a) substitute—

‘(a) as to grounds on which an integrated care board may, or must, refuse to grant an application for inclusion in a list referred to in subsection (3),’;

(ii) in paragraph (aa) omit ‘of medical practitioners’;

(iii) in paragraph (b), for ‘NHS England by a medical practitioner’ substitute ‘an integrated care board by a person’;

(iv) omit paragraph (c).

(3) In section 134 (pilot schemes), in subsection (8) omit ‘by a medical practitioner or dental practitioner to a patient of his’.

(4) In Schedule 12 (LPS schemes), in paragraph 1(8) omit ‘by a medical practitioner or dental practitioner to a patient of his’.”—(Karin Smyth.)

This updates the legislation about the provision of pharmaceutical services by medical practitioners to conform with current law and practice whereby commissioning arrangements are generally made with the practice rather than individual doctors. It also removes a reference to dental practitioners that is not needed.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 22

Inadequate provision of pharmaceutical services

“(1) Section 133 of the National Health Service Act 2006 (inadequate provision of pharmaceutical services) is amended as follows.

(2) For subsection (1) substitute—

‘(1) Subsection (2) applies if the Secretary of State is satisfied that a situation or event has caused or is likely to cause a disruption resulting in the inadequate provision of pharmaceutical services in England or in an area within England.’

(3) In subsection (2)—

(a) after ‘Secretary of State’ insert ‘may by direction’;

(b) for paragraph (a) (but not the ‘and’ at the end) substitute—

‘(a) require an integrated care board to make other arrangements,’;

(c) in paragraph (b) omit ‘may’.

(4) After subsection (2) insert—

‘(3) A direction under subsection (2) must specify the period for which it has effect.

(4) The period must not be more than 6 months.

(5) But the Secretary of State may by further direction extend the period for which a direction under subsection (2) has effect by up to 6 months at a time.

(6) The Secretary of State must publish any directions under this section.’”—(Karin Smyth.)

The amendments made by this clause (among other things) relax the legal test for making alternative provision to address the inadequate provision of pharmaceutical services owing to a disruption of services.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 23

Pharmaceutical services: appeals etc

“Schedule (Pharmaceutical services: appeals etc) makes provision about the destination of appeals, and jurisdiction to determine certain matters, currently governed by Part 7 of the National Health Service Act 2006 (pharmaceutical services and local pharmaceutical services).”—(Karin Smyth.)

The clause introduces a Schedule which amends provisions about certain appeals etc to the First-tier Tribunal. Those appeals will be transferred to an NHS body determined by regulations. It is expected that initially this will be NHS Resolution.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 91

Regulations: reference to agreements and standards

“(1) The Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 2 (power to make regulations about human medicines), after subsection (4) insert—

‘(4A) Regulations under subsection (1) making provision in reliance on section 3, 4, 5 or 7 may refer to international agreements or standards relating to human medicines, including agreements or standards as they have effect from time to time.’

(3) In section 16 (manufacture, marketing and supply), after subsection (2) insert—

‘(3) Provision made in reliance on subsection (1)(a) may refer to United Kingdom standards that—

(a) relate to the marketing, putting into service or other supply of medical devices, and

(b) are specified in a list published by the Secretary of State from time to time.

(4) Regulations made under section 15(1) that contain provision made in reliance on subsection (1)(a) about relevant requirements (or exceptions from them) may include provision in relation to a medical device where—

(a) the device complies with regulatory requirements applicable somewhere outside the United Kingdom which is specified in regulations, and

(b) a description of the device and the regulatory requirements applicable to it are contained in a list published by the Secretary of State from time to time.

(5) In this section “United Kingdom standard” means a standard that is—

(a) set by the British Standards Institution, or

(b) primarily developed for use in the United Kingdom, or part of the United Kingdom.’”—(Karin Smyth.)

This new clause would amend the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 to (a) enable regulations to refer to both international agreements and standards and standards developed in the United Kingdom and (b) enable the Secretary of State to dispense with requirements placed on devices which meet regulatory requirements applicable outside the United Kingdom.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Karin Smyth]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 92—Medical Devices Regulations 2002: mutual recognition agreements.

Government new clause 93—Consultation about medicines and medical devices regulations.

Government new clause 94—Medicines and medical devices regulations: parliamentary procedure.

Government new clause 95—Medical devices etc: parliamentary procedure for certain fees regulations.

Government amendments 80 to 82.

New clause 67—Secretary of State directions relating to early access to medicines—

“(1) The Secretary of State may give directions to any of the bodies mentioned in subsection (2) about the implementation of a scheme providing early access to medicines to people with life-threatening or seriously debilitating conditions.

(2) The bodies are—

(a) integrated care board,

(b) NHS Trusts,

(c) NHS Foundation Trusts,

(d) NHS Advanced Foundation Trusts, and

(e) other health and social care bodies.”

This new clause would give the Secretary of State power to direct integrated care boards, NHS Trusts, NHS Foundation Trusts, and NHS Advanced Foundation Trusts to implement a scheme to provide early access to medicines to people with life-threatening or seriously debilitating conditions.

New clause 68—Review of the Early Access to Medicines Scheme—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, commission a review of the regime for early and accelerated access to medicines in England and Wales.

(2) The review conducted under subsection (1) must consider—

(a) the effectiveness of the Early Access to Medicines Scheme (EAMS) and Innovative Licensing and Access Pathway (ILAP),

(b) the effectiveness of the early access outside of the Early Access to Medicines Scheme (EAMS) and Innovative Licensing and Access Pathway (ILAP), and

(c) equality of access across England and Wales, with the aim of reducing geographical inequalities between different NHS trusts.

(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report and recommendations of the review before both House of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission a review of regime for early and accelerated access to medicines.

[Karin Smyth]

I will begin with Government new clauses 91 to 95. Many hon. Members will know that the current regulatory framework for medicines and medical devices is seen as overly complicated and difficult to navigate. It is also slow and burdensome to amend, limiting our ability to ensure that it keeps pace with developments. Maintaining the safeguards to public health is central to every decision we make. However, the regulatory framework currently slows down innovation and delays patient access to healthcare products. From a market growth perspective, it also places barriers to the UK market, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises.

These new clauses will deliver a more streamlined regime for making and updating secondary legislation. The ability to make faster and more responsive updates to secondary legislation will enable the Department and the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency to address the current barriers that I have highlighted in the regulation more quickly.

New clauses 91 and 92 provide for changes with regard to powers to make “ambulatory references”, which are references in legislation to external documents such as technical standards and lists, which can be updated from time to time. These changes will ensure that the legislation continues to capture updated versions of those documents without the need for further regulations. International and domestic standards are crucial in the highly technical areas targeted by the change. It is important that the regulatory regime remains aligned with the technical, scientific and international framework that is designed to evolve over time.

Currently, there are limited powers for medical devices regulations to refer to external international agreements or standards that change over time, and there are no such powers at all for medicines. Without the ability to make ambulatory references to those documents, legislation is needed each time the standards are updated. That is disproportionate and risks unintentional regulatory divergence that creates uncertainty for industry.

The new clauses introduce a power for human medicines regulations to refer to external international agreements or standards that are updated over time. For medical devices, the provisions also extend the current ambulatory reference power to make reference to lists of countries subject to mutual recognition agreements, lists of devices or categories of device that are eligible for an international reliance pathway, and lists of British technical standards. Amendment 80 sets out that the extent of new clause 92 will cover England, Scotland and Wales.

The provisions of new clause 93 enable a more flexible approach to consultations on regulatory changes related to medicines and medical devices, rather than the current one-size-fits-all requirement. Under the amended powers, the MHRA and the Department will still retain a legal duty to consult relevant stakeholders, and significant regulatory changes will continue to be subject to public consultation. The measure is designed to enable consultations that are proportionate to the scale of the change in hand. That will ensure that regulations can be updated more efficiently and in line with the needs of the health service.

New clause 94 will enable certain technical updates to medicines and medical devices regulations to be made using the negative rather than the affirmative procedure. Specifically, it relates to changes that routinely arise as clinical practice evolves—for example, updating detailed lists of medicines or making limited adjustments to the professional groups who may prescribe, supply, sell or administer particular medicines. At present, even minor or time-sensitive changes of this sort can require a debate under the affirmative procedure, which is not always the best use of parliamentary time.

New clause 95 is the final measure in the regulatory framework package for the MHRA. It is designed to streamline the process for routine fee updates made using powers under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 by allowing the use of the negative parliamentary procedure for routine fee uplifts. That will bring the powers in line with those relating to fees in the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021, where uplifts to existing fees can be made with the negative procedure. That will also reduce delays in making and communicating such adjustments, while maintaining appropriate safeguards, including the requirement to set out the cost basis for any new uplifts with any legislation—whether it is made under the negative or affirmative procedure. The draft affirmative procedure will be retained for any substantive changes, such as the introduction of a new chargeable function.

Finally, there are a number of consequential provisions related to those I have just discussed. Government amendments 80 to 82 primarily relate to the commencement period in which they come into force.

In conclusion, the amendments will enable a faster and more responsible reform of the existing legislative framework, while preserving proportionate safeguards and necessary scrutiny. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

New clause 91 would amend the Medicines and Medical Devices Act to enable regulations

“to refer to both international agreements and standards and standards developed in the United Kingdom”

and enable the Secretary of State

“to dispense with requirements placed on devices which meet regulatory requirements applicable outside the United Kingdom.”

New clause 92 would amend the definition of “mutual recognition agreement” so that

“agreements are defined by a list published by the Secretary of State, rather than a Schedule to the regulations.”

New clause 93

“amends the duty to consult in relation to regulations about human medicines and medical devices.”

That means that instead of a public consultation, it

“gives the option of consulting such persons as the relevant authority considers appropriate”.

I would be grateful if the Minister clarified whether that could be nobody, or whether it has to at least be somebody.

New clause 94

“changes the parliamentary procedure for certain regulations from the draft affirmative procedure to the negative procedure.”

That relates to regulations about medicines and medical devices. I want to ask about scrutiny, because we have had a number of statutory instruments over the last few years that, under the new regulations, would now be put under the negative procedure. When we have looked at them, there have been questions and potential changes.

Why does the Minister want a lower level of scrutiny? In general, scrutiny is a good thing. I understand that this could smooth out procedure and make it a bit quicker in some cases, but we had an example where a Minister brought forward fee increases. I then raised the issue of national insurance and that Minister was not aware of whether it was paid at that time. The civil service pay estimate was significantly lower than expected and lower than what was given. Therefore, six months later we were back in Committee with a different Minister asking for more money. There is a scrutiny issue with new clause 94. That also relates to the fees and terms in new clause 95, which was one of the examples I gave.

[Karin Smyth]

I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. The purpose of the new clauses is to support our life sciences and medicine sector, in order to make that more streamlined. She will be aware of the proposals about the negative and affirmative procedure. If there were particular issues of scrutiny, normal parliamentary rules and processes would apply if Members wanted to raise any particular issue.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 91 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 92

Medical Devices Regulations 2002: mutual recognition agreements

“(1) The Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (S.I. 2002/618) are amended as follows.

(2) For regulation 1A (Schedules) substitute—

‘1A Schedule

Schedule 2A has effect.’

(3) In regulation 2 (interpretation), in paragraph (1)—

(a) in the definition of ‘mutual recognition agreement’, in paragraph (a), for ‘country listed in Schedule 2’ substitute ‘country specified in a list published by the Secretary of State from time to time’;

(b) in the definition of ‘third country conformity assessment body’, for ‘established in a country which is listed in Schedule 2 and designated in accordance with a relevant’ substitute ‘designated in accordance with a’.

(4) Omit Schedule 2 (mutual recognition agreements).”—(Karin Smyth.)

This new clause would amend the definition of “mutual recognition agreement” in the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (as it has effect in England and Wales, and Scotland) so that agreements are defined by a list published by the Secretary of State, rather than a Schedule to the regulations.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 93

Consultation about medicines and medical devices regulations

‘(1) Section 45 of the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 (consultation) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), for “a provision of Part 1, 2, 3 or 4” substitute “Part 1 or 3”.

(3) After subsection (1) insert—

“(1ZA) Before making regulations under Part 2 or 4 the relevant authority must—

(a) carry out a public consultation, or

(b) consult such persons as it considers appropriate.”

(4) In subsection (3), at the beginning insert “Where a public consultation is carried out”.

(5) In subsection (4), in the words before paragraph (a), for “subsection (1)” substitute “subsection (1ZA)”.’—(Karin Smyth.)

This amends the duty to consult in relation to regulations about human medicines and medical devices. It gives the option of consulting such persons as the relevant authority considers appropriate instead of a public consultation.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 94

Medicines and medical devices regulations: parliamentary procedure

‘In section 47 of the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 (regulations: procedure), for subsection (3) substitute—

“(3) Regulations under Part 1 are subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

(3A) Regulations under Part 2—

(a) are subject to the negative procedure if they contain only provision of one or more of the following descriptions—

(i) provision made in reliance on section 6(1)(a) (fees);

(ii) provision amending the meaning of ‘appropriate practitioner’ or ‘approved country health professional’ for the purposes of Part 12 of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (see regulation 214 of those regulations);

(iii) provision amending any of the following provisions of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012—

• regulations 217C(3) or 217CA(3) (original pack dispensing for products containing relevant substances: definition of ‘relevant substance’),

• Schedule 13 (prescription only medicines for which community practitioner nurse prescribers are appropriate practitioners),

• Schedule 15 (requirements for specific products subject to general sale),

• Schedule 16 (patient group directions and vaccine group directions),

• Schedule 17 (exemption for sale, supply or administration by certain persons),

• Schedule 18 (substances that may not be sold or supplied by a pharmacist without a prescription in reliance on emergency provisions),

• Schedule 19 (medicinal products for parenteral administration in an emergency), or

• Schedule 21 (medicinal products at high dilutions);

(iv) provision amending regulation 250 of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (restrictions on persons to be supplied with medicinal products: exceptions) for the purpose of changing the products to which any exception from time to time provided for by that regulation applies;

(v) provision that is consequential on provision of a description mentioned in any of sub-paragraphs (ii) to (iv);

(b) are subject to the made affirmative procedure if they—

(i) contain only provision that is made in reliance on section 7 (emergencies),

(ii) contain a declaration that the person making them considers that they need to be made urgently to protect the public from an imminent risk of serious harm to health, and

(iii) are not within paragraph (a);

(c) are subject to the draft affirmative procedure if they are not within sub-paragraphs (a) or (b).

(3B) Regulations under Part 3—

(a) are subject to the negative procedure if they contain only provision made in reliance on section 12(1)(a) (fees), and

(b) are subject to the draft affirmative procedure if they are not within paragraph (a).

(3C) Regulations under Part 4—

(a) are subject to the negative procedure if they contain only provision of one or more of the following descriptions—

(i) provision made in reliance on—

• section 17(1)(a) (fees), or

• paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 (supplementary provision about civil sanctions);

(ii) provision amending or revoking regulation 1ZA of the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (expiry of certain provisions) or consequential on such provision;

(b) are subject to the made affirmative procedure if they—

(i) contain only provision made in reliance on section 18 (emergencies), and

(ii) contain a declaration that the person making them considers that they need to be made urgently to protect the public from an imminent risk of serious harm to health;

(c) are subject to the draft affirmative procedure if they are not within paragraph (a) or (b).”’—(Karin Smyth.)

This changes the parliamentary procedure for certain regulations from the draft affirmative procedure to the negative procedure. The changes all relate to regulations about medicines and medical devices (although the procedural provisions relating to certain other matters are restated in the amendment).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 95

Medical devices etc: parliamentary procedure for certain fees regulations

‘In Schedule 7 to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (regulations), in paragraph 12—

(a) in sub-paragraph (1) for “relate to altering the amount of a fee or charge to reflect changes in the value of money” substitute “fall within sub-paragraph (1A)”.

(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) Provision falls within this sub-paragraph if it relates to—

(a) altering the amount of a fee or charge to reflect changes in the value of money,

(b) altering the amount of a fee or charge to be charged in connection with the exercise of a function which a public authority has by virtue of provision made under section 8C in connection with the EU medical devices Regulations, or

(c) altering the amount of a fee or charge to be charged under the Blood Safety and Quality Regulations 2005 (S.I. 2005/50).

(1B) In sub-paragraph (1A)(b) ‘the EU medical devices Regulations’ means—

(a) Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on medical devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC, or

(b) Regulation (EU) 2017/746 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices and repealing Directive 98/79/EC and Commission Decision 2010/227/EU,

as they have effect from time to time by virtue of Article 5(4) of the Windsor Framework.”’—(Karin Smyth.)

This allows regulations altering certain fees in relation to medical devices etc to be made subject to the negative resolution procedure. At the moment those regulations are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 1

National Maternity Commissioner

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, appoint a National Maternity Commissioner, situated within the Department of Health and Social Care.

(2) The functions of the National Maternity Commissioner are to—

(a) oversee NHS maternity services;

(b) act as an independent voice for women and families;

(c) ensure lessons are learned from identified failures and that the recommendations of maternity reviews are acted upon;

(d) promote consistency, safety and accountability across NHS maternity services; and

(e) advise the Secretary of State on matters relating to the safety, quality and provision of maternity services in England.

(3) The person appointed as Commissioner must—

(a) be a person with knowledge, expertise and experience relevant to the discharge of functions of the role;

(b) have first-hand experience of working in maternity services, so far as reasonably possible; and

(c) not be a sitting Member of Parliament.”—(Helen Morgan.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to appoint a maternity commissioner within the Department of Health and Social Care to oversee national maternity services. This person should be someone with experience and expertise of maternity services, and not a political appointment.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Helen Morgan]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Johnson]

As the hon. Lady said, new clause 1 seems somewhat redundant, because the Government appear to have decided to appoint a maternity commissioner.

New clause 13 asks for a report. Before I go any further, I should say that I am a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health and have attended the delivery of many babies as a paediatrician at different levels of seniority. I should also say that I am a member of the British Medical Association, that I continue to work as an NHS consultant paediatrician and that I worked at Nottingham University hospitals NHS trust in late 2012, early 2013.

I have great sympathy with the reasoning behind what the hon. Member for North Shropshire is proposing. We have all been shocked by the many reports we have read, the circumstances we have heard about, the tragedies that have occurred over many years and the challenges that are faced by maternity care. I am not sure that writing more reports is going to help; I think we need more action rather than words.

The hon. Lady mentioned the taskforce. I was disappointed that it took the Government so many months to establish it, that it took so long for it to meet and that it has met only a few times. As we have talked about things such as Healthwatch and the HSSIB, the Minister has shown her enthusiasm to get on with things and ensure that the recommendations made in the varying reports are implemented. I would therefore be interested to understand how that will occur in maternity.

My understanding is that the Government are going to produce a plan on how to deliver the recommendations in the recent report, and that is going to be available by Christmas. However, that means that we will then be in a situation where the Government came into power in mid-2024 and then spent a year writing a plan—the 10-year “Fit for the Future” plan. Around the time that they published that, they decided that they needed an urgent maternity report; that was going to take a few months, but it ended up taking another year in of itself. Now we are going to take another six or seven months writing another plan on how to implement the plan we have written, based on the plan we wrote before, based on the plan we did not have at the general election.

I am interested to understand how the Government are going to convert the good intentions I am sure they have into action. In particular, their manifesto promised that thousands more additional midwives would be trained. I would be interested to know what progress they have made on that.

[Karin Smyth]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for North Shropshire for bringing this discussion before the Committee. I put on record our thanks for the work she has done in this area and for her engagement with me, and indeed with officials at the Department, to help us understand it more clearly, particularly in the light of the new clause.

Hon. Members across the Committee are committed, as are the Government, to ensuring that women, families and babies receive the care and support they need. We know that the vast majority of births are safe and that there are outstanding examples of care in the NHS. However, where things do go wrong, it can have a devastating impact on women and their families.

That is why the Government launched the national investigation into NHS maternity and neonatal care, chaired by the noble Lady Baroness Amos. Baroness Amos brought the findings from past reviews, local rapid reviews and new evidence from families and staff together into one clear national set of recommendations, which as we heard was published last week. The Government also launched the maternity and neonatal taskforce, chaired personally by the Secretary of State, which will translate Baroness Amos’s recommendations into action.

As we heard, Baroness Amos recommended the appointment of a statutory maternity and neonatal commissioner. We have accepted that recommendation, and I know there is support for it across the House. To be clear, the Secretary of State stated last week that we are committed to putting the role on a “statutory basis” as soon as possible.

I am afraid I cannot give the hon. Member for North Shropshire a more detailed timetable at the moment, because we are currently looking at options to legislate at pace, including potentially through this Bill, subject to discussions through the usual channels, while also—this is crucial—giving the taskforce the opportunity to shape the scope of the role. That was one of Baroness Amos’s urgent actions, and we accept it as a crucial first step in overseeing systemic improvements to care and outcomes and earning back the trust of women and families.

The maternity and neonatal commissioner will champion the voices of families and drive forward that necessary change. The Secretary of State will remain accountable to Parliament for maternity services. The role will be discussed urgently with the taskforce and will have a relentless focus on driving those improvements, which will include co-chairing the taskforce.

As the Committee knows, these are complex matters. The Government, having accepted the Baroness Amos’s recommendation, intend to legislate as soon as practicable. Our immediate priority is to work quickly through the taskforce to define the scope and responsibilities of the role. I know that the hon. Member for North Shropshire will not press the new clause, but I commit to keeping in touch with her and other hon. Members as this work progresses.

[Dr Johnson]

We talked about clause 1—on the abolition of NHS England—at the beginning of the Bill. The Minister was keen at that time to take unelected individuals out of the picture and create accountability by returning things to democratic control through the abolition of NHS England and putting them back in the Secretary of State’s hands. However, this proposal essentially does the reverse with maternity care, taking it out of the hands of Ministers and the Secretary of State and putting it into the hands of a commissioner. Could the Minister explain that?

[Karin Smyth]

I am sorry, but I did not get the end of that sentence. However, I think the hon. Lady was saying that the Bill essentially abolishes NHS England. Again, as I have said repeatedly, nobody is opposing that. As is well known, the recommendations on the maternity commissioner have come through a separate process. Given the need for public assurance and to earn back the trust of women and families, as well as—I think the hon. Lady said this herself—the shocking revelations that have come through some of this work, Baroness Amos recommended a maternity and neonatal commissioner to drive through these changes and give confidence to the system. That is why we are going to accept her recommendation. Accountability for maternity services obviously remains with the Secretary of State, who will be co-chairing the taskforce. I hope that addresses the comments the hon. Lady made.

On new clause 13, we know that the vast majority of births are safe, but the devastating trauma experienced by many through failures in care must be brought to an end. The CQC has an important role in assessing whether patients are receiving safe, effective and high-quality care, and it is essential that it can do that objectively and independent of Government. It is therefore not appropriate to impose a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure particular ratings.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

My questions will be very brief. I am conscious that, given that these are mostly Liberal Democrat new clauses, for once I will be asking the hon. Member for Winchester for a response, not the Minister.

New clause 4 would require that contracts be laid before Parliament. I would be grateful if the hon. Gentleman can tell the Committee how many such contracts he thinks would end up being laid before the House in any given year, based on historical data, and therefore how much parliamentary time that would take up. Does he envisage that being handled by an affirmative or negative statutory instrument? What will the process be?

I can see what the hon. Gentleman is trying to do, but I have a certain wariness, along the lines of that expressed by the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket. Although it is important that we have appropriate protections and scrutiny, when we are procuring services and technology for the NHS we should be looking for the most effective and best tools that have those safeguards but can do the job that eminent surgeons and clinicians need them to do in order to do their work for patients.

[Karin Smyth]

I am grateful to hon. Members for tabling these new clauses. I recognise the concerns behind them. Contracts involving NHS data, digital services and technology must be subject to proper scrutiny. Patients expect their medical information to be protected, and NHS staff expect the systems that they use to be safe and reliable. The Government agree that Parliament should be entitled to test how those protections work.

I also want to be clear that the Government want British businesses to win more public contracts and build stronger UK capability in digital and technology. The Government are already using procurement to support British businesses, jobs, skills and national security. More than 90% of UK public contracts are currently awarded to UK suppliers, and the Government have set out reforms to make procurement do more to support British industry and supply chain resilience.

I do not think that new clause 3 is the right way to achieve proper scrutiny. It would require the Secretary of State, within six months, to conduct and lay before Parliament a risk assessment of all contracts between NHS organisations and suppliers based outside the United Kingdom. That would include contracts regardless of the value—we heard a little about that from the Opposition—and of the services being provided, the type of data and whether there is evidence of any sort of concern. Risk is driven by the nature of the data involved, not just where the supplier is located. That is why the Government’s approach is based on targeted assessment and proportionate control.

We already have the tools we need in the Procurement Act 2023, which gives contracting authorities the powers to exclude suppliers and terminate contracts where the legal tests are met, including on national security grounds. They may also refer suppliers for a debarment investigation. The National Security Unit for Procurement supports Ministers in assessing suppliers on national security grounds, working closely with Departments and the intelligence community. In health and digital contracts, those procurement powers sit alongside data protection legislation and data protection impact assessments, in line with the digital, data and technology playbook. That is not an argument for complacency; we should continue to identify risks before procurement begins.

A broad duty of the kind in new clause 3 would risk becoming a reporting exercise and would not necessarily make the highest-risk contracts safer. It could, however, draw time and resource away from the assurance activities that matter most. The right approach is to strengthen the targeted controls, not to create a single statutory risk assessment covering every non-UK supplier.

Similarly, on new clause 4, a blanket “buy British” rule would not be the right test for NHS data contracts, although I hope that I have assured the hon. Member for Winchester that home-grown domestic products are absolutely what we are trying to focus on. The UK must treat suppliers from countries with reciprocal procurement access fairly. Our international obligations matter and are an important driver of the UK economy, including the World Trade Organisation agreement on Government procurement, which gives British businesses guaranteed access to £1.3 trillion in public procurement opportunities overseas annually.

As the hon. Member will understand, new clause 5 would require the Government to commit to a new programme of work to develop domestic capability, to reduce reliance on overseas suppliers of IT services and technology. The strategy would also require us to set out an approach to managing the risk associated with our current use of technology provided by overseas suppliers. I welcome the notion of encouraging domestic innovation to ensure the security and resilience of our IT infrastructure. However, ensuring the security of our data and the resilience of our systems is already embedded in everything we do. The new clause is therefore simply not necessary.

Hon. Members will accept that we want to see continued growth of digital and tech industries in this country; it is one of our real success stories. However, it will not be achieved by cutting across procurement law and not seeking the solutions that provide the best value for our money and the right service for the NHS. Our approach to securing the best IT and tech solutions should always be to seek the best on offer in a diverse, global market, not to prioritise based on location. Prioritising domestic providers means making a decision on grounds other than the quality, integrity or value for money of a solution.

I understand the concern behind new clause 43, which the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham spoke to. However, where public money is used to provide NHS services, there should be proper transparency about the contract, the service being delivered and the use of public funds. Patients and the public are entitled to expect that information is not placed beyond reach simply because a service is delivered through a contract. I do not think the new clause necessary, and I am concerned that it could create confusion about the operation of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. The Act already deals with information held by another person on behalf of the public authority. The key issue is not where the information physically sits. It does not matter whether it is held by the authority or by one of its commercial partners; what matters is whether it is held for the public authority’s purpose.

The Government agree with the principle of transparency, but new clause 5 would not improve the existing framework. It would risk duplicating duties that already exist, cutting across standard contract terms and creating uncertainty about patient information, which is rightly protected. For all those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press the new clauses.

Finally, I say to the hon. Member for Winchester that we have already debated the single patient record. Public trust is key, and there will be multiple suppliers. We are bringing patients and the public with us and will continue to do so. The hon. Member asked about the FDP roll-out. I do not think it was about the supplier. I think it was about the money. It was about inertia in rolling out some good technology that provides good efficiency. It was also about capacity, capability and an attitude to productivity, which we absolutely need to drive more of.

[Dr Chambers]

I appreciate the Minister’s response and the comments of other Members, which were insightful as usual.

When we discussed whether carers could access parts of the single patient record, Members made very good points about privacy and historical health issues that a patient might not want a carer to know about. Those are very sensible concerns, but someone watching these proceedings or looking back over the record would think that there had been a lot more agonising over whether someone caring for a patient could access relevant information than over the potential systemic misuse of health information facilitated by private companies. A lot of people are worried about that when it comes to procurement, trust and sovereignty.

I thank the Minister for her comments on new clause 3. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 4

Duty on the Secretary of State to prioritise domestic suppliers

“In the National Health Service Act 2006, after section 1CC (inserted by section 6 of this Act) insert—

‘1CD Duty to prioritise domestic suppliers

(1) In exercising functions in relation to the health and care service, the Secretary of State must prioritise the awarding of any contract that will involve the handling of NHS patient data to suppliers based in the United Kingdom.

(2) The Secretary of State may only seek to procure technology and information systems which will handle NHS patient data from suppliers based outside of the United Kingdom where a viable domestic alternative does not exist.

(3) Before signing any contract for the procurement of technology and information systems which will handle NHS patient data with a supplier based outside of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State must consult with—

(a) patient groups,

(b) national security experts, and

(c) staff unions,

on the proposed contract and lay a report on such a consultation before Parliament.

(4) Where it is proposed to sign a contract for the procurement of technology and information systems which will handle NHS patient data with a supplier based outside of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State must arrange for a motion agreeing to the signing of such a contract to be tabled in each House of Parliament, and no such contract may be signed where a motion for its agreement is negatived by either House of Parliament.

(5) If a contract is awarded for the procurement of technology and information systems which will handle NHS patient data with a supplier based outside of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State must place a statement before both Houses of Parliament setting out whether the Government is taking, or is planning to take, steps to develop or support long-term domestic alternatives to the systems provided by the contract.’”—(Dr Chambers.)

This new clause would place a duty on the Secretary of State to prioritise domestic, UK-based, suppliers for technology systems and contracts handling NHS patient data, and places restrictions on the signing of contracts for such systems with non-UK based suppliers.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

NHS Staff Standards

Karin Smyth Excerpts

Monday 6th July 2026 Written Statements

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

Today, I would like to inform the House of the publication of the NHS staff standards, which will make staff experience an organisational priority within the NHS.

It is crucial that we look after the people who look after us, not only because it is the right thing to do for our hardworking staff, but because their experience directly impacts staff retention and absenteeism, ultimately affecting quality of patient care and overall organisational performance. That is why the 10-year health plan committed to developing a new set of staff standards, outlining minimum standards for employment across a range of areas in order to improve staff experience. Today’s announcement delivers on that commitment and will ensure that NHS staff feel supported, valued and engaged in a positive work environment.

The new standards will focus on the areas that we know are a priority for staff. These are: supporting line management; improving staff health and wellbeing; promoting flexible working; violence prevention and reduction; tackling racism; and sexual safety.

There has been some good progress improving staff experience, including through the NHS people promise, and there are strong examples across the system where organisations have been prioritising the wellbeing of their staff. However, compliance has not been mandated, meaning the benefits have not been consistently felt across the NHS.

The staff standards aim to provide clarity and consistency, and ensure that all organisations are working to the required level. That is why the standards set out the steps that organisations should take to ensure that meaningful action is taken at board level, with clear metrics to assess performance.

Central to the standards are the accountability measures that underpin them. Implementation of the standards will be compulsory, and organisations will be measured against them in the NHS oversight framework, alongside a range of other assurance mechanisms.

While the standards have been set at a national level, they will be put into practice locally. They have been developed through close engagement with the social partnership forum, and employers and trade union representatives should work together through their local partnership arrangements to apply the standards in a way that fits local services and staff needs.

Launching the staff standards is an important step, but only the start. We will work in partnership with the SPF to refine the standards and the metrics that underpin them, to ensure that the standards remain fit for purpose and drive the changes that we and NHS staff want to see. The accountability and assurance mechanisms, including the NHS oversight framework, will be further refined. We will also implement regular employer-level reporting, in line with the 10-year health plan commitment.

We see every day the dedication and commitment of NHS staff. I am proud to be taking this key step to prioritise staff experience and create workplaces where people want to stay and thrive.

[HCWS189]

Health Bill (Tenth sitting)

Karin Smyth Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 2nd July 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston and my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham have covered a lot of the points I wanted to make, so I will keep this relatively brief. Like them, I entirely sympathise with what the hon. Member for Winchester is trying to achieve with the two amendments. I think we would all want to see more investment in primary care. As my right hon. Friend—a former Health Minister—knows all too well, we need to see growth in primary care. The fact that there is not a single dentist’s practice in my constituency taking new NHS patients is a real concern, as are the waiting times for GPs in my constituency.

However, I do have some concerns. The first is that the standard, as the hon. Member for Winchester puts it, would be mandatorily enforced with a potential financial penalty. That takes away from what I think the Government are trying to achieve, which is local flexibility. As far as I can tell from the amendment, it makes no distinction between revenue spending and capital spending. I am still hopeful that my ICB is going to build a brand-new GP surgery and health hub in my constituency—it has been promising that for eight years and it is not here yet, so this may be hope over experience—and that would be a significant capital investment. Would the ICB be able to include that as spending on primary care services and get around the potential financial penalty?

I also worry about pitting one part of health spending against another. The hon. Member for Winchester said that the proposed standard would be similar to the mental health investment standard, but I believe that the Government—I am sure the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—have relatively recently changed the mental health standard to be in line with inflation rather than overall total spending. Therefore, if the amendment were to pass, primary care budgets would increase in line with total overall spending, whereas mental health budgets would increase in line with inflation. If those two things were out of sync, there would be a problem.

I totally accept what the hon. Member is trying to achieve. We all want to see more spent on primary care. The Government’s stated intention is to bring healthcare closer to home, and that can only be delivered, in my view, through primary care services. But there are some unintended consequences of the two amendments, which at least need more exploration before I could vote for them.

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for bringing this discussion to the Committee. As has been said, we all know how important investment in primary care is, particularly as this Government shift to neighbourhood health, and that is why we have invested so heavily.

Although we are absolutely interested in the outcomes, the inputs merit some attention too. We have provided an additional £601 million for general practice to reinforce the front door of the NHS, bringing the total spend on the GP contract to £14 billion in this year. That builds on last year’s £1.1 billion of investment, which was the biggest increase to GP contract funding in over a decade. In community pharmacy, we have increased funding by £340 million, bringing the total spend to £3.636 billion. That represents a 10.3% uplift on the back of an uplift of more than 19% across 2024-25 and 2025-26, which again was the largest uplift in funding of any part of the NHS at the time.

In 2024-25, we invested around £3.7 billion in primary care dentistry, and we reduced the underspend from £392 million in 2023-24 to just £36 million in 2024-25, maximising the treatment provided across all our constituencies from taxpayers’ money. We are investing £20 million to support digital integration between primary care optometry and secondary care, supporting more eye care in the community.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We have talked about this issue while debating numerous clauses of the Bill. If someone were being ungenerous, they might say that there is an urban bias to this Bill. I think that it is less that than the fact that the Government have decided to use, as my hon. Friend rightly says, these mayoral structures to base health services on, when in fact, in so many areas, they either do not exist yet or, as far as we can tell, will never exist. Maybe Manchesterism will change that; we do not know. The Minister is smiling, so maybe she knows.

Regarding new clause 34 and the promotion of positive mental health, the prevention of mental illness and the reduction of stigma are obviously vital and important goals. I welcome the intention of the new clause to ensure that mental wellbeing is taken seriously across the health service. However, I have a few concerns about placing such a broad duty on a statutory footing, not least because, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham asked: is that not the job of the Secretary of State anyway?

As far as I can tell, new clause 34 essentially duplicates many of the responsibilities that already exist. The Secretary of State and NHS England—as currently exists—along with integrated care boards and other public bodies, are already subject to duties relating to improving health, reducing inequalities, promoting public health and improving the quality of services. Many of the objectives listed in the new clause are already capable of being pursued under those existing powers and obligations. The question therefore arises as to what additional legal effect the new duty would have.

Secondly, the concept of “mental health wellbeing”, while perhaps being a term we kind of understand, is inherently broad and rather difficult to define when we are talking about writing it into law. Unlike things such as waiting times, staffing levels, or access standards, “wellbeing” is not really a measurable outcome. I have some sympathy with my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt), who said in evidence that he wanted to see fewer targets, because they often have unintended consequences and skew the system towards the targets rather than what is actually required.

Mental health wellbeing could encompass life satisfaction, emotional resilience, social connections, employment, housing security and many other factors. As a result, I do not think it is clear what compliance with the duty in this new clause would look like in practice, how the success would be measured or how public bodies could demonstrate that they had fulfilled the obligations.

Finally, although the requirement for an annual report may improve visibility, as with the provision in new clause 33, there is a risk that new clause 34 could create an additional reporting obligation without necessarily improving services or outcomes. Before Parliament imposes a new statutory duty, it should be satisfied that there is a clear objective, a measurable standard against which performance can be assessed and a distinct purpose that is not already served by existing legislation or rules. I am afraid that, unless the hon. Member for Winchester comes back with a devastating argument in his wind up, I am not yet convinced that new clause 34 amendment meets that test.

[Karin Smyth]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for bringing this discussion to the Committee. I will turn to amendments 9 and 10 along with new clause 27, which address similar points. These amendments would require integrated care boards to increase their spending on mental health services at least in line with their growth in their total programme funding. Amendment 10 would enable the Secretary of State to implement financial penalties for non-compliance, and new clause 27 would also place the mental health investment standard, or MHIS, on a statutory footing by requiring the Secretary of State to specify an annual increase in the proportion of mental health expenditure for each integrated care board and require integrated care boards to meet that level of expenditure.

I want to be really clear with the Committee: mental health remains a priority for this Government, and the Government are already making record investments in mental health services. Spending on mental health continues to increase in real terms and is forecast to reach a record £16.1 billion in 2026-27. That represents a real-terms increase of around £140 million, compared with 2025-26 and around £900 million of real-terms growth since 2023-24.

[Liz Twist (Blaydon and Consett) (Lab)]

The Minister has pointed to some improvements. She will know there is real concern about parity of esteem between mental and physical health, including the ways that we measure them. The Government have already done a great deal, but would the Minister say how we can ensure that parity of esteem between mental and physical health is achieved using the powers in clause 43?

[Karin Smyth]

I thank my hon. Friend for that and for her work on this issue. She is absolutely right: parity of esteem is critical, and we are committed to a spending increase to deliver it. I will come on to some of the points that she quite rightly made.

Although I do not think he was speaking on behalf of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon took us through some of the concerns of his Select Committee. The Government have put a formal standard and a financial safeguard in place through the mental health investment standard, and as set out in NHS England’s medium-term planning framework, we expect all integrated care boards to meet the standard over the next three years, and all are currently forecast to do so. For this period—2026-27 to 2028-29—the standard has been set on real funding growth, meaning that funding is expected at least to keep pace with inflation.

Meeting the mental health investment standard remains essential to delivering the Government’s ambitions on mental health, including achieving full national coverage of mental health support teams in schools and colleges by 2029, and expanding access to NHS talking therapies. The Government’s approach is to maintain strong protections for mental health investment, while giving local systems the flexibility to focus on outcomes and deliver services that meet the needs of their communities, which, as we have heard this morning, are very different. However, workforce increases and funding alone will not deliver the improvements the public and patients rightly expect in mental health care and support.

Demand for mental health support has risen rapidly, as we all know from our constituencies, with long waits and too many people unable to access the right support when they need it. We need a new approach that reduces waiting times, improves care quality and promotes early intervention and prevention in mental health. That is why we are developing a new cross-Government mental health strategy for England that will transform mental health care into a system that responds and intervenes earlier, reduces waiting times for support and ultimately supports people to participate fully in education, work and community life.

[Liz Twist]

I wonder whether, as part of that strategy, the Government will look at waiting times for mental health services, as we have heard of the considerable delays. That issue is important to everyone, but especially young people. Will the Government look at that issue and get waiting lists down?

[Karin Smyth]

Again, my hon. Friend makes an important point. Of course, the rising demand and the ways that waiting lists are managed and supported locally will have to be a critical part of any strategy. Also, as we have said in our elective reform plan, giving people information so that they can understand what is happening in their local systems is part of the wider patient experience work that we are going to do.

The Government are committed to prioritising the delivery of mental health services. That is why we have a standard already ensuring that mental health spending keeps pace in real terms, while allowing systems discretion to make additional investment in the way that best meets local needs. The amendments would place an inflexible financial requirement in statute. A more effective and overarching approach will be delivered through our cross-Government strategy. For those reasons, a further statutory duty is unnecessary and I ask the hon. Member for Winchester to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Prinsley]

We are talking about investing in mental health services, and we should consider more widely the causes of the mental health disorders that we are having to approach. If we are spending public money, we may be better off spending it on dealing with the causes of mental health problems rather than the consequences.

[Karin Smyth]

My hon. Friend touches on what I will come to as I conclude my remarks on the next new clause. He is absolutely right. The wider determinants of mental health need to be part of developing these services, as with physical health.

On new clause 34, I reassure the Committee that the Government are taking significant steps to improve mental health services in this area. We have recruited over 8,500 extra mental health workers since July 2024, we are accelerating the roll-out of mental health support in schools and colleges, and we are investing a record £16 billion in NHS mental health services this year. Furthermore, there will remain a requirement, as introduced in the Health and Care Act 2022, for mental health expertise on local integrated care boards.

However, as my hon. Friend just said, we know that good mental health and wellbeing requires more than improving NHS services. It requires concerted action to promote positive mental health and tackle the causes of mental ill health. That is why we are developing a new cross-Government mental health strategy for England, to be published later this year. It will take a whole-system approach, recognising the role of schools, employers, the voluntary sector and local government, and representing all parts of the country in promoting positive mental health and preventing mental health ill. The strategy will also go further on reducing the stigma and discrimination associated with mental health conditions, with a focus on improving mental health literacy across the population.

Finally, the new clause risks imposing unnecessary burdens on local systems. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Winchester not to press it. I hope he feels assured that the Government will take forward many of the Committee’s concerns in the mental health strategy.

[Dr Chambers]

I thank hon. Members for their insightful input to the discussion on mental health in general and for their thoughts on our amendments. It is reassuring to see the cross-party concern for mental health and the recognition that it seems to be an increasing problem.

The hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket made a good point about the causes of mental health problems. We know that people in debt are three times more likely to have mental health issues than people on an average income, and that people who have served in the armed forces are at a higher risk. A whole combination of non-clinical things, such as insecure housing, zero-hours contracts and even social media for adults and children, are potentially adding to the mental health challenges that we are facing.

I appreciate the Minister talking about the new cross-Department mental health strategy. It sounds valuable and it seems to address a huge number of the multifactorial issues that have led us to this point. I will happily not press any of the amendments apart from amendment 9. The mental health investment standard is one of our absolute core priorities, and I would like to press that to a vote. I thank everybody for their contributions and insight into this.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 44 stand part.

[Karin Smyth]

These clauses will make a series of vital changes to the NHS financial framework following the abolition of NHS England, strengthening funding arrangements and financial accountability. First, clause 43 will enable funding to flow to integrated care boards following the abolition of NHS England while simplifying the powers to direct how resources are used. The first change in new section 223G will transfer the responsibility to fund integrated care boards from NHS England to the Secretary of State, maintaining continuity of allocations and allowing in-year adjustments where needed.

We will also simplify the existing power in new section 223GA to direct integrated care boards in how resources are used, making it clearer and easier to use. That will ensure that safeguards can be applied consistently, such as the ability to recover funding where there is a failure to comply with a direction. Transparency will be maintained through the requirement to publish directions.

The clause will also introduce new section 223GB, setting how the direction powers in new section 223GA can be used in relation to expenditure on service integration across health and social care. At present, service integration funding must be placed in a pooled budget with local authorities, even if that is not the most effective approach. The current legislation allows for only one model, even where that may introduce unnecessary bureaucracy or delay. The clause will remove that mandatory requirement, giving the Secretary of State discretion each year on whether integration funding should be pooled.

That will not remove pooled budgets; they will remain the default where they deliver better outcomes, and local areas will still be able to enter section 75 agreements voluntarily. This clause will introduce proportionate flexibility and enable the Secretary of State to decide, transparently and through published directions, whether funding should be pooled in particular circumstances. That will ensure that we can act quickly when needed, for example in responding to urgent pressures, so that the Secretary of State is not constrained by a blanket legal requirement that does not always add value.

Clause 43 will also make necessary consequential changes following the transfer of functions from NHS England to the Secretary of State. That will include replacing “NHS England” with “The Secretary of State” in section 223GC, which concerns the power to give directions about integrated care board expenditure limits, and repealing section 223K on quality payments, as the Secretary of State can use other powers to deliver payments for quality improvement purposes.

Having set out a clearer and more streamlined framework for allocating and directing NHS resources, we now turn to how integrated care boards and providers will be held accountable for managing those resources. Clause 44 will omit sections 223M and 223N from the National Health Service Act 2006, which require each integrated care board and its partner NHS trust and foundation trust to balance their finances collectively. By removing sections 223M and 223N, we will ensure that one organisation’s deficit can no longer be obscured by another’s surplus, while preserving the Secretary of State’s ability to set joint financial objectives for integrated care boards and their partner trusts where system-wide alignment is needed.

If we are to achieve the ambitious aim set out in the 10-year health plan, of getting most providers to achieve a surplus by 2029-30, we must place the onus back on individual organisations. Each NHS organisation should be unambiguously accountable for managing its own finances, rather than relying on collective system balances to absorb overspends.

Importantly, that does not mean abandoning collaboration. Clause 44 amends section 223L of the National Health Service Act 2006 to enable the Secretary of State to set joint financial objectives for integrated care boards and their partner NHS trusts and foundation trusts, where local system-wide alignment is genuinely required.

This approach supports the wider policy direction for ICBs to operate as strategic commissioners. With clearer organisation and financial accountability, ICBs can focus on population health outcomes, prioritising prevention, reducing health inequalities, shaping services around need, and driving better value for money through more effective commissioning.

These clauses make a clearer, more disciplined framework, where individual accountability is strengthened, ambiguity is reduced and national oversight is more coherent, while retaining targeted tools to support collaboration where it adds value. I therefore commend clauses 43 and 44 to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 43 is particularly long: it runs to almost two pages of text. Essentially, clause 43 transfers the responsibility for funding ICBs, and deciding how they use the resources, from NHS England to the Secretary of State. In many cases, that is consistent with the Government’s plan to abolish NHS England, take decisions and responsibility in-house, and get some more control.

One thing that does not make sense to me is that the Government are talking about devolving control and decision making, yet this clause gives the Secretary of State powers to control spending, direct how ICBs spend money in different areas, and penalise them if they do not do what they are told. The Minister has also talked in this Committee about a vision for the future in which ICBs are consistent with mayoral authority areas, and mayors sitting on ICBs to provide some sort of democratic accountability. But how can mayors be held democratically accountable if they are, or might be, overruled by the Secretary of State? How does the Minister see that working?

Also, greater financial intervention powers for the Secretary of State, if used, could expose ICB budgets to short-term political pressure, such as funding for a specific health area that has received celebrity or media attention. How would the Minister guard against that?

If the Secretary of State is able to contest financial decisions taken by ICBs, will that slow down decision making and make things more “sticky”? Essentially, the changes seem to go against the Government’s stated aim of a more devolved and autonomous operating model for the health service. I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that.

Clause 44 is a little shorter. It essentially makes changes to the joint duties of ICBs and providers. Some of those changes are again necessitated by the abolition of NHS England; keeping some of the sections would result in overlapping systems, so those make more sense. But the duties requiring ICBs and their partner trusts to achieve overall system balance are repealed. That goes against the collaborative principle behind the creation of integrated care systems, and makes it more difficult to manage financial pressures across a geographical footprint. If, in a particular year, there is financial pressure in one area of an ICB but less so in another, it is not able to transfer things so easily between those areas. How does the Minister expect that to work?

Clause 44 also allows the Secretary of State to set objectives for “one or more” partners. Is that discretionary or are there criteria for it? If it is discretionary, what would prevent the Secretary of State from selectively choosing which trusts are bound by joint objectives and which are not? How will that decision be made? How will trusts know whether it is likely to be made, or in what circumstances it could be made? This could undermine consistency of treatment across different ICBs and trusts. I will be interested in the Minister’s comments on those points.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

That moment is now. I call the Minister.

[Karin Smyth]

In my comments on the amendments, I think that I addressed many of the points raised. On the final point made by the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon, he will be aware that the Government have already improved financial oversight of the NHS system this year without any changes. We are getting a grip on the finances that were allowed to go so badly out of control across the entire piece under the Conservative party’s stewardship.

The hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, the Opposition spokesperson, started her comments by saying that the changes made by the two clauses are entirely consistent with the wider Bill, and I agree. We are abolishing NHS England—which, as I have oft repeated in these deliberations, has not been opposed by the Opposition parties—and of course there are some consequences of that, including giving the Secretary of State powers.

I will address a couple of other points directly. To be very clear, the better care fund remains a core mechanism to support the NHS and local government to join up health and social care services to a greater degree. The changes made by the clauses address the inflexibility of the current arrangements. The Committee had a good debate earlier this week about the Government’s commitment to enhancing that collaboration and joint working at a very local level. The clauses introduce flexibility, allowing the Secretary of State to determine when pooling is the best way to achieve better outcomes, while local areas are of course still able to pool budgets voluntarily through section 75 of the NHS Act 2006.

The allegation that there is weakening of joint working is not true. The clauses do not remove the ability to pool budgets; they just allow flexibility. As I said, the focus remains on delivering outcomes for patients and communities, not on financial structures.

A final question asked for reassurance that decisions made by the Secretary of State will not be arbitrary. Parliament will be reassured through clear safeguards and transparency. Any directions issued under the new powers must be published, ensuring visibility and accountability. Decisions will be guided by consistent criteria, including joint spending plans and performance objectives. Pooled budgets will continue to be required where they support better outcomes. In exercising these functions, the Secretary of State must also have regard to the need to reduce inequalities in access to health services and the outcomes achieved. Together, that ensures that decisions are—quite rightly—transparent, justified and applied fairly across the entire system.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 43 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45

Licence conditions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 46 stand part.

[Karin Smyth]

Clause 45 adds an additional purpose to those already listed in the Health and Social Care Act 2012 under which the Secretary of State can set or modify conditions in the provider licence. It will allow the Secretary of State, who will be responsible for licensing following the abolition of NHS England, to set licence conditions that promote or secure compliance with statutory obligations.

The NHS provider licence was first introduced in 2013 for NHS foundation trusts and in 2014 for eligible independent providers of NHS-funded care. It set clear rules and expectations around a range of matters, such as pricing and governance, for providers of NHS services. It also provided a mechanism for regulatory action when failures occurred at those organisations.

Licence conditions can be set only for specific purposes set out in legislation; the additional purpose does not change the existing licence conditions. The Secretary of State will be able to add or modify licence conditions only following a statutory consultation.

This additional purpose will allow the Secretary of State to hold providers to account when they are not meeting their legal obligations; for example, when they are not following procurement rules. As with other conditions in the licence, it means that we can use guidance to influence provider behaviour in these areas. The change is necessary and forms an important part of the Secretary of State’s powers to intervene where providers are not meeting expectations.

Clause 46 clarifies the methods by which the Secretary of State can serve certain notices relating to changes in the regulation of healthcare services. It brings existing requirements up to date with modern methods of communication, reducing administrative burden.

As the Committee already discussed when considering the abolition of NHS England, the Bill will transfer functions relating to the provider licence and the payment scheme from NHS England to the Secretary of State. When changes are proposed to these documents, NHS England must consult those affected and must notify all relevant organisations of the consultation. Currently, that notice cannot be delivered by email without the agreement of the organisation receiving it—without that agreement, it must be posted.

That process is out of step with the modern, digital-first approach set out in the 10-year health plan. Technology has evolved since those requirements were set, and we no longer communicate predominately through the postal system. The changes in the clause allow for rapid communication to ensure that the notice reaches the appropriate person promptly.

The clause brings the method by which the Secretary of State can deliver notices up to date with modern methods of communication to ensure that everyone affected has the chance to participate in the consultation in a timely way. I am sure all hon. Members agree that that is necessary, so I commend clauses 45 and 46 to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 45 makes technical changes to the licence conditions, allowing the Secretary of State to use those conditions as a tool to ensure compliance with legal requirements beyond those in the Health and Social Care Act 2012. That power is somewhat open-ended, which reduces certainty for providers, particularly independent ones, as they will not be able to easily anticipate what additional legal duties might be folded into the licence. The Minister said that there would be a consultation, but does she have any more details on how long the consultation process will be, or on how much notice of changes providers can expect? Like other clauses in the Bill, despite the Government’s discussion of devolution, the clause introduces another centralising power.

Clause 46 is about the specifics of to whom legal documents can be served and through what mechanism. I understand the Minister’s argument on the need for modernisation, but everyone will have had emails that were bounced by spam filters or the like. How will she ensure that the emails are not just sent but received, so that there is a fair playing field for everyone?

[Gregory Stafford]

I understand the purpose of clauses 45 and 46, as there is clear public interest in ensuring that providers that hold licences in our health and care system comply with the law. Patients, taxpayers and staff are entitled to expect high standards, proper governance and accountability. Where a provider delivers vital public services, it is reasonable for the licensing scheme to help to uphold those obligations. In that sense, the intention of the clauses is good.

My hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham outlined a number of questions for the Minister. Could the Minister explain in more detail how clause 46, which essentially provides for the enforcement of the provisions in clause 45, will operate in practice?

[Karin Smyth]

I do not have any more details on how the clauses will operate in practice and follow through into guidance; that will obviously be in the usual guidance on the operation of the system. It is usual practice for people doing the work to make contact with the receiver of the email to check that they have received it and are acting on it appropriately.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47

Single patient record

--- Later in debate ---

[Karin Smyth]

I agree with the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon that, through this amendment, the hon. Member for Winchester has given us an opportunity to think. I am grateful to him for this chance to talk about carers and this important issue. I am a carer of an older person, and for those of us who are carers, it is helpful to have some discussion about this area. Carers play a vital role and we are committed to ensuring that they have the support they need. We are of course very grateful for all the work that they do.

The Bill already includes a power that permits regulations to make patient information available to people other than patients on the patient’s behalf. As the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, said, that can include carers, and it is our intention to do so. We want to ensure that carers who act on behalf of the people they care for get the full benefit from the single patient record.

NHS proxy access already allows for people other than patients—which includes carers, parents or care home staff—to manage the health and care of someone they care for. Setting up proxy access requires the consent and involvement of the individual and the person they care for. We will set out in regulations how proxy access will work for the single patient record, as in the existing NHS position.

The single patient record will be developed on two priority care pathways in maternity and frailty, which will initially be delivered through local arrangements. Some clinicians and patients will be able to view and manage additional elements of care, such as proxy access for carers, earlier than others. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Winchester to withdraw his amendment.

We have had some helpful comments about some other concerns.

[Dr Johnson]

Will the Minister confirm whether the intention of the Government is to separate parts of the record out so that people can give consent for part of the record to be shared, but not the complete record, where they have reasons to want extra privacy?

[Karin Smyth]

The hon. Lady knows that we are talking about an enabling power in the Bill. All the details will be brought forward in regulations, through discussions and consultation. We will discuss that more broadly as we talk about the wider clause.

One of the key issues I have been asked about is protecting vulnerable people. Patients will access a single patient record through the NHS app, and NHS England has published guidance on clinical safety, safeguarding and the NHS app, which provides advice on minimising the risk to those where there may be challenges or potential risks. We will adopt a similar approach to the single patient record. Clinicians will be able to redact information that is too sensitive to share, and we will agree a protocol with professional bodies on how that will be applied. I am sure that we will discuss that in more detail, because it is an important area to get right.

[Dr Chambers]

I thank everyone for that very useful discussion. I was pleased to see everyone broadly in agreement that we need to work out how we can provide the necessary information to provide better care, and to balance that with privacy. Everyone made really insightful points on that.

I just emphasise that, as we all know, there is a difference between treatment/prescription and compliance, and compliance is where many medical treatments fall down. It is once the medical staff are not involved on a day-to-day basis, when the patient is not under their direct care or in the facility of the medical treatment, that most of the care takes place, and that is when successful or unsuccessful treatment for the medical condition occurs. If the people providing the daily care are not empowered properly, it is—well, not a complete waste of time, but the efforts of the medical staff are in vain if the compliance day to day is not accurate.

I thank everyone for the discussion. I will not press the amendment to a vote, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Emma Foody.)

Health Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Karin Smyth Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 2nd July 2026 Public Bill Committees

The Committee should also consider the genuine need to access such information. While I can see the benefits, which I have outlined, there is the potential for every possible determinant of health to end up in the single patient record. I am trying not to be flippant, but whether someone drives a car, where they went to school and their parents’ medical histories could all be relevant to their medical history. Although I completely understand the intention and the way in which the hon. Member for Winchester wishes to expand the single patient record, we are in danger of making it such an enormous beast that it becomes unwieldy and unusable. We need to be really cautious before going down a route where it essentially becomes a repository for the story of people’s lives.

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

Wherever possible, the single patient record will build on source records such as GP records. As such, it will include relevant patient information and, where appropriate, digital markers such as those suggested in the amendments. We have had some useful discussion as a result of the amendments, but such considerations are generally operational, and legislation is neither necessary nor practical.

On amendment 71, Members will know that the Government have been doing significant work in support of a digital medical marker for firearms. Medical information for firearms licensing provided by the applicant has been a mandatory requirement for every firearm and shotgun licence application since November 2021, as we have heard, when the new statutory guidance for chief officers of police on firearms licensing was introduced. When any individual applies for a firearms licence, the applicant’s doctor must provide details of any relevant medical conditions, such as depression, dementia, mental health conditions or drug or alcohol abuse.

A digital maker is placed on the GP patient record when a certificate is granted, and a GP can alert the police if a licence holder has a relevant medical condition. The digital marker automatically flags to the GP if a patient is suffering from a relevant medical condition and is a firearms certificate holder. It is true that the marker is not legally mandated, but it is supported by the British Medical Association and the Royal College of General Practitioners, and the former issues guidance to GPs about the firearms marker.

GPs already have professional duties to consider patient and public safety, and existing firearms licensing arrangements support GPs to share relevant concerns with the police where appropriate, while the responsibility for licensing decisions rests with the police. Data shows that, since its introduction in 2023, the marker is being used and that GPs are notifying police of medical issues that have arisen. There is nothing to suggest that the system is not effective.

[Dr Johnson]

Is it not also the case that anyone who is aware that an employee or relative has a licence and is concerned about their mental health can make such a report?

[Karin Smyth]

I am afraid I do not know the answer to the hon. Lady’s question, but if it is relevant, I will try to get back to her on it.

People applying for a licence must now indicate whether they have seen a medical practitioner other than their GP. The Government also intend to make a statutory instrument to require licence holders to inform the police if they consult a third-party medical practitioner who is not their GP.

The single patient record will build on and connect with information from GP source records where appropriate; no new provision is needed for that to happen. That process should be agreed as part of operational arrangements with the profession, in line with the current approach to markers in the GP record. If it is agreed that it would be beneficial for health and care professionals to have wider access to the firearms marker, the single patient record could facilitate that, but we do not intend to fill the Bill with detailed operational requirements such as that.

We do not believe that the SPR is the appropriate vehicle for having a debate about regulations requiring a report on the merits of a mandatory marker. As the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said, we should not expand the clearly defined scope of the single patient record—the scope is limited to direct care—to include a debate about what is stored more generally in NHS records. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Winchester to withdraw amendment 71.

On amendment 72, as I have already outlined, the single patient record will build on and connect with existing source records, such as GP or hospital records, wherever possible. Where a person’s status as a military veteran is recorded, it will be possible to make that information available in the single patient record. Therefore, the provisions already ensure that the information is made available, where veterans opt to have that status recorded—that addresses some of the other issues raised by the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon. There is no need to make any statutory requirement to ensure that staff have that information and consider any necessary adjustments or potential treatment options that may be relevant to ensure safe and effective care.

In addition, the clause contains powers to make regulations to allow people involved in the provision of an individual’s direct care, including that of any veteran after they have left the military, to access their single patient record. We want the single patient record to improve the accessibility and effectiveness of care for everyone. That includes making sure that military veterans can access necessary support and that staff can provide them with appropriate care. Furthermore, duties in the Armed Forces Act 2006 require the NHS and local authorities to have due regard to the armed forces covenant, which, of course, I fully support. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Winchester not to press amendment 72.

[Dr Chambers]

I thank all hon. Members for their input, and the Minister for her insights. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Johnson]

I am advised to declare that, although I am not a licence holder of a shotgun or a rifle, my husband has both a shotgun and a firearms licence.

[Karin Smyth]

I am grateful to hon. Members for this debate. Meaningful public engagement will be key to the success of the single patient record—we absolutely understand that—in building awareness and in designing the system. It has to have digital inclusion at its heart, but adding statutory requirements for public awareness campaigns and risk assessments is not the way forward. Amendment 49 seeks to put such a requirement on a statutory footing. I want to reassure the Committee and all Members: as the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston said, public awareness is absolutely key and will be integral to success. Work is already under way to ensure that we do that; we do not need to wait, nor should we be constrained by the proposed amendment.

In 2024, we began extensive public engagement on the use of data across health and social care, which showed strong support for the single patient record. We have heard that most people felt it was

“long overdue and a necessary step towards better care”.

The public engagement findings indicated support to progress at pace on the concept of a single patient record, to resolve the frustrations that patients and the public have when they have to repeat their story at multiple health and care settings.

As we move towards our ambition to give all patients in England access to a core set of their data through the single patient record from 2028, we will maintain a sustained drumbeat—as they say in the jargon—of public communications to raise awareness of the single patient record. We have heard some examples of where the Government do that well. Of course we want to learn from such examples across the country and from previous Government campaigns that have worked well, to explain the benefits and safeguards in plain English, and to signpost accessible information and feedback routes for patients and the public. I heard the comments made about people who may be excluded or have particular disabilities, including some older people—from conversations with my own constituents, it is often older people or those with multiple disabilities who can have their experience enhanced. We should make no assumptions about who does or does not feel excluded in this space; we need to learn from them all.

Furthermore, we have already published public-facing single patient record information and a dedicated feedback route. We will continue to co-create plain English, easy-read and translated materials, frequently asked questions and “voices heard/action taken” updates with public panels and patient groups ahead of roll-out. We will build on what we learn from that ongoing work as we develop the regulations. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham not to move amendment 49.

On the lead amendment, moved by the hon. Member for North Shropshire, we recognise, as I hope I have assured the Committee, that digital inclusion is an important issue. To quote another Member, we are eager to get it right, and we are taking it very seriously. Digital inclusion is a key driver in addressing health inequalities, supporting individuals and empowering people to better manage their health, which is at the heart of our 10-year plan. It is a system-wide issue, and one that the health and care system is taking action to address. We have considered this as part of the equality impact assessment of the single patient record provisions in the Bill, and will continue to keep those issues and potential mitigations under consideration throughout the development and implementation of the SPR. Therefore, although we agree with the aim of the amendment, we do not consider it necessary. Indeed, it would duplicate work that has already been done.

[Helen Morgan]

We have not seen a full design of the single patient record yet, but it is difficult to envisage what it would looks like for somebody who does not have access to the internet. It is not just older people; it is obviously a significant problem in deprived areas as well. Can the Minister elaborate on what that might look like for somebody who does not have a device or does not have broadband or mobile access? How will they be able to access their medical record? We might need to understand that before we move forward.

[Karin Smyth]

The hon. Lady makes an excellent point. Part the difficulty is that the powers in the Bill that enable the Government to bring forward a single patient record are separate from the secondary routes whereby we describe and work through the detail of regulation. All those considerations have to be very clear. The hon. Lady and I have spoken regularly about the lack of broadband access in her community, which remains a huge problem. All those considerations need to be worked through with the team. They are varied and multiple, and we need to bring parliamentarians and the public with us in doing that, as we bring forward secondary regulations.

NHS England’s digital inclusion framework, as currently, supports the delivery of the 10-year plan by addressing those particular connectivity and skills issues, as well as confidence and accessibility. That work is already partly in train through NHS England. We need to build on that and bring it forward as we come forward with the regulations. I visited the team up in Leeds around some of the digital inclusion they have already been doing from the app. It is very impressive how much they are doing with people to develop the app. I think people would agree that we can take some of that learning forward, because it is about making sure that digital transformation is inclusive and aligned with the ambition in the 10-year plan to personalise care, reduce inequalities and create a health system that works for everyone.

In addition, as set out in the “Managing health services for others” guidance, since February 2026 the NHS has had a process to allow proxy access to the app, which should also support people who, for example, do not have the skills to do it for themselves. Alongside those improvements, it is policy to undertake an inequality and health inequalities assessment prior to hosting anything new on the app. Again, that helps to identify, mitigate and monitor unintended negative impacts on vulnerable and marginalised populations before implementing new policy, services and procedures, as raised by the hon. Member for North Shropshire. That process should identify and consider the mitigations for the groups identified in the amendment.

I hope that Members can see how seriously the Government have taken the development of digital access so far. We absolutely recognise that we have to get it right to enable this record, which the public and population so desperately want to see. That work has already been undertaken and it will continue. For those reasons, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Helen Morgan]

The importance of the amendment is that it requires this problem to be monitored in an ongoing way. Monitoring something usually makes the situation improve, so I will not withdraw the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Karin Smyth]

This is another important discussion to have on the record to give patients and the public confidence as we introduce the vital single patient record. I start by stating that the security and privacy of people’s health data is paramount, and we will build the strongest safeguards possible into the record. Members from across the House have asked how those safeguards will be built into how the system is designed and operated, which is what we are doing.

It will operate on a roles-based access control model, similar to other NHS patient record systems where access to patient information is restricted to the authorised user only. The single patient record will go a step further by applying advanced cloud-based audit and oversight capabilities, enabling near real-time monitoring of system access and detection of unusual or inappropriate patterns. That will allow NHS security teams to track and detect access patterns, and to quickly intervene if specific records are accessed by staff who have no clinical relationship with the patient in question.

The single patient record will ensure that just because a clinician has permission to view a specific patient record, that does not mean they are authorised to do so without a clinical need. The security and access arrangements will be set out in the regulations themselves, which will be debated, rightly, in Parliament. Therefore, it is not necessary to set them out in a plan beforehand.

Furthermore, there are already existing enforcement arrangements that provide sanctions for inappropriate access to patient data, which will also include accessing the single patient record. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford for his extremely helpful intervention, in which he highlighted his own experience in this field. Some of the examples that we heard again today, including Southport, Nottingham, the recent case in Cambridge and others, are truly shocking to people. Clearly, that should never happen, but sadly it has. As my hon. Friend rightly outlined, there are provisions in place for training people on information governance and tracking when that happens.

Additionally, I want to be clear that the Computer Misuse Act 1990 makes it an offence to use a computer to access information in an unauthorised manner, such as a person accessing information without a legitimate reason. Inappropriate or unauthorised access to health records—often referred to as snooping—is a serious offence that can lead to severe penalties, including dismissal, criminal prosecution and financial penalties. Regulated healthcare professionals, such as doctors, nurses and pharmacies, can be reported to their respective professional bodies, which can result in them being struck off in serious cases.

The information commissioner also has powers to investigate and take action against infringements of data protection legislation, which can include monetary penalties, enforcement notices, undertakings, prosecutions and reprimands. Furthermore, patients have a right to access data that is held about them under the data protection legislation, and those rights will continue to apply to the single patient record. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham to withdraw her amendment.

[Dr Johnson]

We think this is an important issue, so we would like to divide the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 7—Privacy by design in NHS Single Patient Record and Federated Data Platform architecture—

“(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that there is privacy by design as part of the delivery of the NHS Federated Data Platform architecture.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), privacy by design includes—

(a) patient data anonymisation outside its usage by clinicians and within the National Data Integration Tenant; and

(b) patient consent for the processing of personal information by NHS.”

New clause 8—NHS ownership of connection software—

“(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that there is NHS ownership of any data connector software architecture used as part of the delivery of the NHS Single Patient Record or Federated Data Platform.

(2) In this section, a data connector means an interface or connection between the NHS Federated Data Platform and any other health system.”

[Karin Smyth]

The single patient record is fundamental to the Government’s mission to create a modern, joined-up NHS that puts patients at the centre of their care. The way we currently manage health records is letting patients down. That must change. Patient information is fragmented, so care is fragmented.

Local shared care records have demonstrated what can be achieved. The OneLondon shared care record is used by more than 100,000 frontline staff, with estimated monthly savings of £4.6 million, and around 45,000 patients are reported to have benefited from the Greater Manchester care record in March 2026, with 15 minutes of treatment time saved per patient.

Successful as some local shared care records are, however, they do not provide a uniform, comprehensive single record across England. The single patient record will allow people to have access to a summary of their full health record and provide relevant health and care providers with access to the health and care information they need to provide effective joined-up care.

This is not a new problem and patients have not been silent about it. For more than a decade, patient groups and organisations across the country have been calling for exactly the kind of change that the single patient record will deliver. As far back as 2013, National Voices captured it simply and powerfully:

“I would like to tell my story once.”

The call has only got stronger. Our independently delivered public deliberations found strong support for the single patient record. It was described as a long-overdue fix to fragmented care, while the survey of 2,000 people found more than three quarters in favour of a single patient record. The Committee has heard directly from a range of stakeholders about the benefits a single patient record could have for patients and their care.

Clause 47 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations for the purpose of creating and operating the single patient record. The purpose of regulations made under this clause is to bring together patient information and make it available to patients and their relevant health and care providers such as GPs, hospital doctors, social care providers or others involved in their direct care. Only information concerned with direct care will form part of the system.

We have also included strong safeguards. The security and privacy of people’s health and social care data are paramount, and we will build the strongest of safeguards into the single patient record. It will be designed to protect personal data by default, with the highest standards of cyber-security and information governance ensuring that only the right people can access the right information, at the right time—and only for the right reasons. Permissions to access patient information will be restricted to authorised users only, with an audit trail of who has accessed a patient’s data. The Secretary of State must also consult appropriate persons before making regulations and must have regard to ensuring that adequate safeguards are in place to prevent misuses of data.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

That is an interesting question. I do not know the answer, but perhaps the Minister can pick that up.

The Bill also creates powers for financial penalties. It sets out a process for notices and opportunities to make representations and a right of appeal. Those procedural protections are sensible, but the Bill does not tell us who might be fined or what conduct would trigger a penalty, and it does not set out a maximum penalty level. Those decisions, again, are left to regulations.

It is also important to remember that the Bill does not replace existing data protection law, as I think the Minister outlined in her opening remarks. Organisations will still have to comply with the Data Protection Act and other UK data protection rules. However, the Bill would provide a new statutory basis for processing information through the single patient record. That makes the wording of the Bill especially important. Ultimately, public confidence will determine whether the system succeeds. People are generally willing for information to be shared when it improves their care, but they also expect transparency, security and accountability and expect to know who can see their information and why. Those expectations are entirely reasonable.

There are several questions that I believe the Committee should ask before these powers are granted. Will patients have a genuine choice about participation? Will they be able to restrict access to particularly sensitive parts of their records? Who exactly will be able to access the system? Will patients be able to see a record of who has viewed their information? What minimum standards will apply? How will misuse be identified and punished? What independent oversight will exist? Those are not technical details; they are central to public confidence.

In conclusion, the clause will create a legal framework rather than a system itself. It will give broad powers to establish the single patient record while leaving many of the most important questions to future regulations. Clearly most people support the goal of improving patient care, but because the system will involve some of the most personal information that people have, Parliament should ensure that patient rights, safeguards, transparency and accountability are clearly built into the framework from the beginning. It should ensure that questions are asked now rather than decided on later.

[Karin Smyth]

I turn first to new clause 7. Patient data is at the heart of the NHS, and it is important to help plan and run health and social care services; we have discussed that before, and a lot of these points have already been recorded in our earlier conversations. The security and privacy of people’s health and care data are paramount. To be clear, the Bill does not rewrite our data protection laws; it works alongside them, allowing the NHS to use existing, lawful frameworks to share information safely and legally for the direct care of patients. Article 25 of the UK general data protection regulation already applies to the federated data platform, and will apply to the single patient record. The new clause is therefore not necessary.

In the NHS, there are different ways in which patient information is used, and not all of them involve asking for explicit consent each time. For example, if a GP refers someone to a hospital, that person would not expect the clinician reviewing the case to ask their permission before looking at their medical record; their agreement is understood as part of seeking care. That is called implied consent. Although a national data opt-out exists, it applies only to data used for secondary purposes such as research and planning.

The single patient record is expected to operate roles-based access control, whereby permission to access patient information is restricted to authorised users only, with an audit trail of who has accessed the patient’s data. Inappropriate or unauthorised access to health records, often referred to as snooping, is a serious offence. There are mechanisms to manage that, including prosecution and fines.

In 2025-26, we invested £75 million across health and social care, building on the £375 million invested since 2017. Through our ambitious cyber improvement programme, we are tackling the changing cyber risk head on, expanding protection and services to better protect the health and care system. The single patient record system is expected to be assessed as critical national infrastructure, with the highest standards of cyber-security and information governance to meet our existing duties to keep personal data safe under the data protection legislative framework.

I turn to new clause 8. No decision has been made about who will be the IT suppliers of the single patient record. It is expected and intended that it will be delivered through contracts with multiple suppliers, which will reduce dependency on a single supplier. Furthermore, no decision has been made as to how, if at all, the single patient record will link to existing infrastructure such as the federated data platform. As hon. Members will expect, I would not support using the Bill to try to rewrite the contract for the federated data platform.

Hon. Members have discussed a wide range of issues relating to this area. They probably know that negotiating the intellectual property in relation to software in digital services is complex and often contentious. The new clause would make it a condition of any single patient record IT supplier contract that the NHS owns the intellectual property in data connector software, regardless of the circumstances. In practical terms, that would be likely to disincentivise suppliers from offering their services if they were required to sacrifice the IP of a product. It is unnecessary to impose such a condition, as there are other ways in which the NHS can ensure that software is reusable, such as broad general licences to use the data connector software in whatever manner, requirements to use industry standard code and interfaces, and information standards.

The recent changes to the NHS information standards in the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 make relevant IT suppliers accountable for meeting information standards and enable the Government to monitor and enforce compliance with information standards by IT suppliers. We wish to see a vibrant UK market in digital and technology, while ensuring that patients get the best technology to improve care outcomes and to keep the NHS financially sustainable. That will give the NHS more choice and help to improve standards while supporting economic growth.

We have had what they call a wide-ranging discussion on some things that are not actually in the clause. I agree with the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon that it is absolutely right, and we have heard some excellent examples from Members with clinical experience. My hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield will now be forever known as Data Dave—sorry about that. The hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham has clinical experience and my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford has NHS experience, as do I. That experience is really valuable. The Liberal Democrats tabled amendments and had a long list of questions, most of which are addressed in various pieces of information that we have put forward. However, I take the point about the intellectual difficulties of what the clause does. We all agree with it, as does the country, and patients think it already happens.

We are an outlier in this sphere. The Government are going to change that situation. However, these questions and concerns are the reason why we take through secondary legislation, which is something that we all understand but the outside world does not. We need to bring people with us. Our officials have come to talk to Members of Parliament about the Bill. I am open to suggestions from Members about the best way to address the issues, and particularly about the best way to inform Members on behalf of constituents. These discussions are important to building public trust and security.

I will finish on a broader point. I commend clause 47, which gives an enabling power, but let us be very clear that patient information will still be held in the system in which it was originally created. These bodies, whether GPs or hospitals, will continue to be responsible for ensuring that the data is handled securely and lawfully and is accessed for valid reasons only. As I mentioned earlier, we have shared systems operating already. Some parts of the country and some of our constituents are already experiencing some of the benefits of a shared system. We will use that experience and learn the lessons of the past, under whichever Government, to build for the rest of the country the shared systems that some people have already. We will come on later to provisions on devolution arrangements, on working for the future and on operating more efficiently across devolved areas.

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the Minister for clarifying that the data will continue to be stored and held in the databases in the electronic record-keeping system where it is currently kept. I am not looking for her to give me a detailed solution on the spot, but does she accept that unless there is seamless interoperability across all those systems the single patient record will not be realised, and that we are still an awfully long way from seamless interoperability across England, let alone the UK?

[Karin Smyth]

The hon. Gentleman tempts me to spend the next hour talking about the shocking state of the capital and infrastructure systems that we inherited from the previous Government, but I will not. Of course they do not work: that is one of the biggest issues around staff morale. We saw through the 10-year health plan, particularly with clinicians having to log on to nearly 10 different systems, how that impedes progress and efficiency at a local level. Where it is rolled out, the federated data platform helps to make systems more efficient, particularly in local hospitals. We heard in our evidence sessions about maternity and frailty, which are the areas in which we will be testing and rolling out this approach to make the best use of it on the ground. Alongside that, the work to make systems more interoperable and efficient at a local level continues. I commend clause 47 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Information about health service products

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

Clause 48 will make amendments to the health service products legislative information gateway to allow the Government to continue to disclose certain information concerning the pricing and supply of health service products, which are items that include medicines that are used in the NHS. We recognise the importance of the effective flow of information between central Government about the pricing and supply of health service products to the NHS. Data sharing is governed by a clear legal framework defining who can access it and under what conditions. That supports the controls that the Government are able to exercise in relation to the pricing and supply of health service products.

Clause 48 will maintain the current safeguards for confidential and commercially sensitive data, ensuring continuity as NHS England’s functions are redistributed to the Secretary of State and integrated care boards. It will achieve that by enabling the Secretary of State to share pricing and supply information with people who provide services to them, such as primary care providers. That is essential to preserve the sharing of information and operation of the service that they provide for patients where that process is currently managed by NHS England.

As a consequence of the changes being made, the Secretary of State will be able to share relevant information with third-party service providers, such as providers of the software that primary care service providers use. They will be able to receive relevant data to make lawful disclosures of that information for specific purposes, those being the provision of certain services to the primary care service provider. This will ensure that there is no disruption to how data flows across the system.

This change will simply enable those who receive essential data to continue to do so following the abolition of NHS England. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Health and social care information: delegation of functions

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 50 stand part.

Amendment 6, in schedule 7, page 96, leave out lines 38 and 39 and insert—

“For section 255 (power to request NHS England to establish information systems), substitute—

‘255 Powers to request the Secretary of State to establish information systems

(1) Any person (including a devolved authority) may request the Secretary of State to establish and operate a system for the collection or analysis of information of a description specified in the request.

(2) A request may be made under subsection (1) by a person only if the person considers that the information which could be obtained by complying with the request is information which it is necessary or expedient for the person to have in relation to the person's exercise of functions, or carrying out of activities, in connection with the provision of health care or adult social care.

(3) The Secretary of State must comply with a mandatory request unless the Secretary of State considers that the request relates to information of a description prescribed in regulations.

(4) For the purposes of this Chapter a request under subsection (1) is a mandatory request if—

(a) it is made by a principal body, and

(b) the body considers that the information which could be obtained by complying with the request is information which it is necessary or expedient for the body to have in relation to its discharge of a duty in connection with the provision of health services or of adult social care in England.

(5) Subsection (6) applies where the Secretary of State has discretion under this section as to whether to comply with—

(a) a mandatory request, or

(b) any other request under subsection (1).

(6) In deciding whether to comply with the request, the Secretary of State —

(a) must, in particular, consider whether doing so would interfere to an unreasonable extent with the exercise by the Secretary of State of any of its functions, and

(b) may take into account the extent to which the principal body or other person making the request has had regard to—

(i) the code of practice prepared and published by the Secretary of State under section 263, and

(ii) advice or guidance given by the Secretary of State under section 265.

(7) In this section “principal body” means—

(a) the Care Quality Commission,

(b) the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, and

(c) such other persons as may be prescribed in regulations.

(8) In this Chapter “health care” includes all forms of health care whether relating to physical or mental health and also includes procedures that are similar to forms of medical or surgical care but are not provided in connection with a medical condition.’”

This amendment would enable the Care Quality Commission and NICE to continue to make mandatory requests to the Secretary of State to establish an information system, following the transfer of NHS England’s functions.

Amendment 7, in schedule 7, page 100, leave out paragraph 14.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 6.

Schedule 7.

[Karin Smyth]

Clauses 49 and 50 explain our approach to the transfer of NHS England’s existing data and information functions to the Secretary of State. Slightly counterintuitively, I will start with clause 50 before turning to clause 49.

Clause 50 inserts schedule 7, which takes existing NHS England information functions and transfers them to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, as part of a single centre for data and digital policy in the NHS. The schedule also includes changes to existing information functions. This will support the shift from analogue to digital and allow us to make the most of opportunities from data and AI, as set out in the 10-year health plan. The changes will not weaken the fundamental safeguards in place to protect health and care data, nor fundamentally change rules relating to how confidential patient information can be used.

I will now outline some key changes made by the clause. It will ensure that information systems for the NHS are set up, where appropriate, not just for the collection and analysis of data but for processing more generally. This will make it easier to support machine learning and artificial intelligence activities, among other uses of data.

The clause extends the extent of chapter 2 of part 9 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to the whole of the UK, and provides for the Secretary of State to establish information systems in the interests of the health service or adult social care in England, or in connection with the provision of care across the British Isles, as NHS England currently can.

The clause enables the Secretary of State to issue guidance to health and social care bodies on the processing of information. It transfers to the Secretary of State NHS England’s powers to require and request information, and such requests will be able specify the form, manner and time within which the information requested is to be provided.

The clause also allows the Secretary of State to publish information obtained in the operation of an information system, including information about service providers. Where NHS England had a duty to publish such information, it is right that the Secretary of State should retain discretion in that regard. Obviously, there may be circumstances in which the publication of data would not be appropriate, and the clause does not give the Secretary of State complete freedom to publish personal information. The Secretary of State may publish personal information without patient consent only where it is for the protection of life or health, or for the protection of public safety or security. It is possible that there could be circumstances—for example, in relation to infectious disease—in which information is published that could lead to an individual being identified. None the less, the change simplifies the process of publication while maintaining a high bar for the publication of personal information.

The Secretary of State’s power to disclose information—for example, to health bodies—other than by publication will be slightly different from NHS England’s current power. The grounds for disclosing personal information will largely mirror the current grounds, with a few additions, including in respect of facilitating clinical trials or other research. This will help to address barriers to data access for research while preserving existing rules on confidentiality. As with his powers of publication, the Secretary of State will also be able to disclose information for the protection of life or health, or for the protection of public safety or security.

The Secretary of State will be bound by certain existing duties on NHS England, including a duty to have regard to any relevant advice from the Confidentiality Advisory Group when publishing or disclosing information in accordance with his data functions. The Secretary of State will retain the regulation-making power to establish an accreditation scheme for information service providers, which will now include a broader range of providers, including public bodies.

Clause 49 permits the Secretary of State to delegate certain functions relating to health and care information. Currently, some of those functions can be delegated by NHSE via arrangements with third parties or under regulations. The clause will insert new section 251ZF, which allows the Secretary of State, by arrangement, to delegate to persons specified in regulations functions relating to information standards.

Information standards help to reduce fragmentation in digital and data services. They include mandatory requirements for how information is recorded, shared, governed and supported by IT. Increasing interoperability and consistency in digital and data is essential to increasing value for money, reducing the burden on staff and, ultimately, improving the quality of care. The continued use of information standards is key to the 10-year health plan’s aim of improving the interoperability of digital and data services across the health and care system. This will provide the Secretary of State with the flexibility to delegate such functions to persons who have the required technical expertise, where necessary.

Clause 49 will also insert new section 277G, which enables the Secretary of State to direct public bodies to exercise a wider range of his information functions, defined as “relevant information functions”. This includes not only information standards but other information functions, such as the Secretary of State’s duty to establish and operate information systems. The measures will provide the Secretary of State with important flexibility to delegate such functions to persons who have the required technical expertise, where necessary.

In all, the changes are necessary not just to effect the transfer of data functions to the Secretary of State but to enable better data use for the benefit of the NHS now and into the future.

[Dr Johnson]

I have a couple of questions. In lots of ways the provisions derive from clause 1 and the abolition of NHS England. Schedule 7 refers to operating a system in the interests of the health service, which is not the same as operating it in the interests of the patients. Does the Minister have any comments on that? The Nuffield Trust has pointed out that schedule 7 would not pass over to the Secretary of State NHSE’s duty to report to Parliament. Is that because the Minister thinks that duty is duplicated elsewhere and is therefore not necessary?

Under the previous legislation, the Care Quality Commission was slightly stronger and could make a mandatory request that NHS England establish a system, and NHS England had to comply with that unless it related to an existing exception. Now if the CQC makes a request, it goes to the Secretary of State, and whether it is agreed to is then somewhat more optional. Will the Minister say why she needs to change that power?

[Helen Morgan]

I want to speak to amendment 6, which is tabled in my name, and amendment 7, which is consequential upon it. Amendment 6 would ensure that the CQC and NICE can

“continue to make mandatory requests to the Secretary of State to establish an information system”,

as they currently can with NHS England. At the moment, NHS England has a duty to co-operate with the CQC and NICE, and that is often enough for a collaborative approach that allows the CQC to access the data it needs.

But the duty that applies to NHS England is not being passed on to the Department of Health and Social Care. The CQC raised the issue in written evidence to the Committee, saying that the duty

“has been an important mechanism”

that has

“supported receipt of patient safety incident reports…information sharing between regional teams, and the development of central data sharing solutions.”

The CQC went on:

“Without an equivalent duty, we would be reliant on there being sufficient capacity and willingness within DHSC to share information, with no statutory backstop. This could inhibit our ability to receive the information”

needed

“to keep people who use services safe. Challenges in this area are often cultural and rely on the subjective judgment of individual data controllers as to whether particular data sets can be shared, how these should be used and what the timeliness of sharing should be, leading to protracted piecemeal conversations and delays.”

As we have harrowingly heard over the past week, there is often reluctance to share data, particularly when there is a defensive culture in certain NHS institutions. Our amendment seeks to address the gap. I hope that what I have outlined is an oversight from the Government, not a deliberate attempt to reduce transparency or reduce regulator access to key data. The wider changes in schedule 11 will omit section 288 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. The Government are dropping this key wider duty in a schedule entitled “Minor and consequential amendments”. We do not think it is minor. It holds major implications for patient safety and transparency.

On a wider note, it seems counterintuitive that the CQC, as regulator, does not have easy access to the data collected nationally in the health service.

[Karin Smyth]

Let me respond to the hon. Member for North Shropshire on amendments 6 and 7. As she said, amendment 7 is consequential on amendment 6, so I will take them together.

I think we can all agree that the CQC and NICE should have access to the information they need to undertake their important work. Amendment 6 is not required to ensure that. Clause 50, and the associated changes in schedule 7, maintain the current ability for any person, including NICE and the CQC, to request the establishment and operation of an information system. However, NICE and the CQC will not be able to make the equivalent mandatory request they used to be able to make to NHS England because NHS England is to be abolished.

Amendment 6 seeks to maintain the current position when, in reality, mandatory requests were practically never made under the current arrangements. They were thought necessary when a separate arm’s length body had responsibility for collecting data about healthcare. There is no need for the Secretary of State to be subject to the same mandatory requirement as they are responsible for oversight of the entirety of the NHS and the adult social care system, and for its effective regulation.

Furthermore, the CQC has a statutory power, under section 64 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008, to require the provision of

“documents, records (including personal and medical records) or other items”

the CQC considers “necessary or expedient” for the purposes of its regulatory functions, from a range of health and social care commissioners and providers.

On amendment 7, the Government agree that a code of practice setting out strict standards for how health and care organisations must handle confidential patient information is an important component of a healthcare system that uses data safely and effectively. That is why clause 50 allows for the insertion of new section 252ZA into the National Health Service Act 2006, to transfer to the Secretary of State the duty to publish a code of practice on confidential patient information. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for North Shropshire not to press amendments 6 and 7 to a vote.

The hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham asked about duplication. I think the answer to her question is yes, but if that is not correct, I will make sure that I respond to her accordingly.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 7

Health and social care information systems etc

Amendment proposed: 6, in schedule 7, page 96, leave out lines 38 and 39 and insert—

“For section 255 (power to request NHS England to establish information systems), substitute—

‘255 Powers to request the Secretary of State to establish information systems

(1) Any person (including a devolved authority) may request the Secretary of State to establish and operate a system for the collection or analysis of information of a description specified in the request.

(2) A request may be made under subsection (1) by a person only if the person considers that the information which could be obtained by complying with the request is information which it is necessary or expedient for the person to have in relation to the person's exercise of functions, or carrying out of activities, in connection with the provision of health care or adult social care.

(3) The Secretary of State must comply with a mandatory request unless the Secretary of State considers that the request relates to information of a description prescribed in regulations.

(4) For the purposes of this Chapter a request under subsection (1) is a mandatory request if—

(a) it is made by a principal body, and

(b) the body considers that the information which could be obtained by complying with the request is information which it is necessary or expedient for the body to have in relation to its discharge of a duty in connection with the provision of health services or of adult social care in England.

(5) Subsection (6) applies where the Secretary of State has discretion under this section as to whether to comply with—

(a) a mandatory request, or

(b) any other request under subsection (1).

(6) In deciding whether to comply with the request, the Secretary of State —

(a) must, in particular, consider whether doing so would interfere to an unreasonable extent with the exercise by the Secretary of State of any of its functions, and

(b) may take into account the extent to which the principal body or other person making the request has had regard to—

(i) the code of practice prepared and published by the Secretary of State under section 263, and

(ii) advice or guidance given by the Secretary of State under section 265.

(7) In this section “principal body” means—

(a) the Care Quality Commission,

(b) the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, and

(c) such other persons as may be prescribed in regulations.

(8) In this Chapter “health care” includes all forms of health care whether relating to physical or mental health and also includes procedures that are similar to forms of medical or surgical care but are not provided in connection with a medical condition.’”—(Helen Morgan.)

This amendment would enable the Care Quality Commission and NICE to continue to make mandatory requests to the Secretary of State to establish an information system, following the transfer of NHS England’s functions.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

Clause 51 makes changes to section 42 of the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007, which governs how information collected at the registration of births, deaths and other life events may be shared for specific purposes. That information plays a vital role in supporting public services, including health service planning, population analysis and the delivery of care. The UK Statistics Authority may already share this registration data directly with a range of public bodies, including the Secretary of State and integrated care boards.

Clause 51 adds NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts in England to that list, providing a clear statutory route for sharing statistically codified registration data with trusts and foundation trusts responsible for delivering services on the ground. The clause is not about expanding the type of information that can be shared or widening the purposes for which it may be used, and does not create new datasets or weaken existing safeguards. All information sharing remains subject to the same statutory controls and protections that already apply. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 52

Arrangements with devolved authorities etc about information services

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 53 to 57 stand part.

[Karin Smyth]

Clauses 52 to 57 are vital. The Committee has discussed our relationship with colleagues in the devolved authorities; these clauses ensure that arrangements with devolved authorities and the Crown dependencies can continue following the abolition of NHS England.

Turning first to clauses 52 to 54, although healthcare is devolved in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland, the devolved Governments currently make arrangements with NHS England to deliver a number of functions on their behalf. Clauses 52 to 54 enable those existing arrangements to continue following the abolition by giving the powers to the Secretary of State. The policy intent is not to impact or reach into devolved competencies, but to secure continuity and legal clarity through existing cross-border and UK-wide arrangements involving Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This is about making sure that the current expertise and resources of NHS England remain available to devolved authorities once these functions merge with the Department of Health and Social Care.

The clauses will not give the Secretary of State any ability or power to do anything in relation to devolved authorities other than as mutually agreed. Arrangements will be fully voluntary and do not create a power for unilateral action; rather, they ensure that, where co-operation is wanted, there is a proper legal basis for it.

Under clause 52, the Secretary of State takes on the data functions of NHS England and, on request from the devolved authorities, to make arrangements for the provision of information services. Clause 52 additionally applies to Crown dependencies. There are a number of such arrangements already in place between NHS England, the devolved authorities and the Crown dependencies.

For example, NHS England provides the NHS login service for the NHS Wales app, as well as the electronic prescription service for Wales, and NHS England collects and analyses data for audits that span multiple devolved authorities, such as the national audit of pulmonary hypertension. These provisions will support continuity of those arrangements. We are making sure that, if it is appropriate, data functions that are transferring to the Secretary of State can be delegated. Proposed new section 294B of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 will allow that power to likewise be delegated to an appropriate public body.

Clause 53 provides a clear statutory basis for the Secretary of State, by agreement with the devolved administrations’ health bodies, to make commissioning arrangements for the Scottish, Welsh or Northern Ireland health services. This clause will help to ensure continuity for patients across the United Kingdom, reducing the risk of disruption, and support the effective commissioning of services where cross-border work remains the right approach.

Clause 54 enables the Secretary of State, by agreement with a devolved authority, to exercise certain education and training functions on that authority’s behalf and to provide services or facilities in connection with those functions. Education and training arrangements often work best when they are co-ordinated efficiently and supported by shared systems. At a time when every part of the health service needs a strong pipeline of skilled staff, it is vital that useful joint arrangements can continue with clarity and confidence as responsibility is transferred from NHS England to the Secretary of State. The clause updates the statutory framework and helps to ensure that shared arrangements supporting recruitment, training cycles and workforce planning can continue following the abolition of NHS England.

Clause 55 relates to clauses 53 and 54. The agreed arrangements are effective only if they can deliver in a practical and efficient way, which is why this clause enables the Secretary of State to direct a public body to exercise some or all of the Secretary of State’s functions under arrangements made with the devolved authorities in relation to commissioning or education and training under section 295 or section 296A of the 2012 Act. In short, it provides a mechanism to ensure that functions under agreed commissioning and education and training arrangements with devolved authorities can be exercised by the most appropriate public body in England. The clause also allows the Secretary of State to direct the public body in how those functions are to be exercised, including in relation to information obtained in the course of exercising them. It also requires directions to be published. Those features support both operational clarity and accountability.

On clause 56, public authorities in the Crown dependencies may seek expert advice or practical assistance from the health system in England. Following the abolition of NHS England, this clause transfers the existing power from NHS England to the Secretary of State, and provides a clear legal basis for the Secretary of State or ICBs to provide that advice and assistance for purposes connected with the provision of healthcare. The clause also makes clear that advice or assistance may be provided on such terms as a provider considers appropriate, allowing support to be given in a practical and transparent way that is tailored to the circumstances of the case, whether that involves technical advice, specialist expertise or other practical assistance in connection with the provision of healthcare.

Finally, on clause 57, clarity and consistency in legislation depends on clear definitions, particularly where a group of provisions are intended to operate together as a coherent scheme. This clause does not create any new powers or duties; rather, it provides the necessary interpretive framework to support the operation of the preceding clauses and ensure legal certainty and clarity. As a group, these clauses play a vital role in ensuring that existing arrangements with our devolved authorities and the Crown dependencies can continue following the abolition of NHS England. I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 53 to 57 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Emma Foody.)

Health Bill (Ninth sitting)

Karin Smyth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are considering the following:

Schedule 4.

Clauses 32 to 34 stand part.

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

I will start where I left off. Clause 34 addresses the gap by making it clear where responsibility sits, so that there is no doubt about who must produce the final accounts and ensure that they are completed properly, and about how those accounts should be audited. We think this is a proportionate provision to ensure continuity and clarity on how NHS money has been managed during organisational transition. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

Clause 31 introduces schedule 4, which essentially makes series of amendments to other Acts. It amends the Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000 to remove a cross-reference to other categories, and it amends the Audit and Accountability (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 and the Public Audit (Wales) Act 2004 for similar purposes. It also amends the National Health Service Act 2006 by deleting section 62 and schedule 10, relating to the audit of accounts of NHS foundation trusts, to end the old audit scheme.

Schedule 4 amends section 3 of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 so that foundation trusts are now included in the list of bodies that must keep accounts in the standard way, it amends section 4 to specify which documents count as accounts of foundation trusts for the purpose of auditing, and it amends sections 8 and 10 so that the auditor appointment procedure and the auditor panel’s role now cover foundation trusts.

In addition, schedule 4 rewrites section 13 of the 2014 Act so that if a trust fails to appoint a local auditor, it is the Secretary of State’s job to step in. Previously, that was NHS England’s job; clearly, that needs to change, because NHS England is being abolished. The schedule also amends section 21 so that the auditors’ general duties now apply to foundation trusts too, and it amends section 30, relating to unlawful expenditure and activity, and section 32B, relating to the independence requirement, to remove a now-redundant item from the list.

Schedule 4 also amends schedule 2 to the 2014 Act to formally add foundation trusts to the official list of audited bodies; schedule 5 so that the rules on who can be a local auditor now cover foundation trusts too; schedule 6 to remove an outdated segment from the audit practice code rules; schedule 7 to tidy the reporting rules and extend them to foundation trusts; schedule 9 to realign data matching rules that apply to foundation trusts in the new system; and schedule 11, relating to the disclosure of information, to remove a reference to NHS England, which is no longer necessary because NHS England is being abolished. In general, clause 31 aligns the audit process for accounts of foundation trusts with those of standard trusts and integrated care boards.

Clause 32 removes the need for NHS England to maintain a register of foundation trusts and the fees associated with maintaining it. Section 39 of the NHS Act 2006 requires NHS England to maintain a current register of NHS foundation trusts and specifies what must be in that register. Section 50 states that an NHS foundation trust must pay NHS England a fee that NHS England may determine in respect of exercising its functions under section 39, which relates to keeping the register, and section 39A, relating to a panel for advising governors. Clause 32 deletes sections 39 and 50. The explanatory notes say that the requirement to maintain a register does not need to be transferred to the Secretary of State when NHS England is abolished because, the Government argue, the information will already be available centrally, and there is no need for a fee to keep that in place. That seems sensible to me.

Clause 33 enables the Secretary of State to impose limits on a foundation trust’s annual capital or revenue expenditure. Section 42B of the 2006 Act allows NHS England to make an order imposing a limit on the capital expenditure of a foundation trust in a single year. Section 42C sets out that NHS England must publish guidance about the exercise of its power under section 42B, including about the circumstances in which it is likely to make an order and the method it will use to determine the capital expenditure limit. Clause 33 entirely replaces sections 42B and 42C with rewritten sections, with some notable changes. The wording is changed from “capital expenditure” to “expenditure”. The power is therefore widened from capital expenditure limits to limits on any expenditure—capital and revenue. The Secretary of State replaces NHS England as the entity with the power to impose limits, which makes sense, and the subsection requiring an order to specify the trust, the financial year and so on has been removed in full.

The change gives the Government financial control to stop overspending by NHS foundation trusts. I note that in financial year 2023-24, NHS trusts overspent by £1.2 billion, so presumably this is the Secretary of State getting a tighter grip on spending. In some respects that is sensible, but overspending is often due to staffing costs and day-to-day pressures, not capital expenditure, so there is an argument that the capital limits themselves are not sufficient to deal with the problem. Under the new governance model, the Secretary of State has oversight and responsibility for the health service, and financial control aligns with those changes. The new power could prevent one organisation’s failures from undermining the health service’s wider financial position or impacting other providers.

However, the purpose of foundation trusts is supposed to be that they have greater independence over spending, and the Government have stated that their aim is to create a more devolved and autonomous health system. How does broadening the Secretary of State’s ability to interfere in expenditure devolve power or make foundation trusts more independent? Imposing expenditure limits may control overspending on paper, but it does not address the reasons why it is happening, so limits could lead to a deterioration in the health services delivered by some trusts. What plans does the Minister have to deal with that?

Because the power moves from an arm’s length body to the Secretary of State, interventions could be politically motivated, rather than in the best interests of the NHS. How does the Minister consider that that will be managed?

The power for the Secretary of State to impose expenditure limits at any time during or before the financial year could create uncertainty among trust leadership and undermine long-term planning. If a trust is given a budget for the year, it knows what it has to work with, but if somebody says halfway through the year, “Actually, you are going to have to work with less money than that,” it is very difficult for the board to plan its expenditure, because it is always looking the other way. Why does the Secretary of State need that power? Can the Minister clarify that, if there is a change in the expenditure limit during the year, it will always be revised upwards, and never downwards?

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[Karin Smyth]

I thank the shadow Minister for in general, I think, agreeing that the alignment of many of these processes is quite sensible.

The shadow Minister talked in general terms about financial controls. The Government take financial controls and our responsibility for taxpayers’ money very seriously. As I said last week, from very early on, we were very keen to ensure that there is a grip on NHS finances in order to properly deliver the sort of healthcare that all our constituents deserve. We take that very seriously. There has not been that sort of grip at board level and through the system in recent years. As a result of the measures that we have taken, I think this is the first year in six or more years that the NHS has not gone back to the Department for additional funds to get through the year. The Committee can be assured that financial control is important.

The shadow Minister referred to limits. Of course they are overall limits; the Secretary of State does not go line by line through what a trust spends. I understand the point that people are trying to make to conflate some situations, but of course it is an overall limit.

The safeguards in these provisions are designed to protect foundation trusts’ freedoms and not constrain them, but a foundation trust can enjoy such freedoms only if it is in a well-overseen and stable NHS financial system. By including a backstop for use in exceptional circumstances, clause 33 helps to safeguard public funds and will help the Department to meet its financial obligations, which I think hon. Members understand. It is a usual process for the Department to go through, as anyone who has sat on the Public Accounts Committee will know. Adherence to the departmental expenditure limit creates and maintains the necessary environment for the foundation trust to exist.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Clauses 32 to 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35

Conversion of failing NHS foundation trust into NHS trust

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 5.

Clauses 36 to 38 stand part.

Schedule 6.

[Karin Smyth]

During the process of producing our 10-year plan, we were clear that, as much as we will reward the best performing providers with new freedoms to innovate, we will not hesitate to act on poor performance, and this group of measures deal with just that: action in the event of a failing provider.

Clause 35 and schedule 5 insert new provisions into the NHS Act 2006 to enable the Secretary of State to, by order, convert a failing foundation trust to an NHS trust. This is intended to take place only in the most critical circumstances, and where it is in the public’s best interest for the Secretary of State to be able to direct the trust about how it should exercise its functions, to address safety or other issues at the trust. Foundation trust status should be a mark of good performance, and there must be a mechanism to remove it when performance is seriously deficient. This deauthorisation power will help to maintain the integrity of the reinvigorated foundation trust status and provide an additional incentive for challenged foundation trusts to improve.

The power to make a conversion order can be used where the foundation trust has failed to comply with a condition of its provider licence or with another legislative requirement. In deciding whether to make a conversion order, the Secretary of State must consider various factors, including the seriousness of the failure, the health and safety of patients, the quality of the provision by the trust of goods and services, the financial position of the trust, and the way the trust is being run.

The conversion power is also subject to two additional requirements. First, the Secretary of State must publish guidance about the matters they will consider in deciding whether to exercise the conversion power, including the factors I just outlined. They must consult on any such guidance before its publication. Secondly, where the Secretary of State proposes to use the power, they must first consult the foundation trust in question, any integrated care boards in the areas in which the trust operates, and any other person to whom the trust provides goods and services, and whom the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult.

Clause 35, together with schedule 5, also inserts new schedule 9A into the NHS Act 2006, which sets out the immediate consequences of a conversion order. Deauthorising a foundation trust has no impact on the property it holds, the contracts it has with commissioners and other groups, or the terms of employment of employees. These powers set clear organisational consequences for significant underperformance and allow the Secretary of State the freedom to take action to protect patients in extreme circumstances.

Clause 36 contains another critical power to allow action in the case of a failing foundation trust. It allows the Secretary of State to add conditions to an NHS foundation trust’s provider licence where they consider that the trust will breach its licence conditions due to issues with its governance. The clause is a consequence of abolishing NHS England and makes changes to the powers currently held by NHS England under section 111 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, to confer them on the Secretary of State, with additional consequential changes reflecting the abolition of councils of governors.

The clause sets clear expectations for a foundation trust through the licence conditions and provides the Secretary of State with a transparent mechanism to take more urgent, targeted enforcement action to address failures of governance. Should the foundation trust breach any conditions imposed via section 111, the Secretary of State may require it to make changes to the executive directors of its board as necessary, including removing or suspending executive directors, replacing executive directors with interims, and preventing the trust from appointing specific individuals. If the foundation trust fails to take those actions, the Secretary of State may implement the changes.

To reassure the Committee, there are clear safeguards underpinning the clause, which can be used only where there is evidence that failures of governance in the foundation trust will cause it to breach the conditions of its licence. Further, acting under section 111 does not preclude the Secretary of State from using their other regulatory powers, including to require the foundation trust to take steps to address a breach of any condition of the licence, or to accept undertakings from the trust to address the breach.

Finally, the section 111 power was originally granted to Monitor in 2012 under transitional arrangements, as it was anticipated that the power could be withdrawn once governors had transitioned into their roles and could hold boards to account without outside intervention. Over 13 years on, that has proven not to be the case. With the abolition of the foundation trust councils of governors, it makes sense to repeal the provisions under sections 112 to 114 of the same Act that made it transitional.

Clause 37 makes changes to the special administration framework to ensure that it continues to function coherently after the abolition of NHS England. The clause makes focused, technical amendments to the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to amend the framework for establishing a mechanism for financial assistance in cases where a provider is subject to a health special administration order under chapter 5 of that Act. It also amends the Act to remove the duty to establish a mechanism for financial assistance to foundation trusts to which a trust special administrator has been appointed. The duty no longer needs to apply to foundation trusts, because the Secretary of State already has the power under provisions in the NHS Act 2006 to provide financial assistance to NHS foundation trusts if needed.

With the abolition of NHS England, the duty to establish a mechanism for financial assistance for independent providers will be retained and conferred on the Secretary of State. It is worth noting that the provisions related to financial assistance in special administration cases, and chapter 5 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which sets out the powers and processes for the making of health special administration orders, have not yet been commenced. However, the amendments made by the clause ensure that the special administration regime can operate smoothly if it is ever needed.

The clause does not create new financial support mechanisms, but ensures that existing ones can be used appropriately in the reformed system. In short, clause 37 ensures that the legal framework reflects the new institutional landscape while retaining the ability to act swiftly to safeguard continuity of services during special administration.

Clause 38 makes changes to the trust special administration framework to ensure that it continues to function coherently after the abolition of NHS England. This clause, together with schedule 6, make targeted changes to the trust special administration process set out in the NHS Act 2006 for NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts as a consequence of the abolition of NHS England. It also aligns more closely the processes between NHS trusts and foundation trusts.

Trust special administration is, and will remain, a last resort mechanism used only in cases of serious failure. It is used to protect patients, stabilise services and put the organisation back on a sustainable footing. Where deemed necessary, a trust special administrator would be appointed to manage the trust and work with relevant key stakeholders to develop recommendations regarding the organisation and its services.

The amendments made by schedule 6 remove functions that currently sit with NHS England and confer the key decision-making functions on the Secretary of State, who will provide clearer lines of accountability and faster decision making when rapid intervention is required. The amendments also simplify the steps involved in the TSA process, with the aim of improving the speed of intervention and providing transparency. They align more closely the processes for trusts and foundation trusts, and set out a simpler process in relation to the administrator’s draft report, consultation and final report. They also require, as is the case now, that key documents and decisions are published and laid before Parliament. That will help ensure proper and meaningful scrutiny of the TSA process and outcomes. It also helps ensure that affected patients, staff and local partners have the opportunity to engage during the process, while maintaining the balance with the need to deliver timely intervention and secure continuity of safe services.

In addition, the amendments in schedule 6 make changes to the role of the Care Quality Commission in trust special administration. The CQC will be able to recommend that a trust special administrator should be appointed. The Secretary of State is also required to consult the CQC before making an order, ensuring that independent expertise on quality and safety informs decisions and that intelligence on service performance is co-ordinated.

The provisions in the Bill ensure that the process remains fit for purpose, proportionate, and aligned across NHS trusts and foundation trusts. They support faster, more coherent decision making in the most serious cases, with the aim of protecting patients and securing sustainable, high-quality services for the future. Taken together, the clauses provide the necessary tools for the Secretary of State to take proportionate, swift and decisive action in the event of provider failure. I therefore commend these clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 35 essentially establishes the right of the Secretary of State to convert a foundation trust into an NHS trust in certain circumstances. Currently, section 25 of the NHS Act 2006 establishes trusts and introduces schedule 4 of the same Act, which makes provision about NHS trusts. Section 56AA sets out how additional requirements concerning acquisitions of a trust or foundation trust are to work. Clause 35 deletes section 25(2), which specifies that an order in this context is referred to as “an NHS trust order”, and amends subsection (3), so that no order under section 25—previously no “NHS trust order”—can be made until any consultation that has been prescribed is complete.

Clause 35 introduces proposed new section 57B into the 2006 Act, “Conversion of failing NHS foundation trust into NHS trust”, which provides the Secretary of State with the power to convert if the foundation trust breaches its licence or other legal duties. The trigger is broad and includes non-compliance with any statutory requirement. The proposed new section requires an order to specify when it takes effect and also requires the Secretary of State, when deciding to issue an order, to consider among other things

“the seriousness of the failure…the health and safety of patients…the quality of the provision by the trust of goods and services…the financial position of the trust, and…the way that the trust is being run.”

Before making an order, the Secretary of State will be required to consult the trust, any ICB where the trust has facilities and

“any other person to whom the trust provides goods or services…whom the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult.”

The proposed new section also provides the Secretary of State with the power, when the conversion order is made, to

“terminate the appointment of the chair or any executive or non-executive director”,

and to

“appoint a person to be the chair or an executive or non-executive director”.

It also time-limits the powers to intervene with management to one year after the order is made.

Clause 35 also introduces proposed new section 57C into the 2006 Act, “Guidance about conversion”, which requires the Secretary of State to publish guidance about matters to be considered when deciding to make an order and requires them to consult persons considered appropriate before publishing or revising guidance. The clause removes “NHS trust order” from section 276 of the 2006 Act, “Index of defined expressions”, and updates schedule 4, so that an NHS trust may be established by an ordinary order under section 25 or a conversion order under proposed new section 57B.

Schedule 5 to the Bill inserts proposed new schedule 9A to the 2006 Act, “Conversion of failing NHS foundation trusts”, which provides that, on conversion, the foundation trust’s chair and directors become the initial chair and directors of the new NHS trust, unless they are removed by the Secretary of State under the procedures we have just talked about. The proposed new schedule initially keeps the board the same size, until new arrangements are made. It provides that the foundation trust’s public dividend capital carries over to the NHS trust and that the conversion does not affect continuity of the body —it will remain the same organisation, just with NHS trust status.

The proposed new schedule provides that the trust’s property and liabilities, including criminal liabilities, continue unaffected. It also provides that existing contracts continue and that the trust remains party to them. It clarifies that those contracts do not automatically become NHS contracts under section 9(1) of the 2006 Act, provides that the trust keeps any corporate memberships that it held before the conversion, and clarifies that the continuity provisions do not affect the Secretary of State’s wider powers to make directions.

The Secretary of State will have a direct power to act where the foundation trust has failed—for instance, where there have been patient safety lapses—and there are clear benefits to that. There are also transparency requirements built in: the Secretary of State must publish guidance and consult before issuing guidance or undertaking conversion, and the power to change the management is limited to a year.

However, the last Labour Government said that independence was central to the success of foundation trusts. In 2005, the then Secretary of State, Patricia Hewitt, said:

“We know that independence from central Government control and greater freedoms are giving NHS foundation trusts the opportunity to innovate new approaches to healthcare and healthcare services, for the benefit of NHS patients.”—[Official Report, 7 November 2005; Vol. 439, c. 5WS.]

The challenge with innovations is that, even with the very best intentions and the very best advice, some will work and some will not. If any failure at all is a reason for trusts to be taken over, will that cause them to be shy about innovating, for fear of their independence being undermined as a result? There is a balance to strike, so I wonder whether the Minister will comment on that.

The change also makes it easy for the Secretary of State to convert a foundation trust for political reasons—for instance, because of pressure from local Members of Parliament. That is a positive in some ways and a negative in others. Again, it could have a chilling effect on the very autonomy and innovation that Ministers want to see, so the question is how they think they will balance that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)]

I will endeavour to be relatively brief in my reflections, and I will address, particularly, clauses 35 and 38. I can see a logic to what the Minister proposes in them. On clause 35, we know that foundation trusts face challenges. We saw that writ large with the scandal at Mid Staffs, and in my time as a Minister, several foundation trusts required intervention—maybe not on that scale—or required improvement. I pick on them just because they are in my head—I do not know the situation today. I am looking across at the hon. Member for Ashford, because going back some years to when I was a Minister, East Kent hospitals NHS foundation trust faced some considerable challenges. I am not necessarily saying that that meets the bar for intervention, but foundation trusts have challenges from time to time.

I should also declare an interest: I was born in the forerunner of the William Harvey hospital—the old Willesborough hospital—in the hon. Member’s constituency. I recognise that on occasions foundation trusts get into serious, or less serious but still challenging, circumstances. So I can see where the Minister is coming from, but I have a few questions for her.

First, we recognise that although foundation trusts can get into bother, so too can NHS trusts. NHS trusts can underperform, have safety issues or have financial or other performance issues. I am interested to hear the Minister’s reflections on why she believes that removing foundation status and the organisation becoming an NHS trust will necessarily solve those problems, when many NHS trusts can have equally significant challenges. I would welcome the Minister’s reflections on that.

In terms of whether a conversion was to take place—if the Secretary of State determined that that was expedient and it met the criteria—what would the timescales and process be if, further down the line, a foundation trust wished to reapply for its old status, having previously converted to an NHS trust? Would that be possible, and how would it work? I suspect that there would be a significant number of hurdles to get over to prove that it had achieved that status. I would welcome the Minister’s reflections on that point.

Finally, on clause 38, what the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, touched on gives me a little cause for concern. Essentially, this appears to be a further centralisation of powers in the Secretary of State’s hands, particularly with the changes to the role of the CQC. It effectively downgrades the CQC’s power as the independent regulator in these matters. Instead of the CQC being able to initiate the appointment of a TSA where, on safety grounds, they consider it to be necessary and the criteria met, that power will sit with the Secretary of State, who will be required to consult the CQC, but it will seemingly lose its ability to take that initiating step irrespective of what they have seen in any inspections. I would be grateful if the Minister addressed and potentially reassured me on those points.

[Karin Smyth]

As people who have been listening will know, this is a chunky set of clauses on some technical details. Let me broadly pick up some of the key points.

I want to be very clear about deauthorisation and our seeking to establish, essentially, a more dynamic model. As I said, the coalition Government repealed the legislation on deauthorisation in the 2012 Act. Although other regulatory levers exist to manage poor performance, we are using two core arguments. First, converting foundation trusts into NHS trusts will enable the Secretary of State, if needed, to intervene further through their power of direction over NHS trusts. The Secretary of State will therefore be able to focus on the patient and public interest over preservation of providers’ statutory freedoms in cases of serious failure. I hope that that addresses some of the points that have been raised. Secondly, having a more dynamic environment with the potential for deauthorisation in such cases, and the consequent loss of statutory autonomy, may act as an incentive for challenged foundation trusts to improve, and it would show that there are consequences.

As I think the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham knows, the usual processes exist for managing performance across various aspects of the provider. They will continue. This is for exceptional circumstances. As I said, this is about maintaining a more dynamic model than the one we have. The purpose behind her questions about continuous service—the purpose of having a range of failure powers—is to ensure continuity of care for patients and the public. The analogy with general practice does not hold; this is a very different set of circumstances. But, obviously, she raises an important point about public concern relating to the service’s provision, and I assure her on that. We need to make sure that we diagnose the situation, provide the trust with support and assess which toolbox is most applicable.

The CQC can recommend that a trust special administrator should be appointed where it is satisfied that there is a serious failure to provide services of a sufficient quality, and it must provide a report on the safety and quality of services following the appointment of an administrator. The Secretary of State must also consult the CQC before making an order to appoint a trust special administrator.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clauses 36 to 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 6 agreed to.

Clause 39

Joint working and delegation arrangements

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 20.

New clause 26—Arrangements between NHS bodies and local authorities: duty to review—

“(1) The Secretary of State must conduct a review of the effectiveness of arrangements entered into by NHS bodies and local authorities under section 75 of the National Health Service Act 2006 (arrangements between NHS bodies and local authorities).

(2) In conducting the review, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) NHS bodies,

(b) local authorities, and

(c) any another person that the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult.

(3) Having conducted the review, the Secretary of State must consider whether the power to make regulations in section 75(1) or the power to issue guidance in section 75(6) of the National Health Service Act 2006 should be exercised in order to improve the effectiveness of arrangements under that section.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, and publish, a report of the review.

(5) The report of the review must explain whether the Secretary of State decided to exercise the powers in section 75(1) and (6) of the National Health Service Act 2006 and the reasons for that decision.

(6) The Secretary of State must comply with the requirements of this section before the end of the 12-month period beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to conduct a review into arrangements under section 75 of the National Health Service Act 2006, and to consider whether to require NHS bodies and local authorities to enter into arrangements with each other if this is likely to lead to an improvement in how their functions are exercised.

[Karin Smyth]

Government new clause 20 and clause 39 both look to strengthen joint working arrangements across the health system. Clause 39 is part of the architecture of the Bill that allows the delegation of functions from the Secretary of State to NHS bodies, local authorities or other relevant organisations. The clause builds on the existing delegation powers in section 65Z5 of the National Health Service Act 2006, which already allow NHS bodies to delegate functions and pool resources with one another and with local authorities or other relevant bodies on a voluntary basis. It is a well-used voluntary power that enables systems to develop joint working and ensure that health functions are carried out by the most appropriate body or groups of bodies. The result is stronger integration, with better joint working between NHS and local government, and services better tailored to meet local needs.

With the abolition of NHS England and the new functions of the Secretary of State, it is right that the Secretary of State should have the flexibility to delegate their health functions appropriately and efficiently under a voluntary arrangement, as and when necessary. We would not want to exclude the Secretary of State from joint working arrangements, if joint working would bring benefits to patients and the public. The power is therefore purposefully broad to allow that, including allowing the Secretary of State to delegate to a range of public bodies, establish joint committees and pool funds. It also allows the Secretary of State to issue guidance to relevant bodies about the use of their powers under sections 65Z5 and 65Z6.

This proposal is not, however, a means to avoid accountability. Accountability for any function delegated through this power remains with the person delegating it whereas liability rests with the person to whom the function is delegated. Accountability, as opposed to liability, means that the body delegating a function must provide oversight for how their functions are carried out and ensure that any issues are dealt with. Ultimately, the Secretary of State will continue to be accountable to Parliament for the health service in England, including any delegated powers. I am sure that Parliament will relish holding all Ministers to account.

Building on our ambition to support greater local partnership working, as set out in our 10-year plan, we have tabled Government new clause 20 to strengthen section 75 of the NHS Act 2006 by providing much greater scope for combined authorities, combined county authorities and the Greater London Authority to use these arrangements. Section 75 currently supports flexible voluntary partnership arrangements, including the pooling of budgets between NHS bodies and local authorities. These arrangements are a critical tool in supporting local collaboration and ensuring more joined-up working within systems.

The new clause looks to strengthen the section 75 guidance-making power. At present, that power only covers consultation and applications for consent on section 75 arrangements. The Government’s new clause will extend the guidance power so that it can cover all aspects of section 75, helping us to support the wider and more effective use of partnership arrangements. For those reasons, I commend new clause 20 and clause 39 to the Committee.

[The Chair]

I do not think that the Minister addressed new clause 26, so does she wish to do so now? [Interruption.] She need not worry about it, I am told.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

I want to touch briefly on clause 39, Government new clause 20, and new clause 26, tabled by the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon in her role as Chair of the Health and Social Care Committee.

I recognise the intention behind clause 39. Greater collaboration between the NHS, local authorities and other public bodies has the potential to improve the co-ordination of services and deliver a more integrated approach to population health, which I think we all welcome. However, it sits slightly uncomfortably with other clauses we have debated that appear to draw local authorities and the NHS further apart. In this case, it looks like they may be brought together.

As the clause expands delegation and joint working powers, I would be interested to understand from the Minister where the oversight and safeguards for accountability for spending the joint budgets would sit. Would it be with the NHS, local authorities or somewhere else? We hope that everything goes well, but if services fail or financial problems emerge, the public deserve to know who precisely is accountable for those budgets. As I have said in debates on numerous other clauses, I continue to be concerned by the broad powers that the Bill gives to the Secretary of State. I have the same concerns about this clause.

On Government new clause 20, bringing health services and wider local government functions together is really important, particularly where combined authorities have responsibilities that affect the wider determinants of health. However, once again, I am concerned about the fact that the new clause further complicates an already crowded accountability landscape. As more functions are delivered through pooled budgets and joint arrangements, it becomes harder to identify who is responsible for outcomes, spending decisions and—hopefully not, but potentially—service failures. I welcome the flexibility, which I think has value, but it must be balanced with transparency and democratic accountability. I am not convinced that the new clause gets that right.

On new clause 26, as I have said before concerning amendments and new clauses that have come from the Health and Social Care Committee, it is often difficult to get entire agreement on these things because of the cross-party nature of the Committee. Therefore, new clauses and amendments that come out of the Committee are in some ways aspirational, rather than ones that hit the nail on the head.

The new clause suggests that the Secretary of State carry out a review of how effective section 75 arrangements are—the hon. Member for Winchester outlined evidence that in some cases, the use of section 75 arrangements has not always been effective—consult NHS bodies, local authorities and anyone else considered appropriate; consider whether existing powers should be used to improve those arrangements; publish a report and lay it before Parliament; explain whether the Government intend to use their powers to change regulations or guidance and why; and complete all that within 12 months of the Bill passing, which I think is a reasonable timeframe.

Section 75 arrangements already play an important role in bringing together health and social care. It is reasonable to ask, as the hon. Member for Winchester did, whether they are delivering the benefits in the most effective way possible. I would potentially say that this proposal does not go far enough. The new clause would require a review, a consultation and a report, but would not require any action to follow that. The Secretary of State need only “consider” whether existing powers should be exercised and explain the reasons for any decision. If the review identified significant weaknesses, there is no obligation in the new clause, as far as I understand it, to implement those changes.

I agree that the new clause is well-meaning. It has some good recommendations, and I hope the Minister takes on board its sentiment, but it probably does not have the teeth and the power to make it an effective part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

I got a little confused at the end, but I think the Opposition generally accept the power in this clause. The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon contended that this Bill and previous amendments to it will drive local authorities and the NHS further apart; just to have it on the record, I do not accept that that is true at all. Section 75 of the National Health Service Act 2006 and the work that we are doing on this further highlights the effect of some of the things that we are trying to do.

The hon. Member for Winchester raised new clause 26. I have sympathy for the intention behind the new clause. We all want health and care services to work closer together, as I have said repeatedly, and we agree that the partnership framework under section 75 of the National Health Service Act 2006 is a useful tool for doing so. While I understand the new clause, it is not necessary. The Department can review the section 75 framework without needing legislation, and indeed it has already done so. The Department carried out a review of section 75 in 2023, as has been said. Since then, we have continued to consider how these partnership arrangements can best support health and care integration.

The new clause would risk duplicating ongoing work. Furthermore, that work is not a one-off exercise but an ongoing process of learning and improvement across the country, and we want something that is responsive and flexible enough to respond to changes in health and care services and to the changing needs of people who use them. For that reason, I do not consider requiring a single statutory review to be the most effective approach.

Hon. Members raised important issues about clarity of accountability and responsibility. To reiterate, the legislation is clear: the legal responsibility or liability for a function being carried out properly rests with the receiving party; however, the delegating party is accountable for that function being carried out, and they must know how it is being carried out and make sure that any issues are addressed. The hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham rightly alluded to one of the examples that we are exploring around section 75, which is how it might support key priorities in delivering neighbourhood health, to make absolutely clear and sure that we bring services closer together.

Both spokespeople outlined a quote from Melanie Williams of ADASS. Although I do not know the whole context of the quote, I understand the frustration of colleagues in social services and this whole area as it is one that I worked in myself. I understand the issue, but it is slightly different because it concerns the what, rather than the how, of what is being discussed. Section 75 is part of the how. We want to make this easier for people who are trying to do the right thing, and these provisions, which I commend to the Committee, do just that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 39 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 40

Consolidated accounts

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 41 and 42 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Karin Smyth]

We know that robust finances are an essential part of the health service. The financial accounts related to the NHS are of keen interest to His Majesty’s Treasury and indeed to Parliament. The Government are especially mindful of the keen interest of the Public Accounts Committee in this area. Under current arrangements, NHS England prepares a set of financial accounts for all NHS trusts and foundation trusts, and that is audited by the National Audit Office. That is the point at which the National Audit Office conducts its oversight of NHS providers, with that feeding into the National Audit Office’s assurance over the Department of Health and Social Care group.

The financial accounts for integrated care boards are currently included in the NHS England group accounts, which are presented separately and audited by the National Audit Office. With the abolition of NHS England, the Government intend to reduce central administration costs, so financial reporting needs to be proportionate while balancing stakeholders’ keen interest in financial information related specifically to the NHS. Clause 40 therefore replaces the current consolidated accounts of NHS providers with a single set of consolidated accounts for the NHS covering its trusts, foundation trusts and integrated care boards. That consolidated account will continue to be audited by the National Audit Office.

We believe that bringing the accounts together in this way will assist the public, Parliament and the National Audit Office in scrutinising NHS expenditure. Although it is not covered by the clause, it is important for the Committee to be aware that there will be no change to the current requirement for the Department to publish a Department of Health and Social Care group annual report and accounts that will consolidate the NHS accounts with the core Department and other group bodies—for example, its arm’s length bodies.

However, the Government recognise that only reporting figures for the NHS in the overall Department group would reduce transparency compared with the current structure of NHS financial accounts. The clause therefore seeks to prioritise high quality audited financial accounts information being made available while balancing against administrative costs, both of which are important to the Government.

Clause 41 amends the Secretary of State’s existing power to create a scheme allowing NHS bodies to pool funds to cover property losses and legal claims arising from their healthcare activities. They ensure that when liabilities arise, whether from damage to property, negligence or other claims, there is a clear and consistent mechanism through which those liabilities can be managed and resolved. In doing so, they protect the financial stability of the NHS. The clause updates the legislation for the new landscape by removing NHS England from the arrangements and ensuring that responsibility for administrating the schemes rests appropriately with the Secretary of State.

Although the clause is targeted and technical, its effect is essential in that it ensures continuity and legal clarity and continued effective operation of arrangements that underpin confidence and functionality across the health service. Clause 42 is a necessary technical and structural change that supports the new statutory framework following the abolition of NHS England. It removes provisions in the NHS Act 2006 and the Health and Care Act 2022 that relate specifically to NHS England’s funding and financial responsibilities, which will no longer be required once NHS England ceases to exist. The clause avoids duplication and confusion and ensures that financial accountability is clearly defined in the post NHS England system. Under the reformed framework, the Department is responsible for the overall funding of the NHS and for national financial assurance, while integrated care boards and providers continue to operate within defined statutory financial duties and controls.

Clause 42 plays an important housekeeping role, providing legal clarity and underpinning a more transparent and coherent financial framework that is fit for the NHS future operating model. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 40 prepares for the preparation of the annual accounts of NHS trusts and integrated care boards. Existing legislation in section 65Z4 of the NHS Act 2006, “Consolidated accounts for NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts”, requires NHS England to prepare a set of accounts every financial year and consolidate the accounts of all the trusts and NHS foundation trusts. The Secretary of State can give directions about the content for methods and principles, and the accounts must be accompanied by reports or other information as directed by the Secretary of State. A copy may be sent by NHS England to the Secretary of State and the Comptroller and Auditor General. The latter must then examine and certify those accounts before sending a copy to the Secretary of State and NHS England, and NHS England must then lay a copy of the consolidated accounts and the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report before Parliament. That is how it works at the moment.

Clause 40 rewrites section 65Z4 and the duty to prepare the consolidated accounts every financial year moves to the Secretary of State, and the list of what gets consolidated now includes the ICB accounts. The power to give directions to NHS England about accounts is removed, which is fair enough because there would be no need for it, as the Secretary of State is now preparing them and NHS England will cease to exist. The requirement for the accounts to be accompanied by such reports or other information as the Secretary of State may direct has been removed. The accounts go straight to the Comptroller and Auditor General, who reports back only to the Secretary of State. At the end, the Secretary of State lays the accounts before Parliament. The changes are necessary owing to the abolition of NHS England.

I want to ask about the consolidation, including the ICB accounts, which was not there before, and what impact that will have. Will the accounts be sufficiently detailed so that it is possible to disaggregate that information if people are interested in doing so?

Clause 41 changes which NHS companies can be covered by the scheme that meets certain losses, legal claims and liabilities. Currently, section 71, “Schemes for meeting losses and liabilities etc of certain health service bodies”, of the NHS Act 2006 enables the Secretary of State to establish schemes to meet the losses of NHS England, ICBs, trusts, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, the CQC and several other bodies. The list of bodies includes

“(ha) a company formed under section 223 and wholly or partly owned by the Secretary of State or NHS England”.

In the new legislation, clause 41 rewrites paragraph (ha) so that it is

“a company formed under section 223 other than by an integrated care board by virtue of section 223A”.

That narrows the scope of the liability scheme by preventing ICB-created companies from automatically gaining protection, presumably to encourage ICBs to manage risk responsibly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

I wish to carry on the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston has just raised. He rightly says that there is a transparency element to this, so that the public and any other interested party can look at the individual accounts of an ICB or a trust. Going further than that on the technical elements, my understanding is that NHS England’s own guidance notes suggest that consolidation does not just bring accounting under one set of accounts, one umbrella or one document. Within that accounting, however, adjustments and eliminations of transactions between NHS bodies can happen. Therefore, the aggregated figures do not necessarily reflect the financial reality of individual organisations.

I understand why that might be entirely appropriate from an accounting point of view, but it can make it harder for external observers to understand exactly where the pressures are coming from, where they are concentrated and, in a world where we want accountability, who should be held responsible for addressing them. That is all I need to say on that point.

[Karin Smyth]

I am pleased that, in an outbreak of cross-party agreement at 3.20 pm on a Tuesday, I completely agree with the comments made by the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon and the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston. It is a point that I made myself: the ability of Members of Parliament and the public to understand the granularity relating to their local providers and ICBs is very important for transparency and accountability. I hope Committee members recognise that I have tried to drive much more transparency in that system. They are absolutely right that that is separate from this clause, and we will continue to expect providers and ICBs to do that; I hope that addresses that point.

To add further clarity on the wider point the clause deals with, the consolidated accounts we prepare include some analysis by different types of body. That will mean separate information about NHS providers being included in the document, such as a summary of income and expenditure. Separately, providers and ICBs will continue to publish accounts so that people can look at those. The Government will listen to any feedback from users to adapt the nature of this content in future years after the initial publication, recognising that this is a new development following the abolition of NHS England. We are also mindful that too many separate publications add to administrative costs and risk losing focus. The intention is to have transparency at the local level, building that up to do something more sensible and cost-effective that is also transparent at national level. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 41 and 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Emma Foody.)

Health Bill (Eighth sitting)

Karin Smyth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Public Bill Committees

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

The clause updates the National Health Service Act 2006 to abolish the requirement for integrated care boards and their partner NHS trusts to prepare and publish a joint forward plan and a joint capital resource use plan. The 10-year health plan aims to simplify local healthcare planning, and the Bill delivers that objective by removing legal requirements for integrated care partnerships, integrated care strategies, joint forward plans and joint capital resource use plans. Planning will now begin with the joint strategic needs assessment, developed by health and wellbeing boards. The assessment will inform a new neighbourhood health plan, replacing the joint local health and wellbeing strategy. ICBs will produce population health improvement plans, aligning multiple joint strategic needs assessments, neighbourhood health plans and local priorities across their wider populations. As a result, the planning process will be streamlined and less bureaucratic, and will deliver healthcare for local people based on local planning and strategy. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

As the Minister said, the clause removes the need for ICBs and their partner trusts to produce a joint forward plan. The existing legislation requires ICBs and their partner trusts to prepare a plan setting out how they propose to exercise their functions over five years, which is reviewed and/or revised each financial year.

Joint forward plans address objectives in the Government mandate regarding the ambitions in the NHS long-term plan and planning guidance. Section 14Z52 of the 2006 Act sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts have to prepare such a plan before the start of each financial year and specifies what the plan must give regard to, including the ICB’s discharge of its duties—general duties and financial duties—under other sections of the Act. The plan must also cover steps that will be taken to implement the local health and wellbeing strategy, the particular needs of young people, and the particular needs of victims of abuse. ICBs and their partner trusts must publish the plan and give it to a set of specified authorities, and NHS England may give directions for that. Section 14Z54 sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts must consult people when developing such plans and that health and wellbeing boards must be involved. Section 14Z55 sets out that the relevant health and wellbeing board may give an opinion, and that when it does so, it must provide it to the ICB and its partner trusts.

Section 14Z56 sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts must prepare a joint capital resource use plan before the start of each financial year, and that the period may be determined by direction from the Secretary of State. Section 14Z57 sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts may revise the joint capital resource use plan, but if it is revised significantly, it must be published and given to the list of specified authorities.

Section 14Z58 sets out that an ICB must produce an annual report on how it has discharged its functions. It must explain how it has discharged its duties under other specified sections of the Act, review the extent to which it has exercised its functions in accordance with the forward plan and its capital resource use plan, review the extent to which it has exercised its functions consistently with NHS England’s views, and review steps it has taken to implement any joint local health and wellbeing strategy. The report must include details of expenditure and be given to NHS England by a specified date and then published.

In essence, the clause deletes sections 14Z52 to 14Z57. In some respects, it is legislative plumbing, to remove plans that are no longer necessary. The Government’s impact assessment notes that

“there is some duplication across planning documents. For example, the Joint Forward Plan covered the integration of services, which the Better Care Fund plan also considers, as does the Joint Local Health and Wellbeing Strategy.”

It goes on to note that duplication delivers an administrative burden, as staff

“complete parallel planning returns and fulfil competing data requests,”

so that is a positive aspect of the clause.

Will the Minister please address the following points? Section 14Z52 contains specific requirements to address the particular needs of young people and of victims of abuse. Where do they fall now? The NHS has a large maintenance backlog. What is the new mechanism for transparency of capital prioritisation decisions between the ICBs and the trusts? Can the Minister remind me and the Committee of other areas in which local democracy will be able to input into ICB planning once these planning documents are no longer required?

Under the Government’s strategic commissioning framework, ICBs have to develop population health improvement plans. Essex ICB published a document that is 148 pages long, with a particular focus on inequality. Is the Minister concerned about the length of some of the plans, the time it takes to produce them and the amount of bureaucracy involved, or does she think this is an improvement? What is the key objective in delivering these plans? Do the Government plan to introduce population health improvement plans through legislation? If they do not, Parliament will have scrutiny of the bureaucracy being removed but not of the bureaucracy that the Government replace it with. As the Minister once said:

“Local taxpayers deserve to know how their money is being spent.”—[Official Report, 13 June 2023; Vol. 734, c. 122WH.]

[Karin Smyth]

I thank the shadow Minister for her comments. I largely agree about legislative plumbing—that is a nice phrase. As she rightly highlights, and as is clear in the explanatory notes and so on, the duplication and administrative burden on all these bodies is considerable. On her question about objectives, we certainly want to streamline that so that ultimately, as well as organisations knowing the objectives they are pursuing, the local population—importantly to her concluding point—can readily see and address that, follow it through and hold people to account. I do think that 150-page documents are not always the easiest to see.

Young people will obviously be part of the joint strategic needs assessment, and ICBs will be mindful of the Government’s wider policy objectives, as we have discussed previously. With regard to maintenance and prioritisation of capital schemes, since coming into office we have already done a huge amount of work to streamline the relationship between NHS England and the Department of Health and Social Care—and, indeed, our friends over at His Majesty’s Treasury—in respect of the approvals process, making better use of capital and making that more transparent at local level so that individual organisations are involved in the prioritisation that comes forward to the ICBs.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Abolition of integrated care partnerships and strategies

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

The clause abolishes the requirement for ICBs and their partner local authorities to form an integrated care partnership. It also abolishes the related requirement for that partnership to prepare and publish an integrated care strategy.

These abolitions address the policy objectives of the 10-year health plan by streamlining the number of plans that must be created by local health systems and supporting key local stakeholders to work together more flexibly and effectively. The changes recognise that in many areas, integrated care partnerships have not had a positive impact on local health outcomes and have come with significant opportunity costs. Alternative planning approaches proposed elsewhere in the Bill and more broadly will enable local health bodies to plan for their patients in a way that is tailored to their strengths. However, I can reassure the Committee that where existing arrangements are working well, nothing in the Bill will prevent local areas from coming together to consider how best to integrate services and plan their approach to tackling the challenges they face. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

In essence, the clause abolishes integrated care partnerships and strategies, which are where ICBs come together with local authorities to discuss how they can make their services more integrated. We know that many of the challenges facing the NHS are caused by difficulties in social care provision and some of the difficulties in social care provision are caused by issues with health provision, and that if those commissioning services in those two areas work together, we can see an improvement in both.

The Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 made changes to local government structures and enhanced public involvement in health services. Section 116 requires local authorities to produce joint strategic needs assessments for the local authority and its partner ICB. When preparing the assessment, the local authority and its partner ICB must

“co-operate with one another…have regard to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State…involve the Local Healthwatch organisation”,

and involve local people and the relevant district councils. I note that later in the Bill we will also come to the abolition of Healthwatch.

Section 116 of the 2007 Act has been modified by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and the Health and Care Act 2022 to ensure that references match the current NHS structure. For instance, in 2008 there were primary care trusts, rather than ICBs. Section 116ZA of the 2007 Act requires ICBs and local authorities whose areas coincide or overlap to create integrated care partnerships, which consist of a member appointed by the ICB, one from each responsible local authority and any other members that they choose to add; to some extent, they can determine their own procedures.

Section 116ZB of the 2007 Act requires ICBs to prepare an integrated care strategy

“setting out how the assessed needs in relation to its area are to be met by the exercise of functions of…the integrated care board…NHS England, or…the responsible local authorities”.

When developing that integrated care strategy, the integrated care partnerships must have regard to NHS England’s mandate and any guidance issued by the Secretary of State. Clearly, that would now apply only to guidance issued by the Secretary of the State, because NHS England is also being abolished. An integrated care partnership must publish its integrated care strategy and give it to each local authority and partner ICB. Integrated care partnerships must reconsider and, where necessary, revise the strategy each time they receive a new needs assessment.

Clause 23 deletes section 116(5A) of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. That subsection required the local authorities to give a copy of the needs assessments to the ICBs, which is of course no longer necessary because they are being abolished. Clause 23 also deletes sections 116ZA and 116ZB of the same Act, which established ICBs and defined integrated care strategies respectively.

As Conservatives, we believe that streamlining bureaucracy is sensible, and I am sure that this is a well-intentioned reform. However, a survey conducted by the NHS Alliance in November indicated that a quarter of integrated care system leaders are likely to keep the integrated care partnerships anyway on a non-statutory basis, and 40% plan to fold them into health and wellbeing boards and working partnerships with the authorities. It is not really a ringing endorsement of the policy if a sizeable number of people intend to keep it anyway.

Like many other elements of the Bill, these changes are uncosted—if we read the impact assessment, it says “N/A” for the cost. Clearly, there will be a cost incurred by the abolition of the process, but there will also be an opportunity cost to services if ICBs and commissioners are not working together in the provision of social care as effectively as they were before. That will cost people in social care, and it will cost people in healthcare.

As recognised by the impact assessment that the Government have produced themselves, there is a risk of reduced focus on the wider determinants of health at system level. Committee members on both sides of the House have already stressed the impact that other health determinants can have on the health service and social care, and we have previously considered amendments to that effect.

Overall, it is regrettable that local government does not have the direct feed into ICBs that the design of those integrated care partnerships provided. Whether or not I agree, I can follow the theory or principle behind making the area covered more local, in line with the strategic authority. However, if the Government wanted to do that, I do not understand why they did not decide the mayoral areas first. At the moment, we do not know where the mayors will be, and where they are now is not where the ICBs are. The Government have decided to cut ICB budgets and force mergers before they have decided where the mayoral authorities will be in some cases. Even where there are mayoral authorities already, the Government have not mandated that the ICBs be coherent with them, and, therefore, in many cases, they are not. We have a very confusing pattern emerging, which may require further reorganisation of ICBs to line them up, with a further cost down the line.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. There is a consensus—not just in this room, but within Parliament and going back several decades—that we want more integration and partnership working, particularly to bring together health and social care services, but this clause drives a coach and horses through that, and does so in a way that weakens rather than strengthens the Government’s plans to replace the system.

Local authorities bear responsibility for social care and public health in their areas, but they will no longer have a direct voice when it comes to integrated care boards. What we have seen to date is not an ideal system, or even a system that works particularly well, so I understand that the Government want to strengthen it, but we should not do that by removing the local government voice or making it indirect via a mayor who does not have the direct responsibility for delivering social care locally. Mayors may have some strategic oversight, but that is different.

Just last week, the Minister of State for Care appeared before the Health and Social Care Committee and was questioned on this very issue by me and others. His view was that the mayoral strategic partnership would be more than sufficient to make up for the local authorities losing their seat, but he faced particular scrutiny from the hon. Member for Chelsea and Fulham (Ben Coleman), who made some excellent points, which I will not repeat or paraphrase as they are on public record.

The gist of his argument was that local authorities have been ignored for too long when it comes to joining up health and social care services. This measure puts local authorities in an even weaker position and threatens what the Government are trying to achieve with social care, particularly for areas such as mine that have an older population and a relatively small unitary authority with so much responsibility to deliver on.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon has already said, the combined area of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight—or the Solent, as the Government like to call the Isle of Wight, despite the fact that fish cannot vote—is not set to get a mayor for a couple of years, but it will be at the vanguard of the Government’s plans. What about those areas for which there is no date, or even no plan for a mayor at all? It seems extraordinary that the Government would do away with the current set-up, imperfect as it is, and replace it with something that does not yet exist.

The Government have time deal with this problem. I am sure they quietly understand that there could be a problem. It is now on their shoulders to deal with it. I welcome the Minister’s reflections.

[Karin Smyth]

There has been a wide-ranging discussion on this clause. I remind Members that the abolition of ICPs is about reducing that complex legal framework, allowing for local decisions and putting partnership work in place in the most effective way. That is what the measure seeks to do. I do not think anyone has disagreed with the notion that the landscape is complex, and that people are producing a lot of reports. In future, health and wellbeing boards will be the focal point for the collaboration between ICBs and local authorities. They are statutory committees that bring together the NHS, local government and relevant community partners; set the strategic direction for health and care services; and oversee joint working in their area, which we are of course committed to making work in local areas. I do not think many people will disagree with that; I hope that is clear.

There is also an enhanced role, not only for the health and wellbeing boards—as I said last week, I think they have been underutilised in most areas; again, I do not think people generally disagree with that point—but for health scrutiny. Again, across the country, that has not been pursued to the greatest extent to create links with elected councillors in local areas.

We are clear that the role of local authorities is crucial at a local level—as the name describes—and particularly in working on our commitment for neighbourhood partnerships and developing the neighbourhood plan; most of that was covered in our sittings last week. I accept that there are a number of concerns about how that will work in different geographies. I think the Opposition said last week that a survey suggested a quarter of areas will keep those partnerships, which is absolutely fine. That is up to them.

On the one hand, the Opposition say that there is centralisation and a power grab in this Bill; on the other, they complain—I should not say complain, because it is their right and their job to do so—about the move to devolution and the freedom to allow, or indeed encourage, local leaders to work together across authorities on behalf of the populations they serve, even where some of them are politically divided, because the populations they serve voted for different people. It is incumbent on all of us as individual elected politicians to work with people—whoever the population around us voted for. These provisions provide for that.

[Edward Argar]

Can the Minister set out how she envisages health scrutiny committees having genuine teeth? Our cross-party health scrutiny committee in Leicestershire universally condemned a decision by the ICB—totally disagreed with it—and the ICB basically said, “Thank you; noted,” and carried on anyway.

[Karin Smyth]

We all have examples of decisions that are made in our constituencies that we do not like. Again, that is part of the democratic process, but I go back to my earlier point: either there is a centralised unaccountable body like NHS England making decisions, or the Secretary of State devolves those responsibilities.

It is incumbent on people and elected leaders locally, and the ICB, which is not elected, to work with local leaders on these decisions. ICBs will be held accountable through mechanisms in the Department of Health and Social Care. There will be decisions that people do not like—that is a consequence of some of these things—but the clause simplifies the landscape.

[Gregory Stafford]

Will the Minister give way?

[Karin Smyth]

I will not; we need to move on from this point. Of course, if people want to keep the partnerships, they are totally able to do so. That will be up to local leaders to decide.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 70—Duty to engage primary care providers in integrated care boards—

“(1) An integrated care board must take all reasonable steps to secure the meaningful involvement of primary care providers in the exercise of its functions relating to—

(a) service redesign,

(b) integration of health services,

(c) development of neighbourhood health services, and

(d) population health planning.

(2) In this section, ‘primary care providers’ includes—

(a) providers of primary medical services,

(b) community pharmacy contractors,

(c) providers of primary dental services, and

(d) providers of ophthalmic services.

(3) Under subsection (1), ‘meaningful involvement’ includes—

(a) involvement at an early stage in the development of ICB proposals,

(b) provision of sufficient information to enable informed participation of primary care providers in ICB functions,

(c) opportunities for primary care providers to influence ICB decision-making, and

(d) opportunities for primary care providers to deliver feedback on how their views have been taken into account in the delivery of ICB functions.

(4) An integrated care board must publish an annual statement describing—

(a) how it has complied with this section, and

(b) the impact of primary care providers’ involvement on decisions taken by the ICB.

(5) The Secretary of State may issue guidance about the application of this section to which integrated care boards must have regard.”

This new clause ensures a certain range of primary care providers are consulted by integrated care boards in the development of their healthcare plans.

[Karin Smyth]

Clause 24 abolishes the requirement for health and wellbeing boards to prepare and publish a joint local health and wellbeing strategy. Instead ICBs, local authorities and their partners must work together through the health and wellbeing board to develop a neighbourhood health plan, in line with this Government’s commitment in the 10-year health plan. The neighbourhood health plan should be updated regularly to reflect the needs of the local population, unless all partners consider the existing plan is sufficient.

In developing their neighbourhood health plans, responsible local authorities and partner ICBs must involve the people who live or work in the area of the responsible local authority. The neighbourhood health plan will cover most of the topics previously considered by joint local health and wellbeing strategies, but will also encourage a deep focus on tackling the challenges facing individual neighbourhoods. That may mean applying different geographical focuses to different elements of the plan, to ensure that planners are addressing the real and different needs of the diverse communities they serve.

These plans will outline how the NHS, local government and local partners intend to improve the health of people in their locality and reduce health inequalities through a joined-up neighbourhood health approach. The plans will consider how local services can help realise national NHS priorities, further public service reforms, and improve performance against the adult social care outcomes framework and the local outcomes framework metrics. To support this work, the Government also intend to provide local areas with guidance and we will work with systems to ensure this addresses the needs of local planners and local communities.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 24 puts neighbourhood health plans on a statutory basis. Currently, section 116A of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 requires local authorities and partner ICBs to prepare a joint local health and wellbeing strategy once they have received their integrated care strategy. Essentially, that means that the ICBs and local authorities produce their overall strategy, then it devolves down, and then the joint health and wellbeing strategy looks at how it will be delivered. The local authority and its partners must give regard to the integrated care strategy, the NHS England mandate and any guidance issued by the Secretary of State. The strategy must be published and local people and the local Healthwatch must be involved in its development.

Section 116B of the 2007 Act places a duty on local authorities and partner ICBs to have regard to various strategies when exercising their function, specifically, a joint strategic needs assessment, an integrated care strategy and a joint local health and wellbeing strategy. NHS England also has regard to these when providing healthcare for a specific area.

Clause 24 changes the JLHWS to a neighbourhood health plan. In many ways, that aligns with the shift in the Government’s 10-year health plan from hospital to community. As they have described it, more care in the neighbourhood will allow hospitals to focus on the more specialist care that may be needed, so more people can be cared for closer to home, which seems a reasonable aim.

However, if local authorities and partner ICBs have to give regard to what the centre is doing when developing neighbourhood health plans, to what extent does the Minister envisage that being directed? Local authorities and partner ICBs giving regard to the centre could mean there being a very loose requirement from the centre to provide for the local population, and then they get on with it; it could also be very prescriptive—my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) has talked about the pros and cons of having targets—with a whole litany of targets in the plans. Whether that squares with the Government’s claim to be devolving power, or whether it strikes as a centralising power, depends on how that is done and to what extent the Secretary of State plans to direct it. I would appreciate it if the Minister could talk about that.

As has been said, Sir Andrew Dilnot told the Committee that

“we cannot really address many of the fundamental problems facing the NHS if we do not sort out social care.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 84, Q131.]

The Government have asked Baroness Casey to review social care, but they have developed this measure in the meantime. Is that because they have been talking to her and know that it is the sort of thing that she will recommend—or are they putting the cart before the horse, as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon suggested?

Later in the Committee’s considerations, we will come to Healthwatch, its benefits and the concerns that I and, I am sure, many other Committee members have about its abolition. What mechanisms does the Minister envisage there being for local people—local patients—to contribute to the neighbourhood health plans? A local Healthwatch currently contributes to the equivalent, the joint local health and wellbeing strategy, as a way of ensuring that it captures patient and community voices. How will that be done otherwise?

Some 80% of the Government’s new neighbourhood health centres that will deliver these plans are expected to be funded through public-private partnerships. Does the Minister have any comments on that, particularly in the light of the expensive private finance initiative that the last Labour Government entered into and left us stuck with?

In March 2026, the Government produced a neighbourhood health framework policy paper, which identified the goal of reducing non-elective admissions for those with severe frailty. Given that goal, why are the Government not on track to deliver the fracture liaison service improvements that they promised?

The policy paper also commits to what it calls

“a diversion rate of at least 25% by March 2027 for at least 10 high volume specialties”.

What is a “diversion rate”? It essentially requires more GP referrals to be rejected, so let us be clear about what that means. When someone, either hon. Members or constituents, goes to see their GP, they are referred to a consultant for care; I should declare an interest as a consultant in the NHS. The consultant will then review that referral and decide whether they think it is clinically appropriate to see the patient, whether a different specialty may be more appropriate, or whether they can give advice or make suggestions about treatment that could be given in primary care instead.

When a patient is given an appointment in secondary care, it essentially means that the GP has decided that they clinically need it, and the consultant has decided that they clinically need it too. If the Government want a diversion rate of at least 25% by March 2027 for at least 10 high volume specialties, are they suggesting that patients who the GP and consultant agree clinically need an appointment should not get one? If so, why?

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

We can go back to the record in Hansard, but I do not remember mentioning anything to do with hospitals in what I just said; I may have had some sort of amnesia at that point. If the hon. Member is referring to the plan of the last Government, which was fully costed, for 40 new hospitals, then I am afraid I did not mention that. On his wider point, Conservative Members want to understand how local authorities and deliverers of primary care—dental services and so on—will be included and can have influence over the plans and strategies that ICBs draw up. I fully support that ambition; I just feel that, if we are to have that ambition, we need to table amendments and new clauses that the Minister might actually accept, so that we can go forward.

[Karin Smyth]

I thank hon. Members for their comments. I accept those made by the hon. Members for Winchester and for North Shropshire. I offer the Liberal Democrats the assurance that the Government fully appreciate the important role that primary care plays in informing ICB decisions, which is why we have retained the requirement that ICBs engage with their system partners, including primary care services, in the exercise of their planning and commissioning activities.

It is universally recognised that full engagement with providers, including primary care, is fundamental to good commissioning, and this is reflected in the strategic commissioning framework. The neighbourhood health framework sets out how neighbourhood health plans should be developed through health and wellbeing boards and with the involvement of system partners. We expect primary care to be fully involved in the process.

In addition, ICBs will continue to engage local representative primary care committees, such as the local medical committees. ICBs must comply with their duty to obtain appropriate advice from persons who have broad professional expertise in prevention, diagnosis or treatment of illness and the protection or improvement of public health. Primary care practitioners will remain key sources of such advice. Although I agree that experience of general practice is fundamental—as a commissioner, I worked very closely with general practitioners, who deal with 90% of patient contacts—I do not believe that placing an additional requirement on ICBs to engage specifically with primary care providers is necessary.

I will take this opportunity to clarify matters. We are moving between the roles of ICBs and local authority health and wellbeing boards. I know this is a subject of great interest and will continue to be debated in relation to those bodies’ commissioning and providing functions. The planning structure will be improved under clause 24, reflecting our commitment to neighbourhood health and making it a reality.

Planning begins with a joint strategic needs assessment developed by health and wellbeing boards; that assessment informs the new neighbourhood health plan, replacing the joint local health and wellbeing strategy. Meanwhile, ICBs will produce population health improvement plans, aligning multiple joint strategic needs assessments, neighbourhood health plans and local priorities. Patient and local voices must, of course, be embedded in ICB decision making and in the planning process. ICBs are being supported to do that. The strategic commissioning framework published on 4 November 2025 clearly set out that user involvement is key to strategic commissioning.

Having proper plans that address the needs of neighbourhoods will help the NHS to deliver for every community in our country. That is where the patient focus is and where people experience healthcare the most, and it is why we have made these commitments in neighbourhood health plans. I commend clause 24 to the Committee as the means to make that a reality.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25

NHS trust accounts

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 26 stand part.

[Karin Smyth]

Clause 25 makes focused but important changes to the accounting and audit arrangements for NHS trusts by amending schedule 4 to the National Health Service Act 2006. It does not put additional burdens on NHS trusts; instead, the aim of the clause is to align the requirements for trusts with the updated accounting arrangements for foundation trusts made elsewhere in the Bill. The changes are needed as a consequence of the abolition of NHS England and the removal of the requirement for foundation trusts to have councils of governors and members.

The amendments the clause makes replicate trusts’ existing duties to keep proper accounts and records about those accounts, and to prepare annual accounts for each financial year. The clause also replicates the Secretary of State’s current power to direct an NHS trust regarding the form of its annual accounts, but extends that power of direction so the Secretary of State may also direct a trust to prepare accounts for a specified period—for example, when part-period accounts are needed. That will help to ensure a consistent approach to financial reporting while retaining the flexibility to keep requirements up to date.

The clause also sets out and strengthens how the audit arrangements for NHS trusts should operate, mirroring the approach for foundation trusts and integrated care boards. It provides that NHS trust annual accounts are audited under the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, as is the case currently, but it also provides that part-period accounts may be audited in accordance with that Act where the Secretary of State so directs.

The clause also enables the Comptroller and Auditor General to examine the accounts and related auditor reports, as is currently the case. To reflect the fact that the Secretary of State will have oversight of providers once NHS England is abolished, it requires the accounts and audit reports to be sent to the Secretary of State.

Taken together, these measures support transparency, consistency and robust financial assurance. They will help to reduce unnecessary divergence in accounting requirements across different types of NHS provider, while maintaining clear oversight of public funds. That is consistent with the Bill’s broader intent to support effective governance and clear accountability for providers.

Clause 26 makes minor technical amendments to ensure that the statute book remains clear and coherent as the Bill aligns the approach to audit and accounts across NHS trusts and foundation trusts. It sits alongside the provisions in the Bill that update the arrangements for the audit of foundation trusts following the abolition of NHS England and the removal of the requirement for NHS foundation trusts to have councils of governors and members.

The clause does that by amending or removing outdated transitory provisions relating to the audit of NHS trust accounts in two places: the NHS Act 2006 and the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014. Clause 26 therefore supports the effective implementation of the wider measures in this part of the Bill by ensuring that the legislation is up to date, accurate and internally consistent. I commend clauses 25 and 26 to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

As has been said, clause 25 specifies how NHS trusts should handle their accounting. Paragraph 11A of schedule 4 to the NHS Act 2006 sets out the current obligations, which are that the trust must keep proper accounts, that the Secretary of State may give directions about how the accounts are held, and that the accounts must be prepared annually, may be examined by the Comptroller and Auditor General, and must be submitted to NHS England.

Clause 25 replaces paragraph 11A entirely. Under the new provisions, the reporting goes to the Secretary of State, instead of NHS England—which seems sensible, because the Government are abolishing NHS England—and the Secretary of State may give directions about “methods and principles”, as well as the “form and content”. The Secretary of State may also give directions about specified periods in which accounts are to be prepared.

Will the Minister explain why those provisions are felt to be necessary? There will be suspicion among some more cynical people that the power to specify periods could be used to be more flattering for the Government, or that methods and principles could be used to change the perception of the position. Can the Minister give an example of where she thinks such periods would be useful, and also say why she thinks it is necessary to enable the Secretary of State to give directions about methods and principles, and form and content, in a way that is not done at the moment?

The exception for charitable trusts of which the NHS is a trustee is being removed. Will the Minister explain why she thinks that is important, and in what situation she thinks that power would be used? Finally, will she say whether the financial directors of NHS trusts have been consulted about these changes? If so, what was their feedback?

Clause 26 tidies up relevant provisions in two pieces of legislation, as the Minister has described.

[Karin Smyth]

If there are specific examples that are helpful, I will write to the hon. Lady—I am not entirely sure I got the point about charities, but we will pick that up in Hansard.

As I outlined in my opening remarks, these clauses are about standardising the key requirements across the NHS provider landscape in relation to annual and other accounts and records in relation to those, and audit and reporting requirements, including keeping those up to date and having a consistent approach across all NHS provider types. Of course, we worked closely with NHS England colleagues and directors of finance in seeking to bring forward those provisions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

Special Health Authorities: establishment and exercise of functions

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[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 28 stand part.

[Karin Smyth]

Clauses 27 and 28 make amendments to the legal framework around special health authorities to give the Secretary of State the flexibility to best manage the reliable delivery of healthcare for patients and the public. As the Committee knows, special health authorities are independent bodies established by the Secretary of State, by order, to perform specific functions. They play a key national role in the health system, carrying out specific functions on behalf of the Secretary of State.

Clause 27 does two key things to the special health authority legal framework. First, it amends section 28 of the NHS Act 2006 to increase the scope of functions that a special health authority could be established to deliver. Currently, the Secretary of State can create a special health authority only for the purpose of exercising functions under the 2006 Act. The clause allows a special health authority to be established to exercise functions under any other Act as well.

Secondly, the clause amends section 29 of the 2006 Act, which currently enables regulations to provide for the functions of a special health authority to be carried out flexibly, by another special health authority or jointly with one or more other special health authorities. That applies only to functions that the Secretary of State has directed the special health authority to exercise under section 7 of the 2006 Act. The clause removes that limitation, so that those arrangements can be made for any functions of the special health authority, not just those that it is directed to carry out under section 7.

These changes are needed because the health and care system is underpinned by a range of statutory functions that do not sit exclusively within the 2006 Act. The Secretary of State needs to be able to establish special health authorities to carry out those wider functions, and to give those functions to existing special health authorities. The clause ensures that the Secretary of State has the modern, adaptable tools required to place specialist functions in the right national body, with the appropriate governance and accountability. Equally, special health authorities need to be able to work with other special health authorities across all their functions in a way that best serves the needs of the wider health and care system.

On occasion, it is necessary for Ministers to merge, alter or abolish special health authorities, either because of changing circumstances or to ensure the smooth and effective running of the system. Clause 28 provides the flexibility to transfer and redeploy staff. It allows regulations to be made to enable staff to be transferred to an integrated care board or another special health authority. These changes ensure that staff can be transferred where they may be needed most, allowing for flexibility to direct resources in the health system.

The clause also allows for arrangements to be made for a special health authority’s staff to be made available to another special health authority, a local authority, the Secretary of State or an integrated care board. That may be necessary during an emergency or to provide specialist support to help an organisation achieve a particular outcome. The clause also allows the Secretary of State to give directions to a special health authority to make staff available to another special health authority or integrated care board or the Secretary of State.

Clause 28 also amends the existing power to make regulations about the sharing of information with other bodies, to allow information to be shared with integrated care boards in addition to the Secretary of State and other special health authorities. That allows for information to be shared across the system so that national and local functions can be successfully fulfilled and supports a more joined-up health system.

Clauses 27 and 28 provide for future-facing updates that will support effective administration and ensure the more reliable delivery of healthcare for patients and the public. I commend them to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Special health authorities are, in essence, specialist health authorities set up by the Secretary of State, usually to provide an England-wide service of some form. Examples include NHS Blood and Transplant, and the NHS Business Services Authority, which provides NHS pensions—I should declare that I have an NHS pension—admin for prescription exemptions and other such business-type functions. We also have NHS Resolution, which deals with clinical negligence claims, and the NHS Counter Fraud Authority.

In principle, special health authorities are useful in some cases, but they are effectively a form of quango. Can the Minister explain when she thinks the Government might want to set up a special health authority, rather than using a department within the DHSC to deliver the same thing? There are plenty of other nationally delivered services, and although the Government have suggested that some services, such as screening, will become localised as part of the Bill, some things will remain national. Can the Minister give some examples of what the new provision will be used for?

I can see there is provision for flexibility, but the special health authorities would require setting up, and there are set-up costs and costs associated with branding and those sorts of things. How does the Minister envisage those costs being provided for, and when will it be necessary for the Government to use them rather than just using the Department?

Special health authorities have been created, reconfigured and shelved many times. For example, the National Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse became part of Public Health England in 2013, and the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement was closed in the same year. The functions of the National Patient Safety Agency went to the NHS Commissioning Board Special Health Authority, later known as NHS England, in 2012 and then to NHS Improvement in 2016. Widening the scope could leave us with more quangos than are necessary.

Which specific functions do the Government plan to move into special health authorities under this widened power? Have the Government just decided that they need this power and are increasing the scope because they are abolishing NHS England without a proper plan? Is this power just to cover themselves in the event that, as they start to make a plan, they find out they need it?

Clause 28 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations for the transfer of staff from one special health authority to another, or to an ICB. Paragraph 3(8) of schedule 6 to the National Health Service Act 2006 states:

“Regulations may provide for the transfer of officers from one Special Health Authority to another”,

or to NHS England,

“and for arrangements under which the services of an officer…are placed at the disposal of another Special Health Authority”,

or NHS England, or a local authority. Paragraph 3(12)(a) states that the Secretary of State may give directions

“to place the services of any of its officers at the disposal of another Special Health Authority”,

or NHS England. Paragraph 13 states:

“Provision may be made by regulations with respect to the recording of information by a Special Health Authority, and the furnishing of information by a Special Health Authority to the Secretary of State, another Special Health Authority”,

or NHS England.

Clause 28 modifies that paragraph such that regulations can now provide for the transfer of an officer to an ICB—that is a new power—as well as a special health authority and a local health authority, but no longer to NHS England because NHS England is being abolished. Regulations can now provide for an officer’s services to be placed at the disposal of the ICB and the Secretary of State, which is a new power, as well as the special health authority or local authority, but no longer NHS England. The clause modifies paragraph 3(12)(a) of schedule 6, so that directions may be given about placing the services of officers at the disposal of the special health authority and, newly, the Secretary of State or an ICB, but not NHS England. As the Minister said, the clause also modifies paragraph 13 of schedule 6, so that a special health authority can be required by regulations to pass information to integrated care boards, which is a new power, but no longer to NHS England.

NHS England is to be abolished, so it is sensible to say that staff can no longer be placed there—that seems an entirely reasonable exercise—but the legislation providing for special health authorities essentially contains open-ended spending power. Remuneration of the special health authority chairman and staff can be determined by the Secretary of State, with the approval of the Treasury. Does the Minister foresee an upper limit to those sorts of salaries?

People will essentially be able to transfer from one special health authority to another, or to an ICB—or be placed at the disposal of another special health authority, an ICB, a local authority or the Secretary of State. Will the Minister talk about the location, pension and salary of those individuals? We heard yesterday that the future Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham), may want to move a whole load of civil servants from London up to Manchester. That will clearly be within his gift if he becomes Prime Minister, but for individuals who work in one location to be asked to move to another is disruptive to their family and social lives, and involves significant relocation costs. If people are moved in the way that clause 28 describes, particularly by transfer, what choice will they have? What will happen to their pension, salary and other terms and conditions, and will they have a choice of location or not?

[Gregory Stafford]

Very briefly, on clauses 27 and 28, I am sure the Committee is aware that special health authorities were initially established under the National Health Service Act 1977. Since then the number of special health authorities has expanded and contracted a number of times over the years to leave us with, currently, NHS Blood and Transplant, and the Business Services Authority, which covers pensions, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham mentioned—I should declare that I have an NHS pension, albeit a very small one—as well as the NHS Litigation Authority, also known as NHS Resolution, and the NHS Counter Fraud Authority.

The mood music and the direction of travel, certainly since 2006, has been to reduce the number of special health authorities. On my reading, clauses 27 and 28 suggest that the Government are potentially looking to expand the number of special health authorities, given the Secretary of State’s direction under clause 27 and the practical steps for staff transfers in clause 28. Is the Minister looking at, for example, a special health authority to deal with artificial intelligence? Clearly that is something the NHS will have to embrace—or deal with, depending on which end of the AI argument one is on—rapidly over the coming years. Is that a potential area for a special health authority? Perhaps the Minister could outline where she sees the special health authorities acting and what their remits might be.

[Karin Smyth]

To be clear, in response to the comments of the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, it is not currently our intention to set up any new special authorities to deliver any specific functions. We are taking this opportunity to update the legislative framework and ensure that in future the functions that a special health authority could carry out are less limited. The current legislative framework limits the remit of such authorities to their functions under the NHS Act 2006, which is outdated and does not reflect changes since that time. There are functions of the Secretary of State under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 that we may want special authorities to carry out in future. I agree with the Opposition spokesperson that the situation is complex. We have had a lot of changes over many years, as both she and the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said. I agree that we need flexibility for future provision, and that is what the clauses provide.

We have no immediate intention to delegate specific functions of the Secretary of State. However, following the abolition of NHS England, a range of functions may need to be established, as the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon outlined. Those functions could, as an example, include the data and information functions in part 9 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which currently sit with the Secretary of State.

I assure the Committee that the clauses do not change the existing processes or scrutiny that exist around setting up a special health authority. They are, as I think the Opposition spokesperson said, about future-proofing. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29

Constitution of NHS foundation trusts

[The Chair]

We now come to group 24, and amendment 73 to clause 29 tabled by Charlie Maynard. Does any Member wish to move amendment 73? With that not being so, the question becomes that clause 29 stand part of the Bill.

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[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 74, in schedule 3, page 80, leave out paragraphs 5 to 8.

This amendment would retain the requirement for NHS Trusts to have a Council of Governors.

Amendment 75, in schedule 3, page 80, leave out paragraph 14.

This amendment would retain the requirement for NHS Trusts to have a Council of Governors.

Government amendment 19.

Amendment 36, in schedule 3, page 82, line 3, at end insert—

“(1A) The function under sub-paragraph (1) must be exercised by a person employed in the civil service of the State, and a Minister of the Crown or a special adviser must not be involved in any decision relating to such an appointment, suspension or removal.”

This amendment would ensure that civil servants are responsible for the decision making and appointment processes for trust and ICB leaders, rather than Ministers or Special Advisers.

Schedule 3.

Clause 30 stand part.

New clause 59—Independence of appointments—

“The Secretary of State must make provision to ensure that operational decisions regarding the appointment, suspension or removal of—

(a) chairs and directors of NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts, and

(b) chief executives of integrated care boards,

are made exclusively by persons employed in the civil service.”

[Karin Smyth]

Amendment 19 reinstates in primary legislation the requirement in schedule 7 to the National Health Service Act 2006 for an NHS foundation trust board to include one executive director who is a medical or dental practitioner, and another who is a registered nurse or midwife.

I want to be clear to the Committee from the outset that there was never any intention to change the policy on the clinical membership of NHS foundation trust boards. Foundation trusts would still have been expected to have appropriate clinical leadership on their boards, but we had heard from ambulance foundation trusts that the current framing of the requirement for clinicians is not always helpful, and greater flexibility was therefore required. However, we also heard from important stakeholders, including the Royal College of Nursing, that removing the requirement from primary legislation has been perceived as deprioritising clinicians, which is absolutely not the case. We have therefore tabled amendment 19 to remove any doubt.

These roles provide valuable clinical oversight of board governance in decision making in foundation trusts, and are essential to ensuring the safety and quality of patient-facing services in the NHS. At the same time, some providers may need different clinical expertise at board level. For example, in ambulance trusts, an experienced paramedic may be better placed to provide the relevant clinical guidance and oversight. The amendment therefore gives the Secretary of State a regulation-making power to create exceptions to the requirement following engagement with relevant stakeholders. That preserves the current position in primary legislation while allowing for targeted flexibility for ambulance or patient transport-focused foundation trusts where appropriate. I commend amendment 19 to the Committee.

Clause 29 introduces schedule 3, which makes changes to the governance and constitution of NHS foundation trusts. It removes the various statutory roles of foundation trust members and councils of governors, and repeals the requirement for FTs to have them. Amendment 73 to 75 look to oppose that, but I do not think that we are discussing those.

[The Chair]

Order. Forgive me; let me interrupt to explain. I asked if anyone wished to move amendment 73, and no one did. We will come to amendments 74 and 75, so the Minister is welcome to speak to those amendments now or at the end of the debate if she wants to. Other members of the Committee may wish to move those amendments subsequently.

[Karin Smyth]

Thank you for the clarification, Sir Jeremy. I will come to amendment 75 at the end of the debate.

The Bill’s removal of councils of governors from NHS foundation trusts is part of delivering the 10-year health plan goal of hospitals putting patient experiences and outcomes at the heart of their decision making. That is not because we want to rid the system of local voices in democratic accountability—far from it. Although governors have provided helpful advice and oversight for some foundation trusts, we expect the next generation of NHS foundation trusts to put in place more responsive and flexible arrangements for drawing on patient, staff and stakeholder insight.

Rather than a one-size-fits-all model, providers should develop engagement arrangements that reflect their local populations, geographies and healthcare needs. Foundation trusts will have the option to retain aspects of their engagement model where it is working well, but can take a different approach if needed. Following Royal Assent, foundation trusts will be expected to have those arrangements in place and will be assessed as part of the non-statutory advanced foundation trust process.

Schedule 3 makes related changes to governance and decision making, in line with the Government’s policy to streamline oversight of providers and reduce duplication in the system. For example, the legal powers to appoint chairs and non-executive directors of foundation trusts and NHS trusts will, in future, both sit with the Secretary of State while supporting the effective use of talent across the NHS. Other functions of the council of governors, such as reviewing plans and major transactions, currently duplicate existing NHS England responsibilities, which will transfer to the Secretary of State through this Bill. Removing those requirements will therefore reduce duplication in the system.

Schedule 3 will also give the Secretary of State responsibility for approving changes to foundation trust constitutions and material changes to private patient income, and deciding chair and non-executive remuneration. The Secretary of State will take on the oversight role currently exercised by NHS England, and previously Monitor, including monitoring foundation trust performance, use of resources and governance. That will support system alignment and ensure that appropriate accountability arrangements are in place. Can I seek clarification, Sir Jeremy, that I can speak to clause 30 at this point?

[The Chair]

Yes, we are debating all the provisions in this group together, so the Minister is welcome to speak to clause 30 now or later, when she winds up.

[Karin Smyth]

Thank you, Sir Jeremy. Clause 30 clarifies how NHS foundation trust status will be applied for and granted following the abolition of NHS England and the removal of the council of governors model. The Government are committed to reinvigorating the foundation trust sector by granting high-performing providers greater freedoms and autonomy. The power to authorise foundation trusts originally sat with Monitor and passed to NHS England in 2022. The clause, alongside schedules 3 and 11, sets out how that power will operate when it transfers to the Secretary of State. It also makes consequential amendments to the authorisation process, including removing requirements linked to recruiting members and electing governors. The Secretary of State will also set the criteria for becoming a foundation trust. I commend the clauses and the schedule to the Committee.

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[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is right that there will be a gap in local decision making on these issues. It goes back to that tension I described some moments ago: the Government’s stated intention is to devolve powers locally, but they seem to be pulling so much power up to the Secretary of State that we will lose the ability to make local decisions for the benefit of local populations where appropriate. We have a stated ambition for neighbourhood health, but those neighbourhoods are rapidly expanding in this legislation to become areas of millions of people. Local people who are interested in their local health delivery or local hospital trust would not see that as local decision making, and there is the gap that my hon. Friend describes.

I do not think that amendments 74 and 75 have been moved, so I will not talk about them. Government amendment 19 will require

“NHS foundation trusts to have at least one executive director who is a registered medical practitioner or a registered dentist and another who is a registered nurse or a registered midwife.”

As also stated in the explanatory note, and as the Minister mentioned, regulations may create exception—for example, for ambulance trusts. That is the right decision, and it is important that we have medical experience on foundation trust boards. I am interested in understanding from the Minister, first, why she has chosen a medical practitioner or registered dentist. Does she see some equivalence in their expertise that could be substituted? I have great respect for doctors and for dentists, but they have potentially different clinical expertise. If a foundation trust does no oral healthcare or maxillofacial reconstruction, and does no dentistry or allied specialties, would it really satisfy requirements to have a dentist on the board? Likewise, given that the amendment also refers to a registered nurse or midwife, if a trust has no maternity services, would having a midwife on the board really satisfy the requirement of that trust to have nursing care input? I ask those questions, and I would be interested in the answers.

Likewise, there is the exemption for ambulance trusts. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, I would be interested to understand from the Minister why she thinks ambulance trusts do not need a medical practitioner on their boards, given that they are doing medicine. Plenty of consultants work alongside paramedics and in ambulances, so again I am not quite sure why she is making that exemption. I would be interested to hear from her on that.

I understand the intention behind Liberal Democrat amendment 36. Once again, it is trying to soften the Secretary of State’s power grab over decision making—like the hon. Member for North Shropshire, I am not saying anything against the current Secretary of State, but a future Secretary of State could be different. The aim is to try to temper that in some way. Unfortunately for the hon. Member—I have sympathy for the amendment—the stated intention of the Bill is to pull more power to the Secretary of State. The Minister may surprise me, but I fear that the amendment will not find favour with the Government, because the whole Bill is about pulling more power to the centre, certainly when it comes to appointments, and to the Secretary of State.

However, the Minister should think about how future Secretaries of State may have to go through some process whereby their decisions are checked and justified, especially at local level. If we want local people to have influence and say over their local health systems and trusts, there needs to be some sort of bridging legislation or bridging process to ensure that whatever a Secretary of State decides, it has the confidence and support of local people and local service providers.

[Karin Smyth]

I think I am almost going to agree with the hon. Gentleman on his final point. It is important that local people have confidence in how their local systems are run and managed and, clearly, in the outcomes.

I will come first to the issue of governors and boards and then move to the amendments. I think we have all had emails, as is quite right, from local board members. Let me say, as I did earlier, that that is with good intent; they are very good people, who have given public service to be part of their local health system. As I said, this provision is no judgment on them; it is, as we heard, about effectively making the really important patient voice and patient experience central to the functions of the organisations delivering our healthcare. As I said in previous sittings, a debate will continue to be had about where we most effectively have that, but our intention throughout the 10-year health plan and this Bill is about devolution to providers and to ICBs and about making boards, as I also said in a previous sitting, responsible and accountable for the outcomes.

Let me outline broadly, because I think this is of interest to people, the impact on governance and the role that governors had. Just to be clear, since the creation of foundation trusts in 2004, NHS England—and, before it, NHS Improvement and Monitor—has had a statutory role to oversee the governance of NHS foundation trusts, including holding the whole board to account and taking steps where it identifies weaknesses in how foundation trusts are being run. The regulatory function is underpinned by the NHS provider licence, which will continue when NHS England’s functions pass to the Secretary of State. That is why we do not consider that the removal of the council of governors will have a negative impact on the governance of FTs, as some hon. Members have suggested.

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[Dr Johnson]

Will the Minister give way?

[Karin Smyth]

I will move on, if I may. I think my response will the cover the issues raised in the debate.

On amendment 36 and new clause 59, I note the concern that the Secretary of State could act inappropriately when making appointments to the boards of ICBs and NHS trusts and foundation trusts. We discussed democratic accountability in a previous sitting, and at the end of the day it is up to the British public whom they elect to Parliament and as the governing party.

Transparency and democratic accountability are at the heart of our reforms. It would not be right for the civil service to be given sole legislative responsibility for appointments to NHS trusts, foundation trusts or integrated care boards. Ministers are democratically accountable to Parliament, and civil servants act on their behalf under the Carltona principle. Civil servants serve and advise the Government, and act on behalf of Ministers, but it is for Ministers to take decisions and to be held accountable to Parliament for the performance of the NHS. The civil service will run fair, open and equitable campaigns to fulfil these roles and will recommend appropriate candidates to Ministers.

Ministers are under a duty to comply with public law principles and to act reasonably, and will adhere to the Nolan principles, including objectivity, transparency and integrity, in discharging this function. The practical arrangements for appointments are being developed as part of the transition planning for the integration of NHS England’s functions into the Department, and will be based on these principles. It would therefore be inappropriate to exclude Ministers entirely from the appointments process. I urge hon. Members not to push the amendments to a vote.

[Dr Johnson]

Will the Minister give way?

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 4.

Clauses 32 to 34 stand part.

[Karin Smyth]

I will address clauses 31 to 34 and schedule 4 together. Clause 31 ensures that NHS foundation trusts are subject to the same robust, transparent audit regimes as other NHS bodies. Together with schedule 4, clause 31 makes provision about the audit of NHS foundation trust accounts, which is needed as a consequence of the abolition of NHS England and the removal of the requirement for NHS foundation trusts to have councils of governors and members. Schedule 4 does that by removing the current bespoke provisions related to the auditing arrangements for the accounts of foundation trusts and amends the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 so that foundation trusts are subject to the auditing regime under that Act. This means that foundation trusts will in future be subject to the same auditing requirements as trusts and integrated care boards, ensuring a clear, consistent and transparent framework for local audit across NHS provider organisations. Taken together, these measures strengthen consistency in financial reporting and audit assurance across the NHS provider sector, while preserving the independence of the local audit process.

Clause 32 repeals provisions of the NHS Act 2006, requiring NHS England to maintain a register of NHS foundation trusts and a power to charge fees related to maintaining the register. The register formed a repository of documents that related to how foundation trusts were governed and regulated. However, removing the requirements does not mean there will be no transparency. NHS foundation trusts are already required to publish the information provided on this register, and where a foundation trust is placed into special administration the administrator is required to publish its report. As a result, the additional requirement to maintain a register is unnecessary, burdensome and duplicative, providing the public with no new information. For those reasons we are removing that bureaucratic duty in the Bill.

On clause 33 stand part, the Department of Health and Social Care, like all Departments of State, has a responsibility to diligently and responsibly steward taxpayer’s money in delivering services to the public. Clause 33 updates and strengthens existing legislation to make sure we have the statutory tools we need in order to effectively manage and oversee the finances of the NHS. It does that by updating sections 42B and 42C of the NHS Act 2006 so that the existing last-resort statutory capital spending limit for foundation trusts can also apply to revenue expenditure for a given year.

Foundation trusts account for a substantial proportion of NHS revenue spending, at around 40%, and continue to benefit from significant operational autonomy, including the freedom to retain and reinvest surpluses. We remain committed to seeing those freedoms expanded further through our advanced foundation trust programme. However, this strengthened power ensures we have a financial framework that makes it easier to consider additional freedoms. The Department must therefore ensure it has in place robust tools to oversee the finances of the health service, to reassure taxpayers and Parliament that public money is being managed effectively and to ensure that the Department can meet its financial obligations.

The power will remain subject to strong safeguards, including a mandatory consultation period with the foundation trust before any order is made, the requirement for any order made to be published, and detailed statutory guidance setting out the circumstances in which the power would be used and how limits would be determined. Crucially, this is a last-resort measure. This power would be used only in exceptional circumstances—for example, when the Secretary State thinks there is a risk of breaching a departmental delegated expenditure limit. I should note that the existing capital backstop on which it builds has never been used. The purpose here is not routine financial management, but assurance. By ensuring that foundation trust freedoms operate within a viable and sustainable framework, the clause helps protect those freedoms rather than undermine them.

Finally, clause 34 makes straightforward but important provision about financial accountability when NHS organisations change legal form. It requires an NHS foundation trust that has been newly authorised, or that has recently acquired an NHS trust or another NHS foundation trust, to prepare the final accounts for its predecessor organisation. As the Committee will appreciate, organisational change, whether through authorisation to foundation trust status or through acquisition, can bring real benefits for local services, but it can also create a practical issue at financial year end. The predecessor body will have ceased to exist in its previous form and so will not be in a position to complete and sign off its final set of accounts. Clause 34 addresses that gap by making clear where responsibility sits—

Health Bill (Sixth sitting)

Karin Smyth Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 25th June 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

Clause 12 inserts new section 3B into the National Health Service Act 2006, re-establishing the responsibility of the Secretary of State to commission services. Although we intend ICBs to commission the vast majority of services, as we discussed this morning, we will use this regulation-making power to set out the small number of specialised services that the Secretary of State will be responsible for. That may include, for example, proton beam therapy, alongside a small number of other specialist services not currently suitable for ICB commissioning, such as gender dysphoria services and clinical genomics. By their nature, those are services to which national commissioning is appropriate because, for example, they have fewer patients or providers, greater or changeable costs, or they require specialist clinical expertise and input. Having a regulation-making power allows us to future-proof the system and update the regulations when new services or treatments emerge, or when services become cheaper or mainstream and therefore sit better with ICBs.

I now turn to amendment 57, which was tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. I recognise that any change to the way these services are commissioned matters enormously to the patients who depend on them. The hon. Lady used the word “worried”, and I understand that. Any change must be made with the greatest of care. However, the amendment would require the Secretary of State, before any regulations are made that alter the range of nationally commissioned services and regardless of the scale of the change, to publish a transition plan covering seven prescribed matters, to consult five prescribed categories of persons for a minimum of 12 weeks, to publish a response to that consultation and then to wait a minimum of 60 days before the regulations can be made.

As I have said, I understand and share the concern about continuity of care and the careful allocation of responsibility that lies behind it, but the proposals in amendment 57 are not the right way to address that concern. It proposes a fixed sequence of steps with minimum time periods that would apply to every change without exception. Taken together, the prescribed steps would add the better part of half a year to any change, including changes that are minor or technical, or that, for reasons of clinical safety, need to be expedited. That would create delays for patients and uncertainty for the wider system over where commissioning responsibility sits.

I would like to offer assurance on some of the concerns raised today. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon and Consett, who has spoken to me regularly about her concerns, for the work that she does in this area. I also commend the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for North Shropshire, for her work on spinal cord injuries. I have met the chair of the APPG on spinal cord injury to discuss this topic. I would like to thank Bristol Councillor Kelvin Blake, who has a spinal cord injury and who for many years has impressed on me the difficulties faced by people with spinal cord injuries who are wheelchair dependent. I commend the work of people with these conditions who, as the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said, struggle through a system that they should not have to struggle through. We want to make sure that these changes are assured, and I commit to working with hon. Members to do that as the Bill goes through.

I can assure the Committee that any significant change to nationally commissioned services will be accompanied by proportionate and appropriate engagement with patients, clinicians and the bodies affected. Change will always proceed according to appropriate transition arrangements. Each service, as hon. Members know, has very different patient needs and commissioning requirements, and demands different skills to commission effectively. The framework the Government are proposing will enable the Department to manage these processes flexibly and proportionately.

The hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham asked about arrangements for new organisations. In a changing organisation where people are coming forward for redundancy and in a new organisation that is taking shape, it is important that the executive looks at all redundancy requests and changing needs with regard for critical business infrastructure and the retention of skills. That is what we are currently doing.

The hon. Lady also asked about funding. The Bill allows the Secretary of State to set out which ICB pays for whom, and there are clear rules for people in prisons and those not registered with a GP currently under the guidance of court, which is called “Who Pays?” There are also long-standing processes for ICBs to pay each other as needed. The hon. Lady also asked about high security mental health services; I can assure her that we have no plans to ask the private sector to provide services. The power to direct has been updated to ensure that directions would bite on non-NHS providers if that changes in future.

Clause 13, which is part of this group, is a technical clause that permits the Secretary of State or an integrated care board to confer on a person discretion in relation to anything that is to be provided under the commissioning arrangement. In practice, this means that they could undertake some activities traditionally carried out by a commissioner, such as reviewing how services are provided for a population and designing the way that those services will be delivered within the parameters set by the commissioner. These activities would be clearly set out and measured under the contract, and the commissioner would retain overall responsibility for the delivery of their functions. Currently, integrated care boards are already permitted to do this, and with the transfer of NHS England’s commissioning powers to the Secretary of State, we propose a similar approach for services that are commissioned nationally.

I hope that I have been able to reassure the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, and that she will withdraw her amendment. I commend clauses 12 and 13 to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Unfortunately, the Minister’s reassurances have not convinced me. In relation to change, “significant” means various things to different people. As for “proportionate”, what is “proportionate” to one person is not necessarily “proportionate” to another.

Amendment 57 makes reasonable provision for a situation in which there is a change from national to local commissioning, or from local to—mostly, it is from national to local commissioning. Therefore, I would like to push it to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Government amendments 14 to 18.

Schedule 1.

New clause 2—Right to a GP appointment—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations, within six months of the passing of this Act, establish a scheme to provide every patient with the right to a GP appointment within seven days of seeking one.

(2) The scheme should include a right contained in the NHS constitution for a patient to receive a GP appointment within seven days, or 24 hours if urgent.

(3) The Secretary of State may review the scheme every three years from the day on which this Act is passed and amend it through regulations made by statutory instrument.

(4) A statutory instrument under this section may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to introduce a scheme to ensure that patients have the right to see a GP within seven days.

Government new clause 21—Dispensing medical practitioners etc.

Government new clause 22—Inadequate provision of pharmaceutical services.

Government new clause 23—Pharmaceutical services: appeals etc.

New clause 30—General Ophthalmic Services: national framework, tariff and protected funding—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations establish and maintain a national service specification for the primary ophthalmic services referred to in section 115 of the National Health Service Act 2006 (in this section referred to as general ophthalmic services, "GOS"), setting out the minimum standards of access and provision that integrated care boards are required to secure.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must establish and maintain a national tariff for GOS, setting out the prices at which GOS must be commissioned by integrated care boards.

(3) An integrated care board must commission GOS in accordance with the national service specification and national tariff established under subsections (1) and (2), and may not exercise any discretion to vary, restrict or reduce provision below the standards so specified.

(4) The Secretary of State must ensure that funding for GOS is allocated to integrated care boards as a ring-fenced, protected funding stream, which—

(a) may not be applied by an integrated care board to purposes other than GOS; and

(b) may not be reduced by an integrated care board in order to meet expenditure requirements in respect of other services.

(5) In determining any expenditure limits or resource allocations for integrated care boards under the National Health Service Act 2006, the Secretary of State must calculate and separately identify the GOS component of each board's allocation.

(6) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report in each calendar year assessing the extent to which integrated care boards have complied with their obligations under this section.”

Government new schedule 1—Pharmaceutical services: appeals etc.

New clause 52—Access to dental provision: Dental deserts—

“(1) Within six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must establish a scheme to improve access to dental provision (“the Scheme”).

(2) The purpose of the scheme is to end dental deserts.

(3) A dental desert is defined as any local authority area with fewer than ten active dental practices per 100,000 people.

(4) The scheme must make provision to support integrated care boards to—

(a) guarantee emergency access to an NHS dentist,

(b) provide free dental checks up for—

(i) children,

(ii) mothers within one year of having given birth,

(iii) pregnant women, and

(iv) low-income households, and

(c) guarantee dental appointments for persons commencing—

(i) surgery,

(ii) chemotherapy, or

(iii) transplant procedures.

(5) The Secretary of State must, before publishing the scheme, issue a reformed dental contract.

(6) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the establishment of the scheme, publish a dental workforce plan to support delivery of the scheme.”

This new clause would establish a scheme to support integrated care boards to end dental deserts.

[Karin Smyth]

Primary care is the front door to the NHS and is critical to delivering our neighbourhood health agenda. The neighbourhood health service will bring care into local communities, ending fragmentation and preventing unnecessary hospital admissions. To support that, alongside clause 14, which I will discuss shortly, we have tabled new clauses 22 and 23 and new schedule 1, to strengthen action in the event of local pharmacy challenges and streamline the appeals process.

On new clause 22, many hon. Members will know how the closure of a local pharmacy can significantly affect a community. Pharmacies close for a range of reasons: voluntary closure, business failure or emergencies affecting the premises or surrounding area. Even where a pharmacy remains open, unforeseen or unexpected events can disrupt access for local people.

The NHS Act 2006 sets out how ICBs should commission pharmaceutical services in normal circumstances and what can be done if those arrangements fail. Section 133 of the Act is intended to deal with exceptional situations where standard commissioning processes are too slow and rapid action is needed to restore provision while long-term solutions are put in place, if required. However, the current wording of section 133 is widely interpreted as applying only to large-scale national emergencies, as it refers to inadequate provision affecting a significant number of people. It is unclear whether that would cover more localised situations, such as a village cut off by flooding following a bridge collapse, or where the only pharmacy serving an area closes unexpectedly, creating an urgent unmet need, as we have seen happen. It is also unclear how the Secretary of State would authorise alternative arrangements.

To address those issues, new clause 22 ensures that ICBs can respond swiftly to exceptional circumstances, regardless of scale. It removes the unnecessary provision for the Secretary of State to make arrangements himself and clarifies that authorisation to ICBs should be given through directions. The directions will be limited to six months, with the possibility to extend further if required. This change maintains appropriate national oversight while preventing misuse of the powers. It is a sensible and proportionate amendment that gives the system the flexibility it needs in exceptional circumstances while retaining proper safeguards.

New clause 23 and new schedule 1 simplify the appeal framework for NHS pharmaceutical services by allowing appeals that are currently split between different routes to be heard by a single appeal authority. At present, where concerns arise about a pharmacy contractor, different appeal routes may apply depending on whether a case is characterised as one of fitness or of performance. In practice, however, that distinction is not always clear and the current system can create unnecessary complexity and duplication.

New clause 23 and new schedule 1 address that problem, providing for such appeals to be heard through a single route, which we intend to designate in regulations as NHS Resolution. It is a practical and proportionate change; NHS Resolution already has substantial experience in handling disputes involving NHS pharmaceutical services and is well placed to provide a clear, consistent and independent route of appeal. Importantly, this measure does not change the position in relation to the fitness to practise of individual pharmacy professions. Cases concerning individual practitioners will continue to be dealt with separately by the General Pharmaceutical Council.

By simplifying the framework, this measure will help to ensure that related issues can be considered more coherently, reduce fragmentation in decision making and support the effective oversight of NHS pharmaceutical services. In short, it aligns the appeal system more closely with operational practice, reduces unnecessary complexity and preserves the appropriate safeguards for individual practitioners.

The remaining Government amendments are consequential on those changes, or are technical changes that have emerged as necessary following drafting of the wider Bill. I will speak to new clause 21 in particular, as it updates section 132 of the 2006 Act so that the legislation reflects current commissioning arrangements for pharmaceutical services. Section 132 currently allows, in addition to retail pharmacy business, arrangements to be made with individual doctors and dentists for the provision of pharmaceutical services.

That wording reflects an early model of care. In practice today, arrangements for primacy medical services are made with GP practices, not individual general practitioners, and patient lists are held at practice level. New clause 21 therefore brings the legislation into line with the way services are already commissioned and delivered. It will mean that, where such arrangements are made with dispensing doctors, they are made with GP practices rather than individual GPs. It also removes provision to make such arrangements with dentists, to reflect the fact that that provision is redundant.

In summary, new clause 21 is a technical amendment, which does not change current practice but simply updates the statute book to reflect modern NHS arrangements. Patients in rural areas eligible to receive medicines from the dispensing doctors will continue to receive that service as they do now.

[Peter Prinsley (Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket) (Lab)]

I have received representations from rural dispensing practices in my constituency about the provision of vaccination services. I understand that dispensing general practitioners are having difficulty securing the funding to provide vaccinations, particularly the new meningitis vaccination for young people. Does the Minister envisage that the change being proposed will have any effect on that arrangement?

[Karin Smyth]

The changes here, as I have outlined, are bringing practices in line in terms of the regulation. I think the issue my hon. Friend really addresses is the arrangement between those local practices and the ICB as the commissioner on where the service is provided. Ordinarily a commissioner would seek to make sure that a rural area had provision from somewhere in particular; I am happy to talk to my hon. Friend outside the Committee if there is a problem in his local area.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

The hon. Gentleman makes his point in a typically reasonable way. Of course, he is right to talk about the need to shift, where we can, from acute settings to either community settings or, ideally, a preventive setting or focus. The Minister may well disagree with me, but I think that is a desire or thread that, however well implemented or otherwise, runs consistently through Governments. It ran through the Blair-Brown Government, the previous Liberal Democrat and Conservative coalition, the Conservative Government and into what the previous Secretary of State announced and what the Minister today is seeking to achieve. I do not think that anyone would disagree with that. We will always need those acute settings for particular treatments and cases, as well as for those very specialist pieces of work or for people with significant illnesses.

There has always been a desire to push the care into the local community. GPS are a central part of that, as are—to address the points raised by my hon. Friends earlier—our community pharmacists and other pharmacists. Pharmacies remain an improving but underused resource as part of that preventive picture. I do not disagree with the hon. Member for Winchester in that, but one can agree with the objective, but nonetheless gently push a little on the detail. As we know, the devil is in the detail, and people will want to see a deliverable plan.

That is one of the challenges that I have had in Melton Mowbray, where the ICB says it will do one thing and then says, “Actually, no, we can’t do that anymore.” Expectations go up and down and people are understandably frustrated. When we put such proposals forward we need to be robust in how we are going to achieve them and in their practicalities. The Minister may wish to make further observations.

[Karin Smyth]

I have enjoyed the “back to the good old days” of the Lib Dem-Tories. They tell us we live in fractured political parties, but I quite like the old days.

On new clause 2, I understand the intention that GP provision is important to us all and to our constituents. We have recruited over 2,000 more GPs since 2024—the highest number of qualified GPs since 2015—and there is provision to ringfence money for even more. We all know the importance of timely access to general practice, and patients need to be confident that they can get that care urgently and receive it promptly.

We are seeing improving signs. According to the ONS, the number of people who say it is now easy to contact their GP practice is up 14% since 2024, and that satisfaction is rising. Importantly, 69% of patients are seen within seven days and 44% are seen within the one day that they have requested an appointment, irrespective of urgency. That is the progress that we are encouraging, but we are not complacent; we recognise that there is more to do.

We also recognise that not everyone not seen within seven days is experiencing an unnecessary delay. Not every patient requires an appointment within seven days, and many people book appointments in advance for routine reviews, medication checks, to ensure that they see their preferred clinician or to fit around work and other life responsibilities. The new clause would cut across that flexibility by imposing a more rigid approach to appointment allocation, weakening both clinical judgment and patient preference. We do not believe that would be the best for patients or safe care. We must protect both clinical judgment and patient choice. We therefore cannot support the new clause.

We are clear that if someone is unwell and a doctor needs to see them urgently, they should be seen that same day. NHS England’s medium-term planning framework, which was published in October 2025, sets out an ambition for all clinically urgent appointments to be delivered on the same day, ensuring that patients assessed as needing urgent care are prioritised appropriately. We have made changes to regulations to require clinically urgent requests to be dealt with on the same day to support that ambition within the 2026-27 GP contract. We will publish data on that progress soon.

On new clause 52, we know that dentistry is broken and that we need to rebuild it. That includes ensuring an urgent care safety net across the country by reforming the dental contract and developing the 10-year workforce plan This new clause is unnecessary; we have delivered 1.8 million more dental treatments, and from April we began introducing a package of reforms to address some of the pressing issues that dentists and dental teams have been experiencing. Those reforms will prioritise those with the greatest need, shifting care away from clinically unnecessary check-ups. We are also including dental school places, and we will make more provision in our upcoming workforce plan.

The Government are committed to more fundamental contract reform by the end of this Parliament, which will include publicly consulting on future proposals. I make no apologies for taking the time to get that right. The issues are complex; this has not been done for a long time and there is no consensus on the perfect approach. On that basis, I commend clause 14 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

Conferral of primary care functions on integrated care boards etc

Amendments made: 14, in schedule 1, page 60, line 19, leave out sub-paragraph (2).

This is consequential on NC21.

Amendment 15, in schedule 1, page 60, line 26, leave out “(a), (b), (c) and”.

This is consequential on NC21.

Amendment 16, in schedule 1, page 60, line 36, leave out paragraph 46.

This is consequential on NC22.

Amendment 17, in schedule 1, page 65, line 5, leave out paragraph 65.

This is consequential on NS1.

Amendment 18, in schedule 1, page 75, line 1, at end insert—

“(4) In subsection (5), in the definition of ‘relevant area’, after paragraph (b) insert—

‘(ba) in relation to an integrated care board, in a case where a person has at any time provided or performed services by arrangement or contract with the board, means the prescribed area (at the prescribed time).’”—(Karin Smyth.)

This adds an amendment to section 259 of the NHS Act 2006 that is consequential on the transfer to integrated care boards of NHS England’s commissioning functions in respect of primary care.

Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Emma Foody.)

Health Bill (Seventh sitting)

Karin Smyth Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 25th June 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston and my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon have covered my points so effectively that I will be very brief indeed. How do we ensure that the consultation is not just well meaning and ticking the legal boxes, but actually listened to, so that people’s voices are incorporated into the plans? Also, I appreciate that amendment 28 is a well-meaning intervention, but how do we ensure that all voices are heard in a co-production, not just those who are the most articulate or the most able to engage with a process that they see online?

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

Patients and the public have a critical role in shaping our health services. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon for tabling the amendment, as moved by the hon. Member for North Shropshire. I will discuss the amendment with the wider question of whether the clause should stand part of the Bill.

To be clear, the Government are committed to engaging with patients and the public about the services they use. Services shaped together with the people who rely on them are better services. We want to see deep and collaborative ways of working between patients, public and the NHS. Across the country, there are good examples of that from which we want to learn. That is why the clause requires the Secretary of State to involve patients and the public in the planning of commissioning arrangements, the development and consideration of proposals for service change, and decisions that may affect how services are delivered or the range of services available.

The clause is intended to encourage early engagement and meaningful involvement in service change, thereby helping to build legitimacy, trust and better-informed commissioning decisions. As a duty, it covers the entire end-to-end commissioning cycle. I have been a commissioner myself, so although I will not detain the Committee too much on that, it is indeed part of the job of a commissioner to do that at a very early stage.

I also draw attention to the fact that the clause places a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements to ensure the involvement of individuals who use or may use health services, together with carers and representatives, where appropriate, in commissioning activity. That duty is purposely broad, covering both existing service users and those who may reasonably rely on services in future, and will support preventive approaches and enable the consideration of wider population health impacts.

We made the deliberate choice to include specific references to carers and representatives, recognising that some individuals may require support to participate effectively in engagement and decision-making processes. That is particularly important where barriers such as disability, communications needs, sometimes age, vulnerability or unequal access may otherwise limit participation. We are ensuring that involvement is inclusive and meaningful, which I think is what all hon. Members want to see.

Specifically on amendment 28, I gently caution against creating an implication of different approaches to patient involvement for different parts of the system, leading to a two-track approach and unnecessary confusion. Instead, we propose a Government commitment to ensure meaningful consultation. We support co-production and will continue to champion it, but we do not think it necessary to put it on the face of the Bill.

The Government support involving patients and the public at every stage, and we recognise that working closely with the people and communities affected by commissioning decisions brings valuable insight into service quality, accessibility, equity and effectiveness. We will use the duties and powers available to Ministers to ensure that that principle is embedded across the work of the NHS. I hope, therefore, that the hon. Member for North Shropshire has some reassurance and will withdraw her amendment. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Helen Morgan]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Regulations about commissioning by integrated care boards

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend tempts me to be political; I will rise to that briefly. Yes, I have seen them and she is right. There is a clear concern that when the Government make all these proclamations about how brilliant the NHS has suddenly become, the reality on the ground does not meet that for many patients. However—I am being gentle now—that is probably not exclusively a problem with this Government. My right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston might kill me, but I am sure other Governments have done something similar.

I will go back to amendment 52 because I think it is really important. Let me be clear: it would not prevent people being removed where appropriate; it would simply require the Government to be honest about why. It requires the Secretary of State to publish the number of patients removed from waiting lists each month and, crucially, the reasons why. If everything is being done properly there should be nothing to fear from such transparency, but if there are problems, sunlight is the best disinfectant and the amendment is exactly what we need. We owe it to our constituents and to every patient in the country to ensure that waiting lists are not improved just on paper, or in a press release, or in a social media tweet, or at the expense of the care of real people but actually improved.

If we are to strengthen patient choice, particularly in relation to community services that substitute for or prevent hospital admission and treatment, there are some good measures in clause 16. However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said, there are concerns, so I hope the Minister will be able to pick those up in her comments when she winds up.

[Karin Smyth]

There are a number of amendments in the group. Amendment 35 was not moved but as the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon spoke to it, I will comment on that amendment, which is in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford (Daniel Francis). Community equipment and wheelchair services are really important to us and—to allay the concerns of the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon—that is why the medium-term planning framework requires that, from this year, all ICBs and community health services must actively manage and reduce waits over 18 weeks and develop a plan to eliminate all 52-week waits. I assure the Committee that we will hold the ICBs for their performance. The community health services situation report has a specific monitoring line, covering children and young people and covering adults, for the wheelchair, orthotics, prosthetics and equipment category. We intend to continue that work following NHS England’s abolition. Consistent national standards will help us to identify the best and the weakest-performing areas, to identify what improvements need to be made and to tackle the longest waits.

Amendment 52 was tabled by the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. We are committed to ensuring that all patients receive the NHS care they need in a timely manner, and I recognise the importance that Committee members have placed on that matter. The NHS constitution sets out that patients should start consultant-led treatment within 18 weeks of referral, and it is imperative that the system continues to work towards returning to and then upholding that standard.

I listened with great care to the comments from Members on the Opposition Benches, but I was here—as were you, Dr Huq—during the last couple of Parliaments; I was here as waiting lists rose and rose after 2012, under the previous Government’s stewardship, until they reached 4 million people, all waiting an inordinate amount of time. That Government had no kind of approach to reducing the numbers; they were quite content to have 4 million people on waiting lists, and to never bring forward measures to change that. They were quite content not to challenge NHS England or trust boards about why people across the country in all our constituencies were languishing on those lists. We are determined to resolve that situation.

[Dr Johnson]

Will the Minister give way?

[Karin Smyth]

I will move on. It is absolutely right that integrated care boards, as local commissioners, retain the ability to manage their services and waiting lists effectively, given the shocking numbers that they have inherited. This is complicated, difficult work: commissioners have to balance demand, capacity and clinical need, and a prohibition such as the one set out in the amendment would threaten to remove legitimate flexibilities that are required at the local level to ensure that services are delivered safely and efficiently.

We are clear that systems should not be setting minimum wait times that exceed the 18-week constitutional standard, but hon. Members will appreciate that not all elements of waiting are inappropriate. In many cases, they reflect clinical pathways, sequencing of care or the need to prioritise the most urgent patients. It is imperative that clinical judgment and urgency remain the key drivers of prioritisation, which is something the amendment threatens to remove.

Turning to amendment 52, I recognise that Members across the House are committed to ensuring that all patients receive the NHS care they need in a timely manner. Validation is a routine and long-standing part of waiting list management by providers. It ensures that patient records are accurate, that patients are on the best pathway to meet their needs and that they still need their appointments. Routinely validated waiting lists will support a return to the 18-week NHS constitutional standard.

Reasons for removal as a result of validation include a patient no longer needing their appointment or there being a duplicate appointment. The previous Government left behind some systems and trusts in such a poor condition that they give out duplicate appointments, and we need to resolve that as part of our work. Other reasons for removal include a patient’s record not being properly updated following treatment or a clinical decision—another sign of the inefficiency that the previous Government left behind.

[Dr Prinsley]

I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say, but does she agree that this is yet another reason why we must go full speed ahead to get the single patient record sorted out?

[Karin Smyth]

Once again, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. He is expert on this issue and has outlined to us some excellent clinical examples. I look forward to debating the single patient record further in Committee.

Importantly, any patient removed from a waiting list should be notified alongside their GP. Data on the total number of removals from waiting lists is published by NHS England. That data includes, but cannot separately identify, patient pathways removed as a result of validation. The Department remains committed to the transparent publication of official waiting list statistics following the abolition of NHS England, although there are no plans to publish more detailed breakdowns. NHS staff are delivering record levels of elective activity, which has enabled us to meet our interim target of 65% of patients being seen within 18 weeks.

[Dr Johnson]

If a person has been waiting more than 18 weeks, the trust calls them and asks them to see a consultant to check whether they still need the appointment or whether they need a different treatment. If, after having that appointment, they are told that they still need the treatment, that same day they go back on the waiting list as if it were day one. Therefore, they have not waited less than 18 weeks, even though the Minister’s statistics might suggest they have. Does she accept that?

--- Later in debate ---

[Karin Smyth]

The hon. Lady outlines a particular case, and if she wants to raise that separately, I am happy to come back to her with a fuller answer. As she knows, and as the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon also knows from his work with Getting It Right First Time, there are complications in some of this. I do not accept the hon. Lady’s point, but if there are particular or anecdotal examples of what she referred to, I am absolutely prepared to look at them.

Patients, with their GP, need to understand what is happening. That is a key part of our elective reform plan. If patients are on the list for a long time, they should be told why, and what alternative provision can be made for them. We are taking an active approach to supporting and empowering patients with information and knowledge, and being transparent about how we get down the shocking lists that the Conservatives left us, which stood at 4 million people before the pandemic.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

We know that in some areas of Scotland and Wales that are near the border with England, the way that health services are planned and commissioned in England can have implications for the people who live in Scotland or Wales. That is why clause 17 inserts new section 14Z45E into the 2006 Act, to place a duty on integrated care boards, when exercising their commissioning functions, to

“have regard to the likely impact of those decisions on the provision of health services”

to persons in Scotland and Wales living near the English border.

I assure the Committee that the clause will operate solely in relation to the exercise of ICB commissioning functions in England. It will neither confer functions on ICBs in relation to the commissioning or provision of services outside England, nor affect the responsibilities of devolved Administrations for the organisation and delivery of health services in Wales and Scotland. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Helen Morgan]

I want to draw the Minister’s attention to some of the difficulties relating to cross-border healthcare in a border area. I represent an area on a border. North Shropshire has a very wiggly, for want of a better word, border with Wales, which means that some English constituents are registered with a GP surgery in Wales but receive their secondary care in England. That causes significant difficulties for them because of the lack of joined-up communication between the two Administrations. I seek assurance from the Minister that as ICBs in England will have to pay regard to people who live near the border in Wales, conversations are going on with the commissioners in Wales to ensure that that process is as smooth as possible.

[Dr Johnson]

The clause imposes a duty on ICBs to have regard to the likely impact of their commissioning decisions on areas of Wales and Scotland close to the border. In some respects, this is like other parts of the Bill—a statement of the obvious regarding a person’s job. Are we suggesting that the Secretary of State, and in particular ICBs, would not consider the effect of their decisions? I hope that they would, but, given that the clause is there, what teeth does it have? What if they do not? Is there any consequence in the Bill if they do not? As others have said, will the Minister confirm whether there is a reciprocal agreement with Wales and Scotland? If there is not, what negotiations has she entered into and what progress are they making?

[Karin Smyth]

As an MP in Bristol, which is not quite on the border, but is pretty close, I absolutely understand. We have relationships with our Welsh colleagues and I have been involved in debates on this matter. The clause ensures that, with the abolition of NHS England, regard is had to to arrangements with our colleagues across the border. We all understand that devolution means that different arrangements will be made in the constituent parts of the United Kingdom. It is not for the UK Government to determine what those are, because they are devolved. However, I assure members of the Committee that across the piece in the Department, and indeed across the Government, regular meetings and conversations on these and other matters with regard to the devolved functions are a regular part of the work that we do.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Transfer schemes in connection with integrated care boards

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

The clause gives the Secretary of State the powers to make transfer schemes where an ICB is being abolished or established, or where the area covered by an ICB is being amended. A transfer scheme ensures that all the staff, property rights, responsibilities and liabilities, other than criminal liabilities, of the ICB being abolished are transferred to another ICB. That ensures that the ICB taking over has the appropriate information and resources to continue to arrange healthcare services for their population. In the past, that has been used to support the restructuring of ICBs to achieve geographical boundary alignment with strategic authorities, as set out in the 10-year health plan. The power also allows transfers to the Secretary of State and, when a new ICB is established, allows the transfer of staff from an NHS trust or foundation trust or from a special health authority.

Following the abolition of NHS England, we expect that Ministers will continue to need to be able to make transfers between ICBs. The clause allows that as needed. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

I have one question for the Minister. Which ICBs does she envisage being abolished, or is this just a precaution for the future?

[Karin Smyth]

It is precautionary to give the power in the event—future-proofing the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19

Integrated care boards: power to provide assistance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

The clause relates to the power for integrated care boards to provide assistance and support in relation to the health service. It replaces section 14Z48 and, in part, section 12ZA of the National Health Service Act 2006 with a clearer and more flexible power. At present, the various ICB assistance powers are narrower and more confusing. Section 12ZA provides for certain forms of practical assistance in connection with ICBs’ commissioning functions, while section 14Z48 provides a more limited power to make grants or loans. Other specific assistance powers sit elsewhere in the legislation, including in sections 96, 112, 124 and 147, which allow assistance and support for primary medical services, dental, ophthalmic and pharmaceutical services.

Clause 19 replaces all those separate powers with a general power for ICBs to provide assistance or support. The clause will make it clearer when an ICB may support providers, prospective providers or other activity connected with the health service. It will allow an ICB to provide assistance or support to a person who is providing or proposing to provide services as part of the health service. It will also enable an ICB to support a person who is carrying out or proposing to carry out activities that the ICB considers to be conducive to the health service. The assistance may include financial assistance, making available the services of ICB staff, or making available any other ICB resources. The clause also allows assistance to be provided on agreed terms, including terms about payments by or to the integrated care board.

The clause supports ICBs in their role as strategic commissioners. ICBs need to be able to support the development, improvement and resilience of services for their populations. They need to be able to cultivate their provider sector to meet the needs of the people they are responsible for, and they need to be able to do so in innovative and flexible ways. The clause gives them a clearer statutory basis for doing so. This is only an enabling power; it does not require an integrated care board to provide assistance and it does not create any entitlement for a person to receive assistance, nor does it disapply the ordinary legal and financial controls that apply to integrated care boards, or any other element of the usual way in which NHS bodies are overseen and regulated.

The clause should be read alongside clause 9, which creates a broadly analogous assistance power for the Secretary of State. In combination, the clauses support the move to a simpler, more flexible statutory framework that enables everybody, from the centre to ICBs, to discharge their responsibilities in ways that can be adapted to the complexity and multiplicity of circumstances they will inevitably encounter. I commend clause 19 to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

The Government’s explanatory notes state that the clause is intended to give ICBs the ability to provide a broad range of support to those involved in providing or administering the health service. The flexibility there aligns with the Government’s stated vision for more autonomy across the system. I have a couple of questions. If the ICB were to provide support in a way that was out of line with good practice or what is expected by the Department, what would be the recourse? Where will it be possible for right hon. and hon. Members to see the financial expenditure that ICBs make in any such circumstance?

[Karin Smyth]

I thank the shadow Minister for her questions. ICBs are part of the accountability outcomes framework, so they will be monitored in the usual way, and any expenditure by the ICB—and, indeed, by the Department—is recorded in the departmental accounts.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Performance assessments of integrated care boards

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

The clause transfers the requirement to conduct annual assessments of integrated care boards from NHS England to the Secretary of State and focuses the assessment on the statutory functions of the organisations. To do that, it removes a prescriptive list of duties to be assessed that was inserted by the Health and Care Act 2022.

ICBs are essential to delivering our health mission. They are responsible not only for arranging healthcare services, but for planning how those services will focus more on prevention, digital innovation and delivery in the community. It is therefore entirely appropriate that the Secretary of State should hold ICBs to account and undertake a meaningful assessment of their performance.

Currently, NHS England assesses the performance of ICBs annually, reviewing how well they have performed against a list of duties prescribed by the current legislation. The process for those assessments is set out in guidance each year and is driven by both publicly available performance data and local insight. The results are published online and form part of the ongoing performance conversation between NHS England and each ICB.

Although NHS England can choose to assess more than those statutory duties as part of that process, the duties form a static list of requirements that are already expected as part of the ICBs’ statutory functions. Having such a list may inadvertently skew attention away from other priorities in the 10-year health plan and our mission. As we reform the NHS, the ICB performance assessment will need to adapt to the evolving role of ICBs as strategic commissioners and reflect new models of commissioning. The list of duties will therefore become too prescriptive to provide the accountability intended. The clause allows a more nimble and flexible approach, ensuring meaningful assessment of ICB performance.

[Edward Argar]

The Minister has saved me from having to give a speech on this clause, so I will ask her a couple of questions instead. Does the Secretary of State intend to publish the list of criteria against which he will require assessment to take place, so that it is transparent what is being considered? Notwithstanding the Minister’s point about the 2022 legislation, the Secretary of State will define the list, so will he publish those criteria? Within what period following the end of the financial year will the Secretary of State commit that the results will be published?

[Karin Smyth]

I recognise the right hon. Gentleman’s expertise as a former Minister in this role. I do not want to mislead him, so I will come back to him in writing on both those points, if that is acceptable. He tempts me to be more prescriptive than I think we intend to be at this point, but I will ensure that he gets a proper answer to both questions. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

As has been said, the clause replaces the part of the NHS Act that requires NHS England to carry out performance assessments of the ICBs and rewrites it so that the Secretary of State has to carry out those assessments. That makes some sense, but, as the Minister said, it takes out the criteria against which the ICBs will be assessed.

I accept what the Minister says—she wants those criteria to be set out more flexibly than can be done in primary legislation—but it is not reasonable or fair to assess people against criteria that they do not know in advance. It will be important, will it not, that ICBs know in advance what those criteria will be? Given what she said to my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston about writing to him, will she commit to writing to us to say not only what the criteria will be at the moment, but how far in advance ICBs can expect to receive them before they are expected to work to them and then be assessed against them?

Will variation be a factor in whether an ICB is deemed to have been performing well or not? We know that there is a tension in the Bill between the Secretary of State’s need to equalise provision and the ICBs’ desire and intention to vary it and innovate. Given that the Secretary of State is a political individual, how will the assessment process be conducted in a way that gives ICBs and their leaders confidence that there will not be political interference in it?

[Karin Smyth]

Of course ICBs will know how they are going to be assessed; that will be in guidance in the usual way. In the last two years, in planning terms, we have brought forward all that work for the system—including on the finances—in order that the system works more efficiently, and we will continue to seek to do that.

The hon. Member, as she has several times in the Committee, returned to the question of variation. When there is devolution and local systems are different, there will be a degree of variation, as I have said. In performance management terms, where there is unwarranted variation, we will seek justification and understanding of that. Sometimes, there is variation for geographical reasons. There may also be historical structural reasons in a local system, or temporary reasons why performance is variable. We would look at that as part of that general work.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Membership of integrated care boards

[Dr Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 46, in clause 21, page 15, leave out from line 33 to line 6 on page 16 and insert—

“(2) The constitution must provide for the ordinary members appointed as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b) to include—

(a) at least one person nominated by one or more NHS trusts or NHS foundation trusts which provide services under arrangements made by the integrated care board, in accordance with regulations made under sub-paragraph (2A);

(b) at least one person nominated by a body representative of providers of primary medical services whose area falls wholly or mainly within the area of the integrated care board, in accordance with regulations made under sub-paragraph (2A);

(c) at least one person appointed by a local authority whose area falls wholly or partly within the area of the integrated care board; and

(d) at least one member nominated by the mayor of each mayoral strategic authority whose area coincides with, or includes the whole or any part of, the integrated care board's area (if any).

(2A) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the nomination of ordinary members under sub-paragraph (2)(a) and (b), including provision about which NHS trusts, NHS foundation trusts or representative bodies are entitled to make nominations.

(3) The constitution must set out the process for making nominations under sub-paragraph (2).

(4) A person making a nomination under sub-paragraph (2) must have regard to any guidance published by the Secretary of State as to the selection of candidates.”

This amendment modifies Clause 21 so that, rather than replacing the existing mandatory membership requirements in Schedule 1B to the National Health Service Act 2006 with a requirement for mayoral representation alone, the new sub-paragraph (2) reinstates and consolidates the full range of required ordinary members.

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

I take the hon. Gentleman’s point to a degree, but I would refute a chunk of it. We need within the organisation people who have those technical skills and know how to commission, draw up a specification, put it out to tender, or work out what is needed and ensure that what is delivered reflects what was commissioned and that the performance is what is sought to meet the needs of the local area. At board level, we need representation from local authorities and others, because it sets the strategic direction.

The board members are not the people who are going to sit there and write the commissioning document. They will probably approve it, but they are not the experts who will be drafting it. We are talking about two different functions, and I argue that when a board-level decision is being made, we want those voices in the room to ensure that those different perspectives are reflected and there is that critical challenge to what is proposed by the executive directors. We essentially have non-executive directors who are there to challenge, to question—perhaps to agree, but perhaps to push back on things. That is how many boards operate.

In what is proposed, we lose some powerful voices from round the table. They may not carry the day, but those voices should be heard. Having sat where the Minister is sitting now, I appreciate that she may not be willing or in a position to accept the amendments, but I hope that she will take away and reflect further on the challenges of representation.

[Karin Smyth]

I absolutely recognise that this is an area of huge interest to hon. Members across the piece. I assure colleagues that officials and I have been working with representatives of the Local Government Association and mayors throughout the development of the Bill and the future architecture, and we will continue to do so. We will continue to have discussions and to make sure we get this right, because it is complex and complicated. Given that we are all politicians, we understand. Many of us have been councillors and local representatives, and have spent a lot of our time—sadly, for officials—knocking on doors, going out and persuading individuals to vote for these people. We understand that it is quite personal and we want to get it right.

If I may, I will not take any interventions so that I can address the amendments and our approach to ICB membership. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket said, ICBs are commissioners. This is a fundamental shift, which I will come on to, and it is different from the 2022 work. I now want to outline the board membership set out in clause 21, but I think we will be discussing this for some time.

Lord Darzi’s review found inconsistency in the roles being undertaken by ICBs and concluded that the health and care system would work better if each organisation had greater clarity and focus on its particular role. That is our starting point, and we set out to do that in the 10-year health plan. In future, all ICBs will discharge their common statutory duties through best-practice approaches, getting better at allocating their budgets to meet the population’s needs and securing the best outcomes. The new focus for ICBs is strategic commissioning. All ICBs will, in future, operate at a minimum efficient scale, with a population of around 1.5 million people covering multiple partner local authorities.

Effective partnership working is core to strategic commissioning and is aided, rather than diminished, by replacing ambiguity in roles with clarity and focus. That is why we are altering the membership requirements for ICBs. We are adding a requirement for strategic authority mayors, or a nominated representative, to be appointed to ICBs operating within their footprint. Strategic authorities will increasingly become key bodies for growth and prosperity in their localities. Mayors, or their nominated representatives, will highlight opportunities to improve health outcomes through a joined-up approach to their other devolved responsibilities, such as transport, housing and employment.

Although we recognise that the coverage of mayors and strategic authorities varies across the country, we will provide guidance to ensure that no area is disadvantaged, regardless of how advanced its local devolution arrangements are. In all cases, ICBs will have an obligation to ensure that their boards have a suitable membership to discharge those functions properly.

Given the larger geographical footprint of ICBs in the future, we are also removing the requirement for ICBs to have at least one member jointly nominated by local authorities. At present, local authorities collaborate with ICBs by sitting on health and wellbeing boards and local integrated care partnerships. The multitude of plans, committees and measures have resulted in confusion, siloed working and, too often, inaction. I think many of us would recognise that in our own areas.

I emphasise that we want to ensure a strong voice for local government in the work of the NHS. Our preferred approach is for local authorities to work with the NHS through health and wellbeing boards, co-commissioning and local authority health scrutiny. Those are likely to be more fruitful forums in which to resolve issues, agree joint approaches and tackle the needs of a local area.

As ICBs become more focused on effective commissioning, it is right that we remove any potential conflicts of interest. That is why the 10-year health plan and the Bill propose removing the requirement for one member jointly nominated by primary medical care providers and one member jointly nominated by NHS trusts and foundation trusts. The clause will provide ICBs with memberships that are best equipped to fulfil their commissioning responsibilities and role in health planning.

On amendment 45, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, I assure her that the Government fully appreciate the importance of general practice and primary care more broadly, and the role that they play in informing ICB decisions. However, as I have said, health and wellbeing boards should be the key forum for resolving local issues and making planning decisions for their neighbourhoods. GPs are well placed to contribute to those discussions and also vital to them. We expect health and wellbeing boards to ensure that they involve relevant stakeholders, including GP practices and primary healthcare providers, in their work.

There is an opportunity for health and wellbeing boards to play a much more proactive and important role in the local economy. To respond to the point made by the hon. Member for Winchester, we absolutely recognise that place is important in those arrangements. Although I agree that the experience of primary care is important, I hope that I have reassured the Committee that having a member nominated by primary care on the board of an ICB is not necessary.

A similar argument applies to amendment 46, which would require a local government representative on the ICB. I should start by saying that I wholeheartedly recognise the important role that local authorities play in the health and care system. As we have discussed, their work in social care and public health, and their influence on the wider determinants of health such as housing and employment, mean that they have a fundamental role in supporting the delivery of our ambitions to improve the health and wellbeing of the population and implement the three shifts identified in our 10-year health plan.

Rather than one local authority attempting to represent the interests of many on an ICB board, however, we think that it is more effective for local government to use health and wellbeing boards to address local barriers to joint working and support the development of neighbourhood health plans, which will shape the commissioning plans of the ICBs. I assure the Committee that we expect ICBs to work effectively with every one of their partner local authorities in the local authority footprint to deliver the neighbourhood health service and progress the integration of health and care services at that level.

I should stress that our changes are not designed to weaken democratic accountability in the NHS. ICBs are NHS statutory bodies that are governed by a unitary board that is jointly responsible for ensuring that the ICB discharges its legal duties. Given that specific role, the ICB board is not the forum in which democratic leaders hold the NHS to account; rather, that is conducted through the local authority health scrutiny functions and Parliament. Again, this is a good opportunity for those health scrutiny functions to be much more robust and proactive at local authority level.

Amendment 46 also proposes retaining provider representatives on the ICB board. As I said earlier, we think that an ICB should have a core focus on commissioning, so it is right to remove the requirement to have providers on them. That will also support the avoidance of potential conflicts of interest.

We debated these issues many times—the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston referred to it—in this Committee Room, or one very similar to it that was not quite as hot, during the passage of the Bill that became the Health and Care Act 2022. These are difficult and complex issues. I mean no disrespect to him—he had a difficult job to do at the time—but the architecture has not worked. It is confusing, and I do not know any area that particularly thinks it has worked. We think that clarifying the roles will make the system much more effective.

I think we agree that adding requirements for strategic authority mayors to make nominations to their ICB boards is a good thing. It will be an effective tool to harness the benefits of joint planning between an ICB and strategic commissioners and strategic authorities, who will have increasingly significant roles in shaping their areas. I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments, and I commend clause 21 to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Health Bill (Fifth sitting)

Karin Smyth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

I thank hon. Members for bringing this discussion before the Committee. The Government are committed to ensuring that the NHS has the right people in the right place and with the right skills to care for patients when they need it. We will be publishing our 10-year workforce plan imminently. I cannot give the shadow Minister any more details on that at the moment, but it will set out the action to create a workforce that is ready to deliver the transformed service set out in the 10-year health plan. High-quality education and training for the NHS workforce will be fundamental to that, and clause 7 is in keeping with that commitment.

Before turning to the clause, I will address some of the issues raised during the debate and in the amendments. I understand the intention behind amendment 50, but I cannot accept it. The 10-year workforce plan will set out the staffing needs of the NHS for the next 10 years. That goes further than the amendment calls for and will be updated every two years in line with our manifesto commitment to publish regular, independent workforce planning. It is only because the Government have set such a clear direction for the service through the 10-year health plan that we can credibly set out a sustainable approach to staffing the NHS over the long term.

As hon. Members will understand, workforce planning is a complex topic. It is closely related to the wider service planning, which is why we have engaged so widely with independent experts to develop our forthcoming workforce plan. To divorce the process of workforce planning from service planning in the way that is suggested by amendment 50 would not produce a more reliable or useful set of forecasts. However, it would reduce the potential for innovation and reform of the kind that is needed and which the Government have set out so clearly in the 10-year plan for the NHS. I can only conclude from listening to Opposition Members that they really did learn absolutely nothing from their time in office or, indeed, from the problems with their workforce plan, which focused on headcount but notably did not reform care, did not look at new patterns of care, did not look at retention or training, and created some of the bottlenecks and problems that we have had to deal with.

Our commitment will be guided by the workforce plan, which is why we cannot accept new clause 44. Decisions on training numbers must be guided by workforce need, and that will have to be considered as part of the forthcoming plan. Adding to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, whatever the Government’s position on the number of medical school places that will be required in the future, fixing a number in primary legislation would be unhelpful as it would limit our ability to adjust target training numbers subsequently to reflect any changes in workforce need.

I was asked about correcting the record. The last Government did double places in their 2024 workforce plan, and I commend the movement of medical schools across the country. If the former Secretary of State is reported in Hansard as having said something contrary to the correction of the record by my hon. Friend the Minister for Care, we will of course pick that up.

Amendment 54 and new clause 45 look to reduce flexibility and increase bureaucracy for a workforce that is simply trying to deliver what is best for patients. On amendment 54, I think we can all agree that we need strong leadership and management to deliver national priorities, including the 10-year plan’s three shifts. Having a clinical voice in management positions is vital and many of our board-level and senior leaders are also clinicians. While some choose to carry on with clinical practice, others might prioritise their managerial role, and it is right that they should have that flexibility. Prescribing that all NHS managers with clinical experience must also undertake clinical care risks reducing board capacity and expertise, including clinical leadership, and disincentivising opportunities for management experience at a time when the NHS has seen a reduction in the number of managers per NHS staff from 2010 to 2025. We do not think that simply prescribing that requirement would benefit clinicians, managers or, crucially, the wider health service, so we oppose the amendment.

New clause 45 would require the collection of further data on the proportion of time spent on clinical care. Detailed statistics on the number of staff working for NHS provider trusts broken down by profession and pay band are already published by NHS England on a monthly basis. Adding requirements to that is not simple. There is not a centrally held collection of data about NHS staff time, and setting one up would have costs both centrally and for NHS trusts to collect specific data. It is also not easy to separate out clinical care meaningfully. Clinicians spend time in supervision, education, safeguarding, quality improvement and clinical leadership, and the amount of time they spend on different activities can vary from month to month. The new clause risks putting more burdens on NHS staff if they are being asked to record what they are spending time on beyond existing procedures. We therefore cannot accept it.

I turn to amendment 33, which was moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, on workforce training. It would require the Secretary of State to intervene in the content and design of healthcare programmes. Standards of proficiency, conduct and performance of registered professionals are the statutory responsibility of independent healthcare regulators, although universities and practice partners develop the specific content and design of programmes to meet those standards. It is vital that the independence of regulators and universities is maintained to respect their expertise in designing standards and curricula that ensure public safety.

We have published our 10-year health plan setting out major NHS reforms, including moving from sickness to prevention. Supporting healthcare workers to address the wider determinants of health will be essential to delivering that shift. That is why we are providing the “All Our Health” e-learning on critical public healthcare topics for people working in the health and care sector, and revitalising the “making every contact count” approach to ensure that every contact that a person has with the healthcare system supports a shift to prevention.

I assure colleagues that our upcoming 10-year workforce plan will set out plans for ensuring that we train the staff we need so that we have the brightest people and the right skills to support patients. For those reasons, I ask my hon. Friend to withdraw the amendment.

Finally, I turn to clause 7. The Secretary of State already has an overarching duty in relation to the education and training of the NHS workforce. Currently, that duty is partially delegated to NHS England. NHS England also has a duty to ensure that there are sufficient numbers of appropriately trained healthcare workers across England. Clause 7 will simply merge those existing duties into a single, robust education and training duty on the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State will be entirely responsible and accountable for exercising relevant functions with a view to ensuring that there is an effective system for the planning and delivery of healthcare education and training, and that we have enough healthcare workers with the right training to meet England’s health service needs. Bringing those duties directly under the responsibility of the Secretary of State will reduce bureaucracy, streamline oversight and enable the Government to provide national strategic leadership across the NHS workforce.

I reassure colleagues that accountability will not be diluted. Bringing these responsibilities into the Department will create clearer, stronger lines of accountability with the education and training of the NHS workforce. Ultimately, the Secretary of State will continue to be accountable to Parliament for the health service in England, including for the planning of education and training and ensuring sufficient numbers of trained healthcare workers. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Peter Prinsley]

I am happy with those assurances, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment 33.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 50, in clause 7, page 4, line 32, at end insert—

“(4) After subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) The Secretary of State must publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS’s workforce needs every five years.’”—(Dr Caroline Johnson.)

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS’s staffing needs every five years.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

Clause 8 will give the Secretary of State the power to direct integrated care boards to exercise his or her functions. This power, similar to that currently employed by NHS England, will promote subsidiarity by enabling such functions to be delivered at the lowest appropriate level. The clause builds on the existing section 7B of the National Health Service Act 2006, which allows the Secretary of State to direct ICBs but only in respect of public health functions.

With our plans to abolish NHS England, the Secretary of State will again have broad powers and responsibility relating to the health service, and so this power encompasses a wider range of functions. Unlike the delegated frameworks set out under sections 65Z5 and 75 of the 2006 Act, which are entered into voluntarily, any integrated care board directed under this power would be obliged to carry out the stated functions.

I reassure the Committee that, while the ICB will be legally responsible for how it discharges a function, overall accountability will remain with the Secretary of State. Furthermore, the Secretary of State might also use directions to place restrictions on the onward delegation of any functions, preventing delegation where it may be inappropriate. Finally, any directions must be published, ensuring transparency and allowing proper accountability.

This measure will empower the Secretary of State to assign functions to ICBs where most appropriate. It aligns with and facilitates our broader direction of travel towards flexibly planned and delivered local services. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 8 is essentially about the control that the Secretary of State has over ICBs. When we discussed the clause abolishing NHS England, we talked a lot about the balance between democratic accountability on the one hand and independence from political interference on the other.

The Government suggest that the Bill is a decentralising Bill. What this clause does is essentially to recentralise by default. As the Minister has just said, the Secretary of State can change what the ICB is doing if they think that it is inappropriate. What does “inappropriate” mean exactly, and how will that power be used? It may be used very infrequently—perhaps the current and previous Secretaries of State think that the power would be used infrequently—but equally it could be used in response to considerable pressure from MPs, lobbyists and campaign groups. Instead of issuing directions sparingly, we may end up in a position where the Secretary of State is issuing day-to-day instructions.

The Government want ICBs to take greater responsibility for commissioning decisions, but then they want to be able to undermine them by direction from the Health Secretary. The Health Secretary will never have as good a grasp of the situation in the local geographic area as local leaders, but he has the power to tell them what to do and issue blanket instructions with different characteristics. That will be inherently inefficient. ICB leaders will be under pressure, knowing that if they make a particular decision they can be removed or be told to do something different. They have the job and they have the power, but they haven’t really—all at the same time.

There is also the plan, as the Minister outlined, to make directions something that the Government publish. The clause says that directions must be published by the Secretary of State, but only

“as soon as reasonably practicable”.

The intention behind requiring the prompt publication of directions is to reduce the surface area for back-room pressures, but the lack of a clear timeframe makes it rather a weak measure.

We currently have a Government who seem open to greater use of the private sector, whether in financing projects or in delivering out-patient care. Well, our Prime Minister resigned yesterday, and there is no guarantee that the Government of the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) will take the same approach. Will the Minister confirm whether the powers in clause 8 could be used by a Health Secretary to instruct ICBs to stop using a specific type of provider?

I would not dispute the idea that the Secretary of State needs to be able to exercise some control over the health service now that NHS England is being abolished, but the clause seems contrary to the Government’s stated vision for health management. I am not sure whether it is in the best interests of patients.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I agree heartily with the shadow Minister, and a couple of other things concern me about clause 8.

On the one hand, the clause appears to bring more centralisation, but on the other hand it pushes things down to an ICB level at the same time. I am worried that if we have individualisation of ICBs, we will only exacerbate the disparity of services across regions. I would be interested to understand from the Minister how the Secretary of State’s functions will allow the independence of ICBs and, where an ICB understands its local population well, ensure that patients do not end up in a postcode lottery based on which ICB area they happen to live in.

The danger here is that if the Bill does not deal with those problems and close regional gaps, it is not immediately clear from the clause how the Secretary of State could intervene to ensure that ICBs have the autonomy to make decisions based on their local populations and ensure at the same time that patients do not receive a worse service just because they happen to live in one ICB area rather than another.

[Karin Smyth]

I recognise that this is a subject of some debate; we may discuss it further when we come to the part of the Bill on ICBs. The abolition of NHS England and transferring all its functions to one body has a consequence, which is that the Secretary of State retains that accountability and power. We are keen to have that power clear but flexible in order to empower local systems. That remains the intent.

The power is necessary for the Secretary of State to update national commissioning standards, for example. The ICBs will have wider roles as strategic commissioners. We expect them to take on formal responsibility for a number of services delegated by NHS England. That allows us to issue a common set of commissioning standards, on the point made by the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon about variability in different places. There need to be common standards across the piece: eligibility criteria, the treatments the provider should use, and national reporting requirements. ICBs having those standards means that there will be a reduction in unwarranted variation in some of these events.

The shadow Minister raised the timetable. The Opposition will recognise that there needs to be flexibility for the Secretary of State and Ministers to respond to unforeseen or changing events. That is why it is purposely broad, because the range of events that can impact the NHS is clearly very broad. We cannot predict the future.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said that the Bill needs to deal with all these problems. The Bill needs to give enough flexibility to the system and devolve as much power to the system. The Bill needs to make sure that the powers are in the right place, but it is for the local systems to respond to their local needs within that framework. They will be held accountable, for example through the NHS oversight framework and through ICBs’ normal accountability frameworks.

[Dr Johnson]

The Minister is talking about flexibility. I understand that if a Minister is responding to an unforeseen circumstance, he or she may be very busy, but where a direction has been made, it should not take very long for a member of staff to publish it, because it will already have been written and sent. I understand that a Minister might take a day or so to sign it off because they are so busy, but it should not take months. The addition of a deadline is therefore not an unreasonable request.

[Karin Smyth]

With due respect to the hon. Lady, it is not a matter of the Minister being busy, whether that is me or anybody else. It is about the operational running of a £200 billion organisation with 1.5 million staff treating millions of people every day. I am sure we all remember from our own experience incidents and unforeseen events that have happened in the local system, and sometimes very tragic events that have required the Secretary of State to take action. We are trying not to increase the number of reports and documentation and to rid the system of bureaucracy by putting something out in that timeline.

[Dr Johnson]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Karin Smyth]

No, I have finished.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Secretary of State’s power to provide assistance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

Clause 9, which will insert new section 12DA into the National Health Service Act 2006, will give the Secretary of State a clear statutory duty to provide financial, staffing or other practical assistance in connection with the health service. The power may be used to support persons providing, or proposing to provide, services as part of the health service or which are beneficial to the interests of the health service. It may also be used to support public authorities where the assistance relates to education or training for people employed, or considering becoming employed, in activities connected with the provision of health services. The assistance may include financial assistance, the services of civil servants or other resources of the Secretary of State, and it may be provided on agreed terms, including terms about payments by or to the Secretary of State.

The clause will support the wider purpose of the Bill by enabling a small centre to act in a supportive and enabling way towards the wider system. Where appropriate, the Secretary of State will be able to provide assistance directly to those delivering or supporting health service activity. The clause is needed because the existing statutory framework does not include a clear power that enables the Secretary of State to provide practical support across the full range of health service activity. Relevant support may be financial, practical, staffing-related or connected with education and training.

Without this clear power, there is a genuine risk of confusion about the basis on which such support may be offered, particularly where the Secretary of State is acting to facilitate the delivery of services by others. The power is permissive and facilitative: it does not require the Secretary of State to provide assistance, and it does not require any person or body to accept it. The power is also limited by its connection to the health service and matters relevant to education, training or activities considered beneficial to the health service. Its exercise remains subject to ordinary public law principles and public financial controls. For those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

In a system as large as the NHS, covering an area as diverse as England, it is necessary that the Government be able to deal with unexpected situations. The pandemic may be half a decade behind us already, but the Committee will remember that the previous Government had to act quickly and part with a lot of money in a short time. In such instances, it is essential that Ministers have the power to provide financial assistance. It is not only about crises, however; ordinarily, there are occasions when a Government will want to roll out a new prevention programme or address deficiencies in care in particular areas. I know that health policy is always evolving, and the case for flexibility is clear. The Health Secretary may need to be able to provide financial assistance in pursuit of supporting the health service.

I am sure that hon. Members are familiar with the existing legislation. Section 12D of the National Health Service Act 2006 gives the Secretary of State, NHS England, an ICB or the local authority the ability to make direct financial payments as an assistance to persons or bodies. Clause 9 would new section 12DA of the Act, under which the Secretary of State would be empowered to provide assistance to any person or body carrying out, or proposing to carry out, activities that they deem beneficial to the service.

This is where semantics are important. The existing legislation allows the Secretary of State to make payments, but clause 9 is different: it would allow the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance and to make available persons employed by the civil service or any other resources that the Secretary of State has. This is a remarkably open-ended power that would allow the Secretary of State to spend taxpayers’ money while bypassing standard scrutiny. When NHS England spends money, there is transparency: the public can see how much has been spent on different types of care, ranging from hospitals to public health programmes. The public can see how much money has gone into trusts, into the independent sector and into procurement.

Transparency builds trust in the system and disincentivises wasteful spending. Where will parliamentarians or the public be able to see the financial expense of civil servants, or literally any other resource that the Secretary of State may offer in support? For the first time, the Health Secretary will have the power to insert politically directed civil servants into elements of the health service that are not under public ownership.

As clause 9 is drafted, the Secretary of State could provide civil service labour to private or mutual health providers that work within the NHS. Will the Minister elaborate on how that would be used, and how it would be beneficial to the taxpayer and the health service? The number of civil servants taking home more than six figures has increased under this Government. Their time should be focused on delivering public services, not propping up providers, especially ones that are private businesses.

It is also unclear where the legal liability lies under such arrangements. If something goes wrong and the human resources provided by the Secretary of State are responsible, is the Secretary of State responsible or the entity into which those staff have been inserted? Can the Minister clarify that?

It may be politically beneficial in the short term to provide state support, but it can be costly to the public purse and damaging to markets in the long term. By allowing the Health Secretary to issue assistance in the form of free civil servant labour, clause 9 effectively creates a new type of off-the-books subsidy. How can Members of the House or NHS providers tell whether assistance is operational support or a de facto subsidy? It could undermine the idea of a level playing field for firms contracted to deliver NHS services.

There is also the question of when assistance crosses from operational support into running a provider or firm. We do not necessarily want to be in a position where the Bill is used to bail out failing private firms with NHS contracts. I return to the phrase

“any other resources of the Secretary of State”.

It is difficult to understand why the legislation was written in this way, allowing financial assistance, the provision of labour, and then the use of absolutely any other resource at the Health Secretary’s disposal. As with several other provisions in the Bill, it seems another sign that the legislation was rushed. Instead of circumscribing power tightly where it is needed, the Bill gives huge sweeping powers while claiming that it decentralises.

The Minister has described clause 9 as a discretionary power intended to support the effective functioning of the health service and its workforce. Although that may be what she sought to achieve, that is not the reality. The clause paves the way for arbitrary and unaccountable deployments of state resources, and that should concern all hon. Members.

--- Later in debate ---

There are also implications for existing funding and procurement frameworks. The health service operates through established mechanisms designed to promote fairness, competition and value for money. The broad power in this clause to provide direct financial assistance could cut across those arrangements by enabling selective support outside those structures. That may create inconsistencies between providers and reduce confidence in the integrity of any allocation process.

[Karin Smyth]

In concluding the debate on this part of the Bill, the Opposition have helpfully made most of my arguments for me. The hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham opened with reference to the pandemic and the unusual circumstances in which we have found ourselves. It is obviously important that this Government learn the lessons from that pandemic in the round, that we are prepared and that, as NHS England is abolished, those powers come back to the Secretary of State so that we can respond to any eventuality that comes before us.

As the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said, there are existing standards and rules of procurement. Any spending that happens through the Department and the NHS will be publicly recorded and published in the Department of Health’s consolidated accounts. Those come before Parliament, so there is direct transparency through the parliamentary process in the usual way and, as we all know and as the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said, Treasury rules apply.

The point about the use of civil servants has been made. Again, it is really important that we recognise that we are bringing together NHS England, NHS staff and civil servants in the Department. It is right that the Secretary of State, in whatever eventuality comes before him or her, is able to deploy the right person for the right job, be they a civil servant or someone currently under NHS staff terms and conditions, to support that work going forward. The clause is necessarily flexible and broad to provide for those eventualities, and to enable the necessary assistance to be deployed. I commend clause 9 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Secretary of State’s duty as respects variation in provision of health services

[Dr Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 10, page 6, line 21, leave out from “interests” to end of line and insert “of patients”.

This amendment would only allow the Secretary of State to vary the balance between the public and private sectors in the NHS where it is in the interests of patients to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Helen Morgan]

The hon. Gentleman outlines an unintended consequence of the NHS contracting out to private providers. There are ways to get the pricing of those services right, but the clause could introduce that unintended consequence.

Why is this proposal included in the Bill, and what does the Minister see it being used for? Is there a risk that a future Government might use it to bring much more privatisation into the NHS? The general public consensus is that that would be a bad thing. What safeguards can she put in place to ensure that does not happen?

[Karin Smyth]

I will respond to that question before picking up the other comments. If I do not address all the Committee’s comments, I will come back to Members.

Everyone would expect this, but let me be clear: this Government are absolutely committed to a free-at-the-point-of-use, taxpayer-funded service. We also think that unless it is reformed and changed, it is an existential problem for the British public, who will not continue to support the service. As Members know, one Parliament can never bind another one, so I cannot predict what a future Government will do. There is talk from some of our Reform colleagues about an insurance-based system. There are people who were in the Conservative party but have moved over who think that, so obviously I cannot—

[Dr Johnson]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Karin Smyth]

I will make some points, and then I will be happy take the hon. Lady’s intervention if I do not address what she was going to say.

The hon. Member for North Shropshire outlined some of the history. This clause seeks to strike a balance. The governing principle behind it is that the decisions of the Secretary of State must not vary the proportion of providers by the type of legal entity that they are. Decisions must be taken according to what serves the health service and the people who depend on it. The clause permits, by way of exception, the balance between sectors to be varied purposefully, but only where doing so would be in the interests of the health service. That would, for example, prevent the Secretary of State from deliberately choosing to grow the proportion of NHS services delivered by private providers for solely ideological reasons.

I understand the concern that drives the amendment. It is that the exception might be relied on to support the convenience of those already providing the service, without taking into account what is best for patients, as the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said. That is not the Government’s position, and the clause does not lead to that outcome. The test that it creates is whether the interests of the health services are served.

As the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham also said, the definition of the health service—as defined under section 1 of the National Health Service Act 2006—is not separate from the people it exists to serve. It is defined as “a comprehensive health service” for “the people of England”, directed at improving their health and at the “prevention, diagnosis and treatment” of illness. A decision to rely on the exception must be justified by reference to that duty; one taken merely because it was easier or more convenient for existing providers or any other group, with no such justification, would be unlawful. The protection that she seeks is, in substance, already secured by the clause.

The amendment would also create another difficulty. Section 1 of the 2006 Act reaches the entire population and includes the prevention of illness before anyone becomes a patient at all. The “interests of patients” reaches only those already receiving care, which is a narrower test than I think the hon. Lady intended, and would allow a Secretary of State who was so minded to provide a landscape that ignores vital preventive health and wellbeing concerns. I hope that she will take from my remarks an assurance that the clause already meets her concerns.

The hon. Lady also highlighted the example of PFI—a subject of much discussion over many years—and of being unable to change her whiteboard. That is absolutely one of the lessons that needs to be learned from the way in which some past PFIs were procured and dealt with. For example, as a new Government, we outlined proposals for a new model of public-private partnerships for neighbourhood health centres, among other things. The previous Government could also have learned the lessons and done something about that, but they chose instead to completely halt the building of any kind of facilities. That is one reason why we are in such a shocking state at the moment. The new proposal outlines, as I think the Opposition know, an 80:20 funding route, exactly to make the point about which is the most efficient way forward. That will absolutely drive measures for growth and create more jobs in the sector.

[Gregory Stafford]

I want to take the Minister back to her rejection of the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham on the basis that—I paraphrase—she felt the definition of “patients” was too limiting because it would not count people who had not entered the health system at that point. The clause itself, however, refers to the benefit for the health service. Is the Minister suggesting that the health service, as defined in the Bill, includes what happens before people enter what I would describe as the health service? Is it something before that point? She seems to be saying that our definition is too narrow, but her definition in the Bill must apply to those who have entered some kind of formal setting. Or is the health service wider than that?

[Karin Smyth]

I refer the hon. Gentleman back to my comments. The health service is defined under section 1 of the NHS Act 2006 as not being separate from the people it exists to serve. It is defined as “a comprehensive health service” for “the people of England”, directed at improving their health and at the “prevention, diagnosis and treatment” of illness—so, yes.

At this juncture, I will explain a number of other features of the clause. In particular, I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that it builds on section 12E of the 2006 Act to cover the Secretary of State’s health functions, powers and duties. It recognises that, with the abolition of NHS England, the Secretary of State has a far more substantial role to play—as a commissioner of services, for example—than previously. I also put on the record that whenever the Secretary of State takes a decision in this space, the general NHS procurement requirements and other statutory duties will continue to apply.

Finally, the NHS relies on privately owned providers, as well as charities and community organisations, to provide a range of important NHS-funded services across the country. As such, it is important to ensure that, where there is a mixed-market provision between public and private for providers of a particular service, the Government’s powers are not used to distort the provision and potentially discourage important investment from outside the NHS. Conversely, they should not be used purposefully to favour independent providers over NHS providers for reasons unrelated to the quality or efficiency of NHS-funded healthcare.

[Dr Johnson]

If I heard the Minister right, she said that the clause did not provide for changes on the basis of ideology. However, it says that changes are not to be made

“unless the Secretary of State considers that to do so is in the interests of the health service.”

A Secretary of State whose ideology is that the private sector is bad, good or whatever else could well believe that it is in the interests of the health service to be private or not private. How does the clause prevent an ideologically driven Secretary of State from changing the health service on the basis simply of his ideology, rather than of patient or clinical need?

[Karin Smyth]

The hon. Lady tempts me to delve into the politics of future Secretaries of State. They will respond according to the manifesto on which they are elected by the British public. That is the point of a democratically accountable public service. I think that the clause strikes that balance, as I have said. For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Lady will withdraw her amendment. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

I rise to support amendment 47, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, and to ask a few questions about clause 11. I completely understand the thinking behind the clause. The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care is probably the most politically impotent of all Secretaries of State: as my hon. Friend said, they pull levers and not much seems to happen, because they do not have the control over the health service that the public think they do—or indeed, that Members of Parliament think they do, judging by the number of us who stand up and demand that the Secretary of State do things in our local areas.

I understand the Government and the Secretary of State’s desire to change some of that, but there is concern about the potential politicisation of NHS leadership. Integrated care boards were established in various forms under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 precisely to remove politicisation to ensure that decisions in our healthcare service were made for the benefit of patients on the basis of clinical evidence and the needs of the local population, not on the whim of any Secretary of State or Minister. More importantly, ICBs were brought in to make sure that local health systems, local authorities, clinicians and communities made decisions based on local need.

Those politically independent ICB chief executives were expected to exercise professional judgment, make difficult decisions about priorities and resources and sometimes deliver messages that Ministers, and indeed local Members of Parliament, found uncomfortable. If those leaders know that their continued employment ultimately depends on the confidence of the Secretary of State, there is a real risk that the independence of their judgment will be weakened and that patient safety will diminish.

The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham tackles a core question: should an ICB chief executive focus solely on what is best for patients and the local health economy, or should they have to consider whether their decisions may attract ministerial displeasure? Even if the power is rarely used, and even if, as my hon. Friend said, there are currently some guardrails in the clause, its existence will change behaviour—it must do. Leaders will become more cautious, perhaps more risk-averse and potentially less willing to challenge national policy when local evidence points in a different direction.

ICBs have benefited from the ability to speak truth to power. A system in which senior NHS leaders fear dismissal by Ministers risks discouraging precisely that kind of honesty. Do not get me wrong: there are good ICB chief executives and bad ICB chief executives, ones who understand their role well and ones who feel that they do not need to engage at all with their local communities. I have a very good ICB in what is currently Surrey Heartlands, soon to be a larger organisation, and an ICB that does not do the job as well—I will not name it, but any student of geography will be able to work out which one it is.

Secondly, excessive ministerial power blurs the lines of accountability. The Minister, in her defence, has argued that Ministers need powers because Ministers are accountable. I get that argument, but one of the most important principles of effective public administration is clarity of responsibility. If the Secretary of State gains extensive powers to appoint and dismiss local NHS leaders, it will become increasingly difficult to know who is actually responsible for outcomes. When performance improves, Ministers will claim credit; when performance deteriorates, local leaders may be blamed. If Ministers possess the power to select and remove those leaders, they will inevitably become more directly responsible for those management decisions, so far from increasing accountability, this might dilute it by creating uncertainty about where true authority lies.

Thirdly, there is a constitutional concern. Whether one likes it or not, the previous Act created a balance between democratic accountability and operational independence. Parliament rightly determines the funding, priorities and legislative frameworks, and Ministers rightly set national policy, but operational decisions have been made by healthcare professionals and the statutory bodies established for that purpose. That distinction exists for a good reason. No Secretary of State, regardless of ability or commitment, or indeed their own background in the health service, can personally manage every NHS organisation in England, and I do not think they should. The more powers we concentrate at the centre, the greater the temptation for Ministers to become involved in operational matters that are better addressed through professional expertise and local knowledge. My hon. Friend’s amendment seeks to preserve that distinction in a singular and precise way. It recognises that Ministers should govern the NHS and be held accountable at the top by us as Members of Parliament and our constituents, but should not seek to manage every aspect of it.

Fourthly, there is a practical problem. Supporters of ministerial intervention often point to examples of failure and ask what should happen when an ICB is underperforming. That is a fair question, but the answer is not that the Secretary of State must personally possess dismissal powers. A range of mechanisms already exist: ICB boards have governance responsibilities; NHS England has oversight powers; professional regulators oversee the conduct of clinicians; there are provisions in employment law for procedures when it comes to misconduct and capability issues; and auditors and inspectors can identify failings. It would be far better if the Bill strengthened those provisions to ensure that accountability was brought forward, rather than giving the Secretary of State the ability to fire and hire as he or she sees fit.

Of course, none of those mechanisms of accountability will disappear if amendment 47 is adopted. The amendment would not create any kind of immunity from accountability; it would simply ensure that accountability is exercised through the established governance structures, rather than through direct ministerial intervention on a chief executive. Indeed, one might ask whether a Secretary of State is really the best person to assess the performance of an individual ICB chief executive. Such judgments often require detailed understanding of local service pressures, workforce challenges, demographic factors, financial constraints and so on. Those are matters better evaluated by individual organisations with operational expertise than by politicians operating at national level.

Fifthly, I think the clause as drafted would present a risk to recruitment and retention. The NHS already faces significant leadership challenges. Senior leaders are expected to manage enormous budgets, oversee complex organisations and make difficult decisions under intense public scrutiny. If we create a system in which their tenure can ultimately depend upon ministerial whim, we may deter talented individuals from seeking those positions. As my hon. Friend said, the NHS needs leaders who are willing to innovate, take calculated risks and make difficult long-term decisions. It does not need a culture in which leaders are constantly looking over their shoulder, wondering whether a politically controversial but clinically necessary decision could threaten their position. Strong organisations attract strong leaders when governance arrangements are stable, predictable and professionally driven. They do not attract them through uncertainty and political intervention.

Sixthly, we need to consider the precedent being established. Powers granted to one Secretary of State are inherited by the next, as the hon. Member for North Shropshire said. Members may trust the intentions of the current Minister—I certainly do. They may also believe that these powers would be exercised responsibly—and at the moment I think they would be. However, legislation must be judged not on how it is going to be used by one individual, but on how it could be used by any future holder of the office. Therefore, the question is not whether the current Secretary of State or Minister would misuse the power, but whether Parliament wishes to establish a framework in which future Secretaries of State possess the ability to remove local NHS leaders whose decisions, views or priorities may conflict with their political objectives. That is a much more serious question.

Finally, we must remember what ICBs were trying to achieve, even if we do not think that they have achieved it or performed in the way that we wanted them to. If we go back to the principle of why they were set up, they were designed to encourage collaboration rather than some sort of command-and-control structure. They were intended to bring decision making closer to patients and communities. They were established to support long-term planning across local health systems. Those objectives, I am afraid, are very difficult to reconcile with a model in which local leaders remain subject to direct ministerial dismissal. Partnership working flourishes when organisations have confidence in their independence and responsibilities. It is weakened when authority is increasingly concentrated at the centre.

For all those reasons, I believe that amendment 47 in the name my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham raises an important principle. It is not about protecting poor performance or shielding individuals from accountability; it is about ensuring that accountability is exercised through proper governance structures rather than political control. Expanding ministerial powers to hire and fire local NHS leaders risks undermining all of those principles.

[Karin Smyth]

We have a clear political and—as I think the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said—philosophical division here. This Government believe in democratic accountability, in politics and in good government. I understand that both Opposition parties were architects of the 2012 Act, which created this huge, independent body to run what has become a £200 billion service that clearly has not worked, and that they want to hold on to some of that, despite not opposing the Bill on Second Reading and, actually, not really opposing the abolition of NHS England—I think we will keep returning to that—but we believe that, ultimately, the Secretary of State needs to be accountable for the service, which is not working as the British public deserve or expect.

The hon. Lady asked me to go into good variation and bad variation. Our drive has been to understand the variation. I know from Members of Parliament who have come to me in the past two years, and we understand from looking in detail at the variation across the service, that there is often no rationale for the variation. Local people do not understand why services work better in one part of their county, even, than in another. The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon alluded to that when he mentioned some places in his area that are working better than others. That is why—and I personally wanted to drive this very strongly—we are getting more information out, releasing the outcomes framework and releasing information to all Members of Parliament about where and how the current data shows their local systems are performing. That is what local people need, and in my view good local parliamentarians, of whom there are very many, should be able to go back to talk to their local systems and chief executives about why that is—not to berate them, but to understand it. There might be a very good cause for the variation; there might be structural reasons or geographical reasons, and they might be long-standing reasons. That is what we seek to do in order to regain the trust and confidence of the British public, and that is why we are publishing those documents.

I stand by my comments that my approach is more local than centralised. This is about changing the culture, which we seek to do by making that happen more locally. I absolutely get the points about operational freedom and the balance that we will seek when we release the operating model, which is being worked on in the Department, as we bring the new system into being, alongside the Bill.

However, we want to be very clear that when an ICB has failed or is at risk of failure, and that failure is significant, it is right that the Secretary of State has the tools to minimise the impact on patients and the public and to act swiftly to put things right. The public rightly expect that, in such circumstances, Ministers will take the necessary steps to protect patients, taxpayers and the public. In some cases of significant failure, that may include directing an ICB and removing the chief executive.

I am sure that all Members here today will agree that effective performance management of ICBs will continue to be essential once NHS England is abolished, not only to support the provision of a quality service, but to reassure the people served by ICBs that when things go wrong, they will be put right.

[Helen Morgan]

I could not agree more with the Minister that when there is an obvious failure, either in a local system or in a trust, we would hope that the Secretary of State will intervene. She will know from our experience in Shropshire that, when a system is failing or underperforming, that intervention is welcome. But the Bill gives the Secretary of State power to intervene even when things are going well, which is quite an extension of power. Will the Minister comment on that?

[Karin Smyth]

I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention, and I will come on to the power.

As hon. Members are aware, NHS England currently holds similar powers, so it makes sense for these powers to be held by the Secretary of State once NHS England is abolished. I want to be clear—I hope that this will address the hon. Lady’s point—that our intention is to use these significant failure powers rarely and not as a first port of call. It is far better to work closely with ICBs and their leaders to spot issues and work collaboratively to resolve them before they have the opportunity to become significant, but it would be irresponsible not to have the power to intervene as a last resort.

I want to address the other elements of clause 11. The first part of the clause establishes a general power for the Secretary of State to direct integrated care boards about the exercise of their functions. Using that power, the Secretary of State could direct a singular ICB, a group of ICBs or all ICBs, depending on the scope of the direction. This power is a necessary step in restoring democratic control over the NHS. The public rightly expect Ministers to be able to set priorities, drive improvements and set out how they expect the NHS to operate. For example, we expect to use the power to set up and update national commissioning standards.

The power is particularly relevant given the wider commissioning responsibilities ICBs will have in their role as strategic commissioners following the abolition of NHS England. By setting standards for all ICBs, the power will help reduce the unwarranted variation in the way that ICBs discharge their functions. It is also an important tool for enabling Ministers to respond to changing events. The lack of such a power has slowed the ability of NHS England to respond to unforeseen challenges within the health system.

I can also give the Committee an assurance that the clause includes a considered set of limits on the scope of the power. The Secretary of State will not be able to direct ICBs to appoint a particular individual, issue a direction about the services to be provided to an individual, or direct the use of a drug treatment or diagnostic technique where that is inconsistent with NICE guidance or recommendations. Equally, to maintain transparency in the health system, directions made under the general power to direct ICBs as to the exercise of their functions will be required to be made in writing and to be published as soon as reasonably practical. The power will enable the Secretary of State to uphold the standards that patients expect and deserve, while also protecting the principles of fairness and impartiality at the heart of the NHS.

We have already addressed much of the second part of the clause, but I should note that we have purposely placed the powers to intervene in cases of significant failure outside the general power of direction over ICBs. That is because it is important to be clear that those powers are expected to be used only rarely and in situations where an ICB is failing or at risk of failing.

I hope the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham feels able to withdraw her amendment. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.