Employment Tribunal Hearings

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Thursday 26th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, we wish to ensure that employment cases are dealt with swiftly and effectively. We are taking action to deal with the tribunals’ increased case load. This includes setting aside extra days for judges to hear tribunal cases, as well as developing plans to recruit more tribunal judges. We continue to monitor the situation closely.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, this issue was drawn to my attention by a newspaper headline—in the Times, not the Morning Star—entitled “Tribunals gridlocked by surge in claims”. Among the many cases cited by the trade union USDAW and Thompsons Solicitors was a case in London, which happened in November 2017 and will be heard in January 2019, and a case in Watford, listed for a three-day hearing in January 2018 but postponed until September due to “having overbooked and a lack of judicial resources”. Is the Minister aware that ACAS conciliators have reported that they are overwhelmed by the increase in claims? For example, solicitors in Newcastle have been unable to get through to speak to anyone for two weeks. In detail, what steps do the Government intend to take, and within what timescale, to ensure that the maxim “justice delayed is justice denied” is no longer exemplified in the workings of the employment tribunal system as a result of what the Supreme Court ruled was its unlawful and unconstitutional imposition of fees of up to £1,200?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

On the last point, the Supreme Court determined that it was lawful to charge fees for the tribunal; it was the level of fees that was considered disproportionate. The time taken for tribunal cases was in the region of 26 to 28 weeks per case for resolution. That has increased to about 33 weeks because there was a significant increase in applications to the tribunals after the decision in July 2017. We have put in place a process for recruiting a further 54 tribunal judges for employment tribunals, which should increase capacity by about 44%. In addition, we are now taking steps to increase the number of fee-paid judges in the tribunal system; indeed, fee-paid judge sittings have increased by 180% since July 2017. We are also conscious of the need to employ additional staff in employment tribunals; that is being undertaken at the present time. I apologise for the length of my answer, but I felt I should give the noble Lord’s question a full response.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, in the impact assessment supporting the 2013 fees order, the Government said that they were unable to predict how many employment tribunal claims would be deterred by the introduction of the fees but that they should deter unmeritorious claims. We now know that there was a 75% drop in claims following their introduction, with absolutely no effect on their success rate, and that this massive backlog has built up following their abolition. Will the noble and learned Lord accept that this is clear evidence that high tribunal and court fees deter meritorious claims and so reduce access to justice? Will he assure the House that any future impact assessments on this topic will have regard to such evidence?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

When the coalition Government introduced tribunal fees to employment tribunals, they did so in the belief that they were taking a proportionate step to meet the costs of our courts and tribunals. Indeed, the totality of fees income is still less than half the cost of our courts and tribunals. Going forward, we will be conscious of the need to ensure access to justice—a point made by Lord Reed in his judgment in the UNISON case.

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that there is considerable sympathy for him having to keep returning to this House to defend the indefensible situation that the Treasury, being apparently unaware that justice delayed is justice denied and that access to justice is beyond price, has imposed on his department? What does he think of the Treasury’s custom of hiding behind the skirts of the spending departments?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, in what may be my last statement from the Dispatch Box, I observe that the Treasury has had to respond to the dramatic economic turnaround that occurred after 2008. That has had an impact on spending departments, but we require to maintain a coherent economic policy for the whole country.

Probation: Voluntary Sector

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Tuesday 24th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they plan to increase the contribution made by the voluntary sector to the delivery of probation services, following publication on 17 April of the report by HM Chief Inspector of Probation, Probation Supply Chains.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the report of 17 April from Dame Glenys Stacey is one for which we are grateful. The voluntary and charitable sector has a viable role to play in helping to reform offenders. We recognise that community rehabilitation companies have faced financial challenges, which means that many of them have not been able to develop their engagement with the voluntary sector to the extent envisaged. We will carefully consider the inspectorate’s recommendations as we work to improve probation services.

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that Answer. The Chief Inspector of Probation has repeatedly drawn attention to the failure of the transforming rehabilitation reforms—rushed, rather than thought through, by Chris Grayling—to protect the public or satisfy the needs of offenders under probation supervision. In her latest report, she draws attention to the reduction of the contribution contracted from the voluntary sector, an essential partner under the old system, and the failure of community rehabilitation companies to analyse the needs of those under their supervision, a given for all former probation trusts. Can the Minister please tell the House what the Government are doing to rectify this, and whether the chief inspector’s particular recommendations to the Ministry of Justice and Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service will be actioned?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, if I may, I will quote from the chief inspector’s report of 17 April:

“We found that the quality of services was variable, but reasonable overall”.


We intend that the service should be more than reasonable, and we are considering her recommendations.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the report demonstrates that probation services have been going badly wrong, with a failure to involve the voluntary sector on anything like the scale envisaged. Allowing the community rehabilitation companies to design and implement their own delivery models was a mistake and has led to uneven and inadequate delivery. Do the Government now plan to tie CRCs to more rigorous contracts by variation, or on renewal? Might this not also enable CRCs to provide much more in the way of needed services to the National Probation Service?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the community rehabilitation companies faced unexpected difficulties when it was found that the financial float of those companies was less than had been planned for. We have already discussed the terms of the contracts with the CRCs and they are the subject of further consideration. We are certainly determined that there should be a diverse provision so far as probation is concerned, and one that does involve third sector organisations.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

The chief inspector has stated that the present system is fundamentally flawed and that she doubts whether the service can ever be restored to the standard we should accept. Will the Government now join with her, the relevant trade unions and the judiciary to examine how the performance and reputation of a critical part of our system can be restored?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, with regard to the present provision it should be noted that the community rehabilitation companies have reduced the number of people reoffending. Indeed, our reforms mean that they are monitoring 40,000 offenders who had previously been released with no supervision.

[Baroness Corston (Lab)]

My Lords, will the Minister accept that one of the reasons why it is very difficult to know what is going on in the community rehabilitation companies is that, under the Grayling legislation, as it was previously referred to, they are specifically excluded from the Freedom of Information Act?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I do not consider that a material consideration, given that they are subject to the very report that we are discussing presently, Dame Stacey’s report of 17 April.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister should not speak about unexpected difficulties, given that the likelihood that the amount of work going to the CRCs would be lower than the Government predicted was something of which the Justice Committee warned, along with many other things.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the flow of work between the NPS and the CRCs was indeed lower than the Government had anticipated when they implemented these measures.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, could the Minister perhaps answer the question that I put to him? Will the Government sit down with the trade unions and the judiciary to deal with the crisis in the system?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, with respect to this reference to crisis, I remind the noble Lord of what the chief inspector said in her report:

“We found that the quality of services was variable, but reasonable overall”.


We aim to improve that. We do not intend to sit down at present with particular parties, but we are addressing the recommendations in the chief inspector’s report, which is the proper way forward.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, perhaps the Minister can tell us what the current recidivism rate is.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not in a position to answer such a general proposition but I will undertake to check the relevant statistics in that area and to write to the noble Lord in due course. I will of course place a copy of the letter in the Library.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister said that, for some reason, the CRCs did not need to be subject to the Freedom of Information Act because there was a chief inspector. Could he explain exactly why the chief inspector is a substitute for citizens posing questions to and seeking information from the CRCs?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It may not be a substitute for citizens seeking information, but it is a means of ensuring that the conduct of the CRCs and the results of their work are put into the public domain by those who have a clear understanding of how the work should be performed, and are the subject of published reports.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 24th April 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

Relevant document: 22nd Report from the Delegated Powers Committee

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Bill makes important changes to our personal injury compensation system. It is about making that system fairer, more certain and more sustainable in the future for claimants, defendants, the taxpayer and motorists. This builds on our wider reforms to cut the cost of civil justice claims and strengthen the regulation of claims management companies.

The first part of the Bill will deliver a key manifesto pledge: to support hard-working families by bringing down the cost of living through a crackdown on exaggerated and fraudulent whiplash claims, which lead to higher insurance costs. The second part of the Bill will provide a fairer method for setting the personal injury discount rate. It will, for the first time, use a new, regular, more transparent mechanism in which the Lord Chancellor consults independent experts before setting the rate. We aim to provide full compensation for seriously injured claimants while being fair to those, particularly the National Health Service, who bear the cost of paying. We believe that the Bill will provide a compensation system that meets the rightful needs of claimants while saving the public money, both as consumers and taxpayers. About three-quarters of the United Kingdom motor and liability insurance market has already committed publicly, through a letter published on 20 March, to ensure that any savings resulting from enactment of the Bill will be passed on to the public.

I begin with the issue of whiplash. DWP data shows that around 650,000 RTA-related personal injury claims were made in 2017-18. That is nearly 200,000 more than in 2005-06—a rise of 40%. If we take the 10 years following 2005-06, the rise is around 70%. We estimate that around 85% of these are for whiplash-related injuries—higher than in any other European jurisdiction —yet Department for Transport figures show that in the decade up to 2016-17, reported road traffic accidents went from around 190,000 to around 135,000—a fall of 30%. Many claims will, of course, be genuine and the Government would never seek to deny justice to those who suffer injury; it is absolutely right that individuals are compensated for genuine injuries. However, by 2016-17, there were around 670,000 whiplash claims in the United Kingdom. That number is too high and the costs to motorists and consumers too great. It comes despite major improvements in motoring safety, such as the increased use of integrated seat and head restraints. We must ask ourselves what is going wrong.

The reality is that some of these claims are not genuine. Last year the insurance industry identified 69,000 motor insurance claims that it considered fraudulent. By their very nature, these claims are difficult to detect, so I ask the House to consider that the problem goes much further than this already significant number. That the number is so high is indicative of an ever-pervading compensation culture in this country. The knock-on effect of this has been to drive up insurance premiums. I would go as far as to say that, for some, it has become socially acceptable to make a whiplash claim for little or no injury. Noble Lords may have seen examples in the media of exaggerated or fraudulent whiplash claims, such as the man making a claim after his car was slowly reversed into in a supermarket car park. It transpired that he was not in the car at the time.

As the House will no doubt agree, the purpose is to compensate those for whom genuine injury has occurred. Our reforms seek to reduce and control the costs of whiplash claims and to disincentivise people making fraudulent or unmeritorious claims. The level of compensation paid out for such claims is, in the Government’s view, out of all proportion to any genuine injury suffered, especially when balanced against its effect on the price of premiums paid by ordinary motorists. Insurance industry figures show that in 2017 car insurance premiums rose at the fastest rate ever. Though there are other contributing factors, without reform to whiplash claims those increases are estimated by the ABI to continue at an alarming rate—potentially 10% per year. For many people—particularly those in rural communities—owning a car is not a choice: it is a necessity. Higher insurance premiums hit young and elderly motorists particularly hard. That is why we pledged in our manifesto to bring down the cost of motoring. The Bill can and will do that.

The measures in the Bill relating to whiplash will therefore address a number of issues. They will introduce a ban on settling whiplash claims without medical evidence. This will discourage fraudulent claims and encourage insurers to investigate claims properly, providing fairness and certainty for claimants, so they do not feel pressurised into accepting an offer before knowing the true extent of their injuries. They will provide for a new system of fixed tariffs for payments for pain, suffering and “loss of amenity” in whiplash claims. This will give claimants proportionate compensation while controlling the costs of claims. The final tariff figures will be set in regulations to be debated via the affirmative procedure by Parliament following Royal Assent. The judiciary will have discretion to increase the compensation payable in exceptional circumstances, with the cap set in supporting regulations. The whiplash reform programme also includes measures not in the scope of this Bill, to increase the small claims track limit for road traffic accident personal injury claims to £5,000 and for all other personal injury claims to £2,000.

The measures in the whole reform programme are fair and proportionate. They will prevent fraudulent and unmeritorious whiplash claims from driving up insurances costs, allowing insurers to pass on savings of about £1.1.billion a year to consumers. This would mean an average reduction in car insurance premiums for consumers of around £35 a year. As a Government we fully intend to hold the market to account in making sure that happens.

I now turn to the second part of the Bill, the personal injury discount rate. Fairness and sustainability are at the heart of our reforms. With any change to the system for compensating the seriously injured, we must keep in mind the person behind every claim. The Government continue to support the aim that seriously injured people should receive 100% compensation to meet expected future financial losses, including medical and care costs. The way compensation is calculated must be fair to both claimants and defendants, including the National Health Service.

This Bill will reform the personal injury discount rate, which adjusts a compensation lump sum to allow for the return a claimant is expected to receive by investing it over the period of the award. Currently at minus 0.75%, we have one of lowest rates in the world. In Germany, it is 4%; in France it is 1.2%, and in Ireland it is 1%. The current rate consistently compensates for injury at more than the 100% required by law. Awards currently average 120% to 125% even after management costs and tax. This is putting huge pressure on the National Health Service in claims for clinical negligence. Last year, the NHS spent £1.7 billion on such cases, a cost that has almost doubled since 2010-11, with an unsustainable average increase of 11.5% every year.

The current legal framework requires the Lord Chancellor to assume claimants to be very risk-averse investors, and the discount rate has been set since 1998 with reference to returns on very low-risk investments—index-linked UK gilts. This is unrealistic. In reality, claimants do not behave as very low-risk investors; they invest their compensation in diversified low-risk portfolios and on average receive higher returns than is assumed under the present law. This results in inflated payments for claims which overly penalise defendants.

Every pound spent on overcompensation could instead be spent on front-line public services: in our hospitals, our schools and our Armed Forces. We will therefore do a number of things in the Bill. We will provide for the discount rate to be set in future by reference to how evidence indicates claimants actually invest, giving a more realistic rate that will mean that injured parties with low-risk investment appetites still receive full and fair compensation and ensure that defendants, including the NHS, are not left shouldering the burden of overcompensation.

We shall provide for the first time that the Lord Chancellor should set the rate regularly—at least every three years—and must do so after expert advice from an independent panel which protects the interests of claimants, as well as defendants, by ensuring that the rate is grounded in investment practices and market conditions.

Transparency and fairness in setting the rate were two of the main concerns voiced by the Justice Select Committee, and we have responded to that in setting out our position in the Bill. Changes to the discount rate will affect only lump-sum payments for future financial loss. They will not affect periodical payment orders, which account for a significant proportion of the compensation paid for future loss in the cases involving the most serious and long-term injuries.

Periodical payment orders are annual, risk-free payments providing a steady stream of income which is not affected by the discount rate, allowing claimants to plan for their long-term needs. PPOs are available from the National Health Service in all negligence cases, including those involving brain damage during birth, and in almost all cases where the defendant is insured by a UK-regulated insurer. A court is able to provide protection by ordering a PPO where it believes that it is in the claimant’s interest. In any event, for serious long-term injuries, claimants will continue to be able to rely on the National Health Service as any other person would.

These reforms will reduce spending pressure on the NHS. The NHS Confederation and other influential medical bodies have described how the change last year in the discount rate exacerbated the financial impacts of clinical negligence claims. These higher litigation costs against the NHS are now unsustainable.

This fairer approach to setting the discount rate could, assuming a rate between 0% and 1%, save the taxpayer between £250 million and £550 million per year and, in turn, mean savings to insurers of between £0.5 billion and £1.5 billion per year, to be passed on to consumers in the form of lower insurance premiums.

Alongside our wider work to reform the civil justice system and, through the Financial Guidance and Claims Bill, strengthen the regulatory regime for claims management companies and ban cold calling, the reforms contained in the Civil Liability Bill are needed to put personal injury payments on a fair, more certain and sustainable footing for the future. In turn, they will save the NHS and consumer money. Legislating to ensure that genuine whiplash claims are backed by medical evidence, and that claimants receive proportionate compensation, will reduce the number and cost of whiplash claims. This will allow insurers to pass on savings to consumers, and, as I have said, three-quarters of the UK motor and liability insurance market has already publicly committed to doing so.

In changing the system by which the discount rate is set we want to continue to ensure fairness, so that those who suffer catastrophic personal injury get 100% compensation, within a more informed and transparent system in which the rate is set by the Lord Chancellor at regular intervals, with the benefit of independent expert advice, in the interest of claimants. I commend the Bill to the House and I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I thank the whole House for all the contributions on the Bill today. I might not answer every query posed during this stage of consideration, but—and I hope this reflects the steps that we have taken already—I would be perfectly open to, and would welcome, meeting any of your Lordships who wish to engage with me and officials prior to Committee to discuss particular issues. That is an invitation I hope at least some noble Lords will consider taking up if they have any queries.

Clearly, there are different views about the state of the Bill at this stage, but I could not accept the observation made by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, that it is rough-hewn. Respectfully, it appears to me that a great deal of work has been done to prepare for the issues that we shall have to address. I will look at those issues in two parts, as does the Bill, and begin with whiplash.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, took issue with some of the statistics and suggested that perhaps matters had turned, but let us be candid. I shall not use some of the terminology used by noble Lords about a racket or anything else. What we have is a very obvious and clear trend in the development of claims for road-traffic-based whiplash injury. It has been going on for more than 10 years. The consequences are very clear and obvious; it may well be that we should have considered acting sooner to address this issue, but act we must and that is what we intend to do.

The New England Journal of Medicine recently carried out an analysis of the incidence of whiplash injury and the availability of compensation. It discovered a very obvious correlation between the availability of compensation and the incidence of whiplash claims reported in road traffic cases. The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, observed that when he attended meetings with the reinsurers Munich Re in Germany it had alluded to the situation in the United Kingdom, which is quite exceptional. Unless Scandinavians have much thicker necks than us in this part of the world, there is little to conclude except that a claims culture has developed, because the incidence of these claims in that part of the world is very different from our own.

We therefore have to address how these claims will be contained in the wider public interest and, ultimately, in the consumer interest. However, I do not suggest that any one part of the community is wholly or solely to blame for the situation we now find ourselves in. For example, I do not demur from the suggestion that insurers have been complicit in the development of this claims culture over the past 10 years or more in their willingness to avoid undue expense and simply to settle claims without the necessity for any form of real evidence. Many noble Lords have experience of that themselves.

However, there is some rationale to the way in which we are attempting to approach this matter, and it includes the reference to proposed changes in the small claims limit as well. The idea of a tariff is not entirely novel; such an approach has already been taken in Italy and in Spain, where they faced a similar claims culture. We are, first, bringing together a tariff and, secondly, making it a requirement that no claim can be settled without a medical report, or MedCo report. I discern that there is almost universal approval for that step. Thirdly, we have agreed that the claims portal for small claims will be reviewed, which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, suggested would be required, to make it accessible to claimants themselves when they come to make claims. It will of course be simpler for them to make that claim in circumstances where they know that there is, beyond the issue of liability, a tariff that determines the damages for pain and suffering. I emphasise those damages because this does nothing in respect of the claims for wage loss and other outgoings incurred by claimants in the circumstances.

I will also take up a point mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, with regard to the cost as compared with the tariff of damages at the very lower end. I understand that where liability is accepted, the cost of the MedCo report will be a relevant recoverable cost, no matter whether this is in the small claims court or otherwise. Another question that has been raised is how the original cost of the MedCo report is funded, and we are looking at that and discussing it with interested parties at present. However, there will be no material issue over the recovery of the MedCo report cost itself, which the noble Lord identified as in the region of £180 plus VAT.

That, then, is the background. There are other potential targets. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to the conduct of claims management companies, and I will say a little about that. As noble Lords will be aware, we are already taking steps through the Financial Guidance and Claims Bill, which is making its way through the other place, to address some of the difficulties that arise with regard to claims management companies. First, their regulation will go to the FCA. As the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, observed, that is a regulator with teeth, and we consider it properly positioned to deal with claims management companies. There will also be the means to limit the percentage that claims management companies can take from a claimant when they deal with a claim, to try to control their activities in that regard.

We have of course been concerned with the issue of cold calling, which I suspect has bedevilled virtually all of us at one point or another. The Information Commissioner is concerned with that as well. One of the difficulties, and this was touched upon in the course of debate, is how to regulate the unregulated. One of the real difficulties is that in the context of cold calling, we have seen the claims management companies, or those who carry out this cold calling, move out of the United Kingdom and carry out this conduct from abroad. It is a very simple thing for them to do, and it is a very difficult thing for us to stop. That is why you have to look at alternative routes to addressing the wider issue that we have to deal with. We are certainly concerned that we need to control the activities of the claims management companies, although they alone are not responsible for the way in which this whole industry of whiplash claims has developed.

I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Monks, who I appreciate is not entirely sympathetic to the Government’s position on this, did make a passing remark in the context of other claims, such as workplace claims. He said the abuse was a lot less than in road traffic accident cases, but implicitly he accepts the existence of abuse in the context of RTA cases, and I believe that is almost universally acknowledged. We seek to address that in Part 1 of the Bill. We consider that we are taking a proportionate approach. Yes, it distinguishes whiplash-type injuries that occur in a road traffic context from other forms of accident or injury, but that is because we have to address a particular mischief. That is what we are doing with Part 1 of the Bill. It appears to us that this is the sensible and considered way forward in order to control this situation.

I note that the Delegated Powers Committee has made a number of recommendations with regard to Part 1 of the Bill. We do not entirely agree with its recommendations, but I have noted the concern expressed by noble Lords about the question of defining whiplash injury. The intention was to have a degree of flexibility, so that if the claims industry developed in a particular direction in response to legislation, we were equipped to deal quite rapidly with that. It may be that noble Lords would like to see rather more in the way of definition so far as whiplash is concerned, and I take on board the observations that have been made.

There is also the question of the tariff, and of course an illustrative tariff was provided in the papers that were produced along with the original Bill and to which reference has been made. We consider that being able to regulate the tariff by the affirmative procedure is a more flexible way of being able to respond to changes. But, again, I hear what noble Lords say and we will have to consider that going forward.

I would like to respond to a number of points made by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. First of all, I hope I have made clear that medical report costs are recoverable. There was a suggestion that they were not. He referred to the position of other parties such as cyclists being caught, but they are not brought within the tariff on the basis of Part 1 of the Bill. To answer that particular point, they are specifically excluded at Clause 1.

I would like to move on to Part 2, the question of the discount rate, and address a number of points. First of all, it appears to be generally understood that we do need to put in place a means by which the discount rate can be determined and reviewed on a regular basis in order that we do not encounter the sort of situation we had in 2017, when we saw it go from 2.5% to minus 0.75%. I wholly agree with the observations of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, that the present discount does not realistically reflect the way in which a party—any party—is going to invest funds going forward. Therefore, we have to bring this back into a realistic scenario.

The objective—here I address a number of points made by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell—is not to have representatives of various interested parties partaking in an exercise of trying to agree a rate. The whole point of the structure in Part 2 is that there should be an expert panel, not a representative panel. The noble Lord asked about there being a fair balance of representation on the panel, but that is not the intention or the objective. The idea is that we should have an expert panel to advise the Lord Chancellor.

The intention is that that should be an open exercise so that, for example, the way in which the expert panel reports to the Lord Chancellor will be open. Indeed, in our response to the Justice Select Committee, the Lord Chancellor observed that he would be publishing the recommendations of the panel’s report in circumstances where he received it and was to act upon it. In due course, he will also be required to explain the way in which he fixes the discount rate. Indeed, he will be amenable to judicial review in carrying out that function, so that there will be ultimately an oversight of the way in which he discharges that duty. We consider it appropriate that that should be done openly and effectively in that way.

Clearly, it will be important that the discount rate should be reviewed at regular intervals. We have alighted upon the period of three years for review after considering various representations, but I have heard the references to five years as a review period and the interesting alternative mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, of essentially having an expert panel meeting at regular intervals to consider whether there are circumstances that might require a proper review of the discount rate. We would be open to discussing these alternatives to see how we can effectively ensure that the discount rate continues to reflect the reality of investment.

On the point of investment, I believe there is general consensus that we should move from the very-low risk level to the idea of a low level of risk for investment. That is not to suggest that claimants are going to become stockbrokers—I really do not feel that that is a proper reflection of the situation at all. The intention in Part 2 of the Bill is to bookmark the place in which the expert committee will address the question of how the discount rate should be fixed. It is to give the panel a degree of flexibility in that context between, at one end, very low risk and, at the other end, low risk by an investor who is not concerned about having to provide for their future care.

On the question of future care, which arises most particularly in the context of clinical negligence cases and the subsequent cases of severe injury that very often arise from that, there is always the difficulty of determining not only what the appropriate discount should be but, as noble Lords have observed, what life expectancy may be. That is always an estimate. You could almost say that you invariably get it wrong; you can never be sure that you have got it right. That is why we consider that PPOs are a very important option available to claimants. Looking at the data that has been gathered in arranging guidance for the Bill, we have noted that their use is essentially limited to cases where claims exceed £1 million, and more generally £5 million. They are not always taken up, and one of the problems with the present discount rate is that it would tend to discourage claimants and their advisers from taking up PPOs. But clearly, if you want certainty with regard to future care, one way to secure it is to agree to a PPO, and we would wish to encourage them.

We have to underline, however, that PPOs are not universally available. For example, I understand that the Medical Defence Union, which is a mutual, is not in a position to guarantee future payment of a PPO and therefore not in position to provide them. However, that may alter as we look at the question of indemnity arrangements—for example, in respect of general practitioners—which we are doing at the present time. We certainly wish to encourage the use of PPOs and are looking at providing guidance to claimants and their advisers, in order to ensure that they are taken up in appropriate circumstances.

One further issue that has been raised by a number of your Lordships is Section 2(4) of the 1948 Act. We recognise the question that is being raised about this and the appropriateness of maintaining that. Presently, Section 2(4) of the 1948 Act would not fall within the scope of the Bill. I appreciate that, if we were to amend the long title of the Bill, we might be able to bring the matter within scope, but there is a concern that the repeal of Section 2(4) potentially raises issues that will have to be the subject of consultation with interested parties. We are concerned that we need to act promptly, particularly with regard to the discount rate, and it would be unfortunate if that process was materially slowed because of an attempt to bring Section 2(4) and its repeal into the present Bill. I hear what noble Lords have said and am not unsympathetic to the suggestion that the time has come to revisit that provision and understand why we need to maintain it. My concern is that attempting to bring it into the Bill at this stage could have unfortunate consequences for the way in which we are trying to deal with the discount rate.

On that last point, I appreciate the concern about the delay in respect of the discount rate. We are proposing to carry out the first review as swiftly as possible. I understand that we are aiming for April 2019, not 2020 as has been suggested. There is a 90-day period and then a 180-day period. There is a need to have an expert panel in place, but considerable steps may be taken in anticipation of the Bill passing to ensure that we have the machinery in place for the swift appointment of an expert panel, so that the review can be carried out as soon as possible. I will take further advice from officials on the question of how far we can go with that sort of preparation prior to Royal Assent of the Bill, in order to move swiftly on that matter.

I appreciate that I have not addressed all of the queries that have been raised this afternoon. In the time available, I regret that I will not be able to do that but, as I said at the outset, I am open to meetings with noble Lords who wish to raise questions on the Bill prior to Committee, and I would welcome the opportunity to engage with them. I beg to move.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Legal Aid

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Thursday 19th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to ensure sufficient availability of legal aid.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, we recognise that the availability of legal aid is an important part of maintaining access to justice. The Government remain committed to targeting legal aid to those who need it, while balancing that with the cost to the taxpayer. As the Lord Chancellor has confirmed, we will conduct an evidence-based review of LASPO and will publish our findings later this year.

[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his reply, and I am conscious that this is not the first time this Question has been asked, but it is generally acknowledged, in particular by legally trained Chancellors, that the quality of advocacy provided by properly trained barristers is of a significantly higher quality than that which is provided by others in court. Does the Minister agree that not only is the criminal Bar an essential part of the criminal justice system but it also requires adequate fees to function properly?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we agree that the criminal Bar is one of the vital pillars underpinning the rule of law and that its contribution should be fairly rewarded.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, there are two forms of advice desert in relation to the current legal aid system. One is geographic, where legal advice is simply unavailable because there are no longer legal aid practitioners to provide it, and the other is in relation to particularly sensitive and important areas, such as housing or family law, where the number of cases receiving legal help since LASPO has dropped from 200,000 to 40,000 in the last financial year. Will the long-awaited LASPO review address these problems? Do the Government have an open mind in relation to the possible restoration of legal aid and advice currently denied to people of limited means, with the added benefit of reducing the pressure on the courts system from the growing number of unrepresented parties to proceedings?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, with particular reference to housing, at present 133 of the 134 housing and debt procurement areas for legal aid have provision, and in addition there is provision for telephone advice in the context of housing issues that are covered by LASPO. Our review will embrace all the issues that are being raised by interested groups and will take account of the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Low, and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, in their respective reports.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, when the Government inquiry takes place, will it please look at the situation of the criminal Bar, which is currently in very real trouble? The noble Baroness made an important point about the very good advocacy of the criminal Bar. It is under real threat and is an issue which the Government have to look at.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We are conscious of the contribution that the criminal Bar makes. The noble and learned Baroness is alluding to developments with regard to recent changes to the advocates’ graduated fee scheme. That scheme was developed in conjunction with the profession, in particular the Bar Council. The changes are intended to create a simpler and more modern pay system which better reflects the reality of the work being done. As regards the question of an inquiry, a review by the Lord Chancellor is ongoing and we intend to report on it in the course of this year.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the impact assessment for LASPO anticipated annual savings of £450 million. In fact, annual savings have been running at about £950 million. Last month’s terms of reference for the LASPO review commit the Government to ensuring that legal aid is,

“available to those who need it”.

Given that this aim is clearly not currently being achieved, will the Government make these extra savings of £500 million available to fund any proposals made on the review for extra legal aid spending? Has that been made clear to officials conducting the review within the department?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the coalition Government introduced LAPSO in order to ensure that legal aid was directed at those who most require it. The figure of £950 million arises only in the context of a comparison between 2010 and 2016. In that period, legal aid expenditure fell by about £950 million, or 38% in real terms.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, is it intended that the review will cover third-party litigation funding? Third-party litigation funding is a useful access to justice, but too often the division of any awards of damages between those who provide the funding and those in whose name the cases are being brought are obscure. Would it not be a good idea if the courts had the power to require the disclosure of such terms to ensure fairness between all the parties?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the matter of third-party litigation funding is of course a matter of contract between two parties, and the Government would be slow to interfere in that contractual process.

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords, further to the excellent question from my noble friend Lord Beecham, will the Government now at last admit that they have denied access to justice to hundreds of thousands of people, with cuts to legal aid taking people with social security, homelessness, mental health and other extremely important issues out of scope; widespread confusion as to who remains eligible; difficulty in proving financial eligibility; and a very damaging fall in the number of legal aid providers? How does the Minister explain the collapse in the number of private practice and not-for-profit organisations undertaking legal aid work? Will the Government now act to restore access to justice as a basic right of citizenship?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we recognise the need for access to justice; it is a fundamental common-law right. We seek to ensure that there is a legal aid scheme that is affordable but allows for access to justice. That scheme is currently the subject of review by the Ministry of Justice.

[Lord Watts (Lab)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree with that famous saying, “British justice is the best in the world if you can afford it”? Do we not need a different legal system that makes it possible for ordinary people to pursue cases in the courts?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am not familiar with that particular comment.

Worboys Case and the Parole Board

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will repeat a Statement made by my right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. The Statement is as follows:

“With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a Statement on the High Court judgment handed down this morning in the case relating to the Parole Board decision to release John Radford, formerly known as John Worboys.

This is an important and unprecedented case. The President of the Queen’s Bench Division, Sir Brian Leveson, the most senior judge who heard this case, said it is wholly exceptional. It is the first time that a Parole Board decision to release a prisoner has been challenged and the first time that the rules on the non-disclosure of Parole Board decisions have been called into question.

The judgment quashes the Parole Board’s decision to release Worboys and finds that Rule 25 of the Parole Board rules is unlawful. This means that Worboys’ case will now be resubmitted to the Parole Board. A new panel will be constituted and updated evidence on his risk from prison and probation professionals will be provided. The panel will then assess anew whether Worboys is suitable for release. Those victims covered by the victim contact scheme will be fully informed and involved in this process. My department also has to reformulate the Parole Board’s rules to allow more transparency around decision-making and reasoning.

It is clear that there was widespread concern about the decision by the Parole Board to release Worboys. As I have previously told the House, I share these concerns and consequently I welcome this judgment. I want to congratulate the victims who brought the judicial review and to reiterate my heartfelt sympathy for all victims who have suffered as a result of Worboys’ hideous crimes.

I want to set out, in greater detail than I have previously been able, the reasons why I did not bring a judicial review. As I told the House on 19 January, I looked carefully at whether I could challenge this decision. It would have been unprecedented for the Secretary of State to bring a judicial review against the Parole Board—a body which is independent but for which my department is responsible. I took expert legal advice from leading counsel on whether I should bring a challenge. The bar for judicial review is set high. I considered whether the decision was legally irrational—in other words, a decision which no reasonable Parole Board could have made. The advice I received was that such an argument was highly unlikely to succeed, and indeed this argument did not succeed. However, the victims succeeded in a different argument. They challenged that, while Ministry of Justice officials opposed release, they should have done more to put forward all the relevant material on other offending. They also highlighted very significant failures on the part of the Parole Board to make all the necessary inquiries and so fully take into account wider evidence about Worboys’ offending.

I also received advice on the failure of process argument and was advised that this was not one that I, as Secretary of State, would have been able successfully to advance. The victims were better placed to make this argument and this was the argument on which they have won their case. It is right that the actions of ministry officials, as well as the Parole Board, in this important and unusual case have been laid open to judicial scrutiny.

I have always said I fully support the right of victims to bring this action. I have been very concerned at every point not to do anything to hinder the victims’ right to challenge and to bring their arguments and their personal evidence before the court. Indeed, the judgment suggests that, had I brought a case, the standing of the victims might have been compromised.

The court’s findings around how this decision was reached give rise to serious concerns. The court has found that the ‘credibility and reliability’ of Worboys’ account in relation to his previous offending behaviour,

‘was not probed to any extent, if at all’,

by the Parole Board, and that, although the Parole Board was entitled to make inquiries of the police in relation to his offending, it did not do so. These are serious failings which need serious action to address. In these circumstances, I have accepted Professor Nick Hardwick’s resignation as chair of the organisation.

I am also taking the following actions: instructing my officials to issue new guidance that all relevant evidence of past offending should be included in the dossiers submitted to the Parole Board, including possibly police evidence, so that it can be robustly tested in each Parole Board hearing; putting in place robust procedures to check that every dossier sent by HMPPS to the Parole Board contains every necessary piece of evidence, including sentencing remarks or other relevant material from previous trials or other civil legal action; boosting the role of the Secretary of State’s representative at Parole Board hearings, with a greater presumption that they should be present for more complex cases where HM Prison and Probation Service is arguing strongly against release; working with the Parole Board to review the composition of panels so that the Parole Board includes greater judicial expertise for complex, high-profile cases, particularly where multiple victims are involved or where there is a significant dispute between expert witnesses as to their suitability for release; and developing more specialist training for Parole Board panel members.

The judgment also found that the blanket ban on the transparency of Parole Board proceedings was unlawful. I accept the finding of the court and will not be challenging this. It was my view from the beginning that very good reasons would be needed to persuade me that we should continue with a law that does not allow any transparency. I am now considering how the rule should be reformulated.

When I addressed the House on this matter in January, I said that I had commissioned a review into how victims were involved in Parole Board decisions, into the transparency of the Parole Board and into whether there should be a way of challenging Parole Board decisions. That work has been continuing for the past two and a half months. Given the very serious issues identified in this case, I can announce today that I intend to conduct further work to examine the Parole Board rules in their entirety.

As a result of the work that has been completed to date, I have already decided to abolish Rule 25 in its current form and will do so as soon as possible after the Easter Recess. This will enable us to provide for the Parole Board to make available summaries of the decisions they make to victims. In addition, I will bring forward proposals for Parole Board decisions to be challenged through an internal review mechanism, where a separate judge-led panel will look again at cases that meet a designated criterion. I intend to consult on the detail of these proposals by the end of April, alongside other proposals to improve the way that victims are kept informed about the parole process.

I am grateful to Baroness Newlove for her help with this part of the review and to Dame Glenys Stacey for her helpful suggestions and review of the way that victim liaison operated in this case. I will come back to the House with further proposals as they are developed.

In conclusion, let no one doubt the seriousness with which I take the issues raised by this morning’s judgment, nor the bravery of the victims who brought this case to court. I commend this Statement to the House”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their observations on this matter. We are all agreed that we have to maintain the independence of the Parole Board: that is certainly our intention. Transparency came up early in this process as a matter that had to be the subject of review. Indeed, my right honourable friend’s predecessor announced on 9 January this year that he intended to institute inquiries into the question of Rule 25. Those inquiries have effectively concluded and, as I indicated, we intend to bring forward proposals with regard to Rule 25 by the end of April. The detail of that is not something that I can address because we have yet to formulate an alternative rule that allows for the appropriate level of transparency. As to the further, more detailed review that is to touch on victims, for example, and their position, we fully intend that such a review should be completed by the summer. I cannot give a cast-iron guarantee, but that is certainly our intention. We recognise the importance and the urgency of this work.

I turn to the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The question about the evidence of past offending raises the issue of reports of other offences for which an individual has not been tried or convicted. The court commented on that in its judgment and indicated that such evidence should be before the Parole Board, not in order that it should make its own determination of guilt or innocence but so that it could utilise that material in engaging with the party seeking parole and test their honesty and candour with regard to their previous offending. It is in that context that I anticipate this material being used. Particular note is taken of the interests of victims and the question of notification: that will be addressed in the course of the forthcoming review, as well as the question of how the Secretary of State’s representatives will take a more enhanced role in these matters. That will be a matter for consideration.

As for training, we were not saying that the training was deficient in the past, but we believe it can be improved. That will again be the subject of the forthcoming review. The noble Baroness also asked what material was and was not before the Parole Board. I should say that the judge’s sentencing comments should, as a matter of procedure, have been before the Parole Board. That is a failing on the part of HM Prison and Probation Service, which should have been providing the material to the Parole Board. There is other material that the Parole Board could have called for, and which the court clearly felt it should have called for, that it did not call for. Clearly, we have taken that into account when deciding on the need for further review in this area. Beyond that, I would not like to make any further comment, except that in light of Nick Hardwick’s resignation it may be that new leadership will bring about change in itself, so far as the conduct of the Parole Board is concerned.

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, I shall take up the last point that the noble and learned Lord made in answering the questions raised a few moments ago. Nick Hardwick has been an outstanding contributor to criminal justice in this country. I say that knowing that other Members of this House who have occupied the highest judicial posts in this country share that view, even though they have been closely involved in criminal justice as Lord Chief Justice. I have not spoken to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, but I have spoken to the others and they confirm that that is the case. It was not mentioned in the Statement that has just been read out that Nick Hardwick indicated that his role in this matter was extraordinarily limited. Although the Parole Board may have been at fault, as indicated in the judgment, it is right to say there was no personal criticism of its chairman. I am sure the House accepts that being a member of a parole board is an extraordinarily difficult task. A parole board can act only on the information given to it. In those circumstances, I ask the Minister to make clear that the view I have just indicated about Nick Hardwick is accepted by the Lord Chancellor and Minister of Justice. It is right that it was made clear to him that he should resign, albeit that he thought he would have been able to carry on perfectly well in the role. Bearing in mind the importance of the Parole Board, this is a most important matter.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for his observations and readily concur with his comments on the contribution that Professor Nick Hardwick has made to criminal justice in this country. I say that without qualification. Clearly a situation had arisen in which there had to be consideration, both by the Secretary of State and by Professor Nick Hardwick, of whether it would be tenable for him to continue in the present circumstances. In light of that, he tendered his resignation. Again, I repeat, I accept without qualification the comments made about his considerable contribution to criminal justice in this country.

[Baroness Newlove (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a successful day for victims and they have received justice, but we must not forget how hard this journey has been for them. They have had huge pressure on their shoulders. It has not been an easy fight and is still not an easy fight. I ask my noble and learned friend to think that it cannot be right that offenders have legal teams to take them through the parole system, yet the victims have had to crowdfund through the internet to get a legal team to represent them. Surely the Government will look at this so that it never happens again.

My other point is that, if Worboys appeals this judgment, I want it understood that all the victims in this case should be given the right information, including those who did not go to trial but had their evidence put on file. It is more important that we do not see the same situation again, where victims are scared and do not feel safe for their lives.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged for the observations of my noble friend Lady Newlove. I should like to repeat the appreciation of the department and the Lord Chancellor for the work she has done in leading engagement with victims in the inquiry to date. That has been extremely important. Under the present victims’ scheme, those who are the victims of an offence for which there has been a conviction are automatically engaged in the victim engagement scheme. Where the victim of a reported offence did not proceed to trial or conviction, however, the position is different. We shall look at that matter in the forthcoming review.

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

My Lords, in endorsing the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, the ruling of the High Court, and the transparency, training and other measures that will flow from it, I wish also to endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said. I was responsible for appointing Nick Hardwick to his first major public appointment 15 years ago, to head the Independent Police Complaints Commission. He has been a great public servant. He has done a superb job in modernising and reforming the Parole Board, with great difficulty, and we owe him a debt of gratitude.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I entirely accept the observations of the noble Lord.

[Lord Grabiner (CB)]

We have focused attention—quite properly, in my view—on the performance of the Parole Board, but there is a separate and rather important aspect of this very shocking case. As I understand it, the CPS had available to it a good deal of material which was not then the subject of prosecution. That may have had a real impact on the sentence that was ultimately imposed upon Worboys; in fact, I am sure that it did. Can the Minister assure us that the performance of the CPS in this story and in future possible prosecutions and investigations will be carefully looked at? If you do not charge what you should charge, you often end up with the wrong result.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note the observations of the noble Lord. Clearly, the role of the CPS in the conduct of the prosecution of Worboys is a matter of some concern. The CPS takes these decisions independently and clearly, that independence has to be respected. Worboys was the subject of an IPP sentence, albeit one that was liable to open the door to review before the Parole Board. I cannot give an undertaking at this time of any formal inquiry into the role of the CPS with regard to the original prosecution decisions that were taken, but I note what the noble Lord has said.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome what my noble and learned friend has said about the action that has been taken. With regard to enhancing the role of the Secretary of State at the meetings of the Parole Board, I suggest that in complex cases he gives consideration to using a special counsel, who might, after all, also be able to articulate the views of the victims. I remind him of the practice that was adopted when I was a very junior Minister in the Home Office reviewing the tariffs in life sentence cases, which was to obtain the up-to-date observations of the trial judge, if available—and, if I may say so, the Lord Chief Justice.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note the observations of my noble friend Lord Hailsham. Clearly, these considerations will be taken into account in the review process that is being carried out.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the High Court decision and the fact that it showed up the really serious errors made by both the Parole Board and the Ministry of Justice. But I take it that the Minister agrees that these errors should not blind us to the proper role and importance of the parole system within our criminal justice system and, indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, rightly pointed out, to the contribution, which the Minister has already acknowledged, that Nick Hardwick has made in several positions—bearing in mind also that Nick Hardwick argued that the transparency we are all now calling for was not allowed by law and should have been.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Well, indeed. I am obliged to the noble Lord for his observations in that regard. As I indicated earlier, it had occurred to my right honourable friend’s predecessor, almost as soon as this matter came to his attention, that Rule 25 really did need to be looked at and given further consideration because of the impact it had on the perception of proceedings. Regarding the proceedings of the Parole Board itself, clearly, there are hundreds of individuals involved and engaged in that process. It is critically important as part of our criminal justice system and it is equally important that it should remain independent of the Executive.

[Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, in my experience, when criminals convicted of serious offences and serving long sentences are released, it is generally to an open prison so that they can be further assessed. Why did this not happen in Worboys’ case?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not able to answer that question but the point the noble Lord makes is entirely accurate because, generally speaking, the issues for the Parole Board to consider are, first, whether it should release into an open prison environment and, thereafter, whether there should be release on licence.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, what is the proposal to improve the arrangements by which the victims in this case are provided legal aid?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There are no immediate proposals in that regard. As the noble and learned Lord is aware, the LASPO provisions are currently under review.

[Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)]

My Lords, the head of the Parole Board has resigned and, as usual, the Secretary of State and the Government sail on with apparent impunity. However, the failings revealed by this case—the excessive secrecy, the failure to consult victims, the apparent inadequacy of training and the failure to look at previous offences—were part of the system’s structure for years and years. They should have been known about—if, indeed, they were not—and the Government should have addressed them a long time ago. Has the noble and learned Lord persuaded himself that the Government have no responsibility at all for these shortcomings?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, I have not suggested that the Government consider themselves as having no responsibility in respect of the matters disclosed in the Worboys judicial review.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to raise one question about the funding for this appeal. Quite rightly, noble Lords have commented that it is inappropriate that the victims should have had to crowdfund in order to challenge this decision. From the Statement that the noble and learned Lord made, I understand that the Secretary of State for Justice himself had some impediment to bringing a claim—I am not talking about the substance of his claim here. Why did the Attorney-General not consider it to be part of his job to challenge the decision? After all, it is the Attorney-General who challenges inappropriate sentences and, to some extent, has responsibility for looking after victims. Would that not have reduced the problems, such that the Government, through what is in many ways the independent office of the Attorney-General, could have stepped in to bring this matter before the courts?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble and learned Lord makes an interesting suggestion. It is not a point which I recollect being addressed at the time, and the matter was looked at from the perspective of the Secretary of State for Justice. As the noble and learned Lord implicitly acknowledges, the Secretary of State was in something of a difficult position, given that the Parole Board—albeit an independent entity—has a link to the Ministry of Justice. But I take on board the noble and learned Lord’s observation.

[Lord Selkirk of Douglas (Con)]

Does my noble and learned friend accept that his assertion that there will be a review of procedures with a view to keeping them properly up to date is extremely welcome? Does he agree that in very anxious cases of this nature, the protection of the public must be considered paramount?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Of course, the protection of the public is an all-embracing requirement, but there are certain things which require particular consideration. These include the interests of the victims.

[Lord Christopher (Lab)]

Will the noble and learned Lord reflect for a moment on the fact that this case, awful though it was, may well lead to changes being made which have unexpected consequences? I suggest that he go back to the original papers from when the Parole Board was set up to see precisely what its purpose was and was not intended to be. There is another side to this matter which has not been aired today—and I understand why not: the interests of offenders who are, one hopes, working towards release by parole. If that confidence in the Parole Board stops, considerable damage may well be done to the position and the penal system—of prisons with numbers of prisoners we have never seen before. If we go back and look at the papers, we may be able to provide something better which does not give rise to a whole rash of cases for all sorts of offences. In particular, confidentiality is very valuable in many cases of offenders coming before the Parole Board.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we are concerned that we maintain a balance between the aims of the parole process and the interests of the victims of serious crime. In the context of any review, that balance will be at the forefront of our minds. The Parole Board has always been conscious of the need to take account of the future of offenders who are in prison. We do not operate a system of permanent internment—there comes a time when offenders are deemed safe for release on licence—but clearly the process by which we arrive at these conclusions has to be the subject of continued assessment and, in this instance, further review.

[Baroness Hussein-Ece (LD)]

My Lords, only a fraction of crimes of sexual violence such as rapes ever come to court and end with successful convictions. How can the Government ensure that women will still be encouraged to come forward to seek and get justice if they are the victims of such crimes, given the way that Worboys’ victims have been treated in this total failure? Victims of these appalling crimes have had to crowdfund. I am sure that Members in this House have seen these brave women come forward and exactly what they have gone through in giving evidence and being interviewed. There are women who have not had justice at all yet and were told not to push it, since the sentencing of Worboys would somehow reflect the true nature of the crime and the numbers of women affected. How can the Ministry of Justice ensure that women will come forward, and that these women will receive justice in the end?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly, it is a matter of concern for the entire justice system that victims, particularly of these sorts of serious crimes, should not feel inhibited in coming forward and reporting them. We have seen issues arise regarding the way these complaints were handled on some occasions by the police; those resulted in civil litigation, which has now concluded. We have also seen the issue raised of the CPS in the context of the number of prosecutions actually undertaken in the Worboys case. Clearly, we must keep these matters under review in the context of ensuring that victims of such crimes are willing to come forward and report offences, and appreciate that they will receive justice at the end of the day.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

Can my noble and learned friend assure the House that this deeply unfortunate case will not result in undue delay in looking at other prisoners who are on indeterminate sentences? That issue has been raised many times in this House, not least by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly, the Worboys case will not be allowed to displace further consideration of the position of IPP prisoners. That issue is raised regularly in this House. We have had it under active consideration and continue to have it under consideration.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

The noble and learned Lord has told us repeatedly of the importance of the Parole Board’s independence, and he responded positively to all the statements made around the House about the integrity of and contribution made by its outgoing chairman. Can he therefore explain the thinking of the Secretary of State that Nick Hardwick’s position was untenable, essentially requiring him to resign? Is that not incompatible with his statements about the independence of the Parole Board?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not regard the position taken by my right honourable friend as inconsistent with the independence of the Parole Board. He took a view on the matter following the decision of the High Court, and he expressed that view to Professor Nick Hardwick, who tendered his resignation.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, may I take the Advocate-General back to the question of legal aid? Had the legal aid scheme provided for assistance in cases of this kind, it would none the less have had to apply the test of reasonable prospects of success, or probable cause. Given that the Secretary of State received advice to the effect that there was no probable cause, that could well have resulted in the victims making an application for legal aid but still being turned down.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is of course potentially the case, although I would observe that the High Court’s decision eventually turned on a different point from the issue of rationality: the failure to take account of material information that should have been before the Parole Board. Beyond that, I would not seek to speculate as to the outcome of a legal aid application, but the point the noble Lord makes is entirely sound.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, at one stage I thought that, for the first time in many days, I was going to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, but then he went and spoiled it.

Many people—today, yesterday, a year ago—wanted to remain EU citizens, but more people decided that they did not. That is where we find ourselves today. I do not seek to elaborate on that. I understand the strength of feeling from many people who did not want to see us leave the EU, but the reality is that we will. The consequence of that is clear and has been made clear by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Kerr: pursuant to Article 20, EU citizenship is an addition to the citizenship of a member state.

[Lord Dykes (CB)]

I apologise for interrupting at this juncture because the Minister has only just begun his interesting speech. He asserted that people voted decisively in favour of Brexit and therefore also against being European citizens. As far as I recall, that did not really come up in the campaign, so how many of those people would have known about EU citizenship arising from the Maastricht treaty a long time ago?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is so utterly basic to the issue that it is difficult to conceive of many, if any, people who did not understand the nature and consequences of Brexit, so I will not elaborate on that.

I want to come back to remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, in an earlier debate. We have debated this already in Committee in the context of another amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, mentioned Northern Ireland. Clearly, where one meets certain residency tests in Northern Ireland, one is eligible to apply for a passport from the Republic of Ireland Government. By that means, membership of an EU state can be retained and one can remain an EU citizen. As I indicated in an earlier debate, there are two areas of opinion in Northern Ireland: there are people who are perfectly happy—indeed, anxious—to secure a passport from Dublin and people who have no desire to do so.

[Lord Adonis]

I am afraid I must disappoint the noble and learned Lord because I think we are continuing to agree. However, I asked him why he will not extend the right to apply for an Irish passport to those of us on the mainland.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not in my gift. It would be a matter for international treaty negotiation between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. It is for Ireland to decide who it will admit as citizens of the Republic; it is not for us to demand. That is the answer to the noble Lord’s point.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

As a point of interest, perhaps one should recommend to all pregnant mothers in Great Britain that they might consider going over to Northern Ireland to have their babies.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not going to indulge in an issue regarding maternity at this stage. Let us try to keep focus on the amendment, shall we?

We are all aware of the issue and we are also aware of the agreement that has been entered into to protect the rights of EU citizens and their family members living in the UK and of UK nationals living in the EU until the end of the implementation period, set at 31 December 2020. During the implementation period, individuals will still be fully covered by the EU acquis. UK nationals will be able to continue to move around the EU 27 member states and will have the freedom to move to another member state to live and work, as long as they do so before the end of the implementation period.

That reminds me of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, about Article 32 of the withdrawal agreement. The position is this: what was proposed in Article 32 was removed as there was no actual agreement on that point. Therefore, there was no reason to have a legal text covering a point that was not the subject of agreement. The United Kingdom pushed strongly for the inclusion of ongoing movement rights during the first phase of the negotiations, but the European Union was not yet ready to include them. Of course, it remains an issue that we wish to pursue. We have already made that clear.

To come back to the amendment itself, it is simply not feasible for us to set upon a course of negotiation that is doomed to failure. We cannot secure EU citizenship for citizens of the United Kingdom after we leave the EU. That is the short point to be made. Therefore, the amendment would set the Government on a course of negotiation that would effectively prevent the present Bill—

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I shall just finish the sentence, so will the noble Lord please sit down? It would effectively prevent the present Bill getting on to the statute book and achieving its intended purpose: to ensure legal certainty at the point at which we leave the European Union.

[Lord Wigley]

I am very sorry to hear that this would prevent the Bill reaching the statute book. Notwithstanding those feelings, I ask the noble and learned Lord to address the point I raised in my earlier comment about the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that that convention,

“will be binding on all remaining Member States, the UK, and the EU itself post Brexit”.

Does he accept that the convention,

“ensures that the status and rights of those EU citizens resident in the territory of the Union and those resident in the UK will continue”,

after Brexit?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I hope the noble Lord did not pay good money for that opinion. He will perhaps elaborate on the position in due course, but I do not accept that proposition.

[Lord Wigley]

I will not come back after this intervention, but has he read the document to which I referred, or have experts in his department done so?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I have not read the opinion in question, but I am not unfamiliar with the terms of the Vienna convention on treaties.

[Lord Wigley]

If between now and Report he or his advisers have an opportunity to read that opinion and, having done so, feel that what has been said in a Chamber does not fully reflect the situation, will he be prepared to come back at a later stage?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am perfectly content to look at the opinion.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I will take up a point that the noble and learned Lord was making before he took the very sensible and helpful intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. We all accept—I explicitly accepted it in my remarks—that EU citizenship is not within the Government’s gift. I accept, too, that there is no practical possibility of the Government negotiating it in foreseeable circumstances with the EU. What I am asking for and what I hope the noble and learned Lord can offer on behalf of the Government is that they will place no obstacle in the way and will do anything that appears possible to facilitate and support any move by any of us to try to achieve from the European Union some recognition of the fact that we are European citizens and we will continue to feel that way even after Brexit, if Brexit, unfortunately, takes place.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The reality is that if Brexit takes place we will not continue to be EU citizens.

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I am very grateful to everyone who has participated in this short debate, particularly to the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, who I am sorry I relegated in my earlier reference. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, with whom I usually fully agree on these matters, although it was encouraging to hear that there may be alternatives by not pursuing this Bill. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith, Lady McIntosh and Lady Hayter, and the noble Lords, Lord Davies, Lord Kerr and Lord Roberts of Llandudno, for their comments. I think I have got as far as I am likely to get on this. I was grateful to the Minister for saying that he is prepared to look at the opinion to which I have been referring. I can ask no more than that, and on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for raising the issue of Clause 6 in the context of the implementation period that is referred to in his amendment. Reference is made repeatedly to the transition period; yes, we recognise that there is to be an implementation period, as it is termed, if that and everything else is agreed. But nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, so we do not yet have that implementation period. We desire it and recognise that the EU also sees its significance. That is why we were able to express matters as we have in the March text—the multi-coloured text to which the noble and learned Lord referred. I agree with his reference to Articles 82 to 85 in that context and the point that they are on white, because they express a proposal and not a concluded agreement on those points. That is what I want to underline at this stage.

As I have said during Committee on a number of occasions, this Bill is to ensure that there is a functioning UK statute book on day one, regardless of the outcome of negotiations. In his speech on the implementation period, the Secretary of State was clear that it will allow—if it is finally agreed—a strictly time-limited role for the European Court of Justice, in keeping with the EU’s existing structures.

I am sensitive to the fact that unlike some other amendments, the provisions of this amendment are conditional upon the implementation period being part of the withdrawal agreement. Accordingly, they do not fully prejudge the outcome of negotiations and I acknowledge the delicacy of the drafting of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, in that respect. However, that does not change what we have asserted consistently: that the details of the implementation period will be legislated for in the withdrawal agreement and the implementation Bill. We have always been clear that the major elements of the withdrawal agreement will be implemented in that Bill and not in this Bill.

[Lord Dykes]

Presumably that means, too, that because there are so many gigantic individual subjects to be agreed in the implementation period, it would be perfectly feasible for the Union and the United Kingdom in further negotiations to agree on a longer period in order to get through all the complicated material, which the Government still say will be easy to do but will be extremely difficult.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The Government’s objective is to conclude a withdrawal agreement by October of this year. That has been stated on a number of occasions and it is in that context that we intend that the present Bill should deal with the situation, whether or not there is a withdrawal agreement or an implementation period. As and when a withdrawal agreement is concluded, it will be dealt with in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. Clearly, if we enter into an international treaty with the EU 27 in respect of these matters, we will respect that international treaty and our obligations inherent in it and, in accordance with the duality principle, draw down those obligations into our domestic law, using the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. I suggest that it is inconceivable that we would not seek to do that.

[Lord Beith]

The noble and learned Lord has been quite clear that it will be the withdrawal Bill that is the mechanism. Is he saying that it will be that Bill and not the use of the statutory instrument powers to be found elsewhere in this Bill which will enable him to modify or repeal its sections when it is an Act?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We have been clear that the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will legislate for the withdrawal agreement. That may involve us amending the terms of the present Bill, but we should remember that the present Bill is intended to accommodate the situations where there is a withdrawal agreement and where there is no withdrawal agreement and therefore no implementation period. It is to bring certainty to the statute book in that context. Clearly, there may be a situation in which we have to bring forward amendments to the present Bill in the second withdrawal agreement Bill. I recognise that.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

The Minister has just been paying tribute to the delicacy of the drafting of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, whose language in this amendment copes with both eventualities. It sets out the contingency that there is a transitional agreement. I do not see the difficulty.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not a question of difficulty; it is a question of how we have decided to approach dealing with this in a legislative manner. The intention is that the present Bill will legislate for legal certainty whether there is or is not a withdrawal agreement. In the event of a withdrawal agreement, we will legislate to ensure that in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill the terms of the present Bill will be brought into line with the terms of the withdrawal agreement in order that we can discharge our international legal obligations. We have consistently pointed out that that is the approach being taken to legislation in this context. It is really quite inconceivable to suppose that the Government are going to enter into a withdrawal agreement and then not implement that international legal obligation in our domestic law. That is the intention. It is simply a question of the order in which these things are being done, and it has always been maintained, and will be maintained, that it is not for this Bill to deal with the eventuality or the prospect of the implementation period.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Does the Minister not appreciate the absurdity some of us feel? As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, pointed out, we are being marched to the top of a hill that the Government have already abandoned. We are being asked to legislate in terms that are contrary to government policy and strategy in the Brexit negotiations, which leaves one feeling in a somewhat surreal position.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I sympathise with the idea of being left in a somewhat surreal position. As I said at the outset of my remarks, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, so while we have the anticipation and desire to secure an implementation period, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

Does my noble friend not think of Sir Thomas More:

“I trust I make myself obscure”?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I often think of Sir Thomas More, but not on this occasion.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I find it rather hard from the Cross Benches and as a non-politician to make this point, but I wonder whether the Minister has considered what the Government are proposing to do. They are proposing to offer in an Act of Parliament signed into law by the Queen something which they know is not going to happen. They have offered that up; their supporters will, no doubt, rise cheering to their feet; and then, three or six months later, they will repeal that part of the Act, at which point there will be cries of betrayal and perfidy—and those are probably rather mild words compared with the ones that will be used by the Daily Mail and others. Have the Minister and his colleagues not given any thought to that? Is not the simple thing to do to accept the amendment, and then there will be no betrayal and no perfidy, or if there is it will have been done already?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There is no betrayal and no perfidy, but I feel misrepresented by the noble Lord because he said “knowing that there will be an agreement”. We do not know for certain that there will be an agreement. Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Of course, we have an aspiration; we seek to secure the implementation period, and when we do we will then legislate for that in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. Meanwhile, this Bill is designed and intended to accommodate the situation in which there may not be such an agreement.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

I hate to add to the surreal nature of this, but the formula “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” seems incompatible with negotiating a transitional agreement during which we recognise we will agree only a small number of things and carry on negotiating. It seems to me that the Government should now drop the mantra that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, because we are actively pursuing, if I understand the Government’s case, a transitional partial agreement, during which a number of commitments will be made but a number of the fundamental issues of our future relationship with the European Union will remain entirely unclear and will be negotiated in the two or perhaps three or more years afterwards.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we are engaged in a bilateral negotiation; it has not yet concluded. This Bill is designed to accommodate the situation in which there may not be a conclusion to that negotiation, as well as a situation in which there may be. In the event of the latter case, the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will bring the legislation into line with the statute book.

[Baroness Altmann]

Will my noble and learned friend clarify for the Committee, if nothing is agreed until everything is agreed and we may not go into a transition period, how it can possibly make sense to have 29 March written into the Bill?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Because that addresses a distinct issue, which is the exit date from the EU. It is quite distinct from the question whether we are able to finally conclude an implementation period, which it is our intention to do. Let us be clear about that. The EU has also indicated its intention to do it as well. But we are engaged in a bilateral negotiation.

[Lord Pannick]

It is plain and obvious that nothing is agreed, but can the noble and learned Lord be clear with the Committee about the Government’s position in relation to negotiating this transitional implementation period? Do they now accept that they are no longer seeking to impose any red line relating to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice during that implementation period?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not sure I agree with the term “red lines”; it is not one that I am inclined to use. I am never quite sure what they are. Our position is that during an implementation period, if and when finally agreed, we will accept that there is a role for the European Court of Justice. Indeed, it is outlined in the EU’s own proposals for the agreement at Articles 82 through to 85. As the noble and learned Lord indicated, that is not yet the subject of final confirmation between the two parties but it is what is anticipated.

On a related point, during that period, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that as we cease to be a member state we will cease to have the right to have a judge in the Court of Justice of the European Union. That must follow. However, we will have the right to make interventions in cases that pertain to the United Kingdom.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, there have been moments during the 11 Committee days that we have had so far on this Bill when I felt a little sorry for the noble and learned Lord opposite for the positions that he was being expected to argue by those behind him and in other places, but never more sorry than I am today. This is the most absurd situation. We have offered him an amendment and I am grateful for the description given by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, as delicate. It does not presume even that there are transitional arrangements. It simply says that, if there are transitional arrangements, this is what will happen. I cannot understand why it is not accepted. I had hoped on this 11th final day of Committee that we would have a breakthrough.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I support the amendment. There is not much to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about what the amendment does and why it is necessary, nor to add to the questions he asked or to those then added by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, which in particular picked up issues with regard to the devolved Administrations.

We know that a major theme in your Lordships’ House, rightly, has been how powers are to be exercised, recognising that there may be circumstances in which they have to be exercised. Notwithstanding that, on the whole this Committee has rightly taken the view—or we hope that we will see it take the view, certainly from the interventions and contributions that have been made throughout the Committee—that this is a matter where proper parliamentary scrutiny is required. There may well be a role for certain delegated legislation, but please let us not add to it with still yet another way in which things can be done which avoid that full parliamentary scrutiny.

I hope that the Minister, when he responds, will be able to say something reassuring, both answering the questions posed by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beith, and saying why we need not be concerned and that the Government will content themselves with relying on those delegated powers that will be specific to the Bill, once this Committee and the other place have determined just what those delegated powers should be.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords. I begin by making two observations. These amendments are linked closely to the issue we have already debated in Committee of the status of retained EU law and how we deal with it in the context of its status. As has been indicated previously in Committee, the Government have been listening and considering that, and we intend to come back to the House on the matter before Report. I mention that because it is a relevant backdrop to what we are considering at this stage.

On the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, essentially, the powers in paragraph 3 of Schedule 8 are, first of all, designed to remove what I might term the shadow of European law from what will be domestic legislation. However, more particularly, the noble Lord raised a point about the devolution issues and quoted from the Explanatory Notes. I understand that the section of the Explanatory Notes that he refers to addresses Clause 11 prior to its recent amendment. I appreciate that we then withdrew that amendment, but the Explanatory Notes should be read in that context. Essentially, therefore, we have moved on because of the decision to flip Clause 11—I think that was the term used—so I ask the noble Lord to look at the proposed amendment to Clause 11 to understand the context in which we now want to deal with this point.

[Lord Beith]

The noble and learned Lord is being reasonable, but he is inviting us to presume that we have moved on when we have not yet done so. The Government have indicated a willingness to look further at the Clause 11 issues and come back with something new. However, when we compare that discussion to the one we just had, it is a bit odd now to be invited to behave as if something has happened which has not happened yet.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I understand the noble Lord’s point. He appreciates the statements of intent that we have made with regard to Clause 11. Although we withdrew the amendment to Clause 11, it was tendered and withdrawn for a particular purpose, in order to ensure that it could be finalised before Report. I hope that that addresses the noble Lord’s concern about the terms of the Explanatory Note that he quoted.

We have discussed on previous occasions in Committee the risk of ossifying the statute book and how that has to be balanced against checking the ability of the Government to propose changes to retained EU law. Clearly, as I indicated, the Government have heard the debates on the question of how we should treat the status of retained EU law, and we intend to come back on that. However, we must make provision for how delegated powers outside the Bill will interact with retained direct EU legislation. To do nothing would create uncertainty and potentially—by putting it beyond the reach even of Henry VIII powers that can modify Acts of Parliament—risk placing retained EU law on a pedestal of protection beyond even the elevated position of primary legislation. That is why I say that the two issues are linked: how we deal with the status of retained EU law but also carry on with our domestic powers to deal with the entire scope of our domestic legislation, including that which is going to be defined as retained EU law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, since we have returned to the subject of Henry VIII powers, I would like to inform the Minister that, after this morning’s discussion on the Statute of Proclamations, I looked up the Wikipedia entry—my historical memory of this being relatively limited—and discovered that Thomas Cromwell’s original proposals for the Statute of Proclamations passed through the House of Commons unamended, but they were amended in the House of Lords. Does the Minister think that is a relevant precedent?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Of course, our constitutional position has altered over the last few years—say, the last 500—and, at the end of the day, we see ourselves as, essentially, an amending House. I understand the noble Lord’s point but, in that context, we also understand the precedence of the other place with regard to the final passage of legislation. Therefore, our primary tasks in this context are scrutiny and comment.

The Government have always said that this Bill is not the place for radical policy change. Essentially, what we want to do at this stage is preserve the existing domestic powers to amend legislation pursuant to paragraph 3 of Schedule 8, in order that we can address issues with regard to retained EU law. But the manner in which those powers will ultimately be deployed will depend on the outcome of our consideration of the question of what status we confer on retained EU law. Given that that is an ongoing issue, I invite the noble Lord at this stage to withdraw his amendment. He may, of course, choose to return to it once he has seen our proposals with regard to retained EU law, but it appears to me that the two issues are inextricably linked.

[Lord Goldsmith]

Before the noble Lord announces the fate of his amendment, I have a question for the Minister. He said several times that there is a connection here with what will happen to EU retained law and what status it will have. We have had full debates on that, as he rightly says. We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles; we have heard from the Constitution Committee; we have heard a rather different proposal from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who is not in his place at the moment. My question is simply: when will we know what the Government’s decision is? I hope that they will not stick—because they cannot stick—to the idea that it will be simply for Ministers to decide as we go along the status of a particular piece of retained law. When will we know the Government’s position? That might enable us to advance not only on that point but on points such as the one being debated at the moment. Can the Minister give us an answer as to dates?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I cannot give the noble and learned Lord an answer as to dates, but clearly we are concerned to ensure that any proposals we have to make are in place in time for consideration by the whole House before Report.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, who I have always regarded as a true Renaissance Minister in all respects. I am very pleased to hear him confirm that the Government are seriously considering the issue of the legal status of retained EU law. The Committee of the House will look forward to seeing amendments from the Government in that respect. I am far less persuaded of the need to include in this Bill paragraphs 3(1) and 5(1) of Schedule 8, in addition to all the other extensive powers which the Government—and Ministers—will be giving themselves to amend retained EU law, under Clauses 7, 8, 9 and 17. The question is: why is it necessary also to include these powers in Schedule 8?

The concern, as the Minister will understand, is that future Ministers may decide that it is much more convenient to use the extensive, unrestricted powers in Schedule 8 than to comply with whatever restrictions are imposed by this House, by the other place—by Parliament—on the powers to modify under Clauses 7, 8, 9 and 17. So we might need to come back to this matter on Report.

I was also interested to hear the Minister say in his reply that the Bill is not the place for “radical policy change”. I will remind him of that when we debate the amendments—which no doubt will be put forward on Report—to take out the provisions in the Bill that remove from retained EU law the European Union charter of rights. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Media: Press Sustainability

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Thursday 22nd March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the recently launched review of press sustainability in the United Kingdom will have the power to call for evidence; whether all such evidence received will be published; and whether all meetings held as part of the review will be public.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Cairncross review into the sustainability of the national and local press is being led by an external chair, Dame Frances Cairncross, with support from an advisory panel. It is not a statutory inquiry and will therefore not have the statutory powers to compel witnesses to give evidence, nor will it be required to hold meetings in public. Dame Frances will determine the process for gathering evidence in due course.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

I am obliged to the Minister and congratulate him on his ability to switch effortlessly from subject to subject overnight; it is almost legendary. I welcome the review, and congratulate the department on its distinguished choice of chair and on assembling what looks like a knowledgeable and expert advisory panel. I am sorry that the evidence is not going to be published automatically and that the hearings will not be in public, but I hope that the chair will see the wisdom of doing that and look forward to seeing how events develop. Does the Minister agree that, given that the aim of the review is to secure high-quality journalism, the remit is oddly framed with its focus on the market environment and on consumers rather than citizens? Given the recent news, will he confirm that section 1.5 of the remit will allow the review to investigate and report on the ways in which social media have clearly been influencing opinion ahead of elections and referenda? If not, who will look at that?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the review will examine the role and impact not only of digital search engines but of social media platforms and other digital content aggregation platforms which have an impact on press sustainability.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

Will the concerns and needs of the local press, so vital for local democracy, be prominent in the work of the review?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Ultimately, the scope of the review will be a matter for the chair. It is going to be an independent, expert review but clearly it is intended to address the issue of the local press, where we have seen such impact from digital media in the past 10 years.

[Lord Soley (Lab)]

Does the Minister accept that the press will not be able to go back to its old role of doing news in small bits? It will need to do a deeper analysis and to focus on what is true news and go deeper into it. Some newspapers are beginning to do that—not before time. Will he take on board the importance of the British public being able to get in-depth and thoughtful news, as well as instant news? The two are important, but they are different.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we fully recognise and accept the importance of such developments and, indeed, it is one means by which we can address the insidious development of fake news.

[Lord Razzall (LD)]

I am sure that the noble and learned Lord is aware that it is five years since Parliament endorsed the Leveson royal charter. It is some progress to have the sustainability review, but is he confident that press regulation is really working?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Yes.

[The Earl of Listowel (CB)]

Will the review look at the initial training of journalists and their continual professional development, to ensure that they get all the support that they need?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not in a position to anticipate how Dame Frances is going to proceed with the review.

[Lord Robathan (Con)]

My Lords, have Her Majesty’s Government made any assessment of the funding of Impress by Mr Max Mosley?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We recognise that Impress is now recognised by the PRP and that some but not many newspapers at a national level have engaged with it. We also recognise the importance of IPSO and, indeed, of those newspapers, such as the Guardian and the Financial Times, which have instigated their own independent review positions.

[Lord Inglewood (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as someone who was a director of a local media company until a month ago, when it sold up. Could my noble and learned friend please explain to the House what in fact the Government mean by sustainability in this context?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We have to identify a model by which the local and national press can continue to deliver what is required of an independent and informed news source. That has been the subject of change, clearly; we have passed from the days when a piece of journalism could be accompanied by an advertisement and, therefore, self-sustaining. We have to look at how we can sustain our media in future.

[Lord McNally (LD)]

My Lords, will the Minister not consider that his one-word reply to my noble friend Lord Razzall holds only till the next newspaper scandal hits us? Will he not accept that we still have a media self-regulating in its own self-interest, and that the abandonment of Leveson 2 is a massive missed opportunity, given that data is now today’s headline?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

No.

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

My Lords, will the Minister comment on the excellent scheme that is the levy on the BBC for local democratic reporting, and whether some of the very large international platforms should not have a levy on them to ensure that we can expand such a scheme?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I entirely agree with the noble Lord’s observations with regard to the BBC scheme and its outreach to local news. The extension to a levy has been considered and is being looked at.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, my question is further to the very important point made by my noble friend Lord Lexden. Will Dame Frances give at least equal attention to the local press, which is the lifeblood of many local communities?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Dame Frances will determine the scope and depth of her review but, clearly, that will include the important element of the local press.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, we have had Latin from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, and French from my noble friend Lord Bassam. Later in the day, somebody else might be able to say something in Welsh or Irish, but I cannot do either.

This group of amendments relates to topics that we have already discussed in Committee and no doubt we will do so again: the extent of delegated powers and the extent of protection of rights. When the noble Lord, Lord Low, moved his amendment very cogently, he emphasised points with which I absolutely agree. There is concern that rights should not be removed as a result of what is taking place in the Bill. We have also looked at this topic before in Committee and no doubt we will do so again. I have referred on several occasions to the promise by the Prime Minister that rights after exit will be the same as the day before.

These amendments concern a different aspect— the explanatory statements which are proposed to be used for statutory instruments. The technique of using statements to be laid before the House is a valuable one. I previously referred the Committee to the benefits of the requirements under Section 19 of the Human Rights Act for certificates on the face of the Bill that the provisions are, in the opinion of the Minister, compliant with the Convention rights. The significance of such a statement is that, first, it puts a personal obligation on the Minister to be satisfied that the Bill does what is being certified. What is more, it is a requirement that those conditions are met and not simply that there is an argument that they might be met. I am glad to see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, in his place. I have referred before to the memorandum that resulted in there being a requirement on Ministers when they come to certify under the Human Rights Act to do so on the basis of legal advice provided by government legal officers, or the law officers themselves, and also to be satisfied, at least more probably than not—I paraphrase and hope I have it right—that the requirement will be met in the case of a particular provision. That makes it not an idle requirement that the Minister should so certify but a very valuable requirement.

The idea of the statements is an important one. We have several questions here in relation to them. The first, raised by Amendment 242A, is that the requirement for such explanatory statements should apply to all cases where statutory instruments are being made under the Act and not simply those which are identified. I look forward to hearing from the Minister why the Government do not think, having taken the view that it is necessary, appropriate and right to have such statements in relation to certain statutory instruments, that it should apply to all statutory instruments made under this Act. Bearing in mind that it is not a requirement that stops the instrument being made, such a statement tells this House and the other place what the Government think they are doing—whether they think they are reducing protections or not—and puts both Houses in a position to take the steps that they think appropriate to deal with that in the light of what the Government say. Therefore, I look forward to hearing why the requirement for explanatory statements does not apply to all instruments under the Act.

The second amendment is the important amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Low, which asks why it is not right that the words,

“is satisfied that it does not remove or diminish any protection provided by or under the equalities legislation”

should be inserted in place of the much weaker words in the Bill providing that the Minister should have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, et cetera. As he rightly pointed out, this, in any case, deals with only one aspect of equalities legislation. I would hope that Ministers always had due regard to that, whatever the circumstances and whether or not the Bill stated it. Something more is needed: a requirement that the Minister is satisfied that this does not in fact reduce the protections currently provided. That amendment should be supported and we look forward to what the Minister has to say.

The third amendment, Amendment 246, has been spoken to by my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton. It would be valuable for Parliament—whichever House —to be told what the intention of any proposed modification is and whether it is intended to reduce or change EU law. That is a valuable proposal, though it goes in a slightly different direction to the other amendments, which are concerned with rather more concrete statements as to whether or not rights are being retained.

The noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, rightly referred to one aspect of the Bill that has been mentioned in Committee before. While the Government recognise that there needs to be special protection for rights protected by our Human Rights Act, which is drawn from the European Convention on Human Rights, it does not do the same for rights that come from other areas, in particular EU law. Again, we need to understand from the Government why they do not think the same sort of protection is necessary in relation to rights derived from EU retained law. One example is data protection. Nothing could be more pertinent at the moment, as we read today’s newspapers. We see that data is a critical area that needs protection. Very important protection comes from the EU at the moment. This will come into law, but do the Government take the view that it is subject to much easier removal, or should it not be subject to the same degree of protection as rights under the European Convention on Human Rights?

For those reasons, I look forward to the Minister’s response and I hope that it will promise change. I follow my noble friend Lord Bassam in hoping to see an amendment brought forward on Report by the Government to deal with these important points.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government are committed to transparency before Parliament for the statutory instruments that will come under the Bill. We hope the statements we have already committed to in Schedule 7 will assist Parliament and deliver the due level of scrutiny required for secondary legislation. We have been listening to the debate and, for Report, we are looking closely at where these could be expanded to address some of the concerns raised in Committee.

Amendment 242A to Schedule 7, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Low, would extend the requirement for Ministers making secondary legislation under the Bill to make statements in respect of all the powers in the Bill. With respect, these statements are designed to apply only to the key powers under the Bill, and for good reason. The other powers in the Bill are tightly limited to specific purposes, such as allowing for challenges to the validity of EU law or making provision which is consequential on the Bill. These other powers will not be making the sorts of changes to which these statements are applicable and are designed to be applicable. We will debate these other powers in more detail in due course but I hope that that will reassure the noble Lord as to why we have proceeded in this way on the matter of statements.

The noble Lord, Lord Low, also tabled Amendment 245A, which would adjust the equalities statement in Schedule 7. Let me assure everyone, including the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, that I understand and sympathise with the motivation behind this amendment, which I know is shared by many others on all sides of the Committee. The amendment looks very like the Government’s existing political commitment. However, the language of a political commitment does not necessarily lend itself to the very different context of the equalities statute book.

In the equalities area, it is not always straightforward to determine what is deemed to be “protection”—the term used in the amendment—for one group of people when it may exist in tension or potentially conflict with the protection of other groups. To take a simple example, looking at the operation of domestic violence refuges or rape counselling centres taking account of the provisions in the Equality Act that relate to women, how does that also relate to gender recognition? These are quite complex areas that we have to bear in mind. That is precisely why, for example, the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 are so detailed and granular rather than creating high-level rights that would potentially raise more questions than they answer. I note that the 2010 Act dwarfs the mere 68 pages of the Bill.

In these circumstances, we are concerned about the limits of the statement that would be required. I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Low, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, said about the scope of the public sector equality duty and the notion that perhaps only a part of that is expressed in Schedule 7. We will take that away for consideration before Report.

Amendment 246, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, raises an interesting point regarding how further clarity can be provided on the effect of regulations made under Clauses 7, 8 and 9. As he observed, the point was mentioned in the recent report by the Constitution Committee. The Government want the Bill to provide certainty and clarity, and I have listened to his observations on this with some interest.

As we discussed on day five of Committee, Clause 6(3) provides that questions on the validity, meaning or effect of unmodified retained EU law are to be interpreted in accordance with retained EU case law. Clause 6(6) goes on to provide that modified retained EU law may still be interpreted under Clause 6(3) if that is consistent with the intention of the modifications. It is this point that the noble Lord’s amendment strikes at. It seeks to impose an obligation on Ministers by adding to the explanatory statement requirements in Schedule 7 to explain the intention of any modification, and how that modified law should be interpreted under Clause 6.

I understand the aim, but we have to be cautious before adding to the explanatory statement requirements in Schedule 7. Requiring a statement for each modification as to its intent and instructions to the courts on whether Clause 6(3) should apply to them could complicate matters. In that context, I merely observe that it is important to bear in mind that courts themselves will already have the text of the modification itself together with a statement explaining the reasons for it, the law before exit day that is relevant, and any effect of the modification on retained EU law. It may be that this could complicate matters.

I have listened carefully to the points raised on that matter and I can confirm that we will reflect on what I appreciate is a constructive suggestion in order to bring further clarity to these parts of the Bill. I hope that with that reassurance, the noble Lord may not have to engage in sequential groups of amendments in Committee this morning.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, the provision indeed looks a bit innocuous when one first looks at it. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, is absolutely right. But the more one examines it, as has been demonstrated by speeches from noble Lords in this short debate so far, it is much more than that.

Two ways have been proposed for dealing with this clause. One had been to follow the golden thread of “appropriate” and “necessity” that the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, referred to. Amendments 253 and 254, which have already been debated, touched on that and we will have to come back to those important proposals in due course. But this amendment goes even further in proposing that the power should be removed. As it stands, the idea that the Minister can, by regulation, make any change that he or she considers appropriate under this Act is extraordinarily wide. I therefore share the hope of other noble Lords that we hear from the Minister—having seen, as I am sure he has, how wide this provision is—that something needs to be done: probably something more radical than simply changing the words “considers” and “appropriate”.

We will listen to what he says. However, the powerful speeches by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick, Lord Cormack and Lord Wigley, and by my noble friends Lord Liddle and Lord Bassam, demonstrate that there is a real risk—as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, put it—that this is another example of the accretion of power to the Executive at the expense of Parliament. It is our duty to put the brakes on when that sort of provision is put before us. Again, I look forward to what the noble and learned Lord will say; I am sure he has seen the point—in all languages. We need a clear commitment, not just to comfort, but to a change that will satisfy this House that it is not being asked to sanction untrammelled power to the Executive in such an important area.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the Government are always listening. The Government are concerned to ensure that we have appropriate powers to deal with the consequences of this Bill: to bring the statute book into line with the consequences of the repeals brought about—or intended to be brought about—by it.

The context is that the European Communities Act has been a central piece of legislation for the past 46 years and is spread throughout our statute book. So much current legislation stems from the ECA. Repealing the 1972 Act, and the other key EU-related Acts listed in Schedule 9, will leave many loose ends that need to be addressed.

The purpose of the consequential power is to deal with the consequences of the widespread changes to the statute book that may arise from the provisions in the Bill itself. I stress “in the Bill itself” in the light of the suggestion by my noble friend Lord Cormack that we are dealing here with “untrammelled powers”. In that context, I understand the expressions of concern about particular provisions—which can sometimes be read out of context—but I stress again that these consequential powers can be used only in consequence of the provisions of the Bill itself, rather than in consequence of our withdrawal from the EU more generally. I see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, frowning, but if he feels that a different interpretation can be placed on this provision I would welcome discussion on it, because that is clearly its intention. If, in his view, it goes further, I would be happy to listen to him on that.

[Lord Goldsmith]

In the light of his invitation, I ask the noble and learned Lord to consider this question. I take his point that the words are “in consequence of the Act”, but the Act includes the repeal of the European Communities Act and all that it has brought with it. He may not want to reply to this question now and I am very happy to have further discussions with him, as they are always useful and constructive, but does he not see that the repeal of the Act and the instruments under it may indeed give rise to very wide opportunities if all that is required is for the Minister to consider it “appropriate” to do something in consequence of that?

[Lord Bassam of Brighton]

May I ask the Minister a further point? I am trying to help him. He seems to be suggesting that this provision is a mere tidying up facility that is available to a Minister as a consequence of this Bill. I understand that point, but will he describe the sort of tidying up that he envisages this power being used for? I think that is what acts as a driver of our concerns. I can understand if it is a practical measure to do with something that is clearly a defect, but I want some reassurance, which perhaps should be placed in the legislation. I want to understand what the provision will be used for and its consequences.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord for his assistance, which is always welcome. I do not agree with the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, regarding the breadth of the provision. This is a standard type of power contained in many Acts of Parliament to deal with consequential issues, such as those alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. A very similar power can be found in the Scotland Act 1998, in the Northern Ireland Act 1998, in the Government of Wales Act 1998, and in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—LASPO. All these statutory provisions have a similar consequential power for the same purpose, so this is not unique, exceptional or unusual.

However, I understand concerns being expressed about the scope of the power and the way it will be used. I notice the reference by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, to the use of the term “appropriate”, which some, of course, often consider to be inappropriate in a statutory context. I hear what is said about making clear that this is a consequential power that will be needed to repeal provisions.

The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, asked for examples. If we look at the various statutory provisions for accession of other countries to the EU—the Croatian accession is the most recent—which amend the ECA, it is necessary to address that sort of primary legislation. If we look at the provisions of the European Union (Approvals) Act 2017—

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. He cited some other examples. I admit that I am not familiar with devolution statutes and the consequential powers in them, but we have to take account of the context in which this legislation is being made and the considerable worries about the potential use to which they could be put, which is surely more than the Croatian accession. The Government cannot ignore the worries that these powers—in the context of the Brexit negotiations, future relationships, trade deals and whatever—could be used in a way which could significantly affect existing rights and remedies.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, it appears to me that some of the fears being expressed are not about the use of these powers, but about their misuse. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, observed, we have to see this provision in context. It is to be applied to the consequences of the Bill becoming law.

The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, asked for further examples. There are many examples in primary legislation of where consequential amendment will be required. I will not elaborate on them at this stage. For example, there are provisions in all the accession Acts that would have to be regarded as necessary to clear up in the context of the statute book. There are provisions in such things as the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, which would again have to be addressed in this context as a consequence of our removal when the Bill becomes law.

What will be required is a meaningful indication of the type of change that is needed to keep the statute book in reasonable order after our departure from the EU. In my respectful submission, where there may be concern about the misuse of this consequential power we are of course alive to concerns that are expressed. It may be that it turns largely not on the way Clause 17(1) is presently framed, but on the use of a term such as “appropriate”. We will give further consideration to the use of that language and whether that is the way this consequential—I stress “consequential”—power should be employed in this context.

I hope that gives noble Lords some degree of reassurance about the intention here. I suggest that the removal entirely of the consequential power contained in Clause 17 would have a materially adverse effect on the way the Bill can be properly implemented to bring the statute book into proper order following our exit from the EU. I hope at this stage that the noble Lord will see fit to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

The Minister has just used the phrase that it is “not our intention” to use these powers. That is one of the difficulties that the Committee has on many of the issues that we have raised. The Government repeatedly say that it is not their intention to abuse these powers, yet they are taking powers which clearly can be abused in the future.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Baroness, I do not believe that any responsible Government would contemplate abusing powers given to them by Parliament. Indeed, if they did, they would be brought up very short by a sovereign Parliament.

[Lord Wigley]

Could I press the Minister further on the point that I raised? Will he clarify whether the powers that are being accorded in this clause will enable a Minister at Westminster to overrule powers normally exercisable by Ministers in Cardiff or Edinburgh?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not believe that they would be employed to overrule powers that are legitimately being exercised under the devolved arrangements. That is not their purpose. Their purpose is to make consequential amendments that will bring the statute book into line with our departure from the EU.

[Lord Wigley]

I am sorry, but those consequential amendments may well include the need to change an instrument that is being exercised in Scotland or Wales. If that does not happen, does it give the power for a Minister in London to exercise those powers?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Ultimately, the UK Parliament would have the power to ensure that the statute book in the devolved Administrations also reflects our departure from the EU.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

When responding to amendments, the Minister has, on a number of occasions, said that the Government will give further consideration to the points made. We are now coming towards the end of Committee and will then be preparing for Report. Could the Minister give us more of an explanation of what further consideration will mean on the very many points that have been made? When we come to Report we will have six days, and, as we all know, a large number of issues have been raised. Will the Government be consulting on these? Will they be able to tell us before we start Report what changes they wish to make or the date by which government amendments might be published? Otherwise, Report stage will be as lengthy and as difficult as Committee stage has proved to be.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly, when I say that we will give consideration to these matters, I mean that I am making more work for myself in that context. Of course we are going to discuss with officials how best to structure this legislation to meet the concerns that have been expressed. That may lead to amendments, in which case they will be available before Report, and it may not, in which case I will be happy to indicate at Report why such amendments have not been brought forward.

[Lord Pannick]

Will the Minister address the concern I expressed that the breadth of Clause 17(1) is such that it could be used by Ministers to evade the restrictions that will be contained in the other powers that Ministers enjoy under Clauses 7 to 9, particularly in the light of paragraph 17 of Schedule 7? Will he consider that point?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I will certainly give consideration to that point, but it is not immediately clear to me that the clause could be used to evade those limitations. I will address it in due course.

[Lord Judd (Lab)]

Before we conclude this part of our deliberations, I refer back to what my noble friend said. I have every respect for the Minister—I mean that. I am quite sure that he would never, with ministerial responsibility, go against the clear intention of Parliament with these residual powers. But are we absolutely certain, with all the unpredictability and turbulence of politics across the world today, that every possible Administration would act as responsibly as he would?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not sure that I am in a position to answer that question. Nevertheless, when we legislate, we must also legislate as to what a future Administration would do with that legislation. I quite accept that point.

[Lord Goldsmith]

The Minister’s self-effacing remark draws attention to the other aspect of this clause. It was helpful when he said—and I hope that we will see some concrete results from this—that the Government will look at the word “appropriate” and, I hope, change it to “necessary”, but that is only part of the problem in this and other clauses. There are two elements. One is that the Minister “considers” and the second is what it is that the Minister considers. In this clause, it is “the Minister considers appropriate”. Many of the amendments before the Committee want to see that it is changed to “is necessary”—an objective rather than a subjective test. Sharing, as I do, views as to the good will and intentions of the Minister who sits here at the moment, we need to have, as he says himself, more conviction about what might happen in the future. So will the Minister also consider in those circumstances not just changing the word “appropriate” to “necessary”, but removing the subjective element so that we are satisfied that there has to be a clear objective statement before the Minister can actually exercise these powers?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am not going to draft at the Dispatch Box and I will not give undertakings about any part of this clause at this stage. I am saying that we will look at it in the context of the observations that have been made in Committee, and we will do that responsibly.

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, I welcome that assurance from the Minister. I have been surprised by the passion that this short debate has aroused. It raises many serious issues about what powers the Government are giving themselves as a result of this Bill. The Minister is aware of the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith about this power. To my non-legal mind, when my noble and learned friend talks about the power that is in consequence of this Act because it repeals the European Communities Act 1972, the potential scope of what could be done is extremely large. When we come back to this on Report I hope that the Government will be able to provide us with some assurance that the scope will not be impossibly big. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, as has been noted, this is in a sense a continuation of a lengthy debate we had in Committee in response to, I think, Amendment 33, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I will not repeat all that was said from the Dispatch Box in the context of that debate but I hope the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, will not think that, because I am taking this amendment relatively briefly, I am taking it relatively lightly. Indications were given at the time of that earlier debate as to our consideration of this matter.

EU law is of course comprised of many things, including domestic primary and secondary legislation, converted EU regulations, decisions and EU legislative and non-legislative provisions. Due to the breadth of retained EU law, it is therefore unique in its nature. That is why the Government deliberately chose to tread carefully and not simply to assign this new category of law, retained EU law, to a single category of domestic legislation. Treating all retained EU law as primary legislation may be possible but such a broad approach will inevitably raise unforeseen and uncertain consequences—the very thing we want to avoid. If one looks at an EU provision that deals with the content of a particular chemical and those contents are to change, are we to address that only by way of primary legislation? I suspect that if that were the case, we would be sitting much later than we have in the last few days of this Committee.

Again, treating it all as secondary legislation may also pose considerable difficulties because of the interaction between retained EU law and other domestic legislation which is in the form of primary legislation. This is not a straightforward exercise, which is why it was thought fit to identify certain areas where it should be treated as primary—for example, in the context of human rights—and other areas where Ministers would be allowed the opportunity to consider how best to deal with the issue, albeit as cases arise.

I notice that there is a concern about how the matter is to be approached but it is not one that identifies a universally approved approach. I noted what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay said about the treatment of retained EU law in the context of a qualification with regard to what is brought into domestic law by way of Clause 2, for example, and what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said about Professor Paul Craig’s solution, which we discussed previously in Committee in reference to Amendment 33.

We have taken that on board and we believe that at present, the position we have adopted is the correct one for achieving maximum legal certainty after exit day and for ensuring the most appropriate outcome across the domestic statute book. Equally, we recognise the need to look at alternatives in the context of, for example, Professor Paul Craig’s proposals, and perhaps to look at it in a different context altogether: that of outcomes rather than, in the first instance, identification of whether it is primary or secondary. That is what we indicated we would do when this matter came up for debate before in Committee, and what we are doing. In that context, I hope the noble Lord will see fit to withdraw his amendment at this time.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton]

My Lords, I am intrigued by the Minister’s reply. I guess I shall have to look back at the debate on Amendment 33, which he referenced earlier, but I am far from satisfied on this point. While I have been sitting here, I have been thinking of an example of what Ministers can actually do with pieces of primary and secondary legislation, and one comes to mind.

Towards the end of our time in government, an amendment was passed in this House very much against my better judgment; I was rather horrified by it. It basically had the effect of enabling the Secretary of State to bring forward an order to give effect to the particular amendment. I went back to the department and said, “Look, this is terrible. We lost this vote in the House yesterday and it means that you will have to do something that we really do not want to do and that would be quite wrong”. The Secretary of State very simply said to me, “Don’t worry about it: I simply won’t bring forward the order”. That is a powerful position to be in if you are Secretary of State. The order was never forthcoming. I am sure there are many examples of a similar nature that will be adopted by Secretaries of State, not just now but in the future.

That makes me think that we may be giving a Secretary of State—a Minister—far too much by enabling them to decide what is and is not secondary and primary legislation. I do not know whether that was in the mind of the Constitution Committee when it particularly picked this out, but it was right to be alive to that concern. I was grateful for the support for the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, because he is long experienced in these matters. He has a very wary and thoughtful eye on legislation and what it is.

I accept that we are in somewhat exceptional circumstances in that we are dealing with EU retained law, but the Minister will have got the message that we are very concerned and the concern is rather broad. In the end, what we put in primary legislation makes a difference and has the effect of changing people’s lives. Giving too much power to Ministers to determine what they can sneak in through secondary legislation, where we can do far less about it and do far less to improve its quality, is a proper constitutional concern that this House might express. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

No, I have it absolutely right. I know that that is precisely what it is. I have said that on previous occasions. But, with respect, it was the couple of speeches that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, made earlier on that moved me in the Government’s direction.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions at this stage of the debate. I appreciate, as do other Members of the House, that when I move the government amendment to Clause 11, we will embrace a debate about the consequences of that amended clause and the significant change it makes to the way in which we are going to deal with, among other things, devolved competences. But as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed, his amendments are consequential in a sense on what is going to happen with regard to Clause 11. In that context, I point out that we had already indicated our intention to move the amendment to Clause 11 and then withdraw it, in order that the consequences for the schedules to the Bill can be addressed more properly when we reach Report. However, there is a more fundamental issue underlying this, which has been highlighted by the use of the terms “consult” and “consent”. It is really rather fundamental. Because these are probing amendments, I will just outline the Government’s thinking with regard to this area of the Bill and how it will work. I am sorry if I am going to appear somewhat repetitive about some matters of history that have been touched upon already, but perhaps your Lordships could bear with me, if but for a moment.

In 1972, the UK Parliament of course transferred certain competences to the EU. Having done so, it limited its competence to legislate for the United Kingdom. When it came to the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006, that Brussels competence, as I will term it, had already gone. When it came to considering the scope of the divorce settlement, the matter of the powers held by the European Union in Brussels was not in scope for consideration as part of devolution. They had gone, by virtue of an international treaty implemented in domestic law pursuant to the ECA 1972. The devolved settlement was determined by reference to the competence that remained in Westminster in 1998 and in 2006.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am going to elaborate on what happens to the competences in Europe. I wonder whether the noble Baroness will bear with me just for a moment.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

But I wanted to challenge what the Minister just said. The competences were not actually removed from us. We agreed to operate within the framework, but the idea that we actually gave up those competences in the way described would perhaps not be accepted, as such. We agreed that the EU had rights to make laws in certain areas, but that is not the same as saying, “This is no longer our responsibility”.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, pursuant to our international treaty obligations, we bound ourselves at the level of international law to allow the EU to exercise competence in areas where previously the UK Parliament would have exercised it. That was then implemented in domestic law by virtue of the 1972 Act. Of course a sovereign Parliament is always able to repeal the 1972 Act, as it is now doing, but so long as it remained in place, and so long as we remained party to the relevant treaty—which became treaties—we were bound in that context. I do not entirely agree with the analysis, but I do not believe it is material for the present purposes, if I may respectfully say so.

Once Brussels had certain competences, it then exercised them. It was important that Brussels should exercise them in one area in particular, which was the development of the EU single market, as no one else could have exercised jurisdiction over a single market in the EU. The idea that 12—now 28—individual jurisdictions could have maintained the single market is self-evidently untenable, so Brussels exercised that jurisdiction, for very good reason. When we leave the EU, we will find ourselves in the position where we want to maintain an internal single market in the United Kingdom; the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, referred to that, while the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said we are looking forward to the internal market in the United Kingdom. We have to bear that in mind. What Parliament is in a position to legislate for a UK single market? The answer to that is the Parliament that has jurisdiction for the whole United Kingdom. I will come on to the issue of devolved competence in a moment, but generally speaking if you are going to maintain a single market you need a legislative power that is able to do that for the single market.

Lest anyone interrupt just yet, I add that of course by their very nature the devolved Administrations, parliaments and assemblies have responsibility for devolved powers in their respective nations. We respect that, of course, but there is an issue here that has not yet been mentioned. We identified, on the basis of analysis that was carried out with the devolved Administrations, that there were some 153 areas of competence where—

[Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale]

Before the Minister moves on to the detail of those competences, I want to challenge the analysis that he has given about the comparison between the UK single market and the EU single market. No one would have suggested at any time in the last 26 years that the relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU single market, and the decision-making around the EU single market, would have been such that the decision-making on the EU single market would have been left solely to the European Parliament and the European Commission. It was not. The decision-making around the EU single market was done primarily by the Council of Ministers, and in the Council of Ministers some aspects of that single market were determined by absolute consent, where the UK had a veto, while some areas were determined by qualified majority voting. We cannot replicate that arrangement with one that leaves the sole decision-making power after consultation, without consent, with the UK Parliament and the UK Government in relation to areas where currently the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly or the Northern Ireland Assembly would have legislative competence.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not entirely agree with the noble Lord’s analysis but for the present purposes I am not sure that it is particularly relevant. What is relevant is this, if I can continue: we have identified about 153 areas in which, upon our leaving the EU, competences will return and touch upon areas of devolved competence. These are areas that the devolved parliaments and assemblies previously had no engagement with because they lay in Brussels, but they are coming back and touching upon these areas of devolved competence and we recognise that.

However, some of these areas of competence are critical to the maintenance of a single market in the United Kingdom, as I will illustrate in a moment. Those therefore had to be addressed. We did that by engaging with the devolved Administrations and assemblies in the context of the Joint Ministerial Committee negotiations. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter: there may be criticisms of that process but I respectfully suggest that that is not for this Bill. It is important to notice the achievements made by that committee in this context. In particular, noble Lords may have received a copy of the communiqué of 16 October 2017 from the Joint Ministerial Committee, which was attended by Mark Drakeford, a Cabinet Secretary in Wales, and Mr Russell, a Minister from the Scottish Government, among others, including senior civil servants from Northern Ireland in the absence of their Executive. I shall quote briefly from it, although some aspects are referred to in some of the proposed amendments:

“Ministers noted the positive progress being made on consideration of common frameworks and agreed the principles that will underpin that work”.


The definition of those principles includes the line:

“A framework will set out a common UK, or GB, approach and how it will be operated and governed”.


Then there is a list of principles:

“Common frameworks will be established where they are necessary in order to … enable the functioning of the UK internal market”—


for example, to,

“ensure compliance with international obligations; ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements and international treaties; enable the management of common resources; administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element; safeguard the security of the”,

United Kingdom.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wigley]

Will the noble and learned Lord give way?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

No, perhaps I can finish this point. I am just trying to explain why in these 24 areas it has been identified as very material that we should retain and then develop frameworks.

[Lord Wigley]

I just wanted to intervene on this very point about pesticides. The Minister will be aware that the Welsh Government did in fact legislate on the question of genetically modified crops, and it was forecast that the roof would fall in. It did not; it was quite possible to have a different regime in Wales from that in England. As he addresses the rest of the points that have been raised, will he tell us how the regime will be allowed or not allowed to work in the context of agricultural support? Sheep farmers may well want and be entitled to get support from the Welsh Government. The Welsh Government may want to give them that support but, if it is argued that that distorts the UK market, they would not be able to do so. That is the sort of issue that causes concern.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

As regards agricultural support, that is another subspecies of agriculture. I am dealing with those matters that fall within the 24 identified areas where we find it necessary to retain and operate the single internal market. Not all areas within those 24 competencies are going to have to be retained for the purposes of that market. There are areas which we will devolve.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

The Minister is making a very strong case for how a single market can operate effectively. Does he not believe that the United Kingdom could operate under a frictionless trading or regulatory arrangement with managed divergence across the four nations?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is not what is in contemplation, and that is why I am trying to explain the Government’s thinking with regard to maintaining effectively a single market, not frictionless borders between nations within the United Kingdom, which is a different issue altogether and one that does arise in a different context.

[Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale]

I will not take this opportunity to contest some of the points that have been made about, for example, fertilisers, although I think there is a debate to be had about the way in which the Government describe that issue. It is not helpful to the heat generated around this debate when the examples the Government give for the need to retain the power imply that decisions that would be made in Scotland or Wales would be stupid. The Government need to think hard about the fact that when they describe the need for these single market frameworks in the UK, they should do so in a positive way in terms of the UK having regulations that work together.

On the substantive point about the frameworks, the issue is not the list of 24, but how they will be agreed and who will have the ultimate decision-making power. It is not about what is or is not on the list. That is a matter for negotiation and determination within the existing settlements. The issue here is who agrees the frameworks, how they are agreed and who ultimately has the power to veto them or otherwise. That is the substantive issue I would ask the Minister to address.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I wholly reject the implication that we are suggesting that any of the devolved Administrations are going to proceed to legislate, with any of the competencies returned to them, in a way that would be regarded as stupid or unacceptable. That is a most unfortunate gloss to put on the matter. It is, however, very helpful that the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, has raised the question of how we are going to deal with the issue in this context. The framework agreements have been the subject of ongoing negotiation among all of the Administrations, but in order to achieve that it is necessary to retain competencies in those areas so that there is not the prospect of legislation within the devolved areas which impacts upon areas outwith their competence. To give a simple example in that context, the Scottish Government are entitled to exercise devolved competence and powers within Scotland for the Scottish people, but if we allow all of the additional competencies to go back to the Scottish Government and they legislate in an area such as food labelling, that impacts on the people not only of Scotland but of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. There is therefore, in a sense, a veto over proposals for the internal market, with one devolved Administration saying, “No, we don’t like your proposals on food labelling. We know everybody else likes them but we’ve decided we don’t like them, we’re not going to consent to them, so you can’t have them.” That is the problem that we want to ensure does not arise.

Coming more particularly to the point that was made about how this is decided, we do ring-fence, as it were, the 24 competencies—or elements of them—that have been identified following the consultation process with the devolved Administrations and which are reflected in the principles that I quoted from the Joint Ministerial Committee on 16 October last year. Then, we have to formulate framework agreements, essentially, in each of these areas for the United Kingdom.

Taking up the noble Lord’s point on how we are going to implement those, we will do so by way of primary legislation. And where do we find ourselves? Back in the relevant devolved legislation, which says that we will not normally legislate in respect of these devolved areas except with the agreement of the relevant devolved Government. So the relevant safeguard is exactly the same as the one that exists at the present time. What we propose will not intrude on the devolved competence in Scotland, Wales or indeed Northern Ireland. It retains 24 areas that are coming back from the European Union in order that we can work out what is required for the purposes of maintaining a single UK market. However, what would alter the devolved competencies quite fundamentally would be a provision that said that we could retain those areas of competence only with the consent of each of the devolved Administrations. That would give them a veto over matters that went beyond their present devolved competence and a veto over matters that impacted on England, Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland, depending upon who was doing it. That is why we have set out matters in the way that we have. When we come on to the amendment to Clause 11 in due course, I hope that, having essentially flipped Clause 11, we can reflect on the great progress that we have made to date in these areas. It is in that context that I simply invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

We will return to these matters under reference to the government amendments but I wanted to set out, I hope with a reasonable degree of clarity, the Government’s thinking in this area. This is not, with respect, a power grab—on the contrary: if we consult, if we agree and if we achieve this, there is no question of a power grab. It is certainly not a derogation from devolved competence. A great deal of competence will be laid on the devolved Administrations, because so many of these competencies coming back from the EU, and under the amended Clause 11, are going straight to the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I just tempt him? He has given a very clear exposition of the Government’s position and why it is in the interests of the devolved Administrations and the United Kingdom as a whole to proceed in the manner that the Government describe. He has also talked about the great efforts that have been made by the officials and the work that has been done. Why, then, do we have such opposition, in particular from the Scottish Administration?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not going to rehearse the rhetoric that has been used by some members of the Scottish Government to feed populism. Terms such as “power grab” may have their place, but they do not have a place in the context of our looking at this legislation. Of course, it has been asserted that consultation is not enough—even though it may lead to agreement—and that there has to be consent and only consent. But if it is consent, that is, let us remember, a very material change to the devolved settlements. That will result in the devolved Parliaments and Governments being able effectively to veto matters that impact upon those outwith their area of devolved competence.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

The Minister used a phrase—which is used also either in the Explanatory Note or in a letter, I cannot remember which—about the retention of this for the purpose of the internal market. It might be helpful if that wording appeared on the face of the Bill.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note that comment. The noble Baroness will appreciate that the amendment to Clause 11, which I will move in due course, seeks to ring-fence these powers to ensure that they are limited. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has also tabled an amendment regarding a sunset clause in that context. It is perfectly clear from the proposed amendment to Clause 11 that they are meant to have a very limited function—but I note what the noble Baroness said and I will take it forward.

[Lord Wigley]

Does the Minister not realise that the Labour Government in Cardiff feel as strongly as the SNP Government in Scotland about this matter? This is not a matter of party politics; it is a question of where power lies. That is why the term “power grab” has arisen. When he says how outrageous it would be if Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland had a veto, does he not realise that the structure that he is advocating gives England a veto? It gives Westminster a veto; that is what is causing so much trouble.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

No. With great respect—

[The Archbishop of York]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

One moment. I am terribly sorry, Archbishop, but I must reply to that. This does not give England a veto. Essentially, England has no voice. This is the United Kingdom Parliament: it legislates for the United Kingdom.

[The Archbishop of York]

The point I was going to make is exactly the same. As I have listened to the debate, it seems to me that the issue is probably what the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, tried to address. When we leave the EU, the state of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland will still be the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. Therefore, there are areas that are for all four nations and others that are just for one nation. Devolution was a good thing, but it does not mean that powers that affect other nations can simply be devolved. I have listened again and again, and I think the point is that, of all the powers that are coming back, 23 have been identified which, if they were simply handed over without clear legislation, would leave us in a real mess. There would be no coherence, no sense that this would be the United Kingdom; it would be something else. So may I plead with those who come from nations with devolved Governments to realise that, for the benefit of the whole of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, there are some areas that affect all of us together, not separately, and that those need to be retained? Of course there could be negotiations and conversations—but I get a little concerned that the message is not getting through. This is not grabbing power: some areas are returning to the United Kingdom and we must sort out which bits really need to go straight to the devolved Administrations. The 23 areas that we have heard about require very careful consideration; otherwise some might think that leaving the EU equals independence for them.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not going to indulge in party politics at this stage; I do not think that that is necessary. We all know the ultimate objective of the Scottish National Party. It is not to have a United Kingdom; it is to break up the United Kingdom and have an independent Scotland. Although Scottish nationalists talk about all these powers coming back from the EU, let us remember that they do not want them. If they get them, they want to give them back to Brussels, because they want Scotland, as an independent country, to remain in the EU—and, if it leaves, they want it to join EFTA and the single market. Therefore they will return all the powers they are talking about if they get their ultimate aim.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon]

The noble and learned Lord has distinguished between “consult” and “consent”, and has described consent as a veto. Does he not accept that over the years the normal use of “consent” by both the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly has been exercised responsibly, and that there is no basis for that fear? How would he define the word “consult”? What does it mean?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Consultation has been going on in the Joint Ministerial Committees on a regular basis since October of last year. As regards respecting the constitutional settlement on devolution, I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord—with one qualification. A convention has arisen out of the memorandum of understanding between the Scottish Government and the UK Government about how we ensure that legislation put before the Scottish Parliament is competent. That convention has operated since 1999 and involves an exchange of a note of competence. Prior to a Bill being introduced to the Scottish Parliament, a copy is passed to my office—the Office of the Advocate-General for Scotland. That is always done.

I then confer with the Lord Advocate and his officials—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, will be familiar with this—and we iron out any differences and come to a view on what is competent and what is not, and consequently these matters are resolved. For the first time in nearly 20 years, that convention was departed from by the Scottish Government in respect of their EU Continuity Bill, which I first heard about after it was introduced to the Scottish Parliament. They did, however, give it to the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament in time for him to take legal advice. Therefore, while I accept the generality of the point the noble and learned Lord made, particular exceptions have arisen very recently.

[Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale]

I was the Minister who negotiated the memorandum of understanding. I think I am the only Minister involved in the negotiation at the time who serves in your Lordships’ House. I agree that the Sewel convention and the arrangements for considering the competence of legislation have worked very well. That concerns the point I made earlier—two debates ago, I think—about the clarity of the legislation and of the memorandum of understanding, which have worked well over many years. I am encouraged by the Minister’s comment that these frameworks would all be subject to the Sewel convention. It would certainly be very helpful for the debate that we are about to have on Clause 11 for the Minister to say that, if these 24 areas are indeed the final 24 areas that are agreed for common frameworks, in each of the 24 areas the establishment of the common frameworks would be subject to the Sewel convention, as I think he hinted at a few minutes ago.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

In so far as they are carried forward by primary legislation—and I rather anticipate that that will be the case—they would engage not only the Sewel convention but the provisions of DGN 10, the devolved guidance note, because there may be areas where these matters impact on the competence of Scottish Ministers. That is what is anticipated and I have no difficulty with that.

I keep trying to answer a question raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, about what happens with regard to the transition period. Clearly, that will have to be addressed in the context of the withdrawal agreement Bill—and that, as has been indicated before, may result in some amendment to the existing provisions of this exit Bill.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

As I understand what the Minister is saying, ultimately everything has to be settled by primary legislation, so there will be a single market in the United Kingdom that is settled by primary legislation—for which legislative consent will be sought and no doubt given. What we are talking about is an interim period when Ministers take powers to themselves. Over a temporary period they will in effect dictate what the framework agreement will be until there is a final agreement in a number of years—that is what I understand the Minister to say.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With great respect, I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has understood what I said. It is not a case of us dictating anything to the devolved Administrations; it is a case of ring-fencing these limited competences until we have reached agreement with the devolved Administrations as to what the framework agreements will be. They will then be put forward for the purpose of legislative consideration in the usual way. But it is not suggested that we are going to start regulating agriculture in Scotland in the meantime—that is not what is comprehended by this at all. I do not know whether I asked this earlier, but will the noble and learned Lord withdraw his amendment so that I can sit down again?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Before the Minister does, how long will this ring-fence last? I believe the Barnett formula was temporary; how long does the Minister envisage the ring-fence will last before there is a proper legislative framework?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It will last until we have managed to implement all of the framework agreement. That will be a finite period—there is no question about that. Indeed, if the noble Lord looks at the proposed amendment to Clause 11, he will see that there are various checks and balances, including the requirement that Ministers report to Parliament if they retain the powers for any longer. So that is already addressed.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, this debate has ranged a good deal wider than was necessary for the Minister to deal with my points on this group of amendments. With respect to him, he has not given me the kind of reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, gave me on earlier groups. My point is that this very disparate group contains a number of points that I raised with regard to Schedules 2 and 8, which need to be reconsidered in the light of the reformed Clause 11. A simple example is on page 56, where there is a reference to a fetter on the power to,

“make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation”,

which extends to the wording of Section 57(4) of the Scotland Act as in the Bill. However, that section is reworded by the proposed new Clause 11.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I just remind the noble and learned Lord that I said that when we come to Clause 11, we will move and withdraw the amendment. We appreciate that although we want Clause 11 in its present form, to put it forward in a form that covers all these matters we will have to address the impact it has on Schedule 2 in these contexts.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am grateful for that. Not every one of my amendments is a Clause 11 point—there are other points of detail which need to be looked at. If the Minister would be kind enough just to say that these will be looked at, I will be happy to withdraw my amendment. Can he give me that assurance?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am content to indicate that we will look at these points.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

On that basis, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 274.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I will respond briefly, without repeating what I said on the immediately preceding group, but this raises essentially the same issue. On these provisions, the circumstances in which consent applies to the powers—which are the obverse of some of the others—are those where the devolved Ministers could use powers in ways that have implications outside of their devolved jurisdiction, for example when making provision regarding the World Trade Organization obligations. That is why we have framed it in this way, but it raises the wider point made by the noble and learned Lord and I appreciate that that might be addressed in more detail when we come to Clause 11 and the government amendments. I wonder if, in these circumstances, the noble and learned Lord will, at this stage, withdraw his amendments.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am glad we have not provoked a longer debate on this group of amendments. There is a reason for being concerned about this; the provision I am concerned about deals specifically with something within competence—in other words, it deals with regulations made for the purpose of preventing or remedying any breach of the WTO agreement. It does not deal with the WTO agreement itself; it simply exercises the power given under paragraph 7(2)(b) of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 to deal with these matters domestically. Since it is within competence under the Scotland Act, it is hard to see why the position should be regulated in the way proposed. However, I have listened to what the Minister has said and—on the understanding that we can look at all this again when we get to the revised formula for Clause 11—I am happy to withdraw this amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

302A: Clause 11, page 7, line 25, leave out subsections (1) to (3) and insert—
“(1) In section 29(2)(d) of the Scotland Act 1998 (no competence for the Scottish Parliament to legislate incompatibly with EU law) for “with EU law” substitute “in breach of the restriction in section 30A(1)”.(2) After section 30 of that Act (legislative competence: supplementary) insert—“30A Legislative competence: restriction relating to retained EU law(1) An Act of the Scottish Parliament cannot modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify, retained EU law so far as the modification is of a description specified in regulations made by a Minister of the Crown.(2) But subsection (1) does not apply to any modification so far as it would, immediately before exit day, have been within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.(3) In addition—(a) a Minister of the Crown must (unless the regulations only relate to a revocation of a specification) consult the Scottish Ministers before laying a draft of a statutory instrument containing regulations under this section before either House of Parliament, and(b) see paragraph 6 of Schedule 7 (duty to make explanatory statement about regulations under this section).”(3) In section 108A(2)(e) of the Government of Wales Act 2006 (no competence for the National Assembly for Wales to legislate incompatibly with EU law) for “with EU law” substitute “in breach of the restriction in section 109A(1)”.(3A) After section 109 of that Act (legislative competence: supplementary) insert—“109A Legislative competence: restriction relating to retained EU law(1) An Act of the Assembly cannot modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify, retained EU law so far as the modification is of a description specified in regulations made by a Minister of the Crown. (2) But subsection (1) does not apply to any modification so far as it would, immediately before exit day, have been within the Assembly’s legislative competence.(3) In addition—(a) a Minister of the Crown must (unless the regulations only relate to a revocation of a specification) consult the Welsh Ministers before laying a draft of a statutory instrument containing regulations under this section before either House of Parliament, and(b) see section 157ZA (duty to make explanatory statement about regulations under this section). (4) No regulations are to be made under this section unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing them has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”(3B) In section 6(2)(d) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (no competence for the Northern Ireland Assembly to legislate incompatibly with EU law) for “incompatible with EU law” substitute “in breach of the restriction in section 6A(1)”.(3C) After section 6 of that Act (legislative competence) insert—“6A Restriction relating to retained EU law(1) An Act of the Assembly cannot modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify, retained EU law so far as the modification is of a description specified in regulations made by a Minister of the Crown.(2) But subsection (1) does not apply to any modification so far as it would, immediately before exit day, have been within the legislative competence of the Assembly.(3) In addition—(a) a Minister of the Crown must (unless the regulations only relate to a revocation of a specification) consult the relevant Northern Ireland department before laying a draft of a statutory instrument containing regulations under this section before either House of Parliament, and(b) see section 96A (duty to make explanatory statement about regulations under this section).(4) In subsection (3)(a) “relevant Northern Ireland department” means such Northern Ireland department as the Minister concerned considers appropriate.(5) Regulations under this section may include such supplementary, incidental, consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provision as the Minister making them considers appropriate.””

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to the other government amendments in this group. We have put forward these amendments to facilitate scrutiny of the Government’s current position on Clause 11. They reflect the status of our discussions with the devolved Administrations, and noble Lords will be aware that our discussions with the Scottish and Welsh Governments are continuing. We remain convinced that this Bill is the right vehicle for providing legal certainty across the UK and that we should reach agreement with the Scottish and Welsh Governments. As such, the Government do not seek a vote on these amendments today and we will withdraw or not move them at the conclusion of the debate, but we will reflect seriously on the points made and incorporate them into our discussions.

The Government have been clear that the Bill is about continuity, certainty and control. That applies equally and without exception to people and businesses across all parts of the United Kingdom. Our approach has always been guided by two principal aims; namely, that we have a fully functioning statute book on exit, and that there are no new barriers to people living and doing business across the United Kingdom. These amendments have been tabled, in line with our commitment made in the other place, to address the concerns raised regarding the current Clause 11. They represent a substantial movement from our original position and reflect the sincerity of our commitment to finding a mutually agreeable position.

We have had lengthy discussions on this issue at official and ministerial level, including at the Joint Ministerial Committee. Noble Lords will well know that the Scottish and Welsh Governments have not yet agreed these amendments, but we will continue to work with them to try to find a way through. I am confident that all parties to this discussion are invested in trying to reach that agreement, as was demonstrated by the constructive tone set at the JMC by the Prime Minister and the First Ministers. This is a crucial piece of legislation in the national interest. It must work for all parts of the United Kingdom and we are sincere in our hope that we will find a way for us all to come together in support of it.

Noble Lords spoke at length at Second Reading and in previous debates of the importance of the “presumption of devolution” and have debated the principle that if there is not a good reason for a matter to be held in common, it should be devolved. That is what these amendments aim to deliver. They would take the existing Clause 11 and effectively turn it on its head. Their effect is that by default on exit day any decision-making powers currently held by the EU in areas that are otherwise devolved would pass directly to our devolved institutions without first being diverted through Westminster. The amendments then give UK Ministers powers to apply targeted and temporary limitations on competence to modify retained EU law, which would in essence have the effect of maintaining existing UK frameworks. We envisage that they will be used in those specific areas where we have identified that a future framework for the United Kingdom may be needed. That would ensure that in those areas the current common approaches established by EU law will continue to apply until we—the United Kingdom Government and the devolved Administrations—can together determine the form that the new bespoke UK framework will take, if one is ultimately required for the benefit of both our communities and our businesses.

I should be clear that the limits that would be applied by these powers are not new limits or constraints. They would merely preserve existing competence in relation to EU law after exit as it stood in relation to EU law immediately prior to exit. Therefore any decision that the devolved institutions could take before exit day will continue to be a decision that they can take after exit day in areas where they have exercised their powers. There is no encroachment into existing devolved areas, and of course in areas where we have not exercised these powers there will be an immediate and significant increase in the decision-making powers of the devolved institutions upon exit. I should also be clear that these limits apply to an area only to the extent it is covered by EU law and not to the entire subject matter. They will not limit competence to make any provision in relation to a subject matter where this does not involve the modification of retained EU law. I urge noble Lords to refer to the Government’s frameworks analysis, published on 9 March, to see the kind of areas where we envisage that the temporary powers may need to be exercised.

Noble Lords will also want to be aware of the additional limits placed on the exercise of these powers. Not only would the powers be subject to the affirmative procedure but the amendments also apply a reporting duty, a duty to consult the devolved Administrations and a duty to produce explanatory statements.

Ministers will be under a duty to report at regular intervals on the steps taken to implement future frameworks; the way in which the framework principles that underpin that work are applied; steps taken to apply or remove restrictions on devolved competence under the powers; the progress towards removing restrictions and repealing those powers altogether once they have served their purpose; and any other information they deem relevant. All this serves to demonstrate that this mechanism is a temporary means to achieve our end state on frameworks.

Before laying an instrument under these powers, UK Ministers will also be required to consult the relevant devolved Administrations and make a statement on the effect of the instrument and any representations made by the devolved Administrations in response to consultation. Further, since these limits are but a temporary means to preserve existing EU frameworks until they are replaced by a UK framework, the amendments also provide a power to repeal the constraining powers so that they will not be retained for longer than is necessary. Ministers would be under a duty to consider periodically whether it is appropriate to repeal the powers. In doing so, they would be required to have regard to the intended temporary nature of these arrangements and to any progress in putting lasting arrangements in place.

Through this, we have sought to emphasise that these powers and restrictions are not to exist in perpetuity or as a permanent feature of the devolution arrangements. Rather, they provide a short-term fix for our longer, more detailed work on the development of long-term future common arrangements. I note in relation to this the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, which would subject the current Clause 11 and any regulations made under the new Clause 11 power relating to Scottish legislative competence to a sunset limit. I understand why that suggestion has been put forward; we have of course been clear that these are temporary arrangements and I am interested to hear the debate on this point.

I must be clear that the temporary nature of the constraints is not the same as proceeding to a fixed timetable. We need to ensure that these complex matters are given due consideration, and there is a risk that the creation of a sunset merely prolongs the cliff edge.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Might noble Lords be referring to the mixed metaphor they have just heard?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

May I proceed to split an infinitive?

The new arrangements must be achieved in partnership with the devolved Administrations. Crucially, that takes time to work through.

We must proceed with caution in considering any form of sunset which would change the purpose of our discussions from designing and implementing frameworks that are fit for purpose to ones that can be achieved in the time allowed. Our priority must be to continue to provide legal certainty on how these laws will work in that interim, but this could risk uncertainty where the provisions may lift before their replacement is known.

This is a substantial and significant amendment to Clause 11. It reflects the progress that we and the devolved Administrations have made on frameworks and in our discussions on Clause 11. It strikes the right balance, delivering for the devolved Administrations and for businesses and people across the United Kingdom. I am grateful for the consideration that this House will provide on this offer as we continue to refine and consider the policy in coming weeks.

The amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson, Lord Griffiths and Lord Thomas, would amend elements of the amendments that we have put forward. We have heard much on the question of the consent of the devolved institutions for the use of the proposed new Clause 11 powers that would “freeze” existing UK frameworks. As I indicated earlier, I wish to be clear on two fundamental points. The first is that this will be a collaborative process. There is no suggestion or intention that we want to cut our devolved institutions out of these decisions. We have put in place a set of shared principles that the Scottish and Welsh Governments have agreed and which guide our work on frameworks—I referred earlier to the statement following the Joint Ministerial Committee in October last year that sets out those principles in detail. Departments across Administrations are now working together to consider frameworks. Devolved and UK Ministers continue to discuss these matters regularly at Joint Ministerial Committee meetings. The limits on the powers make it clear that the views of the devolved Ministers must be heard and the United Kingdom Government in exercising the power must set out what those views are for Parliament’s consideration. That is not a power grab. As we have heard today, this Parliament will rightly hold us to account on how the Government act on devolution policy. The second point is that we must be clear about the implications and outcomes of this work. These decisions affect every part of the United Kingdom. It is the United Kingdom Government and the United Kingdom Parliament that are responsible for matters that affect the whole of the United Kingdom.

We must therefore be very careful about the impact of a hard-edged legal requirement, not because we do not want the Scottish Government and the Welsh Government and, once restored, the Northern Ireland Executive to be part of these decisions but because it cannot be for an Administration in one devolved nation to exercise what amounts to a veto over something that would be in the interest of the other nations of the United Kingdom as a whole. That is not and never was the purpose of the devolution settlement.

I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay and the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord Wigley, for their proposals to bring the United Kingdom Government and devolved Administrations together. These are constructive suggestions for a middle way that deserve serious thought. I am encouraged by the effort being made to reach agreement.

At present, we believe that the JMC will be the right forum for engagement, working under the principles agreed for the work on frameworks in October last year, but I would like to take away the ideas that have been brought to the table here today by way of the further proposed amendments and consider how these matters might be incorporated into our policy thinking, while continuing to meet our two stated objectives on legal certainty and respect for the devolved settlements.

I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern for his amendment, which seeks to find a way forward in the context of Clause 11 and the frameworks. Again, it is an attempt to ensure engagement between all the interested Administrations to achieve consensus at the end of the day. My noble and learned friend’s amendment highlights the importance of clarity as we develop frameworks. As we have discussed during earlier debates, the work on frameworks will have to be a collaborative effort designed to ensure maintenance of a single internal market for the United Kingdom after we leave the EU. Our intention remains to reach agreement with the devolved Administrations. However we approach it, we have that as a goal.

The approach that we have put forward for Clause 11 in these amendments is, I venture, an entirely reasonable proposition. By default, and unless further action is taken, the returning EU powers in the 153 areas identified will become devolved matters. We should perhaps take pause to remind ourselves that these are entirely new powers for the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales, expanding devolved competence into areas previously held and exercised by the EU and, prior to that, by the United Kingdom Parliament.

We believe that what we propose addresses the points raised by the Scottish and Welsh Governments in their legislative consent memorandums. I hope that noble Lords will recognise that we have moved a considerable way on this, but that we continue to see the importance of providing as much certainty as early as possible for businesses across the UK in order that we can avoid, or indeed manage, divergence between the individual nations of the United Kingdom. While we have not yet reached agreement with the devolved Administrations, discussions will continue and we are extremely keen to maintain our engagement with them. But we consider that it is right that noble Lords have the chance to consider these amendments—the Government committed to that on Report and we brought them forward for consideration by this Committee. I hope noble Lords whose amendments are in this group will feel able to withdraw them at this stage; we, as I indicated earlier, will do similarly with the government amendments at the end of this debate. I beg to move.

Amendment 302B (to Amendment 302A)

Moved by

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, are you sure? I do not think there is any need to rush this. We have covered a lot of ground and we have a lot more ground to cover now.

This amendment was put forward as a catalyst, and there has been a reaction. I leave others to judge whether it was contained or uncontained. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, just observed, this is not the vehicle for major constitutional change in the United Kingdom. If we attempt to bolt that on to this Bill, it will sink without trace. Some may prefer that that should happen; nevertheless, that is not a sensible way forward. I am obliged to all those who have contributed to this debate, because it was our intention in putting forward this amendment to judge the mood of the Committee with regard to the quite radical change and approach that we have taken with this proposed amendment. It may be that I approach the matter with an open mind; it may be that I approach it with an empty mind; but at the end of the day we will have to make a decision that works for the whole of the United Kingdom.

I will take up one or two points. There is an appreciation—it may not be universal, but it is almost universal—of recognising the benefits of maintaining a single market in the United Kingdom. We already enjoy that single market by virtue of our membership of the EU, and it is something we want to retain after we leave the EU. In order to do that, there has to be agreement in principle as to the areas that underpin such a single market. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, alluded to the principles set out in the Joint Ministerial Committee minute of 16 October 2017. That is essentially what underpins our seeking agreement; there was consensus. That is what we need to do.

Ultimately, if we are to have a single market for the United Kingdom, we require a body to have jurisdiction over that single market. Again, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and others have acknowledged, that ultimately has to be the Parliament of the United Kingdom. There is no other way of addressing that issue. If we look to the issue of consent, rather than consultation, let us be clear that it is not a question of trust but of constitutional propriety. If we have a black and white, sharp-edged consent mechanism for the devolved Administrations, then we have the basis for what has been termed the veto problem. We have the situation in which, beyond the existing devolved competence, any one of these Assemblies could—it is at that level that it must be judged; not would, but could—proceed to legislate within its devolved competence in a manner that impacted upon those in another country within the United Kingdom, whether it be England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland. We cannot go down that road. That would be a fundamental change in the devolved competence that we created in, and have indeed developed since, 1998.

It appears that we have, at times, merged two issues. The noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, apart from criticising Ministers for not getting on and doing any work on this, pointed out that there had to be a breathing space. Indeed, that point was developed by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, when he quoted the letter from my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Wales. Just to put that into context—and if I may briefly go back to a point I made in an earlier part of the debate—the first stage of this process is to identify those competences coming back from the EU that will be required to operate a single market in the United Kingdom and to effectively ring-fence them on a temporary basis; thus the breathing space that the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, referred to.

That is all that is involved in the first stage. That process has carried on in great detail since the principles were established last October. It has been the work of officials not only in Whitehall but in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. They have all come together to do what is termed in Civil Service-speak as “deep dives” into these matters. The product has now been published. It is the table that identifies 24 areas where it is considered there will have to be some temporary ring-fencing so that we can establish the next stage of the process for the single market—the framework agreements that will then form the basis for that single market.

Let us be clear: that is a separate stage. The ring-fencing is merely to hold those competences for the time required to put the framework agreements in place. We have agreed the principles on which the competences can be identified, and we have now carried out a process that identifies those competences. There is an element of disagreement about that, but only in two or three areas, so far as the Scottish Government are concerned. State aid is one of them. We regard it, for reasons I find fairly obvious, as a reserved competence, but they say it touches on a devolved competence. We will therefore have to address that, and potentially have a framework agreement in those areas as well. That is why there are a further 12 areas of competence that we are confident are in reserved areas, but which may be open to debate. None the less, there is a very substantial element of agreement on the ring- fencing.

Now let me go to the next stage. We then require the framework agreements. To the extent that those agreements will be implemented by primary legislation—it is anticipated that in many of the areas that will be the case—the primary legislation will be carried on in accordance with the constitutional conventions that we already have, and with the respect for the devolved settlement that we have always shown in the past. That includes the Sewel convention as now expressed in the Scotland Act 2016, which amended the Scotland Act 1998. It also includes those areas where, pursuant to DGN 10, such matters will touch upon the competence of Scottish Ministers.

That is where we seek the true element of consent—but ultimately, of course, if we cannot get agreement, we have the Sewel convention. Normally we proceed with the consent of the devolved assemblies, and that remains the position. That is the political understanding that underpins the devolved settlement, and has done for a very long time.

Can we just remove that dichotomy of consultation or consent? I know that within some Administrations, for reasons we do not have to explore, there is a determination to push for consent. Consent, as such, is constitutionally very difficult; I indulge in understatement when I say that. But there is still room for agreement, and the process overall should result in what somebody termed consensus—that is, a belief that we are all doing the same thing for the same reasons, with an expectation of the same result. That involves an understanding of what these frameworks are.

It has been suggested that the 24 areas of competence that require to be ring-fenced on a temporary basis should be expressed in a schedule to the Bill. I hear what is said about that, but whether it can practically be done in the context of the Bill may be another matter. As was observed, I believe by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, that may have to be expressed elsewhere. We can look at that, but in the first instance we have to understand what needs to be ring-fenced for the purposes of the framework agreements.

A sunset clause has been suggested, and I have already expressed a view about that. Clearly, we are listening to the idea that a sunset clause might run for five years. But the more we have gone on about this, the more we realise that what it all comes down to is two questions. One: can we have an appropriate forum in which to negotiate agreement with the devolved legislatures? Yes; that has been carried on in the joint ministerial committees. They have been criticised, but they have been successful, as can be seen by the agreement in principle in respect of these matters. Can we achieve that? The answer is yes.

Secondly, can we then express, in a manner that will satisfy the devolved Administrations, what the framework agreements will be? The answer to that is again yes because we will follow the normal and usual constitutional principles that involve embracing the Sewel convention in cases where primary legislation is required.

I hope that goes some way to reassure noble Lords that we are making progress here because underneath the concern about consent versus consultation there has been considerable movement. We not only have the principles that we will apply to the ring-fencing of competences but we will also have the means to bring forward framework agreements in a manner that will satisfy the devolved competence, as I say. It may be that it will go beyond the 24 areas already identified but work can continue on that matter. What is ultimately of importance is that we retain the means for uniformity of regulation in those critical areas that touch on the principles enunciated in October 2017. That is what has to be achieved. There may be more than one road but ultimately they all lead to Rome, and that is where we want to be at the end of the day, so with that—

[Lord Newby (LD)]

They go to Brussels.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Newby, that the roads do not go to Brussels any more. However, he is welcome to go and hack a path there, if he wishes. With that, I seek to withdraw the government amendment.

Amendment 302B (to Amendment 302A) withdrawn.