Brexit: Justice for Families, Individuals and Businesses (EU Committee Report)

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Wednesday 20th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, on the noble Lord’s last point, it is not for me to anticipate the Uber decision but the hint might be in the existence of the motor vehicles.

I begin by congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, on securing this debate. The question of the EU’s departure from the European Union is well-trodden ground in this House by now, but the question of future civil judicial co-operation between the United Kingdom and the EU has perhaps not received as much attention. I commend her and her sub-committee for the work they have done to address this. I would also like to thank, through her, the witnesses who contributed to the inquiry and whose experience and expertise we value very highly. It is because of that expertise that this is such a commendable report.

The debate gives me the opportunity to set out to your Lordships the Government’s position on this technical but important subject, to the extent that I can while we are in the course of a negotiating process. Before addressing the specific issue of civil judicial co-operation, and dealing with the points made by your Lordships, it may be worth some scene-setting.

Since June, we have worked intensively with our European partners to settle the issues in the first phase of our negotiations to leave the EU. We have made good progress and reached agreement with the EU’s negotiators on some very difficult issues. Nearly two weeks ago, the United Kingdom and the EU negotiating teams issued a joint report on the progress they have made on the three areas covered in the first phase of the negotiations. It proposes a fair deal on citizens’ rights that allows for UK and EU citizens to get on with their lives broadly as now in the country in which they live; it agrees a financial settlement that honours the commitments we undertook as members of the EU, involving a fair delivery of our obligations; and it contains an agreement on the island of Ireland that preserves the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom and the stability that has been brought about by the Belfast agreement.

As your Lordships will know, last week, the European Council agreed that this report represents sufficient progress and that we should now move on to the talks about our future partnership. This allows the next stage of negotiations to proceed, and the Council has agreed that there should be quick progress on agreeing an implementation period.

On that implementation period, the United Kingdom Government’s proposal is to ensure that businesses and people have time to adjust, and to allow new systems to be put in place. We believe that any implementation period should be strictly time limited—to around two years, as noble Lords are aware. I emphasise that it should be based on the existing structure of EU rules and regulations, during which the UK and the EU would have access to one another’s markets on current terms, and the UK would take part in existing security and other measures. Of course we welcome that progress. It is in everyone’s interests that the talks now move on swiftly during the second phase.

On the subject of this debate, many noble Lords, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, used the term “certainty and predictability”. Let me be clear that there is consensus about that. Of course, we seek to secure certainty and predictability. But a third word was used by a number of noble Lords that I would also emphasise—reciprocity. Just as we look from the United Kingdom to the EU 27, with concern about how we will ensure suitable civil judicial co-operation following our exit from the European Union, so those 27 countries look to the United Kingdom in the same way, anxious as they are, just like us, to ensure certainty and predictability, because that is what reciprocity brings.

Of course, what we call civil judicial co-operation is the framework that governs a whole spectrum of legal systems work and cross-border situations and provides rules not only in the context of commercial cases, but in the context of family law. As has been noted, the current EU rules are contained in regulations such as the Brussels Ia—the revised regulation on jurisdiction recognition and enforcement of judgments—the Rome I regulation on choice of law in contracts, and the Brussels II regulation, which covers jurisdictional rules for recognition of divorces, and for recognition and enforcement of parental responsibility and other matters. It does not stop there. There is also the insolvency regulation, which is equally important to commerce across the whole of Europe and which covers jurisdictional rules on the recognition of insolvency proceedings, and there are others. There is a guide to them in the paper that was issued by the Government in August this year.

These instruments provide a legal route to resolving, with certainty and predictability, difficult cross-border situations that can arise whether in the context of commercial law or family law. Clearly, these various measures have over the years benefited many citizens of the United Kingdom. Equally, they have benefited many citizens of the EU 27. They have benefited small and large businesses throughout the United Kingdom and small and large businesses throughout Europe. I am obliged for the noble Lord’s encouragement on that.

It is against that background that I emphasise that we are all concerned to secure certainty and predictability. For example, we know that about 3 million EU citizens currently live in the United Kingdom. We wish to ensure that their rights can be certain and predictable going forward. Equally, about 1 million British citizens live in the other EU 27 countries and we wish the same for them. Again, I underline the point about reciprocity. It is not essentially in anyone’s interests to move backwards and wind down from such a position.

Indeed, that certainty is a key foundation of economic growth. Confidence in cross-border commercial contracts and investment relationships is underpinned and enhanced by clear rules governing each country’s jurisdiction, its courts’ responsibility for resolving disputes and its ability to avoid what the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, referred to as the Italian torpedo, which was a feature of commercial litigation in Europe until the revision of the Brussels I regulation some years ago. Everyone understands the need for an effective system of cross-border judicial recognition, if I can call it that, in the context of the choice of law, choice of jurisdiction and enforcement proceedings. That is not cut down by any red line. I will return to that in the context of something that was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy.

The Government are seeking a future agreement with the European Union that allows for close and comprehensive cross-border co-operation. I will return to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, about what we are seeking in that context. But what we want to do is reflect as closely as possible the substantive principles of the current framework. They work well for citizens in the United Kingdom and throughout Europe. In addition to other regulations, I mentioned such things as the insolvency regulations, the EU service regulations, the taking of evidence regulations and, in the context of Brussels II and family matters, the Maintenance Regulation. They are all-embracing.

To touch on one or two points, under the repeal Bill, we will incorporate into domestic law the Rome I and Rome II instruments on choice of law and applicable law in contractual and non-contractual matters. If we do that, and Rome I and Rome II already apply in the other EU 27 states, then essentially we will have achieved a level playing field in those matters. There is no need for us to do more than that in the context of Rome I and Rome II.

Of course, in other areas, it will be necessary for us to engage in negotiations with certain parties. The matter does not just stop at the stage of Brussels and the EU; there are countries beyond the European Union. We have signed up to agreements in civil judicial co-operation that apply well beyond the EU: reference was made to the council of the Hague Conference, which gives rise to a series of Hague Conventions in this area. There are also the UNCITRAL—United Nations Commission on International Trade Law—provisions as well, which apply beyond the EU. We will continue to embrace all of those.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, suggested that there were perhaps three Hague Conventions that we were interested in, but it goes much further than that. The UK is a signatory to the 1965 Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters; the 1970 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters; the 1970 Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, which I accept does not go as far as Brussels II; the 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction; the 1993 Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption; and the 1996 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. So, there is a great deal more to this subject than just Brussels I, Brussels Ia and Brussels II.

Reference was also made to the Lugano convention, which is the convention on judicial co-operation between the EU and the other EEA countries—Norway, Ireland and Liechtenstein. Denmark has a separate agreement, which I will not go into detail on at the moment. I want to make one point about the Lugano convention, which I accept has not caught up with Brussels Ia —although it is up to speed with Brussels I. It is wrong to suggest that any red line, as it is termed, with regard to the CJEU’s jurisdiction is a barrier. The Lugano convention is not subject to the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU, even though the EU is a party to the Lugano convention. So, there are instruments through which we can achieve judicial co-operation, outwith the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU. That reflects the steps that we are endeavouring to take in present negotiations, and indeed what drives them.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

The point that was made in our report, which I certainly tried to make, was that we were not sure how it would be possible for the UK to accede to the Lugano convention in practice, given that it is between the EU and three EEA countries. I did not mention the red line about the CJEU in the context of the Lugano convention; the question was more about how we could manage to insert ourselves into the Lugano convention.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There is no legal barrier to us becoming a party to the Lugano convention, but that would be a subject of negotiation with the council to the Lugano convention. I believe it was the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, who suggested that the CJEU was somehow a red line in this respect. I emphasise that it is not a red line, but it is an issue that has to be addressed in the context of the present negotiations.

I will touch on one or two points made by noble Lords in the debate, beginning with the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. Again, I go back briefly to her suggestion that our rejection of the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU had a profound effect on civil judicial co-operation. I simply cannot accept that. It does not apply in the context of the UNCITRAL rules, the Hague convention or Lugano. Therefore, there are clearly areas where we can negotiate and determine judicial co-operation without accepting the direct jurisdiction of that court.

The noble Baroness also observed that Lugano had not been upgraded. I think she suggested it was essentially stuck in aspect, or something of that kind.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

I said aspic. It is a sort of jelly.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Indeed so. I am familiar with it—absolutely ghastly stuff.

It is not stuck; it so happens that the convention has moved more slowly than Brussels in this context. Lugano was essentially in parallel with Brussels I. When Brussels moved on to Brussels Ia Lugano did not accelerate at the same speed, but that is not to say that it is in aspic.

I may have misheard the noble Baroness, but she suggested, in the context of arbitration, that there was no allowance for enforcement of arbitral judgments. That is not the case, because the New York convention provides for enforcement of arbitral judgments. That applies right across the world. It is not limited in any sense to the EU. Again, it seems arbitration—and commercial arbitration, which is particularly important in the context of the City of London, for example—is not affected by these issues of reciprocal judicial agreement and enforcement.

The noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton of Belgravia, suggested that the Government’s response was disappointing. I hope we have moved on from that point. She suggested that the reference to things being wound down would not do, but with great respect, we have no desire to see any of this wound down. We seek certainty, predictability and an outcome that we can say is in parallel with Brussels Ia, Brussels II and the other regulations referred to.

The noble Lord, Lord Cashman, referred to the Brussels regulations having a significant role. He is absolutely correct about that and we acknowledge it. Indeed—I believe I can get this far—we certainly agree as to our goal. He may feel that we are a little less certain than others about how we get to it, but there is no suggestion or intention of us walking away from these regulations. We will have to address the question of the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU and we acknowledge that.

[Baroness Shackleton of Belgravia]

I apologise for interrupting, but I did not invent the phrase “wound down”. I can quote it directly back to the noble and learned Lord. The Government’s reaction to our report was,

“in the event that we do not agree an arrangement for future civil judicial cooperation with the EU, it will be important to have reached a common view on the general principles that would govern how ongoing cooperation in this area could be wound down”.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is absolutely correct, but the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, brought this out more fully when he distinguished between cases in the pipeline and those that arise post Brexit. As paragraph 91 of the joint report points out, there will essentially be agreement—or consensus; let me put it that way—on how we deal with existing cases at the point when we leave the European Union. But there is no desire to see us walk away or wind down the existing regulatory regime.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, posed two questions in the context of the Government’s response, where we talk about a “close and comprehensive agreement”. It cannot be a mirror of what is already there, because of the jurisdiction of the CJEU, but “close and comprehensive” is what we seek.

The noble and learned Lord’s first question was whether we could give an assurance that the aim is to achieve the same degree of certainty and predictability. The answer, I would suggest, is yes. The aim is most certainly to achieve that. I assure him that there will be no cliff edge. We have no desire for there to be any cliff edge anywhere, but that will be the subject of negotiation because we are now entering the second phase. Perhaps it is more important to point out that the Government’s aim in this context is to ensure that we have certainty, predictability and continuity.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

What would happen if at the end of the time-limited implementation period it had still not been possible to achieve what the noble and learned Lord said in answer to my first question?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

If at the end of the transition period there had been no agreement, there would be no basis for reciprocal enforcement pursuant to Brussels Ia, Brussels II and those regulations, because we would no longer be a member of the EU for those purposes. That would appear to follow. Nevertheless, there would still be recourse to the Hague convention, although I am the first to accept that the convention provisions do not replicate or achieve the level of predictability and certainty that is in the Brussels regulations.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Does that not just heighten the importance of achieving agreement during the implementation period as a matter of urgency?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I absolutely concur, which is why we and the EU have expressed a desire to move forward to the second phase of negotiations as swiftly as possible. I emphasise that this is about reciprocity. It is about the interest not only of the United Kingdom but of the EU. It appears to me that those interests will eventually prevail.

I am afraid that I keep on getting a note saying that I have one minute to go and I keep on stretching that one minute. I have not expressly addressed all points raised by noble Lords, but perhaps I may touch on one or two. I entirely concur with the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, that one cannot negotiate in public. We can express our intentions and our aims, but it is very difficult for us to give a running commentary about where we are on these issues any more than on other issues, but I underline our aims in this context.

The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, referred to the delay in the Government’s response to the report. I apologise for that. The report was followed by the general election and then by the Summer Recess. The government paper was issued on 22 August, when I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, was invited to take part in a briefing on the matter, but I accept that it took until the beginning of December for the response to be published.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked about progress in “discussions”. These are not discussions; these are negotiations. The noble Lord is a very experienced lawyer and knows perfectly well that one cannot have or maintain a running commentary on such matters when one is hoping to achieve consensus at the end of the day. However, we verily believe that we will achieve certainty and predictability, which, I emphasise again, is our aim.

I again thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and her sub-committee for the report.

CPS: Disclosure of Evidence

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Monday 18th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, prosecutors are obliged to disclose relevant material that could assist the defence case. That obligation is not determined by issues of cost. The Crown Prosecution Service is considering with the police a recent independent review by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of the CPS of disclosure policies and practice.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon]

My Lords, the then chairman of the Bar Council, Ms Heather Hallett QC, complained as far back as 1998 about non-disclosure. I believe I took steps to put matters right. Matters seem to have gone backwards since then. In the light of recent events, will the Attorney-General set up an independent inquiry, headed by a judge, to examine whether disclosure rules are being complied with, to ensure the timely delivery of justice?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, disclosure in the context of criminal cases has not gone backwards since 1998. There is no present intention to set up an inquiry of the type referred to by the noble and learned Lord.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I think we can all agree that early and adequate disclosure is at the heart of a fair criminal justice system. Given that the senior independent prosecutor at the Bar who averted a recent miscarriage of justice, in addition to being a senior and experienced prosecutor, is a former Conservative MP, who described a system “creaking” for lack of resources, will the Minister please consider my noble and learned friend’s request and, in any event, return to this House with a Statement after more full and adequate consideration of what happened here?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the matter to which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, alludes was a recent case in which the Crown withdrew and the matter did not proceed. There is to be a joint internal review by the CPS and the police to determine what occurred in that case. With regard to the case that she alludes to, the CPS has acknowledged that its standards may have fallen below what is expected and it has apologised to all the parties involved.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, one of the problems is that there is a great deal more to disclose than there once was in terms of the number of records that are kept. However, does not the obligation go both ways? Not only must the prosecution make sure that everything is available to the defence, but defence lawyers must make sure that every single piece of relevant information is disclosed to them and that it is analysed properly for the benefit of their client, which places a considerable burden on them. Is my noble and learned friend satisfied that adequate resources, by way of legal aid or otherwise, are made available to enable them to do this?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to my noble friend. It is of course important that the defence has the opportunity and the means to consider what requests should be made of the prosecution in the context of disclosure. Indeed, in the context of the case alluded to earlier, that point will be addressed.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

Could the review also look into this simple question? It is reported that it took 14 months for this young man to be charged, which means that he was on bail uncharged for 14 months. What on earth is the reason for that?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am not able to determine why the charge took as long as it did in that case. I appreciate that investigations take longer in some cases than they do in others, but I cannot—

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I wonder whether noble Lords wish me to continue. I am obliged to the Opposition Benches. To give an example, there are instances in which a considerable amount of digital data relevant to a particular complaint have to be considered.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in the case of Liam Allan, it was fairly obvious that this material should have been looked at, and what happened was either the result of lack of resources in the police service or in the Crown Prosecution Service or a deliberate attempt to pervert the course of justice. Can the Minister estimate how many people are unlawfully imprisoned as a result of similar mistakes having occurred in the past?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I believe that the noble Lord probably knows the answer to his own question. Nevertheless, the alternatives that he advances do not exhaust the issue of why, if it occurred, disclosure was not made at an appropriate time, and that will be the subject of a joint high-level review by the CPS and the police. It is not for me, in this place, to anticipate the outcome of that review.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, will the conclusions of the proposed internal review be published?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not anticipate that the review itself will be published, but I am confident that its conclusions will be.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, would not my noble and learned friend acknowledge that there is very widespread concern about this clear near miscarriage of justice? Could he at least say that he understands why people’s confidence in the police service has been significantly undermined?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, again, I am not going to anticipate the outcome of the review that will be undertaken jointly by the CPS and the police in respect of this case.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, why is it that the full detail of the internal review should not be published, given the public interest in the matter?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, at this stage it is anticipated that the conclusions of any review will be published, but it is not usual or normal for the full terms of an internal review to be put into the public domain.

[Viscount Ridley (Con)]

My Lords, will the review look at the culture of “sales targets” within the police—as it was described by the person in this case—as an issue?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am not familiar with the term “sales targets” in this context. Clearly, a balancing exercise has to be carried out to ensure that, particularly in cases of this kind, complainants are able to come forward uninhibitedly and, equally, that anyone complained against is given a full and fair opportunity to put forward their defence. However, I reiterate that I am not familiar with the term “sales targets” in this context.

[Lord Dholakia (LD)]

My Lords, will the review take into account past cases in which injustice may have been done because of the failure to disclose information to the defence solicitors?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the terms of any review are yet to be determined, but it will be an internal review into the particulars of this case.

[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab)]

But that is where the problem lies. The noble Lord’s question is relevant: what about all the other cases? I have handled a lot of cases over the years in which people have been accused of rape. What about those cases in which a mistake or error of judgment was made?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, here is a criminal cases review board, which was set up to address the sorts of issue to which the noble Lord refers.

[Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall (Lab)]

My Lords, would the Minister concede that the reason this case has much wider relevance than the particulars of the individual concerned, however dreadful his circumstances may have been, is that it allows credence to be attached to the notion that there are more examples of injustice against people who are accused of rape than against those who have suffered rape? The review really ought to take that into account.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note what the noble Baroness says on that matter. I reiterate that it is fundamental that justice is fair to both the accuser and the accused.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, as I understand it, a recent change in the Crown Prosecution Service is the demise of the disclosure offices, and those duties have been passed back to the police. Barristers are expressing concern about whether the police are adequately resourced or trained to do that. Will my noble and learned friend outline whether that is indeed the case and that there will be a time at which we will review whether that is also having an effect on disclosure?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not in a position to say whether that is having an effect on disclosure, but that is why, at the highest levels, the CPS is looking at the outcome of the inspector’s review of the CPS disclosure policies and practice. No doubt that is an aspect of the review that will be taken into account.

Probation Service

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Thursday 14th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Laming (CB)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government are committed to delivering a probation service that strictly enforces sentences, reduces reoffending and protects the public. It is reassuring that the National Probation Service, which supervises high-risk offenders, is doing a good job overall, and we will use this incisive report to continue improving it. We have changed community rehabilitation companies’ contracts to better reflect their costs and are clear that CRCs must deliver a higher standard of probation services.

[Lord Laming]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord. However, does he agree that this well-researched report, which I commend to the House as of interest to us all, presents a thoroughly dispiriting account of just how great has been the deterioration and the effectiveness of the probation service in the past three years? It is now clear that the so-called innovative programme has resulted in a disjointed and incoherent system despite the hard work of the staff. I hope the Minister will agree that the victims of crime, the courts of this country and local communities deserve better, and I hope urgent action will now be taken to recover what has been lost in these recent changes.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we recognise the concerns identified by the inspectorate and are working hard to address these problems. Many of the performance issues with CRCs stem from the financial challenges that providers are facing, which has meant that we have addressed those contractual terms. However, I observe that nearly two-thirds of CRCs have reduced the number of people reoffending.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, this report is another legacy of the unlamented tenure as Lord Chancellor of Chris Grayling. The chief inspector states:

“Regrettably, none of government’s stated aspirations for Transforming Rehabilitation have been met in any meaningful way … I question whether the current model for probation can deliver sufficiently well”.


She identifies a number of deep-rooted organisational and commercial problems and says:

“We find the quality of CRC work to protect the public is generally poor and needs to improve in many respects”.


She adds that,

“unanticipated changes in sentencing and the nature of work coming to CRCs have seriously affected their … commercial viability, causing them to curtail or change their transformation plans”.

They have reduced staff numbers, some to a worrying extent. Is it not time for the Government to review their ideological commitment to private sector organisations playing a major role in criminal justice, with results often as disastrous as these?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this is not an issue of ideology. Many of the CRCs’ performance issues stem, as I say, from the financial changes they have faced because of the limited number of referrals they have received, and that has impacted on their performance. We hold CRCs to account for their performance through robust contract management. Where that performance is not good enough, we require improvement plans to be put in place.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, one of the important issues that the chief inspector raises in her report is the fact that low-risk people, who are supposed to be supervised by the probation service, can become high-risk. She gave the example of someone convicted of driving while disqualified, who was receiving telephone supervision—one call every six weeks—and who eventually assaulted a previous partner. Does the noble and learned Lord accept that a phone call every six weeks is no way to supervise people who are supposed to be under the supervision of the probation service?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, supervision of offenders needs to be proportionate to the risk they present. In some cases, remote contact may be appropriate for lower-risk offenders who are complying with their orders. However, we recognise that best practice is for probation officers to work with offenders face to face.

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister please tell the House what the case loads are for individuals in the National Probation Service and in the community rehabilitation companies? A case load of 200 is simply unacceptable, and it is unbelievable that anyone can exercise any form of supervision of that number of people.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I do not have the current figures in respect of case loads for the service but I undertake to write to the noble Lord and will place a copy of that letter in the Library.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister has been meticulous in not thanking or supporting the inspector for her report. I invite him to do so. During my 12 years in government I came across Dame Glenys Stacey, and she is one of the finest public servants I had contact with during my time as a Minister. She deserves incredible support and the thanks of the House for the report, and I should like to hear it from the Minister.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am perfectly happy to endorse the observations made by the noble Lord. Had I been asked about that point earlier, I would have responded in the same way.

[Lord Birt (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the spouse of the founding director-general of the National Probation Service. This is a devastating report and the Minister will find some of the statistics that he is unaware of in it. These reforms were ill framed and speedily and poorly implemented. Does the Minister accept that it is time to go back to the drawing board?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We do not accept that it is necessary to go back to the drawing board. It is, however, necessary to address the shortcomings in the delivery by CRCs. That is what we are in the course of doing.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, is the Minister satisfied that the CRCs are properly breaching people, given that they are not fulfilling the requirement of their orders? Does he accept that it is extremely important that the judiciary and the magistracy retain their faith in community sentences? If the orders are not properly administered and people are not properly breached, it will undermine faith in those sentences.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I endorse entirely the observations made by the noble Lord. It is for the courts to impose programme requirements as part of the community or suspended sentences orders that they make. Clearly, we have to ensure that they continue to have faith in the system when they are making those orders.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, surely the case is overwhelming for a careful review of what the Government were warned about by the House of Commons Justice Committee and others: not providing the resources for Through the Gate supervision of prisoners, which was the purpose of the reform, would ensure that it would fail. Given that the structure has not worked either because, as the Minister has indicated, far more people have been referred to the National Probation Service because of the level of their offence, it is surely time to review the operation of the scheme.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we do not consider that a root-and-branch analysis or going back to the drawing board is required at this time. However, we are taking active steps to address the very point that the noble Lord raises. Indeed, we are paying CRCs significantly more in the way of funding to ensure that they can deliver the services required, including, critically, Through the Gate services.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, if the whole purpose of prison and the probation service is rehabilitation, which it must be, is it not essential that whether you live in Lincoln or Bootle or Bognor or Bath, you get the same service? Will my noble friend reflect on that and on the wisdom, or lack of it, in farming out responsibilities of the state to private concerns?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, responsibilities have not been farmed out. Contracts have been entered into and they are properly supervised.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Is the noble and learned Lord really saying that the Government are satisfied with a telephone form of probation, because I do not believe anybody in this House is?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we are not satisfied with the telephone form of probation but, as I said, contact with offenders has to be proportionate to the risk they present.

[Lord McNally (LD)]

My Lords, I assure the Minister that when these proposals were put through by the coalition Government they were ideologically driven, and some of the flaws that have emerged reveal the kind of compromises that were created in the probation service. Before these reforms, the probation service had an excellent report; we now have this disastrous report. If the Minister is approaching this ideologically, I put it to him that there is now a strong case for handing probation over wholly to the National Probation Service.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am not approaching this matter as an ideologue. I am approaching it as a Minister with responsibility for the implementation of the existing system of probation, in which we continue to have faith.

Bach Commission: The Right to Justice

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Thursday 14th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for securing this debate. The ability of individuals to secure access to justice is of paramount importance to society and to the rule of law. Ensuring access to justice is a responsibility that every Government take seriously. I thank the noble Lord and his fellow commissioners and advisers for the work of the commission, including the final report, and for his comments in the House today. I am also grateful to other noble Lords who have contributed to the debate for their considered and diligent scrutiny of government policy on access to justice.

This Government fully agree on the importance of access to justice, to which legal aid makes a valuable contribution, and our commitment to the principle of legal aid is unwavering. Yet it is important to remember that it is only one element of access to justice. In addition to the £1.6 billion we currently spend on legal aid, which is more than a fifth of the department’s budget, we are looking to the future by investing more than £1 billion to reform our courts and tribunals. That, too, is important to ensure that access to justice remains robust and at the centre of our modern justice system. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to the courts Bill. It is certainly the intention of the department that that Bill should be brought forward in order to implement these important changes.

We have also invested some £5 million to support litigants in person and we have committed to changing the Lord Chancellor’s guidance on inquests to make the inquest process easier for bereaved families by seeking to make the process less adversarial. We have announced changes that will make it easier for the victims of domestic violence to apply for legal aid, something that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to in his observations. On that point, I shall pause to say that while there is a suggestion that solicitors might certify such cases, concern has been expressed in some quarters that this could give rise to a perception at least of conflict of interest. It is a matter that has to be approached with some considerable care.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, mentioned, the Lord Chancellor has announced the start of the post-implementation review of the LASPO Act, thereby fulfilling the commitment made by Ministers during the Bill’s passage through Parliament in 2012. I hope that noble Lords will recognise that a modern justice system demands that all of these elements, not only legal aid, have to be brought together; essentially, what we are looking at is a jigsaw. When put together, it does seek to ensure access to justice.

The most recent reforms made to legal aid under and since LASPO were founded on the principle of ensuring that legal aid continues to be available for the highest-priority cases. It was important to take a balanced approach to legal aid, which is why the reforms within LASPO were founded on delivering better value for money for taxpayers by reducing the cost of the scheme and discouraging unnecessary adversarial litigation. It was important that some cases were removed from the scope of funding where alternative routes of resolution were or were to become available. It was also important that legal aid was focused on those in our society least able to pay for their representation.

The changes were of course subject to a significant amount of scrutiny during the passage of the LASPO Bill and they were debated extensively, with amendments being made, before they were approved by Parliament. Now, several years since the implementation of those landmark reforms, we are fulfilling our commitment to Parliament to conduct a review of the changes to legal aid. That is why we recently laid before Parliament a detailed post-legislative memorandum summarising how LASPO was implemented and making a preliminary assessment of its impact. In addition, the Lord Chancellor’s detailed post-implementation review of these changes will cover each issue that has been subject to a previous parliamentary commitment by Ministers. In that respect, we are listening to interested parties. Moreover, as indicated by the noble Baroness, we hope to publish our findings by the 2018 Summer Recess.

The noble Lord, Lord Bach, both in his commission’s report and in his remarks today, has raised the idea of a right to justice. A constitutional right to justice is, of course, not a new concept. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to the speech of Lord Reed in the recent Supreme Court judgment in the UNISON case. I shall quote only a short passage, which says that,

“the right of access to justice … has long been deeply embedded in our constitutional law”.

We would all acknowledge that. Sometimes it takes an exceptional Scottish lawyer to explain to the English the scope and impact of the English common law, and Lord Reed has done that yet again. The essence of the issue and our focus should not be to mull over a right which already exists, but rather how this right of access to justice manifests itself in a modern justice system, a point touched on by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. We are focused on ensuring that it is correctly supported by an effective framework of legal aid, a well-funded, modern court system, and alternative methods of dispute resolution, which were alluded to by several noble Lords. We want to give individuals the power to address their legal issues in a way that is right for them.

Ensuring that access to justice is supported by an effective framework of legal aid guided our latest step to protect and support victims of domestic abuse. I note the point that was made about ensuring that parties are aware of their rights and their ability to secure legal advice in such cases. I am sure that that will be looked at in the LASPO review. It is not enough to have the rights—we must ensure that people are aware of the existence of those rights and of how they can be accessed. We have laid a statutory instrument enabling victims of domestic violence to secure more support in taking an abusive former partner to court. In that context, the current five-year time limit on abuse evidence in the family courts will be scrapped, while the range of documents accepted as evidence of abuse will be widened. However, as I indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, we have some reservations about the idea of certification by the solicitor involved in the case. That is an area where we have worked other parties—including Rights of Women, Resolution, Women’s Aid and the Law Society—to ensure that we are doing all that we can to protect and support victims. I am grateful for the discussions on this point today, and I share the views and passion of your Lordships’ House for ensuring that victims have access to justice.

Another point that was touched on was the importance of early legal advice and being able to engage with people at a point in time when it may be feasible to resolve a dispute or issue without resorting to litigation. We talk about individuals exercising their right of access to justice, but it is important to remember that the court is not always the right solution. It is not just a financial consideration; there are other reasons why early legal advice may be appropriate. Access to such advice or information can help individuals to understand their options and it may dissuade them from pursuing court proceedings in circumstances where it is not the appropriate step to take to resolve their issues. That is why we have protected legal help in many cases and why we spent almost £100 million on legal help last year.

Where an alternative route is more appropriate, people should be empowered to pursue it without having to find a lawyer at a great cost to them or to the state. For instance, in cases involving separating couples, mediation or other forms of out-of-court dispute resolution can be less stressful and quicker than going to court—and it is certainly often cheaper than employing lawyers. It can help to reduce conflict after separation, which we know can lead to poor outcomes for children. So we continue to aim for greater use of alternative dispute resolution in such cases, such as when separating parents wish to resolve issues of child arrangements or finances. I note the observations made about where some difficulties may be encountered because, for example, there may be issues with the availability of expert evidence.

We have recently launched an online child arrangement information tool, which is intended to provide clear and concise information on the dispute resolution services that can help parents agree child arrangements, including mediation. I fully accept the importance of ensuring that such services are made available and that people become aware of them. We have also introduced a telephone helpline to provide legal advice in certain categories of law. Last year, there were more than 20,000 instances of advice being provided by that means. In addition, and in reflection of today’s society, we have also developed a user-friendly digital tool that makes it clear to people when legal aid is available to them. For people who are not eligible, the tool signposts them to alternative sources of free or commercial advice.

The matter of litigants in person was touched on and I appreciate the points that were made about their impact, or potential impact, on the court process. Since 2015, the Government have invested £5 million of funding to support litigants in person through the litigants in person support strategy—although I accept that that will not necessarily lead to the production of a single bundle, as alluded to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. However, it will hopefully improve the ability of litigants in person to pursue matters, particularly in the higher courts.

In some circumstances where publicly funded representation is clearly necessary but matters are generally out of scope of LASPO, funding can be provided through the exceptional case funding scheme. I hear the criticisms that have been made of that scheme, but I will make one point about it in so far as it relates to inquests, where more than half of the applications made in the last two years have been granted. The inquest process is of course important. It can be incredibly traumatic for those involved and it is important that we give as much assistance as we can where the bereaved have to consider the circumstances of the death of a relative. There again, early legal advice can be helpful in allowing families to understand what the process is and will be.

There are additional issues concerning deaths in custody. Noble Lords may be aware of the recent report on deaths in custody by Dame Elish Angiolini, which highlighted some of the issues regarding public participation at inquests in cases of that kind. We are working closely with the joint Ministerial Council on Deaths in Custody, and we have committed to update the Lord Chancellor’s guidance for these cases by the end of the year because they are clearly important.

I appreciate that this is an important debate, no matter when it comes in the House’s calendar, and I am glad of the opportunity to address this matter. As we go forward, I reaffirm our commitment to the post-implementation review of LASPO that is now under way and which I hope will address many of the questions raised in your Lordships’ House.

We are committed to looking forward to ensure access to justice for future generations. We are continuing to ensure that legal aid is made available to the most vulnerable. We are investing more than £1 billion to transform our courts and tribunals, and we are committed to delivering a modern justice system, today and into the future, that maintains its standing in the world.

I will very briefly touch on one or two of the particular points raised during the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, raised early advice as an essential element in any legal assistance process. We accept that. Indeed, we have been seeking to develop mediation and advice as being appropriate in this context.

Regarding statutory recognition of a right to justice, we suggest that that is already embedded into our common law. We have reservations about whether such statutory recognition could improve matters. Therefore, I express reservations about that.

My noble friend Lord Faulks indicated that it perhaps would not be appropriate—I believe this reflected observations by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas—to take the matter of spending for legal aid away from Parliament and government and essentially to subcontract it to a quango. There are very real political issues about these matters. They should ultimately rest with Parliament and government.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, referred to the need for an agency, an independent body, that was not subject to ministerial interference in the context of legal aid. I observe that the Legal Aid Agency operates free from ministerial interference. Indeed, there is a statutory prohibition on Ministers interfering in respect of any legal aid application. Therefore, there is that degree of independence already in the system.

The noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, alluded to the issue of those in custody and prisoners. I indicate first of all that spending in respect of legal aid for those in custody has increased recently. On the particular point he raised in the context of the recent Court of Appeal judgment, an amending statutory instrument is being drafted to reinstate legal aid in the three categories of cases highlighted in that judgment. Indeed, I reassure him that we hope to have that statutory instrument going forward in the near future.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, raised the interesting point that we have to address not just the issues of legal aid and access to justice but the issue of how we provide justice in this country. It may be that in some areas—inquests are a particular example—we will see further moves towards a more rigid, inquisitorial system that would benefit parties going forward. After all, the inquest was originally intended to be an inquisition, an inquisitorial system, and over the years it has rather grown arms and legs. I am certainly not suggesting a movement towards a civilian code or anything of that kind, but I do believe that the noble and learned Lord’s contribution underlines the fact that we are dealing with a rather broad and delicate ecosystem. We cannot just take legal aid out and put it back in; we have to look at the overall system to see how it is going to work.

If I do not mention noble Lords specifically, it is not because I am unconscious of their contributions but because I am slightly more conscious of the time, and of the fact that I hope I have addressed some of their points already. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, spoke of the distinction between the Rolls-Royce and the bicycle. Clearly, there are those who require the Rolls-Royce, but most of us are content with a bicycle and have been during our professional careers.

The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, raised certain issues about the provision of legal aid in Wales. I understand that there is intended to be a commission in Wales looking at the provision of justice—albeit we are talking about a single jurisdiction between England and Wales, there are certain specialities that are developing, particularly from statutory law.

I hope that I have covered the majority of the points that noble Lords raised. A number of noble Lords raised questions about early intervention, advice centres and the ability to seek advice before the need for court litigation. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, alluded to observations made in Westminster Hall by a fellow Minister. I note the observations that were made in that regard. Of course, the Ministry of Justice is undertaking a review of LASPO, and we will take into account all the interested parties’ submissions on that matter.

I hope that I have been able to address some of the points raised in what I acknowledge is an important debate, which had as its foundation the report of the commission undertaken by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and which we will take away and give consideration to. I am obliged to noble Lords.

Brexit: Human Rights

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Tuesday 12th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, on securing this important debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, said that human rights matter. I would go further: human rights are central to the way we live now and to the way we wish to live in the future. They are an integral part of the society of which we wish to be a part. It is not only that they matter but that they are there and will be retained.

Protection of human rights remains a priority for this Government. The principles that underpin our legal and justice framework have developed over many centuries, with the evolution of human rights at its heart. As the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, pointed out, history is important because it has taken time for these rights to develop, emerge, be recognised and upheld without qualification. We look back upon a long-standing tradition of liberty and human rights.

The noble Lord mentioned Magna Carta, which was rediscovered in the 17th century but nevertheless is a critical foundation of the rights we enjoy today. The 1689 Bill of Rights and the common law underpin much of what we have, including—as was pointed out in the recent Unison decision of the Supreme Court—the right of access to justice, which is essential to the maintenance of human rights. We also have the Human Rights Act 1998, which this Government are committed to retaining in the present Parliament.

Reference was made to the role that the United Kingdom has played in developing the international human rights framework—including in the Council of Europe—the European convention and the United Nations. We have recently been re-elected to the United Nations Human Rights Council and will be a part of that until at least 2019. That is an important step and position for the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom’s human rights framework is multi-layered and has developed over many years. Our departure from the European Union does not change our commitment to human rights, nor is there any reason why it should. The European Union began to recognise what it termed fundamental rights many decades ago. This initially occurred through the case law of the European Court of Justice and subsequently through EU legislation. The EU decided to reaffirm the rights and principles that it recognised in what became the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights—the charter, as it has been referred to by noble Lords. That was first proclaimed in 2000 and became legally binding in 2009 with the introduction of the Lisbon treaty.

It is important to stress that the charter did not create rights. It brought existing European Union and international rights and principles together into a single document—the charter—but it did not create them. EU fundamental rights in the charter then applied to member states only when they were acting within the scope of EU law. Now the United Kingdom has, despite the misgivings of many in this House and elsewhere, voted to leave the European Union, and the withdrawal Bill currently being discussed in the other place is designed to ensure that the United Kingdom exits the European Union with certainty, control and continuity. That is essential in the national interest. The Bill will save EU-derived domestic legislation, including UK legislation that has been passed to implement EU directives, and incorporate direct EU legislation and directly effective rights that arise from treaty articles into domestic law.

The substantive rights that provide the source law of the charter will be retained or converted into domestic law. Although the charter will not be retained after exit, non-incorporation of the charter into domestic law will not in itself affect the substantive rights that individuals already benefit from in the United Kingdom, as the charter was never the source of those rights. The Government remain fully committed to ensuring that there are strong human rights protections once we leave the European Union; we do not consider that those are in any way undermined by our decision not to incorporate the charter into domestic law.

The Government are committed to furthering the United Kingdom’s status as a global, outward-looking nation, contrary to the suggestion of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. We are playing an active, leading role in the world in that regard; I mentioned our position on the UN Human Rights Council. We will continue to support an international order in which rules govern state conduct, and be champions of British values of freedom, tolerance, democracy and the rule of law. We will continue to comply with our international human rights obligations and take action to tackle any abuse of those rights where we can.

Of course, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, the principal international treaty in this regard is the European Convention on Human Rights, which is given further effect domestically by the Human Rights Act. The Government have made clear their commitment to respecting and remaining a party to the convention. We will also continue to work with our European partners to improve the functioning and efficiency of the Strasbourg Court—particularly in the light of its enormous backlog of pending cases, which disrupts its ability to maintain the jurisprudence of the convention. Our commitment to European co-operation in this area and pan-European standards is as firm as ever. Of course, we remain members of the Council of Europe. In addition, as I believe the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, noted in his opening speech, we are signatories to the Council of Europe Convention On Preventing And Combating Violence Against Women And Domestic Violence—the Istanbul convention—and we are working towards meeting our commitment to ratifying it.

I turn to some other specific areas of rights where the UK is taking action. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, would agree that the United Kingdom is now recognised as a world leader on LGBT rights. We can take some comfort from our record but we cannot be complacent. We have made significant progress over the past 50 years, tackling some of the historic prejudices that existed in our laws and ensuring that LGBT people are involved in the issues that affect them. We are also seeking to tackle discrimination in wider society. Homophobic, biphobic and transphobic bullying in schools is clearly unacceptable, as is the disability-based bullying that was alluded to by the noble Baroness. We have invested some £3 million in a programme to tackle this bullying in primary and secondary schools in England. The programme is aimed at schools that currently have no or few effective measures in place to address the issue.

We are also looking to the future. In July this year, we launched a national online survey to gain the views of LGBT people living in the United Kingdom on what they think about public services. There are questions on health, education, safety, the workplace and more general questions about what it is to be an LGBT person in the United Kingdom. The survey received quite unprecedented feedback, with over 100,000 responses, making it the largest LGBT survey in the world. We will analyse those results closely and set out further steps to promote LGBT equality next year.

We are also committed to achieving gender equality—I noted, as has been mentioned, that more than half of the contributions in this important debate were from women; I certainly welcome that. We will be doing that through the 2015 UN sustainable development goals, which consist of 17 goals, one of which specifically focuses on achieving gender equality and women’s empowerment. Indeed, our Foreign Secretary wants our foreign policy consciously and consistently to deliver for women and girls, and he appointed the first FCO special envoy for gender equality in February. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office works closely with other departments to achieve our gender equality goals.

If I stray a little beyond my time I hope noble Lords will forgive me. Defending the right to freedom of religion or belief—a point touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Alton—remains a high priority for the Government. Freedom of religion or belief is a human right enshrined under the universal declaration and one that we respect. Indeed, in February the Prime Minister reiterated her commitment to,

“stand up for the freedom of people of all religions to practise their beliefs in peace and safety”.

Domestic violence again is a matter that has to be addressed in this context. We are committed to introducing a draft domestic violence and abuse Bill to demonstrate our commitment to, among other things, ratifying the Istanbul convention, which I mentioned before. There is a further ambitious package of non-legislative measures to be funded in that regard.

I turn to the particular comments made by noble Lords. Much was said by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, that I hope I have touched on already. I hope that I have, in a sense, been able to put some of his doubts to rest. While the general principles underpinning the charter are of critical importance, the law we retain after Brexit will ensure that the rights of individuals will be respected. In so far as the charter distinguishes between rights and principles—a point touched on by a noble Lord—we can of course enforce the rights, but we cannot enforce principles. However, they will remain relevant and material to the interpretation of the jurisprudence going forward in so far as it applies to the construction and applicability of rights relating to equality and other human rights. There was also the issue of EU case law post Brexit, which is addressed by Clause 6 of the Brexit Bill.

My noble friend Lord Faulks observed that the charter contains a fine statement of general principle. I hope I have addressed that point. Those principles of course are important, but they do not operate in the same way as rights.

The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, referred to concern about a lack of confidence and a need for the Government to set out a clear vision that there will be no dilution of human rights post Brexit. There is no intention that there should be a dilution of human rights post Brexit. The intention is that those rights that we enjoy and which underpin the charter—they are not created by the charter—should continue and be maintained.

On the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, I noticed that he proposes to put forward the genocide Bill. I will of course look at it and consider its terms. We have debated this on previous occasions. I understand his concern and his deep interest in this area.

My noble friend Lord Shinkwin had very particular points to make about the position of a commissioner in the context of disability. He added that he would ask me nothing. I am obliged to him for that, because it is beyond my brief to address the points that he raised, but I noted what he had to say.

The noble Lord, Lord Judd, opined that human rights are not an option and I hope that what I have said will reassure him that this Government do not regard them as anything like an option. We certainly do not regard them as a form of negotiating point. I wish to make that clear.

The noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton, indicated that there should be no regression. Again, I emphasise that there is no intention that there should be. She touched on some specific questions about how we will maintain protections post Brexit if there is no charter. Again I emphasise that the charter itself is not the source of rights; it is an expression of principles and rights that already exists, and already existed, in our domestic law. As to the issue of how one vindicates those rights, as the Solicitor-General observed in the other place, in so far as there is a question about that, the Government will consider and address it, if there are issues about whether certain rights have to be implemented in a different way after Brexit.

On the matter of immigration, one has to emphasise that there will not be an absolute bar on immigration. They are talking about free movement, and the two things are quite distinct. The immigration process is yet to be worked out and, as noble Lords are aware, there will be an immigration Bill which will address some of these issues.

My noble friend Lady Warsi suggested that human rights are not a priority for this Government, but I would dispute that. They remain central to this Government’s vision of a society. Whether it is the society that exists within the European Union or without it, it is a society that exists in Europe and exists internationally, and that has as one of its motivations a respect for the rule of law and respect for human rights, and in particular for equality.

The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, spoke about the issue of disabled people’s rights. Again, I simply underline that those rights will be retained and protected. As regards hate crime, of course it is an important issue. I hope that I have been able to give some reassurance about the Government’s recognition of it as an issue and the steps we are attempting to take to deal with it.

The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, alluded to the position of the Roma population in the United Kingdom. This Government are concerned about the inequalities experienced by the Roma and Traveller communities, particularly in the context of health and education, but there are other areas as well where issues arise. There has been a race disparity audit showing that these communities are among the most disadvantaged in British society and we agree that more needs to be done to ensure that these people are not excluded and not left behind.

The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, asked whether there are plans to water down employment and other rights by means of the powers given to Ministers under the EU Bill. That is not the intention. It is quite clear what the purpose of these powers is—it is to ensure that there is a smooth transition at the point when we leave the European Union with regard to the workability of our existing legislation. That is the aim of those particular powers.

I think I have touched on the observations from the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, and I hope I have responded to her concerns. But I would make one observation. She suggested—I might have misheard her—that people who want to leave the European Union, people who want a hard Brexit, do not have human rights values. I would dispute that, and I would reject it.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

I was referring to the sections of the Minister’s own party, the Conservative Party, that are driving for a hard Brexit and have led on it. They are not people who have been proud exponents of human rights. They have been great critics of the Human Rights Act and wanted to see its abolition. They have often spoken of withdrawing us from the European Convention on Human Rights. It is reasonable to make the connection between the desire to rid ourselves of Europe and the desire to rid ourselves of the human rights connections that we have with Europe. I think that is regrettable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not going to debate this at length, but I wholly reject the proposition that the noble Baroness advances. I simply do not accept it at all.

A series of questions were posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. Is equality before the law part of the United Kingdom’s law? Yes, of course; it is fundamental to our law. Is equality protected by United Kingdom law? Yes, of course it is. We do not have to rely on the EU charter for these rights; they already exist. The charter is an expression of rights and principles that already exist. I noted some specific questions and if the noble Baroness wishes, I will write to her to respond to those questions—I shall not attempt to address them now.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, sought to turn this into a party-political broadcast rather than a debate. I am not sure that is the way forward for a determination of these issues. I believe that we have fundamental beliefs in common on equality and human rights, and I reject the suggestions of xenophobia, or that there will be any loss of rights because we are losing the charter.

[Lord Judd]

The Minister suggests that my noble friend was turning this into a party-political broadcast. Does he recall that only yesterday afternoon at Question Time we were challenged from that side of the House on what our policy was? This afternoon my noble friend was giving it.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I was not here yesterday afternoon but I am obliged to the noble Lord for his intervention.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords—

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

Order!

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I was very happy to allow the noble Baroness to speak in the gap and to take her earlier intervention, but there is a question of time and I am not going to take a further intervention. I have to come back to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and say that I am pleased that the Labour Party has decided to put human rights at the centre of its policies—I thought they were always there. I certainly hope so. Human rights have always been at the centre of our policies. It is important that we recognise that and that we reject those intrusions on human rights that can come from any number of directions, be it on the grounds of disability, nationality or religion, including anti-Semitism.

I thank noble Lords for contributing to this debate and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, for raising this issue in the House.

House adjourned at 7.28 pm.

Selection of the President of Welsh Tribunals Regulations 2017

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Monday 4th December 2017 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 14 September be approved.

Considered in Grand Committee on 29 November

Motion agreed.

Criminal Justice: Interpretation and Translation Services

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Wednesday 29th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Coussins (CB)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper, and declare my interest as vice-president of the Chartered Institute of Linguists.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the ministry’s suite of language service contracts was designed to ensure value for money and affordability of the services provided by its suppliers. Given the importance that the ministry attaches to the provision of court interpretation, we have not felt it appropriate to set a target figure for cost savings for the provision, which is a demand-led service. Fulfilment of interpreter bookings is currently around 98%.

[Baroness Coussins]

My Lords, that sounds encouraging, but there has been a long-standing concern that the quality and qualifications of some of the interpreters sent to our courts do not match up to the demands of the job, which results in cases needing to be rescheduled. Is the Minister satisfied that the new contract for quality assurance can provide much useful information when it scrutinises only 1% of assignments, and can he say whether interpreters’ pay and conditions have improved under thebigword contract? Poor employment practice was one of the reasons why large numbers of high-level interpreters boycotted the service previously.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the new contracts came into place on 31 October 2016. They include a contract in respect of quality assurance, which has proved extremely effective. Indeed, the number of complaints about the service provided has dropped quarter by quarter. As regards the numbers of interpreters available, 4,660 have now registered with the new contractors. We are proceeding on that basis; it is at present a success.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, may I support the noble Baroness in her remarks? Does my noble and learned friend agree that the provision of honest and professional interpretation in criminal courts is absolutely central to the proper construction of many cases? Does he also agree that that applies to many civil cases as well, particularly family work and immigration? What public provision is now made for those classes of case, and if none, would he consider the position further?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I agree with both the propositions advanced by my noble friend. We have no difficulty at present with the provision of interpretation services in respect of these matters.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this month there have been at least six reported instances of cases being adjourned for lack of an interpreter, and there may be more. This is part of a continuing pattern which disrupts court business and wastes resources. Does the MoJ have any new proposals to ensure that needs for interpreters are identified and arrangements made for their attendance earlier and more efficiently?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We have no proposals to alter the present system, which works effectively. I point out that there are around 500 to 550 bookings for interpreters each day, so the number he refers to—six—is a very small proportion of the overall interpretation service.

[Lord Suri (Con)]

My Lords, will we be able to see that justice is being done without providing proper translation services, either in criminal or other proceedings?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is clearly critical to the administration of justice and to the issue of access to justice that full and adequate interpretation services should be available to the courts and to those who have recourse to them.

[The Lord Bishop of Leeds]

My Lords, there is clearly a difference between interpretation and translation. I speak as a former professional linguist. What about quality control? Will the Minister comment on that? Being able to deal with a language is not the same as being a competent interpreter, sometimes of very delicate matters.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I entirely agree with the observation made by the right reverend Prelate. That is why the present contract provision includes a quality assurance provision by the Language Shop, to ensure that not only are the appropriate levels of qualification available but also the appropriate skills.

[Lord Judd (Lab)]

Does the noble and learned Lord agree that there is a great deal of anxiety about people’s experiences with interpretation? It is not just a matter of making sure that an interpreter is there—the quality of the interpretation is essential. Surely with the whole principle of the quality of justice, and of justice being seen and felt to be done, one cannot overestimate the importance of interpretation and its quality. That must apply to civil law as well as criminal law and certainly to the immigration sector.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We are confident about the quality of the translation and interpretation services provided to the courts at present, which have been provided under the present contractual regime since 31 October 2016.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the Minster will know that this is an obligation of an EU directive. I was a rapporteur in the European Parliament; the UK Government chose to opt into this. Not only do we maintain standards that help standards across the whole EU but, if we Brexit, we will obviously want to keep up those standards so that we can operate such things as the European arrest warrant without our operation of it being called into question.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Of course, that is one of the objectives of the withdrawal Bill, which noble Lords will have the opportunity to pass in the near future to ensure that we maintain our legal obligations in that context. Over and above the European regulation—I believe it is a regulation and not a directive—there is of course the convention right under Article 6 and the common-law right of access to justice.

Selection of the President of Welsh Tribunals Regulations 2017

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Wednesday 29th November 2017 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Selection of the President of Welsh Tribunals Regulations 2017.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

By way of background, there are seven devolved tribunals that are the responsibility of the Welsh Government: the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales, the Special Educational Needs Tribunal for Wales, the Agricultural Land Tribunal for Wales, the Adjudication Panel for Wales, the Residential Property Tribunal Wales, the Welsh Language Tribunal, and a tribunal covering the registered school inspectors appeals panels and the registered nursery education inspectors appeals panels.

There are 41 judges currently appointed to those tribunals. Each tribunal has its own judicial lead but these judges have limited access to senior judicial leadership within Wales, which is inconsistent with other judicial officeholders in England and Wales. Sir Wyn Williams, a retired High Court judge, has been undertaking an informal leadership role, but he does not have any statutory powers.

To address this, Part 3 of the Wales Act 2017 created a new post: the President of Welsh Tribunals. The president has responsibility for making arrangements about the training, guidance and welfare of Welsh tribunal members, as well as for representing their views to Welsh Ministers and other Members of the National Assembly for Wales. The president will also be able to give practice directions and will be responsible for deploying tribunal members between the different Welsh tribunals, as well as between the UK-wide tribunals and the Welsh tribunals.

The president will also be responsible for establishing and communicating the judicial strategic direction for the Welsh tribunals. He or she will provide leadership and build effective relationships with the judicial leads of the Welsh tribunals, as well as with the Welsh Government’s Welsh Tribunals Unit, the Lord Chief Justice, the Judicial College, and Ministers and officials in the Welsh Government, relating to policy issues affecting the Welsh tribunals.

Paragraph 2 of Schedule 5 to the Wales Act 2017 provides two routes for the appointment of the President of Welsh Tribunals. The first is by agreement between the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Chancellor and the Welsh Ministers with regard to a person who is, or has been, a judge of the Court of Appeal or the High Court. The second route, in default, is following selection by the Judicial Appointments Commission.

If agreement cannot be reached between the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Chancellor and the Welsh Ministers on the appointment, paragraph 2 of Schedule 5 to the Wales Act 2017 requires the Lord Chief Justice to make a request to the Judicial Appointments Commission for a person to be selected for appointment to the office of President of Welsh Tribunals.

Elements of the procedure for appointment by the Judicial Appointments Commission are set out in the Act itself. These include that the Judicial Appointments Commission must appoint a selection panel which must include at least two members who are non-legally qualified, at least two judicial members and at least two members of the Judicial Appointments Commission.

The Lord Chancellor is also required to make additional provision about the process to be applied. That is what these regulations do. In particular, they specify that the selection panel should consist of five members and make further provision about the appointment of people to that panel, including that the chairperson of the panel is to be a person designated by the Lord Chief Justice who holds, or has held, office as a judge of the Supreme Court, a Lord Justice of Appeal or a puisne judge of the High Court.

The regulations also make further provision relating to consultation during the process and to the reporting of the panel’s selection to the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chief Justice’s options when deciding on that selection. In order to be consistent with the relevant primary legislation and the nature of the new office, the appointment process closely reflects that which applies to the selection of the Senior President of Tribunals.

The Wales Act 2017 established the role of the President of Welsh Tribunals and the requirements for the appointment of a judicial officeholder to that office. These regulations allow that appointment to be made. I therefore commend the regulations to your Lordships and beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I very much welcome these regulations, although I hope that the machinery that they set up will not be used, because of course the alternative way is by agreement between the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and Welsh Ministers.

At a time when the independence of the judiciary has been under attack, when we have heard expressions in the press such as, “Enemies of the people”, and when the press has questioned the impartiality of judges in many ways and the degree to which they are in touch, it is very important that the independence of the judiciary in Wales should be emphasised. In most of these tribunals, one of the parties concerned will almost certainly be the Welsh Government or local government, and it is very necessary that the administrative tribunal should be seen to be impartial.

I am very pleased that my old friend Sir Wyn Williams has been acting in an informal capacity as President of Welsh Tribunals—we used to meet on many a rugby field in our youth. Hopefully, he will continue in that role, and maybe he will be a candidate for president. I could not imagine the independence of the judiciary being in better hands to give leadership and direction. So many of the 41 judges who are sitting on these tribunals are lay persons without necessarily any lengthy experience in the law, so it is important that they should be properly trained and properly led. I am sure that that has been done under Sir Wyn Williams and that it will continue under these regulations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I of course defer to the experience of the two noble Lords from Wales, who clearly have a greater insight into the position than either the Minister—with due respect—or I could have. Of course, I join them in welcoming the instrument. However, according to the Explanatory Note, the consultation process was very limited, as it was apparently confined to officials of the Welsh Government and the Lord Chief Justice. Was there any consideration with the professions in Wales about this? Presumably many members of the legal profession would have an interest in the matter.

On the concern about diversity, I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord is in a position to say—if not, perhaps he could subsequently advise me—what is the present composition of tribunal membership and chairs of the tribunals in terms of gender and ethnicity. Clearly there is an implicit aspiration at paragraph 12.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum to promote diversity. I would be interested to know what the starting point is. Although the question of developing a baseline against which progress can be measured is apparently still incorrect, it would be helpful to see where we are starting from, if not today by a note to those Members present.

This is clearly a welcome step forward. One hopes that it will work well and in particular that the diversity issue will be addressed properly and in a timely way. I join other noble Lords in welcoming the regulations and trust that their impact will be beneficial.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords and to the noble Baroness for their contributions. I begin with the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. I entirely agree with his observations about the importance of maintaining the independence of the judiciary and, equally, of defending the judiciary from inappropriate attack. There is an important distinction to be made between what can be regarded as justified criticism and what is tantamount to abuse. We have to underline that distinction if we are properly to defend the judiciary. Of that there can be no doubt.

On the question of whether these powers should be used, I again entirely agree with the noble Lord. This is the alternative mechanism to be employed, but it is contemplated that it will be employed only in circumstances where there is a breakdown in agreement between various parties. It is not something that is contemplated, but because the Act makes provision for this alternative mechanism it is only appropriate that we should have regulations in place so that, if necessary, it can be employed.

On the matter of who will be the president of the Welsh tribunals and his role so far as defence of tribunal members is concerned, remembering that some of those tribunal members are lay members, it is doubly important there is somebody there who can advise and defend their interests. One of the responsibilities of the President of Welsh Tribunals will be not only the training and guidance of members of the tribunals, but consideration of their welfare. That again is important.

On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, on the Welsh language, of course we recognise the importance of the Welsh language in the context of proceedings in Wales, but we have to remember that we are making an appointment to the judiciary of England and Wales. While the proceedings of those tribunals may take place in Welsh as distinct from English, it is not considered appropriate that we should extend the criteria for the appointment of this post to include the Welsh language itself.

[Lord Wigley]

I hear what the noble and learned Lord says. There are numerous bodies that have responsibilities that go beyond the borders of Wales where the status of the Welsh language is recognised. I would not have been surprised if there had been no provision at all for equality here on the basis that other legislation covers it, but if we are writing the equality of men and women and racial equality into this, surely it is not unreasonable to write the language in because some of the work will be undertaken in Wales, if not all of it.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Lord’s observations, language is not an equality issue in that context in the same way as the other criteria he alluded to. It is a matter of context. Of course it is important we recognise that the use of English and Welsh have equal demands on any tribunal process in Wales, but that is quite distinct from how you go about the appointment criteria.

[Lord Wigley]

I am sorry; I do not want to labour this unduly. The language question has, to a large extent, been put to rest in Wales over recent decades after there was a lot of strong feeling about it on the basis that there was recognition of language being an equality criterion. I do not know whether it is technically so in the legal framework here but, surely in terms of the spirit of what is being done here, it should be accommodated.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, there is no issue about whether an individual applicant would be prejudiced whether he spoke only Welsh or only English or both. That is why I say, in this context, it does not arise for the purposes of this schedule. If an applicant came forward who did not speak English but spoke only Welsh, there would be no issue about that applying to the suitability of his appointment.

[Lord Wigley]

May I help the Minister? I do not want to see issues like this boiling up to become another bullet in a language war, as it were. It is the sort of thing that we need a harmonious approach towards. Equality is regarded as being relevant in a language context, as in other contexts, and therefore, if it is necessary to write it into the terms as they are here, I cannot see why they are not broad enough to encapsulate language, but I have made my point.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

If I can make one short addition, it is that these regulations are concerned with the technical operation of judicial appointments and therefore, again, our view is that the question does not arise in this context.

I turn to territorial application. My understanding is that technically, in the context of tribunal appointments, we are looking across the UK and not just at England and Wales, which is why the regulation extends as it does. There are circumstances in which tribunal membership can move between the various jurisdictions.

On the consultation process and diversity in particular, diversity is of course taken extremely seriously. I believe that we have some figures with regard to tribunal membership. I am not sure that I have figures with regard to the chairmanship of tribunals. As regards male and female membership, about 40% of tribunal members are female. In the senior courts, the figures are of course different but, for tribunals, the figure is as high as it is anywhere. As far as BAME in tribunals is concerned, the number is about 10%. Interestingly, perhaps, we even have a figure for those who are of a non-barrister background. I am not quite sure what a non-barrister background amounts to, but 66% of tribunal judges come from a non-barrister background. On whether that is regarded as a good thing or a bad thing, I will not comment. If the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, wishes to have figures about the chairmanship of tribunals, and their gender mix, I can undertake to write to him, if those figures are available. I do not know if they are; I know that the overall figures are there, as I have just mentioned. That, I hope, addresses the points that noble Lords have raised.

Motion agreed.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 6th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Skidelsky]

With great respect, we are concerned with the permanence of arrangements set up and put into primary legislation. The chairman of IPSO is not there for ever, and the code can be rewritten whenever the committee decides to do so.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, of course, we appreciate the contributions from all sides of the Committee on this issue, but let us be clear: this Bill is about data protection—it is not about press regulation. It is not about distinguishing between journalists, nor between the regulators they may or may not belong to.

The Government are committed to defending not only hard-won liberties but the operation of a free press. That is a fundamental principle of any liberal democracy. This Bill seeks to preserve the balance found in the 1998 Act, where journalists can process personal and special categories of personal data, but only when their processing is in the public interest and the substantial public interest respectively. The Bill also seeks to ensure that journalists are exempt from compliance with certain data protection requirements where to do so would undermine the operation of a free press, a key part of a strong and effective democracy where Governments are held to account and corruption and criminal behaviour can be challenged. No one seeks to condone the past misbehaviour of individual media organisations, nor to legitimise it.

Amendment 42 is moved by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. As we discussed last week in reference to Part 2 of Schedule 1, there is an exhaustive list of the types of processing which could be in the substantial public interest. When the Government consider that processing of a particular type will not always be in the substantial public interest, the Bill makes it a requirement that the data controller satisfies himself that any particular instance of processing is in the substantial public interest. Amendment 42 concerns the condition allowing journalists to process data in connection with unlawful acts and dishonesty, as dealt with in paragraph 10. The Bill, however, needs to balance freedom of expression with privacy and it may be that in some cases an act of dishonesty is not important enough and does not engage the substantial public interest to the extent that it justifies the processing of sensitive data by journalists. That is why the distinction is made.

To pick up on a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, about continuity of arrangements in the 1998 Act, this processing condition is the same as that which currently appears under the existing Data Protection Act. It would appear that journalists have been dealing with that effectively and making the appropriate judgments for the last 20 years. I hope that that goes some way to explaining why we resist Amendment 42.

On Amendment 87B, I reassure the noble Lord that the specific inclusion of “photographic material” in paragraph 24(2)(a) of the schedule is unnecessary. This is because photographic material is likely to fall within one or more of the categories listed in that paragraph—for example, journalistic material or artistic material. We suggest that there is no requirement for express reference to photographic material. As for the point that was raised with the noble Lord by the NUJ, I think, about the use, the test is,

“with a view to publication”.

As long as that test is met, it does not necessarily follow that there must have been publication in order to legitimise the material in question. The position would, of course, be radically different if one had regard to one of the amendments moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins.

Amendment 87E would remove the list of codes and guidelines in paragraph 24 of Schedule 2 that help controllers assess whether a publication would be in the public interest for data protection purposes and would replace it, as I understand it, with the term “appropriate codes”. I confess that I am a lawyer, to respond to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, or at least it is alleged that I am. That would certainly make it more difficult, as a matter for interpretation, for both publishers and the Information Commissioner to evaluate whether the publication of an individual’s personal data was in the public interest. Indeed, rather than the clarity of a list, one could instead be faced with years of potential litigation before an adequate body of case law was in place to establish what was appropriate. That is why we suggest it is appropriate that there should be a specific list, as reflected in the current legislation, the 1998 Act.

Amendments 88 and 89A concern the specific industry codes listed in the Bill. I start by saying that the codes currently listed in the Bill reflect those that are listed in the existing legislation. The editors’ code listed in the Bill—now enforced by IPSO rather than the Press Complaints Commission, I acknowledge —is one of these, and the Information Commissioner has already reflected this change in her current guidance on Section 32 of the existing Act. That follows from the Data Protection (Designated Codes of Practice) (No. 2) Order 2000, which set out the various codes of practice and included the editors’ code of practice. While there is a suggestion that the editors’ code of practice might change, in the light of any such change the Information Commissioner’s view and guidance as to the applicability of that code may also change. So it is not as if it is entirely without control.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

The Minister said that it could change, but the word IPSO is actually in the Bill, so I do not quite understand the point that the Minister has just made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Let me elaborate on the point for a moment to make it clear. IPSO did not exist in 1998; the editors’ code did and therefore the editors’ code was incorporated as such by reference to the 1998 Act and the 2000 order. The relevant editors’ code is now known as the IPSO code. It is essentially the same code, as I understand it. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, is shaking his head on this point, but it is essentially the editors’ code that is now incorporated within the IPSO code.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

I could not resist jumping up. I think the nub of the argument is the four letters IPSO. It is an editors’ code. IPSO is a separate body. I think there would be less concern if it were just simply the editors’ code because we understand what that is. That would be the right reference, but I think we will return to this later.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The terms of the editors’ code are now referred to as the IPSO code, but I take the noble Lord’s point and I will take away and consider whether there is any material issue about using the designation of that code in the schedule. However, it is, with respect, essentially the editors’ code as it was originally recognised. As I understand it, that is reflected in the Information Commissioner’s current guidance under reference to Section 32, which is why it appears in the schedule in the form that it does.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I shall be corrected in due course if I am wrong, but I think the position is that the editors’ code was the code that was formulated under the PCC, and then when Sir Alan Moses became chair of IPSO the code was then amended to strengthen it—but I shall be corrected if that turns out to be mistaken.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Lord is quite right that it had its origin as the editors’ code before the PCC, but I am reflecting the fact that the Information Commissioner, being aware of the genesis of that code and its approval, has, as I understand it, under current guidance under reference to Section 32 of the existing Act acknowledged it as a relevant code. It seems to me that we may be arguing around designation rather than content, and I will give further consideration to the question of designation.

Removing that code—I will call it “that code” for present purposes—as proposed in the amendments would be a quite extraordinary step. Whatever one might think of IPSO, we should recognise that it has more than 2,500 members, including most of the major tabloids and broadsheets. Removing the code from the Bill would therefore remove protections for the vast majority of our press industry and cause significant detriment to what is a free press.

No codes adopted by a Press Recognition Panel-approved regulator are listed—and of course there is only Impress in that context. Under current legislation the Information Commissioner’s guidance on Section 32 does not include that code. That does not mean that such a code cannot be included in the future. However, before amending the list of codes, the current and proposed legislation makes it clear that the Secretary of State must consult the Information Commissioner. The self-regulator Impress has applied for its standards code to be included in the schedule, and the Secretary of State is currently considering that application—but in due course, once she has considered the application, she will have to refer to the Information Commissioner and consult her about that application.

I should also emphasise that the current list of codes, allowing for the point about designation, does not represent an endorsement of any one press regulator over another. This is about ensuring that the codes listed are appropriate, having regard to the need for data protection.

It is also worth noting that the exemption the Bill provides to those processing data for special purposes will be available to all journalists where the criteria set out in paragraph 24(2) of Schedule 2 are met. Where a publication is subject to one of the listed codes of conduct, it must take that code into account when determining whether publication is in the public interest. However, although the commissioner’s current guidance emphasises that compliance with industry codes will help demonstrate compliance, those publications that are not subject to a code are not somehow excluded from qualifying under the relevant exemptions, if they meet the three-part test in paragraph 24.

I appreciate that the intention of Amendment 91 is to ensure that we interpret the notions relating to journalism broadly and, in doing so, protect the right to freedom of expression. However, there is no requirement for this amendment if one has regard to Clause 184, the relevant interpretation clause, which makes it clear and underlines that material need be available only to a section of the public, and that would include those who subscribe by way of a fee for particular access to material. So these exemptions will extend to the sort of body that was referred to by the noble Lord in relation to Amendment 91. If anything, there is duplication, because we have not only paragraph 24(9), which refers to the public and a “section of the public”, but Clause 184, which defines the public by reference to, and includes, a section of the public. I believe that there was an earlier proposal to take paragraph 24(9) out in order to avoid that duplication.

I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and supported by my noble friend Lord Attlee. Article 85 of the GDPR requires member states to reconcile the right of protection of personal data with the right to freedom of expression and information, which is of course embraced by the European Convention on Human Rights. Although like, clearly, other Members of the Committee, I have great sympathy for the noble Baroness’s own experience, I firmly believe that the Bill strikes the right balance in reconciling these interests and aligns with the requirements of the regulation.

By contrast, the proposed amendments seek to reset that balance, so that the right to personal information privacy trumps that of the right to freedom of expression and information. This would be inconsistent with Article 85, which recognises the special importance of freedom of expression and provides a wide power to derogate from the regulation for processing for the special purposes. That point was elaborated by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, when he underlined the importance of the freedom of the press in this context.

Amendment 87A seeks to amend the journalistic data protection exemption to make it available only where the processing of data is necessary for publication, rather than simply being undertaken with a view to publication. I fear that this does not reflect the realities of how journalists work and how stories, including the most sensitive and important pieces of investigative journalism, are put together and published. A journalist will not know what is necessary until the data has been gathered, reviewed and assessed.

Amendments 87C and 87D relate to what factors the controller must take into account when considering whether publication of data would be in the public interest. The amendments would remove the requirement on the controller to take account of the special importance of the public interest in freedom of expression and information, and make the exemption available only where, objectively, the likely interference with privacy resulting from the processing of the data is outweighed by the public interest.

Controllers already have to consider issues of privacy when considering the public interest. But this amendment goes too far in saying that public interest can be trumped by privacy, weighting the test away from freedom of expression. This is again contrary to Article 85, which requires a reconciliation of these rights. I understand the noble Baroness’s intent here, and the harm that she seeks to prevent, but the rebalancing that she suggests goes too far.

Finally, Amendments 89B and 91A aim to narrow the exemptions for journalists who are not members of an approved regulator as defined by the Crime and Courts Act 2013. Fundamentally, these provisions are about protections that journalists should be able to legitimately rely on in going about their important work. We should view these clauses through that lens—as vital protections that give journalists the ability to inform us about the world in which we live and to effectively hold those in power to account.

The Government do not condone the past behaviour of individual media organisations, nor, as I noted earlier, do we seek to legitimise it. Equally, though, we do not think the problems that Sir Brian Leveson and others have identified can, or indeed should, be fixed through the medium of data protection law. Indeed, the Government feel strongly that these important protections for journalists should be maintained.

We must strike the right balance in reconciling the right to privacy with the right to freedom of expression and information. I hope I have gone some way towards explaining how the Bill seeks to do that. I hope I have addressed the concerns that have been expressed through the amendments, and I urge noble Lords to withdraw them.

Probation Contracts

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Tuesday 31st October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government when the review of probation contracts, due for completion in April this year, will be published.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, we undertook an internal review of the probation system and, as a result, made changes to community rehabilitation company contracts in the summer. Details of these changes were contained in a Written Ministerial Statement from Minister Gyimah on 19 July. We are continuing to explore further improvements that could be made to the delivery of probation services and will set out at a later stage any changes that are made as a result of this work.

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. Clearly, all is not well with probation. Following a whole series of disappointingly and devastatingly bad reports by the chief inspector, the Justice Select Committee launched an inquiry. Following the bad contracting, during the summer the Ministry of Justice had to bail out community rehabilitation companies to the tune of £277 million, which it can ill afford. Many of the warnings in the official impact assessment that the rushed Transforming Rehabilitation agenda had a higher than average risk of failure have been proved correct. Can the Minister tell the House what the Government are going to do about probation? Will they make time for a debate on the subject before the end of the year?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

On that last point, I cannot say that the Government will be able to make time for a debate on the subject before the end of the year. On the suggestion of bad contracting, I would point out that contracts were entered into with 21 CRCs, and that those contracts encountered some financial difficulty for one particular reason—namely, it was originally anticipated that some 80% of those undertaking probation would be referred to the 21 community rehabilitation companies. In the event, only about 60% of those subject to probation supervision were referred to the companies, and that impacted directly upon their financial model as determined under the original contracts. For that reason, interim arrangements were made with the CRCs in the year 2016-17, and in the current year. However, the figure of £277 million referred to by the noble Lord is not a fixed figure: it may have to be met, depending on the performance of the CRCs.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, morale in Northumbria’s probation service and CRC is at a low level because of understaffing, with 50% of officers leaving the service, excessive workloads, less supervision and the need to concentrate on high-risk cases at the expense of other cases. This is exemplified by case loads of 40, including four to five high-risk cases, now being replaced by much higher case loads, with a greater proportion of high-risk cases and problems with escalating cases from the CRCs to the National Probation Service. What do the Government regard as a satisfactory case load for officers to manage in terms of overall numbers and the balance between high-risk and other cases?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There is no fixed proportion as between officers and the number of persons being supervised. That will depend upon the particular CRC and the circumstances in which it is engaged with the individual. The National Probation Service is in the course of recruiting 1,400 additional staff. In addition, the CRC contracts require providers to ensure that they have sufficient adequately trained staff in place. Indeed, results tend to bear that out. Nearly two-thirds of CRCs have reduced the number of people reoffending in the past year, according to statistics up to June 2017.

[Lord Trefgarne (Con)]

My Lords, is it not the case that the probation arrangements relating to those prisoners serving indeterminate sentences need to be brought up to date as a matter of urgency, since many of those prisoners should have been released long ago?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly, there is an issue over the supervision of those subject to IPP sentences. The circumstances in which they come before the Parole Board are determined under existing rules. Those are always under consideration.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, just last month, the Chief Inspector of Probation laid out two conditions that she thought ought to be in the review: first, the community rehabilitation companies should have their finances put on a stable basis; secondly, these companies should be incentivised for success. Will the Minister heed the advice of his chief inspector, and will the Government meet this requirement as urgently as possible so that these companies can get on with the job of reducing reoffending, getting people into work and making sure that our prisons are not so overcrowded?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We are of course conscious of the recommendations made by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Probation, which is why we undertook the task in the summer of ensuring that the CRCs were properly financed. As a consequence of that, during the year 2016-17 an additional £37 million was made available, and in contract year four—that is, the first three months of this year—a further £22 million has been made available for the CRCs so that they can meet their commitments. Over and above that, I can confirm that the CRCs are incentivised under the terms of their present contracts to achieve results, and that will remain the position.

[Lord Laming (CB)]

My Lords, the prison population has never been as great as it is today. Is it not therefore a serious matter that the Government should ensure that courts have available to them a robust, rigorous and serious range of non-custodial penalties? The probation service is central to that.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I agree with the noble Lord’s observations. In that connection, I would observe that, since February 2015, statutory supervision has been extended to a further 40,000 offenders who are otherwise sentenced to a period of imprisonment of less than 12 months—so that has increased the numbers subject to supervision. But clearly, we have regard to the extent to which community sentences and suspended sentence orders operate effectively. It is noted in the statistics published—

[A noble Lord]

Too long.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord.

It is noted in the statistics published on 26 October 2017 that the extent of further offending is lower in the case of community sentences.