Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) (Amendment) Rules 2018

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd May 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That the draft Rules laid before the House on 28 March be approved.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the statutory instrument before us today updates the procedure of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission so that it reflects new bail provisions in the Immigration Act 2016, which I had the opportunity to bring before this House on behalf of the Home Office in the then Immigration Bill. It also implements measures included in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 allowing appellants to appeal directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the Court of Appeal. Related to the second point, it also makes changes to the time limits for applying for permission to appeal to make them consistent with the High Court.

For noble Lords who are not familiar with it, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, more generally known as SIAC, is a specialist tribunal which deals with challenges to immigration and asylum decisions made by the Home Office, such as decisions to deport a person or to refuse them leave to remain. Challenges to such decisions are usually heard by the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or the High Court. However, when a decision is made for reasons of national security or international relations, or is made relying on evidence which it would not be in the public interest to disclose, any challenge is heard instead by SIAC.

SIAC is different from other immigration tribunals in that it has the ability to operate a process known as the closed material procedure, which allows sensitive material that the Home Secretary intends to use in his response to the appeal to be protected. In the closed material procedure part of the hearings, appellants and their legal representatives are excluded from the court but are represented by special advocates. These are lawyers who have undergone strict security vetting and are of the highest integrity and ability. The system of special advocates is designed to provide a balance between the right to a fair hearing and the need to protect national security.

The first piece of legislation to which this rule amendment is designed to give effect is Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016, which simplifies the previous framework with a single power of immigration bail. This allows for illegal immigrants, including foreign national offenders, who are awaiting removal to be released subject to conditions if detention is not appropriate. Financial conditions were also introduced to replace recognizances, which in this context are undertakings to pay a sum of money in the event that bail conditions are breached, in England and Wales and bail bonds in Scotland. This statutory instrument will bring the SIAC procedure rules in line with the new bail provisions in the Immigration Act 2016.

The other piece of legislation that we are concerned with is the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 which, among other things, extended the concept of cases leap-frogging to the Supreme Court, extending it from just civil cases in the High Court to include cases in the Upper Tribunal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal and SIAC. Leap-frogging will allow SIAC appellants to apply for a certificate which will allow them to appeal SIAC’s decision directly to the Supreme Court without first going to the Court of Appeal, provided they can demonstrate that their case raises a point of law of general public importance. Leap-frogging is not a new concept; it has been allowed for civil cases in the High Court since the Administration of Justice Act 1969. This statutory instrument will bring SIAC into line with other courts on the same level of the appellate system.

The final change brought about by this statutory instrument is to increase the time limit for making an application for permission to appeal, which will bring it into line with time limits in the High Court.

To conclude, the draft rule amendment before us today makes technical but necessary changes to the procedures used by SIAC to make sure they are consistent with measures already set out in primary legislation, namely the Immigration Act 2016 and the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. We have also taken the opportunity to make time limits for permission to appeal consistent with those in the High Court. I beg to move.

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[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for a very clear explanation of the provisions of this statutory instrument. I note that in the House of Commons Delegated Legislation Committee, all of 11 minutes were spent on this matter. The Minister has provided us with somewhat more information than was provided on that occasion. Is he in a position to indicate the number of cases expected? The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to a very limited number, but is it anticipated that it will remain at a low level, or is there likely to be any growth?

Can the Minister also make some reference to the condition of the asylum centres where, presumably, some of these applicants will be held pending the outcome of their cases? Of course, great concern has been voiced about the management of some of these establishments. I confess that this issue is not directly related to the statutory instrument, but it is a matter of concern and I would be pleased if the Minister could say that the Government are looking seriously at the management of these places, whatever the outcome of the applications by the individuals involved.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions. We consider that this instrument is necessary to make sure that the SIAC procedure rules are consistent with the primary legislation, as has been acknowledged. SIAC does of course perform an essential function in dealing with appeals without compromising national security.

On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and followed up by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, there have indeed been about 14 cases before SIAC in the past year. There is only one party on bail from SIAC at present, pending a determination by the commission, so the use of these powers is extremely limited and I am not aware of any indication that that will increase in the foreseeable future.

On the point raised by my noble friend Lord Hodgson, I am not aware of the current position on re-interview by special advocates, but I will determine what the current procedural position is and write to him on that and place a copy of the letter in the Library. On the point about the condition of centres where persons are held pending determinations by the commission, I am not in a position to comment upon any adverse management issues at present, but I will inquire of the appropriate department as to what current work, if any, is ongoing with regard to that issue. Again, I will write to the noble Lord and place a copy of that letter in the Library.

Motion agreed.

Sexual Offences Legislation

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have, if any, to reform sexual offences legislation.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government recognise the importance of keeping sexual offences legislation under review. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 was amended in 2015 and again in 2017. We are currently reviewing the law around upskirting and considering the wider law on non-consensual photography.

[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab)]

My Lords, given that Mr Harvey Proctor has launched a civil action in the High Court, revealing in his particulars of claim the full name and identity of the man “Nick” who trashed the international reputation of Sir Edward Heath and others, and in so far as the public interest provisions under court procedure rules, which deny anonymity in the Proctor action, are in conflict with anonymity provisions in sexual offences legislation, surely the cloak of lifetime anonymity should not be extended to false accusers such as “Nick”, whose full name is now plastered across the internet worldwide. This was never, never, never the intention of Parliament. Is it not about time that we reviewed the law on anonymity?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, lifetime anonymity that is extended to complainants may be removed. Indeed, those complainants who are found to have made false and misleading claims regarding sexual conduct may be subject to prosecution.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, is the noble and learned Lord aware of the case, highlighted on Channel 4 last night and again in the Times this morning, of a defendant who was arrested for rape in 2015, charged 18 months later, suspended from his job without pay and whose case was dropped by the CPS yesterday? Are such cases the result of a failure in the law to protect the innocent—to uphold the principle of being innocent until proven guilty—or are they a failure of the police and the CPS properly to investigate such cases? What do the Government intend to do about it?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not going to comment on the particulars of an individual case. However, police guidance is clear that the name of a suspect should not be released before they are charged. The naming of people who have been charged with a sexual offence is consistent with the principle of open justice.

[Baroness Corston (Lab)]

My Lords, I draw the Minister’s attention to an item in today’s Times, which states:

“Google is helping its users to uncover the identity of rape victims whose anonymity is protected by law”.


What action will or could the Government take?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Again, I am not in a position to say what action the Government will take with regard to such a matter, but clearly such conduct could potentially be regarded as a contempt of court.

[Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble and learned friend agree that when, in cases such as those of Sir Edward Heath—there would be many others such as Cliff Richard and Paul Gambaccini—people’s names are leaked or made public because the police are on a public fishing expedition and no charge is made, there is no formal way in which they can be acquitted? Therefore, their reputation is permanently damaged.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

We quite recognise the danger to a person’s reputation where their name is leaked prior to charge. That should not occur, as I indicated before. That does not mean that they do not have civil means of redress. The noble Lord referred to the case of Cliff Richard, who I understand has undertaken a civil course for redress in these circumstances.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

Further to my noble friend’s question, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, informed the House recently that the Government have the power to establish an inquiry into Operation Conifer. Since the hopeless Wiltshire chief commissioner has made it clear that he will not take any action, will the Government now establish this inquiry so that the reputation of Sir Edward is not left in intolerable limbo?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, that would be a matter for the Home Office and not for the Ministry of Justice to consider. However, I am sure that Ministers in that department are listening.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

My Lords, can I take the Minister back to the question asked by my noble friend Lady Corston? His answer seemed rather complacent. If on Google women who have been victims of rape can be identified and help is being offered to do that, surely the Minister would want the Government to take some action and not just accept it.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Baroness, there was no complacency in my previous answer. Clearly, we will look at the facts and circumstances of any complaint and then determine what action it is appropriate to take. However, it would not be appropriate to anticipate prosecution or other action without a proper investigation of the facts. Indeed, that underlies many of the complaints made here today.

[Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe (Lab)]

My Lords, are there any positions on which the noble and learned Lord can take some action?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Not at present.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, will the Government make the change whereby, when people are not prosecuted, the police do not say “because of insufficient evidence” but use the phrase “a lack of evidence”? There is a very important distinction.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not sure that I would necessarily draw a strict distinction between those two terms, but clearly no charge will made unless the police have an element of evidence. Where a case is not proceeded with by way of prosecution, that may be because of an absence of a sufficiency of evidence.

[Lord Hayward (Con)]

Further to the answer that I understood my noble and learned friend to give earlier on, will he recognise that many people who have faced such accusations have spent many hundreds of thousands of pounds dealing with lawyers and seeking representation to clear their name before any decision is taken about no further action? To suggest that they should then pursue redress implies that they have the resources to pursue that claim. For many of them, that is just not financially practicable.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I entirely agree with the observations of my noble friend: it may well be that some of those who are charged and indeed prosecuted and found not guilty of an offence do not have the means to take civil action in order to vindicate a complaint about the way in which they were treated.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 21st May 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 62B proposed instead of the words left out by Commons Amendment 62, to which the Commons have disagreed, and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 62BZA to 62BA and 62BC to 62BF in lieu of Amendment 62B.

COMMONS DISAGREEMENT AND AMENDMENTS IN LIEU
The Commons disagree to Lords Amendment 62B proposed instead of the words left out of the Bill by Commons Amendment 62 but propose amendments 62BZA to 62BA to Clause (Review of processing of personal data for the purposes of journalism) inserted by Commons Amendment 109 and amendments 62BC to 62BF to the Bill in lieu of the Lords Amendment—

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62BF: After Schedule 16, insert the following new Schedule—
“REVIEW OF PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA FOR THE PURPOSES OF JOURNALISM
Interpretation
1 In this Schedule—
“relevant period” means—
(a) the period of 18 months beginning when the Commissioner starts the first review under section (Review of processing of personal data for the purposes of journalism), and
(b) the period of 12 months beginning when the Commissioner starts a subsequent review under that section;
“the relevant review”, in relation to a relevant period, means the review under section (Review of processing of personal data for the purposes of journalism) which the Commissioner must produce a report about by the end of that period.
Information notices
2 (1) This paragraph applies where the Commissioner gives an information notice during a relevant period.
(2) If the information notice—
(a) states that, in the Commissioner’s opinion, the information is required for the purposes of the relevant review, and
(b) gives the Commissioner’s reasons for reaching that opinion, subsections (5) and (6) of section 143 do not apply but the notice must not require the information to be provided before the end of the period of 24 hours beginning when the notice is given.
Assessment notices
3 (1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies where the Commissioner gives an assessment notice to a person during a relevant period.
(2) If the assessment notice—
(a) states that, in the Commissioner’s opinion, it is necessary for the controller or processor to comply with a requirement in the notice for the purposes of the relevant review, and
(b) gives the Commissioner’s reasons for reaching that opinion, subsections (6) and (7) of section 146 do not apply but the notice must not require the controller or processor to comply with the requirement before the end of the period of 7 days beginning when the notice is given.
(3) During a relevant period, section 147 has effect as if for subsection (5) there were substituted—
“(5) The Commissioner may not give a controller or processor an assessment notice with respect to the processing of personal data for the special purposes unless a determination under section 174 with respect to the data or the processing has taken effect.”
Applications in respect of urgent notices
4 Section (Applications in respect of urgent notices) applies where an information notice or assessment notice contains a statement under paragraph 2(2)(a) or 3(2)(a) as it applies where such a notice contains a statement under section 143(7)(a) or 146(8)(a).”

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

Noble Lords will recall that Amendment 62B would require the establishment of an inquiry into allegations of data protection breaches committed by or on behalf of national news publishers and other media organisations. This House has debated the necessity and proportionality of such an inquiry on several occasions during the passage of the Bill. It has been an informative and sometimes impassioned debate as noble Lords from all sides of the House have brought their experiences to bear, and the Government have been listening throughout.

The last time that we debated this topic, the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, asked about the past. Before I get into the substance of my speech, I think I can offer some reassurance on that point. When the Information Commissioner undertakes the review described in Commons Amendment 108, she will be reviewing the extent to which the processing of personal data for the purposes of journalism complied with data protection law in the next four years; as my right honourable friend the Secretary of State has said, we must look forward, not back. Her hands are not tied, though, and the commissioner’s existing enforcement powers are not time-limited. Indeed, compliance with the new law and compliance with the old law are deeply intertwined. That is why the Commons sent us 20 pages of amendments on transitional provision.

Most of what we have heard about relates to wrongs in the past that were illegal. If at some future date new evidence came to light that showed that the press were acting in breach of the law, the Government would expect the relevant enforcement bodies, including the Information Commissioner’s Office, to investigate and possible sanctions to follow. The Government are clear that what was illegal then remains illegal now.

There is no lacuna and no amnesty. Anyone who thinks that that is what the Government are proposing is quite wrong. What we are doing, however, is providing the institutions we need for the challenges of the future. 

We have given the Bill a thorough examination. My noble friend Lord Ashton of Hyde has reminded us several times of the number of amendments that have been secured, not just on media regulation but on issues that impact on everyone. This is a good Bill, but we have now, I suggest, run out of road. The question now is whether the Bill is good enough to justify passing it into law.

To assess that requires two things. First, it requires knowledge of the Government’s proposed way forward on the issues we asked the other place to reconsider last week. Secondly, it requires knowledge of what would happen if this House did not pass the Bill which is before it today.

On the first point, I have already mentioned the Information Commissioner’s review of compliance with data protection law. Since we last debated the merits of having a review, the Government have further proposed that that should not be a one-off event but a recurring fixture. We have also given her additional powers to make sure that her review is as comprehensive and robust as it can be.

Between now and then, the commissioner will produce guidance for data subjects seeking redress and a code of practice for those who process data for the purposes of journalism. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State will report on the availability and effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution procedures, including IPSO’s new mandatory low-cost arbitration scheme, and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services will report on police forces’ adherence to its guidance on how to interact with the media.

I am confident that, when these amendments are viewed alongside the improvements IPSO has already made to its processes and procedure, this country now has the most robust system of redress for press intrusion it has ever had, and it has achieved it without resorting to state regulation.

But noble Lords know all this already, especially if they, like the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, watched last Wednesday’s debate in the other place. So I want to spend my remaining time on the subject of not media regulation but data protection.

The GDPR will take effect in the United Kingdom at midnight on Friday. It will do so irrespective of whether or not we are prepared for it. If we do not pass implementing legislation in the next three days, medical research will grind to a halt. The administration of justice will stutter as chambers attempt to work out whether it is preferable to breach court disclosure rules or data protection law. Sectoral regulators will have to tip off the people they are investigating. It will potentially be chaotic, and this House will be held responsible.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said it well at Second Reading, when he welcomed the Bill:

“It provides the technical underpinnings that will allow the GDPR to operate in the UK both before and after Brexit … it is an enabling piece of legislation, together with the GDPR, which is absolutely necessary to allow the UK to continue to exchange data, whether it is done by businesses for commercial purposes or by law enforcement or for other reasons, once we are considered to be a third-party nation rather than a member of the European Union”.—[Official Report, 10/10/17; col. 205.]


The damage done by not passing this Bill today would be irreversible, and the only winner would be data protection lawyers.

As is quite proper, the House has asked the elected Chamber to think again about the detail of this Bill. It did so, and it has returned it to us as a Bill that is now ready to go to Her Majesty for signature. Two votes in the House of Commons in the past two weeks have come to the same conclusion. If we further delay this essential legislation, that decision will be on us.

Is this Bill good enough to pass? We are convinced that it is, and I therefore beg to move.

Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)

Moved by

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions of noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, referred to me making blood-curdling threats. I made no threats—blood curdling or otherwise—and what I did say was essentially true.

This Bill is about data protection. The primary concern of your Lordships’ House, which we have debated over recent months, is whether individuals have the ability to defend themselves against excessive press intrusion, and the Bill now provides a number of mechanisms to address this concern. These are all designed to maintain the freedom of the press and the independence of self-regulation, albeit in compliance with the law. For example, it was announced three weeks ago that IPSO will introduce a low-cost mandatory arbitration scheme. We are determined that there will be no backsliding on that kind of commitment, and Commons Amendment 62BC is designed to ensure that the use of such schemes is reported on—a point to which I will return in a moment—to reduce any temptation there might be to turn away from them once the heat of the Bill is off.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, sought, with vim and vigour, to address two points. I was slightly taken aback because, a few minutes before we began this debate, I had endeavoured to explain to him the operation of Clause 174(3)(b) and its interrelationship with Clause 144, and thought I had done so quite well. However, clearly I failed to some extent in that regard. I had also sought to give him further assurances about the role of the Secretary of State.

On the first point—the operation of the Information Commissioner’s powers—as I had sought to explain to the noble and learned Lord, under his amendment the Information Commissioner would have had access to prepublication material gathered for journalistic purposes. It was acknowledged across the House, and by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, during earlier debates that that could not be tolerated given the intrusion it would involve upon press freedom and journalistic preparation. The interrelationship between Clauses 174 and 144 is complex, but I again make it clear that the effect is that the commissioner will not be able to access prepublication journalistic material but will be able to access material that has been processed for the purposes of journalism.

On the second point, about the power of the Secretary of State, one has to be clear that this is not actually a power but simply a duty to report. It is for the Secretary of State to report, and he could do so even without an express statutory power, but this is to underline it. We are making it a clear duty, to import transparency into the process. He will essentially be reporting on the metrics available with regard to the take-up of alternative dispute resolution. The effectiveness of dispute resolution will be determined by reference to its take-up and its resolution. It will then be for us—Parliament and the people—to determine in light of those facts whether we consider that further steps have to be taken.

Let us be absolutely clear: the Bill imports no power on the part of the Secretary of State to compel the media to act in any way on the report that he is putting in place. This is simply a mechanism by which he can ensure that the relevant facts and figures—if I can put it that way—are laid before Parliament at the appropriate time. I hope that I have been able to put both those reassurances with greater clarity than I did a few minutes earlier, and to reassure the noble and learned Lord on those points.

I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for the observations he has made, and I hope again that he is reassured by the position the Government have now adopted regarding the intent and consequences of the amendments from the House of Commons. As regards the observations from other noble Lords around the House, I recognise that there has been widespread concern about the way in which we have been able to address the past and the need to address the future, having regard to the fundamental requirement for freedom of the press—one of the foundations that underpins our democratic process. Before closing, I acknowledge the contributions of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, to this entire debate. I quite understand why she has maintained the need to bring these matters before the House on a number of occasions, and I do not seek to imply any criticism of her in that regard.

We have reached a point where the Bill should pass, however. It has to, really. It is in those circumstances that I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment to Motion A.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, when I studied the British constitution 50 years ago I read the books by Sir Ivor Jennings, who said that one of the only weapons that an Opposition have against a Government is time, and that an Opposition—and, indeed, critics on a Government’s own Benches—are perfectly entitled to use time to put pressure on Governments. My goodness, we have had a cascade of useful changes because we have used time to press the Government further on the issue.

As I said before, the line between the Daily Mail and the MailOnline is increasingly blurred. This legislation will be tested against that blurred background. At some stage, the old print media may regret not being in the comfortable protection of a royal charter, as my learned friends listening to this debate must think that there is a lot of work ahead for them as this Bill is tested.

We never wanted to stop the Bill coming into law, and I beg leave to withdraw Motion A1.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 15th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Woolf]

There is an answer to the problem that the noble and learned Lord raises. It might have implications for the workload of the judiciary but I think that could be handled. We should get away from the idea that a judge should assess damages in appropriate cases only at one stage. There is no reason why you cannot have a system where the matter can be restored to a judge in a case of differences of opinion to take into account succeeding circumstances. If the power existed, the courts would find that in the majority of cases, litigants—properly advised, as they are in these big cases—would come back only when there was a real difficulty between the insurer in practice and the claimant. In that way, matters could be reviewed to reflect any differing circumstances. It was not a one-off assessment that I was advocating but the ability to change the assessment. That would apply to PPOs as it would to any other laws.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for setting out the background to this matter. His Amendment 55 would require what he referred to as new rules of court to be made that highlight features of periodical payment orders which may make them a more appropriate way for a person with a long-term injury to receive an award for damages for future care costs. I understand that Amendment 55 and the other amendments in this group are essentially probing amendments.

“Rules of court” in Amendment 55 means the Civil Procedure Rules. The purpose of the Civil Procedure Rules—and, indeed, all rules of court—is to govern the practice and procedure of the court and the parties in court proceedings. This may be a technical issue but that does not detract from the importance of ensuring that claimants who have suffered long-term serious injuries are well informed as to the implications of their choice between a lump sum payment of damages and a PPO. I am conscious of the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, about the care that the Executive must always exercise in circumstances where it may be perceived that they are giving directions to the judiciary. I will explain why the Government therefore take a more modest approach to this issue but one which they feel will be effective.

Of course, some Civil Procedure Rules have been made in relation to the exercise by the court of its powers under Section 2(1) of the Damages Act 1996 to order that all or part of an award of damages in respect of personal injury is to take the form of a periodical payment order. These rules already require the court to consider all the circumstances of the case, as well as the preferences of the claimant and defendant and the reasons for them. I appreciate that there are instances in which PPOs may not be available; for example, a mutual insurer such as the Medical Defence Union would not be considered sufficiently well reserved to meet future liabilities. I appreciate also that there have been reservations among insurers about the use of PPOs because of the way in which they are required to reserve for them and the capital requirements related to that.

PPOs are certainly in principle considered a better form of taking compensation for future loss than a lump sum because they provide strong protection for claimants who may be concerned about the return on a lump sum. This Government certainly support their use. At the same time, we must keep in mind that the person behind a claim has a choice and is entitled to make one in such circumstances. We consider it important that claimants making a choice in these circumstances should be properly informed, irrespective of whether their particular case reaches such a stage that the court has to consider whether to order a PPO. Of course, not every case will reach the court; many will be settled before that and, at an earlier stage, claimants have to be properly informed as to which option they should adopt.

I note the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, with which I entirely agree. It is perhaps moot to say that no estimate of life expectancy is ever precisely accurate because they are just that—estimates—and one takes that out of the equation where you have a PPO.

The Government remain fully committed to ensuring that appropriate advice is available to claimants in all cases and stand by the commitments they made to action in their response to the Justice Select Committee. To pick up on the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, the point made in paragraph 50 of the response to the JSC was a concern to ensure that guidance was provided to individual claimants. It is our intention to put in place appropriate guidance and to ensure that it is available. We aim to do that by the end of 2018. In addition, we are investigating whether current advice received by claimants on the respective benefits of lump sums and PPOs is effective, and whether there are other ways in which the use of PPOs could be increased within the present system. At present, we intend to complete this work by the summer of 2019.

I hope that goes some way to meeting the concerns expressed by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, on these matters. He raised a further question on indexing and I think the noble Lord, Lord Monks, touched on this. The reason that the ASHE 6115 index is taken is that it is the specific care costs index. It may be that wage costs have not increased at the same rate as the wider RPI, which may explain the discrepancy the noble Earl pointed out. However, the ASHE 6115 index is a specific care costs index, which is why that has been employed in the past.

Amendment 92 would require the Lord Chancellor to conduct a review of the impact of setting a new discount rate on the extent to which PPOs are made by the courts, but within six months of the provisions in Part 2 of the Bill coming into force, and then to publish a report of the results within 18 months of commencement. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, hinted, that may be far too tight a timescale to produce an effective report. We certainly do not consider that a requirement to carry out a review of this nature at the time proposed would be particularly informative. That is because the first review of the rate under the Bill would probably not have been completed by the time at which completing the review under this amendment would be required. Effectively, that would mean that the review would have to focus on any impact that had resulted from the setting of the rate as of March 2017 under the present law, which was a rate of minus 0.75%. I suppose that such a review may, however, be of limited use given that the legal framework for setting the rate would have changed but I suspect that it would tell us only something about the past, not the future.

I also observe that the settlement of major cases can take some years to agree, whether or not they arrive at the door of the court, so it might be some time before there is sufficient evidence to draw meaningful conclusions about changes in claimant behaviour. We do not yet have the statistical information about the effect of the March 2017 change in the discount rate on the use of PPOs. We therefore do not know whether the lowering of the rate has diminished the take-up of PPOs, although there is certainly some anecdotal evidence to that effect. It is logical to assume that this would occur, given the size of the change that took place in March 2017.

The evidence from the previous four years does, however, suggest that the use of PPOs is concentrated in the most serious and long-term cases, with the propensity to use them increasing with the size of awards up to about £5 million. They are not really employed in cases where the award of damages is lower than £1 million. That is largely because the use of PPOs is concentrated on provision for future care costs—long-term care costs, generally in cases of catastrophic injury. That is why there is a large percentage of cases in which PPOs are not considered appropriate. The National Health Service pays out PPOs in about 70% of awards over £1 million, while the equivalent figure for insurers is only about 36%, and there may be further work to be done. That is why we are going to look at the question of further guidance in order to encourage their use. Certainly, the take-up is far from negligible in serious cases.

On the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, this is not just about funding clinical negligence claims by the NHS. It goes far deeper than that; it is about ensuring fairness between claimants and defendants in the difficult process of assessing damages, particularly damages awarded for future care. I do not accept the noble Lord’s general point that we are simply trying to move the cost of future care from victims to somewhere else. That is not what we are about; this is concerned with ensuring fairness between claimants and defendants.

I have spoken about the way in which the amendments would require some sort of review. Amendment 92A would also require such a review to assess whether the fact that a PPO may be uprated by reference to an inflation index other than the retail prices index is having an impact on the relative merits of PPOs versus lump sums in the context of a revised discount rate. That would go beyond a consideration of the impact of the discount rate to the overall level of damages award, and how individual elements may be indexed for inflation. At present, the index used for PPOs is a very specific care cost index rather than the RPI.

We will, as I have indicated, be taking forward a range of initiatives to encourage the use of PPOs and to ensure that claimants are properly advised when choosing the form of their award. We hope to have the first part of that process completed by the end of 2018 and the wider investigation completed by the summer of 2019. We believe that those practical steps will encourage the use of PPOs where appropriate—we will, of course, monitor that—and create a situation in which a review requirement, such as that envisaged by the amendments, will not be necessary. Indeed, it would be more appropriate to move in this direction rather than find ourselves in the somewhat invidious position of the Executive sending out directions to the judiciary about how it should approach the award and determination of damages in such serious cases.

With that explanation of the Government’s position, I hope the Committee will be reassured that we are committed to effective action to encourage the use of PPOs. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Before my noble and learned friend sits down, I understood the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, to have suggested that a PPO could be reviewed as the instalments were going ahead. That would be something of an innovation but it might be worth considering. I do not know whether my noble and learned friend has that in mind.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We do not have that in mind. One of the concerns about such a proposal is the impact it would have on the insurers and their inclination to embrace PPOs. At present they are concerned about their reserving liability and their capital requirement on the basis of risk when it comes to a PPO. If we were to add to that equation the possibility of the PPO being revived at some indeterminate point in the future, I believe it would have a counteractive effect on the employment of PPOs by insurers. I have noted what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said; I will take it away and consider it further, but my initial reaction is that it could act as a disincentive for the operation of PPOs.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend for that extensive reply and other noble Lords for their contributions to this debate.

I take issue with my noble and learned friend on two matters. First, it is perfectly possible for us to deal with the question of PPOs for mutuals by setting up a proper reinsurance programme. That could be done quite easily. Therefore, to say that we would like to do this but we cannot because mutuals cannot provide it is inaccurate. We can sort that out with a certain amount of technical help.

Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said that we were engaged in a nudge. Personally, I am engaged in a bit of a shove, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Monks, will join us in in that shove. I am not sure that my noble and learned friend has given a shove; I think it is a very delicate pressure on the arm of the industry, which I am not sure will be effective.

We heard from the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, about how PPOs are declining in use and from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, about the culture and question of fairness, which must be at the heart of all our discussions. I was encouraged to think that such an eminent jurist as him should think that the rules of court could provide the flexibility to enable the issues covered by my amendment to be incorporated. We are in an era where things are moving fast, and we do not want to find ourselves stuck in inflexibility.

My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern referred to the question of interference by the Executive with the judiciary. I made clear that I was concerned about that in my opening remarks. The amendment is designed so that Parliament, the legislature, makes its view clear. It is nothing to do with the Executive. It is giving judges a steer, but after that, it is over to them how they proceed. My worry about my noble and learned friend’s comments is that the best remains the enemy of the good. We have a system that is not working very well, but we are saying, “This is frightfully difficult, so we should not change it; we are likely to cause more trouble by changing it than we solve, let sleeping dogs lie”.

The system is not working very well. The transfer of investment and longevity risk away from the individual has to be a key part of making matters fair. It deals with important and difficult cases of the sort raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I hope that the Minister will agree to meet some of us between now and the Bill’s next stage, because I do not think we have got to the bottom of this. We are missing an opportunity to do something seriously helpful for people who suffer long-term, life-changing injuries. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

In response to my noble friend Lord Hodgson, and a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, I would be perfectly content to meet them before the Bill’s next stage to discuss this. If they contact my private office, that can be arranged.

Amendment 55 withdrawn.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I simply wish to confirm that we on this side agree with what noble Lords have suggested, so the quicker we can get things moving, the better for everyone.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I believe that we are as one in our desire to see these provisions brought into force as rapidly and as sensibly as possible, and all of these amendments stem from the entirely reasonable, and indeed strongly argued, wish for the review to be carried out in order to minimise the impact that the present discount rate is having—disproportionately, one would venture—on defendants and in particular on NHS Resolution.

As I explained in writing to noble Lords following Second Reading, to which the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, referred, the Government remain fully committed to beginning the first review of the rate promptly after Royal Assent and to completing that first review as soon as is practicable in 2019. To that end, I indicated that although the expert panel cannot be appointed before the power to do so has been created, preparatory work on the setting up of the panel is already under way and the Government will progress the appointment process as far as they properly can before Royal Assent. I hope that that goes some way to meeting the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. As part of that preparatory work, the Government intend to publish the draft terms of reference for the expert panel in time for the Report stage of the Bill in this House. However, the appointment of the expert panel cannot take place until after Royal Assent and thus the completion of the appointment process cannot be predicted with absolute certainty.

The effect of Amendment 58 and its related Amendments 63 and 66 might be to force the Lord Chancellor to delay commencement or risk the time to conduct the review being eaten into, thereby reducing its effectiveness. We have in mind the stages that have to be gone through. Amendment 59 would reduce the period of time within which the first review of the discount rate must be started following commencement from within 90 days of commencement to 10 days of commencement, and other amendments specifying 30 days have been referred to as well.

What I would emphasise is the word “within”. These are outliers, but we are determined to carry out the process as swiftly as we reasonably can. Having regard to that, however, we have to make provision for any uncertainties that may emerge, and therefore to fix too stringent a period might impact adversely upon the whole process that we want to carry out. In other words, while it is important to move quickly, it is also important to ensure that any review is completed fully and properly and is not going to be the subject of untoward challenge.

As I have said, the appointment of the expert panel to advise the Lord Chancellor simply cannot take place until after Royal Assent and even then it may still take a little time, despite the preparations that are ongoing even now. If the review starts without the panel being ready to start work, the whole task is going to be thrown into some difficulty.

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[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I want to say just one thing about the nature of the Lord Chancellor’s judgment in this case. The noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, said that the Lord Chancellor is acting on behalf of the Government, but that is not the nature of the decision: it is the Lord Chancellor’s decision as representing the Lord Chancellor himself. He has the responsibility of a personal decision in this matter, in the way this Bill is drafted. Certainly, when I had responsibility for these matters, it never occurred to me that I should consult the Cabinet about it.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I begin by acknowledging the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The Bill makes perfectly clear that this is a decision of the Lord Chancellor as Lord Chancellor, and it is in that context that it has to be seen and understood.

Amendment 61 would replace the proposed three-year maximum review cycle for the second and subsequent reviews of the rate with a system under which the need for the rate to be reviewed would be determined by the expert panel by reference to changes in returns on investment. Of course, there are then consequential and supplementary amendments. The effect would be to add a new and distinct responsibility to the role of the panel. It would in effect, as I believe my noble friend Lord Hodgson acknowledged, require a standing panel to be created. If more than a year had passed since the rate was reviewed, the expert panel would be required to assess the need for a review and then to advise the Lord Chancellor to review the rate if it considered that the nature of return on investment had changed enough to justify a review. If the panel decided that this condition had not been satisfied, it would have to report its reasons for this view to the Lord Chancellor.

The concept of a review based on changes in investment returns was canvassed as an alternative to a fixed review period in the Government’s 2017 consultation on how the rate should be set, and it was supported, let me be clear. However, basing the review requirement on changes in investment returns would, we believe, create more uncertainty and be less predictable than a regular fixed-date review. The introduction of a requirement for the panel to consider the need for a full review annually could further fuel such uncertainty.

I appreciate the concerns raised by the noble Lord and others at Second Reading about the potential for a fixed review period to prompt undesirable litigation behaviour and the possibility of what is sometimes termed the gaming of the system in anticipation of a change to the rate. However, this problem would not be avoided by the system which the amendment proposes. Litigants would still know when the panel would be required to consider whether the rate required reviewing. Indeed, such occasions would be more frequent under the amendment than under the three-year cycle proposed in the Bill. One can imagine a stop-start mentality emerging leading up to the time when the panel was expected to report.

A further consequence of the amendment would be that the expert panel would have, in practice, to exist independently of the review of the rate, rather than being convened by the Lord Chancellor for each review, as the Bill currently provides. In effect, a standing panel would be required, which would have to exercise judgment as to the timing of reviews, rather than confining itself to the technical matter of advising the Lord Chancellor on the factors that might be considered in the setting of the rate, which is the purpose of the expert panel. The amendment would therefore make a very significant change to the proposals in the Bill regarding when the rate should be changed. The Government’s proposals for a fixed-period maximum cycle for the review of the rate have, as I say, been developed through consultation and been the subject of pre-legislative scrutiny, and we consider that they provide a simple and certain method by which reviews can largely be predicted.

Amendment 74 would require the Lord Chancellor to adopt any recommendation from the expert panel as to whether the rate should be changed and, if so, what the rate should be. Clearly, such a change would diminish significantly the responsibility and accountability of the Lord Chancellor for any review outcome—indeed, it would essentially remove it. Amendment 74 would also remove the requirements on the Lord Chancellor, the panel and the Treasury set out in paragraph 2(6) and (7) of new Schedule A1 to comply with or to take into account the duties of the Lord Chancellor in relation to the setting of the rate that are set out in paragraph 3 of new Schedule A1. What we would have is the elevation of the panel from an advisory role to essentially an executive role. That would be a major change and clearly greatly alter and increase the role of the panel.

The creation of the expert panel to advise the Lord Chancellor is, of course, one of the most important changes introduced by Clause 8. The panel is central to the Government’s proposals for the way in which the rate is set, introducing new expertise and transparency. The panel will play a very important role in providing assistance to the Lord Chancellor in setting the rate, but it would not in our view be appropriate for the panel’s recommendations to bind the Lord Chancellor in deciding whether the rate should change and what it should be. The setting of the discount rate requires the weighing of different potential outcomes for individuals in relation to a range of possible rates. An element of value judgment will ultimately be required. It is important, therefore, that the decision-maker should be politically and publicly accountable for decisions on the rate. That is why the Lord Chancellor is, in our view, the appropriate person to make that choice. Indeed, this was recognised by the Justice Select Committee, which stated in its report that:

“Setting the discount rate has repercussions on the taxpayer through Government expenditure and also consumers through its impact on insurance premiums and inflation; therefore we think it is right that the decision to set the discount rate lies with the Lord Chancellor”.


We agree with that assessment.

In addition to being influenced by the pre-legislative scrutiny carried out by the Justice Committee, the proposals we have put forward have been developed through the public consultation process. In response to the question of by whom the rate should be set, the largest single group of support was for the rate to be set by the Lord Chancellor following advice from an expert panel. I note the support for that which has been given, in particular, by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, expressing his experience as Lord Chancellor and underlining the distinct role of the Lord Chancellor in this context.

[Lord Sharkey]

The Minister talks about the consultation and the preferences expressed there. As I think I mentioned at Second Reading, there was no majority in favour of the Lord Chancellor being involved. There was a majority for other methods, not the Lord Chancellor.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I acknowledge that. As I said, the greatest number of responses were in support of that particular proposal. I reiterate that.

I understand that Amendment 74 is a probing amendment but it would at a stroke remove many of the benefits that the proposed reforms in the Bill are seeking to achieve. This is because paragraph 3 of the new schedule governs how the Lord Chancellor is to decide what the rate should be, and Amendment 74 would remove paragraph 3 from the schedule. The essential change made by paragraph 3 to the present law is that in future the rate is to be assessed on returns reasonably expected to be achievable from a diversified low-risk portfolio of investments. This has regard to how claimants actually invest and the returns available to them. This evidence-based process of assessment will replace the hypothetical approach of the present law, which leads to the rate being set largely by reference only to returns from UK index-linked gilts.

Our evidence is clear that claimants simply do not invest all their awards in UK index-linked gilts; in other words, claimants do not pay Her Majesty’s Government to look after their money. Our research indicates that setting the rate on this basis leads to awards of compensation that are expected to produce on average around 135% of the funds anticipated to be necessary to meet the claimant’s losses, although this drops to 120% to 125% after taxation and the costs associated with the management of investments have been accounted for—a point that I will return to in a moment. The new system will put the setting of the rate on a far more realistic basis and bring the average closer to the target of 100%. This will be fairer for both claimants and defendants.

In support of this process, the paragraph sets out a number of key assumptions that the Lord Chancellor must adopt in deciding what the rate should be and a number of supporting factors he or she must take into account. It also enables the Lord Chancellor to identify and apply further assumptions and to take into account further factors in determining what the rate should be. Amendment 74 would remove the entire framework provided by the Bill for the basis of the setting of the rate. The effect would be that, unless the Supreme Court were to decide to adopt a different basis for the setting of the rate in a future case, the rate would continue to be set on the basis of the present case law, principally the 1998 decision of the House of Lords in Wells v Wells, which was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, at Second Reading; it is a case on which I believe he sat. This would remove the central aim of the reforms to provide a fairer, more certain and more sustainable system for both claimants and defendants, and would remove any possibility of overcompensation and its impact on the National Health Service.

Clearly, we want seriously injured individuals to be fully compensated for all the losses caused by their injury. They should receive the full and fair compensation that is legally due to them. We do not seek to change the overriding objective of 100% compensation. The problem is that at present the rate has to be set largely by reference to UK index-linked gilts. But our evidence is that this is not how such claimants actually invest and therefore we have to move on.

I add that it might be a little odd to adopt the noble Lord’s Amendment 74 in light of his Amendment 71, which encourages us to have the Lord Chancellor fix the first rate without recourse to the panel at all. There seems to be a slight tension between the two amendments. I have expressed my view on Amendment 71, and we are going to look at that again, but I do not find it easily reconcilable with Amendment 74, albeit I acknowledge that it is a probing amendment.

[Lord Sharkey]

I simply observe that I do not think lawyers have an exclusive right to exercise and run conflicting arguments.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Generally speaking, they are alternative arguments.

Amendment 77 would add an obligation on the Lord Chancellor to take into account the response of the expert panel in determining what the rate should be. Of course, that is exactly what the Lord Chancellor will do. Indeed, why would the legislation require the Lord Chancellor to consult the panel and require the panel to respond if the Lord Chancellor was not required to consider the panel’s response? Of course, there may sometimes be merit in stating every detail of a process in primary legislation but I suggest that it is not necessary in this case.

Amendments 82A, 85A, and 90A, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, relate to the procedures and responsibilities governing the operation of the panel. Clearly, the expert panel has an important advisory role but it is not appropriate or desirable to load it with the additional responsibilities suggested in the amendments. Paragraph 2(7) of new Schedule A1 already requires the panel to take into account the duties of the Lord Chancellor under paragraph 3. Paragraph 4 requires the Lord Chancellor to give reasons for his or her decision and to publish information about the response of the panel. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, observed, ultimately the Lord Chancellor’s decision on the matter, as it is disclosed, will be amenable to judicial review. It is not a case of the Lord Chancellor receiving the expert panel’s views and simply ignoring them. Clearly, such a perverse course of action, which one would not anticipate, would leave his decision-making power amenable to review.

The obligations are expanded by the commitments that we gave to the Justice Select Committee to consult the panel about the allowances to be made for taxation, investment management charges and inflation in the setting of the rate and, over and above that, to publish the panel’s report to the Lord Chancellor at each review. It is not a case just of disclosing what the panel’s advice may have been but of undertaking to publish the panel’s report and then to give reasons for the decision that the Lord Chancellor has made.

As I touch upon that, I recollect that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, raised the question of the experts on the panel. I will come on to the question of a medical expert in a moment but I note that with regard to the position of someone concerned with consumer investments, one would be interested there in the context of someone who acted as a financial adviser to those who made investments as consumers at various levels. That, I understand, is what is contemplated at that point.

As I have sought to underline, the overall thrust of the amendments is that the panel should, in effect, carry out a pre-review of the rate. This is not the intended role of the panel. The panel’s role is advisory. It will be consulted by the Lord Chancellor and it will provide the Lord Chancellor with its views. The report of the panel and the Lord Chancellor’s decision and his reasons for the decision will be published. But the role of the expert panel is not to take away from the role of the Lord Chancellor. It is not the role of the panel to make a decision on what the rate should be. Its role is to provide expert support to the Lord Chancellor.

At the end of the day it is the Lord Chancellor who will make the necessary determination and will be publicly answerable for the determination he makes. Therefore, we consider that the decision must be for the Lord Chancellor, who will take that decision in his role as Lord Chancellor and be legally and politically accountable for it. The process of the setting of the rate is going to be transparent. The panel has been created for a very important purpose—namely, to bring new expertise to the process of setting the rate—but it is not its role to second-guess the outcome of the final review by the Lord Chancellor.

Amendment 84 would require the Lord Chancellor to base the allowances to be made for taxation, inflation and investment management costs on recommendations from the expert panel. The Lord Chancellor is already required by paragraph 3(5) of new Schedule A1 to make appropriate allowances for each of these three items. This will be an evidence-based exercise requiring judgment as to what the standard allowance should be against the range of possible individual circumstances that might be foreseen. The expert panel forms an integral part of the Government’s proposals. It will introduce additional expertise but, at the end of the day, the final decision must be for the Lord Chancellor. The amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, would in my submission take the role of the panel way beyond that of an expert consultative role.

I turn to Amendment 87, which was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and would extend the membership of the expert panel to include a medical representative. Here I concur with the view already expressed by my noble friend Lord Faulks. On one view, the effect of this amendment would be to broaden the general expertise within the panel, but I should explain that its role is intended to focus purely on matters relating to financial rates of return, in order to provide advice to the Lord Chancellor. The Bill therefore provides for the panel to be chaired by the Government Actuary and that the other members should have experience as an actuary, a manager of investments, an economist and, as I indicated earlier, in consumer matters relating to investment—for example, as a financial adviser.

The Government consider that this range of expertise is the most relevant for providing advice on what the relevant investments and rates of return are likely to be, and will be the most useful source in formulating advice for the Lord Chancellor. While medical expertise is relevant when determining a lump-sum amount of compensation to which the discount rate is to be applied, or in estimating the life expectancy of a claimant, these are separate issues to the setting of the discount rate and would be outside the remit of the panel, as an expert panel advising the Lord Chancellor. We do not see that a medical expert would contribute to the process of the expert panel.

I turn next to Amendment 88, which was also spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and would require the Lord Chancellor to use the power to appoint the four appointed panel members to secure that each of those members approaches the work of the panel as an expert with the object of recommending a rate of return that is fair to the interests of both claimants and defendants. The appointed panel members are indeed intended to be experts in their fields. The expertise that they will bring to the process of setting the rate is one of the most significant reforms introduced by the Bill. The Government made it clear in their response to the Justice Select Committee that they intend to recruit experts who will act as independent experts in providing their advice, not as representatives of specific interest groups. This is not a representative panel; it is, I emphasise, an expert panel.

The appointed panel members will be required to disclose potential conflicts of interest and, under paragraph 3(2) of new Schedule A1, to take account of the duties imposed on the Lord Chancellor as to how the rate is to be set in deciding what response to give to the Lord Chancellor’s consultation. The mix of expertise stated in the Bill strikes, we suggest, a correct and fair balance between the various areas of knowledge that would be required. The proposed additional requirements on the Lord Chancellor in Amendment 88 are therefore unnecessary.

This amendment, however, also seeks to indicate what the objective of the work of each of the appointed panel members should be. The panel as a whole will play a very important role in providing advice, as I say, to assist the Lord Chancellor in setting the rate. It is very important that this advice is fair, which is why the Bill sets out the range of expertise referred to. However, the role and objective of the panel is to advise the Lord Chancellor on matters relevant to the setting of the rate by the Lord Chancellor. The role of the individual appointed members will be framed accordingly. We consider that the requirements on the Lord Chancellor under the terms of the legal framework for the setting of the rate, coupled with the advice from the panel of experts, who will bring a balanced range of expertise, and the requirements in the Bill which provide that the Lord Chancellor will give reasons for his or her decision, underline the way in which the decision-making process will be accountable and transparent. It will also have the objective of being impartial.

Amendment 91, which I believe was spoken to by my noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lord Hunt, who is still with us, would remove the provisions in paragraph 8 of new Schedule A1, which interpret provisions in relation to the setting of the discount rate to cover the possibility of the Lord Chancellor deciding on the occasion of a review to set no rate or no rate for particular classes of case, on the one hand, and changes from that situation, on the other. In fact, that new paragraph would reproduce the provisions in the Damages Act 1996 which indicate that the court must take into account such rate of return—if any—as may from time to time be prescribed by an order made by the Lord Chancellor. This wording implies that the Lord Chancellor might decide to set no rate under the present law. The provisions in paragraph 8(2) to (4) are intended to clarify how this power would operate.

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I will briefly support the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, in what she just said. It is easy for us to overlook what quantitative easing has done to the returns on savings and fixed interest. It has been a much longer-running saga than was anticipated, and it is still carrying on. If we are to set up a system that precludes people investing in equities, which gives some protection against that, we will be doing no service to the people who need this money as part of the way to recover from terrible injuries they received. The last line on page 9,

“who has different financial aims”,

does not add anything at all to the situation and will merely provide fuel and funds for lawyers to discuss exactly what that means in cases in future years.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to all noble Lords for their contributions. The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton, began by referring to the briefing from APIL—the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. I am familiar with it, and indeed, the association invited me to speak at its annual conference, where I confirmed that we would take the Bill through Parliament. I have not cleared my diary for next year. Much of what they had to say, which was repeated by the noble Lord, was, as the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, pointed out, met by the need to encourage the uptake of periodical payment orders. We are committed to that and we will take it forward in various ways. They need to be embraced more thoroughly, not only by claimants but by defendants —insurers—as well. Nevertheless, I make that point.

The noble Lord referred to the case of Wells v Wells, which has been mentioned before. There we saw the reference to what was essentially construed as “very low risk investment in UK gilts”, and we are moving away from that. However, there is an additional element in that, which is volatility: you have an investment portfolio which may be subject to volatility, and you may find that it is at a low point at a stage when you need to withdraw capital funds. That has to be factored in as well, and we appreciate all that.

On the suggestion that we are somehow inviting people to invest their savings, or a majority of them, in hedge funds, that will not do at all. The portfolio A that was examined included 13% UK equities, 15% overseas equities, and 18% of alternative investments which could be modelled as hedge funds. We have to see all this in context. We took clear evidence on the nature of a low-risk portfolio, and there was reference, for example, to widows and orphans, but we are in a different climate in this context. We are not seeking to move away from the idea of 100% compensation. I will come on to the probing amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, on setting the rate by reference to not only a floor but, I suggest, a ceiling—there are reasons for that—and the question of investment objectives, as distinct from different financial aims.

Amendment 78 seeks to amend paragraph 3(2) of new Schedule A1 by removing the words,

“in the opinion of the Lord Chancellor”,

from the requirement that the Lord Chancellor must decide the rate on the basis that,

“the rate of return should be the rate that, in the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, a recipient of relevant damages could reasonably be expected to achieve”,

if he invested the relevant damages for the purpose of the assumed objectives. The effect of the amendment would be to prevent the Lord Chancellor seeking to justify a rate on the basis that it seems perfectly reasonable in his subjective opinion when, by any objective assessment, the rate proposed is not supportable.

The noble Lord referred to an “unfettered discretion” and conflict with a political interest, but we are talking about the Lord Chancellor making the decision in his capacity as Lord Chancellor. He does not have an unfettered discretion. He is subject to public law duties in the exercise of his functions. Any decision of the Lord Chancellor as to what the rate should be must be rational, and any failure in rationality can be challenged by way of judicial review. I have already touched upon that and the question of disclosure, and I shall not repeat it.

It is necessary to have reference to the opinion of the Lord Chancellor in relation to setting the rate because the setting of the discount rate is not now, and will not under the proposed legislation, be a precise science—it cannot be. The decision to be made on the rate will require the weighing of different potential outcomes for individuals in relation to a range of possible rates. An inevitable degree of subjective assessment is involved in this process. That is why it is appropriate that, although there is an expert panel, that subjective assessment is made by the Lord Chancellor, albeit with the reasons being given and explained, with a rational analysis of the information submitted to him.

Amendment 78A would require the Lord Chancellor to assume, when considering the damages to which the discount rate would apply, that the relevant damages would be payable as a lump sum or partly as a lump sum. The current wording of the Bill requires the Lord Chancellor to assume that the relevant damages will be payable wholly as a lump sum. We do not consider that this amendment is necessary. The discount rate will only ever be applicable to damages payable as a lump sum, and in setting the rate the Lord Chancellor will have regard to that.

Amendment 79 would include the requirement to assume, among the assumptions which the Lord Chancellor must make under paragraph 3(3) of new Schedule A1 in determining the discount rate, that the cost to the claimant of investment advice shall not be recoverable by way of damages. I appreciate the point made by my noble friend Lord Faulks about the need to be clear about how investment management costs are to be treated in setting the rate, but we do not consider that this amendment is necessary.

Paragraph 3(5) of the schedule provides for the Lord Chancellor to make such allowance for “investment management costs” as he thinks appropriate. This provision has been included on the basis that under the current law the cost of investment advice is not, for the reasons explained by my noble friend Lord Faulks, recoverable as a head of damages and therefore needs to be taken into account as a factor in setting the discount rate. Should the law change, an allowance in the setting of the discount rate would then become unnecessary, as the claimant would already have the benefit of the compensation for the costs. However, we understand that paragraph 3(5) reflects the current law and can adapt to changes in the law. Therefore, we do not consider that it casts doubt on the present law regarding the unrecoverability of investment costs as a head of damage. That is a feature of fixing the discount rate.

Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, seeks to change one of the assumptions that the Lord Chancellor is required to make under paragraph 3(3) of the new schedule. Under the amendment, the recipient of the relevant damages would be assumed to invest in a diversified portfolio of investment grade listed debt securities rather than a diversified portfolio of investments. The range of investments to be assumed to be made and included in the diversified portfolio under the amendment is clearly narrower than that under the proposed assumption in paragraph 3(3)(c) at present.

The Bill does not restrict the investments that are to be assumed, save that the overall investment approach must be assumed to fall within the range of risk described in paragraph 3(3)(d). We consider that this approach avoids the rigidity of tying the assumptions to a single type of investment. The Lord Chancellor and the panel can therefore assess what the appropriate investments should be in the circumstance of the review. In making their assessment, the Lord Chancellor and the panel will have to have regard to evidence of how claimants actually invest and the returns actually available to investors. We consider that to be a more sustainable system for the future.

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[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that very detailed reply and all other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. On a small point of detail, I think the noble and learned Lord referred to 80% hedge funds. I do not think that is the figure I mentioned, but even at 18% it seems surprisingly high—but there we are.

One outstanding issue is that of how those who are compensated actually make their investments. I draw a parallel with the pensions system. We have just spent quite a long time in this House and at the other end looking at default arrangements for people who have a pension pot and want to transfer it or cash it in on some basis. Encouragement to try to get those individuals to take advice of one sort or another is exercised quite extensively. I raised the same point in relation to people receiving compensation for injury and damages. What happens when they get the cheque? Is there any encouragement for them to get independent guidance on where they should get such advice from? That is still a bit of a mystery to me, even after the debate. I do not know whether there is anything more the Minister can say on that point. The presumption is that individuals will make their own arrangements with presumably regulated advisers. But what about those who do not? What is the process and system that encourages them to avail themselves of investment advice?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not know whether the noble Lord wants me to respond to that but I will, very briefly, if I may, with the leave of the House. Where you have major claims for catastrophic injury, the lawyers involved for the claimants are highly sophisticated. One clear message that I received when discussing this with claimants’ lawyers was that they are concerned not only with the processing and pursuit of the claim itself but with establishing a framework within which the claimant will be able to live. I imagine that almost invariably involves the provision of suitable investment advice, albeit no one is obliged to accept it.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, in practice, when these cases come before a court, particularly where there is a party who lacks capacity, a judge, before approving one of these orders—they have the right to approve or disapprove a settlement—must be satisfied that appropriate advice has been taken on the split between periodical payments and a lump sum and that, generally, it is a satisfactory settlement from the court’s point of view. If they are subject to the Court of Protection, the court will then be able to manage investments according to the best interests of the protected party. If I may say so, the noble Lord has a good point on what happens to those who do not need the approval of the court or who are outside the protected party, and who are like anybody else who comes into a large sum of money in any other context. They will be well advised to take advice: some do; some, I fear, do not.

Grandparents: Legal Rights

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Farmer]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to ensure grandparents have a more effective legal right to see their grandchildren after the parents’ divorce.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, in the first instance, it is for parents to decide what is in the best interests of their children. The Government recognise the important role that grandparents may play in children’s lives and the stability they can provide in families when parents separate. We are keeping the matter under review.

[Lord Farmer (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. The requirement for grandparents to apply for child arrangement orders is cumbersome, expensive and needs reforming. However, when grandparents need to go to court to maintain contact with their grandchildren, they typically have a relationship problem with one or both parents, rather than a legal problem. In Australia, where there is disharmony following divorce and separation, extended family members can access family relationship centres. Do the Government have plans to ensure that there is similar community-based help—sited, perhaps, in the family hubs slowly emerging across the country?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the requirement for non-parents first to seek leave of the court in order to apply for a child arrangement order is regarded as an important filter mechanism, and was the subject of review by an independent panel in 2011 which came to the same conclusion. With regard to means of alternative dispute resolution, we are of course anxious to see mediation employed in the situation to which the noble Lord refers. He may recollect that at a recent Westminster Hall debate, on 2 May, my honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Justice indicated that she was carefully considering the current position and provision. In doing so, we will of course be happy to look at international experience.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

Will the Government consider extending legal aid to grandparents, assuming that the law is changed to allow them to apply, because that would clearly be very helpful in many cases?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The law does not require to be changed in order that grandparents can make an application in respect of an arrangement order for children. As regards legal aid, as the noble Lord is aware, that is currently the subject of a review within the Ministry of Justice.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, with some family experience, I am concerned that a Minister of Her Majesty’s Government was talking about presumptions for grandparents to have contact with their grandchildren. I would hope that that would not go any further, because presumptions are highly undesirable in the law, but it would be useful to review whether grandparents are finding it unusually difficult to get access to the court when they wish to be in touch with their grandchildren.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, with regard to access to the courts, the number of applications for child arrangement orders has generally been in the region of 2,000 over the period since 2011. They have varied slightly, and the number of applications has increased steadily from 2015 to the current year, where the figure is in excess of 2,000. I have certainly not referred to presumption, and various issues would of course arise if we were to consider such a move because, if you contemplate a presumption in favour of grandparents, you are in a sense intruding on the rights of the parent.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, is there really a justification for the two-stage process whereby grandparents have to apply for the right to make an application for a contact order and there is then a filtering system? Would it not be much easier for there to be a single application for a contact order with a filter system for non-parents built into that application, thus saving grandparents a great deal of time and trouble—all, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, points out, without the benefit of legal aid under the current arrangements, which require there to have been domestic violence or abuse?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the matter of seeking permission, whether it be by grandparents or other non-parent applicants for an arrangement order in respect of children, was the subject of independent review by the Family Justice Review panel in 2011. In its final report, published in November 2011, it concluded that the matter of an application for permission should continue.

[Lord Suri (Con)]

My Lords, respect for grandparents’ rights to see their grandchildren should be always in place. In the case of divorced parents, what strong, lawful action can be taken to restore this great and loving tradition?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we respect the right of grandparents to make an application for an arrangement order for children. Indeed, in the context of public law cases, local authorities are directed to consider placing children with relatives where it is not possible for the parents to continue with their care. It is open for grandparents to be appointed as special guardians in such situations.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure the Minister agrees with me that grandparents often have a very special relationship in the life of any child, and I congratulate the Government on the recognition of grandparents’ rights, for example, in the crediting of national insurance contributions for grandparents who look after their grandchildren. May I also urge my noble and learned friend to encourage our honourable friend in the other place to reinforce the concerns expressed that denying rights of access for grandparents can often be like a living bereavement? If there is an opportunity to amend the Children Act to give grandparents more rights, I would very much welcome it.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, of course we understand the concern of grandparents with regard to child arrangements. But, as I indicated earlier, this is a difficult field. It is easy to talk of a presumption in favour of grandparents, but if you do that, you are, in effect, intruding on the rights of the parents with respect to the care of the children.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I thoroughly agree with the proposition that is highly desirable for the definition used as the basis for later provisions in this part of the Bill to be on the face of the Bill. The difficulty I have had so far is in identifying what we want to do. It is the area of exaggerated claims, or something of that sort, that underlies the Government’s proposals. I agree that it must be, ultimately, a medical definition, because a medical report saying that you have this injury is an essential requirement for you to come under this part of the Bill.

The difficulty, however, is that the doctors have to know where these exaggerations take place. I have been instructed by people who suggest that if you go for the back, and the rest, you are extending the thing beyond the real position. I have, therefore, some sympathy with the amendment restricting that, which I think is to be moved or spoken to later. I do not, however, profess to know exactly what the problem is, in the sense of the area of medical expertise that is being used by the claimant industry to exaggerate claims. That is their idea: to exaggerate these claims and ask for more than they are worth. As I said at Second Reading, I have some experience long past of the difficulty of actually quantifying the correct amount for these injuries, particularly if they are serious—and they can be quite serious, I think. This is my problem and I would be glad of help when the Minister comes to speak.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions that have been made so far this morning. I observe that it appears to be generally recognised that the Bill is addressing a very real issue about which policy decisions have to be made and implemented. I quite understand the question raised about where the definition of whiplash injury should appear. The definition in the Bill seeks to limit injuries to those soft tissue injuries that affect the neck, back or shoulder and arise from road traffic accidents. The vires in the Bill are tightly drawn to enable regulations to be made by the Lord Chancellor that would apply only to a discrete number and type of injury.

It is interesting to see the diversity of amendments that have come forward this morning. That may underline the particular challenge we face in arriving at a suitable definition, be it in the Bill or in regulation. We have sought to address an issue that involves reconciling a legal understanding of this matter with a medical definition—one which covers both injury and the symptoms of injury. That involves us engaging with not only medical expertise but a degree of legal expertise. In addition, while I am not going to go through the detail of every amendment, because I understand what lies behind them, I will note this much. The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, set out three points for consideration, and in doing so underlined the very real problem that we need to address here. It was emphasised by the suggestion that if you go to a particular claims management site you are encouraged to believe that even if you have no symptoms you may still have a claim.

I was reminded of an incident some years ago where I was acting for an American pharmaceutical company. The US attorneys showed me a photograph of a genuine roadside sign that had been erected in the state of Mississippi. It said, “If you’ve taken drug X and suffered a fatal heart attack, telephone this number”. The lengths to which we lawyers will go know no bounds, and our belief in the Almighty is always there. There is a very real industry out there. I do not use the term “racket”, but others have—and with some justification.

Looking to the current position, the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, correctly observed that the regulations that we have produced in draft to elaborate the definition of whiplash injury have only just appeared. I quite understand the need for noble Lords to consider those regulations in more detail. In turn, I will consider in more detail whether we should incorporate a more precise definition in the Bill. But I stress that, even if we were to take that step, it would be necessary for us to bear in mind the ability of government to proceed by way of regulations to support any definition in the Bill. We are well aware that flexibility will be required with regard to any final definition so that we can meet the way in which claims development occurs—the way in which this sort of market develops—in order to put limitations on claims.

At the end of the day, the detailed definition of whiplash injury will need to reconcile the current legal understanding with an accurate medical definition covering both injury and symptoms. Our aim is to achieve that objective, but to what extent we achieve it by incorporating the definition in the Bill is not a matter on which I would take a final position. I quite understand the suggestion that we should consider further the extent to which the definition can appear on the face of the Bill, and also allow noble Lords the opportunity to consider the scope of the draft regulation that has only recently been made available. In the light of that, and understanding that these are essentially probing amendments, I invite noble Lords not to press them at this time.

[The Earl of Kinnoull]

My Lords, I am grateful for those last few sentences from the Minister, which were very helpful and reflect the strong mood of the House. I must say that if we had had a brief fee clock going, with the number of very expensive lawyers here, it would have been going round quite rapidly. I will make one point, following what the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, said. I too am a non-practising barrister, but I would never do anything to suggest that advocacy was not valuable. Advocates are immensely valuable in our justice system.

I do, of course, have experience of sitting on the other side of the table from the “claims industry”, as I term it—and the last thing those people want is an advocate in the mix. Most of their companies do not employ that many lawyers: some companies have no lawyers at all, or just one on their writing paper. They want a paper-based or telephone-based operation, in order to process things as cheaply as possible. This would actually help advocacy, because it would try to push things back into the proper legal market and away from companies that have been commoditising the rather grubby process of grabbing money. But, on the basis of what the Minister has said, and knowing that we will be having discussions with a view to bringing forward some sort of amendment on the definition—no doubt several noble Lords who have spoken today will be involved—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I intervene briefly, having put my name to the noble Earl’s amendments. I am not sure that the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, quite followed the idea behind this, which is that psychological injuries are specifically identified at various places in this clause but minor injuries are not. The purpose of the amendments is therefore to remove psychological injuries as a specific category and reinsert them further down, through Amendment 22, with minor injuries, so that we sweep up everything concerned with a whiplash unless it is a serious injury, such as a fracture of a leg, which is clearly a different issue. However, the issue is picked up by the reinsertion by Amendment 22 of the words “minor injuries”, such as a bruised knee.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions to the Bill in Committee. I begin with Amendment 4, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, which would limit the definition of whiplash to soft tissue injuries of the neck. There is then a further amendment that would require the definition of whiplash to be set by the Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Health. The amendment to remove the back and shoulder from this definition would significantly reduce the number of claims subject to measures in the Bill, namely the tariff and the ban on settling claims without medical evidence. It would also encourage claims displacement into other areas to avoid them being subject to the tariff. That would be a serious issue.

The definition in the Bill has been adapted from that in the Prisons and Courts Bill following feedback from stakeholders that the definition in the latter Bill was not broad enough to capture the intended claims. The current definition, with the draft regulations that have now been produced, is intended to achieve that objective.

The amendment requiring the definition of whiplash to be set by the Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Health would provide an independent person who has responsibility for advising the Government on medical issues, but the definition of whiplash injury needs to reconcile the current legal understanding with an accurate medical definition that covers both injuries and their symptoms. This is why the Government have developed the definition of a whiplash injury with input not only from medical experts, but from other expert stakeholders, including claimant and defendant solicitors.

Amendments 8, 9 and 10 restrict the scope of the tariff provisions by reducing the injury duration of affected claims to 12 months from two years. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, observed, this would reduce the number of claims captured by these reforms, but have the negative effect of encouraging claims displacement or claims inflation. Having an injury duration of up to two years will ensure that genuinely injured claimants seek timely treatment for their injuries, as well as enabling the Government to reduce and control the level of compensation in whiplash claims and consequently—as is one of the objectives—reduce insurance premiums for consumers.

The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, spoke to Amendments 15 to 20 and 22, which would widen the types of injuries affected by both the tariff of damages and the ban on settling claims without medical evidence. It would remove the term “psychological” from the clause, so that the measures in the Bill would apply to all minor injuries related to road traffic accidents, regardless of whether they are psychological or physical in nature. Consequently, this would apply the single-figure tariff to all those injuries, irrespective of number and type, by reference to the duration of the whiplash injury alone. This would result in the reduction of damages for a substantial number of personal injury claims outside the scope of our proposed reforms. The proposed reforms are intended to reduce the number and cost of particular claims—“an industry”, some people have referred to; “a racket”, others have mentioned. We are committed to addressing the issues that arise with whiplash injury.

I understand the point made about the bruised knee. I respond to the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, on the potential for discrepancies between awards made under the tariff for the whiplash injury itself and awards made for other minor injuries.

Clause 2(8) makes provision for the fact that the court will take into account other minor injuries and will make an award that is not related to the tariff itself. That is my understanding of the words in parentheses: that, in the context of the whiplash injury, regard will be had to the limits imposed by the tariff and the regulations but that, with respect to the other injuries, there will be no such limitation. That is why we do not consider it appropriate to delete the term “psychological” and extend these provisions to all minor injuries. Including minor psychological claims within the original tariff, as the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, indicated, was done in order to meet the way in which claims develop in this area. Indeed, it is in line with the Judicial College guidelines for personal injury compensation, which indicate that minor psychological injuries such as travel anxiety are not in themselves separate injuries attracting compensation; they have to be linked to physical injury itself.

Turning to Amendment 21, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Primarolo, if one considers Clause 2(6), persons who are unable to locate treatment for either their physical or psychological injuries are in fact only required to take appropriate steps to seek such treatment. There is no requirement for them to undertake it if it is not available for any number of practical reasons. I would therefore suggest that this amendment is unnecessary in the circumstances.

[Baroness Primarolo]

Can the Minister explain, then, what the point is of putting a subsection into a Bill that will have no effect, given that we know that psychological and physiotherapy services are under enormous strain and vary around the country? On the point he makes about people just adjusting how they make their claim, surely the answer would be, “We tried and it wasn’t available”. If it is to be a test, should it not be a test that is capable of being judged?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With great respect, the relevant text can be judged, because the requirement is that a person should take reasonable steps to secure those services where they are required. If they are not available then that is an answer to the point.

May I move on to Amendments 27A and 49A, on the course of employment? I have to confess that, on this matter, I am inclined to side with the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. It appears to me, with due respect, that there is perhaps a misunderstanding here. If we look at Clause 1(3), we see that it is concerned with a situation in which a person suffers whiplash injury “because of driver negligence”. Whether a person is in the course of their employment or not, if they suffer a whiplash injury because of driver negligence, the third-party driver’s negligence will be responsible for the injury and, therefore, the insurer of the third-party driver will respond. If, on the other hand, the injury is the consequence of the driver himself, then he will have no claim, because you cannot claim in respect of your own negligence. In neither event would there be a legitimate basis for claim against the employer. It is for that reason that we do not consider it necessary to exclude a group to that extent.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but is that the point? The point of these amendments, as I understood them, was to exempt those who drive in the course of their employment from the rigour of the new provisions of this Bill when they are claimants, so that the claimant in the course of his employment has a legitimate claim. We may assume it is a legitimate claim because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, said, it would have to be backed up by the employer’s evidence saying, “This claimant, driving my lorry on a perfectly legitimate delivery, was injured”. It is the claimant who counts, not the defendant.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With great respect, if the claimant is driving, his claim will be against the third-party driver whose negligence caused the claim. There is no reason why, in those circumstances, you should distinguish between a claimant who is in the course of his employment and a claimant who is not. They are both liable to suffer the same injury in the same circumstances as a result of the negligence of the same party. The distinction is one without a difference, with great respect. There is no justification for making such a distinction. I recollect discussing this with the noble Baroness, and she talked about the distinction between motor insurance and employers’ liability insurance, but there is no question of the claim being directed against the employer’s liability insurance in such circumstances.

[Baroness Berridge]

That is not the point that is being made here. I would be grateful if my noble and learned friend could address the question. We are all, I believe, in your Lordships’ House working on the assumption that the target of the Bill is fraud, not genuine claimants. So the specific question is, where is the evidence that people who are claimants when they drive in the course of their employment and are injured by a third party’s negligence—the claim is not against their employer but against the other driver—are fuelling any of the calls or the fraud that is the underlying principle of the Bill? Because that is an injustice.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With the greatest respect to my noble friend, there is no basis for distinguishing between the cohort which is driving in the course of employment and the cohort which is not driving in the course of employment when an injury is suffered due to the negligence of a third-party driver. I am not aware of any examination, study or evidence that would seek to distinguish, or of any conceivable basis for distinguishing, between those two cohorts. So, with the greatest respect, I would suggest that it is a distinction without a difference.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

May I just try to assist—I hope—the noble and learned Lord? The fact that the employer can authenticate that the accident was caused while the driver, the claimant, was acting in the course of employment does not authenticate the fact that he suffered a whiplash injury, and that is the vice that this legislation is designed to attack. Why, in any event, exempt from these provisions that particular class of driver? Why not the man taking his wife to hospital to have a baby, or a whole host of perfectly legitimate drivers? I hope to have helped.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am grateful for the noble and learned Lord’s assistance. In the past his interventions have not always been of assistance, but they certainly are on this occasion. I would go further and suggest that it would make no more sense to exempt people who were driving red cars at the time of the accident. It is a distinction without a difference; it is as simple as that. That is why we do not consider this to be a helpful line of inquiry, and it is not one that we intend to pursue further.

With regard to the other amendments that were spoken to in this group, I have endeavoured to address the points made. I acknowledge the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and indeed by the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, about the potential for anomalies where someone suffers a whiplash injury and other forms of injury as a result of the same accident. That is there, and there is no obvious answer to that. Nevertheless, the Bill is structured with the intention of addressing the vice we are really concerned with here and which is generally acknowledged to exist. In these circumstances, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Belhaj and Boudchar: Litigation Update

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House I will repeat a Statement made in the other place by my right honourable friend the Attorney-General:

“Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement. In 2012, Mr Abdul Hakim Belhaj and his wife, Mrs Fatima Boudchar, brought a claim against the United Kingdom Government and two individuals, the former Foreign Secretary, the right honourable Jack Straw, and Sir Mark Allen, the former director at the Foreign Office. The claimants alleged that the United Kingdom Government were complicit in their abduction, detention and rendition to Libya in 2004 and for the treatment that they suffered at the hands of others. Mrs Boudchar was pregnant at the time.

The claimants’ case, in outline, is that in early 2004 they were detained and forcibly conveyed through a number of jurisdictions by others, ultimately to be handed over to the Libyan regime of which Mr Belhaj was an opponent. During this period, they were subjected to a harrowing ordeal which caused them significant distress. Mrs Boudchar was released from detention in Libya in June 2004, and gave birth shortly afterwards. Mr Belhaj was not released until March 2010.

On 3 May, the claims against Jack Straw and Sir Mark Allen were withdrawn. Today I can announce to this House that, following mediation, the United Kingdom Government have reached a full and final settlement of Mr Belhaj and Mrs Boudchar’s claims. I would like to pay tribute to the constructive way in which Mr Belhaj and Mrs Boudchar have approached the mediation. This has been a long-running and hugely complex piece of litigation which has been difficult for all the individuals involved as parties.

As we have seen in recent years, there remains a considerable international threat to the United Kingdom and our allies and it is important that the Government and the security and intelligence services are able to respond properly to that to keep our country safe, but it is also important that we should act in line with our values and in accordance with the rule of law. That means that, when we get things wrong, it is right and just that we should acknowledge it, compensate those affected and learn lessons. I believe this is such a case.

The settlement of this claim has been agreed out of court. The main elements of the agreement I can report to the House are as follows: first, no admissions of liability have been made by any of the defendants in settling these claims. Secondly, the claimants have now withdrawn their claims against all the defendants. Thirdly, the Government have agreed to pay Mrs Boudchar £500,000; Mr Belhaj did not seek, and has not been given, any compensation. Finally, I have met Mr Belhaj and Mrs Boudchar. Indeed, Mrs Boudchar was present in the Gallery to hear the Statement and the Prime Minister has now written to them both to apologise. I thought it right that I should set out to the House the terms of that apology in full. It reads as follows:

‘The Attorney-General and senior United Kingdom Government officials have heard directly from you both about your detention, rendition and the harrowing experiences you suffered. Your accounts were moving and what happened to you is deeply troubling. It is clear that you were both subjected to appalling treatment and that you suffered greatly, not least the affront to the dignity of Mrs Boudchar, who was pregnant at the time. The United Kingdom Government believe your accounts. Neither of you should have been treated in this way.


The United Kingdom Government’s actions contributed to your detention, rendition and suffering. The United Kingdom Government shared information about you with its international partners. We should have done more to reduce the risk that you would be mistreated. We accept this was a failing on our part.


Later, during your detention in Libya, we sought information about and from you. We wrongly missed opportunities to alleviate your plight: this should not have happened.


On behalf of Her Majesty’s Government, I apologise unreservedly. We are profoundly sorry for the ordeal that you both suffered and our role in it.


The United Kingdom Government has learned many lessons from this period. We should have understood much sooner the unacceptable practices of some of our international partners. And we sincerely regret our failures’.


I hope that the Government’s acknowledgment of these events in these unequivocal terms, and the apology they have each been given, will be of some comfort to Mr Belhaj and Mrs Boudchar. As the Prime Minister observed in her letter to Mr Belhaj and Mrs Boudchar, the Government have learned lessons from this period.

These events took place in the period after the 11 September 2001 attacks, which was one in which we and our international partners were suddenly adapting to a completely new scale and type of threat. It is clear with the benefit of hindsight that the Government, the agencies and their staff were, in some respects, not prepared for the extreme demands suddenly placed on them. The unacceptable practices of some of our international partners should have been understood much sooner.

The Government have enacted reforms to ensure that the problems of the past will not be repeated. We have made it clear that Ministers must be consulted whenever UK personnel involved in a planned operation believe a detainee is at serious risk of mistreatment by a foreign state. We have also improved Parliament’s ability to oversee the actions of the agencies through the Justice and Security Act 2013. The Intelligence and Security Committee is a committee of Parliament, fully independent of the Government. It has a statutory right to review past intelligence operations, and the committee and its staff have direct access to agency papers. These reforms mean that the framework within which the UK now operates is very different from that in the early 2000s.

I end by reiterating that vital work is done to keep us safe and we aspire to the highest ethical standards. When those standards are not met, it is right that we apologise, that we compensate those who have suffered as a result and that we make whatever changes we can to avoid the same thing happening again. This is the approach we have now taken in this case and, as such, I commend this Statement to the House”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I too am grateful to the Minister for repeating the Attorney-General’s Statement.

On 21 February 2008, this House was concerned with the use of UK facilities and UK airspace by the United States for the purposes of extraordinary rendition. In answer to a Written Question from my right honourable friend Menzies Campbell, now my noble friend Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, assurances had been given by Mr Jack Straw in 2005, and later assurances were given by Mr Blair, the Prime Minister, in 2007, that these events had never occurred—that there had been no extraordinary rendition. A Statement in February 2008 was made by the noble Lord, Lord Malloch-Brown, in this House to the effect that this was incorrect and that extraordinary rendition had taken place through the British territory of Diego Garcia. Perhaps I may crave the House’s indulgence for quoting myself. I said on that occasion:

“We look for a public inquiry, as we have called for several times, which will investigate what extraordinary renditions have taken place not just to European countries but to places where we know that torture takes place—places such as Syria, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, where it is thought that there are secret holes where United States detainees are held. We cannot be satisfied by assurances given by the Government today on this matter”.—[Official Report, 21/02/08; col. 351.]


Nothing was said in 2008 about the events of 2004—the abduction, detention and rendition to Libya of Mr Belhaj and Mrs Boudchar, who were opponents of the Gaddafi regime and could expect torture and imprisonment.

Today, the Prime Minister’s apology, as we have heard, contains the following:

“The UK Government’s actions contributed to your detention, rendition and suffering”.


We are entitled to know in what specific way. Mr Belhaj’s claim was that MI6 provided information to the CIA which led to his capture in Kuala Lumpur in 2004 and rendition via Bangkok to a Libyan jail. He further claimed that he was interrogated by British intelligence officers during his six years’ imprisonment and during the period of torture that he endured. All this was denied at the time. The Prime Minister says in her letter:

“The UK Government believes your accounts”.


Therefore, I take it that what Mr Belhaj said in his statement of claim is admitted, despite the fact that liability in the case is not admitted.

Another phrase used by the Prime Minister was that she was,

“profoundly sorry for the ordeal”,

of Mr Belhaj and Mrs Boudchar. If that is so, why did this Government try to quash these proceedings and argue a defence of state immunity and “foreign act of state” immunity all the way up to the Supreme Court as recently as January of last year? Do the Government now recognise that these defences must be subject to exceptions where there are violations of fundamental norms of international law and basic human rights, such as the prohibition of torture, which has been recognised in this country since Felton’s case in 1628?

A further point is that the costs of such a series of applications and appeals, which were unsuccessful, have no doubt fallen upon the public purse. What were those costs?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her observations and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas. As the Statement made clear, more could have been done to prevent the suffering of Mr Belhaj and Mrs Boudchar when the Government shared information with their international partners. Although the Government believed assurances that they sought in good faith about the treatment, with the benefit of hindsight they feel that they could have done more. Furthermore, after the detention of Mr Belhaj and Mrs Boudchar in Libya, it is now clear that the United Kingdom Government missed opportunities to alleviate their plight.

As regards future ministerial scrutiny, of course that will be all that is required to ensure that these events do not repeat themselves. Our vigilance will be clear and robust, and will reflect our core values, as outlined by the noble Baroness.

With regard to the queries from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I will not make any comment on operational matters, but it is not the case that the Government tried to quash any decision. The case which was raised and which has now been settled without admission of liability raised complex issues of law, and we of course respect the decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court handed down in January 2017. The costs were incurred by the Government Legal Department and were approximately £3 million.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I should like to draw the House’s attention to the fact that I am an officer of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition. I am extremely grateful to my noble and learned friend for repeating the Statement and to the Government for having taken the opportunity to draw a line under this very unhappy and unsatisfactory episode. They are to be congratulated on having grasped this particular nettle.

Perhaps I could ask my noble and learned friend to follow up on a couple of loose ends that are still lying around. The first relates to the press release put out by the Crown Prosecution Service on 9 June 2016 when it decided not to proceed with the case against Sir Mark Allen. The press release said that,

“there is sufficient evidence to support the contention that the suspect”—

that is, Sir Mark Allen—

“had … sought political authority for some of his actions albeit not within a formal written process nor in detail which covered all his communications and conduct”.

Will any further probing take place on what that political authority was and who gave it?

Secondly, there has been discussion in the Statement and elsewhere about the question of consolidated guidance and the review of consolidated guidance dealing with interviewing prisoners abroad when they are at risk of torture and ill treatment. There has been discussion about this being reviewed for some months, and tomorrow never seems to come for this. Will the Minister explain where we are with the review of consolidated guidance and when we might expect to see it published?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord. It is not for me to comment upon a press release from the Crown Prosecution Service, which is, of course, an independent body concerned with the consideration of criminal complaints and cases. Therefore, I cannot add to the comments that were made in that press release.

On the matter of guidance, the current consolidated guidance is from 2010. That sets out the principles consistent with both domestic and international law governing the interviewing of detainees overseas and the passing and receiving of intelligence-related matters and information. At the moment, I am not able to give any indication as to when a review of that guidance will be completed, but it might be informed—apart from anything else—by the work of Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee, which is due to publish its detainee report in the near future. In light of that, we will give attention to the 2010 guidance.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I had forgotten that it was a Question asked by me in the other place that initially produced the Answer that no such rendition had taken place. At the time, there was great speculation that airfields other than the principal airfields in the United Kingdom were being used for that purpose. It might help the House if I were to point out that I was subsequently given a public apology by the successor as Foreign Secretary, Mr David Miliband. Even by the standards of the time, what happened in this case was quite extraordinary and unacceptable. The strength of these new arrangements—some of which arose out of recommendations made by the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I subsequently became a member—will be to ensure that nothing of this kind ever happens again in any circumstances.

On a technical note, I understood the Advocate-General to say—I may have misheard him—that there was no admission of liability when this settlement was made. Having listened very carefully to the terms of the letter written by the Prime Minister, it seems to me that on any view, that might not be a judicial admission of liability but it is most certainly, in the minds of any who hear it, an admission by the Prime Minister that a great wrongdoing was created in this case.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

As I indicated, the conclusion of the mediation was, among other things, that there was no admission of liability. However, the noble Lord will recognise the concern that the Prime Minister and the Government felt over the events that led to the detention of Mr Belhaj and Mrs Boudchar. I hope that the Prime Minister’s clear apology will speak for itself.

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)]

My Lords, about a decade ago, I had the privilege of chairing the Intelligence and Security Committee, which produced a report on rendition. I assume, therefore, that all of the information that the Minister has given us today in this Chamber, and which the security services and the Government have given to the ISC, comes under a different regime. The committee now has more powers of greater strengths. Will the Minister tell us when the ISC is likely to report on this matter?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly, I am not in a position to determine the timing of the ISC report, but my understanding is—and the expectation is—that it will be published later this year.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome this Statement: it is very clear in drawing a line under matters. Things have changed since these events happened. I was the Security Minister at the time and when I asked the question about rendition, I was told, as a Minister in the Government, that it was not going on. Does the Minister feel that this could not possibly happen again now because of the changes that have been put in place by a number of noble Lords, when they were in the other place, and by the committees that are in place or does he think that such a thing could happen again, where a tiny cabal of people is able to do something and there is no way of breaking this out?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am confident that we have put in place such measures as will ensure that there will be no repetition of this.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, the Statement mentions the unacceptable practices of other countries on several occasions. Can the Minister assure this House that we will not be bent in our moral judgment by the need to kowtow or suck up to other countries, which appears to be one of the reasons that has driven this behaviour in the past? Can he also undertake to make sure that these other countries have been told that we find these practices unacceptable?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, our international partners are well aware of our standards, our belief in the rule of law and our desire to uphold the rights of the individual. They are therefore well aware of our concerns in that area.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord McKenzie of Luton (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a step back from the legal intricacies of the Bill to reflect on a wider issue. The problem that the Government identify is the high number and cost of RTA whiplash claims. Their policy objective and intended effect are to disincentivise minor exaggerated and fraudulent claims—that is, to bear down on costs by reducing compensation levels for all, and requiring medical evidence before claims are settled. The impact assessment records that the volume of RTA-related PI claims has remained fairly static over the last three years, with rising volumes of traffic, meaning that there are proportionately fewer fatal or serious accidents. It attributes this in part to improvement in vehicle design—for example, integrated seats and headrests. Yet the Department for Transport recorded, for the year ended September 2017, 27,000 killed or seriously injured, with 174,000 casualties of all severities.

Although there was a decrease in settled claims, attributable in part to LASPO reforms, financially settled soft tissue claims for that year totalled some 520,000, whether they were from whiplash or as a result of other road traffic accidents. What seems to be missing in this debate is any form of focus on a wider prevention agenda. It should be about not only reducing costs but avoiding the pain and suffering and sometimes life-changing injuries in the first place. Why are we not raging against the scale of all this, as well as chipping away at monetary compensation levels?

I should point out at this juncture my interest, set out in the register, as president of RoSPA, the safety charity, and am grateful to it for the information it provided. I shall instance just two developments which have the potential to make a difference. In-vehicle monitoring—telematics—is increasingly available in the UK. As noble Lords may be aware, these systems essentially monitor how, when and where a vehicle is driven. The system can provide in-vehicle alerts if pre-set parameters are exceeded. There are obvious benefits for crash reduction circumstances. At present, it is understood that take-up of a variety of different systems is ad hoc and the catalyst, particularly for younger drivers, is reduced insurance premiums. Would not a comprehensive national take-up campaign have a beneficial effect on the real reduction of whiplash, reducing not only costs but the actual medical effects and suffering?

It is understood that next week the European Commission will propose new regulations that will focus on the mandatory fitting of autonomous emergency breaking systems. It has been estimated by the EU new car assessment programme that AEB can prevent up to 38% of rear-end crashes and avoid 1,100 fatalities and 120,000 casualties over the next 10 years. Currently, about 21% of new cars fit AEB as standard. I hesitate to move into issues of the European Commission, but will the Government support those regulations, both before and after Brexit, if that is where we end up?

I am aware that this amendment may be seen as a bit away from the mainstream before us today, but I hold to my point that concerns over levels of compensation for whiplash should be about prevention as much as about having a fair and robust system of compensation. I beg to move.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his contribution to the debate and I acknowledge the importance of looking more widely at issues such as road safety in the context of addressing the very issue that this Bill is intended to deal with.

On the question of the European Union regulations, in so far as they have direct effect before exit day, they will form part of retained EU law, and in so far as they do not have direct effect by that date, they will not form part of retained EU law. Going forward, it will be for our domestic legislatures to consider the appropriate steps to take with regard to such measures, and of course they will be conscious of developments in other jurisdictions when addressing that point. I am sorry to revert to an earlier Bill and its progress through this House, but I thought that I ought to address that point directly.

We recognise that the definition of whiplash injury is complex and that there is a need to reconcile the current legal understanding with an accurate medical definition that covers both injuries and symptoms. That is why we developed the definition of a whiplash injury, and the wider reform proposals, with extensive input from expert stakeholders, including medical experts, in order that we could come to a view about the appropriate definition for these purposes. In developing the whiplash reforms, we have considered the impact of improvements in vehicle safety. Indeed, developments in vehicle safety have been one of the features of the analysis and impact assessment that have been carried out. As the Government have mentioned on several occasions, it is surprising that the number of whiplash claims continues to be so high despite the significant improvements in vehicle safety over recent years, including the development of safe seats and head restraints which have had such a material bearing on safety in road traffic cases.

The amendment would enable the Government to take account of advances in vehicle safety and driving techniques when revising the definition in regulations. The noble Lord did not go so far as to incorporate the possibility of increasing numbers of driverless vehicles—but, looking further ahead, that is an additional development that we may have to take into consideration. It is crucial that we retain the ability to continue to amend the definition of whiplash in order to reflect all these developments, some of which may come along far more rapidly than we presently anticipate. That is why in the first instance we propose that the definition should be set out in regulations that can be amended and, in any event, allowing for the suggestion that there should be a more extensive definition in the Bill, it would be essential that there should be the means to amend that definition rapidly in response to changing conditions, and to do so by way of regulations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I concur with the views expressed and proposals made by the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Marks. They are absolutely on the right track, although I do not agree with the provision for the Judicial College guidelines to be taken into account. It will be seen that in the next group, we have an alternative proposal suggesting that the Civil Justice Council should be involved in making the decisions.

In this group, however, there is an amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lord McKenzie which would restore a degree of discretion for the court to uplift the amount of damages payable where it deems it just to do so in all the circumstances of the case. That would revive the role of the judiciary in assessing damages, at least to some extent, where it felt that the scale proffered under the legislation was inadequate—as noble Lords have already made clear, that seems likely in many cases.

I broadly support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey and Lord Marks, and will revert to one aspect to which I referred in the next group.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions that have been made. It respectfully appears to me that the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Marks, materially bolstered the approach that the Government take in the Bill. Why do I say that? Because it is quite clear that we are addressing a matter of policy and have to do so as such. What ultimately has to be taken here is a political decision, not a judicial determination.

In fairness, I think it was a slip from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, but when he talked about the question of whether claims are genuine or not reasonable, he said that it was unquantifiable—and then corrected himself to unquantified. The former is more accurate than the latter.

Let us be clear. More than 80% of road traffic injuries are allegedly whiplash-induced injuries. The vast majority of all personal injury claims are whiplash claims. Over 10 years, the number of whiplash claims has rocketed—yes, it has stabilised a little in the past year or two, but it has still rocketed. At the same time, the number of road traffic accidents reported has dropped by 40%. At the same time, the number of vehicles classified by Thatcham as safe from the perspective of seating and headrests has increased from 18% to 80%.

As some people have said, an industry is going on. As others have suggested, there is a racket. We have a claims culture that has built up—I attribute no blame to any one party; all sides involved have contributed in one way or another to the ballooning of the claims culture. The time has come—indeed, the time may be almost past—when we need to address it as a political issue.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, suggested that somehow we were making a transfer from claimants to motorists. With great respect, a very large proportion of claimants are motorists, so it is not as simple and straightforward as that. Secondly, he talked about the transfer requiring to be justified. The transfer is a consequence of the policy decision we are making to deal with the industry, the claims culture; it is not the purpose of it. It is, as I say, the consequence.

[Lord Sharkey]

In fact, I was asking the noble and learned Lord, with respect, to justify the quantum, but perhaps he is going to deal with that.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, as I say, the quantum is a consequence of the steps we are taking to address the claims culture. The way in which we are doing it is such that we are confident that the benefits will be passed to consumers in the form of motor insurance premiums.

[Lord Sharkey]

In that case, perhaps the noble and learned Lord could explain exactly how the tariff was constructed—on what basis?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Yes, I shall come to that. We have had regard to the present level of damages awarded in these cases, we have had regard to expert input about how we can deal with the claims culture that has built up, and we have taken the view on the level of tariff required to implement the policy decision that we have made to deal with this emerging problem.

[Lord Sharkey]

Does the Minister accept that that is not really an explanation? It is simply a statement that the Government have done something. I was asking for the basis on which they arrived at these numbers. In fact, oddly, the numbers changed between the impact assessment and the SI published yesterday. There must be a reason for that; there must have been some discussion. There must be some basis on which these amounts were constructed, but it is not clear from his answer what they are.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, first, I understand that there was not intended to be a change between the impact assessment and the SI publication. That is why the rather odd difference of 4 point something per cent emerges. I acknowledge that that was not intended.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. Perhaps he will confirm to the House that even the Judicial College guidelines or awards of damages by judges for pain, suffering and loss of amenity are not mathematically calculated; they are figures arrived at doing the best that a judge can to represent the nature of the injury by such an award.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey]

I think this is a misunderstanding. I was not trying to imply that there was an element of certainty involved here. I simply wanted to know how the figures had been arrived at. Why not some other figure? Instead of 235, why not 200? Why not 400? How were these figures arrived at?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, a judgment had been made having regard to all the information available as to what level should be set for the tariff to address the very problem that we are attempting to deal with. It is not based on some mathematical formula or percentage.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

I refer my noble and learned friend to his previous comment which, fairly, recognises that all parties are to blame, which is something that I think he conceded at Second Reading—that the insurance industry shares part of the blame. May I clarify? When he says that all parties are to blame for this, may I clarify that he was not including the genuine claimants, who have become a focus in this House: that they are not to blame for an industry, a racket or whatever created by others?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Everybody readily acknowledges that point but, with respect, you cannot take 650,000 claims and identify 300,000 that happen to be fraudulent, or 200,000 that happen to be exaggerated. A policy decision has to be made, acknowledging that there are within that very large body of claims perfectly genuine claims, perfectly fraudulent claims, exaggerated claims and minor claims that would never have been brought but for the encouragement of a claims industry that sees the financial benefit of ensuring that people take these claims forward. That is part of the culture that has developed. I noticed that when the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, suffered an unfortunate accident on the Tube and mentioned it in this House, he was asked if he intended to make a claim and said no. One was encouraged by that. People tend to consider that these events can happen; they may be able to point the finger of blame at someone, but they feel that life goes on and it is unnecessary to be distracted by such issues. We have a claims management culture that goes out of its way—many noble Lords have noted it—to encourage people who would otherwise think nothing of a minor injury to come forward and join the bandwagon. Let us emphasise: this is a matter of policy that we are addressing in these circumstances.

[Baroness Primarolo (Lab)]

On that point, the Minister will be aware that the business model for insurance companies is to assist those who they insure, and to make claims against others when it is appropriate. They are part of that industry, and some of them own claims management companies. Will the Minister explain to the House what he undertook in terms of research to make sure that the figures he is basing his assertions on are correct?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I acknowledge the noble Baroness’s expertise in these areas as a non-executive director of Thompsons Solicitors, and her knowledge of the claims culture that has built up. With respect, in carrying out our work, we looked at the behaviour of the insurance industry in this context. Of course, the insurance industry can operate as an intermediary because, where the claims arise, it passes on the costs to the consumer by way of increased premiums. There have been instances in the past where insurance companies have passed on details of their own insurees’ claims to third parties and that has been exploited. I was quite open earlier in saying that we acknowledge the contribution of a number of different parties to what has developed into an unacceptable claims culture. That is what we are seeking to address in this Bill.

Can I continue just a little further in that context? The first group of amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Marks, proposed that compensation for pain and suffering should be determined by reference to the Judicial College guidelines. Indeed, the second set of amendments proposed to place the tariff amounts into the Bill rather than in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor. All those figures would be significantly higher than those proposed by the Government—indeed, more in line with the amount currently paid out by claim.

I understand that noble Lords feel that the proposed tariff amounts are too low, but we continue to be concerned about the high number and the high cost of these claims in general, and the impact of that on the consumer. Therefore, we have to take a policy view as to how we can disincentivise not just fraudulent claims but what I would call unmeritorious claims—very minor and exaggerated claims. Our view is that it is right to set the tariff through regulations, which will help to control those costs and ensure greater certainty to both claimants and defendants when they come to deal with these claims, remembering that the vast majority of these claims never reach court anyway. They are dealt with before they ever arrive at the door of a court. In addition, we consider that a tariff will provide the flexibility required to change the tariff amounts, in reaction not just to inflation but to changes in the market, if I can gently call them that. We know that we are dealing with a marketplace; it is extremely inventive and can rise again phoenix-like from any statutory provision that we bring forward.

Therefore, we are going to have a tariff of predictable damages, albeit for those who suffer injury with a duration of up to 24 months. That is a relatively minor personal injury, but not one to be dismissed—and we do not seek to dismiss them. The relevant tariff will then be applied. It will be far simpler for someone to take their claim forward and, of course, we then have in place the requirement for an independent medical expert report, albeit in circumstances of dealing with subjective complaints of injury, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, acknowledged. They can be very difficult to determine. If someone comes forward with symptoms, on the basis of a subjective assessment, a report can be made, but it can be very difficult to determine whether those subjective complaints are well based. Indeed, as the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, observed, there are claims management companies that would encourage someone to come forward even if he had not suffered any symptoms so far, in the belief that something might emerge in due course. That is why we have taken that approach, albeit we have allowed for the judiciary to have input so that it can, in appropriate or exceptional circumstances, increase the tariff award by up to 20%.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I just wanted to make this point, but because of the noble and learned Lord’s plea I have perhaps left it a little late, as he has left the question of the figures. He made it clear that a political judgment was made in reaching these figures. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, asked for clarification that the Judicial College guidelines, on which we rely, were merely an extrapolation from judges’ awards. However, as I expect the noble and learned Lord will accept, there is an element of circularity here because the judges reach their decision as to what is appropriate invariably after having the Judicial College guidelines cited to them, so they feed on themselves and are therefore a fairly carefully worked-out set of figures into which there could be political input.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, as the noble Lord outlined, they are self-perpetuating figures. Therefore, although we have regard to those guidelines when coming to a view as to where the tariff should be set, that was only one element in deciding the appropriate levels for the tariff itself.

I shall turn for a moment to the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, which would provide the court with complete discretion with regard to any percentage increase of exceptional circumstances. We do not consider that that is an appropriate way forward. It would simply lead to an increase in litigation and in the claims culture, so that is why we feel that there should be an appropriate limit on how any exceptional circumstances can be dealt with by the court.

In that context, I should point out that the tariff system is not entirely a novelty. Other European jurisdictions faced with the same claims culture and the same racket, as some people have called it, have introduced tariffs as well, or tables of predictive damages. That includes Italy, Spain and France. In due course both Houses will have the opportunity to debate the details of any regulations that are introduced to put forward the appropriate figures for the tariff, which at present we consider should be in the regulations, if only for the purposes of flexibility.

Again, I want to emphasise that this is essentially a matter of policy to deal with a very particular problem. It is a political decision; it is not one that we consider is for the judges; it is one that is ultimately for the Lord Chancellor to deal with in his capacity as a Minister. It is in these circumstances that I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Sharkey]

I thank the Minister for the long and comprehensive—and occasionally interrupted—answer. There is an issue here. I accept that it is a political decision, of course, and we are all operating on that basis, but I am still worried and puzzled about the way in which this table of tariffs has been devised. I have heard nothing from the Minister to suggest that it is not arbitrary. In particular, he did not answer my question so perhaps he can do it now. Were the figures devised on the basis of some target saving being set and then working backwards to say what the tariff would be to generate that saving? If that is the case, we ought to be told.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Can I be clear to the noble Lord? I am not aware of there having been any target saving. As I sought to indicate earlier, this was rather an approach from the other direction: what policy is required? Effective policy is required to deal with the problem facing us.

[Lord Sharkey]

The Minister will forgive me if I say that that sounds a bit like the back of a political envelope. The question still remains. We are interested in what these figures are, and it would help our discussions if we had a clearer idea of how they were arrived at. I am sure that we will want to pursue that as the Bill makes progress. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I was rather hoping that my noble friend was going to explain the tariff, but that may be for another day.

If I respond shortly, it is not because I dismiss the importance of the amendments that have been moved but because I have already sought to set out the Government’s approach to the tariff, and I hope that will be appreciated. However, I understand the purpose of these probing amendments, in particular the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, which reflects some recommendations from the Bar Council. I will add two short points.

First, as I mentioned before, we allow for the 20% uplift for exceptional circumstances to be placed in the hands of the judiciary. Secondly, in setting the tariff, the Lord Chancellor is going to consult widely and take into account the views of a wide spectrum of interested parties in order to arrive at what is considered, for policy purposes, to be the appropriate levels, both now and in the future. However, we do not consider that it is appropriate to formalise any part of that consultation, for example by reference to consulting the Lord Chief Justice.

I have heard what has been said; it is essentially a development of the previous group of amendments. I appreciate why these additional amendments have been moved, but invite noble Lords to withdraw.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, we have Amendment 26 in this group. I thank my noble friend Lord Young for stepping in to the breach in place of the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, and for the other contributions that have been made.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We have not finished the previous group.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I am sorry. I will speak to Amendment 23 only to congratulate my noble friend for stepping into the breach. I thank him and the noble Lord, Lord Butler, for speaking in support of cyclists. We are very happy to support their proposition.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord for supporting their proposition rather than their amendment—which, I venture, is entirely appropriate in the circumstances. Clause 1 goes out of its way to ensure that vulnerable road users such as cyclists or motorcyclists are not encompassed within the ambit of the provisions in Part 1 of the Bill. That has to be made absolutely clear. I entirely endorse the views expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, as to the types of injury normally suffered by cyclists or motorcyclists. It does not tend to be of the whiplash variety, which is why we have ensured that they are not included in the terms of the Bill. In particular, as I say, Clause 1 expressly serves to exclude vulnerable road users of that type.

However, the point that the noble Lord made was more to do with a matter outwith the present Bill, which is the proposal to increase the small claims limit to £5,000 for road traffic cases. That is being mooted. Indeed, that increase was a factor in our approach to the whole issue of whiplash injury—but it was not limited to that. The proposed increase in the small claims limit will apply to all road users, including cyclists and motorcyclists. The Government’s reasons for seeking that increase are not simply limited to whiplash claims and the claims culture that has developed there but reflect the fact that, in our view, low-value road traffic accident claims—whether whiplash or otherwise—are appropriate for the small claims track and are capable of being dealt with in that track, whether they be for whiplash or other forms of road traffic injury.

In that context, I also note that we are developing, with expert input, the claims portal for these small claims so that claimants will find the system far more accessible. I simply seek to emphasise that the Bill does not embrace vulnerable road users such as cyclists. However, our reason for increasing the small claims limit for road traffic accidents in general is not limited simply to the view that that is a means of dealing with the whiplash claims culture; it reflects a wider view that low-value road traffic accident claims can appropriately be dealt with in the small claims track. Of course, where those claims are perceived to be complex, they can be moved from that track into the next track of judicial determination. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment—albeit he acknowledges that it was tabled for probing purposes.

[Lord Young of Norwood Green]

I welcome what the noble and learned Lord said—I have found it constructive and helpful. Nevertheless, I still think that there is some concern and, rather than having to return to this on Report, it would be useful if we could meet him for further consultation.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am perfectly content to meet the noble Lord. As I return to my feet, I am reminded of the regular reading material of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, which includes the Insurance Times. I circulated a letter to Peers following Second Reading and it may be referring to that, but I do not recollect having made the sort of concession reported in that material. Unless the noble Lord feels that he can correct me, I am certainly not aware of it. Our position has always been that the original draft of the Bill specifically excluded vulnerable road users. I suspect that it is a case not of journalistic licence but of journalistic error.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Primarolo]

When the Minister considers in the round the comments made by other noble Lords, will he undertake to go away and look specifically at the way in which Scotland has approached this important question of asymmetry in the process? Will he look at whether there is a way of incorporating or dealing with claims in a similar way, without clearly undermining what he has identified as the Government’s policy principles in simply reducing tariffs?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, perhaps I may begin with Amendment 26, as put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and Amendment 47, put forward by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Sharkey, and my noble friend Lady Berridge. These amendments seek to secure assurances as to the recoverable cost of a medical report in respect of whiplash injury claims, notwithstanding the increase in the small claims track limit.

The cost of medical reports is currently recoverable in personal injury claims where the defendant insurer has admitted any part of liability. It is intended that these costs will continue to be recoverable following these reforms, including the proposed reform in the small claims track, which is not part of the Bill. I seek to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in particular that it is intended that that cost will be a recoverable element in each and every case where liability is accepted. My understanding is that the civil procedure rules currently permit the recovery of such a cost; if there is any issue with that, I would be perfectly happy to look at it again to ensure that the rules reflect that position, because that is certainly our intention.

The effect of Amendment 27 would be to require the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to undertake both a review and a consultation in respect of the proposed increase to the small claims track limit for whiplash claims before publishing its decision. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, is taking us beyond the realms of whiplash claims and I will comment upon his observations in a moment. The Government have already undertaken a consultation on this issue and our policy changed as a result of that consultation. Originally, we proposed raising the small claims track limit to £5,000 for all personal injury claims but, after consultation, we proposed that the track limit should be raised to £5,000 for road traffic accident-related personal injury claims but only to £2,000 for all other personal injury claims, including employer/employee claims. We do not believe that a further consultation on this issue is required, nor that such a requirement should be placed into the Bill.

I observe in passing that the small claims limit for non-personal injury claims is now, I believe, £10,000 and it operates adequately. In respect of the personal injury limit of £1,000, that was set about 10 years ago so even if we were to apply various inflation-linked multipliers, it would be in the region of £1,700 to £2,000, depending upon what index was taken in respect of inflation. As regards personal injury claims in general, it is not going much beyond that.

The proposal in the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, is that the increase should be to a maximum of £1,500, as opposed to the increase to £5,000 for road traffic accidents and £2,000 for personal injury claims. In that context, the noble Lord observed that these cases—I believe he was referring to non-road traffic accident cases in particular—can be very complicated. I acknowledge that, but if such a claim is complex, that is a ground for removing it from the small claims process to the fast track. There is already provision for that very situation, so we do not consider that further steps need to be taken.

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[Lord Bassam of Brighton]

Can the Minister assure me that there will be consultation with the trades unions? Given the case he is making, it is important that that should take place. Their experience here is highly relevant.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Trades unions’ experience is, essentially, filtered through claimant solicitors such as Thompsons, and those being consulted include representatives of both claimant and defendant groups—so that is being done. However, I would be perfectly happy to meet the noble Lord, and such representative groups as he may wish to bring to a meeting, to discuss the proposed increase in the limits on small claims. If he wishes to do that, I shall be perfectly content for him to contact my private office, and we can make suitable arrangements. At this time, however, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am a little concerned at the degree to which political considerations are supposed override our system of justice. This is not the first time it has been mentioned. However, the latest case is perhaps the least acceptable of the recommendations of this kind. Why on earth should Parliament decide on the so-called exceptional circumstances—undefined, of course, for the purposes this debate—on what are already constrained sums to be awarded in damages? It is trespassing too much on the rights of the citizen and the role of the judiciary. I hope that the Minister will concur with that, given his enormous experience of these matters, and, I apprehend, a real interest in justice being effective and available. With all due respect, the amendment moved by the noble Lord undermines both.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for his amendment. I understand the intent when we are seeking to address a very particular problem. However, I cannot concur with the proposal that we should set in the Bill some limit to the judicial discretion that will be exercised in exceptional circumstances. We have yet to see how exceptional circumstances will develop once the Bill comes into effect. We therefore consider it more appropriate that the percentage increase in tariff should be determined by regulation by the Lord Chancellor in order that he may, from time to time, have regard to developments once the Act is in force. We do not consider it appropriate to constrain that exercise by setting a ceiling in the Bill. For these reasons, I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I thank my noble and learned friend for that reply. It was not entirely unexpected. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that it is nothing to do with access to justice, it is merely limiting judicial discretion. Indeed, the noble Lord accepts that judicial discretion is going to be limited because he is quite happy to have this percentage in regulations which can subsequently be altered one way or another without much parliamentary scrutiny for all the reasons we know. I note the points my noble and learned friend has made, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, the amendments in this group pray in aid, as it were, for the work of MedCo, a body set up by the Government, I believe in 2015, to facilitate the sourcing of medical reports on injuries of the kind that we are debating under the terms of the Bill. The Ministry of Justice produced a pre-action protocol for what it calls low-value personal injury claims in road traffic accidents. Before that, there was no system at all to effectively source reports, and apparently a practice was developing of some claimant representatives—not necessarily solicitors—and insurers using what are described as “tame” doctors to produce medical reports for the purposes of securing compensation.

The Government set up the MedCo organisation to provide claimants with access to independent medical reporting facilities from reputable sources, which are themselves subject to regulation and control by the MedCo board. Apparently MedCo had a bit of an uneasy period in its early days and there have been a number of reviews, but the principle remains valid. I understand that it is now working better and that there is no channelling of medical reports to, as it were, sympathetic doctors who might be relied on to back up claims that are less than valid. To that extent, the Government’s original idea has proved right.

In relation to the Bill, it appears that there will be a necessity to reconstruct the portal so that litigants in person can access and use the portal themselves. Therefore, it is all the more necessary to ensure that the MedCo system is available and as user-friendly as possible. I hope that the Minister will acknowledge that I am taking the unusual stance of having supported a decision made by the Government some time ago and seeking that it should continue to flourish. I look forward to his acknowledging that this is a good way of serving justice for both sides in such cases, by having thoroughly professional, independent people providing the necessary political evidence, not being paid for a particular kind of evidence—which one suspects can happen and perhaps has happened hitherto, producing some decisions that were, frankly, unjustified. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will build on the position created originally in 2015 by the Government and ensure that it remains applicable and useful under the new regime being developed.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords—

[Lord Bassam of Brighton]

There are other amendments in this group, are there not?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There are indeed, and that was why I wondered at the noble Lord’s reticence. If the noble Lord wishes to speak to them, I am not the person to stand between him and the remainder of the Committee.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton]

I am extraordinarily grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his prompt rising, as it were, from a sedentary position. My Amendment 42A is in this group. On the Bill as a whole, in Clause 4 the Government seem to recognise the problem of what are called “pre-med offers”, yet fail to ensure that they are sufficiently discouraged. We are in the same territory here but perhaps not seeking to approach it in the same way. My understanding is that such offers are made to people sometimes at a point of vulnerability following injury and sometimes, it has to be said, in the most cynical of circumstances—when sick pay runs out and after putting in a denial, which, although clearly weak, sometimes worries people.

Lawyers for claimants have a professional duty to put an offer to their client. There are many circumstances in which desperate people ignore the advice to reject that comes with that offer and accept what is offered, however inappropriate the sum is to the injuries that they have suffered. Pre-med offers are not made to be fair or reasonable. The offers are often made by defending insurers to get rid of a case cheaply, and I quite accept that the Government are right to seek to prohibit them. The consequence of acceptance in the absence of a medical report is that if the injured person later develops conditions arising from the accident, they will of course fall back on the NHS to support them. They will have no compensation to get treatment and the cost will fall more widely on society and the taxpayer. Meanwhile, the insurer for the guilty party who caused the injury will have walked away having saved money.

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The Government want to take away free legal help from, we think, about 90% of people injured on the roads and at work. That is a terrible situation and we ought to act as best we can against the insurers. I hope that the Minister will take this issue seriously. It is clearly on the Government’s radar, but we do not think they are approaching it in quite the right way.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, would place the requirements for medical reports to be provided by an accredited medical expert selected via the MedCo portal or other experts specified by the Lord Chancellor in regulations. Currently, the Civil Procedure Rules require any initial medical report in support of a whiplash claim to be sought through the MedCo IT portal, which is established and proves, as the noble Lord indicated, the independence and quality of these medical reports. The Civil Procedure Rules also require that all MedCo medical reports must be provided by an accredited medical expert. I am therefore uncertain what additional benefit the amendments would add to that process, because we already have in place the requirement that it should be a MedCo report that is obtained.

Indeed, the amendments could have a negative impact on the success of MedCo as, on one view, it would widen the pool of medical experts to any person with medical qualifications rather than someone who has been accredited specifically for these types of report by MedCo. I may have misunderstood Amendment 41, but that appears to be what its result would be, although that may be unintended. I emphasise that we consider that the creation of MedCo, as adjusted recently, has been a success and will continue to be so. We require that parties should have to go through the MedCo portal for an appropriate independent expert report before these claims are settled.

So I ask the noble Lord to reconsider the terms of the amendment because we do not feel that it adds anything to the Bill. I believe we have a common intention here and it may be that I have misunderstood what lies behind Amendment 41, but at present we believe the present structure of MedCo reports and the portal is appropriate as it stands, and at this stage we would not be prepared to contemplate the amendments that have been moved. If the noble Lord wishes to discuss this matter further with me, I will be content to do so because it may be that I have somehow misunderstood the intent of Amendment 41 in that regard.

I turn to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. We looked at the whole question of how it would be most appropriate to deal with claims that were settled without a MedCo report. That would place the insurer or relevant party settling the claim in breach of their own regulatory requirements, and appropriate steps would be taken. In due course, as we know under the financial regulation Bill that is currently going through, that would be the FCA in respect of claims management companies.

I draw attention to Clause 5(6), which states:

“A breach of section 4 does not make an agreement to settle the whiplash claim in question void or unenforceable”.


We adopted that approach to ensure that the claimant should not suffer at all in circumstances where the person making the settlement did so without the report. In other words, the claimant would be entitled to retain all sums paid in those circumstances. If we make the agreement void, the sector would potentially seek recovery of the sums passed in respect of a void transaction. I appreciate that the noble Lord seeks to qualify that, but it raises complex issues over contract liability. We believe that we have taken the correct approach by ensuring that the person making the settlement, who is a regulated party, will be in breach of their regulatory regime if they do so without a MedCo report, while equally ensuring that the claimant should not suffer because of that misfeasance, and should be able to retain the settlement sum.

We do not believe that there is a major issue in this context with regard to those who are persuaded to settle early but, if that is an issue, it is more widely encountered across personal injury claims as a whole, and we do not see any basis for taking an exceptional route in regard to whiplash injury claims. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord that there is a mechanism to protect the claimant and enforce the requirements of Clause 4 against those who are settling claims.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his attempt at reassurance. I will reflect on his words, but I may come back with something on Report because I want to ensure that we have that protection there.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I quite understand the noble Lord’s concern, and I would be willing to consider any further amendment that he puts forward on this in due course. At this stage, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

I am obliged to the Minister for his invitation, which I will certainly take up. The intention of the amendments is to fill out, as it were, the provisions in Clause 4 relating to regulations to be made by the Lord Chancellor about the appropriate evidence of an injury for the purposes of this clause. It may be that both of us are replicating something that already exists, but we can have a look at it and I am sure it is a matter on which we can reach agreement one way or another. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, clearly these amendments are directed primarily at two areas: first, the review or regulation of the effectiveness of these reforms and the supporting regulations and, secondly, the issue of cold calling. I will deal with each in turn. I am not going to go through the detail of each set because I understand that the force of the amendments is all in one direction on the first point. The amendments as drafted would require reports on these reforms to be published shortly after their implementation. Although I understand the reasoning behind them, I question how effective they would be in their current form. I appreciate, nevertheless, that these are essentially probing amendments and it is in that spirit that I address them.

As has been observed, the insurance sector has made it clear and very public that it has a commitment to pass on savings. Having made that commitment, insurers will be accountable for it in a highly competitive market. Insurers have pointed out how they have passed on to customers the benefits of previous government action to cut the cost of civil litigation without the need for regulation. The Government, of course, are intent on monitoring the reaction of the insurance sector to these reforms and will engage with it in that regard. If the industry as a whole sought to avoid passing on these savings, that would signal that the competitive nature of the market had changed. If that were to happen, I have no doubt that the Financial Conduct Authority and, indeed, the Competition and Markets Authority would wish to investigate.

Nevertheless, I hear the message from around the Committee about the need to put further discipline in place with regard to these savings, and that is a matter that we will consider. As I say, I appreciate what is intended here. The question is how we can effectively bring that about. We have to remember that the insurers are regulated by the FCA already. Oversight is in place with regard to their conduct. With all due respect, I take issue with my noble friend Lady Berridge about there being some conflict between shareholder interest and the interest of customers.

An insurance company requires to rely on its integrity in order to maintain its resilience as an insurer. Any board of directors that abandoned integrity in favour of a larger dividend would find itself not only in conflict with its regulator but, no doubt, in conflict with its own shareholders, who would not appreciate that sort of conduct either, given that it would simply undermine the capital value of their investment. Therefore, I do not believe that there is that conflict of interest at all.

The amendment put forward by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord McKenzie of Luton, would introduce a formal requirement for Her Majesty’s Treasury to keep under review the ban on cold calling, and the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Sharkey, would introduce a formal requirement for the Lord Chancellor to review the effect of cold calling and the ability to introduce regulations for a ban on cold calling. Of course, a ban on cold calling in relation to claims management was introduced in the Financial Guidance and Claims Bill and was agreed by this House quite recently. As noble Lords will be aware, the Bill inserts a provision into the privacy and electronic communications regulations, which govern unsolicited direct marketing calls, to ban such calls in relation to claims management services unless prior consent has been given. The Government consider these to be robust proposals which will add to the package of measures in place for tackling unsolicited marketing calls.

With regard to the use of the material that is obtained, there is of course provision for regulation of the legal profession. The SRA has regulations in place for the acquisition and use of such data, so that matter is already regulated. However, I acknowledge the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about the difficulty of what I would term “regulating the unregulated”, where cold calling centres are based outside the United Kingdom. I am advised that it is possible to trace more than half the cold calls received in the United Kingdom to one place—essentially a factory—based in Pakistan. But it is fleet of foot: it changes its name and location on a regular basis. That is a formidable challenge and we are seeking to approach it by means of regulating, apart from anything else, the use of the material gleaned by those means.

The amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, would introduce a formal requirement for the Treasury to make regulations requiring the FCA also to prohibit certain pre-medical offers—I think that that is also in the amendment. Again, we are of the opinion that the Bill deals sufficiently with that issue as well.

As I indicated, I have heard what has been said around the Chamber about the consideration of further measures to ensure that savings are passed on to consumers, and I will give that further consideration before Report. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that detailed reply. I am sure that these are matters to which we will need to return at a later stage. One of the things that we were seeking to be sure about—and this is, perhaps, an issue that we share with the Lib Dems—is how extensive and how robust across the board are the prohibitions around cold calling. The noble and learned Lord mentioned the SRA. As I recall, when we were debating the financial guidance Bill at Second Reading, the SRA and its activities were held out as being a reason to ban cold calling for personal injury claims. But then one noble Lord in the debate said, “No, there are people getting round that by a number of means”. It is those sorts of issues that we want to be sure about, so that we can look across the piece and see that cold calling—so far as it can possibly be legally achieved within the UK—is dealt with. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Report: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd May 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

88A: Schedule 2, page 17, line 29, leave out from “under” to end of line 29 and insert “sub-paragraph (1) above”

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, we are dealing here with truly technical amendments to ensure that the provisions of the Bill deliver the intended policy. They achieve two things. The first is to clarify how the requirement for regulations made by devolved Ministers under Schedule 2 to be within devolved competence interacts with the principle of severance applied by the courts.

The normal practice would be that when a Minister makes regulations that include, for instance, 10 different provisions, should one of those provisions be outwith the scope of the power, the courts would not strike down the regulations as a whole, they would simply sever the offending provision and allow the remaining nine provisions to stand as law. Some concerns were raised that the requirements in the Bill might imply that this standard practice should not occur. The amendments therefore make it clear that when a provision is outside devolved competence, only that provision would be ultra vires and not the whole instrument in which the provision is included.

The second purpose of the amendments is to allow for a devolved Minister and a UK Minister acting jointly to make provision that would not be in the competence of the devolved Minister acting alone. It has always been the Government’s intention that the Schedule 2 powers can be exercised jointly to allow us to work together in areas where we may need to make the same or related changes to retained EU law and so that, where appropriate, those changes can be subject to formal scrutiny and approval in both this Parliament and the relevant devolved legislature.

We believe it is right that, for instance, where a UK Minister and a Welsh Minister jointly make regulations in relation to a matter that concerns the England/Wales border, those regulations can include both the provision for England and the provision for Wales, even though it would not be within the Welsh Minister’s competence to make the provision in relation to England if they were acting alone.

We will also be bringing forward at Third Reading a number of further drafting changes to permit combinations of instruments beyond what is normally possible, reflecting the level of joint working that will be needed in relation to these powers. I will be speaking to the Government’s Clause 11 amendments shortly, when we reach the group beginning Amendment 89DA. I am sure noble Lords will appreciate that we have a number of further groups to get through on other parts of the devolution provisions before we reach that debate. The amendments provide what I hope to be welcome legal clarity. They reflect standard practice and the mechanisms for good, collaborative joint working between the Administrations. I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation of these technical amendments. Can he say whether there is agreement among the devolved Administrations and the UK Government on these amendments?

[Lord Griffiths of Burry Port (Lab)]

My Lords, at last we have reached this stage, although I find it a little off-putting that we are coming to consequential, technical matters before we look at the meaty issue; but that will come, as was said.

I would like to pay the respects of those on our Benches to the serious way in which the Government have contributed through the joint ministerial group to the success of the proposals, and thank them for bringing them to us now. I would also like to thank Mark Drakeford from the Welsh Government and Mike Russell from the Scottish Government for the part they played, even if the latter has thus far been unable formally to sign up to the inter-governmental process. As the Minister said, we are going to discuss Clause 11 and neither of us can wait for that. It is coming in more detail later this evening. However, we on these Benches recognise and appreciate the progress that has been made. We have come a long way since the Bill was published and it is against that backdrop that this and subsequent groups of amendments should be considered.

The Labour Party has always been the party of devolution. While we will be watching the Government’s treatment of the devolved Administrations very closely throughout the Brexit process—that is our job—we recognise the genuine progress that has been made and welcome the amendments in this group. They allow United Kingdom and devolved Ministers jointly to exercise powers in Schedule 2 in order to make provisions that could not be made by a devolved Minister acting alone. This clarifies the use of so-called composite instruments, as the Minister said, and we hope paves the way for collaborative working between the devolved Administrations and the UK Government.

Other amendments in the group improve the position regarding ultra vires provision within instruments made under Schedule 2. I believe that the devolved Administrations previously raised concerns with the Government as to whether the courts would permit those parts of an instrument that were within competence to remain law. We are glad that Ministers and officials have responded positively to the appeals from the devolved bodies and that the amendments provide greater clarity for all involved. The group amounts to just one piece in the jigsaw puzzle. I usually start my jigsaws with the edge pieces. This looks like putting a piece in the middle and working around it in due course. It is a piece that these Benches are happy to support.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, and note his comments. The amendments will provide not only clarity but a much needed flexibility when it comes to the application of the schedules.

With respect to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, my understanding is that both devolved Administrations were content with the proposals. Indeed, much of the force for the first group of amendments came from them. I hope that satisfies noble Lords.

Amendment 88A agreed.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

88B: Schedule 2, page 17, line 30, leave out from “8” to end of line 35

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

89ZZA: Schedule 2, page 17, line 37, leave out “regulations” and insert “provision”

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

89ZA: Schedule 2, page 23, line 14, leave out paragraphs 13 to 20

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

89AA: Schedule 2, page 26, line 25, after “taxation” insert “or fees”

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

89DA: Clause 11, page 7, line 25, leave out subsections (1) to (3) and insert—
“(1) In section 29(2)(d) of the Scotland Act 1998 (no competence for the Scottish Parliament to legislate incompatibly with EU law) for “with EU law” substitute “in breach of the restriction in section 30A(1)”.(2) After section 30 of that Act (legislative competence: supplementary) insert—“30A Legislative competence: restriction relating to retained EU law(1) An Act of the Scottish Parliament cannot modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify, retained EU law so far as the modification is of a description specified in regulations made by a Minister of the Crown.(2) But subsection (1) does not apply to any modification so far as it would, immediately before exit day, have been within the legislative competence of the Parliament.(3) A Minister of the Crown must not lay for approval before each House of the Parliament of the United Kingdom a draft of a statutory instrument containing regulations under this section unless— (a) the Scottish Parliament has made a consent decision in relation to the laying of the draft, or(b) the 40 day period has ended without the Parliament having made such a decision.(4) For the purposes of subsection (3) a consent decision is—(a) a decision to agree a motion consenting to the laying of the draft,(b) a decision not to agree a motion consenting to the laying of the draft, or(c) a decision to agree a motion refusing to consent to the laying of the draft;and a consent decision is made when the Parliament first makes a decision falling within any of paragraphs (a) to (c) (whether or not it subsequently makes another such decision).(5) A Minister of the Crown who is proposing to lay a draft as mentioned in subsection (3) must—(a) provide a copy of the draft to the Scottish Ministers, and(b) inform the Presiding Officer that a copy has been so provided.(6) See also paragraph 6 of Schedule 7 (duty to make explanatory statement about regulations under this section including a duty to explain any decision to lay a draft without the consent of the Parliament).(7) No regulations may be made under this section after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.(8) Subsection (7) does not affect the continuation in force of regulations made under this section at or before the end of the period mentioned in that subsection.(9) Any regulations under this section which are in force at the end of the period of five years beginning with the time at which they came into force are revoked in their application to any Act of the Scottish Parliament which receives Royal Assent after the end of that period.(10) Subsections (3) to (8) do not apply in relation to regulations which only relate to a revocation of a specification.(11) In this section—“the 40 day period” means the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which a copy of the draft instrument is provided to the Scottish Ministers,and, in calculating that period, no account is to be taken of any time during which the Parliament is dissolved or during which it is in recess for more than four days.”(3) In section 108A(2)(e) of the Government of Wales Act 2006 (no competence for the National Assembly for Wales to legislate incompatibly with EU law) for “with EU law” substitute “in breach of the restriction in section 109A(1)”.(3A) After section 109 of that Act (legislative competence: supplementary) insert—“109A Legislative competence: restriction relating to retained EU law(1) An Act of the Assembly cannot modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify, retained EU law so far as the modification is of a description specified in regulations made by a Minister of the Crown.(2) But subsection (1) does not apply to any modification so far as it would, immediately before exit day, have been within the Assembly’s legislative competence. (3) No regulations are to be made under this section unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing them has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.(4) A Minister of the Crown must not lay a draft as mentioned in subsection (3) unless—(a) the Assembly has made a consent decision in relation to the laying of the draft, or(b) the 40 day period has ended without the Assembly having made such a decision.(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) a consent decision is—(a) a decision to agree a motion consenting to the laying of the draft,(b) a decision not to agree a motion consenting to the laying of the draft, or(c) a decision to agree a motion refusing to consent to the laying of the draft;and a consent decision is made when the Assembly first makes a decision falling within any of paragraphs (a) to (c)(whether or not it subsequently makes another such decision).(6) A Minister of the Crown who is proposing to lay a draft as mentioned in subsection (3) must—(a) provide a copy of the draft to the Welsh Ministers, and(b) inform the Presiding Officer that a copy has been so provided.(7) See also section 157ZA (duty to make explanatory statement about regulations under this section including a duty to explain any decision to lay a draft without the consent of the Assembly).(8) No regulations may be made under this section after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.(9) Subsection (8) does not affect the continuation in force of regulations made under this section at or before the end of the period mentioned in that subsection.(10) Any regulations under this section which are in force at the end of the period of five years beginning with the time at which they came into force are revoked in their application to any Act of the Assembly which receives Royal Assent after the end of that period.(11) Subsections (4) to (9) do not apply in relation to regulations which only relate to a revocation of a specification.(12) In this section—“the 40 day period” means the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which a copy of the draft instrument is provided to the Welsh Ministers,and, in calculating that period, no account is to be taken of any time during which the Assembly is dissolved or during which it is in recess for more than four days.”(3B) In section 6(2)(d) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (no competence for the Northern Ireland Assembly to legislate incompatibly with EU law) for “incompatible with EU law” substitute “in breach of the restriction in section 6A(1)”.(3C) After section 6 of that Act (legislative competence) insert—“6A Restriction relating to retained EU law(1) An Act of the Assembly cannot modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify, retained EU law so far as the modification is of a description specified in regulations made by a Minister of the Crown. (2) But subsection (1) does not apply to any modification so far as it would, immediately before exit day, have been within the legislative competence of the Assembly.(3) A Minister of the Crown must not lay for approval before each House of Parliament a draft of a statutory instrument containing regulations under this section unless—(a) the Assembly has made a consent decision in relation to the laying of the draft, or(b) the 40 day period has ended without the Assembly having made such a decision.(4) For the purposes of subsection (3) a consent decision is—(a) a decision to agree a motion consenting to the laying of the draft,(b) a decision not to agree a motion consenting to the laying of the draft, or(c) a decision to agree a motion refusing to consent to the laying of the draft;and a consent decision is made when the Assembly first makes a decision falling within any of paragraphs (a) to (c)(whether or not it subsequently makes another such decision).(5) A Minister of the Crown who is proposing to lay a draft as mentioned in subsection (3) must—(a) provide a copy of the draft to the relevant Northern Ireland department, and(b) inform the Presiding Officer that a copy has been so provided.(6) See also section 96A (duty to make explanatory statement about regulations under this section including a duty to explain any decision to lay a draft without the consent of the Assembly).(7) No regulations may be made under this section after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.(8) Subsection (7) does not affect the continuation in force of regulations made under this section at or before the end of the period mentioned in that subsection.(9) Any regulations under this section which are in force at the end of the period of five years beginning with the time at which they came into force are revoked in their application to any Act of the Assembly which receives Royal Assent after the end of that period.(10) Subsections (3) to (8) do not apply in relation to regulations which only relate to a revocation of a specification.(11) Regulations under this section may include such supplementary, incidental, consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provision as the Minister of the Crown making them considers appropriate.(12) In this section—“the relevant Northern Ireland department” means such Northern Ireland department as the Minister of the Crown concerned considers appropriate;“the 40 day period” means the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which a copy of the draft instrument is provided to the relevant Northern Ireland department,and, in calculating that period, no account is to be taken of any time during which the Assembly is dissolved or during which it is in recess for more than four days.””

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, to be clear, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, indicated that he was not going to move Amendment 89, but government amendment 89AA was to follow from that amendment so I would just like to address our amendment in order to avoid confusion. I am afraid that this is like one of those smart restaurants where you get a series of amuse-bouches before you get to the main course.

Amendment 89AA replicates the restriction that we have already applied to Clause 9 on the withdrawal agreement power in relation to imposing fees and charges for the corresponding power for devolved Ministers. This follows exactly the same rationale as the Clause 9 power. It has never been our intention for these powers to be used to impose fees; that is the preserve of the bespoke Schedule 4 powers, which are exercisable by devolved Ministers and should be subject to the limits that apply to those powers. This same restriction has already been applied to both the correcting power in Clause 7 and its Schedule 2 equivalent. The devolved Administrations were informed in advance of our intention to apply this restriction to that power and have agreed to its effect, so I hope noble Lords will support the amendment.

I turn to Amendment 89DA and the group that follows it. I thank noble Lords for their constructive engagement on this important issue during the passage of the Bill. The Government have now tabled a comprehensive set of amendments to Clause 11. We have worked with the Scottish and Welsh Governments to develop them, and noble Lords will recognise that we have drawn heavily on their consideration of our initial amendments in Committee. I put on record our thanks to this House, and to the Scottish and Welsh Governments for their endeavours in crafting these amendments. We are immensely pleased that the Welsh Government have agreed this approach and I am of course disappointed that the Scottish Government have not. I hope they will sign up in due course.

The intention behind Clause 11 as originally drafted was to provide maximum legal certainty across the UK to our communities and businesses after EU exit in areas that are subject to a common EU framework. As the Welsh Government aptly put it,

“it is essential to provide legislative continuity at the point at which the UK leaves the EU”.

We know, of course, that the EU has common legislative arrangements across a vast range of areas, but we must now decide in which policy areas we may need to continue those common arrangements legislatively, informally or not at all. To provide the time to do that work and provide assurances that there would not be immediate divergence across the UK, the original Clause 11 sought to freeze the law in all those areas.

We are all familiar with the views of the devolved institutions on this clause, and of course the Government have accepted the case for a more targeted and proportionate approach. This has been supported by the work that we have been doing with the devolved Administrations on assessing these current frameworks. Since we agreed the framework principles, which set out why common approaches may be needed across more than one part of the UK, our Governments have worked closely to analyse those policy areas that sit across devolved competence and EU law.

Noble Lords will recall that in March we published our initial analysis. It demonstrated that our work with the devolved Administrations indicated that legislative frameworks may be needed, in whole or in part, in only 24 of the 153 areas that had been identified, and 82 areas could be managed through more informal, non-legislative arrangements. The remaining 49 areas would likely require no further arrangements at all. We also agree that where common approaches are needed, they cannot all be designed and implemented by exit day. So it continues to make sense to maintain existing frameworks and provide certainty over which areas may be subject to change in the future, but we can and should do this in a more measured way.

Our amendments in Committee set out targeted mechanisms for doing so, following discussions with the Scottish and Welsh Governments. We have carried forward the basic proposition from Committee and have built on that in the amendments that we have put forward today. Our amendments would see powers returning from the EU in otherwise devolved areas pass directly to the devolved institutions. Where a common legislative framework may be required, we propose to freeze the current arrangements to provide the time to establish our own framework for the UK. This would apply only to those policy areas that have been explicitly frozen through regulations, rather than across all policy areas where EU law currently creates common frameworks. That was the proposal that we put forward in Committee and that we had been discussing with the Welsh and Scottish Governments. We withdrew our amendments because discussions with those Governments were ongoing and we were committed to continuing them. Our Committee proposal was a substantial, but not a final, offer. It meant that noble Lords were able to debate the very latest proposition and inform those discussions.

One theme raised here and by the devolved Administrations was consent. The devolved Administrations thought it right that there was a role for the devolved legislatures in deciding whether specific areas should be the subject of a freeze. We also heard that in the debate in this House. This House agreed that a role for the devolved legislatures was important in this process, but that it must be balanced against preserving the right—indeed, I would say, the responsibility —of the United Kingdom Parliament to act, where there may be a cross-United Kingdom impact. Only the UK Parliament can do that.

The Government listened carefully to the submissions on this matter and reflected them in discussion with the devolved Administrations over Easter. We have amended the Committee proposal. We shall seek to agree which areas should be subject to a freeze. This is part of the bigger frameworks question that we continue to progress.

We should also have the view of the devolved legislatures, not just the Administrations. Our amendments ensure that, before the UK Government may lay regulations in draft in this House, they must have sent them to the devolved Administrations and sought the consent of the legislatures. The devolved legislatures will have 40 days in which to decide whether to give or withhold consent for the regulations. Only after that decision is given or the 40 days have passed can the United Kingdom Government lay the regulations before Parliament. This process is built on collaborative working. It favours agreement for freezing areas, but also recognises that if agreement cannot be reached, it must be for the UK Parliament to decide what is in the interests of the UK as a whole.

We believe that this approach should minimise areas of disagreement, as we have also developed a comprehensive intergovernmental agreement that supports and complements the legislative amendments we are considering today. It emphasises that we will work on these regulations together and in advance of sending them to the devolved Administrations formally.

Where there is unavoidable disagreement and the United Kingdom Government consider that they must proceed in the absence of consent from a devolved legislature, UK Ministers would be under an express legal duty to provide this Parliament with a Statement, and, if provided, a statement from the devolved Administration on why consent was not being granted. The UK Minister will be under a duty to explain to Parliament why the Government consider that they must proceed without that consent. Parliament will decide on the case presented: whether it is indeed in the best interests of the United Kingdom to freeze a specific policy while we implement new arrangements.

I should also remind noble Lords of the additional reporting duties on UK Ministers. I do not wish to repeat the detail that I provided to the House on them in Committee. Needless to say, they ensure heightened accountability by providing transparency to the process of developing frameworks, the use of the regulation-making powers and where frameworks are maintained in the short term. They will also require us to report on those principles that underpin this work, the principles agreed between the United Kingdom, Scottish and Welsh Governments at the Joint Ministerial Committee in October last year. Through this, our work on future frameworks is open to the scrutiny of this Parliament and of the devolved legislatures.

The other key change to the amendments that I should mention, as compared to the proposals that noble Lords considered in Committee, is the addition of sunset provisions for both the new powers and the regulations made under them. This was raised explicitly by noble Lords in Committee. We have always said that any freeze under Clause 11 would be temporary. The amendments place that beyond doubt by making it explicit in law.

I am grateful to noble Lords for the constructive manner in which they have engaged with the question of sunsets. In particular, I must give due credit to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, for the tenacity with which he has pursued this, including by tabling his amendments. I hope that he will be satisfied that his concerns in this respect have been addressed and will feel able not to press those amendments.

The powers last for only two years from exit day. This aligns them with the other powers in the Bill and makes certain that they will not be an ongoing mechanism for limiting competence. The regulations will also be time-limited. We have had in-depth discussions with the devolved Administrations on how long is needed to determine and implement our future frameworks. We have settled on a period of five years from when regulations come into force.

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I note that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, in presenting his amendment in Committee, and in his earlier contribution, highlighted the necessity for Parliament to act as a backstop if, despite collaborative processes designed to lead to agreement between the UK and the devolved Governments, discussions ended in deadlock. This contention, which commanded widespread support across the House in Committee, is one at the heart of our current constitutional settlement. We rejoice at the place we have reached, which is honest, open and takes things forward. In the spirit of wanting a legal system that is functioning, and well, the day after Brexit, it is a noteworthy contribution to that progress.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am most obliged to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I am essentially moving a series of very complex and extensive amendments to the Bill, from Amendment 89DA through to Amendment 92AD, with consequential amendments from Amendment 89DB through to Amendment 117C. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has moved his own amendments on sunsetting constraints, which I shall address; and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has moved extensive amendments from Amendment 89DAA through to Amendment 92BBA—and, indeed, could have extended his Motion for amendment further than that, I suspect.

At the heart of this lies a simple principle. The EU has developed and maintained a single market for the benefit of the members of the Union. As we exit the EU, we are anxious to maintain a single market for the benefit of the union of the United Kingdom. That is what it comes to. In doing that, we must of course respect the devolution settlement and the position of the devolved entities and parliaments, whether in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland—even though at present it is not sitting as an Executive, which we acknowledge.

I am not going to address the original Clause 11. Noble Lords have expressed their views on that and I do not need to either add to them or necessarily rebut them; we are anxious to move on, and to move this amendment. What are we intent on doing? Well, I would counter the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, that this is a power grab. Such rhetoric has been thrown about before, of course, and I do not feel that it would advance matters to engage with that sort of rhetoric. I just remind noble Lords of the terms of the amendment itself. If your Lordships have the Marshalled List of amendments, at page 7—or, for the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, page 8, where it refers to Wales—I simply read out proposed new Clause 30A(1):

“An Act of the Scottish Parliament cannot modify, or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify, retained EU law so far as the modification is of a description specified in regulations made by a Minister of the Crown”.


We know that there is then an elaborate process for the making of those regulations; the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, referred to the stages that would be gone through in the making of those regulations. Let us then look at subsection (2):

“But subsection (1) does not apply to any modification so far as it would, immediately before exit day, have been within the legislative competence of the Parliament”.


There is no intention here to intrude upon the existing legislative competence of the parliaments. But of course, as powers come back, it is necessary to consider which of those powers have to be maintained in order that we can have a functioning internal market in the United Kingdom. That is the objective and what we seek to do. All powers pass to the devolved Administrations on exit day where no regulations have been made under the proposed amendment. That is the right policy outcome that we have agreed with the Welsh Government and which we still seek to agree— I emphasise still—with the Scottish Government.

That takes us on to the question of how the frameworks have been arrived at. Noble Lords will recollect that, at the Joint Ministerial Committee in October last year, the principles to be applied were agreed by all those attending: the Welsh Government, the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government. I just add in response to a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, that where he finds reference in the amendments to “principles”, that refers to the principles that were agreed at that stage and are carried over in the agreements. At the present time, we have identified 24 areas of retained EU law—or what will be retained EU law—where we require frameworks to maintain an internal United Kingdom market. There is debate about some additional areas, which will have to be addressed in due course. We have focused our attention now on 24; it may be fewer at the end of the day, as we talk our way through them, because they apply only to particular areas of policy, not to one general area. We are not talking about agriculture or fisheries, we are talking about discrete aspects of these policy areas that are perceived to be necessary in order to maintain the UK internal market.

Perhaps before I move on, because a number of noble Lords have raised the point, I should address the question of how the regulations will operate. That can be seen from the proposed amendment, and there are two elements to it. Proposed subsection (7) says:

“No regulations may be made under this section after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day”.


That is the first period of two years. If no regulations have been made in respect of what is perceived to be a necessary framework, no regulations will be made. Proposed subsection (9) says:

“Any regulations under this section which are in force at the end of the period of five years beginning with the time at which they came into force are revoked in their application to any Act of the Scottish Parliament which receives Royal Assent after the end of that period”.


Therefore, in so far as we have not taken that forward, these powers will then revert to the appropriate authority.

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It seems that we have an explanation. Were officials of the Scottish Government involved in that and, if in-depth work has been done, would the Minister help the House by publishing it?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not in a position to say that such work would be published, because of course it has been on the basis of engagement between officials dealing with this. I do not believe that there is any official report to that effect; it is just a matter of the product of engagement between officials negotiating these matters. Therefore I cannot indicate that we will publish anything in that regard. That is to try to explain the position with regard to the sunset clauses in the regulations. I turn to the question—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The Minister was about to tell us about the gap my noble friend introduced between exit day and the making of the regulations.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord. There may be a situation in which powers go to the devolved Administrations and yet they do not deal with those powers, and it may be considered that upon further consideration there are additional areas where frameworks ought to be based on a UK-wide determination and where regulations would be made. But as the noble Lord himself observed, that regulation-making process would involve us consulting the Scottish and Welsh Governments—and, I hope at that stage, a Northern Ireland Executive—so that we could secure their consent. Only if there was a failure to secure the consent would the matter go forward to this Parliament, with two clear safeguards. First, the Minister of the Crown would have to explain to Parliament why he was seeking to make those regulations without the consent of a devolved Administration, and secondly, there would be an opportunity for the devolved Administration to make their representations to this Parliament as to why they felt it appropriate to withhold their consent. But, as I said, there may be a period after exit when it occurs to parties that it might be appropriate to proceed in that way.

Turning to the question of where we are with the Scottish Government, I begin by saying that the door—

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

Before the noble and learned Lord moves on, did I miss it or has he answered the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, on when the sun will rise before it spins across the sky for five years? When does it start? Is it with the particular regulation?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. My understanding is that the five-year period will commence from the point at which the regulation is made.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

So in practice we could be looking quite a long way ahead—it is five plus X.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am tempted to mention here the noble Countess, Lady Mar.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Keen of Elie]

But I will not. If the noble Lord wishes me to elaborate on the operation of the sunset clauses, I would be quite content to write to him. At this stage, perhaps I can continue—with the encouragement of the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths—to address the question of the Scottish Government.

We are extremely grateful that we have achieved consensus with the Welsh Government and will be able to take this forward with their wholehearted agreement. I will come on to one or two points raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, in a moment. As far as we are concerned, the door is still open for the Scottish Government, and we would be anxious to see them come through it so that we can take this forward with the agreement of all the Administrations in the United Kingdom. However, we are where we are at the present time. As regards their proposed amendments, they would, by different routes, result in a situation in which one of the devolved Administrations would effectively hold a veto over the implementation of UK-wide legislation for the maintenance of the UK internal market. That, I respectfully suggest, could not and would not be appropriate.

The exit from the EU raises complex questions with regard to the construction and application of the Scotland Act 1998 because, in 1998, such an exit was never contemplated. Reference has been made to Schedules 4 and 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 and the mechanisms for their amendment, but, as we were reminded by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, those are not the only mechanisms that impact upon the competence of the Scottish Parliament. We have to look at the terms of Section 29 of the 1998 Act, which as the noble and learned Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Mackay, observed raises issues with regard to territoriality in respect of the competence of the Scottish Parliament. I do not want to go into the detail of that at present, but one notices that its competence is limited in that respect, and by reference to EU law as well. Therefore, we do not consider that, at the end of the day, we can appropriately accept a situation in which the devolved Administration can exercise a veto over the exercise of power by the United Kingdom Parliament in situations where it is being exercised for the benefit of the UK as a whole. I hope that that goes some way to explaining, without looking at the complexities of the 1998 Act, why we do not feel we are in a position to accept the position expressed by the Scottish Government on this point.

We simply regret the fact that, despite the very significant efforts—I underline “significant”—of the representatives of the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government in producing an outline agreement, it has not been possible to persuade the Scottish Government to join us on that point.

The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, suggested that this might reflect a lack of trust. As I have observed on previous occasions, this is not an issue of trust. This is an issue of constitutional propriety. Whatever view one takes of the devolved settlement and of where we are with regard to the legislation on that, at the end of the day it is not appropriate to accept that one of the devolved Administrations could effectively exercise a veto over legislation for the benefit of the other members of the Union—namely England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

[Lord Wigley]

I thank the Minister for the detail in which he is responding to this debate and the work that he has undertaken. None the less, there may be issues such as the sheep meat regime, which we have used in a number of circumstances as an example where the differential impact of policies in one area such as Wales may be much greater than the impact in other areas. To that extent, the wishes of the Welsh Government in that context should have a greater weight, in the same way as when Welsh Ministers represent the UK in the Council of Ministers to discuss the sheep meat regime. Is it not possible to fine-tune the Government’s proposals to enable that happen?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, I must say that it is our clear intention, which is reflected in the memorandum of understanding in the agreement, that we will engage with the devolved Administrations in the consideration of these framework agreements and their application. Of course, these matters will be taken into account at that stage. But I do not consider it appropriate to bring that sort of granular detail into this Bill, which is designed for a very specific purpose. I hear what the noble Lord says and, clearly, we wish to proceed on the basis of mutual respect and understanding with the other devolved Administrations.

In that context, I underline the point in response to a query raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, speaking, I understand, on behalf of the Scottish Government who are not otherwise represented in this House. There is no question of this process under Clause 11 being somehow the thin end of the wedge so far as the devolution settlement is concerned. The devolution settlement is a reality of our constitutional situation and one that we extended under the 2016 Act, really quite recently, in light of the Smith review. We continue to respect, understand and wish to apply the devolution settlement. But it is a devolution settlement that has to work for everyone in the United Kingdom. I return to the point that it cannot work for everyone in the United Kingdom if one devolved Assembly or Government assume that they have the ability to exercise what amounts to a veto over legislation that is relevant, pertinent and important to the entirety of the United Kingdom.

I move on to address one or two additional points raised by noble Lords in respect of these matters. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, referred to finance and whether the Welsh Government had missed a trick. I do not believe that they did for a moment. Indeed, they put themselves one step ahead by embracing this agreement and the amendment. But the noble and learned Lord raised a point about funding. He is right to point out that our agreement for the Welsh Government does not speak to funding but that is not to say that funding has been forgotten or put to one side. Clearly, it is a matter that will be addressed. We recognise the importance, for example, of the Barnett formula. We understand why there is concern, particularly about agricultural funding under CAP Pillar 1 under the current EU budget that runs to 2020. We have provided a degree of certainty by promising to continue to commit the same total cash funds for farm support across the UK until 2022. At present, the Secretary of State for the Environment is in close discussion with his counterparts in the Welsh and Scottish Governments on exactly how our agricultural systems should work outside of the EU. I stress that that is not a matter for this Bill. This is the Bill that provides for our exit and our exit alone, so I hope that the noble and learned Lord will accept that. He raised the question of public procurement—again, these issues are not for this Bill but we are clearly conscious of them and they will have to be addressed.

The noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, also raised the question of whether further areas might be the subject of reservation under the freezing provisions of the amendment. We have identified 24 areas for frameworks but a number of other areas that could be the subject of regulations going forward are still subject to discussion. I acknowledge that. Noble Lords may recollect that we published the list of frameworks and included not only the 24 areas I have referred to, but a further 12 where there is ongoing discussion about how they will be addressed and resolved.

I am conscious that I have not answered every question that has been posed. If noble Lords are concerned that I have not addressed a point that still concerns them about Clause 11, as amended, I would be content to receive their queries and write to them. In the event that I write to any noble Lords on this issue or any issue relating to this clause, I will place a copy in the Library. I seek to reassure noble Lords on that point. With that, I will formally move each amendment. I am sorry—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has to reply.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, it is for me to say what will happen to my Amendment 89DAA, which is an amendment to Amendment 89DA, moved by the noble and learned Lord the Minister.

I want to make a few short points. First, I want to pick up on a remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that he will not accept the opprobrium that was visited on the Scottish Ministers for the way they conducted themselves in these negotiations. Having had discussions with Michael Russell and the Lord Advocate—like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—the points I put forward in my introduction to my amendment were sincerely held. Those points were not made to cause trouble. The Lord Advocate in particular gave advice on his reading of the Scotland Act; Michael Russell, for his part, was entirely genuine in his points about principle as well. That should be clearly understood.

When I was in practice at the Scottish Bar, I was junior to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. As he pointed out, if I appeared with him, I would speak first; it would then be his function, as my senior, to speak second. Quite frequently, I found that when he spoke, he refined the kind of argument that I was attempting to put forward. It took on a slightly different—rather more attractive, perhaps—appearance after he had refined it. As he pointed out in his speech, the points that I made about the construction of Section 30 and the other sections do not really apply in the situation with which we are dealing here. I was grateful for his remark that the situation is unique and not seeking in any way to undermine the devolution settlement. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for making the same point that there is no question of this being the thin end of the wedge or in any way seeking to undermine the devolution settlement, to which he wishes to adhere. These remarks should help a lot in reassuring those in Scotland on how they should approach the continuing discussions. I was glad to hear from the Minister that the door is still open; I think that the Scottish point of view still regards the door as open too.

Perhaps this debate has refined things and shown that the purist argument—that of principle—does not really apply here. This is not about trying to construct the market that we were trying to construct in 1998, which was done by separating out the bits that mattered for that market into Schedule 5 so that they were clearly identified. We are dealing with a different, rather more subtle, situation in trying, as the Minister said, to create a functioning internal market with what has come back to us from Europe. That requires a rather more subtle approach that is not really dealt with in the Scotland Act, for understandable reasons. That being so, I hope very much that the way forward will be pointed by our discussion this evening. Without any further ado, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I intervene to raise a point that I have spoken to the clerk about. Noble Lords might recollect that earlier in the evening I gave a passing imitation of a rabbit in headlights. The reason for that was that it appeared to me that the amendments in group three had been moved and agreed without me speaking to them—which is absolutely ideal, as far as I am concerned. They are highly technical amendments, but I felt I should mention that to the House, lest any noble Lord wishes me to speak to them. As I said, they have been agreed, but noble Lords did not have an opportunity to hear my dulcet tones on the subject.

Amendment 89DAA, as an amendment to Amendment 89DA, withdrawn.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I have put my name down in support of the amendment. The arguments which led me to do that are those which I set out when I was moving my amendment earlier this evening, so I need not take up the time of the House in repeating them. What I said earlier is the full explanation as to why I put my name down.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his amendments, which are pertinent given the different positions of the Scottish and Welsh Governments and the imminent timing of votes in their legislatures that will address consent.

The Government have been clear that they wish to make the positive case for consent for this Bill. We have not just talked about our commitment to making that case but have shown it. We have engaged in extensive discussions with the devolved Administrations and have now introduced the amendment to Clause 11 that we have just discussed at some length to try to meet the expectations of the devolved legislatures. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, will accept that our commitment to the legislative consent process is reflected in the agreement that we struck with the Welsh Government last week.

This is the legislative consent process in action. We have put forward policy objectives; we have worked through the differences, and we have found an appropriate compromise. As a result, the Welsh Government have recommended that the National Assembly for Wales grant legislative consent to the Bill when it votes on this matter, I believe, on 15 May. The Welsh Government agree that our amendments now strike the right balance between providing legal certainty and maximising assurances to the devolved legislatures on how we will jointly manage the process of powers returning from the EU in otherwise devolved areas. Of course we are disappointed that we have not been able to reach the same agreement with the Scottish Government, but this, I suggest, is not for want of trying. I stress again that time remains for the Scottish Government to join this agreement, so that we can all demonstrate that we have done what we consider to be the responsible thing in this context.

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[Lord Wigley]

I ask for one point of clarification from the Minister. Does he not accept that there is a real danger of confusion in the public mind between allowing a consent order and actually getting consent? In other words, the process can be one where consent is given, is not given or is refused, but whichever of those three outcomes it is, the process can still go on for a parliamentary resolution here by order; and we know that orders, in the House of Commons and here, go through on the nod most of the time. Is that not a deception, giving the impression that there is a consent mechanism when, in fact, it is a pretty meaningless one?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I simply do not accept the noble Lord’s characterisation of the matter. It is clearly the case that where consent, for example, was sought and not obtained, it would be necessary for the Minister of the Crown to address that, very clearly and specifically. There would be the opportunity, as there always is, for the devolved Administration to make their own views clear as to why they had declined consent. I do not believe that this is in any sense deceptive, misleading or a mirage. These are constitutional requirements that are adhered to and that will be adhered to. It would not be appropriate to introduce the sort of amendment moved by the noble Lord that would, in effect, tie the hands of this sovereign Parliament, so far as this exit process is concerned. Whatever view one might take about the merits of exit, that is neither here nor there. This is a constitutional principle with regard to the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom when it comes to legislate for the benefit of the entirety of the United Kingdom. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment, and indicate that I would not expect to return to this matter at Third Reading.

[Lord Wigley]

I am very grateful to the Minister. I have heard that form of words from his colleagues in the past. Clearly, this is a matter on which there may be a difference of opinion. I realise the need for there to be coherence on a UK scale but there are matters which have a specific effect in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland where their interests need to be taken into account. Clearly, we are not going to make progress on this tonight. Therefore, on the basis of the discussion we have had, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Non-Disclosure Agreements

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Tuesday 1st May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to ensure that non-disclosure agreements are not used to cover up criminal behaviour or silence victims, and that there are no financial or other consequences imposed when a breach of an agreement is in the public interest.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, non-disclosure agreements cannot prevent any disclosure required or protected by law. A court could find a non-disclosure agreement to be void or decline to give effect to it for reasons of public policy. The Government are looking at the structures around non-disclosure agreements and the evidence coming forward about how they are being used.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

Noble Lords will know that after the great surge of disclosure when Harvey Weinstein’s sexual abuse came to light, those very serious allegations gave light to many other instances of women in the workplace experiencing sexual abuse and drew attention to bullying experienced by men and women both. A light has been shone on the fact that non-disclosure agreements are used all too often to silence complainants who have experienced harassment of a sexual nature that sometimes falls short of criminal behaviour. Do the Government agree that they should give a clear statement, and, if possible, bring legislation, to say that it is not right to use non-disclosure agreements in this way for the purpose of silencing complaint?

The second matter is that we also know that many employment contracts now contain a clause to say that there has to be recourse to arbitration if there are any complaints or matters of dispute to avoid court hearings. Again, that silencing is often used to prevent those who are suffering harassment and abuse in the workplace from taking their cases forward. Should something not be done about that?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the Employment Rights Act 1996 makes two things clear. First, if an employee does not get independent legal advice regarding such an agreement it will be void. Secondly, it ensures that where a non-disclosure agreement has been entered into it does not affect the right of the employee to make a protected disclosure—that is, a disclosure that pertains to various forms of wrongdoing and is made to a protected party.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

But protected disclosure does not cover all forms of sexual harassment or harassment in the workplace. Is there not a duty on lawyers to make it clear to their clients, whether employers or employees, that non-disclosure clauses in contracts of employment or settlement agreements cannot be used to conceal criminal conduct or to prevent the reporting of conduct that amounts to sexual harassment, particularly where it involves an abuse of power by a senior over a junior or where it is repeated and habitual?

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 includes the matter of sexual harassment. On the need to disclose to employees their rights in this context, I reiterate that, to have an enforceable non-disclosure agreement, it is necessary that the employee should have been given the opportunity to take independent legal advice.

[Lord Soley (Lab)]

By chance I recently came across the case of an employee of a charitable body that operated in the private and public sectors and had contracts with employees that prevented them taking away any correspondence between themselves and the employer in the event of their leaving for any purpose at all, as far as I could understand the contract. I wonder whether that is lawful. I should add that the case was in Scotland. I am not sure whether the same laws apply in Scotland in this case as would apply in England. Can the Minister offer the House any guidance on whether such a contractual arrangement between an employer and employee is legal?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I cannot comment in detail on the particular case outlined, but there are legitimate reasons why an employer would wish to retain correspondence or other confidential information pertaining either to its business or to its charitable functions and not wish it to be taken away. There can be a legitimate basis for such a provision.

[Lord Watts (Lab)]

My Lords, are not large amounts of money often paid to individuals which may satisfy that individual but are not in the public interest? Should we not do away with some of these disclosure deals?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, in circumstances where a person accepts a sum of money which is beyond reasonable indemnity for any loss they have suffered on the grounds that they will not disclose wrongdoing or a criminal offence, they themselves are liable to commit a criminal offence.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister will remember, I think, a very similar Question being asked on 22 January. It is now a glorious May Day. Given the complexities and competing public concerns around this issue, might the Government not consider setting out a clear timetable for clarity in policy and potential legislation in this area?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the House of Commons Women and Equalities Select Committee is currently conducting an inquiry into sexual harassment in the workplace and has taken evidence about the misuse of NDAs in that context. The Government want to see what the committee has to say about that before reaching their own conclusions. In other words, we will make an informed decision on the matter.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure that the whole House deprecates the use of non-disclosure agreements to bully employees or former employees, and appreciates that the Government are looking carefully at this. However, does my noble and learned friend agree that non-disclosure agreements originally came into being to protect, quite legitimately, trade secrets and other matters that it was in the interest of both parties should remain secret? I hope that the Government will bear that in mind when deciding what to do in this area.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, my noble friend is absolutely correct: non-disclosure agreements have an entirely legitimate use, particularly in the context of protecting confidential information of an employer upon the departure of an employee.