Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments in my name relates to Clauses 1 and 2. I start by observing that we on these Benches are broadly supportive of most of the provisions in the Bill. Many of the amendments tabled in my name, save one or two exceptions, have the aim of strengthening the Bill’s existing provisions rather than removing them. The use of reasonable force to compel attendance at sentencing hearings was a measure first proposed by the previous Conservative Government in the Criminal Justice Bill, which fell at the Dissolution of Parliament. It is, therefore, a policy that we on these Benches strongly support.

As the Government have consistently said, victims and their families deserve to see justice done. They deserve to hear directly those remarks which explain the court’s reasons for the sentences that are being imposed, and they deserve the chance to face their offenders and have their own voices heard in open court. In that spirit, many of the amendments in my name probe details of Clauses 1 and 2, and question how they would operate in practice. These clauses set out the statutory powers for judges to order an offender to attend court for their sentencing hearing, by reasonable force if necessary. As we have heard previously, offenders who refuse to attend their sentencing hearing thereby insult their victims. Offenders should not be able to undermine the final moment of justice in such a way. The amendments in this group ask the important question of why the Government are not taking this opportunity to expand the applicability of Clauses 1 and 2, given their upcoming and substantial court reforms.

I understand that the application only to the Crown Court in these clauses is the same as the approach taken in our Criminal Justice Bill, but I point out a crucial difference between the positions of the last Government and this Government. When this clause was originally proposed, there were no plans to alter the sentencing powers of the magistrates’ courts. However, this Government are now proposing to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to three years, thereby shifting a large number of cases away from the Crown Court towards magistrates. As such, magistrates will hear a much greater proportion of increasingly serious cases, which surely throws into question the application and scope of Clauses 1 and 2.

In fact, this is a different contextual background from not only that of the previous Government but that of this Government. The Bill was introduced in the other place before the Government announced their court reforms. So, as published, Clauses 1 and 2 would have permitted the compulsory attendance of an offender for sentences between one year and three years. Now, however, if the Bill is unamended, and the Government’s court reforms go ahead, a person convicted in a magistrates’ court for an offence that would have previously been heard only before a Crown Court will not be required to attend their sentencing hearing.

If it was previously the Government’s view that offenders facing between one and three years’ imprisonment should be subject to compulsory attendance at their sentencing hearing, why have they not made the necessary amendments to the Bill? Perhaps that is because they have changed their mind, in which case the Minister should be clear about that. If it is the Government’s position that the scope of offenders who should be compelled to attend their sentencing hearing should remain the same as when the Bill was introduced, they must surely accept these amendments. The question that then arises is: why stop at the Crown Court, when extending these powers to other courts could make a meaningful and positive difference to the victims of other crimes?

We should not dismiss the experience of victims of, for example, burglary. Requiring an offender to attend their sentencing hearing may give those victims just as much closure. Conversely, an offender refusing to attend could cause just as much insult, if this series of amendments is not accepted. If anything, by reserving these powers for the Crown Court only, we risk playing down the significance of other crimes by signalling that offenders do not have to face their victims. Extending these powers to other courts would not only provide greater consistency but show that no crime is more permissible than another, or that one victim’s experience is not more or less important than another’s. If the rationale is one of practicality or resource, the Government should make that case. If, however, there is no compelling reason, whether it be legal, procedural or financial, the Bill presents an ideal opportunity to address a gap, rather than requiring further primary legislation later on down the line after court reform has been implemented.

If the Government’s intention is to strengthen victims’ confidence in the criminal justice system, surely consistency must be at the heart of that ambition. Victims do not experience crime through the lens of jurisdictional boundaries. They experience the indignity of being wronged and they rightly expect the justice system to deal with offenders in a manner that recognises that harm each time, regardless of which court is sentencing. It is for these reasons that I believe the Government should revisit the decision to confine these powers solely to the Crown Court; otherwise, the Bill risks creating a two-tier system, where the victims of some crimes are afforded the closure of seeing justice done in person, while others are denied it for reasons that are administrative rather than principled.

I would be grateful if the Minister could also clarify what consideration has been given to victims’ expectations and their confidence in the justice process when limiting these powers to the Crown Court. I hope that the Minister will reflect on these points and consider whether there is scope for a more ambitious and comprehensive approach. I look forward to her response and to working to strengthen this legislation for the benefit of all victims. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make a brief observation about the amendment. The exercise of this power by a judge is never going to be easy, and we should be very cautious about the way this is introduced. Let us first see how it works with people who have the experience of handling what, in the circumstances, will be a very difficult position before we move on to doing it in all courts. This power must be confined to those cases where it is really necessary, because I think that a number of us who have had experience of this would be very worried indeed if this power came to be routinely deployed.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, seek to ensure that the Bill lives up to its purpose in the name of victims.

Clauses 1 and 2 set out how offenders can in future be compelled to attend their sentencing hearing. But, as currently drafted, they contain no mechanism to involve the victims directly in the process. This is contrary to the Bill’s purpose to make provision for an enhanced experience for victims within the criminal justice system. Indeed, it is unclear in what situation a judge would be minded to make such an order without the request of the prosecution and what the criteria for such a decision would be in that instance.

If, in the absence of a request by the prosecution, the court’s power to compel attendance is not automatic, I look to the Minister to say why that is the case. Further, I ask her to clarify whether published guidance will be provided to judges as to what factors should be considered when making an order, beyond the practical considerations of officer safety.

The amendments which we advance, on the other hand, would overcome some of our concerns. They would enable the victims to have a say and to request that the offender be ordered to attend. As the Minister set out at Second Reading, the reasoning behind this Bill’s provisions is to compel attendance in the first place and to provide an opportunity for victims to look the defendant in the eye and explain exactly how a crime has affected them. The sentencing remarks are often their last opportunity for this. Why, then, should victims not be given a say whereby they can expressly request that an offender is ordered to attend? This would both give the victim a greater voice and give the judge greater clarity on how to proceed.

The second two amendments in this group, Amendments 4 and 9, would also require the courts to consult the victims if the judge is minded not to make an order compelling an offender to attend sentencing. If a victim is deceased or incapacitated mentally or physically, our amendments would allow family members or another appropriate representative to be consulted in their place. Justice should not stop when the victim cannot speak for themselves. This would put victims at the centre of the process. It would ensure that such decisions are taken not behind closed doors but in consultation with those victims whom these decisions affect.

We cannot treat these issues as merely procedural. For a victim, a sentencing hearing can be a profoundly significant moment, and it is an opportunity for closure. I am sure that the last thing noble Lords would want is for a victim to feel disconnected, sidelined or unheard by the courts in the run-up to a hearing. This amendment would also give judges a chance to explain and justify their decisions. If the offender will not be in attendance or the judge will not exercise their powers to compel attendance, victims or their representatives deserve an explanation of why that is the case. This should happen both where a victim has made a request for an offender to be ordered to attend and where they have not. We do not consider this to be a heavy burden on the courts. It should instead be considered best practice. These steps would ensure that the judge’s decision-making process is consistently transparent. It would make our system more accessible and demonstrate to victims that they are a priority, not an afterthought, particularly at the point of sentencing.

This Bill was presented to Parliament as an opportunity to address these very concerns. Our amendments would fill real gaps in drafting. I am sure the Minister will want to reflect carefully on them. I look forward to hearing the contributions of other noble Lords to this debate. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I shall make two observations. The first relates to the remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in relation to how judges will exercise these powers and whether guidance will be given. No doubt the Lady Chief Justice will consider whether to give guidance, or such guidance might be given by practice direction or be the subject of discussion at the Judicial College, but the handling of this is entirely for the judiciary. It is difficult enough, and it certainly would not be in any way appropriate for the Ministry of Justice to give guidance. It seems to me that the exercise of this judicial power must be for the judicial branch of the state and it alone—unless, of course, Parliament in its infinite wisdom decides that it wants to set down the criteria. I strongly urge Members not to do that.

The second relates to a more practical point, and that is the ability of the victim to intervene in the decision and to be able to make a request. It is sometimes forgotten that a transformation occurred during the 2000s and the next decade in the way in which the Crown Prosecution Service dealt with victims. There was a time when the victim was regarded as peripheral to the way in which the courts operated and to matters that had to be taken into account. That position changed remarkably and for the better. I think it is appreciated that the judicial power to have someone brought into court has to be exercised with the greatest degree of thought. If the Crown Prosecution Service were to request this to happen, I would be astounded if it had not consulted the victim. In my experience, that is what often happens in these difficult circumstances. There is a discussion as to the best way of proceeding and it is very important that this is approached in that sort of way.

If the victim was to be allowed to make the request directly, this raises the question as to how. Is this to be done in open court with the discussion of the various issues? Is it not best left to the wisdom of the Crown prosecutor and the judge’s ability to ask questions as to the victim’s views? It seems to me this is a much more efficacious way of dealing with the matter rather than bringing the victim in personally—because there is no suggestion of a victim’s advocate for this—to what will be, if this power is to be exercised, an occasion of great difficulty. The last thing anyone wants to happen is to provide secondary victimisation by an awful scene in court. I urge the Government to exercise very considerable caution in considering this amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, once again I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for his note of caution about Amendment 3—and Amendment 8 in the case of service personnel—which would allow victims to request that an order be made. I completely agree with him that it is a matter for the judiciary to exercise its discretion as to whether orders are made. I am not entirely sure that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, took into account quite how difficult it is going to be to make these orders. I suggest that the caution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, about bringing the victim in as effectively a party to such an application is a point well made. But I accept that it is right that the victim’s voice should be heard. I also agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, that the victim’s voice in court now is heard in a way that it certainly was not decades and even years ago. But a formal position whereby the victim was entitled to make a request is probably undesirable, though it is quite clear that the victim’s voice should be heard and that guidance to and from the judiciary should reflect that.

Amendments 4 and 9 are effectively seeking a very serious conflict:

“If the court is minded not to make an order under subsection (2), the court has a duty to consult the victim, or, where the victim is deceased or is unable to be consulted … a family member or other appropriate representative”.


That would put the victim in a wholly invidious position of effectively making the victim compulsorily a party to the application for an order. That is likely to stoke up hostility between the victim and the offender, which we are trying to avoid or at least reduce, and even possibly between the victim and the court, which would be a thoroughly undesirable position. Far better, I suggest, to leave it to the judge to decide how the victim’s views should be sought and taken into account, without imposing any duty on the court to consult the victim at any stage. It would be much better for the Bill to remain silent on how the victim’s views should be sought, but the expectation will be that they will be sought, and I have no doubt that that is how the judiciary would approach this exercise.

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[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

As my noble friend will recall, I raised this issue at Second Reading. I support Amendment 14, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and Amendment 15, in the name of my learned friend, if I may refer to him in those terms, the noble Lord, Lord Meston. I add that I have sympathy towards the drafting of Amendment 13, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.

As I say quite frequently in this House—the issue of sexual offending arose in the passage of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, and I said it then and I repeat it now—sexual offences in the family environment are appalling. The offence of a father—it is often the father, rather than the mother—sexually attacking, which I think is the right word, his own son or daughter, who are as young as 14 years-old, is absolutely appalling. It is beyond most of our comprehension that any father would do that—it is certainly beyond my comprehension.

The important thing here is the value of the prohibited steps order made in the family court, because that can be carefully fashioned to the particular needs of a family. Therefore, it is welcome that the family court has this provision. The use of this prohibited steps order is most valuable for the protection of children and spouses in the family.

I am a little puzzled by the provision in Clause 3, and I ask my noble friend the Minister to reply to this, under which it is obligatory, within the circumstances set out, for a prohibited steps order to be made. I would be grateful for guidance—I am sorry I have not researched this—on whether the power to make a prohibited steps order is a matter of discretion by the Crown Court, or whether it is the situation that a prohibited steps order can be brought into force only under the drafting of Clause 3? I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister could answer that.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make a few observations. No one can doubt the revulsion towards sexual offenders who have attacked their own children or have the potential to do so, but there are two practical points that we must bear in mind.

First, the criminal justice system and the criminal courts, and the family justice system and the family courts, have been starved of resources by both Governments—there is no doubt about that. When sentence lengths are increased by both parties, we end up with a situation in the prisons that is a crisis. In deciding what orders to make in this kind of case, it is of paramount importance to have regard to the resource implications. It is no use saying that there is money for this. There is not. The courts system is starved, and the result of that is victims suffering in a whole host of other cases by the tremendous backlog. Both this Government and the last Government are responsible for the position into which the courts have been placed. When we look at this, please have regard to resources.

The second point, a point made by the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Meston, is that it is important that we get correct the balance as to what the Crown Court is to do and what the family court is to do. I am not sure, having listened to this debate, that that is a matter that has been sufficiently addressed. The one thing you cannot have—because it is a waste of resources and does not deploy expertise correctly—is the lines not clearly drawn. I hope very much that, before this comes back, there will be the opportunity for those who have day-to-day responsibility in the judiciary and the Courts Service, together with the ministry, to be sure that we have got the most effective and efficient use of resources and the right kind of drawing the line. It is very difficult, but we cannot ignore the bankrupt state of the courts. It is a regrettable fact, and we must not make the mistake we have made in relation to sentencing.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise for organising my notes here—I have been listening hard. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this group, which concerns the operation of Clause 3 and the use of prohibited steps orders for the safeguarding of children where a parent or individual with parental responsibility has been convicted of serious sexual offending. The group rightly raises profound questions about thresholds, discretion, safeguards and consistency, and indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has pointed out, the balance between the two wings of the court system—the family and the criminal courts. I thank noble Lords for their searching and constructive contributions to this debate, all of which are motivated by a shared desire to protect children from harm.

I begin with Amendment 13, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, Amendment 14, in my name, and Amendments 15 and 19, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston. All these amendments concern and probe the four-year custodial threshold that currently triggers the duty on the Crown Court to consider making a prohibited steps order. I thank the Government at the outset for the constructive manner in which they have already engaged with the clause. They accepted, during the Bill’s passage through the other place, that the original scope of Clause 3 was too narrow. As drafted on introduction, it applied only where the offender had committed sexual abuse against their own child. Following sustained concern, the Government rightly expanded that clause, so that it applies where the offender has abused any child. That change was welcome and necessary.

However, while the class of victims has been widened, the custodial threshold remains set at four years. It is here that noble Lords have expressed deep unease. A four-year sentence is an extremely high bar. There are numerous sexual offences involving children that may result in sentences well below four years yet would plainly justify the imposition of a prohibited steps order to safeguard a child, such as sexual communication with a child, causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity, certain forms of indecent assault or online grooming behaviours. These may, depending on the facts, attract sentences of significantly less than four years. Yet it would be surprising to suggest that an individual convicted of such conduct should automatically fall outside the scope of a safeguarding measure which has been designed to prevent them from exercising parental responsibility without scrutiny.

I think all noble Lords accept that there is a balancing exercise here. The state should not intervene lightly in family life. We must be careful not to construct a regime which is too blunt and results in unnecessary or disproportionate separation of children from parents. However, equally, Clause 3 as drafted risks being too narrowly drawn and failing to engage precisely in those cases where concern is most acute. The current threshold risks excluding serious and dangerous individuals because the custodial term imposed falls short of an arbitrary figure. We look to the Minister to explain why four years was chosen, what evidence underpins that decision and why a lower threshold or an offence-based approach was not chosen.

Amendments 22 and 27 raise an issue of rather different but also troubling nature—the power of the Secretary of State by regulation to amend the list of offences to which Clause 3 applies. As drafted, that power is not limited to expansion. It allows the list to be amended. That necessarily includes the possibility of reduction. It is difficult to conceive of a principled reason why a future Government would wish to remove sexual offences from the scope of a safeguarding provision of this kind. That prospect should concern the whole House. We accept the need for flexibility. The criminal law evolves. New offences may be created, particularly in the online sphere, as was illustrated by the recent Grok AI scandal and by non-consensual deepfakes of women and children in particular.

I recognise that Parliament cannot foresee every future risk. Recent controversies involving emerging technologies only underline that reality. It is therefore sensible that Ministers should have the power to expand the list where gaps emerge. However, it is not at all clear why the power should run in the opposite direction. Our Amendment 22 seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State would be able only to expand the list of relevant offences rather than shrink it. Opposition to what is modest drafting would raise serious questions about the Government’s intentions. We hope that the Minister will reflect carefully on that.

In that context, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for Amendment 27, which would add Section 15A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, on sexual communication with a child, to the schedule. This offence criminalises the deliberate sexualised communication with a child for the purpose of sexual gratification. A technology-enabled form of abuse can be profoundly harmful. It often forms part of a wider pattern of grooming. Its inclusion in the schedule would materially strengthen the safeguarding framework, particularly if the threshold under Clause 3 were to be revisited.

Finally, Amendment 34, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, seeks to extend Jade’s law to cover attempted murder. This amendment raises an important principle. While the law recognises that certain conduct is so grave that parental responsibility should be curtailed automatically, it is difficult to see why the distinction between murder and attempted murder should be a point of difference, particularly given the catastrophic harm that attempted murder can cause.

This has been a thoughtful and serious debate. The amendments in this group are aimed at strengthening Clause 3 to protect children from harm while respecting the practical policy constraints which the Government face. We have no doubt that the Minister will engage constructively with the issues raised and provide the House with the assurances and explanations that these amendments request.

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[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I begin by commenting on two parts of the noble Lord’s amendments. I find it difficult to understand how his Amendment 16 would work in practice. These orders have to be made at the point of sentencing; they cannot come later on as an afterthought or at a later hearing. More importantly, I question how the Crown Court would be in a position to assess what is or is not in the interests of the child, and, certainly, how the Crown Court could do it without a report that typically, in the family court, might be available from Cafcass or a local authority.

Moreover, what would the Crown Court do if the suggestion of not making the order to remove or restrict parental responsibility is strongly opposed by the other parent, as would quite likely be? That other parent, certainly in the Crown Court, would not have party status and would probably not have legal representation.

On the face of it, the Crown Court might face the prospect of a contested hearing on the question of whether to restrict parental responsibility. Clearly, that is much better dealt with by the family court in the appropriate way. Having said that, I of course understand the force of the noble Lord’s Amendment 33, which seems to present a sensible solution to a potentially difficult problem.

I move briefly to my amendments in this group. They are procedural and evidential amendments. Amendment 23 would provide for the Crown Court that is required to make the prohibited steps order to be supplied with all necessary information to make the order, enabling it to make the order in appropriate terms, covering all the children to whom it might apply and enabling it to be provided to the other parent and others holding parental responsibility. As it appears from the very length of Amendment 23, parental responsibility can be acquired by a number of different people in a considerable range of situations. It almost goes without saying that the convicted offender may not be a reliable source of information about the children for whom he has parental responsibility, or the basis on which he might hold it. The Crown Court therefore cannot be expected simply to make a blanket, generic order referring to all or any children for whom the defendant holds or might hold parental responsibility. That would be of little use to anyone. The court therefore has to be in a position at the point of sentencing to make an order that should refer to specified children. For that, accurate and reliable information should be provided. As the amendment suggests, that would be best done by the Probation Service as part of the pre-sentence report.

Once that order has been made, it is also important that those who are affected by the order are notified of it. Hence, Amendment 17 would provide for notification by the Crown Court to the relevant local authority and the provision of a copy of the order, with a duty on the local authority to convey that information by onward notification to all persons who hold parental responsibility for the child or children concerned. Clearly, they need to know what has been ordered and to understand the effect of it. The local authority is best placed to provide that information.

Finally, Amendment 29 would ensure that in rape cases the victim is promptly and properly informed that the order has been made, with an obligation on the court to notify the relevant local authority within seven days of the order being made and an obligation on that local authority within 14 days thereafter to notify the victim of rape. Without this, there is a risk that the other parent or holder of parental responsibility for the child or children concerned, and the victim of the rape, are not made aware of the order or of its implications. They may be aware if they attend a sentencing hearing, but that is not certain. In any event, a local authority, particularly one involved with the family, would be best able to explain the effect of the prohibited steps order, its duration and other implications.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I shall again make one very brief observation. It is obvious that what is to be provided is a short, speedy, summary step to protect whatever range of offence is decided on. I agree completely with the noble Lord, Lord Meston, that the Crown Court cannot be the appropriate place to start debating what is in the interests of the child. We need to see whether a form of order can be devised, and an exchange of information put forward, that does not impinge on resources, say for the Probation Service, which is probably going to be in a worse position than the courts, that can give the speedy remedy that is needed simply and transfer, for the making of the final order, to the family court, which is obviously the right place to do it. I am not sure we need all these complicated pieces of legislation to do that: rather, it should be something probably very much simpler, with a power for the Minister to make regulations once a proper, simple procedure has been worked out. I fear we are getting ourselves into a degree of complexity that is not desirable.

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 39 in my name would require the Secretary of State to issue revised guidance on victim personal statements, clarifying what victims may include and ensuring that the courts appropriately disregard prejudicial material.

Victim personal statements are a valuable and important part of our criminal justice process. They allow victims to articulate in their own words the impact that a crime has had on them and on their families. This personal element is often deeply cathartic and can provide a sense of agency in a system that victims have described as otherwise procedural and somewhat distant. However, as this Bill was scrutinised in the other place, it became clear that many victims and practitioners find the current approach to personal statements unclear and, in some cases, unnecessarily restrictive.

Members spoke of victims feeling that they were sometimes advised to omit heartfelt and deeply personal material from their statements. These omissions were not for any legal reason, but appeared to be due to an overly cautious interpretation of the guidance. There is also a concern that victims do not always understand what is and is not permissible, and that this lack of clarity can undermine their confidence in the entire process.

One recurring theme from previous debates is that victims should not be left uncertain about what they can and cannot say, nor should they feel that their legitimate expressions of harm are being suppressed for procedural reasons. At the same time, the amendment acknowledges the equally important principle that personal statements must not be vehicles for

“allegations of untried criminal conduct”,

or material that is contrary to

“statutory limitations on free speech”

or due process. It is designed precisely to strike the appropriate balance. It would not remove any existing safeguards. It simply asks the Secretary of State to revisit and clarify the guidance governing the content of personal statements in a way that gives victims clarity and a genuine sense of voice.

The amendment would require revised guidance to be issued within six months of the Bill passing. The revised guidance must stipulate that, when making a victim personal statement, the victim should be able to say

“anything they wish about the defendant”,

so long as it does not go beyond lawful free speech, make untested allegations of new criminal conduct, or contain “disorderly language”. These are sensible and well-established legal boundaries.

The amendment also states that the court must disregard any

“prejudicial comments made during a victim personal statement”.

In practice, this would simply enshrine what is already understood by judges: that victims may express themselves freely, while judges continue to confine themselves to factors that are legally relevant and admissible. Placing this in the Bill would reassure victims that greater freedom of expression in their statements will not be misconstrued as diminishing the fairness of proceedings, or indeed as providing a basis for an appeal. This would not mean that victims would be able to litigate matters that fall outside the scope of the case before the court, nor would it mean that victim personal statements would supplant other evidence or judicial reasoning. It would mean that victims would know where they stand, and that they would not be discouraged from expressing the full impact of their experience simply because the existing guidance is interpreted excessively cautiously.

The importance of clarity in this area cannot be overstated. Victims and their families often report that they do not know what is expected of them when making a personal statement, or that they are told they must temper their comments in ways that feel artificial or perhaps insensitive. That undermines public confidence in the system and risks denying victims a meaningful voice at a critical moment in the justice process. This amendment offers a proportionate way forward. It respects judicial integrity and would preserve the lawful limits on personal statements. At the same time, it would provide victims with the clarity and the dignity that they deserve. It would ensure that they can say what they need to say without fear that well-meaning but over cautious guidance may curtail their voice.

I present the amendment in a constructive spirit. I look forward to the Minister outlining how the Government believe that the current guidance is operating—whether it achieves its objectives, and whether there is an appetite for revision that reflects victims’ legitimate expectations—and speaking to the points raised by Members on both sides of the House and in the other place. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My brief observations draw on my experience of what happened about 20 years ago when the statements were being developed. For more serious cases, such as murder and manslaughter, there was an attempt to give the victim’s family an advocate. It had transpired that drafting these statements was not easy, and so this was trialled for a few years. It proved to be an extremely expensive way forward, and the scheme came to an end with the financial crisis of 2008.

That left us with the problem, in all these cases, of how you formulate what was then called a victim impact statement and is now called a personal statement? They are extraordinarily difficult to formulate. Those with experience of civil cases will know that, if you ask a witness to produce something in his own words, or you ask the claimant in a case to do the same, you get something you could never put before the court, because it would never really convey what had to be put forward. Therefore, the way in which progress was made was along the cautious lines of developing guidance. I think such guidance always needs to be kept under review. You need consultation with the Crown Court judges, who see this all the time. Clarity in the guidance is essential, but I greatly caution against allowing a victim to do more than explain to the court the way in which the crime has affected the victim, his family and the community. Going beyond that seems to raise all sorts of problems, and the last thing one wants to do is to revictimise a victim by saying, “You shouldn’t say that in court”. Clarity is essential, but I say, with respect to the noble and learned Lord, that his formulation goes too wide of the mark.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I shall add a couple of very brief points. First, from my own experience, also nearly 20 years ago now when I was a victim of stalking, as were some of my colleagues, I found that the police encouraged me to make a victim statement, but we were advised quite specifically to talk not about what the stalker had done but solely about the effect on us of what he had done: in other words, to completely avoid making any comment about him or his actions. That was quite difficult. I was advised very heavily not to get involved and show how emotional many of us were as a result of his actions, and I chose not to do that at all.

However, I talked last week to Glenn Youens, the father of a four year-old who was killed. He and his family were asked if they wanted to do a victim impact statement, and the police advised them not to use certain language because the court had advised them not to. They were told that bluntness might upset the perpetrator, they could not call him a child killer; they were not allowed any props in court, such as their daughter’s teddy bear; and the CPS advised them not to appeal the unduly lenient sentence, because it might actually make the Attorney-General get less for him in the long run. So, this particular family’s experience of making a statement was the exact opposite of what it was intended to be. While I have some sympathy with some elements of the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, I think I am more with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, on the grounds that we would have to design it so carefully to make sure that a victim is doing it willingly and that they are able to say what they want without jeopardising the court process. I am afraid that that would also mean very strict guidance on the officials helping them not to do so in a way that prevents victims speaking in their own voice.

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose the Question that Clause 11 stand part of the Bill. This clause seeks to extend the right to prosecute to those with different qualifications from solicitors or barristers.

As my noble friend Lord Gove highlighted at Second Reading, the Crown Prosecution Service faces constraints in whom it can employ, and the criminal Bar is facing a retention crisis. Last year, a national survey by the Criminal Bar Association found that one in three criminal barristers intends to quit. It is obviously crucial that we have enough Crown prosecutors for cases, and we fully appreciate on this side the challenge that the Government face. However, I do not believe that this clause is an appropriate solution. Rather than carefully addressing the causes of those pressures and looking for proper solutions, this clause simply moves the goalposts. It redefines who is qualified to undertake what is highly serious work. That is not good enough.

While it has been argued that allowing CILEX members to prosecute will help to increase diversity, this argument should not be used as a smokescreen for what could potentially dilute standards. I dare say that is not what those truly calling for diversity want either, on their part. Genuine diversity in the legal profession is not achieved by lowering thresholds or by altering qualifications to fill gaps. It is achieved by facilitating pathways and by supporting structures within the profession, so that people from all backgrounds can succeed on an equal footing. To suggest otherwise risks turning diversity into a box-ticking exercise. It does not demonstrate an authentic commitment to broadening access to the profession.

We cannot risk lowering the quality of prosecution. This would not be fair on the defendant, and certainly not on the victim, and it is definitely not in the long- term public interest. Victims and defendants rely on the competence of the prosecutor. A victim must have confidence that their case is being handled by someone who is suitably qualified. Those who prosecute murders today will some years ago have prosecuted in the magistrates’ courts; they start at the lower level and they move up, gaining their experience moving from level to level as proportionate to their skills.

A defendant whose liberty may be at stake is entitled to proper assurance. These are not minor concerns; they go to the heart of our justice system. More widely, any weakening of our standards risks undermining public confidence in the justice system as a whole and weakening the supply, I suggest, of future prosecutors of serious crime. Can the Minister please explain what assessments were undertaken previously of the impact of this proposed change?

If we are to expand the pool of prosecutors, we must be absolutely sure that this shift is backed by sufficient evidence of good quality, and that any necessary safeguards are in place to ensure that standards will not drift or diverge over time. The Committee deserves clear evidence that this reform will enhance, and not diminish, the quality of prosecutions. We have not been shown that evidence. Without it, this clause risks creating more problems than it solves. I urge the Minister please to reflect carefully on these concerns and to ensure that any change to the thresholds is supported by robust, transparent evidence and proper safeguards. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make one or two brief observations about this, if I may. First, I must declare an interest, in that about 10 years ago I was made an honorary vice-president of CILEX. In case it is thought that I am speaking with the interests of CILEX in mind, I wanted to make that absolutely clear.

My first observation is this: the transformation of the way in which the legal profession operates and its financial position has been enormous over the last 20 or so years. Sometimes, I think we forget the huge difference there is in remuneration for those who practise in areas such as commercial and administrative law and those who practise in the criminal sphere. This is having a very serious effect on the ability.

How that problem is solved is a matter for Her Majesty’s Government, not for me, but it seems to me that, in looking at what the state can afford, it is necessary to look at the way in which an organisation such as CILEX has transformed itself, the qualifications that are given and the reality of many cases. As a judge, one sometimes feels that the best experience for being a good prosecutor is having done a lot of prosecutions, not necessarily where they had a first-class degree from a great university or whether she had done extremely well in the solicitor’s or Bar finals; experience is important.

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We must also reflect on the fact that once the power is conferred, it would not be limited to the present Government. It would sit on the statute book, available for future Ministers to exercise in future fiscal or political circumstances, and without further primary legislation. Parliament should be cautious about granting wide executive powers that alter long-established constitutional arrangements, particularly where the case for change has not been made—we await the review —and the potential consequences for access to justice are so grave. For those reasons, we do not believe that Clause 12 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, the issue of costs in private prosecutions is an extraordinarily serious one. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has spoken of the position of charities, the RSPCA being one example. One can well understand the position of a charity conducting a prosecution through a small solicitor where costs are modest. On the other hand, one must recall that for good reasons of public interest, there are private prosecutions by large corporations to protect intellectual property. The consequence of the change in the market for solicitors and barristers has produced a problem, because what the CPS pays prosecutors to prosecute is completely out of line with what a large, industrial conglomerate that wants to enforce its intellectual property rights can pay. This is a problem that has to be grappled with.

One of the reasons why the CPS cannot prosecute more than it does is the Government’s constraint; both the last Government and this one are responsible for that. There is not enough money in the system to enable the CPS to prosecute where it should be doing so. More than 10 years ago, the change in the market and the constraint on the finances of the CPS, arising out of the 2008 financial crisis, began to manifest themselves in the contrast between what happened in private prosecutions by large conglomerates, or associations of those interested to protect their economic position, and in the CPS. The courts have tried to do something about it through a number of cases, but it is an extraordinarily difficult area.

For example, in a commercial case—many of these cases go to solicitors—there did not used to be the idea that you would have to get a tender before you prosecuted, but the courts now require it. The courts have made a number of very important changes to try to bring this cost under control, because, although it cannot be shown that if you pay a large sum—several hundred thousand pounds—to defer the costs of a private prosecution it will directly come out of any bit of the overall justice budget, anyone who has had to deal with the Treasury knows that that is the case. The Treasury looks at a pot for justice and, if you take large sums out of it by paying for private prosecutions, the other part of the justice system suffers.

This is a matter that has to be grappled with, and the right people to grapple with it are the Government. It is not a very good position for judges to be in to be making these very difficult decisions because of the gross inequality between what you pay private lawyers, which many may think is far too much but that is not for me to judge, and what you pay the Crown Prosecution Service, which may not be enough—again, that is not for me to judge. The problem of what I might call public penury and private affluence is absolutely illustrated by the problem of paying for private prosecutions. It is for the Government to grapple with, and setting rates is one of the ways to do it. I think it is probably the right way, but all I am saying is we that cannot run away from this problem that has arisen because of changes in the market and the constraints on public expenditure.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has inevitably given us a very brief tour d’horizon of the problems of the costs and charges of the legal profession getting out of hand. Looking at the Bill over the weekend, I had to turn up the 1985 Act and write into it the changes that would be made by the Bill. It seems that the one to focus on is making the provisions subject to regulations, which boils down to the Lord Chancellor setting rates—at least that is how I read it. It is not much of a stretch to think that those are going to be linked to legal aid rates, and one can see the problem.

The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who explained some of the problems very clearly, mentioned consultation and rather dismissed it as being helpful, but it is important that the Committee should know what is planned by way of consultation. I hope the Minister can help us on that, because so much turns on its outcome.

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I ask the Minister: what has been the outcome of all this sympathy, all these reviews and all this time? Ultimately, I agree with other noble Lords that this has to be the Bill: this has to be the moment, because it is about not only the grave injustices we have already seen, but those coming up the pipe.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I support the principle behind Amendment 61. The real question is: how quickly can this be done?

I want to give an illustration of a problem that has arisen in civil courts across the world: the ability of artificial intelligence to hallucinate—to create cases and precedents for lawyers to use that do not exist. All civil courts across the world, including those in this country, have realised that this is an immense problem. It is being dealt with by practice direction—in some cases, very quickly indeed—because it is corrosive to the proper conduct of litigation, and it seems to me that there is no reason why, when this comes back on Report, it cannot be dealt with. It is not a difficult problem, and if it has been around for two years, that is 18 months too long.

The other point I want to address, in a slightly different manner, is Amendment 62. This is a much more difficult problem and has arisen because of the way in which drill music, and similar music, has been used in the prosecution of cases. The admissibility of such evidence is quite complicated.

What is very worrying—as can be seen by the attendance here today of one of the counsels involved in these cases—is that the way in which this evidence has been used in some cases has caused a lot of deep misunderstanding and suspicion about the way our criminal justice system operates for certain minorities. The thought that you will be found guilty because of the music you listen to is deeply troubling.

However, it seems to me that what we need to do first is look at the cases where this has been used. I looked at the case of the Manchester 10 and, coincidentally, in that case, the evidence had been admitted by agreement, and the Court of Appeal upheld the way in which it had been used for certain purposes.

It seems to me that this is a more complicated problem, and it would be helpful if the Minister was able, between now and Report, to put before the House a short letter explaining what the problem is. I think it would be easier to look at the amendment in the light of a better understanding. The last thing I want to do is to bore the Committee by explaining the ways in which evidence can and cannot be used legitimately. It is much better that members of the Committee have the benefit of reading that on a piece of paper.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have two brief points on Amendment 61, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for tabling it. It is really wrong that computers or systems have ever been deemed to be reliable, let alone infallible. My husband is a research and design engineer who has worked in Cambridge Science Park for well over 40 years. He and his friends have a phrase that they use among themselves and about themselves: “Garbage in, garbage out”. When we started hearing about the Post Office Horizon scandal and Fujitsu, the first thing he said to me was, “Garbage in, garbage out”. The problem we have is that too many people, the courts and the court of public opinion believe that computer systems are infallible.

I also want to touch very briefly on AI because we are seeing cases in the courts now. Facial recognition cases are coming up. Big Brother Watch reported on one last June. I notice that not quite weekly, but quite frequently, an individual is arrested as they go into a store and are accused of taking something very small and then evidence is produced of them on a facial recognition watch list. It then transpires some time later that they are not that individual. One particular firm’s name keeps coming up—I will not go into that —but the reaction of the shop is exactly that: it is infallible. I support the amendment, and I urge the Minister and the Government not to pause on this at all. It is needed, not just for the legacy of Post Office Horizon, but for cases in our courts right now.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I do not accept that. My noble friend should think carefully about making accusations such as that.

The point is that we are looking at the evidence that we have received in order to evaluate it to ensure that we make evidence-based and informed changes. The Government are considering this matter carefully. I am not announcing another review or another consultation; I am simply saying that we are looking at the evidence that we have.

I hope that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti will hear the words that I am using. She knows that I understand the problem and that I am not unsympathetic, but we need to find a way that does not create a lot of unintended consequences.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I would never compete with the noble and learned Lord.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

The Government have had nine months. Normally, if you went to a competent lawyer and said, “This is the evidence. We need a solution”, you would be horrified if you had to wait nine months. Why is there not an answer? Can we have one when this comes back on Report? There is no excuse for delay.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords—