Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Luke Evans Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I said I would take one intervention from each side of the House. I have done that, so I will make some progress, but I am certain that Members will get another chance in a moment.

This treaty is indispensable to keeping Britain secure at home and strong abroad. It is an expression of our unbreakable defence and intelligence bonds with the United States. It strengthens and extends our power to respond to terrorists and hostile states, wherever they may be. It protects some of the world’s busiest trade routes, on which British businesses and consumers rely. It is a long-term investment in our core national interests, and it will benefit British people for generations to come.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Luke Pollard]

I am going to make some progress, but I will be happy to give way in a moment.

Before I start getting into the detail, I want to recognise up front the Chagossians affected by decisions taken by Britain many years ago. We recognise in the preamble to the universal deep regret over what happened. It is acknowledged on the face of the treaty, and I know there is cross-party support for the Chagossians, although there is a range of views on the deal within the Chagossian community. I want to place that on the record right at the start of the debate—[Interruption.] I will return to the Chagossians in a moment.

Both Houses have now had the opportunity to scrutinise the treaty under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), who is sitting next to me, gave evidence to three parliamentary Committees during the scrutiny period, allowing Members of this House and the other place to fully interrogate the details of the treaty. The International Agreements Committee concluded that if the treaty were not ratified, the future of the base on Diego Garcia would be at greater risk. The purpose of this Bill is to make the necessary changes to domestic law to implement the treaty, so that it can be ratified and brought into force.

Let me remind the House why we needed to secure this treaty. The Diego Garcia base is central to our national security—I know that all Members of this House will recognise that very simple fact.

[Dr Evans]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Luke Pollard]

I am going to make a wee bit more progress, but I always like giving way to a Luke, and I will do so in a bit—do not worry—but not quite yet.

I pay tribute to all Members of the House who have taken the time to scrutinise the treaty in detail.

Allow me to set out why it is so vital. The importance of the base cannot be overstated. The joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia has played a vital role in defending the UK and its allies for over 50 years. The base plays a key role in operations that support UK forces and our allies across the middle east, east Africa and south Asia. Its deepwater port, airfield, and advanced communications and surveillance capabilities, give the UK and our allies crucial strategic capabilities, which have played a key role in missions to disrupt high-value terrorists, including Islamic State threats to the United Kingdom.

But the base on Diego Garcia was under threat. Had we not signed the treaty, we could have faced further legal rulings against us within weeks, because the negotiations begun by the Conservatives had been stayed. Further legal rulings might have included arbitrary proceedings against the UK under annex 7 of the UN convention on the law of the sea, known as UNCLOS.

[Dr Evans]

Will the Minister give way?

[Luke Pollard]

In a moment. I will come to the hon. Gentleman—he should not worry.

A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK. It would impact on our ability to protect the electromagnetic spectrum from interference, and impair our ability to ensure access to the base by air and sea, to patrol the maritime area around the base and to support the base’s critical national security functions.

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[Luke Pollard]

I did say that I would give way to a Luke.

[Dr Luke Evans]

The Minister has made it absolutely apparent that this is about the long-term security of the base, so could he explain why, under article 13, if after 99 years the Mauritians decide not to negotiate, the base will just stop. We will get first refusal, but we can easily see that the Chinese would outbid us because we in this country decide that that is not affordable. We are a hostage to fortune, and that base will crumble. He has not secured the base, he has just deferred the issue by four generations, and this House will then have to decide what to do.

[Luke Pollard]

It is good that the hon. Member has read the detail of the treaty. As he will know that, at the end of the initial 99-year lease, a first refusal will be offered to the United Kingdom. That is the right place to be, and that offer will mean—as he describes it, in four generations’ time—there is a decision for this House to take about what it wants to do based on the circumstances at the time. This gives us first refusal, so we can conceivably see that full control of the UK-US base on Diego Garcia could extend well beyond the 99 years I have mentioned.

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[Luke Pollard]

I am grateful to the Father of the House for helping me to get back on track with my speech, because that is the topic of my next section. I will answer the right hon. Gentleman’s question in my remarks, but if a bit is missing, he may ask to intervene on me again.

We have heard some outrageous claims artificially boosting the costs of this deal. It will cost an average of £101 million per year in today’s money. That is an investment in today’s money of £3.4 billion over 99 years. That has been rigorously calculated, based on net present value, the methodology endorsed by the Government Actuary’s Department and the Office for Budget Responsibility. All the associated costings have been laid previously before the House and were explained in full at the time of signature.

Crucially, the exaggerated numbers that have been cited ignore inflation, the OBR deflation mechanisms and the Green Book. The Government have secured a strong deal. I remind those who criticise it that the previous Government knew full well that the status quo was dangerous and unsustainable—that is why they entered into negotiations in the first place, why they held 11 rounds of negotiations under successive Prime Ministers, Foreign Secretaries and Attorneys General, and why the Conservatives have never been able to provide serious alternatives to this deal.

[Dr Luke Evans]

rose—

[Mr Calvin Bailey]

rose—

[Luke Pollard]

I am happy to give way to the hon. Gentleman and then to my hon. Friend.

[Dr Luke Evans]

Can the Minister point to any other country in the world that has used NPV to give away sovereignty? As far as I am aware, there is none, so why are we pioneering that way forward?

[Luke Pollard]

This deal secures the base. The calculated value of the deal uses the Green Book. Other countries look at overseas bases that they rent and make the calculation based on their national accounting standards. We base it on the Green Book. Indeed, the Green Book was updated by the previous Government and has been used for such decisions for the past 20 years.

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[Priti Patel]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It speaks volumes about the priorities that this Labour Government—socialist to the core in how they like to spend public money—are focused on. Come November, when the Chancellor has her Budget, there will be no point crowing about the past and blaming other people, other countries and international forces and factors. This is a fiscal mess made by this Labour Government with this utterly scandalous, appalling and reckless financial giveaway.

[Dr Luke Evans]

The Minister challenged the Opposition and the shadow Chancellor about our position on net present value, but the reason is that the use of NPV is unprecedented. It is used for commercial deals that the Government make and is standardised for that alone, not for international agreements on sovereignty. Does my right hon. Friend agree that we will not change on net present value, which has its place in commercial deals but not in giving away sovereignty?

[Priti Patel]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right; it is absolutely shameful. I come back to the fundamental principle that this House will have to consider: at a time when hard-pressed British taxpayers are struggling, with significant tax rises and the share of the tax burden on the public going up, the Government will have to have a good, hard look at themselves and justify this appalling cost to their own constituents.

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[Priti Patel]

I will not. I know that the hon. Gentleman will speak later.

I turn to the British Chagossians. As well as undermining our security and defence interests and ripping off British taxpayers, Labour has betrayed the British Chagossians. Members on both sides of the House have recognised and acknowledged that the Chagossian community has faced injustice and hardship. Their removal from the Chagos islands is a source of great and profound regret. I pay tribute to the Chagossian community in Britain for their campaigning, and to Henry Smith, our former colleague as Member of Parliament for Crawley, who kept pursuing and raising the issue, and who fought in the House for their rights. As a result, we gave the community new rights in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, which Labour voted against. I hope that the Minister can give assurances that those rights will not be undermined by the citizenship measures in clause 4 of the Bill. Because of that past, it is so important that any decisions made about the future of the Chagos islands are made with the community in mind, and that their needs are fully respected.

Ten years ago, when the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), was the Opposition’s spokesman, he said:

“The people of Chagos must be at the heart of decisions about their future…the UK Government have a fundamental moral responsibility towards the islanders that will not go away.”—[Official Report, 28 October 2015; Vol. 601, c. 192WH.]

But this treaty fails them. I have met the community many times and heard their concerns and frustrations; I think everyone in the House will acknowledge their frustrations. They feel that they have been ignored throughout the process, and that the treaty has no guarantees for them. There is a £40 million Chagossian trust fund that UK taxpayers will capitalise, but the UK and the British Chagossians will have no control or say over how it will be used or controlled by the Government of Mauritius. I highlight that point because the Chagossians feel strongly—they fundamentally know—that they cannot trust the Government of Mauritius. The Bill and the treaty make no provision for the British Chagossians to benefit from the trust fund, or be involved in its governance; nor are they guaranteed any right to visit the Chagos islands. Those decisions will be controlled by Mauritius once sovereignty is surrendered.

Hon. Members across the House who have spoken up for British Chagossians know of their fears. It is right that I amplify those fears, or at least raise them in the House, because their voices have not been heard. Now is the time for them to be counted, for their voices to be heard, and, importantly, for their rights to be defended.

Another damning indictment of the Bill and the treaty is the way in which they fail to safeguard the 640,000 sq km marine protected area. Its unique biodiversity enables important marine research to be conducted. In just the last few weeks, a study that included researchers from Exeter and Heriot-Watt universities and the Zoological Society of London was published. It noted:

“Our results provide clear evidence for the value of the Chagos Archipelago VLMPA for protecting a diverse range of large and mobile marine species.”

Yet all we have heard thus far from the Government is warm words about intentions to continue with an MPA. No details have been published.

[Dr Luke Evans]

On the conservation point, is it not that the case has already been tested in UNCLOS between 2010 and 2015, when it was said that we could not go ahead with a marine protection area for this British territory because we had not consulted properly with Mauritius? At that point, it was also determined that UNCLOS could not rule on sovereignty as that was not its basis. So we found out not only about the sovereignty side, but that we cannot protect the islands on the environmental part. What guarantees does my right hon. Friend see in the treaty that we will have ecological protections in the area, given those findings?

[Priti Patel]

My hon. Friend is absolutely correct about UNCLOS and in highlighting the insecurities and serious challenges. It may be forthcoming, but at this stage we do not know what levels of protection will be provided or will continue. We do not know what level of resource Mauritius will put into the MPA or what the UK will contribute.

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[Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)]

I rise to speak on the Bill and proposed agreement, with particular focus on its defence implications. Given substantial other ongoing work and the fact that other Committees have looked into it, this is not an issue that our Defence Committee has investigated thus far. Let us not be under any illusion, however: this is a matter of strategic importance, financial prudence and moral responsibility.

The British Indian Ocean Territory and in particular the Diego Garcia military base have long served as a cornerstone of our defence and security capabilities, not just for the UK but for our allies in the US and across the Five Eyes community. That is why having their stated support for this deal, in addition to that of India and others, is so vital. The base’s role in disrupting threats to the UK, supporting counter-terror operations against ISIS and protecting us against hostile states must continue. Including the management of the electromagnetic spectrum satellite used for communications and the prevention of other powers operating on the outer islands without permission is vital for countering hostile interference. It is not just a diplomatic formality; it is a strategic firewall against encroachment by hostile states.

Maintaining US and UK autonomy on the base cannot be overstated. I note the Government position is that Mauritius will be expeditiously informed of activities. However, I look for reassurance that we do not need to provide Mauritius with advance warning about our operations. I would therefore welcome clarification on that point from the Minister to guarantee that all current and future operations can continue unimpeded.

[Dr Evans]

Given the importance of the Chagos islands to our defence, has the hon. Gentleman’s Committee thought about even doing a review into the Chagos islands and what this would look like? That way, such questions could be addressed directly in a decent period of time—we only have four or five hours tonight—and he could spend several weeks looking into the matter. Is that something he and his Committee would consider?

[Mr Dhesi]

As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, given that various other Committees have been looking into this and that it has been extensively debated on the Floor of the House, and considering the other work that the Committee is undertaking, including an inquiry launched this week into the Afghan data breach, that is why we have not looked into this matter. However, I will give way to the Minister, who I hope will give me some sort of reassurance.

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[Peter Lamb (Crawley) (Lab)]

I congratulate the Minister on his appointment, and thank Ministers for the time they have given me to raise with them matters in relation to this Bill and for the responses they have provided to my questions.

I can see no logical reason why the Government would go through the painful process of bringing this Bill to the Floor of the House today if they were not 100% convinced that it was in the UK’s national security interests. However, I am afraid that I must vote against the Government today because I do not believe that their concerns, no matter how important they might be, give us the right to override the Chagossian people’s right to self-determination. We cannot vote to give away these islands, because they are not our islands to give away in the first place.

I know that many Members have taken an interest in the plight of the Chagossian people over the years, and that in the last year, hopefully, many more have learned more about their history and their circumstances, so I will recount the key points briefly. The first recorded contact with the islands was from those in the Maldives, but its modern history begins with France, which bound the islands together in a colonial administration with Mauritius. This is the only basis on which the modern state of Mauritius makes any claim on the islands.

In the late 18th century, the UK claimed the colonies from the French and planted coconut plantations on the islands. We used slave labour to do that, and it was among those slaves that the unique island culture began to develop. In 1965, the UK divided that colonial entity, granting the modern state of Mauritius independence and at the same time, in return for financial compensation, agreeing to give up any future claim on the islands. However, we had already come to the determination at that point that this would be a convenient location for a military base, jointly run with the United States. I believe that in that initial deal we got a discount on Polaris for providing the site.

In order to facilitate the base, the decision was taken to forcibly remove the islanders from the archipelago—something that began under a Labour Government but concluded under a Conservative Government. Official documentation from the time stated that the base was too important to the UK for “Tarzans” and “Man Fridays” to get in the way, and made it clear that the islanders must be referred to only as Mauritians or Seychellois, recognising the opposition that they would face—even in the 1960s—if it was known that the displacement of an entire people was taking place in the interests of national security.

The islanders were deposited on Mauritius and the Seychelles—islands of a different culture—without a penny to their name, and for decades were abandoned by the British Government, left in poverty and facing discrimination on the basis of their ethnicity. For years, they have fought for their rights, and they have won some concessions in that time, including the right to UK citizenship, with most British Chagossians choosing to set up their home in Crawley. That move came with enormous challenges—a point to which I will circle back in due course.

I have known and worked alongside members of the British Chagossian community for almost two decades. As council leader, I promised them that as a part of Crawley’s community, it was my job to be their voice to Government, not the other way around. It is that promise that leads me to vote against this deal today.

It is true to say that there are Chagossians who enthusiastically support the deal, just as there are those who desperately oppose it—that is the same with any community on absolutely any issue—but what is not disputed is that the islands belong to the Chagossians, and that it is for that people and that people alone to decide the future of their homeland. We have not given them that chance to decide their future. Until every Chagossian has had the chance to have their say, I cannot support this deal.

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Member is making a powerful point. We heard an impassioned defence not to bring the Falkland Islands or other British overseas territories into this, but Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands have self-determination, voted for by their people. Is it his thesis that that will apply for the Chagossians, and therefore they would make the determination whether to be British or, indeed, go to the Mauritians on that basis?

[Peter Lamb]

It is incredibly unfortunate that the Chagossians have not been given that opportunity—that is my view. Had we given them that opportunity, whatever the outcome, I would have had no problem honouring that because we are talking about their land; it is not our land.

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[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

It is a privilege to follow the hon. Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb). I admire his principles and his persistence in his advocacy for his Chagossian constituents, and I know that he would recognise that his predecessor did the same.

There is no dispute that Diego Garcia is crucial to the UK’s security and that of its allies; that is not something we are arguing about. I do not think—although I will be corrected if I am wrong—that it is the Government’s position that, in terms of the day-to-day practicalities of operating the Diego Garcia base, this new arrangement whereby we no longer have sovereignty over Diego Garcia but will continue to administer it, at least for 99 years, is better than what we have now. Rather, it is a more secure arrangement because of what has been described as the legal uncertainty surrounding our sovereignty over it. I see the Minister nodding, and I am grateful for that.

[Dr Evans]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for giving way and using his legal background. It is more secure legally for those 99 years but, more definitively, at that 99-year point, if the Mauritians decide not to have a base there, categorically that is their decision. Therefore, by proxy, it is actually more unsafe, just in 100 years’ time.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I understand the point that my hon. Friend makes, and it is reinforced by the point made by our hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) in reading from the agreement as to how any disputes are resolved. But I want to focus on the position now and the legal justification that the Government have already deployed for the arrangement that they seek to make. My hon. Friend is right that there will be further problems down the road, but there are problems already.

It seems to me that if the position the Government take is as I have set it out and as the Minister accepts that it is, that must be right because it would surely be difficult to argue that, were it not for that legal uncertainty, renting Diego Garcia back from someone else would be better than owning it from a security point of view. So for the Government to persuade us in this House, and indeed the country as a whole, that this is a good deal for Britain, everything turns on the question of legal uncertainty, which Ministers have often referred to as the reason why the treaty, and therefore the Bill, are necessary.

Having spent four years as Attorney General, I am quite familiar with legal uncertainty—there is a lot of it about in Government. It is, I am afraid, invariably the case that whenever a decision is made in Government, someone disagrees with it, and some of those who disagree will be prepared to go to a court and challenge the validity of that decision. Until the court—sometimes until the Supreme Court—has resolved the matter, there can fairly be said to be legal uncertainty about it. Legal uncertainty hangs around Government like the clouds, and it cannot be allowed to paralyse a Government. Nor should that sort of atmospheric legal uncertainty be the only cause of a decision as significant as that which this Government are now making to give up sovereignty over a vital military facility.

There must be something more substantive—more tangible—to the legal uncertainty to which Ministers have referred. Many of us have tried to find out what exactly that is, but with very limited success. Given that, as far as I can tell, the legal uncertainty that is being talked about constitutes the entirety of the burning platform on which the Government rely to justify the Bill and the treaty, surely this House, before we approve either, must be given a proper and clear explanation of precisely what legal jeopardy the Government are acting in response to. In pursuit of that, it is worth having a look at the explanations that Ministers have given so far.

Let us start with the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), who of course is now the Deputy Prime Minister. He made a statement on the British Indian Ocean Territory negotiations on 7 October last year. He told the House that the issue of contested sovereignty over Diego Garcia was becoming more acute, and that

“A binding judgment against the UK seemed inevitable”.—[Official Report, 7 October 2024; Vol. 754, c. 45.]

Many of us have been asking where that binding judgment might come from. The only court that had by then been mentioned was the International Court of Justice, which had issued an advisory opinion on sovereignty over the Chagos Islands and Diego Garcia. Indeed, on this subject it could only have been an advisory decision, because the UK accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ by declarations dated 22 February 2017—I was Attorney General at the time. Those declarations made it clear that the UK did not, however, accept that compulsory jurisdiction in relation to

“any dispute with a Government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth”.

That involves and includes Mauritius, so any dispute with Mauritius before the ICJ could not result in a binding judgment against the United Kingdom. That point has been put to Ministers and, as far as I know, they have not dissented from that analysis.

If the ICJ could not make the binding judgment that the former Foreign Secretary told us was inevitable, which other court might? On that, again, I am afraid that we have not had clarity. On 13 November last year, the Minister of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty)—who I see has the misfortune of having to defend this position once again today—answered an urgent question on the Chagos Islands. He said:

“International courts were reaching judgments on the basis that Mauritius had sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago.”—[Official Report, 13 November 2024; Vol. 756, c. 793.]

The Minister did not at that point say which courts, but I have done some digging, and I think I am supported in my assumption by what the Minister of State, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), said in opening this debate. I think that he may have been referring to a determination made in January 2021 by the special chamber of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea when considering a dispute between Mauritius and the Maldives. Tragically, I do not have time to go into the fascinating detail of that case, but in essence it was a dispute about the delimitation of maritime territory between those two states. The Maldives argued that the special chamber could not determine the case in question because there was an ongoing dispute about the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands between Mauritius and the UK. The special chamber decided, however, that it could treat Mauritius as the coastal state in the dispute before it, because of the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the matter, which it said had legal effect.

If that ITLOS case is what the Government are relying on, I think there are a few problems: first, the UK was not a party to that case; and secondly, the ITLOS chamber was seemingly basing its decision on that of the ICJ, which, as I have already indicated, could not make a binding ruling on the matter. I am not expecting the House, much less the Government, to accept my opinion on this, but it seems to me that, at the very least, the UK would have the basis of a decent legal argument here. It does not seem to be that this ITLOS decision demonstrates that there was no further hope for UK claims of sovereignty over Diego Garcia.

After a bit more prodding, the Government’s argument moves on and introduces the issue of access to the electromagnetic spectrum. On 5 February this year, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office answered yet another urgent question on the subject.

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[Graeme Downie (Dunfermline and Dollar) (Lab)]

We have heard from Members on the Opposition Benches a slew of political opportunism, scaremongering, some cliché bingo and some derogatory terms—something that belongs more in a tabloid than in this House—about the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Back when these negotiations started, the Conservative party knew that a deal was needed—it may have been somewhere on its list of priorities when it still had some lingering credibility about the good of the nation. The Conservative party knew that a deal was in the best interests of the United Kingdom and our allies. It knew that without a deal, Mauritius could very well have pursued a sovereignty claim and allowed Russia and China into the waters around Diego Garcia. People do not sit through 11 rounds of negotiations if they do not think something is important; they walk away. To give the previous Government credit, they did not do that. They understood the importance of a deal.

[Dr Evans]

On that basis, there were 17 rounds of formal negotiations for the Falkland Islands between ’65 and ’82. What would the outcome be under the hon. Gentleman’s way forward?

[Graeme Downie]

That point was covered before. We have already seen scaremongering from the Opposition about the other British overseas territories, including the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. I hope that the Conservative party will reflect on and apologise for that.

None the less, the previous Government knew that a deal would keep Britain safe. They knew that without a deal, international courts could effectively make the base inoperable, and they knew that that could plant China right on our doorstep. Now, they cannot even say why it was important. They cannot say why they even started the negotiations; several Government Members have raised that point, and not once have the Conservatives been able to say why, other than hiding behind the fact that they are being entirely politically opportunist. They knew all that, and they now pretend that none of it matters. They are playing politics with Britain’s safety.

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[Tim Roca (Macclesfield) (Lab)]

It has been a long afternoon, but I should say from the start that I genuinely believe that the motivation of all of us is the national interest of the United Kingdom. Whatever differences of opinion there might be, I think it is important that we try to avoid hyperbole in this matter and think coolly and calmly about what is in the UK national interest.

There are tests we need to apply to what we are discussing: first, does it protect UK national security; secondly, do our allies and the professional military and security establishment support it; and thirdly, are the costs and obligations reasonable and proportionate? We also need to have a weather eye to our responsibility to the Chagossians, and I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) for speaking passionately on behalf of his constituents. I believe the answer to those three tests is yes, and I will address them in turn.

Diego Garcia is not just another overseas facility; it is fundamental to our security. It is where our forces and US forces have launched operations against high-value terrorist groups. It is a communications and logistics hub, and it is where we monitor hostile states and safeguard global trade routes that underpin our economy. Without this treaty, all that is at risk.

Ministers have outlined that international rulings could make the base inoperable. I spoke earlier to Dr Marco Longobardo, a specialist in international law, and it is clear that even the non-binding ICJ judgment is nevertheless a matter of international law and potentially gives hostile countries the opening that they need to contemplate interference in the islands—in the same way that Chinese claims in the South China sea are not recognised by many countries. That is all at risk. Our ability to berth submarines, patrol waters or launch operations would be compromised, and a vacuum would be created.

[Dr Evans]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Tim Roca]

I believe that the hon. Member has had quite a lot of turns today, and I have been waiting a long time without intervening, so I will proceed. If we allowed a vacuum to be created, it would be filled by China or others in a region that is vital to our security. I will come back to China in a moment, because what China thinks about this treaty is important as well.

Turning to the first test, the treaty secures 99 years of guaranteed access, with the option to extend it by a further 40 years; 99 years was good enough for Lord Salisbury, so it is good enough for me. It gives us full operational control over installations, logistics, communications and the electromagnetic spectrum. It establishes a 24-nautical-mile buffer zone and bans any foreign military presence on the outer islands. We have talked about how it protects a unique maritime environment and provides tangible support through the trust fund for Chagossian communities. On the first test I am satisfied.

On the second test—whether the agreement commands the backing of allies and experts—other colleagues have spoken powerfully about this, but Lord Goldsmith, a former Attorney General, said it was

“consistent with our national security interests and with our respect for international law”.

The international support is equally strong. Australia’s Kevin Rudd called it a

“good outcome for Mauritius, for Australia, for the UK and for our collective security interests”.

Canada’s foreign ministry said that it ensures

“the long-term, secure and effective operation”

of the joint base, strengthening a free and open Indo-Pacific.

In the United States, where there is not much that gets bipartisan support, it is a bipartisan matter. Antony Blinken said that America “strongly supported” the negotiations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio commended the “leadership and vision” shown. The Democratic former Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin said that the agreement will

“safeguard strategic security interests into the next century.”

I believe an hon. Member has already quoted President Trump, who described it as an amazing deal, a beautiful deal or whatever kind of deal—but a good deal, that is the main point.

The international consensus is clear. Our allies, partners and experts back the deal. I was very taken by the comments of Professor Benjamin Sacks of the RAND school of public policy in the United States. He said:

“I contend that Beijing privately views the agreement, even if modified to ameliorate some Chagossians’ outstanding demands, somewhat as a setback. In practical terms, it gains little if any advantage from it.”

He added:

“The Chagos issue constituted a perennial problem for British foreign policy; one that China could simultaneously exploit to demonstrate its supposed adherence to existing RBOs”—

rule-based orders—

“and undermine the UK’s traditionally important role in maintaining it.”

He also said that the deal deters Port Louis—Mauritius—from becoming an effective client state of Beijing. On the point of whether our allies support it, I believe that the treaty meets the test.

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[Dr Luke Evans]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Phil Brickell]

I will make some progress, if I may. I wanted to intervene on Opposition Members earlier, but was not allowed to.

It was the Conservatives who rightly described the situation in 2022 as unsustainable, and it was they who held 11 rounds of talks on sovereignty. In 2023, when he was Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak) said that he wanted to conclude a deal soon. At the time, when they were in government, Conservative Members recognised that the base’s legal status was under serious threat, and that an interminable sovereignty dispute risked paralysing operations.

Let me make a quick point about international law. In reflecting on the ICJ advisory opinion, the right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel) said that it is an international court that few have heard of. Those kinds of reckless throwaway remarks undermine the United Nations’ highest judicial organ. She mentioned that we are a permanent member of the UN Security Council. There are judges sitting in the ICJ who are elected by members of the General Assembly, and through the Security Council. Although we have had judges sitting in that international court since its inception, we have not since 2018, which is a source of much shame for the country at large. I hope that she will take back those remarks denigrating the international system of law that underpins our international work. Let us not forget, after all, that in the 1940s, the United Kingdom was the first country to submit a case for arbitration by the ICJ. [Interruption.] I ask those Opposition Members who are chuntering: where were you when those 11 rounds of negotiations took place? I know that two years is a long time in politics, but have you already forgotten—

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[Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his speech earlier, although he is no longer in this place. We have heard clearly from those on the Opposition Benches that they are opposed to this deal, so it is first worth outlining what sort of deal they are opposed to. They are opposed to a deal that secures our vital national interest on probably the most important base in the country’s history in the Indian ocean. They are opposed to a deal that is supported by every one of our Five Eyes closest security partners. As we have heard from many of them, they are opposed to a deal that they spent 11 rounds negotiating over two years, and we have not quite heard from them why they started negotiating that deal in the first place. They spent 11 rounds negotiating it, but they have not yet told us—the shadow Minister or otherwise—why they felt it was necessary and why they think this Government might have come to the same conclusion as they did at that time. I believe, as many of us do on the Government Benches, that that dangerous rhetoric puts the security of our base in Diego Garcia at risk. It is playing politics with our national security.

I want to take us back in history for one moment to look at a similar situation. During the second world war, the UK established another airfield in the Indian ocean known as RAF Gan. RAF Gan was the southernmost island in the Maldives, and it was secured in 1942 by the Royal Navy, and then taken over by the Air Force, to secure our operations all across the Indian ocean into the far east, combating the Japanese threat we were facing there. It was such a successful base that the Japanese did not even discover its existence until close to the end of the war, once their expansion plans had ended. Later, in the cold war, it became a vital staging post for the UK and our allies to get our forces across to Singapore and other bases in the far east. In fact, my father served there in 1974, and it was a great shame that two years later we closed that base and handed it over to the Maldivian Government at the same time that we secured our base in Diego Garcia.

I mention that case in particular because it was a vital strategic secure base of ours in a similar situation to Diego Garcia. As soon as the Maldivian Government took possession of that base, the Russians began to exert influence to try to take it over. They were attempting to take over the base that we occupied—that we spent decades developing—and turn it into a secure base for the Soviet Union. They are doing exactly the same thing again on Diego Garcia. They are trying to influence the Mauritian Government to claim the base for their own use.

[Dr Evans]

Is this not the point that we have heard time and again from Government Members? This deal runs out in 99 years, and at that point Mauritius can simply close the base or hand it on to the biggest offer. We get first rights on it, but if the Chinese decide to invest hundreds of billions, we may not be able to match that. We are over a barrel. In 100 years’ time, people will be in this place having this exact debate saying, “How do we solve this problem?” Is the hon. Member as concerned about that as I am?

[Alex Ballinger]

I go back to the example of RAF Gan. The Maldivians refused the Soviet Union back in 1976, because the UK had a good reputation with them. We honoured our agreements and respected international law, and they felt that it was inappropriate for them to be seen to be supporting a country that had not done the same.

In the case of Diego Garcia, this is a situation that has been negotiated for many years. The Conservatives recognised that there was a threat to our sovereignty, because they started the negotiations. As we have heard from my hon. Friends, if we are unable to conclude a deal soon, there is a serious risk that our operations at the base would be thwarted. It would not be in 99 or 140 years after the deal; it would be in weeks or months.

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[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

May I say how much of an honour it is to follow the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn)? Although we do not necessarily agree on a lot of policy, I am always struck by the fact that he puts people at the heart of his speeches. That has never been the case more than during his long campaign on this issue, on which he spoke eloquently. He is putting Chagossians right at the heart of any decision making. He deserves a lot of acclaim for that. He is right to call out some of the rhetoric in this debate, because, at the end of the day, those people really matter. I thank him for putting his points on the record.

There are three broad areas that I would like to cover: sovereignty, costs and some of the scariest parts of the Bill. I listened to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), and I must admit that I am not nearly as learned or experienced as him; I bow to his legal analysis. I am a mere doctor, so I look for an evidence base when trying to understand the process. To that end, I thought it would be useful to write to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which I duly did. I received a letter on 28 July 2025 from the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), who I see will kindly respond, and is sat in his place. Much to my surprise and pleasure, a lot of what is in the letter was in the Minister’s speech. This debate allows me to walk through some of the letter and pose the questions that hit me as I looked into this case.

I must admit that when I stepped into this House in 2019, this was not a topic that I knew a huge deal about—I think many Members on both sides would say the same—but it very quickly became a topic that I realised we should look into understanding, especially as it deals with security.

The letter states:

“We had to act now because the base was under threat.”

That implies urgency, but the letter is loose on who was under threat, where and how. There is legal uncertainty but, as we have heard, we do not know which court is involved or why. It goes on to say:

“The courts have already made decisions which undermine our position.”

Courts, plural. We know that the ICJ is involved, but as has been stated, its opinion was non-binding, and there is a carve-out relating to the Commonwealth.

The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), said, after being pushed to speak on the matter multiple times, that the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea was the area of concern, but he will know that back in 2015, under annex VII, the tribunal agreed with the UK that sovereignty could not be determined by UNCLOS. This was a marine protection issue. Britons were trying to protect the area, and Mauritius wanted to open it up to farm it, and we were found against, under that treaty, in that court. This raises an important side issue: what protections are there in the Bill for the environment? They seem scant, or just not there.

The letter goes further, stating that

“in 2021…a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea…ruled that Mauritius’ sovereignty was inferred from ICJ”.

So the Government themselves point that out. The letter goes on to say:

“The UK was not party to this case”.

Well, obviously, it would not be, but that means that we have not had our day in court to explain why we do not think that the judgment should apply. Mauritius’ sovereignty was inferred from that non-binding, political judgment.

The letter goes on:

“If Mauritius were to take us to court again, the UK’s longstanding legal view is that we would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such litigation.”

Well, which court? If this advice is so long-standing, why do we not know about it? How have we got this far, going for year upon year with no agreement, without any urgency? It seems sensible and appropriate to release the advice on this. At the start of that quote, the letter said “If Mauritius”. It states later that it is

“highly likely that further wide-ranging litigation would be brought quickly by Mauritius against the UK.”

What evidence do the Government have to back that up? What is it that they say Mauritius will act so quickly on? We certainly have not seen it, if it was from 2021. The dates 2023 and 2024 have been mentioned, and we are now in 2025. I would be interested to see the Government release the evidence base for their claim about how quickly litigation would come forward, because as they rightly point out, there have been 11 rounds of negotiations, so there has clearly been time to sort things out.

Before someone jumps in and says, “Well, you opened the negotiations”, I would point out that we did that for the Falkland Islands as well. I find it amazing that we have trade unionists who built their whole careers on negotiating suddenly chastising the Conservatives for listening to the other side of a disagreement. That seems bizarre to me, because we want to respect each other and exchange ideas, but not have an agreement. It is rightly pointed out by Conservative Members that the agreement was not there; we did not take it. On the cost of the deal, there is no cost, because we did not have a deal to sign off.

The very next sentence in the letter says:

“This might, for example, include further arbitral proceedings against the UK under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK.”

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

It is not.

[Dr Evans]

It is. It is true about the legally binding aspect within the area that the tribunal covers, but that does not cover sovereignty, as we learned in 2015 when the tribunal sided with the British Government. Here we have the farcical situation of a House of policy and law shining light on one side and another, but never on the truth. This is where my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam is exactly right. If the Government were to come forward and say exactly which court, where and why, they might get more sympathy from Opposition, but we have been through an entire five-hour debate and we still do not have answers to those questions.

Another court that is often cited is the International Telecommunication Union covering spectre, radio and radar. Article 48.1 states

“Member States retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio installations,”

and the Government know that. Even the written answer from the Minister—it has been hinted at before—states:

“Individual countries have the sovereign right to manage and use the radio spectrum, within their borders, the way they wish, subject to not causing interference with other countries. This right is recognised in the Radio Regulations. The Radio Regulations are the international framework for the use of spectrum by radiocommunication services, defined and managed by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Individual countries, not the ITU, make their own sovereign spectrum assignments in accordance with the Radio Regulations. The ITU has no legal authority over these assignments regardless of the country’s civilian or military classification of spectrum. The ITU cannot challenge the UK’s use of civilian or military spectrum.”

It is clear here—the Government know it in their own answers—that the ITU has no role in sovereignty. It all boils down to where one believes British overseas territories stand.

Now we must talk about the cost, which has been much debated. There have been three figures in the debate: £3.4 billion, £10 billion and £34 billion. The £3.4 billion is the net present value using social time preference rate. The £10 billion is inflation adjusted, and the £34 billion is the nominal value by the Government Actuary’s Department. The question is, why use net present value? I put it earlier in the debate that there is no other precedent in the world for NPV being used in sovereignty matters. The Minister at the time asked whether the Conservatives want to do away with using NPV—of course not.

[Luke Pollard]

It is in the Green Book.

[Dr Evans]

Absolutely, the Minister says it is within the Green Book. Absolutely not, because it has a perfect place in domestic use for commercial practicalities, not for international sovereignty issues. No other country has looked, or would look, at this because it does not make sense.

The House of Commons Library said when asked that

“this methodology is regularly used in government accounting, but its main use is for cost-benefit analyses. It is unusual to see it used in this situation like this, where only the cost is being assessed and it is not being compared to any benefit”.

On that basis, and listening to the House of Commons Library, what cost-benefit analysis has actually been done in this case, and would it be put in front of the House so we might be able to see it?

At the end of the day, NPV is highly political because it assumes a discount rate, and what is the discount rate that one should choose? In the details, it talks about 3.5%, but the US will use 3.5% or 7%, which would vastly differentiate the figures. It goes on further, for the social time preference rate is 3.5%, but for 30 years. This deal is for 99 years, so how can the Government respond in a written parliamentary question that this

“represents good value for UK taxpayers”?

On what basis are they comparing that if there is no international comparison? We are talking only about domestic uses and for an accounting point.

As I come to my conclusions, possibly the scariest thing to me—I have tried to highlight it throughout the debate—which does seem to be falling on deaf ears, is article 13. I believe this treaty is legally bomb-proof. It looks sensible, and I am no legal expert as I have attested to, but it seems to stand the test of time. That means when article 13 says explicitly that in 99 years Mauritius can say no and just take control, that is a big worry. We have heard from many Government MPs how it secures the long-term aspirations of this country for a period of 99 years. When I mentioned that, several Government MPs scoffed. But is it not the duty of this House to provide not only for the next generation, but the rest of time for our country, in the best interests of our country? After listening to all the arguments that have been made about how essential the base is, the very fact that Mauritius could pull the base is a very scary prospect. There is, of course, a caveat: the right of first refusal. But if China decides to do a deal with Mauritius at exorbitant cost, we are over a barrel and the British taxpayer must fork out yet again to guarantee our security. Mauritius has been given a golden ticket, and it knows it.

Beyond the sovereignty and cost, my biggest concern is that we are outsourcing decision -making for our children and our children’s children. That is the modus operandi of this Government—we need only look at the borrowing in the Budget to see how they borrow on the backs of future children. Pushing this decision out for 99 years is not security for now; it will help, but it creates a far bigger problem in 100 years’ time. If the Government want to give away our islands, they should be open and transparent about how and why.

The biggest thing is that we have not even had our day in court. That is what most troubles the British public. I think that the British public would be reasonable if a court found against us—they would happily say, “We follow the rule of law”—but the Government will not even try that. They say that there is a risk. As has been said, this has been going on for years, and still we are looking at a treaty to sign it off.

That inevitably poses final questions about what happens with Gibraltar, the Falklands and Cyprus. The Minister is correct to point out that there are differences, but the biggest fundamental problem that the Government have in arguing to the British people and the people of the Falklands is about understanding. If this House cannot understand the legal concepts of the places where we are likely to fight these causes, how can we expect the public to do so? When it comes to delivering comms to the UK public, that is what they need to understand.