Immigration and Asylum Bill

Matt Vickers Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 13th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

This has been an important and thoughtful debate, and I begin by thanking Members from across the House for their contributions.

There have been genuine differences of opinion this evening, but I think there is broad agreement on one point: our immigration system is not working. Immigration is one of the defining issues facing our country. It goes to the security of our borders, the integrity of our laws, the pressure on our public services, and, ultimately, the confidence the British people have in the ability of the Government to keep their promises.

The British people expect an immigration system that is fair to those who play by the rules and firm with those who seek to abuse them. They expect secure borders, swift decisions, effective enforcement and, above all, a Government to deliver. That is the test the Bill must meet.

In many respects, today’s debate brings us full circle. Ministers stood at the Dispatch Box and argued that immigration policy should be about grip and control, not gimmicks and false promises, yet over the past two years, we have seen too many headlines, too many announcements and too many promises, while illegal migration has continued to undermine confidence in our borders.

Let me be clear: I do not believe that anyone in this House wants to see people risking their life crossing the channel in small boats. Those crossings benefit organised criminal gangs, undermine confidence in our immigration system, place enormous pressure on communities, public services and public finances, and all too often end in tragedy. Nobody should accept them as inevitable. The question before us today is therefore a simple one: does the Bill contain the measures necessary to stop illegal migration? That must surely be the ambition.

The Government’s own impact assessment recognises that deterrence is essential, but it also accepts that the deterrent effect of these proposals is too uncertain even to quantify. That uncertainty goes to the heart of the Bill. The fundamental principle should be straightforward: if someone enters the United Kingdom illegally, they should not be able to stay. Everything else flows from that principle. Without it, public confidence is weakened and genuine refugees lose out. Those who come here legally and contribute to our country are let down, and the criminal gangs continue to exploit the gaps in our system.

To be fair to the Home Secretary, there are measures in the Bill that the Opposition welcome. It is right that the Government are seeking to recover more of the costs of asylum support. It is right that Ministers are finally acknowledging that the article 8 framework has frustrated removals. It is right that they recognise shortcomings in the operation of the modern slavery system. It is right that they acknowledge that the current appeals process is too slow, too cumbersome and too vulnerable to abuse. In truth, one of the most striking features of the Bill is that the Government have finally accepted many of the arguments that they have spent the last two years dismissing.

Recognising a problem, though, is not the same as solving it. The Home Secretary and I agree on much of the diagnosis; we disagree on the cure. Time and again, the Bill identifies the right issues but stops short of the reforms needed to address them. The Government propose a new independent immigration appeals authority, yet they cannot tell us with any certainty whether it will speed up removals or simply replace one backlog with another.

The Bill looks to narrow article 8 claims, while simultaneously creating a new, sponsored human rights claim that risks opening another avenue for litigation. It speaks about strengthening deportation powers, yet it leaves unanswered the wider questions about the legal framework that continue to frustrate removals. Despite repeated promises, the Bill contains no comprehensive reforms to settlement, no clear answer on preventing those who arrive illegally from obtaining citizenship, and no comprehensive removals framework capable of delivering the deterrence that Ministers say is necessary.

That is why the Opposition have tabled our reasoned amendment. We believe that the Bill does not yet go far enough to restore public confidence or deliver the outcome that the British people rightly expect. Our alternative is clear: those who enter the country illegally should have no right to stay.

Several Members have spoken about public confidence, and they are right to do so. Public confidence depends on knowing that the rules matter; that those who have no right to remain will be removed; that foreign national offenders can be deported swiftly; that endless legal challenges cannot frustrate the clearly expressed will of Parliament; and that those who come here legally, work hard and contribute are not disadvantaged by a system that appears unable to distinguish between those who respect the rules and those who seek to exploit them.

As has been mentioned, the Home Secretary faces a political challenge from her own Benches. If she wants to come back and deliver real and meaningful reform that will properly secure our borders, and if she needs some support to do that, she can give us a call—[Interruption.] Give me a call.

The British people do not want another cycle of announcements followed by disappointment. They want to know that criminal gangs will no longer profit from human misery; that dangerous channel crossings will end; and that those with no right to remain will not spend years exhausting endless appeals while the taxpayer picks up the bill. They want to know that Britain remains a country that welcomes those who come legally, while maintaining control over who enters and stays. Those are not unreasonable expectations, but the foundations of a fair immigration system.

As the Bill progresses through Committee, the Opposition will scrutinise it carefully. Where measures meaningfully strengthen border security, improve enforcement and restore confidence, we will support them. Where they fall short, we will seek to strengthen them. The Home Secretary has moved some way towards recognising the scale of the challenge facing our immigration system, and I welcome that. The Bill identifies many of the right problems, but it still stops short of the bold reforms needed to solve them. For that reason, we have tabled our reasoned amendment.

The British people deserve an immigration system that is fair to those who follow the rules, uncompromising with those who do not, and capable of restoring control of our borders. That remains the standard by which the Opposition will judge the Bill. I commend our reasoned amendment to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I call my favourite Home Office Minister.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Third sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry]

It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. I am moving amendment 64, to make fairness and efficiency duties of the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority. I should add that in this group I also support amendments 48 and 49, tabled by my Lib Dem colleagues, I oppose amendment 87 tabled by my Conservative colleagues and I support the Lib Dems’ new clause 12.

My amendment would impose on the IIAA a duty to operate fairly and independently and to handle cases quickly and efficiently. The Bill only imposes an obligation on the IIAA to aim to do those things. The amendment also removes the requirement for the IIAA to operate as part of the immigration system.

The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority will be a body that is independent in name; the reality, however, will be much murkier and more ambiguous. The Home Secretary will personally appoint senior figures in the IIAA, including its chair, and a Home Secretary appointee will be responsible for appointing adjudicators who make appeals decisions. The effect of the Bill is to make asylum decision making less independent, less fair and less expert. It brings asylum appeals under greater political control, putting at risk people’s basic human right not to be persecuted for who they are.

The major driver of the appeals backlog is the poor quality of Home Office asylum decisions, not tribunal judges. The Refugee Council has shown that about two thirds of Home Office asylum decisions that are challenged are overturned, either by the tribunals or by the Home Office itself. My preference, therefore, is for the Government to scrap all of part 1 of the Bill and get back to the day job of making good asylum decisions. If part 1 does go ahead, however—I will debate later whether that should happen—it should contain safeguards for basic standards of independence and fairness.

The amendment deals with two ways in which the Bill tries unfairly to align the IIAA with the Home Office’s policy priorities, rather than the requirements of justice and fairness. First, clause 1(5) states only that

“the IIAA must…aim to be accessible, fair and independent”—

not that it must be independent, fair and accessible in practice, but merely that it must aim to be so. By contrast, under existing rules for tribunals, there is a duty, an overriding objective on tribunals, to deal with cases fairly and justly. That is not an aim, but a requirement. As such, subsection (5) is a watering down, a weakening and an undermining of the independence of asylum appeals. My amendment would make it a legal duty for the IIAA to be independent, fair and accessible, as it is for tribunals, and not merely an aim.

Secondly, the attempt to draw asylum appeals into the Home Office’s sphere of influence is seen even more clearly in the fact that subsection (5) requires the IIAA to prioritise

“in particular…the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration…system.”

That, I think, is an unambiguous push to align the IIAA not with the requirements of justice and fairness, but with Home Office policy priorities. My amendment would therefore remove any risk that the IIAA will be pressured into aligning with the Home Office’s immigration policy priorities, and let the IIAA be what it is meant to be: a quasi-judicial body for deciding appeals fairly and independently.

Ultimately, without my amendment, the IIAA will be a body with a conflict of interest at its heart: a requirement to aim to be independent and fair, but also a priority to view itself as part of immigration control. If the Government are sincere about creating a body that can deal with cases independently and fairly, without interference from the Home Office, the IIAA’s duty to operate independently and fairly should be more than an aim; it should be a requirement, just as it is for tribunals. Moreover, there should be no pressure on the IIAA to align with the Home Office’s political vision of immigration control, whoever is in charge of the Home Office. The amendment would create that safety against the priorities of future Governments, as well as this one, being able to put political pressure on the IIAA. The amendment would put all that beyond doubt. It gives the IIAA the best chance of being truly independent and fair. I will seek a Division on this amendment.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I will speak to Opposition amendment 87 and to two other amendments in the group.

As this is the Committee’s first debate on part 1 of the Bill, let me set out the test that the Opposition will apply to it. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary told the House that more than 150,000 people are waiting for an appeal decision and the average wait is well over a year. Every one of those months is a month in which someone whose claim may well fail remains in this country, very often at the taxpayer’s expense. The public have been promised for years that that would be fixed, and we need to see it happen now. Our test for every clause in this part is a simple one: will appeals be decided faster, and will those who lose be removed?

Clause 1(5) is where the Bill tells the new authority what it is for: the authority must aim to be accessible, fair and independent; it must aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently; and it must have regard to the public interest. Amendment 48, in the name of the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, would remove the words “aim to” from the first paragraph only, so that the authority would be under a firm duty to be “accessible, fair and independent”. I understand the instinct, but that hardens the wrong limb of the measure. If any duty in this subsection needs to be firmer, it is the duty to handle cases “quickly and efficiently”. That is the duty that the authority is being created to discharge, and it is the one that the public will judge it on.

Amendment 64 would remove “aim to” from both limbs, subsection (5)(a) and (b), but it would also remove the public interest duty in paragraph (c) to which I now turn. Amendments 49 and 64 in its second paragraph would go further than amendment 48. They would remove the duty to have regard to the public interest altogether. I respect the concern for independence that lies behind amendments 49 and 64, but I cannot agree. It would be remarkable for Parliament to tell the body that decides who may stay in this country that it need have no regard to the public interest or to public confidence in the system it is part of. An immigration system that does not have the confidence of the British public is a system that will not work.

Amendment 87 takes the opposite approach. It strengthens the public interest duty instead of removing it. In the Bill as drafted, the authority must merely “have regard to” the public interest, and the only content that the Bill gives to that interest is the fact that the authority is part of the immigration and asylum system. That tells an adjudicator nothing. The amendment states what the public interest is:

“the effective enforcement of immigration control, including the prompt removal from the United Kingdom of persons who have no right to remain.”

It would require the authority to give effect to that interest, not simply to have regard to it. The difference between “have regard to” and “give effect to” is not a lawyer’s nicety. A duty to have regard to something can be satisfied by thinking about it and then setting it aside; a duty to give effect to something cannot.

Clause 1(5) reaches well beyond the final decision in each case: it governs the authority in the “exercise of its functions”, which means how it lists cases, handles requests to adjourn and manages its caseload. Under clause 4(5), the Procedure Rules Board must also have regard to those objectives when it writes the rules. Amendment 87 would therefore shape every deadline, every adjournment rule and every listing decision the authority makes. It would put the effective enforcement of immigration control into the DNA of the institution from the start.

The Committee heard in evidence why that matters. Professor Ekins of Oxford University told us that one of the potential advantages of the new authority is that it could make

“the public interest in the enforcement of migration law a more pressing consideration.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 22.]

Amendment 87 would make sure that that advantage is actually realised, rather than left to chance. This is not new ground for Parliament. Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 already states that

“the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.”

The Minister may say that amendment 87 would compromise independence, but it would not. Clause 1(4) will still require the authority to

“exercise its primary function with a view to ensuring that justice is done.”

Clause 1(6) will still require every Minister to uphold the IIAA’s independence. Each case will still be decided on its evidence and on the law. What changes is that the institution is told plainly what it exists to achieve. We are clear that the public interest includes the swift removal of those who have no right to be in the country. That is one of the public’s most pressing concerns, and the new authority should be in no doubt that it is there to serve it.

New clause 12 asks for a report on the cost, timetable and capacity of the authority before part 1 can be commenced. Whatever view the Committee takes of a statutory lock on commencement, the questions are fair, and I will put them directly: what is the full cost of setting up and running the authority over its first five years, and how does that compare with the tribunal it replaces? How many adjudicators will be in post on the first day, and how many appeals will they decide each year? On what date does the Minister expect the authority to hear its first appeal?

We will press amendment 87 to a Division when it is reached.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I thank all Members for the constructive debate we have had on the amendments to clause 1 of this Bill, particularly the hon. Members for Brighton Pavilion and for Stockton West, and the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, who tabled amendment 87.

I would like to say up front that it is very clear that consent for our asylum system in the public domain is fraying. The important part of this Bill is to seek to restore control, restore fairness and rebuild the public’s confidence. We have made huge progress on initial decision making; we have cut the backlog in initial decisions by 72% from the 2023 peak. However, as we have done so, the appeals backlog has grown substantially, now with waiting times of more than two years. Some appeals are absolutely genuine, and they of course must be heard fairly. However, it is clear that some claimants are lodging appeals to frustrate their legitimate removal from this country.

As of June 2026, the open caseload in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber was about 156,000. The average time taken to clear appeals across all categories is currently at 65 weeks: 72 weeks for asylum protection, 74 weeks for human rights and 48 weeks for European economic area free movement. The Government have substantially increased both capacity and productivity in the FTT IAC, but demand has risen considerably faster. Receipts increased from around 58,000 in 2023-24 to almost 118,000 in 2025-26, while the outstanding caseload rose from around 50,000 to more than 150,000. We have done our best to try to support the workforce within that existing system. We increased the judicial workforce by 21% to 311 judges, including 61 new fee-paid judges and 25 salaried judges who began sitting between January and March this year, and we are continuing further recruitment.

The structural constraint is just how quickly judicial capacity can scale. Judicial recruitment draws on a relatively limited pool of experienced lawyers, and it currently takes around 12 to 18 months from launching an exercise to a judge being able to sit, so that is not feasible. The IIAA therefore broadens the recruitment pool, providing greater flexibility and allowing us to increase capacity while maintaining robust safeguards around training, legal support, quality assurance and professional standards.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I appreciate that, and I have laid out the possible alternative remedies, but judicial review is an essential backstop. I do not see why the Government are trying to remove it. This is constitutionally exceptional and I want the Minister to explain why it is okay.

This measure will not only undermine the rule of law; it will inevitably provoke litigation in the courts about how this ouster clause should be interpreted and effected. It is concerning that the Government want the IIAA, which is a novel—experimental, even—non-expert body institutionally close to the Home Office, making life or death appeal decisions, to be made completely immune from judicial review at the outset. It demonstrates the Government’s continuing and concerning prioritisation of speed over the rule of law and justice, which we have seen in other Bills. In those circumstances, my amendment is completely necessary. It would ensure that judicial review remained available in those cases where the High Court believed it was necessary. I hope that all Members will support it.

[Matt Vickers]

I want to speak about amendments 85 and 65. Clause 1(8) provides that a decision of the authority may be questioned in legal proceedings in only two ways: through the authority’s own review power under clause 6, or through an appeal to the upper tribunal under clause 7. Amendment 85 would remove the latter, ending the onward appeal to the upper tribunal.

One of the public’s deepest frustrations with the immigration system is appeal after appeal after appeal. The Home Secretary herself described it on Second Reading. She told the House about a convicted rapist whom it took more than four years to remove from this country after he had served his sentence because of a succession of late claims and legal challenges. We agree with her diagnosis, but we do not understand why the Bill preserves the structure that makes that possible.

Let us consider the journey this Bill still allows. A claim is refused by the Home Office, so the person appeals to the authority and loses. They can then ask the authority to review its decision or for permission to appeal. If that is refused, they can ask the upper tribunal. If permission is granted, there is a hearing, and if that succeeds, the case may be sent to be decided all over again. Each step is measured in months and, at every one, the person remains here—usually at public expense. That expense is considerable—the National Audit Office estimates that the immigration and asylum chamber cost around £79.5 million to run in 2024-25, and that is before the cost of legal aid.

[Siân Berry]

I appreciate the hon. Member’s laying out the process, but can he honestly say that, if he were subjected to any area of justice, he would accept those arguments and the process for taking away his right to appeal twice, which the amendment would effect? Does he believe that that genuinely represents justice without fear or favour?

[Matt Vickers]

The hon. Member for North Northumberland made a valid point—this is an appeals process. The case has been considered once but can go to appeal for reconsideration and even that decision can be reviewed again—that is a lengthy process. The entire objective of this Bill is to speed up the process so that it is fair to the taxpayers, as well as to those subject to it. Removing a whole tier of appeal would reduce the burden on the taxpayer, as would other amendments the Opposition have tabled. The time limits in clause 8 will not help, because they bind the authority rather than the upper tribunal. The Bill does not shorten the queue; it moves part of it upstairs.

The Government’s case for part 1 is that the new authority will make robust and defensible decisions with trained adjudicators, a chief appeals officer overseeing quality, and a professional standards officer setting standards. If that is right, its decision should be capable of being final. Where a genuine error is made, clause 6 allows it to be corrected and that review should be carried out by a legally qualified senior adjudicator. That is a fair hearing—a check for error and then an end.

Let me be clear about what amendment 85 would leave in place, because the Minister will say it removes any check on the authority. It does not. Every appellant would still have a full hearing before the authority on the facts and the law. Every decision could still be reviewed for an error of law under clause 6. Government amendment 36 will mean that that review is confined to exactly the kind of point the upper tribunal would consider. Amendment 85 would remove the second external tier, and its two separate applications for permission—the listing queue and the power to send a case back to the start. The Government accept that the onward appeal is only on a point of law and not a rehearing. The question is simply who checks the law and how long it takes. Our answer is a legally qualified senior adjudicator, with the authority, and quickly.

There is a further problem with subsection (8) as drafted. Professor Ekins told the Committee that this is not an effective ouster clause, that the courts would read it narrowly and that the Committee should not rest content with it. He pointed to the more precise model that Parliament used in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. If the Government agree that the authority’s decisions should be final, they should draft subsection (8) so that it works, and we would welcome their help in doing so on Report.

Amendment 65, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would take the Bill in the opposite direction. It would delete subsection (8) altogether and reopen the possibility of judicially reviewing every decision the authority makes, adding a third route of challenge to the two already in the Bill. I understand the hon. Lady’s concern for safeguards, but they are already there. Parliament legislated in 2022 to end judicial review of the upper tribunal’s refusals of permission, precisely because that route had become a means of delay. Clause 7(3) rightly carries that rule across. Amendment 65 would reopen at the first tier what Parliament closed at the second. Our position is clear; enough is enough. Years of delay and expense must come to an end, and the legal merry-go-round has to stop. We will seek to divide the Committee on amendment 85 and we will oppose clause 7.

[Anna Turley]

Amendments 65 and 85 concern the routes through which decisions of the authority may be challenged. I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion and the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who tabled the amendments.

Amendment 65 would allow individuals to bring judicial review proceedings against the decisions made by the authority. As we have heard, the Bill already provides clear routes for correcting errors and for onward appeals. The authority can review its own decisions under clause 6 and decisions can be appealed to the upper tribunal on a point of law under clause 7 where permission is granted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I would like to speak to clause 1 in more detail. As we have discussed, clause 1 will establish the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority as a body corporate: a public body that is independent of Government. It is the first step in the Bill towards overhauling the current immigration and asylum appeals system, which has seen unacceptable caseloads and waiting times for a determination to be reached. The clause details the primary function of the authority, which will be to determine immigration and asylum appeals as well as applications for immigration bail. It will give the IIAA the authority to determine the same case types determined by judges in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber today.

Access to justice is a fundamental common-law principle and a core requirement of the rule of law. Clause 1 will place a statutory duty on the IIAA to uphold that through a statutory objective to be accessible, fair and independent. As set out in the clause, the authority must also aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and have regard to the public interest in the performance of its functions. The clause makes robustly clear that Ministers must uphold the independence of the authority and not influence decisions through any special access to its adjudicators. The clause also states that a decision of the authority in relation to its primary function may be challenged in legal proceedings only in line with the review and appeal framework. Such challenges will be directed to the authority’s review process and onward appeal route to the upper tribunal.

Schedule 1 makes a number of consequential amendments needed to transfer specified immigration and asylum appeal and immigration bail functions from the first-tier tribunal to the authority. Government amendments 22 and 24 make further consequential amendments to the schedule, which I will be detailing in due course. The schedule updates the relevant legislation so that references to the first-tier tribunal, the tribunal and tribunal procedure rules are replaced, where appropriate, with references to the IIAA and its procedure rules. Those amendments apply across the categories of cases that will form the IIAA’s primary function, as set out in clause 1. They are necessary and largely technical amendments, required so that the wider legislative framework operates coherently once the authority begins determining those cases. I commend Government amendments 22 and 24, clause 1 and schedule 1 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Government amendments 22, 23 and 24 make further consequential changes to schedule 1 and appear to be technical. We do not oppose them. Is the Minister confident that the list is now complete? On clause 1 itself, the Opposition and the British public have one main question: how will this new appeals body get decisions made more quickly? What will the authority be able to do that the existing tribunal cannot? What reduction in waiting times do Ministers expect it to deliver, and by when?

Let me put the question plainly. The Government are taking immigration appeals away from the first-tier tribunal and giving them to a new body, but let us look at what stays the same: the same appeals brought by the same people against the same Home Office decisions, with a right of appeal to the same upper tribunal. Unless something fundamental changes in how quickly cases are decided and in how many people are removed at the end of them, this is rearranging the deckchairs. A new name on the door and a new chief executive will not clear a single case. The public will rightly ask what all that upheaval is for.

The Committee has been given very little to go on, and it has not been told what the Government heard before they wrote the Bill. In March, the Home Office opened a call for evidence on how the body should be designed, covering the recruitment and training of adjudicators, timeframes and oversight. It closed on 6 May. The Home Office said the responses would “inform the legislation”. The Bill was introduced seven weeks later and, so far as I can find, no response to that call for evidence has been published, then or since. Why not? What did the respondents say? Where did the Government disagree with them, and why? Will the Minister commit to publishing the response before Report stage?

Next, the backlog. More than 150,000 people are waiting for an appeal. Do those cases move to the new authority? Do they stay with the first-tier tribunal until they are finished? The authority is to take over gradually, so both systems will be running side by side for some time. How will the Government stop that creating more delay, or cases being lost between the two? The Government will be aware, from the difficulties of folding NHS England back into the Department of Health and Social Care, how hard it is to move functions, staff and buildings from one body to another while keeping a service running. What lessons have been learned, and when will any of this actually happen? The Bill does not say.

Part 1 comes into force when Ministers decide. The authority opens its doors when Ministers decide. Under clause 15, the first-tier tribunal carries on hearing immigration appeals for as long as Ministers decide. The Committee is being asked to approve the replacement of the tribunal without being told when it will be replaced. I ask the Minister for three dates. When will the first case be transferred to the authority? When will the last? On what date will the first-tier tribunal hear its final immigration appeal? If the Government do not know, they should say so.

Turning to the breadth of what the authority will decide, subsection (2) goes well beyond asylum. The authority will decide applications for immigration bail, appeals against deprivation of British citizenship and appeals under the EEA citizens’ rights regulations. Those are serious decisions about liberty and nationality. Under clause 2, many of them could be taken by adjudicators with no legal qualification. Will deprivation of citizenship appeals and deportation appeals brought by foreign criminals be reserved for senior adjudicators? Also, how will clause 1(8) operate where the complaint is about a procedural decision taken during a case, rather than about the final outcome?

Finally, on the practicalities, when will the authority start hearing cases? How many cases will it handle in its first year? Are the staff and money in place? Will the Minister publish the staffing, funding and transition plans, including the arrangements for appeals that are already listed for hearing?

The Opposition’s own borders plan would go further than the Bill. It would abolish the immigration tribunal altogether, with decisions instead being made in the Home Office through a quick, internal appeal. However, whichever model is chosen, the test is the same: decisions made quickly, and decisions acted on.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope I have answered the questions that were raised. For the reasons I have set out, I ask hon. Members to withdraw amendments 66 and 67.

[Matt Vickers]

I will deal first with the amendments and then with the clause. Amendment 66, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would require every member of the authority, from the chair to each adjudicator, to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission. I understand that that is offered as a guarantee of independence; in practice, it could rebuild the very recruitment pipeline that the Government say they are trying to escape. The case made for part 1 is that reliance on judicial availability has left the system without the capacity or the flexibility to meet demand. Routing every appointment through the commission would import that constraint on to the new body on its first day. We cannot support that.

Amendment 67 would require every adjudicator to be legally qualified. It raises an important question, and the Opposition have our own concerns about qualification, which I will come to. What matters is that every adjudicator is properly equipped to make sound decisions quickly and that the authority can recruit enough of them to make a real difference.

Government amendments 25 to 27 provide that where a professional standards officer is appointed on the strength of experience rather than formal qualifications, it will be the chair and not the chief executive who judges whether that experience is sufficient. That seems sensible, since the officer who sets standards for adjudicators should not owe their appointment to the executive they oversee. I would be grateful if the Minister set out the rationale in a little more detail.

Clause 2 states that the Home Secretary is to appoint the chair, the professional standards officer, the first chief executive and the chief appeals officer. After that, the chair will appoint the two chief officers, and the chief executive will appoint the adjudicators who hear cases.

On qualifications, the Bill sets out a test for senior adjudicators: they must have spent two years in practice as a legal professional or have law-related experience that the chief executive considers equivalent. On executive adjudicators, the Bill is silent; clause 3(2) says only that adjudicators must receive “adequate training”. The Committee would benefit from knowing more of what the Government have in mind. What standard will an executive adjudicator be expected to meet before deciding a case, and how will it be tested? Will it be set out in the standards the professional standards officer must publish under clause 3(6), so that Parliament and the public can see it? That matters for speed as much as for fairness. Whoever is recruited, training and assessment must be up to the job. A poor first decision is one that is challenged, set aside and heard again, and every such case is potentially another year in which someone with no right to be here remains.

I have several further questions for the Minister. What criteria will the chief executive use to decide whether law-related experience is equivalent to legal practice? How many adjudicators will be recruited at the outset, and will experienced tribunal judges be encouraged to apply? Which categories of case will be reserved to senior adjudicators, and will the time it takes to recruit and train this new workforce add to the backlog in the meantime? Finally, when will the first appointments be made? Can the recruitment process begin before Royal Assent?

[Anna Turley]

The shadow Minister mentioned the Bill’s use of the phrase “adequate training and support”. In answering his question on that, as well as some of the other questions he asked that were more practical, it is really important for me to specify that it is not for the Home Office to decide that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the IIAA adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain their independence from the executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing the quality of decisions and developing a quality assurance mechanism. They will be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive. It is really important that I confirm to the Committee that the IIAA is independent. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development will be required for the IIAA adjudicators, who will, in essence, be making decisions on appeals to which the Home Office is a party.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixth sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

In a country that has a national health service—a western democracy that delivers healthcare very well compared with the rest of the world—we are already grappling with those challenges. I ask the Minister to set out how on earth a mental illness assessment of someone living overseas will be made. According to her own Bill, someone need not even be a core family member of a sponsor living in the UK to try to get here under the right to family life. Her provision is supposed to make it harder to come here, but it looks to me as if it makes it easier.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.

Let us be clear about what clause 18 is actually for. The phrase “family life” has been stretched for years, and now covers almost anything: adult siblings, distant relatives and relationships that seem to spring up the week a removal notice lands on the doormat. The Government say that clause 18 will bring that to an end, and that family life will mean what most people think it means: someone’s husband or wife, partner or children. That is what the public think family life means, and it is what Parliament should say it means.

The trouble is the drafting. Clause 18 sets out a clear definition and then, in three separate places, adds a single word that undoes it. As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East rightly set out, that word is “normally”. Proposed new section 117AA says that family life

“is normally limited to their core cohabiting family.”

A parent who does not live with their children does not “normally” have family life with them. One adult does not “normally” have family life with other adult relatives, such as brothers and sisters, unless there is real dependency.

Every immigration lawyer in the country will read the word “normally” the same way. If family life is only “normally” limited, their job is to show that their client is not normal. Every case becomes the exception. We have seen that before: a clear rule, a soft word and 10 years of litigation about what the soft word means. It is not as if the clause lacks a safety valve. Proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) provides for adults with a genuine

“additional element of dependency (beyond normal emotional ties)”.

The Court of Appeal set out that test in Kugathas v. Secretary of State for the Home Department more than 20 years ago, and it is where genuinely exceptional cases belong. “Normally” does not add fairness; it adds a second door.

[David Smith]

I have a fundamental question. The hon. Gentleman is outlining the word “normally”; if, to his estimation, all asylum lawyers or whoever is involved in the process would look at their individual case and say, “That’s not normal,” surely none of it would be exceptional.

[Matt Vickers]

We are trying to define something, and I think it is on us to define it. Adding “normally”—inviting them to look for the exception—is very unhelpful, particularly when proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) actually sets out the exception and gives that bandwidth for people to find exceptional cases. To write “normally” beside all these properties is to open a door, and would mean that we fail to do what we are aiming to do. That is the objective of the Bill. Amendments 99, 101 and 102 would take that word out. If the Government believe that their definition is right, let us say what it means.

Amendment 98 tackles the same problem from another angle. Under the clause, a court deciding whether article 8 was engaged must “have regard to” proposed new section 117AA, but having regard to something is not the same as following it. The court can have regard to the definition, nod politely and decide a case on a different basis altogether. Amendment 98 says that the court

“must determine that question in accordance with section 117AA.”

If Parliament is going to define family life, the court should apply that definition, not merely consider it.

Amendment 100 asks a simple question: what is a partner? The clause does not say. The immigration rules have required unmarried couples to have lived together in a relationship akin to marriage for at least two years. Amendment 100 would put that test into statute so that a relationship formed a few weeks before a removal date could not be used to frustrate it. It is good enough for the rules; it is good enough for the Bill.

Moving on to amendment 103, in proposed new section 117AA, subsection (5) says that financial dependency, illness short of needing constant care, emotional reliance or worry about relatives in a warzone do not, on their own, create family life between adults. Fair enough, but subsection (6) then says that nothing in subsection (5) stops a court considering every one of those factors at the public interest stage. Can the Minister explain what subsection (5) achieves if subsection (6) allows the very same factors to tip the balance a few paragraphs later?

I welcome Government amendment 45. It asks decision makers to look at whether contact between a parent and child has only recently been established or re-established. That goes to a real problem: relationships that come to life only when removal is on the cards. By tabling it, the Government make our point for us. If it is right to be sceptical of a parental relationship that appears just in time, it is right to be sceptical of a partnership that does the same. That is all amendment 100 asks. Clause 18 is a good idea let down by its drafting. The Government have written a definition and then handed every lawyer in the land the words to argue their way around it. Our amendment would make that definition stick.

If the Minister cannot accept our amendments, I hope that the Government will reflect before Report. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank hon. Members for their contributions this afternoon. It has been fascinating to have one side saying that we are not going far enough and the other that we are going too far. I hope that means that we are getting the right balance between what the British people wish to see and allowing for the fundamental human rights we all benefit from.

I hope the Chair will indulge me for a moment because I would like to directly address the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It was unfair and, frankly, quite insulting to suggest that we introduced the Bill to chase rhetoric. I feel very passionately on behalf of my constituents about the importance of the Bill. I know that the hon. Lady and I represent very different constituencies, but she says that there is universal support for refugees. I am sure that she, like me, is watching with horror the masked-up thugs on the streets trying to attack asylum seekers and chasing them out of their accommodation, but when I knock on doors in my constituency, people constantly raise the unfairness of people who seek to exploit our systems, processes and commitment to values like universal human rights, because they can see that those people are not genuine and that they are exploiting our generosity. While we want to fulfil those commitments, it is really important to me that the system has integrity, and that is what the Bill is about.

--- Later in debate ---

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked if there is ever overinterpretation that could limit us to codified boundaries, so it might be helpful for the Committee to consider some examples of why we have to preserve the flexibility in clause 18. We have said that family life is “normally” confined to the core cohabiting family, because “normally” allows space for a separated parent who plays a very active, supportive role in their child’s life, for example. I think that most Members would agree that, even if they do not live in the family home, separated parents can still be loving and engaged parents who should be considered part of that family. Similarly, where an adult has a serious disability that means they cannot live without the care and support of their family, that is rightly factored into the assessment of whether family life exists for article 8.

[Matt Vickers]

We are talking about the use of the term “normally”, but would the examples the Minister listed not fall into subsection (4)(b) anyway, meaning that the word “normally” is not required to help them get across the line?

[Anna Turley]

I am afraid that I disagree. I remind the Committee that, just because family life is established, it does not mean that an individual will automatically be able to remain in or enter the UK. Instead, all cases where family life is found to exist will also be considered at the second stage test, where the courts will have to consider whether it is in the public interest to refuse leave to remain or enter.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Seventh sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison.

The clause addresses a basic question: when someone asks to stay in this country, what does the public interest expect of them? The Government’s answer is one that I suspect most of our constituents would recognise: that the person pays their way, does not rely on the state to put a roof over their head, does not commit crimes, co-operates with the authorities and is of good character. Those are reasonable expectations and we welcome much of the clause.

The clause’s strength, however, comes down to a handful of words. Proposed new subsection 117B(4) of the 2002 Act says:

“No weight should be given to a private or family life”

that is built up while someone is here unlawfully, on leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions. Think about who that covers—someone who came here illegally, lied to get a visa or broke the conditions on which this country let them in. When the time comes to remove them, that person asks a court to weigh a life built up in that time against their removal.

We agree with the Government that weight should not be given. However, “should” is the language of advice; “must” is the language of law. The Government have already moved from “little weight” to “no weight”, and I welcome that—amendment 105 simply finishes the job. If the Government mean that no weight must be given, let the statute say, “No weight must be given”. In this area of law, a door left ajar is an invitation.

Moreover, the no weight rule applies only where someone is in serious breach of their conditions. What is serious? Is it working beyond the hours that their visa allows? Is it claiming benefits that they are not entitled to? Is it overstaying their visa by a month? The Bill does not say, so a tribunal will decide case by case, which will bring us back to the very weighing exercise that the Government say they want to end. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee what the Home Office understands a “serious breach” to mean, and whether it will be defined in guidance.

Amendment 104 deals with good character. Proposed new subsection 117B(3A) says it is in the public interest that people seeking to stay here are of good character, but clause 19 does not say what good character means. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire that there is already a well-established test in the good character requirement for British citizenship set out in Home Office guidance. Amendment 104 says that the court should apply that test. It would be strange if the bar to stay in this country were lower than the bar to become a citizen of it, and stranger still for every tribunal to invent its own version from scratch.

The clause asks the right questions. Our amendments ensure that the answers carry the force of the law. The Government have chosen “no weight” over “little weight”, and that is welcome; let them finish the job by replacing “should” with “must” and telling us what they mean by “good character” and “serious breach”. I commend our amendments to the Committee.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Dr Murrison. I thank all hon. Members for their contributions to the debate on the clause and amendments in this grouping.

Before moving on to the amendments, I will give some background on what the clause will do. The balance between an individual’s family rights and the public interest in maintaining an effective and controlled immigration system has shifted, and it needs to be reset. Without greater clarity from Parliament on how that balance should be struck, the domestic interpretation of article 8 has expanded beyond what our international obligations require, resulting in inconsistent decision making and high volumes of article 8 grants to people who cannot meet the rules to come or to stay in the UK.

More than half of those who stayed in the UK for family reasons last year did not meet our criteria to be able to stay here, instead relying on their article 8 rights. That undermines public confidence in the immigration system and the rules-based international order. It also comes at a significant cost to the UK taxpayer. As has already been mentioned, the average net lifetime fiscal cost for each first-time grant is £141,000, equating to approximately £4.9 billion for those granted on the basis of article 8 in 2025 alone.

Colleagues have asked about the evidence base behind those figures, so I will give a bit more information about it. We undertook a deep dive cohort analysis to examine a representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications, in order to support the policy development of these measures in the Bill. Further details are in the impact assessment. I am afraid that the unpublished internal sample that was referred to will not be made available due to the personal data sensitivities involved, but we will obviously keep under review any further analysis that we would be keen to share with the Committee throughout the course of the Bill, for example other statistics that have been mentioned.

This trend has been driven by high volumes of people who have arrived illegally or overstayed in the UK, at 71% of first-time grants, or by people who are unemployed and are making a minimal economic contribution—76% of first-time grants. It is clear that the system is not functioning fairly and effectively. That is why the British public feel exasperated that such exemptions are being abused to enable people to circumvent the system.

Clause 19 will help to restore a fairer balance between an individual’s right to family life and the public interest in maintaining an effective and controlled immigration system. It will provide a clearer statutory framework that places greater emphasis on compliance and contribution, resulting in more consistent and robust outcomes. These reforms will realign UK legislation with Strasbourg, ensuring that our domestic approach to article 8 is within and, crucially, not beyond our international obligations, as it is now.

--- Later in debate ---

In terms of exceptional circumstances in the Bill, there is an argument, and one that I would put forward, for saying yes if the offence is of a less serious nature, but there must come a threshold where the offence is so serious that even those exceptions cannot apply. Four years in prison is a pretty serious crime, so that is obviously, objectively and consistently a good place to set the threshold. If the Government do not agree with amendment 107, I implore them, in reply to what I and my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire have said, and as part of the process of putting the Bill through Parliament, to come up with their alternative threshold for disapplying these exceptional circumstances where the crimes are so serious or of such an unpleasant nature that there should not be an exception under these clauses.

[Matt Vickers]

Let us be absolutely clear about what this group of amendment is about: it is about whether a foreign national who comes to this country and commits a serious crime found to be worthy of a long sentence gets to stay here. The British public have a simple answer to that question, and so do we: they should go. The principle at stake is straightforward: if someone is a guest in this country and they rape, rob, deal drugs or abuse a child, they have forfeited the right to remain here—not after years of appeals or after a tribunal has weighed their family life against the lives of others that they have wrecked. They should go.

On Second Reading, the Government told the House that clause 20 would make it easier to remove foreign criminals and that deportation should go ahead outside of a limited number of truly exceptional circumstances. The trouble is that the clause does not match them; for the most serious offences, it does the opposite. Behind every one of these cases is a victim: a woman who lies awake wondering whether the man who attacked her is still living a few streets away, or a family who were told that justice had been done, only to learn that the offender is now fighting to stay.

My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire explained how the law works today. Since 2014, someone sentenced to four years or more for rape, armed robbery or dealing drugs on our streets has been unable to hide behind their family or how long they have lived here. Those exceptions are simply not enough; someone has to show very compelling circumstances over and above them. That is a high bar, and it is meant to be. The worse the crime, the narrower the door.

Clause 20 takes that line away. The four-year threshold is gone. Someone serving 10, 15 or 20 years can now walk straight into the argument that deporting them would be unduly harsh on their family. Today that route is closed to them, but under this Bill, it is opened. Let us think about what that means. The victim found the courage to give evidence, the jury convicted, the judge handed down a long sentence and then, at the end of all that, the defender gets to say that deportation would be too hard on them.

The Minister will tell us not to worry, because subsection (2) of proposed new section 117C says that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest. That goes to one of the oldest questions in lawmaking: do you legislate with a rule or with a standard? A rule says four years, and that settles it; a standard says to weigh everything up and decide case by case. Rules give certainty; standards give discretion. In this area, discretion has been a gift to lawyers and a source of deep frustration to the public.

That is precisely why Parliament chose a rule in 2014. The whole purpose was to narrow the discretion of the courts because the balance they were striking was one the public simply did not recognise. Clause 20 hands the scales back, and we all know where weighing exercises end up: in front of a tribunal, then an appeal, then another appeal. Can the Minister point to a single line in proposed new section 117C that stops someone sentenced to four years or more relying on the “unduly harsh” exception? I have read it several times and I cannot find one.

Between 2015 and 2022, around 420 foreign offenders a year won human rights appeals against their removal. That is more than one every single day, and that is with the four-year rule still in place. The Home Office does not even publish how many had sentences of four or more years. If the Government are so confident that the clause is tougher, let them publish the numbers. Amendment 107 would put the four-year rule back, and amendment 111 would keep the existing rules on how a sentence is counted, so that the system works.

Then there is amendment 109: it is only a few words, but they tell us everything. Today, a serious offender must show very compelling circumstances “over and above” the exceptions. Clause 20 changes that to circumstances “at least as strong”. “Over and above” means more; “at least as strong” means the same. That is not tightening the test but loosening it. When Parliament changes the wording of a test, the courts are entitled to presume that it meant to change the meaning, so a tribunal reading “at least as strong” will quite properly conclude that this House intended a lower bar. We would be legislating for exactly the outcome the Government say they want to avoid. Parliament chose those words in 2014, and the courts have applied them ever since, so why change them? Did the Home Office mean to lower the bar, or did nobody notice? Neither answer should give this Committee much comfort. Amendment 109 would put the original words back.

Amendment 108 goes further than the current law; we make no apology for that. Sentence length is a rough guide to how dangerous someone is, but it is not the whole story. Guilty pleas get discounts, and the facts of individual cases mean that some very dangerous people get less than four years. Amendment 108 says that, for the worst offences, the type of crime settles it. If someone is convicted of a specified violent, sexual or terrorist offence or a sexual offence against a child, long residence and family routes are off the table, whatever the sentence. Let me put that plainly: a foreign national who has sexually abused a child should not be able to stand in a tribunal and argue that deporting them would be unduly harsh on their family. What about the harshness inflicted on the child?

[Melanie Onn]

I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s points, but that is not what the Bill provides for; it certainly does not allow for what he suggests. We have had some silly games with semantics. Does he agree that this is a broad catch-all of very serious crimes, including those he is talking about?

[Matt Vickers]

We are saying that the Bill puts in place choices based on how long someone has been sentenced. We are saying that if someone is sentenced to more than four years, they should not be eligible. If someone commits specific offences, such as sexual offences against a child, they should not be able to rely on the exceptions. That is exactly where we are at.

[Ben Goldsborough]

Would the hon. Gentleman’s amendment not have the unintended consequence of creating a ranking system? Many of my constituents are concerned about the extremely high-level crimes that the Opposition rightly note, but an individual may commit a series of low-level crimes. This ranking proposal may have the unintended consequence of that not being considered and the individual getting let off the hook.

[Matt Vickers]

The other provisions in the Bill make the case that people can be sent down, depending on the harshness of the sentence. We are saying that if it is over four years, or if someone commits a sexual act against a child or a terrorist act, there will be no ifs or buts, and those exceptions will not apply. There will still be space under the other provisions of the Bill to take action.

An attempt to deport a Sri Lankan paedophile convicted of assaulting three teenage boys was delayed over claims that it would breach his human rights. People look at such cases and wonder whose side the system is on. On Second Reading, the Government cited the case of grooming gang leader Shabir Ahmed. If they accept the principle there, they should accept it here.

Last year, I tabled a new clause to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill to stop the Human Rights Act 1998 being used to frustrate deportations. The Government voted it down, 14 votes to two. Today, we are asking for far less: simply that they do not make the current law weaker.

The Government say they want deportation to be the rule. Our amendments would make it the rule. An immigration system must rest on public consent. Every time a serious offender stays because the law gave them one more argument, that consent wears thinner. Lose it, and the system loses legitimacy. Every member of the Committee has constituents who have lost faith that the system is on their side. They are not asking for a finely balanced weighing exercise; they are asking for their safety and that of their children to come first. This group of amendments does exactly that, and I commend them to the Committee.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Eighth sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

I will wrap up with some final questions to the Minister. A number of stakeholder organisations, such as the British Red Cross and the Refugee Council, have made these points in their oral or written evidence. It would be useful to get further information from the Minister on what the 30-month renewal will involve and how much exactly it will cost the Home Office. Has the Home Office assessed the impact of 30-month leave for those who claimed on or after 2 March, and will it do so regularly? I would also like further assurances on exactly what the Home Office will be doing to make sure that vulnerable refugees, including those who cannot work or study because of medical conditions or caring responsibilities, can still get extra rights and the certainty of protected work and study routes.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. Let me set out the test that we will apply to this part of the Bill. Protection should be there for people who genuinely need it, when they need it. When that need ends, they should go home. That is what the public expect, and it is what the Government say they want. The question is whether this part of the Bill delivers it.

First, to give them credit where it is due, the Government now propose to replace clause 21 with new clauses 35 and 36 and new schedule 1. Instead of leaving the whole framework to regulations, Ministers propose to put the definition into the Bill itself. That is better. Amendment 132 has not been selected so the question of retaining clause 21 will come through the stand part debate, but there is still a scrutiny problem. New clause 36 keeps a power to change primary legislation with no time limit. The linked Government amendment 134 makes those changes subject to affirmative approval, but other regulations would use the negative procedure. Why should powers to confer rights or impose obligations operate on that basis? What further change does the Minister already have in mind?

I support amendment 137, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire. Before any further leave is granted, it would require consideration of whether removal would still breach our obligations on the convention or humanitarian protection grounds. That means checking the continuing need at every renewal, not just in selected cases. Government new clause 35 would give the Home Secretary a power to revoke protection status, but a power to revoke is not a duty to review. Will the Minister carry the principle of amendment 137 into the replacement framework? When protection is no longer needed, how will departure follow?

That is why we cannot support amendment 53, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough. It would require an initial grant of at least five years and eligibility to apply for settlement after five years, but the passing of five years tells us nothing about whether protection is still needed. That need should determine the approach. Nor can we support amendment 54. It would allow partners, children and dependent adult children to apply to join someone with protection status without fees, a health surcharge, an income test or maintenance or accommodation requirements. Who pays when the sponsor cannot support or house the family? What assessment has been made of the numbers and the pressure on housing, schools and GP surgeries?

On amendment 75, how would children’s interests be considered under the replacement framework? Amendment 51 would challenge the power to confer rights and impose obligations, while amendment 52 would challenge a different provision for convention and humanitarian claims. What difference does the Minister intend? On amendment 74, would the commitment not to reduce existing entitlements still apply?

I support amendment 138, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire. Before the first regulations were put to Parliament, it would require the publication of draft regulations and a statement of the proposed immigration rules, covering the length of leave, reviews of protection and the qualifying period for settlement. Those details would tell us how this will actually work. Although the amendment was drafted against clause 21, the need for those answers does not disappear when the Government replace it. Will the Minister publish the equivalent material for the new framework before asking Parliament to approve its implementation?

What happens to existing grants, pending claims and live appeals? Will anyone have to reapply because the label has changed? What staff and resources will be needed to review protection properly without creating another backlog? We support protection for as long as it is needed. Amendments 137 and 138 ask Ministers to explain how they will check that need and show Parliament the rules. Putting definitions in the Bill is welcome, but we still need to know how the system will work.

[Anna Turley]

I really appreciate the contributions from all the hon. Members this afternoon. Before responding directly to the clauses and amendments that we have discussed so far, I hope the Committee will allow me to set out why this approach is being taken.

As part of the wider core protection reforms set out by the Home Secretary last year in the “Restoring Order and Control” statement, the UK’s asylum policy statement published in November 2025 set out the new approach to protection in the UK. That marks a significant change in direction away from an assumption of offering permanent protection towards protection that is granted for the duration of need, which we call “core protection”. Put simply, replacing the two categories of protection—refugee and humanitarian protection status—with one single form of protection status will simplify the asylum decision making process and prevent unnecessary and tenuous appeals.

It is important to reflect on how we got to where we are. Those two protection statuses are essentially a historical relic from separating those in danger on return to their countries of origin from those in need of protection for political or identity reasons. As time has evolved, the two statuses have become functionally identical, except in some small areas such as travel documents. That creates an administrative burden for the Home Office for no good reason. We are therefore proposing to merge those two statuses.

Clause 21 will reconcile those two statuses so that the system is administratively simpler for refugees and decision makers. In order to do that, we are also taking a limited power to deal with the existence of terms such as “refugee”, “refugee protection” and “humanitarian protection”, which exist throughout our extensive immigration and asylum statute book and will need replacing with a single term: “core protection”. Under the current system, those who qualify for refugee or humanitarian protection status are granted similar entitlements—30 months’ permission to stay and the same route to settlement. Where there are differences, such as in relation to travel documents, we are making changes to ensure that all those who are granted core protection are eligible.

One of the points raised in the debate was about whether we are more expansive than other European countries. That is absolutely right; as the Home Secretary set out in “Restoring Order and Control”, our offer to refugees is more expansive than that of other European countries. Once they are granted refugee status, the current system grants leave to remain for five years. At the end of that period, refugees can immediately apply for settlement, giving them an indefinite right to live in the UK. This application is fee-free and essentially automatic, being almost entirely absent of requirements.

When compared with that of some of our European neighbours, this approach to protection is generous. In Denmark—a country that has tightened its asylum system in recent years—residence permits are issued to refugees for just two years, and they are designed to be temporary. Settlement can typically be obtained only after eight years of residence and is subject to multiple conditions, including full-time employment, meeting an earnings threshold, language proficiency and active citizenship.

Clause 21 sets out what constitutes a protection claim and who will qualify for protection status. A person has protection status if they have been granted permission to stay in the UK because removing them would breach our obligations under the refugee convention, or if they would be at real risk of serious harm. The UK is proud to offer sanctuary to those in need, for as long as it is needed, in line with our international obligations. We believe that all those who face persecution for a specified reason, as contained in the 1951 convention, as well as those who fear torture or indiscriminate violence due to war, should receive protection, and that this country should play its part.

This measure is part of simplifying the current system, which has two forms of protection status that grant similar entitlements, namely refugee status and humanitarian protection. Under the new system, individuals who qualify for protection will be granted core protection status. As such, this change will streamline asylum decision making and reduce unnecessary appeals.

Before I turn to the amendments themselves, I want to draw the Committee’s attention to Government new clauses 35 and 36 and new schedule 1. I will discuss them in detail in a moment, but it is the Government’s intention—quite unusually—that these new clauses will replace clause 21, as we have essentially updated it. I know that this is unusual, so I would just like to explain it to members of the Committee. Having included a limited power in the Bill upon its introduction, we now want to narrow that power with more detail, as we work through the technicalities of how this part will interact with what I know Members will agree is a very large volume of legislation on the statute book.

I thank the hon. Members for Harrogate and Knaresborough and for Brighton Pavilion for tabling amendments 53 and 54 and amendment 74 respectively, and I will address some of the questions they raised before I go into their specifics. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion suggested that there was the potential here to reduce entitlement, but that is absolutely not the case. If anything, there will be a minor levelling-up of humanitarian entitlement when it comes to travel documents. So there will be no reducing of entitlement.

We do not think that the origin of the claim should matter for the grounds for protection. We believe that there should be consistency across the two, so the entitlement is therefore the same. We want to be clear that, in all the amendments we have made, there is to be absolutely no levelling-down. As we heard, the Home Secretary’s delegated powers memorandum itself was clear that the powers would not be used to reduce entitlement.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned the best interests of children, which builds on a debate we had earlier today. Of course, their interests are absolutely the priority throughout this process. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 places a duty on the Home Office to ensure that its immigration, asylum, nationality and general customs functions are discharged with regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children in the UK. The Home Office takes its section 55 duty seriously, and every child matters, as set out in our statutory guidance. We are committed to ensuring that we have regard to this duty in the development and implementation of new policy, including core protection, as well as when decision makers apply these policies to children within the UK.

The hon. Member asked about a sunset clause and why we have removed that in the existing powers. The key consequential amendments to primary legislation will be on the face of the Bill through new schedule 1. However, significant additional changes will still be needed for secondary legislation, which is why that was removed.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Ninth sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Kohler]

That was not an attack on the hon. Lady at all. I have been in the Chamber on the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill Committee for the last few sittings, which is why I have not been here. I still think we should try to work together on improving legislation, but I am a voice in the wilderness, as I said—[Interruption.] Well, we do not; we turn it into a political debate where we just make points against the other side. We replicate Parliament. It should be more than that.

The UNHCR has been critical of this provision—this is not a political point; I am asking a question. I will read a paragraph from its critique as I would like to hear what the Minister has to say about it:

“The proposed provision conflates two distinct concepts within the Refugee Convention: whether a refugee falls within the exception to non-refoulement contained in Article 33(2), and whether that refugee is ‘lawfully staying’ in the territory of a Contracting State. While a finding within the meaning of Article 33(2) that a refugee constitutes a danger to national security or, having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community may give rise to removal proceedings, it does not, in itself, determine whether they are lawfully staying for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. Particularly where removal is not possible, including because of other applicable non-refoulement obligations under international human rights law, a refugee may remain authorised to stay in the UK under domestic law. At a minimum, such a person would remain ‘lawfully present’ in the UK for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. Accordingly, they would continue to be entitled to those rights and standards of treatment under the Refugee Convention that are contingent upon ‘lawful presence’ in the territory. Whether they also remain ‘lawfully staying’ is likely to depend on the nature of the leave granted and the extent to which it provides a sufficiently stable and durable basis for residence. UNHCR therefore encourages the Government to reconsider this provision.”

If a refugee is not lawfully staying under these provisions, but cannot be removed for other purposes, what is their status? Are they lawfully present or do they have no status whatsoever?

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. We support clause 22, and I rise in support of new clause 61, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire. Both address the same question: what happens when someone claiming our protection is a danger to this country?

Clause 22 says that a person who falls within article 33(2) of the refugee convention is

“not to be taken to be lawfully staying in the United Kingdom”.

That covers two categories: someone whom there are reasonable grounds to regard as a danger to our national security and someone convicted of a particularly serious crime who is a danger to the community. Those are, by definition, the most serious cases our asylum system deals with. The public will understand why such a person should lose the rights that depend on lawful stay, such as the right to work and access to public funds, but they will ask a far simpler question: why are they still here?

Clause 22 changes how we describe someone’s stay. It does not cancel their leave, make a deportation order or remove the human rights barriers to sending them home. In particular, article 3 of the European convention on human rights can still prevent removal, however grave the danger they pose, so the clause on its own does not give Ministers a clear route to removal.

New clause 61 addresses that gap. For decisions to remove or require to leave anyone covered by proposed new section 37A of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, it would disapply section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 and prevent a court or tribunal from treating that decision as unlawful because it is incompatible with the convention right. It would apply only where the refugee convention already permits return. The measure is targeted squarely at the dangerous individuals identified by clause 22.

The Minister may say that the new clause would not change our obligations under the convention and that cases could still go to Strasbourg. That is true and is precisely why we believe this country should leave the ECHR.

[Catherine Fookes (Monmouthshire) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Member not agree that we are currently a proud member of the European Court of Human Rights and, with that membership, we have still managed to deport 12,000 foreign national offenders to other countries that are signed up to it? It is absolutely no barrier and, in fact, it helps us to fulfil our obligations. We are a proud nation of sanctuary in Wales and we are also going to have safe and legal routes for immigrants. Surely he agrees that being part of the European Court of Human Rights does not prevent us from deporting people.

[Matt Vickers]

If you believe that we are deporting everyone we should be deporting, and if you do not believe that the European convention on human rights has got in the way of us removing people, you start from a very different place from me. People I represent are very concerned about our immigration system. They are very concerned that the laws we are making in this place are not acting to control that immigration system. I think we start from very different perspectives.

[Mr Brash]

The hon. Member talks about the starting point—the starting point that this Government had was markedly worse than where we are now. We have deported 41% more. What are we doing that his party so adamantly failed to do when it was in office?

[Matt Vickers]

The hon. Member makes a fair point. We have had lots of things to say about the past. It is that experience that has led us to the point where we believe that some of the human rights framework that is in place gets in the way of deportations. Clause 22 actually concedes that point. It says that these people should not be able to exercise some of those rights, but it does not remove them. New clause 61 is the step that actually solves that problem.

This system is not working. I would be celebrating if we were a bit further forwards than we are. Actually, 7,042 people arrived from Eritrea in the year to March—how many went back? Two. There were 4,490 who arrived from Afghanistan—how many went back? One. And 4,389 arrived from Eritrea—how many went back? Zero.

The system is not functioning. Progress is progress. We would welcome progress. The opportunity with this Bill is to make much further progress and remove the people who should be removed.

[Melanie Onn]

Perhaps the hon. Member might like to take the opportunity to correct the record. He mentioned Eritrea twice there.

The hon. Member says the system is not working. It plainly is. It could work better, but we are seeing big increases from the failure of his Government to manage to deport people under the current rules. By applying what rules we have and exercising them by putting additional resources behind them, as well as tightening up some of the deportation rules, we will see a marked improvement in the number of foreign criminals who have no right to be here being returned to their country.

[Matt Vickers]

We welcome deportations of people with no right to be here, but when we start going back through the records to see who arrived and who left without us even knowing, we have the Home Office scratching numbers together to work out who has gone. It is a positive that we can improve deportations, but in recent times, we have gone from the point where we said that somebody who arrives in this country illegally cannot claim citizenship—there was legislation in place—to a point where that has been unpicked by this Government. We sat through the debates on the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 on that subject.

This is an opportunity to improve things. We are determined to get among it. We are determined to improve it. Whatever the deportations are, they need to be significantly higher for my constituents to be happy.

I will correct the record—7,042 arrivals from Eritrea, two were removed; 4,490 from Afghanistan, one was removed; 4,389 from Sudan, zero removed. That is not a satisfactory system. That is not working. This is the opportunity to improve that.

[David Smith]

Notwithstanding the abject failure of the last Government to manage our immigration system, there are many ways to skin a cat. The hon. Member mentioned Eritrean immigrants or asylum seekers and deportations. He may have noticed that the Government are looking to work with the Eritrean Government to say that there will be no access to visas to the UK for Eritreans unless that Government agree to take people back. There are many ways to address this.

Those on the Opposition Benches repeatedly mention the ECHR. We have had a long debate about the part of this Bill that addresses article 8 of the ECHR, which has been problematic, but does he ultimately want to throw the baby out with the bathwater? Do he and his constituents care about article 2, the right to life; article 3, the prohibition of torture; article 4, the prohibition of slavery; article 7, no punishment without law; or article 9—something very close to my heart as the UK special envoy for freedom of religion and belief—the freedom of thought, conscience and religion? Is it not true that the Opposition’s approach is to simply throw the baby out with the bathwater?

[Matt Vickers]

We are talking about people who pose a threat to our national security and are, categorically, a danger to our community. I think that the rights of the people in my community should trump the rights of people who pose a threat to our national security and are a danger to that community—[Interruption.] I will try to make a bit of progress, or we might be here for quite a while.

New clause 61 would remove the domestic legal barrier that too often leaves Ministers unable to act. It is a concrete step that the Committee could take today. If the Government reject that approach, what is the answer? Where removal is lawful, how quickly will it happen? Where return home is barred, will Ministers seek agreements with safe third countries? While the person remains here, what measures will manage the risk, and who is accountable for making sure that they work?

Government amendment 133 removes the transitional provision from clause 22. As introduced, the clause applies only to decisions made after it comes into force. The Minister’s explanatory statement says that amendment 135

“would provide for clause 22 to be commenced by regulations,”

which means that the transitional provision can be dealt with in those regulations rather than in the Bill. That means that the question of who this clause applies to and whether it reaches existing cases or only future decisions will be settled by Ministers, not by this Committee. I ask the Minister directly: will existing cases be reassessed, or will this apply only to future decisions? When will the regulations be published, and when will this clause actually take effect? Until Ministers commence clause 22, neither it nor new clause 61 can apply to a single person.

We also need to know who will decide that someone falls within article 33(2) of the refugee convention, what evidence will be required and how challenges will be handled. Those decisions must be robust, otherwise we risk years of litigation while the person concerned stays put.

We will support clause 22 because it tightens the position of these individuals, but our support should not be mistaken for confidence that it solves the problem. Declaring someone dangerous is not the same as protecting the public from them. New clause 61 confronts the gap between the two, and we will press it to a Division at the appropriate point. If Ministers will not support it, they must explain what they will do instead to keep this country safe.

[Anna Turley]

I thank Members for their contributions. It has been a lively one this morning; I think colleagues have had their Weetabix, and I welcome that.

As I said in my introductory comments, clause 22 shows the Government’s determination that those who are excluded from the protections of the refugee convention because they have committed a particularly serious crime or who are a danger to the security of the UK cannot expect the same entitlements as refugees who comply with our laws. When an individual is released from prison, clause 22 will allow the Home Office greater distinction and flexibility to grant shorter periods of leave, restrict access to work or public funds, and impose additional requirements such as reporting and residence.

To pick up on the challenge from the hon. Member for Stockton West, some of the conditions could include restricted leave, a constant renewal of their status every six months, not being able to come back if they leave the country, no access to public funds, restrictions on work, being tagged and reporting requirements. Hopefully that gives him some indication of the steps those people will have to take. The clause will allow a greater distinction between those individuals and those who respect the values of this country and refrain from committing heinous crimes.

I will pick up on the challenge from the hon. Member for Wimbledon. I welcome him to his place on day four; I hope that he has had the chance to read—[Interruption.] I have good intentions. I genuinely hope that he has had the opportunity to read the transcript of our previous sessions, because they have been incredibly constructive. I have welcomed the challenge, the Divisions and the nature of discussion and debate we have had in this Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is the crux of the Bill: ensuring that we define matters for courts so that we do not see the free-for-all of over-interpretation that we have seen before.

I see this as a binary choice: reform the ECHR and have greater control over our borders, or leave and lose our ability to return illegal migrants and foreign criminals. I choose the powers that the ECHR gives us, which protect our individual rights and freedom.

[Matt Vickers]

The Minister talked about Winston Churchill. Does she think that Winston Churchill would have desired legislation that allows people who are categorically a threat to our national security, or a danger to the community, to stay in this country?

[Anna Turley]

I would put that back to the hon. Gentleman and ask whether he thinks that Winston Churchill would have desired the British state to seek to remove people to places where they will face almost certain death, torture and war.

[Matt Vickers]

The clause relates to people who are too dangerous to lawfully stay in the country. It is not giving us a perspective by which to remove those people. Those people are a danger to our community—you are saying that they are a danger to our community and a threat to our national security—yet we are not going far enough to remove them. It undermines the entire clause.

[The Chair]

Order. I remind Members that there have been several uses of the words “you” and “your” this morning. This is not about me.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Gentleman misunderstands the purpose of the clause. We have taken plenty of action on deporting people, and we are pursuing plenty of other provisions. The clause sets out that people who we cannot deport should not have the same rights and entitlements as people who are genuinely fleeing war and persecution and abide by our rules and laws—we are making a very clear distinction. Although I am questioning it now, I am sure that his intent would not be to create a situation whereby this country removes people to places where they face death. I will leave it there in the hope that he will not pursue new clause 61.

[Matt Vickers]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I will be generous and give way again, but then we have to move on.

[Matt Vickers]

This new clause sets out that we would remove people under the mechanism only where doing so complied with the refugee convention. It is there in black and white: we are complying with our obligations under the convention on refugees.

[Anna Turley]

The hon Gentleman’s new clause appears to override those protections and would very likely result in people being removed to places where they face torture, inhuman treatment or even death. That is very clearly the consequence of his new clause, whether he intends it or not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Disapplying the Human Rights Act is about disapplying our domestic legislation—our domestic barriers. That is entirely compliant with the international refugee convention. This is not about international barriers; it is about our domestic barrier, the Human Rights Act.

[Anna Turley]

That Act is the interpretation of these principles in our domestic law, so it is the same outcome.

I have thoroughly enjoyed the debate this morning. Clause 22 ensures that our protection system remains fair, and preserves our commitment to providing sanctuary and the benefits of the refugee convention to those who genuinely need them. At the same time, it recognises that those who commit serious crimes should not be entitled to the same benefits and privileges as those who respect our laws. We are rightly obliged not to send them back to face death or torture, but that does not mean that we should give them the package of support and entitlement that other decent law-abiding refugees get. In so doing, the clause delivers a clearer, fairer and more meaningful distinction between those who deserve our protection and those who have fundamentally abused it.

Amendment 133 agreed to.

Clause 22, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Power to require payments from recipients of asylum support

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Tenth sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

The Home Office confirmed that it spent £22,000 on its “don’t rape women” guide for asylum seekers. Can the Minister confirm that clause 23 restricts the sums that are recoverable purely to accommodation and subsistence, rather than to the Home Office’s comms budget?

[Anna Turley]

I moved to my conclusion too quickly; forgive me, Mr Twigg. I still have a number of points to respond to—I thought we were getting an early escape.

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, and one that I wanted to cover, regarding asylum support. Section 98 support is temporary emergency accommodation, which is not within the scope of clause 23. Section 98 is the immediate emergency support, and asylum seekers then apply for section 95 support, which is what the clause addresses. He asks why that is not included, and I take his point. We are trying to move away from the kind of expensive and unsustainable emergency support that we saw explode under his party’s Administration. We have already saved more than £1 billion by closing hotels, so that will not be part of this measure. The asylum support that people apply for is what is covered by the clause.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked about repayment thresholds. As I said, the Bill establishes the principle and the key framework for the recovery of asylum costs; the detailed operation, including thresholds, will be set out in secondary legislation. That is a common and proportionate approach to drafting such legislation, for which operational detail may be adjusted over time. The policy intent is that repayment will begin only once an individual reaches a defined threshold for repayment, and that deductions will be set at a manageable rate, so that recovery remains proportionate and does not cause hardship or destitution. Any regulations will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and there will be clear safeguards.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked whether we expected to raise any money. The answer is yes. As I have mentioned, the asylum system represents a significant cost to the taxpayer of about £4 billion. The Government are determined to bring those costs down. The policy of recouping asylum support is a world first. It is about ensuring that those who benefit from this specific, targeted form of support contribute towards its cost, when they can. Our objective is fairness to everyone in this country, as well as sustainability, with any revenue generated reducing the burden on the public purse. It is about not just recovering costs, but contribution. Costs will be recouped over time from individuals who have moved into employment or otherwise have the means to contribute.