Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting)

Rebecca Paul Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)]

Good morning, all. I welcome your work and the support that you offer victims—all of you, in what you have been doing. I am sure there is cross-party support for that in the room this morning. Do you think the changes in the Bill will improve the confidence of victims that, when they report crimes, they will receive justice more swiftly than they currently do and, more importantly, that the changes will also encourage more brave victims to come forward and report crimes?

Claire Waxman: There are a lot of good measures in the Bill that, if delivered and implemented well and with important safeguards, should have positive impacts for victims. We are removing appropriate cases from the Crown court, easing the burden there, and limiting the right to elect for a Crown court trial. By the way, victims view that right as an injustice. They feel that power and control is being given to the defendant, knowing full well that there is a chance they will come out of the process or that their evidence will be impacted over the years. That is something that victims regularly talk to me about. The measures around the automatic right to appeal and to make the magistrates a court of record will open up transparency in the courts and hopefully stop victims having to be called back in for a rehearing. That has devastating impacts; you cannot overestimate what it does to a victim when they think that they have gone through the process of giving evidence, and then they have to come in again.

If all those things ease the pressure and burden on the Crown court, that will give reassurance and confidence to victims who are thinking about whether to stay in the process currently. The measures Katrin talked about—putting in important safeguards around the cross-examination of rape victims—are so important. Vera and I have worked on this since 2019, because of section 41, past sexual history, and issues around cross-examination and compensation claims. That is a financial motive used to undermine the credibility of victims. Victims come out of the system and often say, “I will never report again,” but they tell their friends and families about their experiences, and that deters people and erodes public trust and confidence.

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

Q Thank you for your time, Claire. If I am interpreting your answer correctly, your basis for supporting the removal of jury trials is that it will save time and allow victims to get justice quicker. Would your position change if that is not the case and those time savings do not come through?

Claire Waxman: That is impossible to answer. We need to see it happen. You need to come back to me and say if it is not going to reduce—

[Rebecca Paul]

Q Your letter says that this will result in quicker justice for victims, and that is why you support it. My question is: if that is not the case, would you not support it?

Claire Waxman: It is the case. The Crown court is overburdened. You have heard Sir Brian Leveson’s analysis; it cannot continue in the state it is in. If we do not take appropriate cases out of the Crown court, then what is the answer?

[Rebecca Paul]

Q That suggests to me that if it did not save time, you would not support the proposal.

Claire Waxman: But I cannot imagine it. If you are taking cases out of the Crown court that cannot deal with the pressure, that will save time.

[Rebecca Paul]

That is what we will be analysing over the next few weeks—whether it will or not.

[The Chair]

We will limit ourselves to one question each at this stage so that everyone can get in. If there is more time, I will call people again.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)]

Q Thank you for your testimony so far and for your bravery. Morwenna, you mentioned that you waited two and a half years before your court date. My apologies for going into the detail, but can you go through the stresses and strains of that wait and its impacts on your life and possibly on other victims as well?

Morwenna Loughman: Absolutely. One thing that kept me going—I was so close to pulling out multiple times—was that I had this sense that he had done it before. In fact, what I was later told—it was not admissible, but under the Bill it would become admissible—was that he had broken his ex-partner’s leg repeatedly and raped her as well. His defence barrister stood in front of the judge, the jury and me, and said, “This man has never hurt a woman.” Given that this man was out on bail and repeatedly breaching his bail conditions, brutal is the word. I cannot overstate the impact that that has on victims. It was devastating. I did not look people in the eye for two years. I wore a hat everywhere I went so I could hide my face, because he could have been anywhere. I had to move out of my home. My home became a crime scene. I lost my job. It was daily torture. I echo what Natalie Fleet said the other week in the House of Commons: that the one thing worse than being raped is waiting four years or more to hear if people actually believe you.

[Rebecca Paul]

Q I thank you all for being here. I know that this must be incredibly difficult. You are incredibly brave, and it is wonderful to see you channelling something that was so negative for you in a positive way, so thank you for that.

We have focused a lot on jury trials, but there is a real opportunity here to think about what we need to deliver improvements in our judicial system, because the thing we all agree on here is that it is not working as it should. We might disagree on the best way to address that, but we do agree on the fact that change is needed in some form. What would you like to see in this Bill that is not there? What is needed to address some of the issues? Any of you who want to answer, please feel free to take the question.

Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott: It is a very big question. It is tricky, because I do not think that we can really ask for perfection; we are very much asking for a system that is bearable and has a bit of credibility about it. That just has to be centred, with lived experience at the forefront. So often, many victims, myself included, have said that it feels like it has gone so far to the defence side that it is no longer a justice balance. It has flipped so much on that side that I really want to urge you to consider that aspect: that it feels like the balance has gone in favour of the defence, essentially. In any decisions that you make about the Bill, just consider rebalancing that and ensuring that victims’ voices are centred in the decision-making process. If increasing magistrates to the three-year limit reduces the delays by even a small percentage, that can only be a positive thing. All those smaller elements will eventually snowball into more meaningful change across the entire sector. I could ramble on, so I will let someone else have a go.

Charlotte Meijer: I guess the other thing to add, which has been discussed a few times already, is the training of judges and magistrates. We have to find a way to do that—you would not let an untrained teacher into a school—because they are making decisions that mean life or death. After my not guilty verdict, I tried to kill myself, because nobody believed me, clearly. There is a huge impact. Things do need to change.

As I mentioned, I was a victim of rape. The rape did not go to court, because of many mistakes. The police offered to reinvestigate and I declined, because I knew what I would be going into and I did not want to go into that again, as it stands. A lot of that is about not just the courts, but the process leading up to it: the police and the CPS, and making sure that the police, the CPS and the courts are working together, which at the moment they are not. I am going through a three-year complaints process with the police, and they just blame each other. There needs to be accountability from start to end, because, while the Government have many different institutions that you deal with as a victim, you do not always understand it. You should not have to. I should not have to know that the CPS needs to do this and the police need to do that. It should be me coming in and other people understanding that journey for me and holding them to account.

There are no consequences if the victims’ rights we have at the moment are not adhered to. I was failed on at least seven points of the victims’ rights, but there is nothing that anyone can do. It has gone up to the ombudsman, and they said, “Yes, they failed”—great.

[Matt Bishop]

Q At the risk of sounding like a broken record, thank you to the panel for coming in. It is very brave of you to come and relive your stories and experiences. Following on from the previous two questions, maybe this is one for Jade, Charlotte and Morwenna: given the delays and uncertainty in the court process and how that affected your recovery, how do you think the changes in the Bill will better protect victims and survivors in future from the impact that you have experienced?

Morwenna Loughman: I did not actually know that it was the defendant’s right to elect where their trial was heard, and that was a real shock to me. I echo what these extraordinary women on my right have said: it feels like a system that has been weighted against you, and there is no doubt that defendants are gaming the system. As it stands, I would absolutely not recommend this system to someone who finds themselves in my position.

I also agree with what Sir Brian Leveson said. A cultural reform needs to take place, because we are way past the mark of funding being enough. It needs a systemic, systematic, fundamental paradigm shift in how the system is run.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Second sitting)

Rebecca Paul Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

Q Riel, in my submission from the Criminal Bar Association, there is concern about risks to judges in public criticism. The example given is on sexual offences, but I want to ask about protest-related offences and more political crimes, where the victim is the state or a powerful actor. Would the risks to judges also apply in those cases?

Riel Karmy-Jones: Yes. We are already seeing that in immigration cases. We are seeing judges being targeted and threatened as a result of decisions made in immigration cases. The problem is that the judge will set out his decision making in writing; it will be on a transcript; and, under these proposals, it will go to a victim. It is wrong, not for those decisions to go to a complainant in a case, but for them then to be pored over and disagreed with.

What does the judge say if they do not believe a complainant victim? They have to say so, and that could lead to huge disruption and upset, whereas with a jury, those people are largely anonymous and protected by reason of their anonymity. It is far rarer for us to get jurors who are targeted and attacked than it will be, in our view. As the Lady Chief Justice pointed out recently, it is far more likely that judges will be targeted as a result of their decision making.

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

Q Today, 58 out of 516 Crown court rooms are not sitting. Do you agree that it would be better to address that issue—and how would we address it?—rather than limiting jury trials?

Kirsty Brimelow: May I deal with that briefly? Absolutely, if you open the courts, then the courts can hear the cases. Also, let us look at the reason for the lack of productivity. Our courts are just not sitting as many hours as they did in 2016 or 2017. We should get the number of hours back up, and cut out the delays even in the courts that are sitting. That includes looking at the defendants being brought to court late. We are collecting data on that, and it is an astonishingly high number. Around a quarter of the data we have collected so far shows defendants being brought more than five hours late to court. You attack that, do the type of listing that is working now, bring the investment in quickly—

[The Chair]

Order. Sorry to stop you, but that brings us to the end of time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence. Sorry it was so short.

Examination of Witnesses

Claire Davies, Samantha Hillas and Caroline Goodwin gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

Q I am interested in your data. Do you see any differences in different groups electing for a judge-only trial? If you do see a difference—I am talking about age and various other protected characteristics—why do you think that there is one?

Doug Downey: That is a great question. I do not have data on the different groups electing, but we often see high-profile matters trying to move towards a jury. We know that individuals with very technical defences or very technical legal approaches will sometimes go to a judge, so that they can have that expressed. It really depends on the facts of the case, as opposed to the kind of case. I do not have running data on that, so I hesitate to be categorical. The motivation for going to jury, or not, can change with the theory of the case, the approach of the lawyer and, ultimately, the client.

[The Chair]

We have two minutes left.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)

Rebecca Paul Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. As the Committee has likely anticipated, I will argue that clause 3 should not stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3 is the heart of the Government’s constitutional gamble. It creates a wholly new general rule for trial on indictment without a jury in a substantial category of criminal cases. Under the clause, a defendant charged with an either-way offence who has pleaded not guilty will lose the right to be tried by a jury unless the court considers that, on conviction, they would be likely to receive a sentence of more than three years’ imprisonment. It also allows reallocation later if the case changes, says that there is no right of appeal against allocation or reallocation, permits some decisions to be made without a hearing, and still allows a judge sitting alone to impose a sentence of more than three years.

The Government continue to maintain that this change is necessary to reduce the Crown court backlog and reserve jury trials for the most serious cases. I note, though, that the very good House of Commons Library briefing points out that these provisions are based only in part on Leveson, and contain material differences from that which he recommended. Sir Brian proposed restricting, not abolishing, the right to elect, he did not propose the same increase in magistrates’ sentencing powers, and the Government’s model is more aggressive than the one on which much of the original discussion was based.

JUSTICE makes the same point directly in its written evidence. It says that the Bill goes further than the review by removing the right to elect entirely, replacing the full rehearing appeal from the magistrates court with a permission stage, allowing the extension of magistrates’ custodial powers to 18 or 24 months, and introducing judge-only trials for either-way cases with likely sentences of three years or less.

I say that at the outset because I am keen to avoid the suggestion that the Bill amounts to the Government reluctantly implementing a difficult but expert-led recommendation. That is simply not the case in clause 3. In fact, we are dealing with a discretionary political choice to legislate in a way that is broader, harder and less cautious than many of the evidence-based alternatives that are already on the table. As the Law Society put it:

“Clauses 1 to 7 represent radical changes to criminal procedure without convincing evidence that they will improve efficiency.”

The Bar Council says:

“Radical changes to the availability of jury trials…are unnecessary and will consume resources without bearing down on the backlog.”

That is the proper context in which clause 3 should be considered.

As much for my own clarity as for the benefit of the Committee, I would like to dedicate a limited amount of time to clarifying what the clause actually does. It inserts into the Senior Courts Act 1981 proposed new sections 74A to 74D, which create a mechanism under which, in a very wide category of cases, the court must decide at the outset whether a defendant will be tried by a jury or by a single judge alone. The central test is the threshold sentence: whether the defendant, if convicted, would be likely to receive more than three years’ imprisonment or detention. If the likely sentence is above that threshold, the defendant gets a jury; if not, the default is a judge-alone trial in what the Government and stakeholders have described as the Crown court bench division, although that phrase is not used in the Bill itself.

This is about not a tiny number of trivial cases but a structural redesign of the Crown court’s work. According to the Government’s own modelling, about 14,000 cases would continue arriving at the Crown court in 2028-29 and would require a trial, of which approximately 4,000 are expected to be heard by a judge alone, rather than a jury. The package is said to reduce Crown court sitting day demand by 27,000 days a year while increasing magistrates court sitting day demand by 8,500. Even if one accepts every assumption behind those figures—many serious people do not—they demonstrate that this is a major transfer of work and power. The offences within scope are not, as has sometimes been implied, confined to the sort of minor petty theft case used in media briefings.

The written evidence from JUSTICE makes that point bluntly. Clause 3 would cover a huge number of either-way offences, including

“sexual offences, sexual abuse of children, stalking, fraud offences, violence against the person offences and theft offences.”

JUSTICE offers a chilling practical illustration with this observation:

“Most of the postmasters wrongly convicted in the Horizon scandal received a sentence under three years.”

That point ought to give the Committee serious pause. We are being asked to remove jury trial for the types of case in which miscarriages of justice have historically occurred.

The centrepiece of clause 3 is the idea that a court can safely determine, at an early stage, whether a defendant is likely to receive more than three years if convicted, and that that prediction is a just and adequate basis for deciding whether the defendant gets a jury at all. I do not accept that. More importantly, the Bill itself does not truly accept it either. The Commons Library briefing I referenced earlier notes this contradiction plainly:

“While cases that are less likely to result in a sentence of more than three years would be allocated for trial by a judge alone, the judge could still pass a custodial sentence of more than three years.”

In other words, the very legislation that uses the three-year threshold as the decisive basis for removing jury trials simultaneously recognises that the threshold may not map on to the final seriousness of the case at all. The initial allocation may say that the case is not serious enough for a jury, yet the final outcome may be serious enough for more than three years in prison. If that is not an admission that the threshold is an unstable and unsafe proxy, I do not know what is.

Does that not cut to the most basic but most profound concern about this Bill—that it just is not fair? If the threshold cannot reliably distinguish the cases that merit a jury from those that do not, the clause is not preserving jury trial for the most serious cases. It is rationing jury trial on the basis of an impressionistic and sometimes speculative sentence prediction. The written evidence from the London School of Economics says exactly that, stating that the three-year threshold

“is a poor metric for determining the right trial procedure”

and that if jury trial is a

“cornerstone protection against the state”,

alternative measures ought to be exhausted first.

We cannot properly predict a sentence at the plea and trial preparation hearing, and in the context of clause 3, that is a problem. If the allocation decision is to be made at the hearing, the notion that a judge can decide the likely sentence then and there is, in many cases, unrealistic and, at the extreme, absurd. In many cases, the evidence is incomplete at the PTPH. In sexual offences, full achieving better evidence transcripts are often unavailable, and practitioners rely on summaries. CCTV may not yet have been watched in full, medical evidence may be outstanding and the victim impact, which can materially affect a sentence, may be unknown. Sometimes the complainant is still in hospital. It may well be that the psychiatric or psychological impact becomes clear only weeks or months later. Yet the clause asks the court to decide mode of trial at exactly this sensitive and uncertain stage. The Government are therefore building a supposedly rational system on a procedural moment that practitioners know, and I am sure the Minister knows, is often evidentially immature.

The Committee will remember reading the Victims’ Commissioner’s written evidence, which accepts the need for reform but recognises the concern that sentencing ranges vary and that the evidential picture may be incomplete when the crucial decision is taken. JUSTICE likewise says that the proposal risks unfairness because the allocation and reallocation system lengthens the PTPH and depends on speculative assumptions about how much court time will actually be saved. The Bar Council adds that the Bill gives no schedule or annexe identifying categories of offence; instead, a Crown court judge will simply assess in individual cases whether the likely sentence exceeds three years, meaning that the determination is case specific, contestable and uncertain from the outset.

I can well imagine the response to all that being that if circumstances change, the case can be reallocated, but to my mind that is not a defence of the clause; it is an admission that the initial prediction is often too flimsy to bear the weight placed on it. As any King’s counsel will readily point out, real criminal cases are not static things. Charges are amended, defendants are added and new evidence emerges. Perhaps a section 18 becomes a section 20. When something like that happens, is it seriously proposed that the case repeatedly cycles through reallocation every time? Clause 3 says yes, at least in substance.

Proposed new section 74B provides for a formal reallocation mechanism where there is a relevant change of circumstances, including changes in the indictment or new evidence affecting likely sentence. The problem is that that does not solve the uncertainty; it adds another layer of litigation, or at least potential litigation. It invites both sides to argue over whether the threshold position has changed, whether reallocation is required, whether the change is sufficiently material, what prejudice would be caused by moving the case, whether delay, wasted cost or witness inconvenience should prevail, and what happens if the case is already part way down the tracks. Frankly, that sounds like a dream come true for a solicitor’s billing manager, but the rest of us can surely see the problem.

JUSTICE and the Bar Council have both picked up on that point. JUSTICE notes that the

“allocation of cases is going to lengthen the plea and trial preparation hearing as will the process of reallocation”,

and it warns that the absence of any right of appeal against allocation decisions is likely to increase judicial reviews and Court of Appeal litigation. In the Bar Council’s written evidence, it states:

“The proposed Crown Court Bench Division introduces an extra layer of hearings and complication…It could result in further litigation at an interlocutory stage.”

It argues that one of the Bill’s fundamental flaws is precisely the fact that it presents a false binary: either do nothing, or do this. The Bill does not properly assess a range of other policy options.

Having made those points, I would like to pose a question to the Minister, which I think may shed some light on where we are with the clause. Has the additional work needed at both Crown court and magistrates court level for allocation, reallocation, submissions and case management been factored into the claimed 27,000 sitting day decrease and 8,500 sitting day increase? If the answer is yes, can we get some insight into precisely where and how? If the answer is no, the core productivity claim behind clause 3 is overstated from the start.

If clause 3 were merely a bad threshold coupled with an elaborate reallocation maze, that would be bad enough. However, the Government have compounded the problem by providing no right of appeal against allocation or reallocation decisions, and by permitting some decisions to be made without a hearing. Under proposed new section 74D, there would be no right of appeal against an allocation or reallocation determination made under proposed new sections 74A or 74B, and a reallocation determination could be made without a hearing. That is extraordinary. A defendant may lose trial by jury on the basis of an early-stage sentence prediction, under a mechanism that the Government know may need to be revisited as the case develops, yet there is no appeal.

JUSTICE warns that the likely consequence of the proposal is judicial review pressure on the High Court, and appeal pressure on the Court of Appeal once written reasons are handed down, meaning that the supposed efficiency savings may be displaced into other courts. The Bar Council says much the same; it proposes, as a minimum safeguard, that there should be a hearing before reallocation, unless the parties waive it, and that there should be an appeal right. The absence of appeal is especially troubling because summary trial has historically been justified by two safeguards: lower-level offences and the ability to appeal. The Bill proposes to remove both. It moves up the seriousness of cases, while stripping away the classic safeguard of easy correction—that is not a tolerable bargain.

Although the Committee has already debated the retrospectivity point at some length, clause 3 itself remains infected by it. The new allocation procedure will apply to cases already in the Crown court open caseload, including cases where the defendant has already been arraigned at a PTPH before the new regime comes into force, so long as the prosecution has not yet opened its case. For those cases, the court must make a determination under proposed new section 74A as soon as is reasonably practicable, and may do so without a hearing. That means that a defendant who chose a Crown court trial, expecting a jury, may wait months, prepare for that jury and then lose it retrospectively.

The Minister herself has defended that approach by saying that the Government are on sound legal ground, and that there is no procedural or legal impediment, relying on advice from—as I recall—an unnamed KC. However, political defensibility and legal ingenuity are not the same as fairness. To put this in very plain terms, people did not opt to go to Crown court for the car parking or the architecture; they chose it for one thing only—a jury. To move the goalposts after the choice is made is profoundly unfair, regardless of other considerations.

The Committee will recall reading through the written evidence from some eminent groups and individuals that, in as many words, call this retrospective application contrary to the rule of law. The Bar Council says:

“The retrospective provisions may also be subject to numerous legal challenges.”

Dr Samantha Fairclough argues that the plan is unfair, and she says:

“It will also create significant additional work…and likely result in appeals.”

That all points in the same direction. Retrospectivity here is not just constitutionally unattractive; it will ultimately prove to be practically self-defeating.

A very large part of the Government’s case for clause 3 rests on the impact assessment, which says that clauses 1 to 7 will reduce Crown court sitting days by 27,000 a year, while increasing magistrates court sitting days by 8,500. It also says that the Crown court open caseload will fall by around 14,000 cases over 2028-2029, and that

“overall the reforms will reduce demand on Crown Court time by almost 20%”.

However, several stakeholders have criticised the assumptions and modelling, especially those on how much time judge-only trials would save. The Government’s core assumption is that hearing times will fall by 20% for judge-only trials, but Sir Brian himself accepted that this was associated with high levels of uncertainty, and the Justice Committee challenged how anecdotal the basis for that figure appeared to be.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Order. The hon. Member has not done anything disorderly or out of order in any way, but I remind Members that the House has agreed that this Committee must conclude its work by 5 pm on Tuesday 28 April. I have no power to impose a time limit on speeches, and it is for the Committee to decide how it uses its time, but I gently encourage Members to consider the length of speeches in the light of the desire of all Members to speak in the debate and on the later parts of the Bill.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank you for making that point, Ms Jardine. I just emphasise how serious the changes in this legislation are. I know the Opposition are willing to put in the hours that are needed to go through the full detail, so that everyone can say what they need to. I imagine the Government are equally keen to spend the hours required to do full justice to the Bill.

[The Chair]

But there is a limit on time.

[Rebecca Paul]

Absolutely, Ms Jardine—we can go into the early hours of the morning if we need to, and I am happy to do so this evening if that is what people would like to do.

In cases of offensive communications, malicious communications, harassment, stalking and other digital evidence-related cases, the line between criminality and obnoxiousness can be fact-sensitive and context-heavy. We have all seen how politically sensitive a question this has become. We should remember, too, that some of these cases are driven almost entirely by screenshots and unauthenticated digital material, which may be manipulated, selectively presented or forensically thin.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

Rebecca Paul Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

The test for complexity is too subjective. The procedural safeguards are non-existent. The evidence for efficiency is weak, and the power to expand these measures through secondary legislation is constitutional overreach. If the Government are truly concerned about the backlog, let them invest in the mechanics of the court, fix prisoner transport, reform legal aid to ensure early guilty pleas and maintain the court estate. Those are the efficiencies that will actually work. Removing the jury from court fraud cases is an expensive, risky and ultimately ineffective distraction. We should maintain the jury as a permanent feature of the Crown court, not as an optional extra for the simple cases.

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

It will no doubt be a relief to Members to hear that I am not going to talk for quite as long as I did this morning. I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1 standing part, and I support amendment 51, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle.

As is becoming habit, I will begin with a very brief overview of what we are considering. Clause 4 and schedule 1 create a new framework for judge-only trials in certain complex or lengthy cases. The listed offences include fraud, tax evasion, false accounting, insider dealing, money laundering, terrorist funding, bribery and related offences. The court may order trial without a jury if it is satisfied that the likely complexity and/or length makes that appropriate, that it is not in the public interest for the trial to be conducted with a jury, and that there are no other reasons why it would be more appropriate for the trial to be with a jury. There would be no right of appeal against that decision.

That is a serious and constitutionally significant change in its own right, but what makes it even more troubling is that it has been justified on the strength of a paper-thin theoretical benefit. The House of Commons Library states that the Government estimate clause 4 will save 200 Crown court sitting days. That is around 0.18% of current Crown court capacity, which indicates just how small the potential gain is—if there is that gain at all.

That is the first and most obvious point I want to make. The Government are proposing a very serious encroachment on jury trials in return for a saving that amounts to just 200 sitting days. JUSTICE describes the change as “unnecessary,” says that it

“will not impact the backlog in any meaningful way”

and warns that it risks opening the door to restricting jury trials in other categories of case too. The Law Society is similarly clear:

“Removing jury trials for serious fraud cases is unlikely to have a significant effect on the backlogs, but would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.”

That should be the frame for the whole debate on clause 4. We are not being asked to approve some modest efficiency measure; we are being asked to displace the jury in some of the most important and contested criminal cases for an alleged benefit so small that, even in the Government’s own case, it barely registers against total Crown court demand. That trade-off is so poor that I refuse to believe the Minister, in her heart of hearts, believes it is the right way to proceed.

The second point is that the case against juries being used in serious fraud and related cases has never really been made. In written evidence, the Law Society tells us:

“Serious cases of any complexity, including serious allegations of fraud, must be presented by the prosecution in a way that is understandable, not only to the judge and jury…but also, in line with the principle of open justice, to the public.”

It goes on to say:

“They should be subject to effective case management to ensure they take only a reasonable length of time, if necessary, by reducing the number of charges”.

In other words, the answer to complexity is to manage it properly, not to remove the jury.

It is worth reminding ourselves that the issues juries decide on in fraud trials are factual, not technical—in particular, whether the defendant was dishonest. That is judged by reference to the standards of ordinary decent people. Twelve ordinary jurors are far better placed to decide that than a single judge alone. That goes to the very nature of fraud. Fraud is not merely an accounting or regulatory puzzle; it is an allegation of dishonesty, and dishonesty, by definition, is exactly the sort of question on which the community’s judgment matters. Who should decide dishonesty: a single professional judge, or 12 citizens applying the standards of ordinary life? In a democratic criminal justice system, the answer should remain: the jury.

The evidence that we have does not support the idea that juries are what make these cases collapse, drag on or miscarry. JUSTICE’s written evidence points to the Southwark Crown court data gathered by His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, showing that the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two per year lasting over three months and only two cases in total lasting over six months. That is important, because it rather punches the myth that these are all endless epics that juries simply cannot understand or follow.

Rivlin’s evidence also says that jury trials compose a discipline that helps to keep fraud trials shorter. Without that discipline, judge-alone trials may end up running as long as, or even longer than, jury trials. More to the point, delays, collapses and miscarriages of justice in fraud are not caused by juries, as shown by R v. Hayes where convictions were quashed because of judicial misdirection, not because of anything the jury did wrong. That strongly refutes the suggestion that juries are the weak link in these cases.

The Government have two problems here: first, they have not shown that such cases are generally too long for juries; secondly, they have not shown that juries are what is causing the failures when these cases go wrong. Unfortunately, that leaves the Government looking rather like they are indulging in ideological hostility to jury trials rather than evidence-based reform.

There is also a wider constitutional point. The Law Society says, and I very much agree, that removing jury trials for serious fraud cases

“would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.”

These are often cases involving major companies, financial institutions, public markets, public money, terrorism financing, bribery and corruption. They are exactly the sort of cases where the public must have confidence that justice has not simply been done inside a closed professional world by one member of that same world.

Fraud and related financial cases often concern the conduct of powerful, well-resourced and sophisticated defendants. In those cases, public confidence matters immensely. A verdict reached by a jury of citizens commands a kind of legitimacy that a judgment by a single judge does not carry in the same way. That is not a criticism of judges, but a recognition of why juries exist in the first place. They are there to not just decide facts but connect the administration of criminal justice to the public itself.

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[Dr Mullan]

If the schedule said complex and lengthy fraud cases, then the Minister might be able to argue that it is constrained, but the schedule is just “Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases”. It actually opens the door to any number of types of offence being added purely because they are complex and lengthy. I think of, for example, the Lucy Letby trial, which was clearly complex and lengthy, but something that clearly needed to have a jury in terms of public confidence. That could end up included by schedule 1.

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. What is considered complex and lengthy could be quite subjective. We all know that we are potentially going to end up in the courts over defining exactly what is complex and lengthy. It feels like the Bill is not written clearly enough for us to understand exactly how it will work in reality. Amendment 51 is an important safeguard against those risks.

In his written evidence, His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC notes that the schedule 1 list already

“appears to be arbitrary, perhaps the work of a moment; and it goes beyond anything suggested before. But even that is not the end of it.”

That is because part 2 of the schedule gives the Secretary of State the power by order to add or remove offences. He quotes the explanatory notes to show that offences not related to fraud or financial crime could easily be added in the future. He describes this as

“a mighty step along the way to the end of jury trials.”

That does not strike me as overstatement. The Secretary of State will indeed have this untrammelled power, and we should carefully heed this sober warning from a senior judge.

For similar reasons, the Opposition oppose schedule 1 standing part of the Bill. Schedule 1 is the list that gives clause 4 its reach, and the list is already troubling. It is not confined to a tiny, tightly defined category of unusual mega-fraud; it covers a wider class of economic and financial offences, including money laundering and terrorist funding, and can then be expanded later. If we think the core principle of clause 4 is wrong, then the schedule that operationalises it is wrong too.

Rivlin’s description of the list as “arbitrary” is worth keeping in mind. One of the reasons that schedule 1 is objectionable is that once Parliament accepts the principle that a whole category of serious Crown court cases can be singled out for juryless trial on grounds of length and complexity, the argument for confining the list to that category becomes very hard to sustain. The logic of the thing pushes outward. That is why schedule 1 is dangerous: for not only what it contains now but what it invites later.

I am particularly concerned that there is an ideological push away from jury trials. My concern is that this is only the start, not the end of where the Government want to get to. I urge the Committee to think about this carefully. We are taking important decisions for the future.

[Dr Mullan]

As I have talked about in earlier debates, uniquely in this situation we already know what the Lord Chancellor wanted to do. From leaks, we know that five years was the test, in terms of these proposals. The Opposition are being fair in suggesting that this is potentially the thin end of the wedge.

[Rebecca Paul]

I agree with my hon. Friend, as I normally do.

Finally, there is the obvious practical point that there are better answers available. The Law Society says that reform and investment must be strategic, not piecemeal, and warns against stand-alone measures such as changing from jury trials to judge-only trials without convincing evidence that they will significantly reduce the backlog. It says that Parliament should insist on “detailed modelling” and on understanding the Government’s intentions across the whole package of reform, not just on this isolated measure. The existence of pressure in the system does not prove that every proposed constitutional shortcut is justified. The question is whether the shortcut is necessary. With clause 4, the answer is plainly no. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1, and I support amendment 51.

Clause 4 offers a constitutionally serious reduction in jury trials for a tiny claimed benefit of 200 sitting days. The evidence does not show that juries are the cause of delay, collapse or miscarriage in these cases. Fraud cases are not too technical for juries. The key issue is dishonesty, and ordinary citizens are uniquely well placed to judge that. The removal of juries in these cases would damage open justice and public confidence. Schedule 1 gives effect to that flawed principle and then goes further by creating a route to ministerial expansion. Amendment 51 is therefore a sensible and necessary safeguard, but in truth, the better course is simpler still: clause 4 and schedule 1 should not be included in the Bill at all.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I will speak against the inclusion of clause 4. It inserts part 6A in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which will allow complex or lengthy cases to be tried without a jury. My main opposition to the clause is that it is a pointless exercise by the Government that will in no way affect the backlog. The Government’s own impact assessment suggests that the savings will amount to just 200 sitting days per year, which is a tiny fraction—0.18% of the current sitting days. The Government argue that these cases can continue for many months, thereby wasting jurors’ time or putting additional pressure on those called for jury service. However, data from Southwark Crown court, where the majority of fraud and other such cases are heard, shows that only one or two cases per year exceed three months, and only two between 2018 and 2024 went beyond six months.

His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC has argued that jury trials impose discipline, which helps to reduce the length of fraud trials. Without that incentive, judge-alone trials may be as long as or even longer than jury trials. I alluded to this earlier, but jurors decide on issues of dishonesty and fact in these cases, which are not necessarily technical. Twelve jurors are therefore in a much better position to reach a decision.

I also have grave concerns about the terminology of “complex” and “lengthy”. I know the Minister has said that the meaning of complex and lengthy are well understood in the judiciary. I would argue that a lot of people in the legal profession are pushing back against that assertion, and that the Bill does not provide clarity on what they should determine to be complex or lengthy.

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[Rebecca Paul]

My hon. Friend is making some powerful points. Hearing him read out what the law says brings home to me just how terrible this Bill is. Surely everyone can see that there is no clarity how it would work. Rather than there being any clear guidance, it essentially feels as though any judge can have their own view on complexity and length. We will end up with inconsistency and disputes and arguments about the approach. Surely, that could do the opposite of address the backlog by adding additional complexity and confusion to our justice system.

[Joe Robertson]

I agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, the Bill will basically lead to a complete lottery in decision making, depending on the judge a person gets on the day. I suspect that judges ordinarily do not like vague law or having to provide their own interpretation. They are usually more comfortable if the statute is more precise, or if it is backed by caselaw, but there is no caselaw here.

On the issue of length, we know what the Minister thinks because she has told us in this Bill Committee. I do not criticise her for this opinion, but she thinks a case is long if it is disruptive to the personal or professional life of a juror or their wellbeing. That is her view as to what will make a case lengthy, and I do not criticise her for that, but there is no guidance here for the judge to consider those things—[Interruption.] I paraphrase her—she is welcome to intervene if she disagrees about how I characterise her views on what is lengthy for a juror.

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[Joe Robertson]

Indeed. Might a judge, halfway through a trial, decide that it has suddenly become inappropriate, having heard whatever formal or informal representations are made on that point? Even if there is some objective consensus about how long an ordinary person in this country should be prepared to set aside to serve on a jury, does that in itself make it appropriate that a case should not be heard by a jury?

Even if we could agree, for example, that devoting any more than a month to a jury trial is disruptive to a person’s life, does that automatically make it inappropriate for a case to be heard in a jury trial? No, not at all. If it is inconvenient for someone to sit on a jury for a particular length of time, that does not mean the case is inappropriate for a jury trial. Even the Government are not willing to put a specific time value on that.

[Rebecca Paul]

As my hon. Friend was speaking, it suddenly occurred to me that under our current system, jurors can already make that argument—that if sitting on a jury would be particularly disruptive, they should not have to do so. How does that interact with this measure? It feels like this does not make sense.

[Joe Robertson]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are a number of personal and professional circumstances that can enable people to make that argument and get exempted from jury trial or, indeed, not have to sit on the jury in the original case but have it deferred to a more convenient time. She is absolutely right that flexibility for ordinary people in this country is already built into the way that juries are selected.

“Length” is probably the easiest of these three difficult terms; “complexity” is even harder to nail down. How is a judge supposed to decide what level of complexity makes it appropriate to have a jury? I would argue that the more complex a case, in certain circumstances, the more it should be heard by a jury, especially if the complexity relates to what is in the mind of the defendant, rather than, for example, complex financial papers.

Does the involvement of complex financial papers, on its own, necessarily make a trial more complex, if the real issue in the case is whether the defendant intended to be dishonest? As we have already heard with fraud cases, as well as most of the cases in schedule 1, the real issue is not whether something happened; it is the mindset—the legal term would be mens rea—of the person who did that thing. If they did something by accident or unintentionally, depending on the crime, that would often be enough for them to be acquitted. If they did something knowingly, dishonestly or recklessly, also depending on the crime, that would normally be enough for them to be convicted.

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[Sarah Sackman]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central and the hon. Members for Bexhill and Battle and for Chichester for tabling the amendments in this group. In addressing them, I will seek to cover the principal arguments that have framed the debate: first, the impact of the clause on the magistrates court and the suggestion that it carries a risk of overburdening the court; secondly, the critique that because the clause departs from the recommendations of the independent review, somehow it is not a tenable or viable way to proceed; and, thirdly, the procedure through which magistrates courts’ sentencing powers may be varied.

By having the ability to vary magistrates court sentencing powers by statutory instrument using the negative procedure, the Government can respond flexibly to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures on the criminal justice system. Magistrates court sentencing powers have been amended using the negative procedure for this very purpose in the past, including to mitigate pressures on prison capacity in 2023, and to address the Crown court open caseload in 2024.

Requiring changes to magistrates court sentencing powers to be made using the affirmative resolution procedure would constrain the Government’s ability to respond efficiently to pressures across the criminal justice system. It would mean that reductions in magistrates court sentencing powers, such as the 2023 decrease in response to prison capacity pressures, would also be subject to the affirmative procedure. The ability to vary sentencing powers using the negative procedure is an important mechanism, which enables the Government to act with the speed and certainty of timing that the affirmative procedure does not so readily allow.

We consider it proportionate and consistent with existing practice for the level of magistrates court sentencing powers to be adjusted by secondary legislation, within the limits that have already been set by Parliament, using the negative procedure. The negative procedure enables timely adjustments while still ensuring parliamentary scrutiny in the period following the statutory instrument being laid. In that respect, I ask the hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.

On amendment 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, Sir Brian’s recommendations have, as I have said previously, been critical in informing the Government’s thinking. I do not seek to suggest that clause 6 formed a specific part of his recommendations, but he invited the Government to consider the sorts of measures necessary to address the backlog. As the impact assessment demonstrates, on the Government’s modelling, which has been externally quality assured and verified, extending magistrates court sentencing powers to 18 months would produce a saving of some 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That is hugely significant.

To be candid, part of the reason why the Government are introducing this measure is not simply a vote of confidence in our magistrates court and what we think it can cope with and deliver, but because it will enable us to bring down the backlogs quicker. That is the rationale. Although it is an extension, and goes beyond what was recommended by the independent review, we think that it is justified in the circumstances.

We have therefore decided to introduce powers that would enable magistrates court sentencing powers to be extended either to 18 months or up to 24 months. Those powers provide flexibility to extend magistrates court sentencing powers in the future to respond to changing circumstances and manage unsustainable pressures on the criminal justice system.

The Crown court is facing significant pressures, and many triable either-way cases currently heard and sentenced there can be dealt with fairly and expeditiously in the magistrates courts. Lord Burnett, former Lord Chief Justice, told us in Committee that he had spoken publicly on many occasions about his personal belief that there is need to rebalance the work between the magistrates court and Crown court, and this measure is, in part, a way of doing that.

[Rebecca Paul]

If we are increasing the sentence in the magistrates court, I would imagine the Minister will agree that, in some situations, we are increasing the complexity of the case. For example, a sexual assault case could be quite complicated and require, in order to look after the alleged victim and make sure their wellbeing is managed, four consecutive days of sitting to get that over with. How will the magistrates court do that? They are all volunteers, and quite often they are working. How will this help address the backlog if we are in a situation where those volunteer magistrates are not able to commit to the four consecutive days needed to deal with a complex and sensitive case such as a sexual assault?

[Sarah Sackman]

One of the things we have to in order to successfully deliver this court transformation is properly resource our magistrates court. You have heard me say before about what we need to do to increase magistrates recruitment and the steps that the Government have taken in that regard. We are also increasing the recruitment of district judges who sit within the magistrates court. In reality, many of the serious and longer cases currently within the magistrates court would be heard by more experienced magistrates or a district judge.

We had a discussion earlier in Committee about the desirability of having lay magistrates serve alongside Crown court judges as part of the constitution of the Crown court bench division. I have recognised the merit in that. One of the challenges there is not just the number of magistrates you require, but finding magistrates who can sit in longer trials, which inevitably those would be. I understand what the hon. Member for Reigate said, but we already see on a daily basis how serious and less serious matters in the magistrates court are apportioned in that way. We are hiring up to an additional 80 district judges under our current plans, and they will be able to hear those sorts of cases. Part of the capacity also relies on expanding the number of, and support for, legal advisers, who are also critical to delivery.

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[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 22 tabled by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester. This is another element of the Bill that will not survive contact with the Lords. It is quite clearly unfair.

I want to pick up on some of the points that were made. There are key reasons why the amendment is sensible. In other parts of the debate, Government Members have raised the negative impact of cross-examination by defendants, which they do not think is a good thing. They do not think it is a good thing that victims may be cross-examined by defendants, yet they will not support a measure that would reduce the risk of that happening, and it does happen. The context of all the different parts of the clause is important to bear in mind.

[Rebecca Paul]

Does my hon. Friend agree that Government Members and the Minister have spent a lot of time talking about victims being central to all of the changes, so why on earth would they not support the amendment if it is really about protecting victims from being cross-examined?

[Dr Mullan]

The consistent position is that unrepresented defendants can take up more court time and can cross-examine victims, and that is more difficult for victims. As other Members have touched on, this takes place in the context of the other things that we have been unsuccessful in changing this evening. Sentencing powers are increasing and the right to appeal is being watered down. There is a pernicious erosion of the fairness of our courts at the same time as the yardsticks are being essentially changed in relation to access to legal aid.

This is important in the wider context of what is happening with legal aid. The Minister wants to say all the time that the Government are stretching every possible sinew to do everything else they possibly can to improve the backlogs in the courts. Yet we heard in evidence from the Criminal Bar Association and the Bar Council that the £34 million of legal aid announced in December still has not filtered through into the system and is still not available. We are now in April.

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[Joe Robertson]

That is entirely right but, of course, we do not know, because the assessments in respect of the Bill are so light—there is not one on that point. It may or may not at all mean more spending. So many times, the argument on this issue, and on many others, is, “Oh, it doesn’t affect that many cases,” or, “Don’t worry.” Well, it deeply affects the person whose case it is. If a defendant wants to exercise the right that the Government are pulling away, it is hardly an argument for the Government to say, “Well, we’re not pulling that right away from very many people.” For that defendant, the right has been lost.

The same applies to the argument when it is about victims or complainants. The Government are rightly willing to focus an argument on individual victims; they should be prepared to do that for the individual defendants who will lose rights and, in the case of sentences of up to two years, may suddenly no longer be able to access legal aid because the regime is focused on the venue rather than on sentencing power. That should be adjusted not because of what previous Governments have done, but because this Government are moving the goalposts on sentencing powers in the magistrates court, so they should make the matching adjustment when it comes to qualifying for legal aid. For that reason, I do not agree with clause 6.

[Rebecca Paul]

It is a pleasure to start the day with you and end the day with you, Ms Jardine. I am sure you are very much enjoying starting your day with me and ending your day with me, too. [Laughter.] I have just realised how that can be interpreted. My apologies, Ms Jardine; I cannot account for the minds of other Members.

To get back to business, I do not support clause 6 standing part of the Bill. It will expand the Government’s existing power to increase the maximum custodial sentence that a magistrates court can impose for a single either-way offence. The current maximum is 12 months, but the clause will permit Ministers, entirely at their own discretion, to increase that to 18 months or even 24 months. That will affect consecutive sentencing for multiple either-way offences.

The Government have justified the change on the basis that the power is needed so that sentencing limits can be adjusted swiftly to rebalance work between the magistrates courts and the Crown court. The Government estimate that increasing the maximum to 18 months would save 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That all sounds rather neat but, in reality, it is another example of the Government trying to force more serious criminal business into a part of the system designed for swift, relatively low-level justice, and doing so before they have properly shown that the courts can absorb it or that the benefits are worth it.

The first and perhaps most important point is that even Sir Brian Leveson did not recommend the change. Sir Brian said that his recommendation on restricting the right to elect trial by jury was

“contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current maximum of 12 months.”

He also recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument be repealed, and that the current 12-month maximum be made permanent.

Clause 6 therefore cannot be said to follow Leveson: it goes beyond him and, on this point, directly contradicts him. That is a serious weakness in the Government’s position. Ministers have repeatedly leaned on Leveson when defending the Bill as a whole, but in this instance he gave no endorsement of what clause 6 will usher in. More than that, he warned us directly against it. It is perfectly valid to ask, “If the very review on which the Government say the Bill is based said that 12 months should remain the ceiling, why are Ministers now seeking the power to raise it to two years?”

Let me briefly touch on a second common-sense point. The move from six to 12 months took effect only for offenders convicted on or after 18 November 2024. In other words, the current system has barely had time to bed in and the Government are already asking Parliament to authorise a further jump to 18 or 24 months. The earlier increase to 12 months was justified as a response to court pressures, and the Government said it would save up to 2,000 sitting days. We have not had anything like enough time to assess properly how that change has worked in practice before Ministers seek power to go dramatically further.

If the Government and the Minister wish to make evidence-based law, they should first show Parliament what the 12-month expansion has actually done: what kinds of cases have been retained, what sentencing patterns have changed, what effect there has been on appeals, what impact there has been on magistrates courts and whether the claimed savings have materialised. Instead, they are asking, through clause 6, for a much broader delegated power, and inviting us to trust that this will all somehow work out later. That is not good enough where a question as fundamental as the administration of good justice is concerned.

The Bar Council puts its objection crisply and, I think, rightly. It says:

“Summary trial is designed for the purpose of dispensing swift justice in low-level cases. The extension of summary justice to cases in which a defendant could receive up to 2 years’ imprisonment…particularly when combined with the removal of a right to elect Crown Court trial, and the removal of a right of automatic appeal”

amounts to a

“comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.”

That is blunt language, but it is hard to disagree with.

Clause 6 will change the kind of cases that summary justice is expected to absorb. The Law Society warns that under the clause magistrates will have the power to impose lengthy custodial sentences for serious offences such as actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm and possession with intent to supply drugs

“in proceedings that are intended to be quicker”

and less formal than than those in the Crown Court. It warns that this raises the likelihood that

“people will receive longer custodial sentences with fewer safeguards or opportunities to rectify wrongful convictions.”

I will dwell on this point for a moment, as it is something that none of us who have been tasked with scrutinising the Bill in detail should forget. A system designed to be faster, simpler and less formal is being asked to shoulder cases in which the consequences are far more severe. Two years in prison is not some trivial matter: a custodial sentence like that can cost a person their job, their home, their family life, their good name and their future. A justice system that is appropriate for low-level offending cannot be assumed fit for cases that carry that sort of life­changing penalty.

There is then the practical point that clause 6 will not solve the pressure in the system so much as move it around. The change will merely transfer the burden from one overstretched part of the system to another. The Law Society says that the magistrates court already has its own backlog of more than 370,000 cases, and that the Government have shown no convincing plan to deal with the added pressure brought by more serious and complex cases.

JUSTICE makes the same point, and adds an especially telling practical detail drawn from the Institute for Government’s analysis: since magistrates’ sentencing powers were increased from six to 12 months in 2024, only around 30% of sentences in the six-to-12-month band were handed down by magistrates. That suggests a lack of confidence, or a continuing tendency to send more serious cases upwards, which in turn means the Government’s projected savings may not materialise in anything like the way they hope.

If magistrates are already not retaining all the cases that the Government assumed they would after the jump to 12 months, what is the evidence that authorising 18 or 24 months will suddenly transform the position? If cases continue to be sent up, or bounce between jurisdictions, the supposed efficiency gain becomes much more doubtful.

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[Joe Robertson]

The way my hon. Friend articulates the point suggests that the rules are effectively stripping people of the right to legal aid by pushing them down from a court where they currently qualify into a court where they do not. Is that a fair way to characterise it?

[Rebecca Paul]

I agree with my hon. Friend. Frankly, I am shocked that a Labour Government would do that. It is the last thing I expected of a Labour Government.

[Joe Robertson]

I am not shocked by anything a Labour Government do.

[Rebecca Paul]

Perhaps I am more optimistic about these things.

[Sarah Sackman]

On a point of order, Ms Jardine. I ask for your guidance. We hear the rehearsal of a number of the same arguments that we have heard again and again over a long period. Everyone here wants to make progress and wants to scrutinise, but I am not sure there is much merit in hearing the same arguments and, indeed, the same quotes again and again. I seek your guidance on how best to deal with that, Ms Jardine.

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[The Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury (Stephen Morgan)]

Yes.

[Rebecca Paul]

Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine, but that seems to suggest that we are not allowed ever again in this Bill Committee to bring up the fact that the right to elect for jury trial and rights to legal aid are being removed. Surely we need to be able to talk about that as we go through the Bill.

[The Chair]

You can ask for further advice, but the Clerk tells me that the scope of this debate is clause 6, and when we move on to other clauses, we will debate those clauses.

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[Rebecca Paul]

Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine. I would suggest that the legal aid changes are a really important outcome of clause 6. In fact, I think I would come under huge criticism if I made this speech without mentioning legal aid, because I have not raised it at all—well, I did in an earlier speech. I have not raised it at all today.

[The Chair]

It is not for me to say what is a valid point. I was asked for guidance on the scope of this debate, which is clause 6.

[Rebecca Paul]

Thank you for that, Ms Jardine. I reassure you that I will not be speaking for very much longer, but I will cover the last of what I consider to be the important points. Thank you for your guidance and patience.

The Law Society warns that the Bill’s proposals will increase the number of defendants in magistrates courts who are ineligible for legal aid, even though they would currently qualify if their case were heard in the Crown court, because the magistrates court means test is significantly stricter. It notes that duty solicitor numbers have dropped sharply between 2017 and 2025 and that the impact assessment does not properly address

“the disparity between the magistrates’ and Crown Court means tests”.

We know that individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment may not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, and that unrepresented defendants often do not understand charges, and often enter inappropriate pleas, struggle with cross-examination and end up with harsher outcomes. Under the Bill, then, a defendant may face a much more serious case in a summary forum, with a possible sentence of 18 months or two years, yet be less likely to have publicly funded legal representation than they would be if the case were before the Crown court. That simply is not fair.

Even if one were somehow persuaded that giving the magistrates courts the power to impose sentences of 18 or 24 months might in principle be acceptable, we would still have a major objection to how the clause is drafted. It does not simply set the limit and leave it there; it expands the regulation-making power so that the Government may increase the maximum to 18 or 24 months by statutory instrument. The delegated powers memorandum justifies that on the basis that magistrates’ sentencing limits may need to be adjusted swiftly “where operational pressures” require a “rebalancing of work”.

Are we not, then, being asked to hand over a flexible tool that could be used to rebalance criminal jurisdiction by secondary legislation? I could not be more convinced that Parliament should retain oversight of increasing the powers of magistrates. At the very least, any such regulation should be made by affirmative resolution. This is not the sort of decision that should be casually adjustable at ministerial convenience.

For all those reasons, I oppose clause 6 standing part of the Bill. Even Leveson did not recommend this change; on the contrary, he said his wider recommendations were

“contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at…12 months”

and recommended that the power to alter them by statutory instrument “should be repealed”. The move to 12 months has taken effect only recently and has not yet been properly evaluated. The clause will extend summary justice into cases carrying up to two years’ imprisonment, despite the fact that summary justice was designed for lower-level, swifter cases. It will push more serious cases into magistrates courts that are already under strain, and do so in a package that also weakens appeals and intensifies legal aid problems. It risks moving the backlog rather than solving it, and it does so by way of an over-broad delegated power that gives Ministers too much room to reshape criminal jurisdiction by regulation.

The magistracy deserves respect, and nothing I say should be taken as criticism of the many magistrates who serve conscientiously and well, but having respect for magistrates is not the same thing as assuming that every structural burden should now be placed on the summary justice system. The Government have not even begun to make the case for the clause compellingly.

[Sarah Sackman]

Members have asked about the intended impact of the clause. As I explained earlier, the reason why we are making this change is that we have confidence in our magistrates and because it would save a significant number of Crown court sitting days.

This is a tried-and-tested approach: the sentencing power of magistrates courts was raised from six months to 12 months for a single triable either-way offence in May 2022, under the previous Government—Conservatives can look to their own record to see the evidence for what we should do—and a review of the impact between May 2022 and March 2023 confirmed that increasing magistrates sentencing powers had helped to reduce to pressure on the Crown court. In that context, there was a 21% reduction in the number of defendants sent by magistrates courts to the Crown court for sentencing, and a further 6% reduction in the number of theft offences sent for trial to the Crown court by March 2023. That shows how recalibrating sentencing powers—[Laughter.] I did not realise it was that funny, but we are getting into the witching hour, so I am going to be kind to everybody. That reduction is just one of the ways in which we think the clause can assist with the backlogs.

I addressed the points about legal aid in my remarks on amendment 22, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester. I have set out the justifications both for extending the powers and for the flexible, agile mechanism that the negative procedure affords us.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting)

Rebecca Paul Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I am happy to have you back in the Chair today, Dr Huq. I wish to oppose the clause and the schedule. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden for pointing out so clearly that the restrictions on appeals will push down hardest on the least advantaged people and will compound injustices in wider society, as well as the injustices put in place by other clauses.

I will not reiterate in detail the evidence we heard, or the speeches I made previously, about the risks of more errors due to the speedier but rougher and readier justice of the magistrates courts being applied to more cases, or the risks arising from higher sentences. However, clause 7 adds yet more risk to the potential harm from reducing the right to select a jury trial in clause 1 and the restrictions put in place by other clauses. This is counterproductive for the overall courts workload, too.

As others have pointed out, the clause will introduce a multi-step process. We heard in oral evidence from Emma Torr of Appeal that the

“multi-step process…will only increase the workload of both the magistrates and Crown courts. To give a very brief outline of how it works at the moment, the defendant or the solicitor can fill out a very simple form, which results in a quick rehearing at the Crown court. It takes a couple of hours at most and even less for sentence appeals.”

She also pointed out that the Law Commission had carefully considered the matter last year in a consultation paper that ran to 700 pages. She said:

“Its independent analysis was that the removal of the automatic right to appeal will increase the workload of the magistrates court and the Crown court.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 83, Q174.]

In our oral evidence sessions, we heard clear views about the lack of legal aid in magistrates courts for people without representation to meet fairly the test set for appeals. Fiona Rutherford of JUSTICE told us:

“Without a lawyer being present, and of course without there even being the right to appeal directly, you are leaving a whole load of defendants, who may well be wrongly convicted or may get the wrong sentence for the crime they have committed, floundering…I simply don’t know who will inform these people about how they will put grounds of appeal together, what grounds of appeal even are, how you formulate those, what key points you need to make in them to persuade a Crown court judge sitting alone in a room with just some evidence papers and how to put your best case forward.” ––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 86, Q184.]

These are serious matters of injustice. I do not know how the least advantaged defendants will be able to do anything to use the application to the High Court for judicial review, which seems to be the only remedy that the Minister has put forward to us today. I do not know how many miscarriages of justice are acceptable to the Minister, but I believe that these measures must not form part of the Bill, because of the impact that they will have on the right to justice for too many people.

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. I do not support clause 7 or schedule 2. I welcome the debate on various amendments and the comments from the Minister.

Clause 7 and schedule 2 would replace the current automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court with a much narrower permission-based system. At present, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court can appeal to the Crown court against conviction or sentence, and that appeal is heard by way of a full rehearing, usually before a Crown court judge sitting with between two and four magistrates. About 40% of conviction appeals and 47% of sentence appeals succeed.

We are now being asked to introduce a system that would instead require permission for such appeals, would usually proceed on written grounds, would be heard by a single judge and would limit the grounds on which permission is granted. The Government say that that would save about 500 Crown court sitting days. I feel that I may be running out of ways to phrase this sentence, but yet again we are seeing a significant roll-back of an important safeguard, justified on the basis of a small hypothetical gain.

We should ask ourselves whether an important protection is being weakened for anything like a proportionate return. On clause 7, I do not believe that it is. I strongly emphasise that appeals are not historical oddities or a procedural quirk; they are one of the principal safeguards against the risks inherent in summary justice. The Bar Council is very clear:

“The proposed change would remove a vital safeguard against wrongful summary conviction and excessive (or unlawful) sentences imposed by magistrates. The consequence risks adding to the burden on the criminal courts rather than reducing it.”

It goes further and says that the current right

“does not appear to be exercised frivolously or vexatiously.”

The Law Society made similar points in its written evidence: it said that the automatic appeal route is a “vital safeguard” and that in 2024 it was used in 2,487 cases, overturning magistrates’ decisions in 41% of convictions and 44% of sentences. It describes about 1,000 miscarriages of justice as being corrected through that route. That is the central fact that the Government cannot really get around. If four in 10 conviction appeals and nearly half of sentence appeals succeed, that cannot be read as evidence that the appeals process is being abused. In fact, it is the opposite: the process is demonstrably being exercised appropriately.

I am deeply concerned that if we roll back the right to appeal, we will be locking the door on an unknown number of cases in which a conviction might have been found to be erroneous, but will now not be identified as such. That is an unknown number of miscarriages of justice not put right, and an unknown number of lives ruined. I am not willing to pay that price for the gain of 500 sitting days, and I cannot bring myself to believe that Government Members are differently inclined.

We do not particularly need to speculate about what the safeguards protect against, because we can point to recent examples. In the notorious Hamit Coskun case, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court of a section 5 public order offence had his conviction quashed on appeal to the Crown court. The appeal court found that the prosecution had failed to prove essential elements of the offence and stated plainly:

“For these reasons we allow this appeal and quash…conviction”.

That is the automatic appeal route doing exactly what it is supposed to do and correcting a conviction that should never have been imposed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

Yes, I do. This is why we have to get this right. As I say, we are firmly committed to improving transparency across the system and making a success of it, but those changes have to be balanced against the operational realities and the financial realities in which our court system operates.

Proposed new section 108S of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, to be inserted by schedule 2 to the Bill, will already provide the power for the rules of court to provide free transcripts to any person the Secretary of State directs. The amendment is therefore not required, as the intended effect will already be achieved under the current drafting.

We have taken significant steps to strengthen transparency, including expanding transcript provision, so that all victims who want them will be able to request free transcripts of Crown court sentencing remarks directly relevant to their case from as early as spring 2027. That is a meaningful step forward for victims. In cases of public interest, Crown court sentencing remarks are already published online, and broadcasters are able to film sentencing remarks in the Crown court with the agreement of the judge.

We are focused on driving improvement for the longer term, exploring how technology, including AI, can reduce the cost of transcript production in future and make it more widely available. That is why we are undertaking a study into the use of AI transcription in court hearings. All this work will provide this Parliament and future Parliaments with an evidence base for future decisions about how transcript provision could be expanded in a way that is operationally sustainable and delivers real-world benefits for victims, including in the magistrates court, over time, as recording capability expands.

[Rebecca Paul]

One thing I have increasingly noticed, particularly in high-profile cases, is that people live-tweet, setting out exactly what is going on. That is another thing to bear in mind. I very much welcome the progress that the Minister has set out, but in the world of social media it is important that people, and particularly victims, can get an accurate transcript as easily as possible, especially if something inaccurate has been tweeted out.

[Sarah Sackman]

The hon. Lady raises a valid point. All sorts of work needs to be undertaken about the use of social media in courtrooms, whether by juries or other participants, and where that is and is not appropriate, particularly in the context of reporting restrictions that are put in place for a good reason. But on this point, we think that the amendment is not needed. We can continue to make progress informed by an evidence base. For those reasons, although we are in real consensus on the principle of this, I urge the hon. Member for Chichester to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

We now come to a series of considerably less contentious clauses, including clause 8, relating to the admissibility of evidence in our criminal courts. This area of the Bill deals with the sensitive and often contentious issue of sexual history evidence. Of course, we want victims of rape, sexual violence and domestic abuse to experience a justice system that treats them with dignity and protects them from irrelevant, prejudicial attacks. Complainants can be subject to questioning that is invasive and distressing, that may not be relevant or may hold little or no genuine relevance to the legal issues at hand.

Clause 8 seeks to tighten and clarify the rules governing when a complainant’s previous sexual behaviour can be introduced as evidence. The underlying principle is that a complainant should not have their credibility undermined through assumptions, stereotypes or what are often described as rape myths regarding their past.

To achieve this, the clause will replace the current model with a more rigorous admissibility framework. Under the new rules, such evidence may be admitted only if it meets one of two criteria: it must have substantial probative value in relation to a matter of substantial importance to the case as a whole, or it must constitute important explanatory evidence. This shift is intended to ensure that only genuinely relevant material is put before the court.

Furthermore, the clause explicitly requires the court to consider whether the suggested value of the evidence relies on inferences that cannot be properly drawn, to avoid the situation in which evidence is admitted with the defence knowing what inferences be drawn even if it would not be proper to do so. That is another important safeguard designed to prevent the trial process from being distorted by prejudice.

Although the Opposition support the aim of ensuring better protection for complainants, our role in Committee is to ensure that the law is not only well intentioned, but clear, workable and consistent with the right to a fair trial. I am sure the Minister agrees that there cannot be a blanket ban on the admission of this sort of evidence where it meets those tests.

I have a number of questions in relation to the need to ensure that the measure does not create any unintended procedural hurdles. To forewarn the Minister, this will be a consistent question across these clauses, but what assessment has been made to ensure that the substantial probative value threshold is sufficiently precise—not sufficiently high or low, but sufficiently precise—to meet both sides of the coin, and that it is workable in practice? How do the Government intend to monitor the application of the new framework to ensure that it delivers the intended protection for complainants? Is the Minister confident that the drafting strikes the correct balance between protecting victims from inappropriate and invasive questioning and upholding the fundamental right of a defendant to a fair trial?

The need for reform in this area has been well argued, and protecting victims from irrelevant and prejudicial questioning is a goal we all share. However, as I have said, the Committee’s task is to ensure that this clause is the right approach. That is something we should continue to explore throughout the later stages of the Bill.

[Rebecca Paul]

It is truly a pleasure to get to a part of the Bill on which I suspect we will agree more than we will not. I think we will all find that rather refreshing after the last few sittings.

Clause 8 seeks to introduce a new framework governing the admissibility of evidence about the previous sexual behaviour of the complainant. I very much welcome the fact that we are now having this debate and looking to address some of the issues we currently see in the justice system with respect to sexual assault crimes. Rape and sexual violence are horrendous crimes that have a lifelong impact on victims. In oral evidence, we heard this directly from some of the brave witnesses who testified, and I thank them for giving their time so generously and for speaking so honestly and courageously. What was made very clear is that they are keen to see change in how the justice system deals with these types of offences. They want to see justice done swiftly and considerately.

It takes a huge amount of bravery for an individual to report these types of crimes and to pursue their attacker through the courts, so we must do all we can to ensure that the process is quick, supportive, effective and efficient for them, while preserving the principles of natural justice. Although I may disagree with some victims on the limitation of jury trials being a way to achieve this, I share the same ambition: to speed up the process so that justice is no longer delayed and denied.

It is important to remember that most of these crimes are committed by someone the victims knows, making the process even more of an intrusive ordeal. It is deeply personal. That is why it is important to treat victims with respect and care, not to diminish their experiences or feelings, and not to make them feel like they are the ones on trial. It is incredibly important not only for justice, but for deterrence purposes, that the state sends a clear message that those guilty of such crimes will face the consequences. This is much needed at a time when violence against women and girls is rife in our communities. If the state can get this right, we should see more victims coming forward and being more willing to undergo the stress of a trial in the confidence that justice will prevail.

In June 2021, the Conservative Government published the findings of an end-to-end review of the criminal justice system response to rape, which they referred to as the rape review. What it found made for difficult reading. In the prior five years, there had been a significant decline in the number of charges and prosecutions for rape cases and, consequently, fewer convictions. One in two victims were withdrawing from rape investigations, demonstrating a big problem. The Home Secretary at the time, my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel), said:

“We are not prepared to accept that rape is just ‘too difficult’ a crime to prosecute. We can, and must, do better.”

The review set out that there are an estimated 128,000 victims of rape a year, that less than 20% of victims of rape report to the police, and that only 1.6% of rapes that are reported result in someone being charged. That means that considerably fewer than one in every 100 rapes actually leads to justice for the victim. That shows the scale of the issue. One of the actions set out was that

“only evidence about the victim that is pertinent to the case should be used at court and a victim’s credibility should not be undermined by pre-conceptions or rape myths.”

In the final recommendations issued by the Law Commission in 2025, it was made clear that the use of evidence relating to the previous sexual behaviour of the complainant—for example, previous consensual sex between the defendant and complainant, or between a defendant and a third party—is highly distressing, humiliating and even traumatising, and is often irrelevant and can prejudice a case.

The admission of sexual behaviour evidence has, rightly, long been restricted through so-called “rape shield” legislation, which applies specifically to a trial where a person is charged with a sexual offence. No question can be asked about the sexual behaviour of the complainant without the leave of the court, and various gateways are considered in determining that. However, the Law Commission has criticised those gateways for being too restrictive, too broad and too complicated.

Clause 8 seeks to address some of the issues raised by the Law Commission, and has incorporated the stage 1 recommendation accordingly. It amends the conditions that must be met before a defendant can adduce sexual behaviour evidence or ask questions intended to elicit evidence of sexual behaviour in criminal proceedings. It ensures that such evidence may be admitted only if it

“has substantial probative value in relation to a matter which—

(i) is a matter in issue in the proceedings, and

(ii) is of substantial importance in...the case as a whole”.

However, clause 8 does not include stage 2 of the two-stage framework suggested by the Law Commission, which prohibits the use of sexual behaviour evidence unless its admission would not significantly prejudice the proper administration of justice. The Law Commission has raised that specific deviation in its written evidence. I ask the Minister to give her reasoning for not adopting the second stage, so that we are all clear.

It is reassuring to see the Bar Council welcoming the changes brought by clause 8, which it says

“provide appropriate safeguards for victims and for fairness of trials.”

The Law Society also supports the proposals, along with many other rape crisis and women’s organisations. Having said that, I note that a joint letter from Rape Crisis England & Wales, the Centre for Women’s Justice, Rights of Women, the End Violence Against Women Coalition and Imkaan, while welcoming much of clause 8, raises some specific concerns. It would be helpful to hear from the Minister on those points and whether she intends to make any changes.

[Dr Mullan]

I mentioned this point in my speech, but I will repeat that these clauses interact with the other elements of the Bill that will remove juries. Under the older jury trial system, the judge decides on things that the jury will never hear, so if something is made inadmissible, there is no question at all of it colouring the judgment. Of course, if we remove the jury in potentially more serious cases, we can have all this legislation and all these things that become technically inadmissible, but as we have talked about, we are then relying on the intellectual operation of the judge’s mind. Whether or not people think it is right for them to draw a direct conclusion, it is a matter of fact that judges are a group of people who are more distant and removed from the people we are concerned about. For example, if we are talking about women and girls, judges are more likely to be men. Those are the issues that will become more contentious as a result of the other changes in the Bill.

[Rebecca Paul]

My hon. Friend makes a really important point. There is a lot that is positive about the clause, but, as he rightly says, we have to think about it in the context of all the other changes. Unfortunately, we could find that the other changes unwind the good that is done by this clause. That said, it is still a positive clause, and I am pleased to see it in the Bill and to debate it today.

Lastly, I want to flag that in its evidence, Victim Not Suspect notes a need to address verification and/or the reliability of digital evidence, which it believes is relevant to the admissibility test and has not been addressed in the Bill. It would be useful to hear the Minister’s view on that matter too. Victim Not Suspect says:

“Without forensic verification, including IP address data, account ownership confirmation from platforms such as Meta, and metadata examination, there is no reliable basis for assessing authorship.”

That is a point of detail, but it could become important in certain cases, so it is worth bearing in mind. There may be scope to improve and tighten that up in the Bill during its further progress, which is why I have flagged it to the Minister.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)

Rebecca Paul Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Sackman]

I am very happy to do that. I will make that correspondence available to all members of the Committee and the wider public because it is important that, when judges and others are looking to apply the test, they understand the Government’s rationale and understanding of the provisions.

For reasons that others have articulated, this is an important clause, which recognises something that women’s groups and others have been campaigning on for an awfully long time. It can help to change the culture in our criminal justice system for victims of sexual violence.

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

I would appreciate some clarity from the Minister on the deviation from the recommendations of the Law Commission—again, just so that we are clear. To refresh her memory, the Law Commission, in its written evidence, states that

“Clause 10 does not implement our recommendations in two key respects.

(1) It does not implement our recommendations regarding distinguishing the different categories of evidence and the thresholds that should apply where there is a previous allegation of sexual offending. Nor does it address the confusion about whether FAE should be subjected to the BCE or SBE frameworks”—

that probably means more to the Minister than to me. It goes on:

“As set out above, in our view, if the evidence of an allegation does fall within the definition of ‘sexual behaviour’, the SBE framework should apply. If not, then the bad character framework will apply, or the relevance threshold will apply if the evidence of an allegation is not said to be false or is not alleged to be misconduct.

(2) It does not address the concern that within the BCE framework there is currently no express provision for consideration of the particular risks associated with the sexual nature of previous allegations, as we recommended.”

[Sarah Sackman]

I will set this out in writing so that, again, the hon. Member and the public have it, but I can say, in essence, that although we agreed with the spirit of the entirety of the Law Commission’s recommendation, our view was that stage 1 of the test, which is effectively reflected in the Bill, already sets a high bar. We thought that that was sufficient in the context and that stage 2— I was asked about this previously—would not add materially to the way in which the test operates. However, I will take the opportunity to give a response to the question that the hon. Member has just asked so that she can interrogate that over time.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Evidence of propensity to commit offences involving domestic abuse

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I support this clause quite strongly. We heard powerfully from Claire Throssell in oral evidence how important its impact could be.

Most Members will have experiences like mine through casework of cases where this clause could help. I have heard from parents and family members so distressed at how their cases have been determined, despite clear evidence, where this presumption was obviously given far too much weight in decisions. These words in legislation, which were added and have had an influence on decisions, need to go.

I want to read parts of correspondence I received after the announcement in October 2025 that this measure was going to be changed. My constituent described it as an enormous relief. They were very impatient to know exactly when this was going to come forward. I am very pleased that we are discussing this now before the end of the Session.

My constituent said:

“I have personal experience of the impact the current legal framework can have. I am unable to provide specific information as a very close family member is still going through Family Court hearings to protect a child in a case of domestic abuse. However, as recently as January this year”—

this was in 2025—

“the aforementioned person was advised by two independent firms of solicitors to avoid the Family Court at all costs, due to the ‘presumption of involvement’, allied with the inconsistent and regionally patchy training and understanding by Family Court judges in domestic abuse (in spite of changes to the Domestic Abuse Act in 2021), referring to potential outcomes in Child Arrangements as ‘a lottery’.”

I really do support this clause. I also support the amendments in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester, which will help to tackle training gaps and which also reflect experiences that I can recall from casework. They are based on high-quality work and requests from organisations that work directly with victims and survivors, who have asked for these changes. I hope that the Minister will look at making changes that further strengthen the Bill in this way.

[Rebecca Paul]

I begin by echoing the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. I completely understand why the Government have brought this clause forward. I welcome the debate. Similar to the hon. Member for Chichester, who spoke so eloquently, I was deeply moved by the evidence we heard from Claire Throssell. I cannot even imagine how she has coped. To do what she has done and to try to take something positive from that is an incredible thing.

The evidence this Committee has heard from those witnesses and other survivors of domestic abuse is that they feel that the family courts have not properly identified risk and believe that a pro-contact culture has, at times, overridden safety. That is extremely concerning, and it is absolutely right that we take it extremely seriously.

Child safety must come first. Where the present framework has contributed to poor outcomes, it is right that the Government act, but it is also incumbent on us today to make sure that the clause that is being repealed is indeed the cause of the harm to those children. I also make the point that, where Parliament removes an existing statutory principle, it has a duty to be clear about what will replace it.

My concern today is less with the Government’s objective than with whether repeal on its own is sufficiently precise, evidence based and thought through to achieve the Ministers’ intended objective. The Government’s own impact assessment, which has already been set out, says that

“repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”,

even though it is expected to

“change the process judges follow”.

That is an important starting point for this debate. It is really important that we do not make changes to law because everyone wants us to make those changes and thinks that will improve things when, in reality, we have the evidence and facts to know that it may not deliver those outcomes.

It is incumbent on all of us to make sure that we actually deliver the outcomes that we all desire; we all have the same ambition. I know this comes from a good place and we are all approaching this debate in the best way we can to protect children. My purpose this afternoon is to be constructive—I am not saying I have all the answers on this, and I hope my comments will be taken in that spirit. If the Government proceed with repeal, do they also need to do more to provide a principles replacement framework, clearer guidance and stronger supporting reforms?

It is important to start with the facts around the presumption. The current presumption does not give any parent an automatic right to contact, override the welfare checklist or override the paramountcy principle in section 1 of the Children Act 1989, and it certainly does not require courts to make orders that place children at risk. The Family Services Foundation is clear in its written evidence that current law already places the child’s welfare first, stating:

“Section 1(6)…expressly ensures the presumption applies”

only where parental involvement

“does not put the child at risk of suffering harm”.

It says that practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already provide an important framework for identifying and responding to abuse in family proceedings.

Equally, I recognise the contrary concern expressed by survivors who say that, in abuse cases, the presumption can place pressure on courts to prioritise parental contact even where there are serious safety concerns and can make it harder for victims to be properly heard and protected. The real question is therefore not whether safety matters more than contact—it plainly does—but whether removing the current presumption will improve how risk is identified and acted upon, or whether it risks creating new uncertainty while leaving the deeper operational problems untouched and discouraging parental involvement in cases where it would actually be beneficial.

There are already substantial protections in the current legal framework, although they clearly fail in the worst way on occasion. The Family Services Foundation points out that the Children Act 1989, practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already equip the courts to restrict or refuse contact where “harm is shown”. It also reminds us that the UK is bound by the UN convention on the rights of the child, including article 9, which recognises that children should maintain regular contact with both parents unless that is

“contrary to the child’s best interests”.

Both Parents Matter makes a similar point, saying:

“The Presumption was introduced in 2014”

to reflect the UNCRC and provide a statutory benchmark that the safe involvement of both parents generally furthers child welfare. I emphasise the word “safe”—no one has ever said that parents should be involved if it is not safe. I make those points not to argue that nothing should change. If the Government are minded to proceed, we need a clear understanding of how the replacement framework will continue to distinguish between safe parental involvement, which can be beneficial, and unsafe parental involvement, which must be stopped. At present, I am not sure the Bill by itself gives enough reassurance on that point, and I am worried that safe parental contact will be discouraged.

That leads to one of the most important points of all. The Government’s own documents suggest that repeal alone may not be the solution that they are hoping it will be. As mentioned earlier, the impact assessment says,

“repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”,

although it is expected to change the process that judges follow. That is a significant admission. It suggests that if the Government want safer and better outcomes in family proceedings, repeal can be only part of the picture, and perhaps not the decisive part.

We should keep in mind that many of the awful failures that have rightly horrified people seem to be failures of risk assessment, information sharing, institutional practice, professional judgment and resourcing. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys puts it well:

“If abusive contact is being ordered or preserved inappropriately, then the concern lies with the quality of risk assessment, the speed and fairness of investigation, and the consistency with which courts and agencies apply the law.”

That is a useful and constructive way of putting the point. It does not deny the seriousness of the problem, but it does ask whether the solution is the right one. My concern is not that the Government want to strengthen protection; it is that repeal may be presented as more self-sufficient than, on the basis of the evidence, it really is.

I also think the Committee should be careful and candid about the strength of the evidence base behind repeal. Both Parents Matter says that the Government’s own review

“provided limited and inconclusive evidence of the impact of the Presumption. It could not determine how often the Presumption was applied in judgments, nor could it assess how harm…related to the application of the Presumption.”

It also criticises the underlying methodology:

“Quantitative analysis was based on only 245 court judgments, with over half from a single magistrates’ bench. Qualitative analysis involved only 29 parents.”

It added that the literature review

“examined only 55 studies, excluded all research published after April 2024,”

and omitted

“major studies showing positive outcomes”

from safe shared parenting and ongoing parental involvement.

Other evidence goes further, arguing that the Government review appears to have misunderstood or overstated the conclusions to be drawn from Professor Anja Steinbach’s work. I recall a striking line from Professor Steinbach, who said:

“There is plenty of research showing that contact with both parents is beneficial”,

and

“except for violence…contact with both parents is the baseline.”

I do not think that material should make the Committee cautious about treating the review as a fully settled or exhausted evidential platform for repeal.

Again, my point is not that that means that repeal must not happen; it is that we should not over-claim what the existing evidence can prove or support. I also think it is important to avoid turning this into a false choice between protecting children from abuse and supporting children to maintain safe relationships with both parents. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys says that the public debate often frames the issue in that way. However, it says:

“A good family justice system must do both. It must protect children and adult victims from abusive parents. It must also protect children from the avoidable loss of safe, loving, and important parental relationships.”

I think that is right.

The Family Services Foundation similarly said:

“reform should focus on enhancing the protections available, rather than creating conditions that may inadvertently prevent children from maintaining safe, meaningful relationships with their parents.”

That is why I urge the Minister not to present clause 17 as though all principled concern about repeal is somehow concern for parental rights over child safety. It is perfectly possible to support the Government’s child safety objective while asking whether the law should continue to recognise some clear and carefully framed way, where there is no established risk of harm, of enabling children to benefit from stable and safe relationships with both parents.

Several of the written submissions that we received raise concerns about unintended consequences if repeal proceeds without a clear replacement framework. Both Parents Matter warns:

“Removing this important statutory benchmark, and relying instead on practice and non statutory frameworks”

may increase uncertainty, inconsistency and conflict. The Family Services Foundation says something similar, warning that repeal may confuse frontline professionals, affect negotiations outside court, reduce the incentive for out-of-court resolution and, ultimately, increase strain on a family court system that is already under pressure. It notes that only a minority of separated families ever come before the courts, but many more families and professionals orient their expectations around the legal framework.

That is a serious point. Even if the court’s paramount consideration remains unchanged, removing a statutory starting point may still alter behaviour before a case ever reaches a final hearing. It may affect how solicitors advise, how CAFCASS frames disputes, how mediation is approached and how parents negotiate. With that point in mind, I hope that the Minister might be in a position to share some more detail on how she expects the changes to operate, and why she is confident that they will improve outcomes rather than simply shift conflict elsewhere.

--- Later in debate ---

[Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)]

I am finding it difficult to listen to the hon. Member’s speech. I do not believe that we can talk about balance when 68 children have lost their lives because of the presumption. I feel that we have to take forward this clause; it is so important. I want to understand the hon. Member’s terminology and whether she can reflect on the fact that 68 children have already lost their lives because of this presumption.

[Rebecca Paul]

I am sure people saw me during evidence. I get really upset about the loss of any child’s life. We have to remember that we all want to keep children safe—[Interruption.]

[Dr Mullan]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Rebecca Paul]

No, I’m okay.

I would gently say to the hon. Member for North West Leicestershire that I hope she has heard—and even seen—enough from me to know that I am here to protect children. Of course I am horrified by any loss of a child, but my point is that I am trying to step back, be objective and say, “What is the reason that those children lost their lives?”. I am not convinced that it was the parental presumption—I am not saying that I am right on that; I am just open-minded to it.

I have seen a particular case quite closely—I should declare that I am a serving county councillor in Surrey—and that is the case of Sara Sharif. I have gone through the safeguarding reviews in a huge amount of detail; it affected all of us councillors in Surrey greatly. It was an absolutely awful case. So many things went wrong throughout her life. From the family courts to social services, her GP and the school, there was just a barrage of failure that led to that poor little girl being murdered, and that absolutely could have been prevented.

People might argue, “Well, if we had removed the parental presumption, that would have saved her.” Having gone through all that, I can tell the hon. Member that, in that case, it would not have done anything. It was safeguarding failures. People just made mistakes. They got things wrong. They were too worried about offending people to take the right actions.

What I am saying today is just that it is really important, when we look at these things, that we diagnose what went wrong. We have to do that quite objectively. That is difficult when we are hearing from lots of different people who have gone through awful things, but our job is to try to not be emotional—I say that having got emotional myself—and to look at it logically. At the end of the day, we all just want to deliver the outcome that protects children. That is what all of us on this Committee want to do. But it is important that we can talk about that without the hon. Member suggesting that I somehow do not care about children, because what I am trying to do is to have that objectivity, because it matters to me so much that we do protect those children that I want us to have that proper debate and to say, “Is this really the right way or are there other things we can be doing? Do we need to do multiple things? Maybe this isn’t enough.” I am not saying that we should not do it; I am saying that we just need to make sure that we have thought this through.

I will be really keen to hear from the Minister; I know this really matters to her as well, and she will have done that thinking, so I look forward to hearing her thoughts on the challenges I have brought up today. But, as I say, I keep an open mind, and we all share the same objectives.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Am I right in thinking that the hon. Member agrees with me that, when we are trying to legislate for what the most complex part of our justice system—families—that is an incredibly hard job? We all know from personal experience that the one thing that binds us all is that we have a family; we might disagree on whether they are good ones or bad ones, and whether we get on with them or not, but we all came from somewhere, and they are complicated things.

Across the House, we all share the desire to ensure that we recognise the complexity of family relationships and protect those most vulnerable in our society by making sure that people do not have the right to still have contact with their children when they have done things that mean that they absolutely should not. However, we also recognise that systems are abused, and we see that in all directions; people will always find ways of getting around systems, or of using the criminal justice system to retraumatise or to hold on to some form of control. Does the hon. Member therefore agree with me that, while what we are trying to do here is really complex, we are all doing it for the right reasons?

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree with the hon. Member. I appreciate the fact that she has tabled these amendments and that she recognises that it is not easy to strike this balance, particularly when we are trying to address abuse and alienation cases and it is sometimes hard to know what situation we are dealing with.

We are trying to come up with a system that protects as many people as we possibly can, but I think we also have to acknowledge that it will never be perfect. If anyone thinks that we can change one bit of law and then all of a sudden nothing horrible will ever happen again, I am afraid to say that these awful things will always happen, and things will always go wrong. It is about trying our best to have a framework that gets the balance right.

I will stop there—I have probably made my point. This has been a really good debate, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister about some of the points I have raised.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank all hon. Members for their contributions. I will set out the rationale for clause 17 and then address the central argument presented by Opposition Members about the repeal of the presumption —the Government do not overclaim for it; is not a silver bullet for the problems and challenges of child protection in this country and will not solve all the challenges in our family court—and why we nevertheless think that it is the right thing to do. I will then address the amendment and new clauses.

The Government’s intention through clause 17 is to repeal the presumption of parental involvement from the Children Act 1989. The child’s welfare must always be the court’s paramount concern when making decisions about a child’s life, and that principle is enshrined in the 1989 Act. The Children and Families Act 2014 amended the 1989 Act to introduce a presumption that, in certain private law proceedings, the child’s welfare will be furthered by each parent’s involvement, unless evidence shows otherwise.

We know that, in most families, both parents play a vital role in a child’s life. However, although the legislation clearly states that the presumption is rebuttable and does not apply where a parent poses a risk of harm to the child, it has none the less faced serious and sustained criticism. To echo what others have said about the testimony and campaigning work of Claire Throssell, ably supported by her MP, my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball), Women’s Aid and a whole host of survivors of domestic abuse and those who represent them, the presumption contributes to a pro-contact culture in the family courts that too often prioritises parental involvement over child welfare.

We published our review of the presumption in full last October, and its conclusion was that unsupervised and face-to-face contact was the most common outcome in child arrangements cases, even where there were allegations or findings of domestic abuse. To give some context, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has presented evidence of her own that proven allegations of domestic abuse arise in 80% of those cases. This is prevalent. Those cases come to the court in the way they do because, by definition, family relationships have broken down and there is conflict—that is the nature of these cases, and domestic abuse is already an issue in so many of them. The review demonstrates that, although the presumption is not the sole driver, it can be a contributory factor to a culture in family courts that prioritises parental involvement, even in cases of abuse, which means that, too often, decisions are putting children in harm’s way.

I want to be really clear about that, because we are not overclaiming that the repeal of the presumption will change everything overnight, and we are certainly not saying that it will keep everybody safe. There has been a lot of criticism of the family court, but one thing I do know is that those tasked with making these decisions are trying, through their professionalism, empathy and training, to keep children safe. I do not doubt their good faith. I struggle to imagine the burden of having to make those decisions. We are talking about the devastation of loved ones who have lost children—but imagine being the judge who made that decision, and living with that. I do not think for one second that they would have intended that consequence, and I suspect that, where a child is harmed or even killed as a result of a child arrangement, they regret those decisions every single day.

Through clause 17, we are seeking to ensure that judges approach the application of the law and the welfare checklist, which we regard as really important, with an open mind. The danger with the presumption is that they start with just that: a weighted approach to the consideration of the child’s best interests. We do not think that repealing the presumption is a silver bullet, but it will send a signal to the system—to the leadership of the family court and to everybody who sits within it— that the way to approach this is purely with an open mind, focused on the child.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Rebecca Paul Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Mullan]

The Minister is correct. That is the only time I have referred to it more broadly; I have been consistent throughout in saying that it is a system with significantly less access to jury rights than there is at present. There is a third way: to take the path towards operational excellence and better placed resourcing. We should not trade a centuries-old right for a 1.5% efficiency gain on a Government spreadsheet.

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I speak in support of amendments 59, 35 and 36 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, and the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester. Those new clauses are constructive, and the Government should engage with them seriously. They seek to address the right question: how can we increase capacity, improve efficiency, preserve public trust and make better use of the system before cutting into long-standing criminal justice safeguards?

The Opposition amendments would ensure that before clauses 1 to 7 are commenced, the Government must show that they have exhausted the practical alternatives, such as more sitting capacity, better use of buildings, fewer lost sitting days from late guilty pleas and prisoner transport delays, proper funding for sitting days and a serious examination of extended sitting hours. That is the right order of operations. The Government’s approach too often appears to be about restricting rights first and hoping that savings arrive later. Our approach is to build capacity and fix operational failures first and contemplate introducing legislation only then, and if truly necessary.

Our approach is encapsulated perfectly in amendment 59 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. The amendment would prevent clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill from coming into force until reasonable steps have been taken

“to increase Crown Court sitting capacity, including but not limited to—

(a) using buildings not currently in use as courts to hear cases where cells are not needed, and

(b) reducing lost sitting days as a result of late guilty pleas and prison transport delays.”

That is exactly the right approach, and it is at the heart of the argument we have made throughout proceedings. The Government say that the backlog is so bad that they must remove the right to elect a jury trial, create judge-alone trials, expand magistrates’ sentencing powers and restrict appeals. We say that before they do any of that, they should show us that they have used all the practical means already available to increase capacity and reduce wasted court time.

We are seeking to draw attention to the tangible, everyday causes of courtroom delay, which, as the Minister well knows, is often about the case not being ready, defendants not arriving, late pleas, poor listing, lack of courtrooms or staff, or failure to use the estate properly. If those are the root causes of inefficiency, it is extraordinary to reach first for the curtailment of our ancient right to jury trial rather than for more mundane operational fixes.

I would go as far as to suggest that the evidence that the Committee has received from the Bar Council could almost have been written in support of the amendment. It says that the current backlog was not caused by the availability of jury trials. It supports “opening all…courts so they can hear cases”,

“intense court listing” and “proactive” CPS “case ownership”, “revising” the PECS contract so that

“defendants are delivered to the dock on time”,

“better use of technology” and “proper resourcing”. It also specifically identifies PECS as a problem, and warns that the Government’s impact assessment does not contain enough modelling on the changes needed to make prisoner transport work under the new system.

Amendment 59 also references late guilty pleas. Late pleas waste enormous amounts of time. They consume preparation time, courtroom hours, witness time and judicial energy that is better spent elsewhere. If the Government can reduce late pleas by better case progression, better early engagement or stronger listing discipline, that should happen before constitutional rights are reduced. I am in danger of repeating myself, but this point is central to the Opposition’s position: it is far more sensible to make the existing system work properly than to redesign it around its current inefficiencies.

Another question we should ask is whether every possible physical capacity option has been explored. Are there hearings that do not require cells and could be heard in other suitable buildings? Are there underused spaces in the existing estate? Are there ways to free Crown courtrooms by moving appropriate administrative or preliminary business elsewhere? Those are practical questions to which I have not seen a satisfactory answer. It seems logical that the Government should be required to answer them before commencing clauses 1 to 7. In essence, if the Government are minded to oppose this amendment, they are effectively saying that they are content to shred legal rights before making the effort to prove that they have exhausted all possible operational reform first. That is the wrong way around.

That is also the crux of our case for amendment 35, which was also tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. It would prevent clauses 1 to 7 from coming into force until three conditions have been met. First, the Lord Chancellor must have

“provided funding for at least 130,000 sitting days in the Crown Court in the financial year following the coming into force of this Act”.

Secondly, HMCTS must have assessed that

“the Crown court has, so far as possible, used that allocation of sitting days”.

Thirdly, the Lord Chancellor must have

“made a statement to the House of Commons that the funding provided…has not reduced the number of cases pending trial in the Crown Court compared with the start of the financial year.”

Put as simply as possible, before the Government curtail fundamental safeguards in the criminal justice system, they should first fund and use the Crown court at maximum practical capacity. If that works, there is no need for clauses 1 to 7. If it does not, Ministers can come back to Parliament having at least proven that the obvious operational fix was seriously attempted.

One of the persistent weaknesses in the Government’s case thus far has been the “do nothing” comparison. Too often, the Government present the Bill in the context of a binary choice: do nothing, or accept the package as it is. But that is a false choice; there are other options. One of the most obvious is to run the Crown court at full sitting capacity and see what happens. The Bar Council has welcomed the removal of the cap on sitting days and has long argued that courts should sit at maximum capacity. If increased sitting days are now being funded, those additional days should be allowed to take effect before Ministers demand more controversial, and likely irreversible, changes.

The Institute for Government has also weighed in on this issue. It says:

“There is a lot of uncertainty attached to the potential benefits of the government’s proposed reforms.”

It also says that there is a serious risk that these reforms could backfire and actually cause a decline in court performance. It identifies productivity as central, noting that the assumptions behind the Government’s proposed savings are “uncertain”. If boosting productivity and increasing sitting capacity are critical, then amendment 35 is exactly the right kind of test. Let us see whether properly funded sitting days can reduce the backlog before proceeding with more radical measures.

Amendment 35 is therefore one of the strongest amendments we are considering today. It does not deny the reality of the backlog—the Opposition never have. Rather, it confronts it directly. It does not say, “Do nothing,” it says, “Do the obvious thing first—fund the Crown court, use the capacity, report back and only then consider whether more fundamental changes are genuinely necessary.”

I also support amendment 36, also tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. It would prevent the Lord Chancellor from

“bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until he has…undertaken a consultation on the potential benefits of introducing extended sitting hours in the Crown Court, and…laid before Parliament a report on the outcome”.

The consultation would have to consider

“potential rates of fees and remuneration for legal professionals and court staff working extended hours”

and the availability of HMCTS staff. The amendment is a reasonable one. It simply requires the Government to consult and report before commencing clauses 1 to 7. Given the scale of the changes the Government are asking us to approve, that is not an excessive demand, in my view.

The amendment also seeks to address one of the practical concerns around extended sitting hours. It recognises that extended hours may have benefits but also inherent costs. It explicitly requires consideration of remuneration and staff availability. We all understand that we cannot run a court system merely by wishing it to sit longer. Judges, advocates, court staff, legal professionals, witnesses and support services all have to be able to make the model work. If hours are to be extended, that must be properly resourced.

That is precisely why a consultation is needed. The Government should not be able to say on the one hand that extended hours are too complicated to consider, while on the other hand pressing ahead with sweeping reforms to jury trial and appeal rights. If their position is that extended hours are impractical, Ministers should set out the evidence. If extended hours are practical in some settings, Ministers should explain where and how. If remuneration is the problem, the Government should consult on it. If staffing is the problem, they should say so. What the Government should not do is ignore the question altogether, as they seem to have done here.

There is also a simple point of fairness. The Government are asking defendants, victims, witnesses, lawyers and the public to accept major changes to the criminal process. They should therefore be willing to accept a much smaller burden: to consult, report and explain why a less constitutionally disruptive capacity measure is or is not viable. Taken alongside amendments 59 and 35, amendment 36 offers a coherent and moderate alternative path forward: build capacity first, fund sitting days first, examine extended hours first, fix operational problems first and only then ask Parliament to consider whether the more drastic provisions in clauses 1 to 7 are necessary. That is a measured and responsible approach that the Government should consider accepting.

I will speak briefly to new clauses 3, 4, 5, 13, 17 and 22, which would improve the Bill. They focus on delivering capacity, efficiency, transparency, public trust and practical reform in line with what the Opposition also seek to achieve. New clause 3 would allow certain Crown court locations or courtrooms to operate as extended-capacity courts, with a morning session from 9 am to 1 pm and an afternoon session from 2 pm to 6 pm. The purpose of that is to allow two different cases to be heard in the same courtroom on the same day. That is clearly a significant operational proposal, and while the principle is sound, it raises serious questions about the availability of judges, court staff, interpreters, security and CPS staff. It also raises questions about remuneration, because the criminal Bar, solicitors and court staff are already under enormous strain. A justice system running on exhausted people will not produce better justice simply because the building stays open for longer. We need to consider all those things at the same time.

New clause 3 is aimed at the right problem: capacity. The Government are asking us to make very large changes to jury trials, allocation and appeals. Before they do that, they should be able to show that every realistic capacity option has been explored. If courtrooms can be used more intensively without compromising fairness, quality or the welfare of those involved, that should at least be examined. The Bar Council’s evidence is clear that the backlog has not been caused by jury trials but by under-investment, poor management of the estate, failures in prisoner transport, listing problems, technology issues and inadequate resourcing. New clause 3 seeks to address that; it asks how we increase throughput while keeping the basic architecture of justice intact.

New clause 4 takes a more cautious approach, and for that reason, it may be the more attractive version of the idea. It would require an independent report into the feasibility of holding two trials a day in designated courtrooms, followed by a Government response and proposals for a pilot, if appropriate. That seems to be a serious and reasonable way to proceed. It does not assume that the model will work: it asks for independent work; evidence; consideration of the effect on defendants, victims, witnesses, judges, practitioners and staff; and an assessment of cost and resource implications.

New clause 5 would require the Lord Chancellor to publish annual targets for reducing the Crown court backlog, both nationally and in each HMCTS region, and to report to Parliament on progress. Again, that appears useful and sensible. If backlog reduction is the central justification for the Bill, Ministers should be willing to define what success looks like and be judged against it.

The regional element is especially important. We know that the backlog is not the same everywhere, and it is undeniable that some court centres have done better than others, sometimes because of stronger local leadership, better listing or more effective case progression. Others face particular estate, staffing or operational problems, and a national figure alone can hide those differences. If the Government are relying on predicted reductions of sittings days and caseload, Parliament should be able to see whether those predicted benefits are actually being delivered, and where they are and are not being delivered.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Rebecca Paul Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Sackman]

The hon. Lady makes a fair point. There is a mismatch between the performance data that PECS has recorded and the qualitative evidence that one hears from barristers and the judicial office as to the time that is being lost because prisoners are not being produced on time. One of the things we discussed in the first meeting of the oversight board was that we need to have a shared understanding of the data and how we capture it.

Another important theme, which we will come to in respect of another new clause, is remote hearings. Clearly, while we absolutely need to improve and speed up the operation of prisoner transport, and initiatives like opening up bus lanes are all to the good, we also have a demand issue. If we want to reduce the demand for prisoner transport, unless it is needed to further the interests of justice, one way to alleviate some of the pressure is to make greater use of remote hearings. This kind of cross-agency working and grip, with ministerial attention, as well as taking soundings and engaging with the Bar, which sees the effects every day, is going to be really important.

We are expanding case-progression functions and case co-ordinators to every Crown court; introducing staff with delegated judicial powers to focus on progressing cases; and sorting out problems that would otherwise take up judges’ time and reduce the hearing time that we spoke about earlier. All those things are under way and will drive at the problem. But I want to be honest with the hon. Member for Reigate, and others who maintain the argument that we should make the efficiencies and have the uncapped sitting days and the investment before we trouble ourselves with reform.

I am a realist, and when I look right across Government, questions of efficiency and productivity challenge our public services all the time. Of course we want our systems to be more efficient, and so we should—the taxpayer deserves nothing less—but we have the insight of the independent review, and our own modelling, which assumes that we have maximalist investment coupled with 5% efficiency gains year on year, and those two things together will not reduce the backlog. They temper it and dampen it down, but they do not cut into it. Assuming efficiency gains above 5% year on year would be optimistic for the system. If it were easy to do, previous Governments would no doubt have achieved it. I am not going to assume more than a 5% efficiency gain, because to do so would be setting ourselves up to fail.

This is probably the area where I take issue with the Institute for Government, because although it accepts, in broad terms, the time savings that can be made through our reform package—I understand that Members will say, “The assumptions are highly uncertain” and all the rest of it—it assumes that we can revert to the efficiency levels that existed pre-pandemic. It essentially assumes an efficiency gain of between 18% and 20% practically overnight, and I simply do not think that that is achievable.

Of course we want to drive improvements in prisoner transfer. Of course we hope that case co-ordinators will get the systems going through, and that blitz courts will work, particularly in London, where things are most acute. But I am not prepared to assume that all that will cumulatively amount to efficiency gains of more than 5% year on year, because we have all seen the lessons, not just from the criminal justice system but right across public services, in respect of how difficult efficiencies are to achieve.

That is why we are pulling every lever—not just the investment or the efficiency drive but the structural reforms—so that the investment is going into a reformed, modernised system that takes the decision to reallocate work to the magistrates court, where we know that cases are dealt with in a more timely and proportionate fashion, and out of the Crown court. That is what all these reforms amount to.

I know the establishment of the Crown court bench division keeps being cited because it will make a 2% saving, but we estimate that the package of measures taken together will make a 20% saving, because of the combined effect of the changes to magistrates courts’ sentencing powers and the magistrates retaining more work. We are pulling every lever because, when we combine all three levers, that will get the backlog down in the timeframe that the Deputy Prime Minister has set out in his various statements.

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

It is wonderful to hear the Minister’s enthusiasm for the changes, but if she is so confident that they will deliver that benefit, why was she not willing to start with a pilot, or even agree to a sunset clause?

[Sarah Sackman]

I do have confidence in the changes. Look at the levers in the Government’s gift: we can get more money for the system—tick. We can try to drive performance and govern the system to be more efficient—we are doing everything we can, but I refuse to be over-optimistic about that. The other lever I can pull is reform, based on the recommendations we have had. The hon. Lady asks me why we are not piloting, being more cautious or waiting for the efficiencies to work themselves through the system rather than running all these things in parallel, and I simply say: look at the crisis we are in, and look at the extent of the problem.

If I were to wait for that 5% to play out year on year, even with maximalist investment, I cannot say that we would get the backlog down in 20 or 30 years. I do not know if we would ever get it back down, because our modelling shows that it is insufficient. That is the conclusion that Sir Brian Leveson drew and it is supported by our impact assessment. It is why we have to act for the people stuck in the system now, with their cases being listed until 2030.

I have drawn on healthcare analogies a number of times in this debate, as have others. The NHS, for example, is an institution that always needs more funding—we are all living longer, and some of the conditions we are facing are more and more complex—but we do not keep pouring money into an unreformed system. Here, we are saying, “Let’s reform the system, get it working better and more efficiently, and give it a chance to succeed by equipping it not just with the investment in terms of sitting days, but with the capital investment, too.”

This is not, I hope, an enthusiastic strategy. I call it the kitchen-sink strategy, because I am trying to throw everything at it to achieve the real-time goal of bringing down these backlogs. When we announced these plans and the timeframe for when we expected to see the backlogs come down, even with these bold and radical plans, the argument I was met with was, “My goodness, you’re not getting the backlog down until 2035,” and we are pushing to see if we can make that date sooner and pulling at every lever we have.

I understand that this Department is going to be judged on whether we turn the corner on the backlog in this Parliament, and whether we see it start to come down in enough time, so that victims of crime and defendants on remand can start to feel it in this Parliament and certainly early into the next. That is the essay question I set myself, and we asked for a comprehensive, evidence-based answer from an independent review. It told us that we could not pick and choose our levers; we need to use all three, and that is what these measures are designed to drive at. That is the best explanation I can give for why we say that, while efficiency and investment are hugely important and necessary, they alone are not sufficient. We need the reforms in clauses 1 to 10.

New clauses 32 and 33, which were tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) and for Bolton South and Walkden, rightly highlight the disparities in outcomes that we see across our criminal justice system, and the questions about the trust and confidence that many minoritised communities have in the system. We had a constructive debate on this issue last week, generated by new clause 29, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington.

As I said then, the Government are listening carefully, not only to the Committee but to stakeholders that represent those communities impacted every day by questions of racial inequality in the criminal justice system. We remain committed, during a later stage of the Bill’s passage, to tabling a Government amendment on a review that will cover all the things that we believe are necessary, including consideration of the impacts of our criminal justice system not just on black and minority ethnic groups but on those from working-class backgrounds. Given that commitment, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press the new clauses to a vote.

New clause 13 touches on efficiencies, on which I have already set out my arguments, and also addresses questions of public trust in the system. A theme of our debates has been the importance of public trust in our criminal justice system. Even those who do not directly interface with the criminal justice system need to know that it works and is there if they need it.

There are two essential elements to sustaining public trust, the first of which is transparency. We have spoken about this a lot, and I know the hon. Member for Chichester has tabled further new clauses on transcripts. We have spoken a lot about transcripts and the recordings of proceedings in both the magistrates court and the Crown court. I think that opening up the process and making it intelligible to the public is so important, as well as the provision of reasons by judges in the Crown court bench division. Those are all ways in which transparency can play an important part in maintaining public trust.

However, there is another element of public trust: people trust systems that work. If a system ceases to work and breaks down—if someone who reports an assault that they experienced on their way home from the underground station is told that they will receive a court date that is one or two years away—that is the sort of thing that corrodes trust. We can think of myriad ways in which it can happen, but I would suggest that a state failing to deliver the very basics of timely justice is corrosive of trust.

That is why what I am trying to do is not just about efficacy, or being able to say that we now have a properly run criminal justice system; it is about trust and legitimacy. Those questions of trust are true, irrespective of someone’s social background. We say again that the new clause is not necessary, but those questions around public trust in our system are writ large through the Government’s mission, not just in our approach to this legislation, but in our entire approach to restoring our criminal justice system to the state it needs to be in.