Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting)

Rebecca Smith Excerpts

Thursday 4th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)]

I want to reiterate a lot of the points mentioned by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. Financial education is key to unlocking many of the challenges that we face in adulthood, whether budgeting, debt management, saving or planning for retirement. I introduced a ten-minute rule Bill, the Financial Education Bill, earlier this year; I know we already have an element of it in secondary schools, but we need to go further as a country and ensure that everyone, from the very young upwards, has that education to inform the key decisions in our lives.

I take the hon. Member’s point on DB schemes funding those seeking advice for DC schemes, but it is often the case that members have pensions in both DB and DC schemes: people move quite fluidly from a job in the public sector to one in the private sector, and will inevitably have membership in both DB and DC schemes. The Bill would benefit from the amendment proposed by the Liberal Democrats.

I also take the hon. Member’s point on the need for better engagement by employers. I know some large companies offer employees mid-life MOTs on financial education and management. Certainly, FTSE 100 companies that I have worked for offer employees that kind of support as they approach retirement. I am sympathetic to new clause 1, which amendment 3 is connected to, because it is essential that as we get older and plan for retirement, we are fully informed on those decisions. I will support the Liberal Democrat amendment.

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

In line with what has been said already, my thought is that plenty of financial education is a good thing; to say that some is worth pursuing and some is not seems a bit at odds with what we have been debating. I echo what colleagues have said about workers who come from a DC scheme into a DB scheme and need that education. I am sure there are many new Members who are in that position—I cannot be the only person who is—and, while I am fortunate enough to have taken pension advice throughout my career, I know many people have not.

For me, this is not something that is mandated, but a suggestion for something that could be done. Providing another alternative and another opportunity for people to receive financial education—particularly people in their 20s, 30s and 40s who have not had it at school, because it was not part of the curriculum at that point—is something we should welcome and not restrict.

The amendment seems to me perfectly sensible. I appreciate why some people might think it does not go far enough, or that the matter will be addressed later in the reporting back that the Government will do on pensions in general, but the emphasis on people around the age of 40 is particularly important, because they still have a good 20 years—or 30 years, potentially; who knows what will come forward from the Government?—to work and to ensure that they maximise returns to achieve adequacy. Having an additional vehicle to do that seems to me a sensible thing, and I put on record my support in the same way that my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Leicestershire has.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

In a broad sense, we are very happy to support the clause. There are, though, a number of issues, and the point about benchmarking and what performance is being valued against can be rather complicated. We heard from the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Torbay, a little earlier about his father’s experience of putting money aside and finding himself wanting to take it out in October 1987—I remember it well; I had been a dealer on the floor of the London stock exchange, so a stock market crash was a pretty hideous thing. However, if we look at a chart of the FTSE 100 from the early 1980s up to now and the 1987 crash, although I think it was down 37% at one point, looks like the smallest of blips in what was otherwise a very long-term bull market that continues to this day.

The one thing we do know for sure is that those wanting better performance are likely to be investing in slightly more volatile assets. That can come from investing in equities or higher-growth businesses. There is no doubt that some higher-growth businesses will go bust, because they are taking risks, but ultimately, how many of us wish we had put more money into Amazon, Google or Apple back in the late 1990s? At the time it was not necessarily seen as a brilliant thing, but some of these businesses have done unbelievably well. That said, how can anybody understand how a company like Tesla, which is really a battery manufacturer, is worth more than General Motors, Ford and Chrysler? It does not necessarily make a huge amount of sense, and yet people are still investing in it.

We can find ourselves looking at the value for money framework and come up with a load of benchmarks, which brings us to the point about the intermediate rating. We could find that an intermediate rating is done at a time when there are particular problems in the stock market, yet, looking at the long term, we could have what could turn out to be a stunning performance. We have to be very careful and not find ourselves throwing out the good in favour of the perfect. This will be something quite complicated; I do not necessarily think it is something for the Bill to worry about, but, as we continue the discourse of pensions performance and adequacy, we need to be very careful that we do not become obsessed with ruling out risk.

There is a big argument about risk in our economy at the moment, which, again, is not for this place, but we could find ourselves ruling out risk. The other thing worth bearing in mind is that, by ruling out risk, we could stop money being invested into businesses that may look absolutely bonkers today, but turn out to be the next Apple, Amazon or Google. We just have to be careful about that.

I suspect we shall have lots of debates over this. The Pensions Minister is on such a meteoric career progression at the moment that I am sure he will find himself as Chancellor of the Exchequer before very long—probably quicker than he imagines—but this is something that we need to keep an eye on. As I say, it is about making sure that we do not rule out the good in pursuit of the perfect.

[Rebecca Smith]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech with a very good historical analysis of what has happened over the last 30 or 40 years. It is worth reflecting on the risk point, particularly for the wide age range of people who hold pensions. This came up during the evidence session: if we end up avoiding risk, the people who are just starting out in their careers and might only be in their early 20s or 30s could end up with a pension that does not deliver anywhere near what it could have delivered, if we apply those same factors. A thought that came to me in the evidence session was how we can ensure that our system allows for risk at the bottom end, but with a tapering out of risk as people get older. The Minister is the expert in this area, and I am interested to know what might be possible in the future. Ultimately, we want to ensure that value for money is based on the right level of risk for the right stage in people’s careers and the right stage in their pensions journey.

[Mark Garnier]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. The story that the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Torbay, told about his father is the most important point here. As we come to the point where we want to cash in the defined-contribution pension, we could find ourselves cashing in at completely the wrong moment. In a stock market crash, although it could be just a blip in a long-term bull market, none the less the hon. Member’s father would have seen a 37% drop in the value of his equities if he was benchmarked to the FTSE 100. If he was in higher growth businesses, he could, as the hon. Member said, have seen a 50% drop. So we have to be very careful.

We can be as risky as we like when we are 21 years old. I cannot remember whether it was Adam Smith or Einstein who said that the eighth great wonder of the world is compound interest. Obviously we want to take risk early but, as we come up to that day when we finally turn our papers in and go home on the last day of work, we need to make sure we have got as much money out of our pension fund as we possibly can. That is why it is important to ensure that the VFM framework does not cause problems.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I beg the Committee’s patience, as a number of clauses are grouped here—Members can thank the powers that be for that—and I will run through them all.

Clause 21 enables the Government to introduce a small pots data platform. This platform will be responsible for determining where each small dormant pot should be consolidated. It will ensure that decisions about where pots should go are made consistently, transparently and with the members’ best interests in mind.

International evidence from other countries, such as Australia, with similar pension systems to the UK has shown that a central platform improves consolidation outcomes, rather than just putting duties on schemes to sort it out. This clause establishes the framework to allow for the necessary infrastructure to be built to support data matching and pot consolidation. The Government believe that the infrastructure will be required to support pension schemes to deal with the volume of small pots that left the hon. Member for Wyre Forest aghast five seconds ago, effectively and efficiently.

As Members may know, we recently worked with Pensions UK, who have undertaken a feasibility review to examine and assess the technical requirements of the small pots data platform. The Government will consider that work as part of our next stages in developing the necessary infrastructure and the underpinning legislation. However, before committing to how best to deliver this infrastructure, we must undertake that full and proper assessment of capabilities.

Clause 22 enables the Government to ensure that members are properly informed about any action that is taken to consolidate their small dormant pension pot. Transfer notices will be the key point of communication between the scheme and the member. We have not had the time to make this point yet, but obviously it will be up to members to opt out of consolidation should they so wish.

[Rebecca Smith]

How will members know that they have that opt-out? Will that be clear enough, given all the comments we have been making on financial education? People have got to be pretty engaged, and we know from the history that they are not always that engaged in their future.

[Torsten Bell]

That is an important question. The communication to members will be standardised, by providing the key information that has to be provided and the option of an opt-out—so it will be explicit that they have the option to opt out of the consolidation process—as well as their alternative options, for example moving their fund into another consolidator. I hope that that answers the question.

The notice is of high importance, because receiving that key information is basically the only point at which the member is informed about what is happening to the financial transaction—the Government are not generally in the business of legislating to change people’s financial arrangements without their consent. Clause 22 will ensure that schemes are bound by regulations to send prescribed information that will enable a member to make the decisions, for exactly the reasons that the hon. Lady set out.

Clause 23 will introduce an important safeguard in the broader framework for consolidating small dormant pension pots. It recognises that although automatic consolidation will benefit the majority, it may not be right for everyone and in all circumstances. The Bill aims to streamline pension savings and reduce fragmentation across the industry, but the clause ensures that members’ interests remain at the heart of the process.

Under the clause, a small dormant pension pot may be designated as exempt from automatic transfer if two key conditions are met. First, the pot must satisfy certain prescribed conditions, which will be set out in regulations. Secondly, the trustees or managers of the scheme must determine that it is in the best interests of the individual or a class of individuals in their scheme for the pot to remain where it is.

That is a vital member protection and safeguard. It recognises that although consolidation is generally beneficial, because it reduces administrative costs, there will be circumstances in which transferring a pot may not be in the member’s best interest. The clause provides the ability for the scheme to make that clear and not to transfer in those circumstances.

Pension Schemes Bill (Third sitting)

Rebecca Smith Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 4th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to ask the Minister about the comments made on Tuesday in relation to the transparency already required of local government pension schemes. My understanding is that local government pension schemes are already pretty transparent, and that they are required to publish significant amounts of information.

On the amendment and the requirement for annual reporting, the case was made on Tuesday—I forget by who—that a particular moment in time may not give a true picture of what is going on. Investments may not provide an immediate return. In fact, pension funds are not necessarily looking for an immediate return; they are looking for a longer-term return so they can pay out to tomorrow’s pensioners as well as today’s. Pension schemes are one of the best vehicles for the patient capital that we need to be invested in the economy for it to grow, so I am little concerned that a requirement for annual reporting on specific investments may encourage short-term thinking. Can the Minister confirm what transparency regulations there are in relation to local government pension schemes and how they compare with those for other pension schemes?

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

I want to build on what the hon. Member for Torbay asked. As a former local councillor myself—I am not part of the pension scheme, I hasten to add, so I do not have an interest to declare—the bit from the evidence session that came out for me, thinking through this bit of the Bill, relates to the equivalent in treasury management. As a council, we often borrowed from the Public Works Loan Board to invest in, for example, a shopping centre to get the income from rent, business rates and so on. What safeguards or requirements will be put in place to ensure that any money spent from a pension fund goes on capital rather than revenue? I appreciate that council tax revenue increases could be used for that, but are there any safeguards to ensure that the money is not just spent and then does not exist anymore?

Pension Schemes Bill (Second sitting)

Rebecca Smith Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[John Milne]

Q The DWP argues that the funds are on the public balance sheet and therefore they object to using them for this purpose. Do you think that is fair, given that the funds were not acquired by the taxpayer?

Michelle Ostermann: To clarify the word “using”, as I think it is important, the PPF is an arm’s length body and those assets are ringfenced. Our board has independence over those. It was set up that way—arm’s length—20 years ago to make sure that it was a dedicated protection fund for that industry. It so happens that we do fall under some of the fiscal measures, so both our assets and liabilities do show. However, there is a bit of a conflict there in that we manage them in the prudent, almost in a trusteed fashion, on behalf of our members and all of our stakeholders. But the use of them would have to be prescribed by the board, legislated, and then approved by the board for its affordability, so as to not put at risk the rest of the industry that we are backstopping.

The ability for us to be able to afford that and the risk to the organisation is the primary, most sacrosanct thing that our board does. We have very complicated actuarial models to figure out the affordability of all the risks that we take on in the entire industry. That is why we have gone through quite a bit of work to build, just recently, a much more sophisticated model to estimate both the asset and liability implication to us and have even started to form a plan for how we might implement it. So we stand at the ready, but it is beyond our responsibility to be able to legislate the necessary change for it.

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

Q Given the international experience that both of you have in this realm, I am interested to know whether there is either anything in the Bill that you think is a red flag or anything that you think is a missed opportunity and not in the legislation in front of us today.

Michelle Ostermann: That is fascinating. I came to the UK, and back to the UK, because I have so much enthusiasm for the UK and the pension system. I am very fortunate to be the chair of the global pension industry association, so I study pension systems around the world and am quite familiar with many of them. The UK pension system is the second largest in the world by size if you include underfunded pensions. It is one of the most sophisticated, but it is the second most disaggregated. As I think a few of my peers mentioned before we got up here, it has fallen behind, frankly. I think the motives that are in this Bill are exceptionally important—they are foundational. I love that we are speaking on scale and sophistication. These are absolutely key, in both DB and DC. I want to underscore that; it is really key.

One thing that is not spoken of quite as much is the concept of an asset owner and the importance of governance. In relation to the successful countries that I have seen, which have mastered the art of pensions and the ability to translate pensions into growth, it is not a proven model, but there is a best practice such that countries are able to make growth by leveraging pension systems. I think that right now we are trying to solve a problem of two things: reshaping the pension system and trying to solve the need for a growth initiative. They are one thing in my mind; they really are one thing. It is not a surprise that as we have de-risked the pension system over two decades, it has, I suspect, quite directly, but at least indirectly, affected overall economic growth.

Making members wealthier pensioners in general and less dependent on social services is what many countries are trying to do and use their pension systems for. I see that out of the commission that is being started, so I am most excited about the next phase. I think there is a lot of potential, and we at the PPF are doing quite a bit of research and want to be able to feed some global ideas into that.

Morten Nilsson: I come from Denmark originally and I think, to echo some of what Michelle said, scale just matters in pensions. The Danish pension industry has been fortunate to have few and relatively large schemes. One of the things I saw when I came over to the UK 15 years ago was that the industry here is very fragmented, and that fragmentation means also that there are so many conflicts of interest in the market. That in a way makes it quite hard to get the best outcomes, and that of course leads into the governance models that Michelle talks about. So this Bill is something we very much welcome across what it is covering. I think it is a really good initiative, but I think scale matters, and governance really matters. I would not underestimate how big a change it is, in the defined benefit sector, that we are moving from two decades of worrying about deficit into suddenly worrying about surpluses and having very mature schemes, which is the other thing that is important. Most of the DB schemes are closed.

If I talk about the BT pension scheme, the average age is 71, so they are pretty old members and that means there is a risk level, from an investment perspective, that really matters. We are paying out £2.8 billion a year in member benefits. That means liquidity is really important. It is really important that we have the money to pay the members and that we do not end up being a distressed seller of assets.

So there is quite a lot in that evolution we are on, and when we go into surplus management or excess funds—Michelle was talking about this at macro level; we would be managing at our micro level in each scheme— I think it becomes really critical that we have the right governance to manage what is a new era. I would really recommend that the Pensions Regulator issue guidance as soon as possible on all this, because it will be quite uncomfortable for a lot of trustees. It will be quite difficult also for the advisers in how we manage this new era.

[David Pinto-Duschinsky]

Q I am really glad that you both mentioned governance, because that absolutely stands at the heart of this. You also mentioned conflicts. We have not talked much about the role of consultants and things like that, but it is clear that you think the framework laid out by the Bill will be helpful and a key part of mobilising those things.

Conversations that I have had also flag up the importance of culture among trustees. We can give people the tools, the powers and the permission to invest, and we can be clear in the framework we set up, but, culturally, they may still be very risk averse. Of course, some of that is appropriate because they have to safeguard member benefits, but there is a point about whether they are overly cautious and about how one creates the appropriate culture to go with the change. From your perspective, what is needed to create the right culture to go alongside the right governance?

Michelle Ostermann: I have one small observation from when I first came to the UK. I recognise that there is a very strong savings culture, but not necessarily an investment culture, and there is a distinct difference there. I even notice the difference when we talk about productive finance targets. We speak in terms of private assets, but there is a difference between private equity and private debt, and between infrastructure equity and infrastructure lending. All those lending capabilities are here in this country. I feel that the debt sophistication is strong, but where it lacks is the equity.

I am a Canadian. With one of the largest Canadian schemes, we had no problem coming in and buying up assets here in the UK—you may have noticed. We own a lot of it, and with Australia, most of it. The supply was never an issue for us. We brought the scale and sophistication, but what we did not have was a local British anchor. We did not have an anchor investor. We did not have a home-grown Ontario Teachers, a Canada Pension Plan or even an ATP that we could use as the local one. I see that the PPF, NEST and Brightwell can be that. We are still not megafunds. I know that we are referred to as behemoths and megafunds at £30 billion and £60 billion, but the peers with £100 billion, £200 billion and £500 billion are those that are putting in £0.5 billion or £1 billion in one investment. They are not lending, but investing.

That is the biggest difference I notice: the definition of scale and the degree of sophistication. It is even about sophistication in the governance model, and having a board and a management team with that sophistication. It is about having a management team with some power that you are hiring out of investment, and being a not-for-profit and an arm of the Government that is allowed to put in that sophisticated capability, with a board that can properly oversee it so it is not done without proper consideration.

Morten Nilsson: I think it is quite critical that you have trustee boards that are supported well by regulation and guidance, as we talked about before. It would also be helpful to start to focus on the management teams that are supporting the trustees. Cultural change is always very difficult. We must acknowledge that we are coming out of a situation that was really quite difficult for a lot of trustees and sponsors in terms of finding out how to fix the big deficits that schemes had. We must acknowledge that that is where we are coming from and that is the mentality we have had for decades. Regulation and guidance is still all over the place, and we must work through how we move that forward. I really recommend more guidance from TPR and, sooner rather than later, more guidance on surplus extraction. That would help a lot of trustees to take more risk and think in a more balanced way about risks.

Of course, if we are considering allowing excess funding to go back, we need to ensure that we are doing that on a prudent and well-considered basis. It is an educational challenge more than anything, but it is also about the advisers. The market really needs to get comfortable with investing for the longer term. Within that, it is critical that we move away from being obsessed with a mark-to-market, day-to-day obligation. We measure our liabilities on one day of the year and then we might panic if there is a little swing in the market, but we are actually working through quite a long horizon and therefore we can smooth that out in a different way. We need to think about how we look through some of these blips.

Pension Schemes Bill (First sitting)

Rebecca Smith Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[John Grady]

Q With DC—defined contribution—schemes, as you know, savers themselves have discretion about where they put their money. The issue we face, illustrated by Dimson, Marsh and Staunton’s regular review of asset returns, is that people are not saving in things that will get them a long-term return, are they? The other issue we face is that there has been a real shift from public markets to private markets over the past 25 years or so. If you are not investing in those, you are missing out on returns that mean more money when you retire. I was just wondering, Ms Clark, if you could just put into context the work you are doing on the advice guidance boundary review and wider advice to savers, and how that will help pension savers and, therefore, help these reforms succeed?

Charlotte Clark: It is important to say that most people who are saving in a pension are probably saving in the default. When you say that they are choosing their investment, most of them are not. Whether it is the trustees of that scheme or whether it is the independent governance committee of that scheme, most people are going into that default, so the importance of the default is really crucial. While it is important to really think about engagement and talk about the advice guidance boundary review and some of the work that is happening there, it is also important that some people will not want to make those decisions. It is only people like us who seem to care about these sorts of things. Getting other people engaged in their investment is quite a challenge.

You are right that we are doing quite a lot of work, largely around the ISA area and the at-retirement area. One of the challenges at the moment is people taking money out of their pension and then putting it in cash. That may seem like a really wise decision if you are 55, but if you do not need that money for 20 years, it may keep track with inflation but you are going to miss out on asset returns, equity returns or other aspects of investment. So, we are really thinking about how we engage with people about those sorts of discussions. How can we make sure they are getting the right support? It comes back to the targeted support programme, which goes live in spring next year. So, working with providers at the moment on how they can support people when they are making these sorts of decisions, and just think about whether, if it is not full financial advice—I understand that can be very, very costly—are there other areas where we can give people help that is not as kind of extreme as that but allows people to think about those decisions in the round?

Patrick Coyne: I would just add that one of the reforms in the Bill around guided retirement is reflective of that default conundrum we face. We have a brilliant system—11 million more savers—but nobody making an active choice. That means that when people approach retirement, only one in five has a plan to access and when they do, as Charlotte said, half are taking it as cash. That cannot be the right outcome. Within the Bill, introducing a guided retirement duty enables those institutional investors to start to guide individuals or cohorts of members into the right kind of products for them, with clear opt-outs for them to choose a different way. As Charlotte said, the type of support and new form of regulated advice could really help inform savers and make good choices at that point.

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

Q Obviously, a big part of the Bill is the assumption that mandation is a good idea. I would be interested to know to what extent you agree with the Bank of England Governor, Andrew Bailey, that mandating pension scheme investments is not appropriate?

Charlotte Clark: Following on from Zoe and Rob—I think they have articulated this issue really well—I do not think anybody disagrees with the direction of travel: trying to get more assets into private markets and higher return markets, and making sure there is more diversity within portfolios and that the scale of pension funds in the UK are using that in an effective way on investment. The issue of whether mandation is the right tool to use is ultimately one for you and the Government. There are obviously challenges, which Rob and Zoe have articulated, around how you do that, when you have a trustee in place whose responsibility is to the member, and making sure that is paramount in the system?

Patrick Coyne: I agree with that. I think it is fair to say that there is a degree of consensus in the marketplace, among Government, industry and regulators, that we need to make structural reforms to the marketplace and put value for money at the heart of the system. A big part of that is a move towards fewer, larger pension schemes, because of some of the factors that Charlotte just outlined—the ability to in-house your investments; the ability to consider a broader range of investments, which can sometimes be quite complex; and broader governance standards. Mandation is of course a matter for Parliament, but clearly structural reform is needed within the marketplace.

[Rebecca Smith]

Q We are not all Government Members in this room, so we are quite keen to hear what bits you think might work and what bits might not work. That is where the question came from.

As a supplementary question, do you think trustees and scheme managers should be provided with a safe harbour if they are required to invest in assets that underperform? I think that is probably what a lot of the public would be interested in as well. You do not want somebody to be mandated to put money into something that is doing worse than it was doing before it was moved.

Charlotte Clark: There is an exemption in the Bill, though, that basically says that if you are a trustee and you do not believe it is the right thing for your members then you should not put that money in. That is just going to be a very tricky assessment for the trustees or the scheme manager, and then for the regulators, at the point of addressing why they did not meet those levels. If they believe that it is not in the interests of the member, the Bill allows for that.

[Rebecca Smith]

Q Are there not going to be too many hoops to jump through to prove that the trustee is correct, if they have to prove it to a regulator? I suppose that is what the safe harbour means. Will the trustees have the benefit of the doubt, or are they going to have to be watertight in their belief that they are right, to make sure that they can stand up to the regulator?

Charlotte Clark: The level of that process would be something that we would put into secondary legislation and rules. We would really have to think through what that process looks like.

Patrick Coyne: Yes, absolutely. Implementation is critical here. This will be something that is done with wide consultation with the industry.

[Torsten Bell]

Q It is not right to say that mandation is at the centre of this Bill. There is one backstop power and there are a lot of clauses that we are going to spend a lot of the next few months—

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[Alice Macdonald (Norwich North) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q My question is related to that. Aviva, in your written evidence, you spoke quite a lot about the value for money framework. Could you expand on what you think the benefits and challenges are? You also referred to the Australian regulator’s model, in terms of learning. You have already covered a bit of it, but if there anything you could add on what we could learn from that model about incentivising investments in the right areas, that would be great.

Dale Critchley: What we have heard from Australia is that the thing to avoid is regulator-defined targets, which will probably lead to herding, and can lead to schemes avoiding certain investments. For example, in Australia, property includes social housing and commercial property, but there is one benchmark for everything. So pension schemes do not invest in social housing, because they cannot achieve the benchmark through investing in social housing, as the benchmark is common across all property. Those are things to watch out for.

The other piece is that if you have set benchmarks, people will look to achieve the benchmark and not exceed it—they do not want to be the white chicken among all the brown chickens. Those are the things to avoid, in terms of the value for money benchmarks.

[Rebecca Smith]

Q This builds on something that was mentioned in the previous panel by Age UK—that a lot of the education that will need to be done to ensure that people understand what is going on, particularly with the small pots consolidation, could fall on Government, charities or providers. As pension provider representatives, what is your view on how far into the detail the Bill has gone in terms of who is responsible for that? We have seen in other, similar legislation an expectation put on businesses to provide the service, and it is often done at your cost rather than any sort of Government cost. I would be interested to know what you think about that.

Colin Clarke: I think it is right that the Bill, as I understand it, places the responsibility for member education and member communications on the provider, because ultimately the pension provider will be the organisation facilitating these things and making them happen. As was touched on in the previous panel, the availability of Pension Wise and other services like that is valuable, but I think pension providers ourselves have a responsibility to make sure that we deliver the right guidance and support for members.

Dale Critchley: The only thing I would add to that is that, if we start to edge towards guidance, we can come into an issue around marketing. If we sell the benefits of, for example, the default solution, rather than just say, “This is who the default solution is designed for,” and leave it to the customer to join the dots, we may have a better outcome, but it would be marketing, and we cannot do that, because of the privacy and electronic communications regulations. We would need member consent to deliver marketing communications, even though we are trying to help the customer.

[Rebecca Smith]

Q Are you effectively saying that if you put the customer first, which is ultimately what this entire piece of legislation is trying to do, then, at the moment, other regulations will stop that from happening, so we might want to look at that?

Dale Critchley: Yes.

[Rebecca Smith]

The privacy piece came up earlier this morning as well, so that needs looking at.

Dale Critchley: If we deliver something that looks towards targeted support, where instead of just saying, “This is the solution you will go in if you make no choice,” we say, “This is the solution we think is best for you, and you will go in if you make no choice,” that would edge towards marketing, and we could not say that.

[Sarah Edwards]

Q I want to pick up on the changes around DC, and the fact that there are quite a lot of different things—we have talked about value for money, changes in scale and, obviously, default retirement ages. From your perspective, is there a sequencing that needs to happen to make sure that they work, and is that provided for? What would your guidance be around that?

Colin Clarke: I do not think the Bill itself necessarily has the timescales in it, because it will be left to secondary legislation to look at when all these things actually fit together. A very helpful document was published alongside the Bill, with a potential road map. There is a logical order in which certain things have to happen. For example, the value for money test will require movement of members from historical defaults into something that will deliver better value. To achieve that, the contractual override for contract-based schemes would need to be in place in good time before the value for money exercise happens. Otherwise, there will be constraints that might inhibit the ability to do that.

Similarly, with small pots, a lot of the measures will lead to consolidation at scheme level. That will address some, but not all, of the small pots issue. The road map sets out small pots being at the end, and that is a sensible place to put them, because there will be a lot of other activity that happens first that will solve some of the problems. It does not make sense for small pots to be moved before they are moved again—you could see things moving around a couple of times.

On guided retirement, the potential timing of implementation is quite tight if it is going to be 2027 for certain schemes, when we do not have any secondary legislation yet. It is very important that that is consulted on as soon as possible so that we have clarity. Dale mentioned working on various different solutions. We have been doing something similar at L&G, and they may well be the right thing for members, but we know that we will have to fit them around regulations and make some adjustments, so having clarity on those early would be very helpful.

Pension Schemes Bill

Rebecca Smith Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 7th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

It has been a privilege to hear so many well-informed and considered speeches this evening. I am sure we would all agree that there is clearly significant expertise in the Chamber.

The heart of this Bill is people doing the right thing by preparing for their future and saving into their pension pots. With auto-enrolment having been introduced by the Conservatives in 2012, there are now over 20 million employees saving into a workplace pension. That is 88% of eligible employees saving into a pension and preparing for later in life, which is a great achievement that I hope everyone in this House can celebrate. However, while the number of people who are saving has increased significantly, engagement has remained low, as we have heard this evening. Less than half of savers have reviewed how much their pension is worth in the past 12 months, while over 94% of pension savers are invested in a pension scheme’s default investment strategy. With people taking the right steps and starting to save for their retirement early thanks to our action, we must now ensure that the pensions market is working for them, so that they get the best returns on their savings and ultimately have the comfortable and secure retirement for which they were planning.

We have heard many contributions this evening. I will briefly mention the hon. Member for Tamworth (Sarah Edwards) and my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), both of whom gave us lengthy and very detailed speeches presenting both sides of the argument. [Interruption.] They were very enjoyable speeches—that was not a criticism, just an observation of the way things have gone this evening. Both the hon. Member and my right hon. Friend clearly showed the expertise that they garnered earlier on in their careers and expressed some legitimate concerns, particularly about the consensus that there has perhaps been in the Chamber this evening. Some points have been made showing that that consensus is not entirely guaranteed, certainly among Conservative Members. We support the principles behind the Bill—indeed, much of what we have heard builds on the work that the Conservatives were doing while we were in government. We want to ensure that poorly performing pension schemes are challenged, excessive administration costs are removed, and savers receive the best returns on their investments. Ultimately, that is how we will ensure more people have a comfortable retirement.

However, we have concerns about some specific measures in the Bill, which we will scrutinise further as it progresses. In particular, we have significant concerns about the reserve powers that allow the Government to set percentage targets for asset allocation in core defaults offered by defined-contribution providers. In other words, a future Government could tell pension schemes where they must invest their funds, regardless of whether it delivers good returns for savers. This potentially conflicts with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their members. While I know the Minister will stress that the Government do not intend to use those reserve powers, that neither addresses concerns about what a different future Government could do nor explains why those powers are being brought in. It could be asked why the reserve powers are being created at all.

We want to see more investment in the UK market. While this country is one of the largest pension markets in the world, only around 20% of DC assets are invested in the UK. However, the solution should be to make domestic investment more attractive—to create opportunities that deliver better returns for savers—not simply to mandate investment in assets that deliver lower returns. During our last term in office, we worked with the industry to introduce the Mansion House reforms as a voluntary agreement to boost investment in the UK, but this Bill goes further—it could mandate such investment against the wishes of the industry. Similarly, the local government pension scheme will have a new duty to invest in the local economy. While that is understandable at face value, it raises concerns about returns on investments if there are not suitable local opportunities.

We also have questions about some of the Government’s assumptions, and would like to understand more about how they were reached and the evidence used. For example, why is the minimum value for megafunds just £25 billion? Why is having fewer and larger pension providers better? We recognise the benefits of economies of scale, but what about competition and innovation? It has also been raised by the industry that a significant number of details are unknown, as they will come later in the form of regulations. Can the Minister set out some more details on when the various sets of regulations will be published, and whether that will be before the Bill has passed through Parliament?

Finally, the Bill fails to cover a number of areas, and we would like to understand why. Concerns about pension adequacy have been touched on this evening and whether people are saving enough to have the security and dignity in retirement they deserve. Auto-enrolment was a good start, but it will not be the only solution. Indeed, lots of people are still not eligible. When we passed the Pensions (Extension of Automatic Enrolment) Act 2023, the then Conservative Government confirmed their intention to reduce the lower age limit to 18, as has been mentioned this evening. As yet, the current Labour Government have not done so. Auto-enrolment does not apply to self-employed people, despite just 16% of self-employed people actively saving into a workplace or personal pension. The Bill does not look at whether people are saving enough and early enough, and I would be grateful if the Minister could set out whether that is deliberate and whether further action will be taken.

I briefly draw the House’s attention to my declaration in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests as a serving councillor, but I hasten to add that unfortunately I am not a member of the local government pension scheme. Sadly, I was elected after that provision was scrapped, but an entire chapter is given over to the local government pension scheme in this Bill. Indeed, it is a key element, enabling local authorities to use pension schemes to invest in their local economy. However, as with much of the legislation being taken through Parliament at the moment, the who, what and when remain unanswered. Without the English devolution Bill before us, for example, we are not entirely clear on what form local government will take, nor entirely clear on how compatible this Bill is with that forthcoming local government legislation.

We are in effect being asked to legislate on a moveable feast. Indeed, there is likely to be a considerable transition timetable for local government changes, which all raises questions about how the local government reorganisation transition fits in with the plans in the Bill. Following on from the comments of the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth (Jayne Kirkham), how will asset pools work under local government reorganisation? Who gets the potential investment benefits or spending power, and where does all that investment take place?

The Bill also fails to mention any reforms to the local government pension scheme, which reached a record surplus of £45 billion in June 2024. One reason for that might be that it is being used to offset Government debt under the Chancellor’s current fiscal rule, which uses public sector net financial liabilities to measure that debt. That is a huge amount of money in local government terms, and it is not going towards local services, business support or regional projects. Can the Minister confirm whether the Government intend to reform the local government pension scheme beyond the measures outlined in the Bill? Finally on the local government pension scheme, I look forward to seeing more detail as to how newly created asset pools will work in practice with the local government pension scheme.

Local government treasury management over recent years has seen local authorities taking advantage of the investment opportunities available to them to acquire properties and the like, but often some distance from their local authority. That is something to tease out in Committee, but when the Government state that they wish local authorities to have finance available to invest locally to bring economic growth, what does “local” look like?

Finally, can the Minister confirm that fiduciary rules regarding investments and how they are assessed will prevail going forward? Overall, we will support a Bill that reduces administration costs, removes complexity for savers and maximises value for members, ultimately helping people who took the right action to save for their retirement to live in comfort and dignity. While this Bill makes the start, there is more to do to get it right, and we look forward to working with the Government to achieve that. There is plenty of food for thought for amendments to take us forward.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the shadow Minister.

Mother and Baby Institutions Payment Scheme: Capital Disregard

Rebecca Smith Excerpts

Tuesday 10th June 2025 Westminster Hall

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I too congratulate the hon. Member for Beckenham and Penge (Liam Conlon) on securing this debate and on pursuing his private Member’s Bill. It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon.

It is worth reflecting on the stories we have heard. I particularly enjoyed the account shared by the hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire (Rachel Hopkins) and it is great to see Christina in the Public Gallery. The point about the age profile for compensation was particularly poignant to hear; these are women who have lived their entire lives with that uncertainty. I was particularly interested as well in the account from the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby (Ian Byrne); I do not have the same community of Irish men and women in my constituency, so it was good to hear of the connection that he has and of the impact and role of the Irish community in his constituency.

The hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) has the privilege, if that is the word, of having Philomena in her constituency—

[Daisy Cooper]

An honour.

[Rebecca Smith]

An honour—yes, I like that. It is also great to see Jane and Joshua here.

The hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling) always makes very good local connections and shares his own stories so well. This has been a really interesting debate and, although we had the break for the Division, we have been able to hear some good stories.

As the hon. Member for Beckenham and Penge has rightly set out, the mother and baby institutions payment scheme was introduced by the Irish Government to compensate those who had spent time in those institutions in the Republic of Ireland. Today we have heard many of the stories of those who were impacted. Anyone who has watched the tear-jerking film “Philomena”, starring Judi Dench and Steve Coogan—unlike some hon. Members, I have been able to see it, and I admit to having cried—will be familiar with this story. It is very moving to see the impact that the backgrounds of these men and women have had on them for the rest of their lives.

As we have heard, an astonishing 35,000 single mothers gave birth in these homes throughout the 1900s. These women were ostracised and pushed into the homes so that society could forget them. The most infamous case is of Tuam house, where 802 infants tragically died over a 36-year period. Across those 18 institutions in Ireland, 9,000 children died. We are not just talking about the women. Children lost their lives as well: 15% of all the children who lived in those homes. I am sure that hon. Members will agree that that was a travesty.

It is clear that there is agreement across this House on an issue that the hon. Member for Beckenham and Penge has alluded to in his private Member’s Bill. Although no amount of money can replace the loss of a child or atone for the trauma that was inflicted, these single mothers have rightly received compensation that ranges from €5,000 to €125,000, depending on their stay. The question is whether the compensation those women received should have an impact on the benefits that they are entitled to as a UK resident. There are 13,000 surviving inhabitants of those homes who moved here to start a new life free from the judgment of the Irish society that they grew up in. As of April 2025, 6,462 applications had been made, with just 11% from UK residents. That means that 700 of those applications are from UK residents, stripping these women of access to benefits that they would otherwise be entitled to. We have heard that described plainly across the Chamber in this debate.

[Carla Lockhart (Upper Bann) (DUP)]

I associate myself with the remarks made across the Chamber about the travesty and life-changing trauma that so many women and children experienced. Does the hon. Member agree that, if Philomena’s law is applied by the UK Parliament, Northern Ireland should be included as part of the United Kingdom, given that a number of women and children will be living in Northern Ireland and encountering the same problem with benefits?

[Rebecca Smith]

The hon. Lady is a true champion for Northern Ireland. I cannot comment on how that would happen; the Minister is better placed to say whether that is possible. But clearly Northern Ireland is as much a part of the island of Ireland, depending on where one’s politics lie, and it would make sense to include anyone who experienced this. I am not in the position of the Minister in being able to say what might happen in the future.

In this debate we have also well-rehearsed the compensation payments for other well-known scandals: the Post Office scandal, the infected blood scandal, the compensation for victims of 7/7, and the Windrush scandal. We know the argument: those people are all eligible for full benefits and their capital is not regarded. Although I appreciate that a precedent can be set, the difference that makes this situation slightly more difficult is that the payments originate from another country. The situation is unique when compared with the others, but ultimately the precedent is clearly there.

Traditionally, the Department for Work and Pensions has opposed the step of disregarding capital payment from additional financial schemes. However, the scheme was only set in motion in 2021. Now that the dust has settled and it is clear that many are not claiming the money they are entitled to because of that lack of disregard, it will be interesting to hear whether the Department plans on changing its mind.

Although in government the Conservative party did not endorse the introduction of a capital disregard for these compensation payments, the issue was also not discussed to the same extent at that time. That is why the hon. Member for Beckenham and Penge requires our congratulations; we are three or four years into the scheme, the dust has settled, and it is clear that there are problems with people applying—we cannot get away from that fact.

Under the previous Government, the Irish Government expressed that they would press other Governments to introduce dispensation for these capital payments within their welfare systems. However, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Chris Heaton-Harris, said in March 2024 that no such approach had been made by the Irish Government. One of the questions for the Minister is whether in his time in office such an approach has been made by the Irish Government. One could argue that the onus is on the Irish Government to provide the list of individuals likely to be impacted by this approach. With the consent of those individuals, that information could be shared with the Department for Work and Pensions so that we at least know who might be in line for that support.

More work is necessary to calculate how many people currently in receipt of welfare benefits in the UK might be impacted, because not everyone who can claim compensation falls into that bracket, and the financial pressure that a lack of dispensation places on them. What sums have been done and what are the numbers likely to be? What would the cost be if the capital payments for this scheme are disregarded when it comes to benefits?

This is an extraordinary situation, as I have already alluded to, and I agree entirely with the position. I wait to see what the Minister and the new Government decide. In 2021, the Taoiseach of Ireland, who, as we have heard, was involved in setting up this scheme, said of the report that brought it about:

“This detailed and highly painful report is a moment for us as a society to recognise a profound failure of empathy, understanding and basic humanity over a lengthy period. Its production has been possible because of the depth of courage shown by all those who shared their personal experiences with the commission. The report gives survivors what they have been denied for so long, namely, their voice, their individuality and their right to be acknowledged.”

That, for me, sums up the entire argument. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.

Pensions: Expatriates

Rebecca Smith Excerpts

Tuesday 20th May 2025 Westminster Hall

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon (Gregory Stafford) on securing this important debate, and I thank everybody who is here to take part; it is heartening to see what is, to all intents and purposes, cross-party consensus on this long-term issue, and I am grateful to be able to speak about it today.

It is worth reminding everyone in the Chamber that, as we have heard, this is a full cross-party challenge that we have faced over the last decades and that, as we have also heard, successive Governments, be they Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat, have not grappled with it enough. I am grateful that that point has been raised, because I do not think it would be honest of us to reflect on it in the way that had been done previously.

We have a duty of care to pensioners at home and abroad, and I believe we are all in agreement about that today. However, we have heard much about inconsistencies in how support is delivered and about the ultimate postcode lottery; we speak of postcode lotteries a lot in this place, but this one perhaps wins the prize for being the ultimate postcode lottery. The arguments have been well rehearsed.

The two strongest criticisms of the existing overseas pension system are, first, that most pensioners do not realise that the frozen pension policy exists—perhaps before emigrating to live with their family, as we have heard—and, secondly, that not all British pensioners overseas are impacted by the policy because of reciprocal arrangements, as a result of which, there is a very unequal playing field. Like many here today, until an elector emailed me when I was a candidate in the election, I was not fully aware of this situation.

A large number of overseas pensioners are covered by reciprocal arrangements, which enables us to treat overseas pensioners moving to the UK comparably with UK citizens living abroad. In total, about 60% of overseas pensioners are covered by reciprocal arrangements, which, where possible, is of course the preferred option for pensioners.

However, we have heard some harrowing cases, and Anne Puckridge has certainly got her mentions this morning. That 99-year-old veteran of world war two has lived in Canada since 2001 and is still receiving the £72.50 a week that she has received for 24 years. With 442,000 people receiving a frozen state pension overseas, and often receiving as little as £65 a week or indeed less, the real-life impact of this approach is considerable.

In my South West Devon constituency, I have heard from Denise Bateman, formerly of Ivybridge and now residing in Australia; Gillian Clarke, another Australian resident, who at the age of 87 has seen no increase in her state pension in 27 years; Stephen Mumby, also a resident in Australia; Clive Gray; and Deborah Matthews and Laurie Morbey, who have both raised this issue with me. They are predominantly resident in Australia, but there are also examples in New Zealand and Canada.

As their correspondence highlights, those people could have moved to Turkey or the Philippines, and they would be receiving an unfrozen pension. Yet, they have moved to Commonwealth countries and, despite having worked for many years and contributed to life in the UK, are now faced with a limited pension. Anecdotally, those I have heard from in Australia lived and worked here for far longer than some of those now living in Europe. Indeed, some good friends of mine are retired and have lived in Europe since before I was born, yet they still qualify for the state pension and receive the full pension, having not even worked here in the last 50 years.

As with anything of this nature, the Government need to make sure they properly communicate pension terms to people well ahead of the time they expect receive a state pension. We have seen in the WASPI women campaign the issues that can be caused, and I believe that no one wants to replicate that. British citizens need to know the implication of any move abroad so that they can plan. That is the fairest thing to do, and perhaps work could be done—for example, with well-known employers or organisations in countries that generally support emigration—to help improve the information flows on this topic, in addition to the work that the Department for Work and Pensions and others are already doing.

In 2020, the cost of uprating frozen pensions to 2020 levels was estimated to be around £600 million, and the cost of uprating to today’s levels would be significantly higher. However, as we heard, the End Frozen Pensions campaign has suggested that people do not want the backdating and are happy to see their pension uprated from this point in time, which would cost £55 million. It is worth reflecting that Ministers appear to be having to hunt for cash down the back of the sofa, and I appreciate that the Chancellor has to make the sums add up. That said, the End Frozen Pensions campaign has clearly highlighted that overseas pensioners are in effect net savers for the UK—there is no burden on the welfare system or the NHS—meaning an aggregated saving of around £2,500 per person, as the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) highlighted.

As we have heard, the current system of reciprocal agreements ensures there are protections on both sides for countries in the EU or the EEA, and I am happy to support that long-standing and right approach. However, in the light of the new voting rights, which we have also heard about, this is perhaps the right time for the Government to start exploring conversations on further reciprocal arrangements, especially with Commonwealth friends such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia—countries to which my own constituents have moved. We have heard about the diplomatic awkwardness that this issue causes, which should also prompt such conversations.

The Liberal Democrats mentioned the challenges around pensioners and pensions, and we understand the difficult situations caused by the lack of compensation for the WASPI women, the cruel cut to the winter fuel allowance and the fact that the Government pledged to reduce energy bills by £300 without mentioning that we may all have to wait until 2030 for that to be delivered. Pensioners up and down the country are understandably losing confidence in this Labour Government and in the Prime Minister.

We have talked about the 442,000 people receiving a frozen state pension, but what will the Government do about the 10 million pensioners here in the UK who have had their winter fuel allowance removed? I was surprised to hear that an additional 100,000 pensioners accessed A&E departments last winter, compared to the winter before, which is a direct consequence of Labour’s policy to literally leave pensioners out in the cold.

It really does not matter what dedicated campaigners say in this debate, because we all know that when it comes to issues facing pensioners, we could argue that the Government have their fingers in their ears. However, today is a chance to break the cycle, and for this new Government to be the one that makes this change. It sounds as though there would be enormous support in the Chamber if they chose to pursue that.

We need to push for more action to deliver reciprocal agreements, if possible, with allies such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where the overwhelming majority of those with frozen pensions currently reside. That should help to provide more security for all those still affected. None of the Front Benchers here has been a Minister before, so we get the privilege of being a fresh pair of eyes, while recognising the lack of action in the past, whether that be under the Lib Dems, Labour or Conservatives, as we have discussed many times. I understand the Minister’s previous expert experience in this field, and he might have a few ideas of his own, which I look forward to hearing.

I appreciate the concerns raised by colleagues about specific cases, and I sympathise with those who committed so much to our country in their early lives, only to face challenges unprepared, when they should have been made aware of them. Information is clearly going to be a large part of the solution, and debates such as this go a long way to raise the profile of issues that do not always get the airtime they deserve. Judging by the Minister’s nods during the debate, I believe that he agrees, and I know from other things he is doing that information is top of his agenda. I hope we will see some commitment to that this morning.

Finally, I plead with the Minister to get the tone right this time. As discussions take place, will he please not treat these pensioners like the WASPI women and those affected by winter fuel payments? He should be honest in the debate, think clearly about the cost and provide constructive solutions that can help reduce the number of pensioners in this position in five, 10, 15 or even 30 years’ time.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Rebecca Smith Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Commons Chamber

I remind the House that obtaining information from banks, including relevant bank statements, under this measure is a vital safeguard to establishing an affordable deduction rate where someone has refused to engage. It will prevent further issues for a debtor than the use of courts could bring about—for instance, a county court judgment or court costs—and it will enable the Department to use regular as well as lump sum deduction orders. I look forward to the debate and to responding to colleagues’ contributions in my closing remarks.

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

I echo the Minister’s comments about the work of the Bill Committee. We had a constructive few weeks getting into the nitty-gritty.

I have no doubt that the House will agree that fraud is unacceptable, whether against individuals, organisations or the state. The money taken does not belong to those responsible. When it comes to defrauding the Government, money is taken from every single taxpayer. At the same time, however, errors do unfortunately happen. They might be made accidentally by the claimant or by the Department. Although there is no ill intention, errors can still be costly to the taxpayer, and that impacts some of the most vulnerable people in our country.

The question, then, is how best to tackle fraud and error in the welfare state and the public sector. Although we welcome many of the principles behind the Bill—much of which builds on the work of the Conservatives before the general election, as I am sure will be mentioned many times this afternoon—we are concerned that it has been rushed through. On one hand, there are gaps where the legislation is not tough enough. It is not a strong deterrent to make potential fraudsters think again, and it does not sufficiently safeguard public money. On the other hand, parts of the Bill have not been sufficiently prepared, and are incredibly vague and unclear on their implications for those involved and on whether the benefit justifies the cost.

This issue must be considered in the context of a sickness benefit bill that is forecast to hit nearly £1 billion by the end of the decade—even after the Government’s questionable welfare reforms—which is vastly more than we spend on defence, and more than we spend on schools and policing. We have tabled a number of amendments to address those points.

New clauses 21 and 8 seek to tackle the rise in so-called sickfluencers on social media, such as those on TikTok and YouTube who post videos showing people how they might be able to make fraudulent claims for benefits, including the personal independence payment, which requires not medical evidence but self-assessment. As we have heard, the advice offered includes specific buzzwords, template claims and guidance on passing questions at interview stage to inflate the value of claims fraudulently. We do not want to target people who provide genuine advice and guidance to people about how the welfare system and public authorities work, but that is very different from providing assistance and encouragement to commit fraud, which is not acceptable.

We recognise the vital work of not-for-profit organisations such as Citizens Advice—which works right across the country, including in South Hams and Plymouth in my constituency—and groups such as Improving Lives Plymouth. They do much to support those seeking to claim what they are entitled to. However, online sickfluencers must be tackled.

In Committee, the Minister queried our new clause and asked why it provided only for a seven-year prison sentence when similar offences carry a 10-year sentence. We have addressed that in new clauses 21 and 8, which, as the Minister will see, propose a 10-year sentence to bring them into line with similar offences.

[Dr Luke Evans]

In their response to my question about sickfluencers, the Government said that relevant legislation is already in place. If that is the case, how many convictions have there been under that legislation? We could infer from that number whether or not the system is working and what we need to do. My suspicion is that we need these measures to be able to hold people to account.

[Rebecca Smith]

I echo my hon. Friend’s concern that the existing powers are not being used enough. I ask the Minister to give us further information on how those powers are being used and an assurance that they will be used further should our new clauses be unsuccessful.

We believe that creating a specific offence to target such online fraud would send the clear message to sickfluencers that what they are doing is not only morally wrong but illegal—something that clear gives them no alternative than to realise that they will be caught. If the Government continue to oppose our amendments because they believe the powers already exist to tackle such crime, I would be grateful if the Minister set out, at the very least, how the Government will ensure that that legislation is used to the fullest, particularly with regard to the DWP, given that Government amendments 75 and 76 refer to the PFSA specifically. We are keen to see how those powers can be used fully used as the deterrent we need to tackle DWP claims. I want to know that, after today’s debate and vote, sickfluencers will be left in no doubt that the full weight of the law will be used against them, as they actively defraud the state.

Our new clause 9 is on powers of arrest. We welcome measures in the Bill—first announced by the previous Government—to give DWP investigators greater powers to aid with their investigations, such as search and seizure, and there must be appropriate safeguards around that. This will bring benefit fraud investigations into line with tax fraud investigations in His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, which is very welcome, but we want to go further and address other shortfalls in the DWP powers. New clause 9 would add the power of arrest to the powers given to DWP investigators and resolve the seemingly illogical current position: the Government want to give DWP investigators the power to enter and search a premises, seize, retain and dispose of material, obtain sensible material and use reasonable force, but not to arrest someone if the evidence shows that it is necessary.

In Committee, the Minister highlighted that the police would be able to carry out the arrest function on behalf of the DWP should it ever be necessary, but we question whether that is a sustainable position and believe that our new clause would ensure we do not place an additional burden on the police. This is not without precedent and would bring the DWP into line with the approach taken to serious and organised crime across Government, such as at HMRC and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority.

Our new clause 10 is on liability orders, because we are concerned about the seizure of assets. We want to ensure that the DWP does everything it can to recover funds fraudulently claimed, even when that money is no longer sitting in a bank account. It cannot be right that someone can use that money to buy expensive cars, flat-screen TVs or other luxury assets, which the state cannot then recover from them. Our new clause 10 would give the Secretary of State powers to apply to the courts to seize assets where someone has been found guilty of fraud and the funds have not been recovered in order to repay the state. In a similar vein to our sickfluencers new clause, we believe these additions are needed to send the strongest message to those who are knowingly defrauding the system that they will be caught and will have to pay.

New clause 10 does not just give powers to seize assets to the Secretary of State; it says that she must use them. The DWP has said that it can already do this, but we know through written parliamentary questions that those powers have not been used in the last five years, albeit the DWP could make use of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. We believe there must be an explicit expectation that assets will be seized, and we need new clause 10 to ensure this is achieved.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

It is great to hear that the hon. Member’s party is committed to taking tougher action against benefit fraud after 14 years of failing in office. Does she also welcome longer sentences for fraud in other areas of Government such as covid corruption, including for those Tory donors who committed the crime?

[Rebecca Smith]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, but that is not what we are debating; it is certainly not part of my speech.

Our new clauses 11, 12 and 20 are on the impact on banks. We have concerns about the lack of detail in the Bill when it comes to the eligibility verification mechanism and the requirements that will be put on banks and other financial institutions. We do not have the statutory code of conduct. We do not know what it will cost banks. We do not know the results of any pilot schemes, and we do not know whether the amount recovered will be more than what it costs to administer. Madam Deputy Speaker, had you been in our Committee, you would know that the code of conduct was probably the thing most frequently commented on, and the Ministers did a huge amount to reassure us that it was forthcoming—

[Neil Coyle]

And cheesecake!

[Rebecca Smith]

And cheesecake as well—I did not want to say it from the Front Bench, but I have now. Madam Deputy Speaker, you will have to look back at Hansard, but I will never look at a cheesecake in the same way.

The code of conduct was regularly raised in Committee, and we got assurances continually from the Ministers, but we still lack that detail. We have therefore tabled a number of amendments to get clarity, including to require the Government to publish their statutory code of conduct, information on the testing completed to date and an impact assessment on the cost implication of the Bill for banks, as well as an amendment to allow banks to challenge the expansion of these powers if the costs that would be incurred exceed a pre-agreed amount. We know that banks and financial institutions want to help tackle fraud, but measures must be proportionate and not unduly burdensome, or they risk diverting resources from tackling other types of financial crime to meet these requirements. We cannot simply assume that the banks and financial institutions will do what is right; we need to give them an incentive to do it, too.

Our amendments 16, 17, 18 and 19 refer to the need for a first-tier tribunal. The Bill takes significant powers for the Secretary of State, giving them the power to review decisions that they, the Cabinet Office or the Public Sector Fraud Authority made. Amendments 16 to 19 change the appeal body from the Minister for the Cabinet Office to the first tier tribunal, ensuring that there is not just independent oversight but an effective independent channel of appeal against information notices that does not just lead back to the organisation that issued the notice.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Pinto-Duschinsky (Hendon) (Lab)]

I rise to speak against amendments 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9, and new clauses 12 and 15.

Fraud in the benefit system affects us all. It costs us as a country almost £1 million an hour. It takes money from the most vulnerable in society and undermines the legitimacy of and public support for our social security system. However, many of the amendments proposed simply do not recognise the vital need for this legislation. Some, such as amendments 2 and 9, would hamstring the Bill by preventing us gathering key information. Others, such as amendments 8, 5 and 6, would limit the effectiveness of the Bill and make its powers more difficult to use. Others, such as amendments 4 and new clauses 12 and 15, would seek to delay its effects.

These amendments, however differently proposed, all suffer from the same pathology: they fail to take fraud seriously. We have heard a number of speeches today from opponents of the Bill, but we are yet to hear from them any serious practical suggestions about how we might tackle fraud. These opponents say that they are concerned to protect the vulnerable, but I say gently that they can offer no proposals on how to prevent the fraud that is stealing from the neediest in our society.

Many Members are coming from a genuine place of concern about how to strike the right balance between protecting the public purse on the one hand and the privacy and rights of claimants on the other. I think the Bill gets the balance right. The powers it provides are proportionate.

[Rebecca Smith]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[David Pinto-Duschinsky]

I have limited time, so I will make progress.

The powers the Bill provides are proportionate, measured and ringed with safeguards. It is a mark of this that, as we heard from the Secretary of State on Second Reading, the Information Commissioner has stated that the Bill as currently drafted has addressed their previously stated concerns.

As well as being proportionate, the powers are necessary to fight the ever-more sophisticated frauds that we are facing. Over the past decade, financial institutions have extensively overhauled their use of technology and data and their approaches to the evolving fraud threat, yet the Government have not. It is illuminating, but perhaps not surprising, that while social security fraud has risen dramatically post covid, fraud volumes and losses in the financial services sector, including credit card fraud, have fallen according to UK Finance. The public sector has paid a steep price for not modernising its anti-fraud approach and failing to adopt industry best practices. It is a gap that this Bill seeks to address.

Most of all, the measures in the Bill are crucial for protecting the vulnerable and safeguarding the legitimacy of the system itself. Our social security system rests on public consent and a belief that money is fairly spent. Fraud and error chips away at this social contract, and it takes money from those who need it most. The public in Hendon and across the country expect us to take action. There is nothing progressive whatsoever about permitting fraud. The only people who benefit are the criminals who exploit our system and those who wish to undermine its role as a cornerstone of a civilised and fair society.

For the sake of the most vulnerable, the taxpayer, fairness and the system itself, I hope the House will join me in supporting the Bill and voting down those amendments.

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[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

That is the end of the Back-Bench contributions. We come to the Front Benches and first the shadow Minister.

[Rebecca Smith]

With the leave of the House, I will make a few additional comments. This is the perfect opportunity to respond to some of the points made about Conservative amendments and new clauses.

The hon. Member for Hendon (David Pinto-Duschinsky) was on a short time limit and was not able to take any interventions, but I want to speak to the points he made on including our new clauses—for example, new clause 12. He rattled off the other amendment numbers quickly, so I hope he will forgive me if I did not hear them all, but I believe that new clauses 12 and 15 were included. His implication was that the new clauses we tabled would delay the Bill being put into law. That would not be the case, because each of them is worded for after the Act comes into force. The new clauses would be additional safeguards on the cost implications for banks, annual reporting and the publication of an antifraud and error technology strategy that would make the Bill even better, rather than essentially being wrecking amendments. Regardless of the other amendments included in the hon. Member’s list, ours are certainly not in that vein.

The hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) said that she was slightly unhappy about new clause 21 because those who genuinely help benefit claimants get what they are entitled to may inadvertently be caught by it. That is not our intention. We want only those who push people towards committing fraud to be caught. Citizens Advice and Improving Lives Plymouth, for example, which help people claim what they are entitled to, would not be caught by the new clause, because they would be involved in error only if a mistake were made, rather than through fraud. I appreciate what she said, but that was not our intention. The wording of our new clause covers that.

Concern was raised in Committee about the extent of bank account searches. In our view, other bank accounts used by those who commit fraud would not be checked under the Bill, so we probably need to go further to ensure that fraud is properly tackled. To be more light-hearted for a moment, if I may, anybody reading the report of the debate will see plenty of references to cheesecake, and I think I should explain why. Concern was raised in Committee about the fact that, under the Bill, an account’s individual transactions could be assessed and judged, so everybody would feel terrible if they bought a cheesecake from Waitrose—other shops are available—and that would be a problem in future. If anybody was wondering why we were talking about cheesecake, it related to concern about transactions being checked. At the time, the Minister kindly reassured us that the Bill would not provide for individual transactions to be checked; it would deal just with benefit payments and whether someone has capital that they should not have while claiming benefits. I hope that that is helpful.

[Andrew Western]

With the leave of the House, I thank all hon. Members for their contributions. In the time I have, I will try to respond to some of the points raised. I have listened closely to the concerns set out by Members from across the House, and I will of course ensure that they are taken forward as the Bill progresses to the other place, but today I will resist all non-Government amendments. I will make initial comments in response to several Members, before turning specifically to the nature of the amendments and new clauses.

The Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), and the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire (Mr Bedford), said that the Bill builds on the previous Administration’s work to tackle fraud and error. I have to say, I think that is a fairly generous interpretation of that work, not least because, as far as I can see, the previous Government introduced absolutely no powers for the Public Sector Fraud Authority to tackle fraud across the public sector, and, moreover, nothing on debt recovery. The only evidence we can find of any new powers the previous Government sought to introduce is in the eligibility verification space. I accept that they sought to do that, but they did so in a rather botched fashion, which was subject to significant criticism, and with none of the safeguards and oversight in place. We have now built those into the Bill. I absolutely agree with the Opposition spokesperson that the Government cannot be complacent in tackling fraud—and we will not be—but I say gently that, having allowed fraud and error in the welfare system to spiral to £9.7 billion at the time of the last election, the same cannot be said of the previous Government.

The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling), spoke of a broken welfare system. I do not want to be drawn into a debate on that, but a broken approach to tackling benefit fraud and error is certainly part of any problem that the Department faces.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Rebecca Smith Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure speak under your chairship again, Mr Western. I tabled the new clause as a probing amendment. In short, it would bring the test for the recovery of universal credit overpayments caused by official error into line with regulation 100(2) of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, meaning that they could be recovered only where the claimant could have reasonably been expected to realise that there was an overpayment.

Let me provide some background on why the new clause is needed. According to Department for Work and Pensions data, in 2023-24 the best part of 700,000 of the new universal credit official error overpayment debts entered into the DWP’s debt management system were caused not by fraud or claimant error but by Government mistakes. Unlike for many other benefits, the DWP can recover official error universal credit overpayments from claimants. This power was introduced through the Welfare Reform Act 2012, and represented a significant change to the position that previously applied to most legacy benefits.

When concerns were raised at the time, assurances were provided by the then Employment Minister that the DWP did

“not have to recover money from people where official error has been made”

and that

“we do not intend, in many cases, to recover money where official error has been made.”––[Official Report, Welfare Reform Public Bill Committee, 19 May 2011; c. 1019.]

However, Public Law Project research shows that the DWP’s default approach is to recover all official error overpayments. Relief is dependent on individuals navigating a difficult and inaccessible process to request a waiver. In 2022, only 26 waiver requests were granted.

DWP mistakes matter. The financial and psychological impacts of overpayment debt recovery on individual claimants can be severe. The research I have mentioned found that the recovery of debts, including official error overpayments, by deductions from universal credit led to a third of survey respondents becoming destitute. The risk of harm is particularly acute for official error overpayments, which individuals have no way of anticipating, so they can lead to sudden, unexpected reductions in income that impact existing fixed commitments and carefully planned budgets.

The recovery of official error overpayments brought an added sense of injustice, with individuals finding themselves in debt due to a DWP error over which they had no control. For example, one claimant was overpaid universal credit because the DWP had failed to consider income from her widow’s pension. She had informed the DWP that she received it and was assured that it would not affect her claim. She relied on that assurance and spent the money on daily living expenses. Four years later, the DWP told her that it would be recovering the resulting overpayment of £7,258.08. Aside from the significant financial impact, the stress associated with recovery impacted her mental health. She found herself constantly thinking about the overpayment and how she would pay it back, which in turn impacted on her physical health. She was left anxious that mistakes would be made again, leading to her incurring debt that she had no power to avoid.

Recovery often puts individuals who have relied on payments in good faith in financially precarious situations, forcing them to make difficult choices about sacrificing essentials. Research by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation has found that the current standard universal credit allowance is not sufficient to cover the cost of essentials. In this already difficult context, households that are repaying overpayment debt can lose up to 25% of their standard allowance each month.

People often base key life decisions and financial planning on information provided by DWP officials about their entitlement to universal credit. An official error universal credit overpayment can also have a knock-on effect on people’s entitlement to other support, such as council tax reduction. I am sure the DWP does not want to be responsible for pushing someone into further financial hardship. We can prevent this harm from occurring in the first place with my new clause, which would mean that overpayments can be recovered only where the claimant could reasonably have been expected to realise that they had been overpaid.

The new clause is equivalent to an amendment proposed by Labour Front Benchers during the passage of the Welfare Reform Act. Under the new clause, DWP officials would themselves consider the fairness of recovering an official error overpayment before any recovery was initiated. Increasing protections against the recovery of overpayments would also create a strong incentive to reduce the rate of DWP errors in the first instance, thereby contributing to a more accurate and better functioning welfare system from the outset.

The Bill provides the Government with an opportunity to proactively address a harmful and unfair process that affects hundreds of thousands of claimants each year, easing the financial burden of debt on claimants who have done nothing wrong and encouraging the DWP to get payments right first time. I hope that the Minister will respond to my points on new clause 1, and I sincerely hope that we will make progress on the issue as the Bill progresses.

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. This is the first time that I have spoken to a new clause in Committee. New clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would amend the Bill so that, where universal credit overpayments have been caused by official error, they can be recovered only where the claimant could reasonably have been expected to realise that there was an overpayment.

I am interested to know how the claimant could reasonably be expected to realise that the amount that they had received was an overpayment, as that would be the test for whether that person becomes liable for repaying the amount. If payments are made to an appointee’s bank account, do they become liable for spotting the overpayment under this new clause? Would the amount have to be repaid only if both the person eligible for the payment and their appointee realised the overpayment?

Are there figures on how much money is lost and recovered due to error? Do we therefore know how much the new clause would cost the DWP? Underpayments in taxes are recovered by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in the following months or years even where the individual is not at fault, and it is not clear why universal credit claimants should be any different. It would help if the Minister could explain to the Committee how, in the case of overpayments, a repayment plan will be put in place that is manageable for the person making the payments, and how that will be assessed.

We would be better off focusing on minimising official errors in the first place. What work is the DWP doing to better guard against overpayments, given that the overpayment rate for universal credit was 12.4% or £6.46 billion in the financial year ending 2024, compared with 12.7% or £5.5 billion in the financial year ending 2023? I argue that we need to focus on ensuring that overpayments are not being made, but once the error has been made, particularly because it is so costly to the taxpayer, we should try to ensure that the money is recouped.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. I support the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. On several occasions over recent weeks, Ministers have gone on the record to describe the DWP and the benefits system as a “broken” system. It is extremely helpful that the hon. Member highlighted the impact that that can have on people who often have chaotic lives and are on the edge.

I have served the people of Torbay in elected office for 30 years. Over that time, I am saddened that, particularly with the recent cost of living crisis, the levels of destitution have become worse, as I hear from people who provide food banks and other support for the people in need in Torbay. Whether it is Scope or the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, many of those good organisations highlight to policy developers that the levels of benefits are really tough and the levels of destitution in our communities are higher than they have been for many years. Therefore, I would welcome some thoughts from the Minister about this proposal, because sadly, recovery will often drive people into destitution and, as highlighted by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, into severe ill health.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 15—Offence of encouraging or assisting others to commit fraud—

“(1) The Social Security Administration Act 1992 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 111A (Dishonest representation for obtaining benefit etc), after subsection (1G) insert—

‘(1H) A person commits an offence if they—

(a) encourage or assist another person to commit an offence under this section, or

(b) provide guidance on how to commit an offence under this section.’

(3) In section 112 (False representations for obtaining benefit etc), after subsection (1F) insert—

‘(1G) A person commits an offence if they—

(a) encourage or assist another person to commit an offence under this section, or

(b) provide guidance on how to commit an offence under this section.’”.

[Rebecca Smith]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 2 seeks to make it a specific offence to commit, assist or encourage others to commit fraud against a public authority. Someone who commits such an offence would be liable to imprisonment or a fine, or both.

The offence of fraud against a public authority in the Bill is a civil offence. The Government argue that civil penalties offer an alternative to prosecution and help to mitigate the burden on the criminal justice system by offering alternative routes for the public sector to manage fraud cases. The Bill introduces a framework of civil penalties for fraud that the Minister can impose, including on behalf of other Government Departments, serving as an important deterrent against fraud in the public sector. We think it is an anomaly for public sector fraud to be a civil offence while benefits fraud is a criminal offence. Will the Minister explain why one type of fraud is seen as less serious than the other?

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Smith]

I have heard everything that the Minister has said. However, we will still press new clauses 2 and 15 to a vote.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Mr Western. It is a pleasure to serve under you in the Chair; can I ask you a procedure question before we go any further? We have had the presentation of the new clauses, but we have not had any declarations of interest. Given that there are some notable Conservative party donors facing potential fraud charges under covid issues, I just wonder whether that should have been declared before we got to the change in how people in those situations might be punished.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Smith]

I thank the Minister for his comments. I have obviously heard what both Ministers have said in response. We are still keen from a principle perspective to push the new clause to a vote because we think more needs to be done to outline specifically what we are doing to tackle the online aspect. I hear what the Minister is saying but, in this particular instance, we would like to take it further.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Rebecca Smith]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We have tabled the new clause to require the Secretary of State to publish the results of any pilot schemes run with banks to test the provisions of chapter 1 of part 2 of the Bill. We have already discussed how banks will be required to undertake ongoing monitoring work to collect the relevant information as part of eligibility verification. The impact assessment states that two proofs of concept have taken place, including one in 2017, with short summaries provided of each. Given the scale of what is being asked of the banks, however, as well as how technology has moved on in the past eight years, it is reasonable to assume that pilots will also be undertaken to ensure that the system works properly before it is fully rolled out. Can the Minister confirm that this will be the case?

In the interest of transparency, we also need to see the results of the pilots, which is why we have tabled the new clause to ensure that they are published within three months of the Act coming into force. It is regrettable that we needed to table the new clause but, as we have said several times throughout the Bill’s passage, and as we heard from witnesses before the Committee, it is extremely difficult to judge how the legislation will work in practice without seeing the code of practice and understanding what will be required of the banks. As UK Finance said in oral evidence:

“Much will depend on the mechanism through which banks will be required to share the information, the frequency of the information notices, whether the criteria we are required to run the checks against change over time and other factors that will influence how much capacity is required from the banking sector. As I say, at this stage it is challenging to do a detailed assessment.”––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 48, Q85.]

The practical implications of how to implement the Bill are not currently clear to the banks.

We also discussed the consequences of getting this wrong. As UK Finance also said in evidence,

“under the Bill banks responding to an information request or a direct deduction order, would have to consider whether there is some indication of financial crime that under POCA requires them to make a suspicious activity report. We think it is simpler to remove that requirement, not least because where there is a requirement to make a suspicious activity report there is a requirement to notify the authorities; clearly, there is already a notification to the authorities when complying with the measure. Removing that requirement would avoid the risk that banks must consider not only how to respond to the measure but whether they are required to treat that individual account as potentially fraudulent.”––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 49, Q89.]

The banks are well versed in dealing with fraud, but not so much with error. We need reassurance that there are clear expectations of the banks in delivering their duties under the Bill, that those are compatible with existing obligations regarding financial crime, and that the banks can resource them.

[Andrew Western]

In my view, the new clause is simply not needed. As the hon. Lady said, to demonstrate the feasibility and potential of the eligibility verification measure, the DWP conducted two proofs of concept, in 2017 and 2022, and the results have been published in the impact assessment for the Bill. Further information on the effectiveness of the measure will, of course, be available following the independent overseer’s annual review and report. No pilot schemes have or will be conducted on information notices specifically, as they are an extension of existing powers. On that basis, I resist new clause 5.

[Rebecca Smith]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 7

Annual reporting of amounts recovered

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report detailing the amount of money which has been recovered under the provisions of this Act.

(2) A first report must be published no later than 12 months after the passing of this Act with subsequent reports published at intervals of no more than 12 months.”—(Rebecca Smith.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Rebecca Smith]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report detailing the amount of money recovered under the provisions of the Bill, with the first report to be published within 12 months of its passage. The main purpose of the Bill is to crack down on error and fraud, and we support that aim. It is reasonable to ask for transparency to understand exactly how much money has been recovered thanks to the measures in the Bill, and to ensure that it is working as hoped. If it is not, further action will be needed, but at least we would know, and a discussion could be had instead of the issue being brushed under the carpet.

An annual report allows the Department enough time to produce it without being an administrative burden, while ensuring that it remains relevant and up to date. Given the large amount of money lost to fraud and error, it is important that we are all able to hold the Government to account for how effectively they are recovering it.

[Andrew Western]

I share and appreciate the hon. Member’s concern and interest in delivering the proposed benefits of the Bill, including the effective recovery of debt. The Bill delivers on our manifesto commitment that this Government will safeguard taxpayers’ money and not tolerate fraud or waste anywhere in public services.

Turning first to part 2 of the Bill, I do not think the new clause is necessary, given the existing routes for external scrutiny and reporting on the DWP’s fraud and error activities, including the new debt recovery powers. The Office for Budget Responsibility provides independent scrutiny of the Government’s costings of welfare measures. The Department estimates that, over the next five years, the EVM will save £940 million and the debt recovery measure £565 million. Those estimates have been certified by the OBR. In total, the Bill is estimated to deliver benefits of £1.5 billion over the next five years. In the published impact assessment, the DWP committed to monitoring and evaluation on part 2 of the Bill, including the new powers to recover debt and the EVM.

Although I understand that the hon. Member is particularly interested in scrutiny of the money recovered under the Bill, I remind the Committee that the Government have committed to the biggest welfare fraud and error package in recent history. The total DWP fraud, error and debt package, with savings from the Bill and other Budget measures, is worth £8.6 billion over the next five years.

In its annual report and accounts, the DWP already reports on the savings made from its fraud and error activities, including savings made from “detect” activity across our counter-fraud and targeted case review teams. In addition, we report on our debt recovery totals and debt stock. I think the annual report and accounts, in particular, will give the hon. Member the information in which she is interested. The Department also publishes annual statistics on the monetary value of fraud and error, including various breakdowns by benefit and type. That is another mechanism by which we can see trends over time and ensure transparency for the public.

Turning to part 1 of the Bill, the PSFA already has a published commitment in its mandate to produce an annual report that makes transparent the levels of fraud in Government and the latest fraud and error evidence base, and an annual report on its performance. Recoveries will be published in the annual report. Paragraph 12 of schedule 2 to the Bill also requires:

“As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of each financial year the PSFA,”

when set up as a statutory body,

“must prepare a report on the exercise of its functions during that financial year.”

Recoveries will be published as part of that.

For the reasons I have outlined, I resist the new clause.

[Rebecca Smith]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 8

Publication of an Anti-Fraud and Error Technology Strategy

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish an Anti-Fraud and Error Technology Strategy.

(2) An Anti-Fraud and Error Technology Strategy published under this section must set out—

(a) how the Government intends to use automated technologies or artificial intelligence to tackle fraud against public authorities and the making of erroneous payments by public authorities, and

(b) a series of safeguards to provide for human oversight of decision making that meet the aims set out in subsection (3);

(c) how rights of appeal will be protected;

(d) a framework for privacy and data sharing.

(3) The aims of the safeguards in subsection (2)(b) are—

(a) to ensure that grounds for decision making can only be reasonable if they are the result of a process in which there has been meaningful human involvement by a human of adequate expertise to scrutinise any insights or recommendations made by automated systems,

(b) to make clear that grounds cannot be reasonable if they are the result of an entirely automated process, and

(c) to ensure that any information notice issued is accompanied by a statement—

(i) setting out the reasonable grounds for suspicion that have been relied on, and

(ii) confirming that the conclusion has been formed on the basis of human involvement.”—(Rebecca Smith.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Rebecca Smith]

I beg to move, that the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish an anti-fraud and error technology strategy within six months of the Act’s passage. That must include: how the Government intend to use automated technologies and AI to tackle fraud, subsection (2)(a); safeguards to ensure human oversight of decision making, subsection (2)(b); protection of rights of appeal, subsection (2)(c); and a framework for privacy and data sharing, subsection (2)(d).

Members might be asking themselves why we tabled the new clause. In part, it is based on the evidence we received. In written evidence, the Public Law Project expressed concern that, although the impact assessment, the human rights memorandum and the statements from the Secretary of State and the Minister for transformation, the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston, on Second Reading state that a final decision on benefit eligibility will always involve a human agent, this is not reflected in the Bill itself. In response to the Public Law Project’s concerns, the new clause would provide an audit of technology systems used to tackle fraud, ensuring accountability while addressing the risks posed by automation in decision making.

A report published by the Treasury in 2023, “Tackling fraud and corruption against government”, said:

“Public bodies can better protect themselves…by sharing data and intelligence with other public bodies and working together.”

We therefore believe the technology strategy clause recognises that sharing data is beneficial to stopping and recovering fraud, but includes additional provisions that audit its use.

The strategy must include: how the Government intend to use automated technologies or artificial intelligence to tackle fraud and error against public bodies; what safeguards exist for human oversight of decision making; how rights of appeal will be protected; and a framework for privacy and data sharing.

The safeguards must ensure that grounds for decision making are reasonable only if they are the result of a process in which there has been meaningful involvement by a human of adequate expertise to scrutinise any insights or recommendations made by automated systems. They must also make it clear that grounds cannot be reasonable if they are the result of an entirely automated process. To ensure this, any information notice issued must be accompanied by a statement setting out the reasonable grounds for suspicion that have been relied on, and confirming that the conclusion has been formed on the basis of human involvement.

We know that AI and other technologies have huge potential to improve efficiency and productivity, and they should be used where appropriate, but we cannot rely on it yet to the exclusion of people and human judgment. The strategy we propose would ensure that those points were adequately considered by the Department, ensuring that the taxpayer receives value for money while safeguarding claimants through the decision-making process.

[Andrew Western]

I thank the hon. Member for tabling the new clause. The Government recognise the opportunities that AI and machine learning can provide, while also understanding the need to ensure they are used safely and effectively. In January 2025, the Government outlined their response to the AI opportunities action plan led by Matt Clifford, which was commissioned by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology. The plan outlined 50 recommendations for how the Government can leverage AI, including recommendations to improve access to data, to make better use of digital infrastructure and to ensure the safe use of AI.

Under the leadership of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, we have endorsed this plan, and the Government are taking forward those recommendations. As the Government work to implement the action plan’s recommendations, I do not believe that the separate anti-fraud and error technology strategy proposed by the new clause is necessary. I believe the new clause would cut across the work being taken forward under the action plan, so I reject the amendment.

As technology advances, the use of AI and machine learning will play a crucial role in detecting and preventing fraudulent activities. The Government want to make use of technology and data to tackle fraud, as the Department has a responsibility to ensure that fraud is minimised so that the right payments are made to the right people. The Government remain committed to building our AI capability, and at DWP we will take advantage of the opportunities offered by AI while ensuring it is used appropriately and safely.

[Rebecca Smith]

Sorry, I should have said this earlier. The new clause would make the Government’s AI strategy a statutory requirement, instead of a manifesto commitment not written into law. That is important to us because, in the case of fraud and particularly benefit fraud, we are dealing with individual people. We want to make sure that we do not inadvertently penalise the wrong people or apply something that is disproportionate. A lot has been said about ensuring proportionality and reasonableness.

I am interested in the Minister’s reflections on where else in the strategy something is applied as personally to potentially vulnerable groups of people, thereby suggesting that we do not need this protection to ensure that people are not inadvertently penalised when we use this legislation to tackle the fraud they are committing.

[Andrew Western]

That is a reasonable question, and clearly the AI framework is not specific to vulnerable groups in the way that the hon. Lady sets out. Decisions regarding benefit entitlement or payments within the Department are made by DWP colleagues who always look at the available information before making a decision. I would not want to make an amendment to restrict that to only the activity within this Bill; I would want it to be Departmental wide.

As I have set out a number of times at every stage and in every area of this Bill, a human is involved in decision making. There is no plan to change that. I can understand the hon. Lady’s anxiousness to see that set out in legislation, but I think it would create an anomaly between the practices within this Bill and in the Department more broadly. For instance, it is outside the scope of this Bill for a human to complete the vulnerability framework when looking at somebody in financial need who has an overpayment. I would not want to make a distinction between these powers and the rest of the Department's activities. If we were to have a broader debate, I would be happy to engage with the hon. Lady on that basis, but I would not want to create a “two-tier”, for want of a better word, description within the Department.

At every stage of model development, as we bring forward the AI opportunities action plan and our work in the AI and tech space, we ensure that checks, balances and strong safeguards are in place. I am proud of our commitment to use AI and machine learning in a safe and effective way.

To provide further assurances to Parliament and the public about our processes, we intend to develop fairness analysis assessments, which will be published alongside our annual report and accounts. These will set out the rationale for why we judge our models to be reasonable and proportionate. This reporting commitment on our fairness analysis assessment further negates the need for the new clause.

Finally, the hon. Lady mentioned the new clause’s role in ensuring reasonable grounds of suspicion when investigating fraud. I remind the Committee that, under the information gathering powers, the DWP may request information only where an authorised officer considers that there are reasonable grounds to suspect a DWP offence and that it is necessary and proportionate to obtain that information. Again, a human is fully baked into the process.

The changes made by the Bill will be reflected in the new code of practice. Updated mandatory training will be provided for staff, who will be accredited to use these new powers. Of course, with the eligibility verification measure in particular, but running throughout the Bill, the principle of independent oversight is very much in place. I hope that will provide the hon. Lady with the necessary information to show that the Government will use the information gathering powers only where there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud, and that this will have considerable human involvement. I agree that there is perhaps a broader conversation to be had about this at an appropriate time.

[Rebecca Smith]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 9

Impact of Act on vulnerable customers

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament an assessment of the expected impact of the Act on vulnerable customers.

(2) For the purposes of this section, “vulnerable customers” means someone who, due to their personal circumstances, is especially susceptible to harm, particularly when a firm is not acting with appropriate levels of care.”—(Rebecca Smith.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Rebecca Smith]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss

New clause 12—Impact of Act on people facing financial exclusion—

“(1) The independent person appointed under section 64(1) of this Act must carry out an assessment of the impact of this Act on the number of people facing financial exclusion.

(2) The independent person must, after 12 months of the passing of the Act—

(a) prepare a report on the review, and

(b) submit the report to the Minister.

(3) On receiving a report the Minister must—

(a) publish it, and

(b) lay a copy before Parliament.”

This new clause would look into the impact of the Act on people facing financial exclusion.

[Rebecca Smith]

New clause 9 would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament, within six months of the Act’s passage, an assessment of its expected impact on vulnerable customers.

Concern has been expressed in written evidence about the Bill’s impact on disabled people. It is important to ensure that vulnerable people are not inadvertently harmed by the Bill. There was a discussion about vulnerable customers in oral evidence, with Daniel Cichocki and Eric Leenders both supporting the notion of an impact assessment while being concerned about the mental strain of being under suspicion. They said that the FCA is due to publish a thematic review on this imminently. We suggest that this strengthens the case for a comprehensive assessment by the Secretary of State.

We define “vulnerable customers” as those who due to their personal circumstances are especially susceptible to harm, particularly when a firm is not acting with appropriate levels of care, per the definition used by the Financial Conduct Authority, with which the sector is familiar. New clause 9 is necessary because some of the people impacted by the Bill will be vulnerable, and some will be repaying money they acquired not through fraud but through overpayments resulting from DWP error. As we heard from UK Finance, banks have duties when they suspect that financial crime is taking place, and although such errors are obviously not financial crime committed by the person who holds the account into which the payments have been made, there is a risk that the Bill does not sit well with those existing duties on banks.

We need to ensure that communication with vulnerable bank customers is of a sufficient standard, particularly where the DWP is recovering funds in cases where customer is not at fault, because the group of people we are talking about is likely to have high levels of vulnerability. If the Minister will not accept the new clause, I would be grateful for an explanation of the reasons why and, importantly, how the Government intend to undertake monitoring, which we believe is important.

The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 12 would require an independent assessment of the impact of the Bill on people facing financial exclusion. I am interested in whether the Liberal Democrats have a particular individual or organisation in mind which they think would be appropriate to undertake such an assessment, but we do not have a difficulty with the principle of the new clause.

[Steve Darling]

New clause 12 is about financial exclusion, as the hon. Member for South West Devon said. The Liberal Democrats’ concern is that, as this morning goes on, a number of safeguards are looking to be—for want of a better phrase—baked into the system by legislation, yet according to the Minister the only thing baked into the system is the involvement of human beings. That causes me, and I am sure other colleagues, concerns.

If an annual review were to take place of the Bill’s impact on people facing financial exclusion, conducted by the independent person appointed with the Minister publishing and sharing that with Parliament, we could ensure a level of transparency. While many of us would acknowledge that the Ministers in place at the moment are well-meaning individuals, who knows where we will be in 10 years’ time? This legislation needs to stand the test of time, so baking in these safeguards would be a positive way forward. I hope that the Minister will welcome that. I look forward to his comments.

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[Rebecca Smith]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 10

Recovery of overpayments of Carer’s Allowance

“The Secretary of State may not exercise any of the powers of recovery under this Act in relation to a person who has received an overpayment of Carer’s Allowance until such time as—

(a) the Secretary of State has commissioned an independent review of the overpayment of Carer’s Allowance;

(b) the review has concluded its inquiry and submitted a report containing recommendations to the Secretary of State;

(c) the Secretary of State has laid the report of the independent review before Parliament; and

(d) the Secretary of State has implemented the recommendations of the independent review.” — (Steve Darling.)

This new clause would delay any payments being taken from people who the Government may think owe repayments on Carer’s Allowance until the independent review into Carer’s Allowance overpayments has been published and fully implemented.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 11—Audit of algorithmic systems used in relation to Carer’s Allowance overpayments—

“(1) An independent audit of algorithmic systems used in the assessment, detection or recovery of Carer’s Allowance overpayments must be conducted at least once every six months.

(2) Any audit under subsection (1) must be conducted by persons with relevant expertise in data science, ethics and social policy who have no direct affiliation with—

(a) the Department for Work and Pensions, or

(b) any person or body involved in the development or operation of the algorithmic systems under review.

(3) An audit conducted under this section must consider—

(a) the accuracy of the algorithmic systems in identifying overpayments, and

(b) the fairness of the systems’ design, application and operation, including any disproportionate impact on particular groups.

(4) After every audit a report on its findings must be—

(a) published;

(b) laid before both Houses of Parliament within 14 days of publication; and

(c) made publicly available in an accessible format.

(5) If any audit identifies significant inaccuracies, unfairness or biases in any algorithmic systems, the Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the publication of the report outlining these findings, present an action plan to Parliament which outlines the steps which the Government intends to take to address the identified issues.”

This new clause would provide for an audit of algorithmic systems used in relation to Carer’s Allowance overpayments.

Amendment 32, in clause 103, page 63, line 26, leave out from start to “following” in line 29 and insert—

“Subject to subsections (1A) and (2), this Act comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office may by regulations appoint.

(1A) No part of this Act may come into force until the recommendations of a report commissioned under section [Recovery of overpayments of Carer’s Allowance] have been implemented.

(2) Subject to subsection (1A), the”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Smith]

Liberal Democrat new clause 10 would delay any payments being taken from people who the Government think owe repayments on carer’s allowance until the independent review into carer’s allowance overpayments has been published and fully implemented. Liberal Democrat new clause 11 would provide for an audit of algorithmic systems used in relation to carer’s allowance overpayments. It would require that, if any audit identified significant inaccuracies, unfairness or biases in any algorithmic system, the Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the publication of the report outlining these findings, present an action plan to Parliament that outlines the steps the Government intend to take to discuss the identified issues. I am interested to know why the Liberal Democrats are singling out carer’s allowance for this treatment—namely, the review of the algorithmic systems—rather than any other allowance or benefits. Is there a reason for that?

Liberal Democrat amendment 32 is a commencement block. It specifies that no part of the Bill may come into force until the recommendations of a report commissioned under the clause “Recovery of overpayments of Carer’s Allowance” have been implemented. We would suggest that there is more holistic information that should be made public before the Bill can be commenced, and that the focus on carer’s allowance is in danger of missing the bigger picture. For example, we need to see the codes of practice, and we need to know precisely how the banks will deliver their responsibilities under the Bill. I would suggest that those things, which are sadly not yet available to the Committee as we scrutinise the legislation, and that has greatly hindered us, would provide a much more holistic assessment of whether the Government are ready to implement the Bill than the report on recovering overpayments of carer’s allowance. Would the Liberal Democrats consider an amendment at a later stage that goes wider than that?

[Andrew Western]

I contend that amendment 32 is simply disproportionate given the wide range of benefits that the Bill is expected to deliver to address fraud and error, not just in the social security system but in the public sector more widely. It is essential that all of Government have access to the capabilities and tools required to stop fraudsters stealing from the taxpayer. Tens of billions of pounds are being lost to public sector fraud. These losses are unacceptable, and waste enormous sums of public money, which could be put to good use. Delaying the Bill coming into force will risk £1.5 billion of savings over the next five years. These have been certified by the Office for Budget Responsibility. The Government made a manifesto commitment that we would safeguard taxpayers’ money and not tolerate fraud or waste anywhere in public services. The Bill delivers on that commitment, and delaying its delivery is unfair on taxpayers, who deserve to have confidence that money spent by Government is reaching those who need it, and not those who exploit the system.

Secondly—we have already discussed this point at length—I remind Members that the Bill introduces new, important safeguards, including provisions for independent oversight and reporting mechanisms, to ensure the proportionate and effective use of the powers. New codes of practice will be consulted on and published to govern how new measures will be exercised in more detail. That will include details of further protections. There will be new rights of review and appeal in both parts of the Bill to ensure that there are opportunities to challenge the Government’s approach. A human being will always be involved in decisions about further investigation or the recovery of any debt.

Finally, I return to my earlier point: data and information sharing are crucial when we look at fraud and error. For example, the eligibility verification measure, while it will not be applied to carer’s allowance itself, will improve the DWP’s access to important data to help to verify entitlements, ensure that payments are correct, and prevent the build-up of overpayments. That will enable the DWP to be tough on those who cheat the benefits system and fair to claimants who make genuine mistakes. It is vital that the DWP is equipped with the right tools, and delaying this Bill will only delay these benefits. In the light of that, I hope that Members will not press the amendment.

[Steve Darling]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 13

Liability orders

“(1) Where—

(a) a person has been found guilty of an offence under section 1 or section 11 of the Fraud Act 2006, or the offence at common law of conspiracy to defraud,

(b) that offence relates to fraud committed against a public authority, and

(c) the person has not paid the required penalties or not made the required repayments,

the Secretary of State may apply to a magistrates’ court or, in Scotland, to the sheriff, for an order (“a liability order”) against the liable person.

(2) Where the Secretary of State applies for a liability order, the magistrates’ court or (as the case may be) sheriff shall make the order if satisfied that the payments in question have become payable by the liable person and have not been paid.

(3) The Secretary of State may make regulations in relation to England and Wales—

(a) prescribing the procedure to be followed in dealing with an application by the Secretary of State for a liability order;

(b) prescribing the form and contents of a liability order; and

(c) providing that where a magistrates’ court has made a liability order, the person against whom it is made shall, during such time as the amount in respect of which the order was made remains wholly or partly unpaid, be under a duty to supply relevant information to the Secretary of State.

(4) Where a liability order has been made against a person (“the liable person”), the Secretary of State may use the procedure in Schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (taking control of goods) to recover the amount in respect of which the order was made, to the extent that it remains unpaid.”—(Rebecca Smith.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Rebecca Smith]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Our new clause would provide that, where someone has been found guilty of fraud or conspiracy to defraud and not made the required payments, the Secretary of State can apply for a liability order. It further provides that, where a liability order has been made against a person, the Secretary of State may use the procedure in schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, on taking control of goods, to recover the amount in respect of which the order was made, to the extent that it remains unpaid.

The new clause is intended to give the DWP powers to apply to the courts to seize assets where fraud is probable, with the same burden of proof as for cash seizures. It would bring the DWP into line with the Child Maintenance Service. I know that we have had some debate on the matter, so this is probably more of a probing or tidying-up amendment than anything else, but it would be useful to have that said explicitly. It goes without saying that, if the Minister does not intend to support the new clause, I will be interested to know why. If the DWP is serious about recovering money lost to fraud and the person liable is not making the required repayments, why should the DWP not be able to apply to seize their assets?

[Georgia Gould]

This is similar to the previous new clause we discussed. We have a lot of sympathy with the points set out. We want to ensure that we recover money, whether it is fraud against the public sector more widely or fraud against the DWP, but we believe that that is already covered in the Bill and I will run through why.

Clause 16 clarifies that the PSFA is able to seek alternative civil recovery through the civil courts, in addition to the direct deduction orders and deduction from earnings orders in the Bill. It confirms that the PSFA will be able to apply to the county court for a recovery order. That is an order providing that the payable amount is recoverable

“under section 85 of the County Courts Act 1984, or…otherwise as if it were payable under an order of the court.”

Section 85 of the County Courts Act also refers to the use of the procedure in schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to recover the money. That would enable the PSFA to seek enforcement of a debt by applying for a warrant of control in the county court, enabling a court enforcement officer to seize and sell goods to satisfy the debt. That ensures that the PSFA is able to pursue recovery through the most appropriate and effective mechanisms. New clause 13 is therefore already provided through the Bill for the PSFA and through existing legislation for the DWP—section 71 and section 71ZE of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to be specific—allowing them operational flexibility to recover money in the most effective and efficient way to return money to the public purse. An amendment is not required to do that.

[Rebecca Smith]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.  

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.  

New Clause 14

Inclusion of systems within the Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard

“(1) For the purposes of this section, ‘system’ means—

(a) algorithms, algorithmic tools, and systems; and

(b) artificial intelligence, including machine learning

provided that they are used in fulfilling the purposes of this Act.

(2) Where at any time after the passage of this Act, the use of any system is—

(a) commenced;

(b) amended; or

(c) discontinued

the Minister must, as soon as reasonably practicable, accordingly include information about the system in the Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard.” —(John Milne.)

This new clause would require the use of algorithms, algorithmic tools, and systems, and artificial intelligence, including machine learning, to be included within the Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would require that the use of algorithms, algorithmic tools and systems, and artificial intelligence, including machine learning, should be included within the algorithmic transparency reporting standard. That standard, established by the Government, is supposed to be mandatory for all Government Departments. However, last November, The Guardian reported that not a single Whitehall Department has registered the use of AI systems since it was made mandatory.

Throughout debate on this issue, the Government have consistently downplayed the risk of using AI to trawl for suspect claimants, but if it really is that simple, why have so many organisations come out with concerns and opposition? That includes Age UK, ATD—All Together in Dignity—Fourth World, Amnesty International, Campaign for Disability Justice, Child Poverty Action Group, Defend Digital Me and Difference North East. I could go on: I have half a page, which I will spare the Committee from, listing organisations that have expressed concern. It is quite a roll call.

Governments can and will get things wrong. History tells us that if it tells us anything. In June 2024, a Guardian investigation revealed that a DWP algorithm had wrongly flagged 200,000 people for possible fraud and error; it found that two thirds of housing benefit claims marked as high risk in the previous three years were in fact legitimate, but thousands of UK households every month had their housing benefit claims wrongly investigated. Overall, about £4.4 million was wasted on officials carrying out checks that did not save any money. We know that more mistakes will happen, no matter how hard we try to avoid them. I therefore ask the Minister to support the insertion of new clause 14 as a small measure of defence against future institutional failings.

[Rebecca Smith]

As we have heard, Liberal Democrat new clause 14 would require the use of algorithms, algorithmic tools, and systems, and artificial intelligence, including machine learning, to be included in the algorithmic transparency reporting standard. I have obviously just heard the comments of the hon. Member for Horsham, but I would be interested to know precisely what the Liberal Democrats are aiming to achieve with this new clause and how such reporting would better enable the Government to crack down on fraud and error. Is that the intention behind the new clause?

[Andrew Western]

I share the support expressed by the hon. Member for Horsham for the algorithmic transparency recording standard as a framework for capturing information about algorithmic tools, including AI systems, and ensuring that public sector bodies openly publish information about the algorithmic tools used in decision-making processes that affect members of the public. However, I do not think the new clause is a necessary addition to the Bill, and I will explain why.

First, all central Government Departments, including the DWP and the Cabinet Office, are already required to comply with the standard as appropriate. We are committed to ensuring that there is appropriate public scrutiny of algorithmic tools that have a significant influence on a decision-making process with public effect, or that directly interact with the public. We have followed and will continue to follow the guidance published by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology on this to ensure the necessary transparency and scrutiny.

Secondly, I remind the Committee that although the DWP and PSFA are improving their access to relevant data through the Bill, we are not introducing any new use of machine learning or automated decision making in the Bill measures. I can continue to assure the House that, as is the case now, a human will always be involved in decisions that affect benefit entitlement.

Thirdly, although I do not wish to labour the point yet again, I remind the Committee that the Bill introduces new and important safeguards, including reporting mechanisms and independent oversight in the Bill, demonstrating our commitment to transparency and ensuring that the powers will be used proportionately and effectively. The DWP takes data protection very seriously and will always comply with data protection law. Any information obtained will be kept confidential and secure, in line with GDPR.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Smith]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 16 would require the Secretary of State to conduct a review of whistleblowing processes in relation to fraud in the public sector within one year of the Bill passing. The Opposition would like the review to include the appropriateness and efficacy of existing whistleblowing processes, the barriers to reporting fraud, the reasons for the under-reporting of fraud, and recommendations for change.

The Committee has previously discussed the 2023 National Audit Office report that highlighted the difficulties with whistleblowing within the public sector, particularly in respect of whistleblowing on senior colleagues. The NAO also highlighted that of the public sector whistleblowing disclosures it received in 2023-24, 12% related to fraud. I did not get a particularly clear answer from the Minister about the safeguards that have been put in place to ensure that junior civil servants are able to raise concerns about more senior members of staff, so I am interested to see if there is more to be said.

It is a serious issue. One of the reasons I was interested in tabling this new clause is that, as a junior member of staff at a local authority, I saw this happen. I was in a situation where two colleagues were defrauding the local housing authority, and at that stage as a 21-year-old I did not feel able to do anything about it. That is one of the biggest regrets of my life. Having worked significantly in housing since, the fact that I was not able to call them out for essentially purchasing a council house that they were no longer living in, makes me feel that this safeguard —ensuring that Government Departments’ houses are in order as the legislation goes forward—is particularly vital.

John Smart, who sits on the PSFA’s advisory panel, raised the example of the US, which has whistleblower reward legislation in place that is effective at flushing out issues affecting payments made by the Government. The legislation flushes out fraud by incentivising whistleblowers to blow the whistle, so to speak. He recommended that the Government consider such legislation, so could the Minister inform the Committee whether the Government have looked into that option? Would it be possible for us to learn from that legislation? Could the Government consider such legislation in the future, and if not, why not?

[Georgia Gould]

I thank the hon. Lady for raising the critical issue of whistleblowing. I assure her of how seriously the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions—my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston—myself, and both Secretaries of State take the issue of whistleblowing. I hope, as I set out our responses to the NAO report and our wider work, to offer the reassurance that the Opposition are looking for.

When it comes to internal and external fraud against the public sector, Government Departments are responsible for their own whistleblowing arrangements and for overseeing arrangements in their arm’s length bodies. For example, the Department for Business and Trade publishes and regularly updates its guidance, “Whistleblowing: list of prescribed people and bodies”, which details who individuals can raise a concern with. The list comprises bodies and individuals to whom making a disclosure qualifies the individual who makes the disclosure for legal protections under the Employment Rights Act 1996—for instance, protection against being dismissed by their employer for the disclosure.

Whistleblowers can report concerns about public sector fraud to bodies such as the NAO’s Comptroller and Auditor General, the director of the Serious Fraud Office, the Auditors General for Wales and for Scotland, the NHS Counter Fraud Authority and various other bodies listed on gov.uk. The NAO report that the hon. Lady referred to set out that between 2019 and 2022 fraud one of the most common concerns raised—I think it accounted for 40% of concerns.

On the review of the existing processes, the key findings of the recent NAO publication related to the need to increase awareness of the channels for whistleblowing, to improve the experience of whistleblowers and to ensure that lessons are learned, as the hon. Lady set out. In the light of the NAO report, and with the intention of opening up as many avenues as possible for the reporting of public sector fraud, the PSFA will explore with the Department for Business and Trade whether it would be appropriate to add the PSFA to the list of prescribed organisations. That would go alongside the existing ability to raise fraud within a public sector body or Department. We will also use the findings of the report, as well as the NAO’s good practice guide to whistleblowing in the civil service, to inform our approach.

The DWP has established processes by which members of the public and staff can report suspected benefit fraud. Members of the public can report fraud online at gov.uk, by phone or by post, while DWP staff follow clear internal guidance and processes. Given the intent to maintain the focus of this legislation, the recent work by the National Audit Office, the existing DWP processes and the steps the PSFA is taking to continue to improve the whistleblowing offer for public sector fraud, I will resist new clause 16.

[Rebecca Smith]

I appreciate the Minister’s response. We will withdraw the new clause, but I urge her to go back and look at what more can be done. I appreciate that the PSFA might come in as a prescribed organisation, but I am particularly concerned about how we bridge the gap and enable more junior civil servants to blow the whistle in relation to senior colleagues. Ultimately, that was the focus of the NAO report. If there is a way to look at that ahead of Report stage, I would be grateful. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 17

Duty to consider domestic abuse risk to holders of joint accounts

“(1) Before any direct deduction order under Schedule 5 is made, the Secretary of State has a duty to consider its effect on any person (‘P’) who—

(a) is a victim of domestic abuse, or

(b) the Secretary of State reasonably believes to be at risk of domestic abuse,

where P shares a joint account with a liable person believed to be the perpetrator or potential perpetrator of domestic abuse.

(2) In this section ‘domestic abuse’ has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”—(Steve Darling.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Steve Darling]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I start by acknowledging the hard work of Surviving Economic Abuse in this policy area. I thank that charity for its briefing, which I am sure it has shared with all Committee members. The charity and the Liberal Democrats are keen to make sure that domestic abuse, particularly where it plays out in relation to joint accounts, is on the face of the Bill, so that it is taken very seriously.

I can almost hear the Minister’s voice saying that DWP officers are well trained to deal with vulnerable claimants, but it is extremely important to put domestic abuse on the face of the Bill. Domestic abuse is a very wicked issue in my Torbay constituency, and I am sad to say that Torbay is not alone in it being a serious challenge in people’s households. I hope the Government will take this seriously and support the new clause, so we would like to press it to a vote in due course.

[Rebecca Smith]

The Conservatives—the official Opposition—share the Liberal Democrats’ view that it is vital that we use different Departments across Government to tackle domestic abuse and domestic violence. We have a really strong track record of doing that in government.

In principle, the new clause seems like a good idea. I am conscious that we need to ensure that the Bill does not exacerbate or create problems for victims and put them even more at risk. I have done a lot of work on violence against women and girls away from this place, and I am conscious of how tricky it can be to prove some of these things. I wonder whether there might be other ways to achieve the same outcome. I assume that is why the Government are not able to support the new clause.

The new clause includes language such as “potential” and “believed to be”. My gentle challenge is about whether it could be worded differently, as we go forward to other stages, to make it more achievable and deliverable, and something that would have a place in the Bill. As it stands, I am not sure that would be the case, but I am interested to see this issue debated further, because the official Opposition share the commitment to tackling domestic abuse and domestic violence.

[Andrew Western]

We have reached the stage in Committee at which the hon. Member for Torbay can second-guess my comments. He will be as pleased as I am that this is the last of the new clauses for debate, but it is a very serious one.

New clause 17 seeks to place a duty on Secretary of State to consider the impact of a proposed direct deduction order where a person is a victim of domestic abuse, or officials reasonably believe they are at risk of domestic abuse, and they share an account with a perpetrator of that abuse. I share the hon. Member for Torbay’s view that, where the new recovery powers are exercised, there should be a consideration of whether there is evidence of domestic abuse. However, I do not believe the new clause reflects the right approach. The DWP understands the importance of supporting victims and survivors of domestic abuse, and has existing guidance, processes and operational best practice for supporting them.

The new clause would apply to both debtors and non-debtors, and would not require the DWP to take any steps to identify possible victims. Subsection (1)(a) would place a duty on officials to consider the impact any time a person was a victim, even when the DWP did not and could not have known that that was the case. Subsection (1)(b) would imply a duty to assess whether there was reason to believe the person was at risk of domestic abuse but, as the hon. Member for South West Devon suggested, in many cases the DWP will not be in a position to make that assessment. That would put officials in a difficult, if not impossible, position.

As the direct deduction powers will be used as a last resort where multiple attempts to engage with the debtor to arrange a voluntary, affordable and sustainable repayment plan have failed, we anticipate that the DWP will know very little about the debtor’s current circumstances, unless it had been made aware previously or there were clear identifiable risk factors. We are working closely with charities, some of which the hon. Member for Torbay will have heard from, to help to identify those risks, as I will outline.

Where a joint account holder could be at risk of domestic abuse but is not the debtor, we are unlikely to have ever had direct dealings with them prior to the power being used. Unless we were directly notified, it is unlikely we would have the information necessary to form the reasonable belief that they were at risk, and much less likely that we could identify all the cases where the person was experiencing abuse. I do not, therefore, agree that a placing a legal duty on officials in this way is the right approach.

We are committed to continuing to support victims of domestic abuse whenever they interact with the Department, which is why we are working with charities such as Surviving Economic Abuse, which is dedicated to advocating for women whose partner has controlled their ability to acquire, use and maintain economic resources. SEA is supporting the drafting of the code of practice to ensure that robust safeguards are in place and to encourage engagement specifically from those who are vulnerable, including victims of domestic abuse. Although SEA works with women, the principles will apply to all victims and survivors of domestic abuse.

Frontline debt management staff already receive training for their role, including on assessing affordability, discussing hardship, and identifying and dealing with vulnerable customers. As we have heard, a specialist debt enforcement team will exercise the new recovery powers, and it will be governed by a code of practice. As explained, we will consult on the draft code of practice, and I welcome further views as part of the wider public consultation.

Finally, I note that paragraph 6(1)(b) of schedule 5 already imposes a broad duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that the amount of any deduction is

“fair in all the circumstances.”

That would include consideration of the impact on a victim of domestic abuse, as the hon. Member for Torbay seeks in the new clause, where the relevant context and circumstances are known to the Department. I hope that reassures the hon. Member that his concerns are already addressed in the Bill, and that the DWP takes domestic abuse seriously and will continue to do so when exercising the new recovery powers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Georgia Gould]

This is the final group of clauses that the Committee will consider. I give massive thanks to the Committee for our constructive dialogue, which I am sure will continue—I look forward to a long afternoon and Thursday discussing these final clauses.

Clause 99 covers how the Bill will be applied and limited by setting out the retrospective effect of the new powers, and makes some technical amendments to the Limitation Act 1980. There is a significant policy change in the clause, which is the extension of the existing six-year limit for civil claims relating to covid frauds. I think the Committee will agree that is critical. Although the application and limitation of the clause covers the whole Bill, and the powers can be used on existing cases, retrospective effect does not apply for clauses 96 and 97, which relate to non-benefit payment administrative penalties.

Subsection (3) of clause 99 sets out that the time-limit change applies to amounts that an England and Wales public authority is entitled to claim from a person as a result of a fraud the person carried out. Subsection (5) clarifies what is meant by an England and Wales public authority, and explains that Scottish and Welsh devolved authorities are not included. Subsection (7) makes technical amendments to section 38(11) of the Limitation Act 1980.

Clause 100 enables the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and the Minister for the Cabinet Office to ensure that the Bill works alongside all existing legislation. As is usual for Bills that may have provisions consequential for other Acts of Parliament, the power allows the Secretary of State and the Minister to amend other legislation to ensure that the Bill works effectively with existing Acts of Parliament.

Clause 101 recognises that the Bill requires a money resolution, primarily because it confers new functions on the Minister for the Cabinet Office and the Department for Work and Pensions.

Clause 102 sets out the Bill’s territorial extent, while annex A in the accompanying explanatory notes provides a full breakdown of the territorial extent and application of its measures. The provisions in part 1 apply to England and Wales. Legislative consent is required for Wales for some parts of the part 1 provisions. The provisions in part 2 apply to England, Wales and Scotland in relation to reserved matters.

As the Committee is aware, the UK Government do not generally legislate on devolved matters without the consent of the relevant devolved Governments. We have written to our counterparts in Scotland and Wales, and engagement with both remains ongoing, to seek legislative consent from Wales on the part 1 provisions that interact with Welsh competence and from Scotland on the part 2 provisions that interact with Scottish competence.

Clause 103 is required to enable the provisions in the Bill to be implemented. It sets out how the Bill’s provisions will be commenced.

Finally, clause 104 is straightforward and confirms that the short title of the Act will be the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Act 2025, to summarise the intent of the Bill captured in the long title. Having outlined the main provisions in clauses 99 to 104, I commend them to the Committee.

[Rebecca Smith]

The good news is that the Minister has answered some of my questions, particularly in respect of clause 99 and the extension of the retrospective time limits. Clause 100 is a standard Henry VIII power to make consequential provision as a result of the legislation; does the Minister envisage that the power will need to be used frequently? Clauses 101 to 104 are standard provisions and we do not have any substantive comments to make on them.

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that we have until 11.25 am.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Rebecca Smith Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 13th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

The clause requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice about the giving of notices to banks requiring the provision of information, the processing of information, the circumstances in which penalties may be issued to banks, and the circumstances in which the Secretary of State expects to exercise functions to disqualify a liable person from driving.

As we have said several times in Committee, it has been extremely difficult to scrutinise the Bill without the code of practice. Will the Minister confirm when it will be published? I believe he just did, but we will get it on record again. He said that it will be before the Bill is finalised, but it would be useful to know what sight we will have of it beforehand. What can the Minister say about how the code of practice will regulate the giving of information notices to banks?

We clearly agree that the Secretary of State should consult on the draft code, and the Minister has just implied that it will be a public consultation. It would be useful to know what form that consultation will take, and how it will be publicised to ensure that it can be seen by as many people as possible. Will it include a consultation on the impact of bank costs and what those should be, and give banks an opportunity to feed back at that point in time?

The Secretary of State must consult before the first code of practice is issued, which is welcome, but there is no suggestion that further revisions will be subject to any scrutiny. Will the Minister confirm whether that is the case? What oversight mechanisms exist to ensure that the code of practice is not changed for the worse in the future, and to ensure that Parliament remains informed?

When does Minister envisage that the powers in the Bill will first be used, given the delay that the code of practice consultation will necessitate? What might trigger a revision and reissue of the code, and who might be able to alert the Secretary of State to the need for that? The clause implies that the Secretary of State could revise the code, but what would be the trigger and who might be involved? Will there be a non-statutory review after a certain period of time as an initial check and balance?

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I thank the Minister for his introduction to the clause and for his assurance that there will be a consultation; it would be helpful if he could explain the likely consultees. Also—Opposition Members have repeatedly raised this question—what are the key principles within that consultation and what areas is he keen to address with the code of practice? The Minister has alluded to that already, but a bit more flesh on the bones would be extremely helpful.

Often, people who commit fraud use other peoples’ accounts and abuse them, and are often financial abusers. Will the Minister flesh out how the code of practice will take that into account? Finally, I would be grateful if the Minister could expand on how the code of practice will take account of people with learning disabilities, covering both those who are able to operate the accounts themselves and those who may need a proxy to manage the account.

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[Andrew Western]

The clause inserts proposed new section 80E into the Social Security Administration Act 1992. That provision gives DWP officials right of audience and allows them to conduct litigation in the magistrates, county and Crown courts in England and Wales. New section 80E has been introduced to enable lay DWP officials to oversee civil claims and applications and appear in related court hearings on behalf of the Secretary of State in debt recovery matters. That is similar to the rights already provided to other Government Departments, such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Child Maintenance Service, as well as local authorities.

The disqualification from driving power in clause 91 and schedule 6 of the Bill will be exercised by the court only on application from DWP, and there are other civil recovery mechanisms already available to DWP involving the courts. Those are generally routine proceedings, but, without the clause, DWP is required to instruct a solicitor in every case. However, the clause does not prevent DWP from instructing a solicitor for debt recovery proceedings where it would be appropriate to do so. That ensures that DWP can recover public money in the most efficient and effective way from those who evade repayments, thereby reducing costs for the taxpayer.

[Rebecca Smith]

As the Minister has just set out, clause 93 grants rights of audience and rights to conduct litigation in the magistrates court, county court and Crown court in England and Wales for, or in connection with, debt recovery proceedings to designated officers of the Secretary of State. That will allow DWP officials to be able to pursue the enforcement of debts via the court without the need to instruct solicitors, thereby ensuring cost efficiency in the recovery of public funds.

This is not particularly complicated clause, so I have just a few questions. We would like confirmation of the level of seniority of the officials signing off the decisions to bring litigation, and will the DWP officials bringing the cases have appropriate training to do so? Where court appearances are required, does the Minister anticipate a slowing down of recovery proceedings? I know he has talked about cost efficiency, but will this mean that it will take slightly longer? Will costs increase as a result, either in terms of what is owed by the person that the action has being taken against or the costs that might be necessary through the courts?

Finally, what consultation has there been with the Ministry of Justice around these new provisions in terms of capacity, the costs and the court backlogs? Will this measure create a problematic situation, or is the Minister confident that it will be okay going forward?

[Andrew Western]

I may have missed a question about costs, so will the hon. Lady please ask me that again if needed? The team members taking forward cases for us in the court will be HEO, or higher executive officer, level. That is the existing process, and that is the required level of authorisation for those using similar powers. This is not particularly new for us; it is just new for us in this space. A specialised DWP team will receive training in conducting litigation and appearing in court in addition to training on the new recovery powers. We already have the right to conduct and appear in similar tribunal proceedings, so we will share best practice when developing that training.

On the question of MOJ consultation and court pressures, whether we use solicitors or take them forward ourselves, the pressure on the courts will be the same, so there will not be a material impact on the court backlog. Clearly, the MOJ is aware of our intentions in this regard, but this is more about our ability to do that while minimising costs.

[Rebecca Smith]

My final question was about whether court appearances, regardless of whether that is with a solicitor or through DWP officers, will effectively slow down recovery proceedings. As a result, will there be some knock-on costs either for the person who the action has been taken against, if interest is being charged or anything like that, or for the Department in terms of staff and that sort of thing? I assume it will be a last resort, but it would be interesting to have an answer.

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[Andrew Western]

Clause 94 inserts proposed new section 80F into the Social Security Administration Act 1992 and relates to the recovery of costs from debtors. The clause simplifies existing legislation to ensure that the costs of court enforcement that DWP is already entitled to reclaim from debtors can be effectively recovered from the debtor, together with any costs incurred by DWP under the new direct deduction and disqualification from driving powers. The clause enables DWP to recover these costs from the debtor using any of the available recovery methods, to make sure that, as debtors’ circumstances change, the money can still be recovered. The clause ensures that the taxpayer does not pick up the burden for costs associated with pursuing debtors who refuse to repay public money, and that DWP can recover these costs from the debtor in the most effective way.

Clause 95 inserts new section 80G into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, providing technical interpretative provisions for the new debt recovery powers contained in part 2 of the Bill. First, it confirms that debt recovery provisions should always be read in a way that is consistent with data protection legislation. This is a relatively standard provision that deals with any unintended and unforeseen ambiguity or apparent conflict with normal data protection principles. Secondly, it confirms that references to “giving notice” can include, among other methods, service by post, as defined in the Interpretation Act 1978. That avoids ambiguity about how, for example, proposed deduction orders can be given to account holders for their consideration, which is a key safeguard under the new direct deduction order power.

[Rebecca Smith]

Clause 94 states that any costs incurred by the Secretary of State in recovering an amount under clauses 71 to 80 or schedules 3ZA or 3ZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 may be recovered as though they were recoverable under the same methods as the debt itself. Will it be done separately, and what might the cost to the Department be in putting that forward? Is there any limit to the costs that the Secretary of State can recoup in this way?

Clause 95 clarifies that provision does not require or authorise processing of information that contravenes data protection legislation, or the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The final line states,

“references to giving a notice or other document…include sending the notice or document by post.”

This also came up in the debate on Tuesday, so I would like to get it on the record. I assume I know the answer, but can the Minister clarify whether this includes electronic methods of communication also, such as email? If I may ask this, as I am intrigued, then why does sending by post need separate legislation? We have debated the subject twice now, and the answer is probably really straightforward, but as it is set out on its own line, it might be a nice idea to find out why it has to be legislated for. I ask that purely because I am nosy and would like to know.

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. Clause 84 states that costs incurred by the Secretary of State in taking recovery actions can be themselves recovered. Will the Minister clarify what happens in a case where the claimant is found to be not guilty? What happens to the costs then? Are they borne by the bank, the DWP or the claimant? Will he also clarify how the cost of the general trawl through all the accounts is apportioned?

Secondly, to go back to the issue of fraud versus error, and how they seem to be treated as pretty much the same throughout the Bill, will the Minister clarify whether, where it is the DWP’s error, a claimant would still end up paying the administrative charge? If that is the case, it seems quite unreasonable, so it would be great if the Minister could clarify those points.

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[Andrew Western]

The clause amends sections 111A and 112 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to include non-benefit payments. This will enable the DWP to charge a person with an offence under either of those sections where it relates to a non-benefit payment. This is a key clause that, in conjunction with clause 97, will enable the Department to offer an administrative penalty where there are appropriate grounds to do so.

The Government take a fair and proportional approach to tackling fraud and error. We will always be tough on serious fraud, but for less serious first-time offences it is appropriate and fair that we have the opportunity to offer an alternative to prosecution. The person will always have the choice to accept or reject an administrative penalty, should they wish to do so. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Rebecca Smith]

The clause makes it an offence for a person to fraudulently claim a non-benefit payment for themselves or another person by making false representations or providing false documentation. Generally, we support this provision.

A non-benefit payment is a prescribed payment that is not a relevant social security benefit and that is made by the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance. Will the Minister provide for the record some examples of the types of payment that would fall within scope of the Bill as a result of this measure? Will he reassure us that it will cover all payments, unlike the provisions on social security benefits, which apply only to the three benefits included in the legislation? The flip question is: does the Minister anticipate any exceptions that will not be covered? If any new non-benefit payments were introduced in the future, would they automatically fall within scope of this legislation? Earlier in Committee we had a similar debate about enabling new benefits to come into scope; would the same apply to new non-benefit payments?

[Steve Darling]

The Minister alluded to proportionality and not wanting to criminalise people in undertaking an administrative charge. As my hon. Friend the Member for Horsham alluded to, it would be helpful if the Minister unpacked a little more for the Committee where that proportionality kicks in.

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[Andrew Western]

The clause amends the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to expand the types of overpayments that can be considered for an administrative penalty under sections 115A and 115B to include non-benefit payments, such as the grants that were paid through the kickstart scheme. Currently, the option to offer an administrative penalty as an alternative to prosecution is not available for non-benefit payments, so the DWP is required to refer all such cases for prosecution. Extending the scope to include non-benefit payments will enable the DWP to offer those who receive a non-benefit payment an administrative penalty as an alternative to prosecution, in appropriate circumstances.

The measure gives individuals or colluding employers the choice to accept the administrative penalty or have the evidence reviewed before the courts. The change is really about fairness. It will bring equity and parity to the way the Department tackles and addresses fraud and it will offer first-time offenders or those who commit low-value fraud an alternative to prosecution. It will provide the individual or colluding employer with a choice, allow the courts to focus on the most serious crimes, and enable the Department to resolve cases more quickly where appropriate.

[Rebecca Smith]

The clause makes provision to allow for a penalty to be issued, instead of prosecution, if an overpayment notice has been issued in relation to a non-benefit payment. This can occur only after the review period has passed and, if a review was sought, after a decision has been made and any subsequent appeals have concluded.

We support efforts to be tough on those who have taken advantage through fraudulent methods and gained from benefits they were not entitled to receive. Will the Minister explain in what circumstances a penalty would be deemed more appropriate than prosecution, and why? That said, we also do not want to unfairly hit those who have made a genuine error, so in what circumstances would a penalty be seen as appropriate, assuming the claimant engages with the process?

Has any consideration been given to the likely timescales for the repayment of moneys obtained following erroneous claims? How long does the person have? Would a repayment be allowed before a penalty was applied? From what the Minister just outlined, the answer is likely to be yes, because an entire process would have taken place first; I seek clarification on the timetable or the process involved, particularly for those who have made a genuine error, and on how they will be able to stop the train and settle what they need to without any penalties.

[Andrew Western]

On when a penalty will be considered more appropriate, there are clearly thresholds for our investigators’ interpretation of when somebody has committed fraud and at what level we consider that fraud to be.

On the hon. Lady’s point about genuine error, the clause is for situations where we consider that somebody has committed fraud, not error. The administrative penalty does not arise in cases of what we consider to be error. It may be that it is a first-time offence. It would certainly need to be a low-value offence, because an administrative penalty is capped at £5,000. It is worked out as 50% of the value of the overpayment, so the amount would always need to be below £10,000. For anything beyond that we would be looking at prosecution. How long a person has to pay back will depend on a range of factors. It is clearly dependent on their ability to pay the money back, and what their means of production is and so on. That would always be considered on a case-by- case basis.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 97 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 98

Amendments to the Social Security Fraud Act 2001: loss of benefits following penalty

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[Andrew Western]

This straightforward amendment is a minor and technical change that looks to update section 6B of the Social Security Fraud Act 2001 by removing the phrase “the corresponding provision”, which will no longer be needed once clause 98 is agreed, and substituting in appropriate wording.

Section 6B, as enacted, references two Acts in which a penalty is defined in legislation and which would attract the loss-of-benefit penalty. The first is the Social Security Administration Act and the second is the equivalent legislation for Northern Ireland. Clause 98 will remove reference to one of those Acts—the Social Security Administration Act 1992—to ensure that the loss-of-benefit sanction is no longer applied if an administrative penalty has been offered by the DWP and accepted by a benefit claimant. Doing so will mean there will no longer be corresponding legislation in section 6B(2)(a) of the Social Security Fraud Act 2001, as it will reference only Northern Ireland legislation. I assure the Committee that the amendment is minor and technical and will have no operational impact on the remaining provisions in the 2001 Act.

Clause 98 removes the loss-of-benefit provisions in cases where an administrative penalty has been offered and accepted as an alternative to prosecution. As it stands, the acceptance of an administrative penalty is compounded by a further four-week suspension of certain benefit payments. The suspension of benefits is made in addition to the acceptance of the administrative penalty and alongside the obligation to repay the overpayment. By removing the four-week loss of benefit in these cases, the clause allows for a more proportionate approach to less serious, lower-value fraud and to first-time offenders.

However, the loss-of-benefit penalty is not being removed in its entirety: it will still apply in cases that are convicted in court, with a potential loss of benefit of up to three years. Limiting the loss-of-benefit penalty to convicted cases will ensure that only the most serious cases of fraud face the harshest consequences, without imposing unnecessarily harsh sanctions on lower-level offenders. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Rebecca Smith]

The clause amends the Social Security Fraud Act so that if an administration penalty is accepted instead of prosecution, the individual does not lose their benefit provisions. From what the Minister said, it sounds like different scenarios are affected.

I appreciate what the Minister said about the different situations—for example, for a lower-level or first-time offence, someone might not lose their benefits—but the challenge is that this perhaps seems like a soft touch, depending on the situation. Does there not need to be a bit more discretion than just a threshold depending on each case being dealt with? What are the expected values of the penalties, and how do they compare with the typical benefits? Although we need to ensure that safeguards on affordability remain in place and that claimants can meet their essential living costs—that goes without saying —it is not clear why a penalty should automatically prevent the loss of benefits. Ultimately in these situations, there has to be a deterrent in addition to the penalty.

Government amendment 36 will update the Social Security Fraud Act 2001 to allow a penalty to be an alternative to prosecution in Northern Ireland. Our questions on that are the same as those for clause 98. I have nothing further to add.