Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTim Roca
Main Page: Tim Roca (Labour - Macclesfield)Department Debates - View all Tim Roca's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(1 day, 20 hours ago)
Commons ChamberIt has been a long afternoon, but I should say from the start that I genuinely believe that the motivation of all of us is the national interest of the United Kingdom. Whatever differences of opinion there might be, I think it is important that we try to avoid hyperbole in this matter and think coolly and calmly about what is in the UK national interest.
There are tests we need to apply to what we are discussing: first, does it protect UK national security; secondly, do our allies and the professional military and security establishment support it; and thirdly, are the costs and obligations reasonable and proportionate? We also need to have a weather eye to our responsibility to the Chagossians, and I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) for speaking passionately on behalf of his constituents. I believe the answer to those three tests is yes, and I will address them in turn.
Diego Garcia is not just another overseas facility; it is fundamental to our security. It is where our forces and US forces have launched operations against high-value terrorist groups. It is a communications and logistics hub, and it is where we monitor hostile states and safeguard global trade routes that underpin our economy. Without this treaty, all that is at risk.
Ministers have outlined that international rulings could make the base inoperable. I spoke earlier to Dr Marco Longobardo, a specialist in international law, and it is clear that even the non-binding ICJ judgment is nevertheless a matter of international law and potentially gives hostile countries the opening that they need to contemplate interference in the islands—in the same way that Chinese claims in the South China sea are not recognised by many countries. That is all at risk. Our ability to berth submarines, patrol waters or launch operations would be compromised, and a vacuum would be created.
I believe that the hon. Member has had quite a lot of turns today, and I have been waiting a long time without intervening, so I will proceed. If we allowed a vacuum to be created, it would be filled by China or others in a region that is vital to our security. I will come back to China in a moment, because what China thinks about this treaty is important as well.
Turning to the first test, the treaty secures 99 years of guaranteed access, with the option to extend it by a further 40 years; 99 years was good enough for Lord Salisbury, so it is good enough for me. It gives us full operational control over installations, logistics, communications and the electromagnetic spectrum. It establishes a 24-nautical-mile buffer zone and bans any foreign military presence on the outer islands. We have talked about how it protects a unique maritime environment and provides tangible support through the trust fund for Chagossian communities. On the first test I am satisfied.
On the second test—whether the agreement commands the backing of allies and experts—other colleagues have spoken powerfully about this, but Lord Goldsmith, a former Attorney General, said it was
“consistent with our national security interests and with our respect for international law”.
The international support is equally strong. Australia’s Kevin Rudd called it a
“good outcome for Mauritius, for Australia, for the UK and for our collective security interests”.
Canada’s foreign ministry said that it ensures
“the long-term, secure and effective operation”
of the joint base, strengthening a free and open Indo-Pacific.
In the United States, where there is not much that gets bipartisan support, it is a bipartisan matter. Antony Blinken said that America “strongly supported” the negotiations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio commended the “leadership and vision” shown. The Democratic former Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin said that the agreement will
“safeguard strategic security interests into the next century.”
I believe an hon. Member has already quoted President Trump, who described it as an amazing deal, a beautiful deal or whatever kind of deal—but a good deal, that is the main point.
The international consensus is clear. Our allies, partners and experts back the deal. I was very taken by the comments of Professor Benjamin Sacks of the RAND school of public policy in the United States. He said:
“I contend that Beijing privately views the agreement, even if modified to ameliorate some Chagossians’ outstanding demands, somewhat as a setback. In practical terms, it gains little if any advantage from it.”
He added:
“The Chagos issue constituted a perennial problem for British foreign policy; one that China could simultaneously exploit to demonstrate its supposed adherence to existing RBOs”—
rule-based orders—
“and undermine the UK’s traditionally important role in maintaining it.”
He also said that the deal deters Port Louis—Mauritius—from becoming an effective client state of Beijing. On the point of whether our allies support it, I believe that the treaty meets the test.
I will not. I experienced the right hon. Gentleman defending the hereditary principle last week, and I do not think I have the strength in me this week to listen to another argument.
The final test was on costs and obligations. Again, Ministers have talked powerfully about the deal being less than 0.2% of the defence budget. Comparisons have been made with what the French are paying in Djibouti, and I am glad that we are getting a better deal than the French. Of course, Diego Garcia is 15 times larger than those bases and in a more strategic location. The treaty gives us immense operational freedom. It therefore seems to me that this is a modest investment for an irreplaceable asset. The risks from delay or abandonment—in this argument, we have to balance the treaty with the risks of what could happen—are vastly greater.
The hon. Gentleman describes Diego Garcia as an irreplaceable asset, but the Chagossians sitting in the Gallery do not see it as an asset; they see it as their home. Even though they have been displaced from their home for the best part of 50 years, they tell me that they see the actions in the Chamber as a new round of the same colonial humiliation they experienced in the 1960s and 1970s. What does the hon. Gentleman say to those Chagossians here today?
I thank the hon. Member for raising that important aspect. We should all be honest that, as was put powerfully by my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb), our country’s history with the Chagossians has been very poor—if we look at some of the diplomatic cables from the 1960s, we see that disgraceful language was used—but I was reassured by what Ministers said about the preamble of the treaty and some of the provisions put in place.
It is a matter of fact that the previous Government were in negotiations with Mauritius over this issue. That was the case, and there will have been motivations for their doing that. I am worried about how our other overseas territories are being dragged into this. A couple of months ago, I was in Gibraltar with colleagues who privately told me they were horrified that party politics were being played with their communities. I am glad to see that Gibraltar’s Chief Minister was clear on the record that there was “no possible read across” to Gibraltar, and the Governor of the Falklands said that the
“historical contexts…are very different.”
I am confident that we meet the three tests.
No, I am afraid that I will not.
In closing, I believe that the three tests have been met: the treaty meets our national security requirements, it has the backing of our allies, and it comes at a reasonable cost. It would be very dangerous for us to dither or delay any longer in view of the potential threat to that base.