Asked by: James McMurdock (Independent - South Basildon and East Thurrock)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the press release entitled Northwood Declaration: 10 July 2025 (UK-France joint nuclear statement), what recent assessment he has made of the potential impact of that declaration on UK nuclear operations and cooperation with France.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
The United Kingdom and France remain two sovereign nuclear-weapon states. Our respective nuclear forces and decision-making processes are independent, while we each retain the ability to act independently of each other, we can co-ordinate our deterrents should the situation demand it. It will remain the case that only the Prime Minister can authorise the firing of the UK’s nuclear weapons.
Deepening nuclear co-operation between the UK and France improves our ability to work together in times of crisis and strengthens our existing commitments to our Allies in an uncertain and dangerous world. The possibility of coordination between our independent centres of decision-making will enhance deterrence by further complicating the calculations of adversaries.
Asked by: James McMurdock (Independent - South Basildon and East Thurrock)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the press release entitled Northwood Declaration: 10 July 2025 (UK-France joint nuclear statement), what assessment the Government has made of the potential impact of that declaration on the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
The United Kingdom and France remain two sovereign nuclear-weapon states. Our respective nuclear forces and decision-making processes are independent, while we each retain the ability to act independently of each other, we can co-ordinate our deterrents should the situation demand it. It will remain the case that only the Prime Minister can authorise the firing of the UK’s nuclear weapons.
Deepening nuclear co-operation between the UK and France improves our ability to work together in times of crisis and strengthens our existing commitments to our Allies in an uncertain and dangerous world. The possibility of coordination between our independent centres of decision-making will enhance deterrence by further complicating the calculations of adversaries.
Asked by: Cameron Thomas (Liberal Democrat - Tewkesbury)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the viability of the purchase of F-35As as an expansion of the UK nuclear deterrent in the context of the US National Security Strategy.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
The United Kingdom is purchasing at least 12 F-35A aircraft. The aircraft will allow the UK to participate in NATO's Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) nuclear mission. The nuclear weapons allocated to the NATO DCA nuclear mission are United States (US) nuclear weapons and the US retains control and custody over them.
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept states that the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the US, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance.
The Government has no plans to expand the UK nuclear deterrent beyond our existing submarine-based system but continues to keep its nuclear posture under constant review in light of the international security environment and the actions of potential adversaries.
Asked by: James McMurdock (Independent - South Basildon and East Thurrock)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what the objectives were of the UK–France Nuclear Steering Group held in Paris on 10 December 2025.
Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
The UK-France Nuclear Steering Group was established to strengthen and provide political direction to UK-France nuclear cooperation and coordinate work across nuclear policy, capabilities and operations.
The UK-France Nuclear Steering Group met in Paris on 10 December to confirm progress made since the UK-France Summit in July and to set further direction for the programme of work to strengthen bilateral nuclear cooperation and enhance coordination of UK and French independent nuclear deterrents.
Asked by: Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Labour - Clapham and Brixton Hill)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what quantity of plutonium has been recovered from the dismantling of the Mk4A Trident warheads since the start of the dismantlement programme; what proportion has been re-cycled and re-used in new warheads; where is the surplus plutonium currently stored; and what has been the cost to date of the dismantlement programme.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
I refer the hon. Member to the answer provided to the hon, Member for Newton Abbott (Martin Wrigley) on 1 September 2025 to Question 70223.
Asked by: Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (Green Party - Life peer)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government what discussions they plan to have at the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and with the government of Saudi Arabia about the government of Saudi Arabia's refusal to ratify the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol on enrichment and reprocessing capabilities; and what assessment they have made of the government of Saudi Arabia's intentions regarding nuclear weapons.
Answered by Baroness Chapman of Darlington - Minister of State (Development)
Planning for the 2026 Review Conference is underway, including for outreach to a range of States' Parties, and our priority will be to ensure that the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains a vital pillar of international peace and security for decades to come. We will also use this Review Conference to underline UK support for the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards regime, including the universalisation of the Additional Protocol (AP). We routinely call on all states to abide by their NPT obligations and for states that have not yet done so to bring an AP into force as soon as possible, including - amongst others - the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Asked by: Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the remarks by Lord Coaker on Wednesday 10 December (HL Deb col 236), whether they plan to review their decision not to join the UN panel on the physical and societal effects of a nuclear war; and if so when.
Answered by Baroness Chapman of Darlington - Minister of State (Development)
I refer the Noble Baroness to the answer given on 17 February 2025 to Question 28881, which - for ease of reference - is reproduced below:
The UK voted against the United Nations General Assembly Resolution "Nuclear War Effects and Scientific Research", which proposed establishing an independent scientific panel on the effects of nuclear war, because the devastation that would be caused by nuclear war has been long understood. The UK questioned the benefit of further research in that area, which could not change our collective understanding of the horror of a nuclear war.
Asked by: John Hayes (Conservative - South Holland and The Deepings)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will publish all document titles from the Merlin database that have been declassified by the Atomic Weapons Establishment.
Answered by Louise Sandher-Jones - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Defence)
All document titles from the Merlin database that have been declassified will be published. Over 4,700 records from the Merlin database are currently listed and accessible on The National Archives (TNA) website. Records are being regularly transferred from AWE to TNA who will make them available at the earliest opportunity.
Guidance on accessing these records can be found at: https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-research/research-guides/records-of-veterans-of-nuclear-testing-the-contents-of-the-merlin-database/
Asked by: Mike Wood (Conservative - Kingswinford and South Staffordshire)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether launching a US sovereign nuclear weapon from the UK's F-35A planes would require the authorisation of the Prime Minister.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
I refer the hon. Member to the answers I gave him on 8 September and 11 November 2025 to Questions 70471 and 87345 respectively.
https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-08-29/70471
https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-11-03/87345
Asked by: Bell Ribeiro-Addy (Labour - Clapham and Brixton Hill)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what has been the cost to date of the Astraea nuclear warhead design and production programme.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
The UK’s replacement warhead, Astraea, remains in the concept phase. I am withholding details on cost for purpose of safeguarding national security.