Victims and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 16th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, as always, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Today, it is an enormous pleasure to congratulate my noble friend the Minister on bringing the Bill forward and introducing it with the style and clarity that we are fast becoming used to—no pressure.

In particular, the Bill addresses a number of concerns that many of us had about flaws and deficiencies in the Act of last year specifically, and our regime for supporting victims of crime in general. So this Second Reading has felt, at times, a little like a reunion. It was a pleasure to see the noble Lord, Lord Russell, in his place before—I think he will return—and to hear in particular from the noble Lord, Lord Meston.

Of course, I have to say it one more time: we all miss Lady Newlove so much. Those of us who worked quite hard on attempting to improve last year’s Bill tabled a large number of amendments and sat for a number of days with her advice, support and strategy. It is therefore very heartening to see so much of the spirit of some of those amendments reflected in this new Bill.

I hope my noble friend was able to take real pride in making what may have been her first Section 19 statement on the cover of the Bill. This is, of course, Section 19 of the Human Rights Act, which requires Ministers to state their view of a Bill’s compatibility with human rights. Noble Lords will notice that my noble friend felt able to do this on this occasion. I hope she took pride in that, not least because, as a criminal barrister and, indeed, a judge of some distinction, she will be very aware that it is perhaps in the realm of victims’ rights in particular that the European Convention, by way of the Human Rights Act, has made the most positive difference here in the United Kingdom.

Briefly, on defendants’ rights, I was heartened to see my noble friend’s body language in the face of the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about the proposals on jury trial. Panto season is upon us and the SW1 rumour mill is working with full force, so I had heard the same rumours about this preposterous suggestion that limitations on jury trial would be dropped into the Bill at Lords Committee. I was, and am still, heartened to see the body language and, no doubt, we will have it from my noble friend’s mouth in her summing up.

Of course, defendants’ rights were well developed in this jurisdiction long before even the European Convention. The drafters of that convention referred to Article 6 as the “English article” because of things such as the presumption of innocence in particular—but this was far less the case in the context of the rights of victims of crime.

I remember that, when I was a young Home Office lawyer in the early 1990s, rape complainants were routinely cross-examined in person by their alleged assailants, sometimes for days on end, at the Old Bailey. They were cross-examined about their sexual history, with judges understandably nervous about interfering, until the commission, as it then was, in Strasbourg, suggested that it might be degrading and inhuman treatment and a new torture for the victim, who was usually a woman—it need not be, but it usually was. It took Article 3 of the convention and a Labour Government’s response to make sure that that should never happen. That is just one example of the many ways in which positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights have animated and accelerated the development of victims’ rights in this country like never before. I put that on the record because it is so infrequently discussed in all the heat and noise around human rights debates in this country at the moment.

In a similar vein, I welcome Clauses 3 to 5, on restricting the parental responsibility of sex offenders who have abused children. There were similar attempts last year, but these measures go further. The House, and in particular my noble friend, will be very comforted by the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, who is distinguished in that area, as is my noble friend in the context of criminal trial. So, that is very much to be welcomed. I agree that the Explanatory Notes are incorrect but, mercifully, Clause 3 is very clear that it is a crime against any child, not just a crime against one’s own child, that meets the test and triggers the new mandatory requirement to make a prohibited steps order in relation to parental responsibility.

I also welcome the provisions on the victim’s right to make disclosures in the face of the abusive NDAs that have been so much in the public consciousness on both sides of the Atlantic in recent years, and to make representations and receive information. These provisions seem to go further than before, which is important. Perhaps in summing up, my noble friend could comment on my comparison between Section 17 of the 2024 Act and the new provision on non-disclosure. It seems to me that the presumption is now much more in favour of disclosure, and not just to a very limited collection of individuals such as lawyers. The new provision is more open and in favour of public interest disclosure of criminal conduct against victims, which is more in line with amendments that I tabled and supported, along with others. I hope that my noble friend will be able to clarify the comparison between the old and the new provisions. I see this as an improvement and more presumptively in favour of disclosure.

I particularly welcome more teeth for the Victims’ Commissioner and the victims’ code. I see the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, nodding in her place. She will remember that we went to enormous lengths last year to plead for a victims’ code with teeth. Maybe we could seek even more teeth—who knows? At one point I even tabled an amendment that would have created a new consolidated victims’ code. It took a lot of careful typing on my part and a lot of patience from the Public Bill Office, but it was rebuffed by the last Government. What I am particularly heartened by is the duty in this Bill on the Victims’ Commissioner to report on compliance with the victims’ code. A code with no teeth would be in danger of cruelly raising victims’ expectations that were then not met.

I wonder if my noble friend could explain whether, like me, she thinks that the new ability of the Victims’ Commissioner to engage in individual cases that have a broader public policy interest could on occasion involve intervening in high-profile cases, at least on appeal, in the higher courts. That would be a good use of the Victims’ Commissioner’s time. If a very serious point of law that affected victims’ rights were in the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, is it anticipated by my noble friend and the Government that the Victims’ Commissioner might, as part of her functions, be able to intervene in that case? That would be incredibly helpful as part of giving teeth to both the commissioner and the code.

I support the provisions on unduly lenient sentences. I know there is some debate about whether they go far enough, but I support them.

I noted my noble friend’s comments on private prosecutions. Obviously, the provisions in the Bill are about costs in certain cases, but I noted—I wrote this down quite carefully—that in her introduction she talked about the right of an individual to bring a private prosecution. That is of course an important right. I think of our friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, and how important it was not just for her and her family but for the whole country that she persevered not just with campaigning but with a private prosecution. That demonstrates graphically the importance of the right of an individual who has been wronged and neglected by the authorities, in the context of policing and prosecution, to bring a case.

However, the other side of the equation is some corporate private prosecutions, about which I am concerned. The Post Office is the most obvious example. That was not an individual who had been wronged; it was a corporation prosecuting for private profit. I have been slightly sceptical about whether it is a right that should be afforded at all to private corporations as opposed to individuals. I just throw that into the air for consideration, but it is not in any way to distract or divert from my support for the Bill. I hope we can give it a safe and speedy passage while allowing enough time for adequate scrutiny and, if necessary, enhancement.

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[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

It would be my pleasure to hear from both my noble friend and the noble and learned Lord.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My noble friend is very gracious, but I fear there is a new trend which is not the practice of your Lordships’ House: to have an extended back and forth at Second Reading. I know this may be the practice of another place not far from here but, with all due respect to noble Lords and to my noble friend with her good humour and fortitude, I am not sure that that is something that we should innovate this evening.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

I was only going to support the Minister. One of the differences between an appeal by a defendant in a criminal matter and the unduly lenient sentencing system is that anybody can write to the law officers to complain that a sentence is unduly lenient. Many of the people that the Minister and I may have dealt with in the past wrote in having read an article in a newspaper saying that a particular defendant had been given what they thought was a lenient sentence. Nobody does that to appeal a criminal sentence as a defendant.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 293 in my name is very straightforward and necessary. Victims of child sexual abuse and other offences often do not come forward themselves at the time of the offences. Research has shown that, on average, it takes around three decades for a survivor to get the courage to come forward—and then even longer to get to court. As a result, almost all abuse claims are brought outside the statutory time limit. The problem is that, if the survivor cannot convince the court that a fair trial is possible, the claim falls and the victim can never get justice.

All the various strands of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, which were referred to earlier—including the Westminster report, the Anglican Church report, the Catholic Church report and the children in custodial sentences report—said that it was usually decades after the offences that victims reported what had happened. Frequently, this then gave other victims the confidence to come forward too, in exactly the way that happened after the BBC presenter Nicky Campbell spoke up in 2022 about the abuse at his school, the Edinburgh Academy, decades before. The abuse there involved arbitrary violence on boys under 11, including choking, throwing them down stairs and various other disgusting forms of abuse.

In September 2023 an ex-teacher, Russell Tillson, was jailed for sexually abusing boys. Beginning in the 1980s, it continued for 20 years, but allegations were first made only in 2018, nearly a further two decades after the teacher had retired. Both cases are absolutely typical of the behaviour of perpetrators and, indeed, of victims.

Earlier this year the Government said they were minded to consider removing the limitation period, but we believe that it needs to happen now and be in the Bill. The amendment seeks to remove any limitation period for historical child sex offences. It just must not be possible for a perpetrator to escape justice because the victims were too traumatised to come forward until years later. I beg to move Amendment 293.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I need not take very long, because she has explained her very straightforward amendment impeccably. After the brilliant previous group led by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, and her team, perhaps there is no need to go into all the quite serious sexual contact included in Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act that need not necessarily be tried in the Crown Court.

I support the amendment for two simple but important reasons. First, there is some very serious sexual activity with children that could be tried in the magistrates’ courts—there is not necessarily a problem with that. Secondly, there is the obvious reason of historic child abuse and victims coming forward sometimes only many years after the fact. Those are very good reasons to depart from the norm of the six-month time limit and, indeed, to have no time limits at all.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I absolutely accept much of what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has said about the awful nature of historic child abuse and the reasons why there is often a delay before bringing forward complaints, but it is important that we do not conflate civil proceedings and criminal proceedings. The earlier group was to do with people claiming damages, where the defendant is not usually the perpetrator. There may be reasons why we have reached a stage where there cannot be a fair trial. I will leave that aside for the moment.

This amendment is concerned with criminal offences. There is not a limitation period for criminal offences generally, subject to the prosecution deciding that so much time has elapsed that it is not appropriate to bring forward a claim. The noble Baroness has experience of occasionally making those decisions in very old cases. The Minister is pointing at me and is going to give a longer and more authoritative answer than I will attempt to do now. I make the point in general terms.

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward the amendment. Obviously, victims of child sexual offences should always be able to seek justice, no matter how long it takes them to come forward.

We absolutely understand and respect the intention behind this proposal. Many survivors of abuse do not feel able to disclose until years—sometimes decades—after the offence, and there is a very real sense of injustice when the law appears to stand in the way of accountability.

However—and on this point I side with my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier—I think there exists no limitation period for offences that would occur under Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act. The Limitation Act 1980 applies only to civil cases, and indictable criminal cases do not have general limitation periods in England and Wales. As offences under Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act are indictable only, we do not think the amendment is strictly necessary, despite the fact that it pursues a very noble aim. While sympathetic, therefore, to the principle—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Briefly, has the noble Lord opposite considered Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, which has a six-month time limit on prosecutions brought in the magistrates’ court? Has he considered that Section 9 is neither a way of—my noble friend the Minister is shaking her head at me, so maybe it is not necessary for the noble Lord to answer.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that. I will just wait for the Minister to explain to all of us what the position is.

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I am grateful to the noble Baroness for moving this amendment today. As I said, I understand the sentiment; I hope she will appreciate the Government’s reasons for opposing it. For those reasons, I invite her to withdraw it.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Just because this is so important, and no doubt for our understanding, can I ask two questions? First, on there being no time limit, is that because there is some exception in the Magistrates’ Courts Act to the normal six-month time limit on summary conviction? Section 9(3)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act allows summary conviction, so this removal of the time bar must be somewhere either in the Sexual Offences Act or in the Magistrates’ Courts Act. My second question relates to Article 7. Of course, the prohibition on retroactive criminalisation does not apply when the crime in question would be thought of as criminal according to the laws of civilised nations. Of course, that was upheld as a principle when marital rape was finally criminalised in all these jurisdictions by the courts rather than by statute.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I will deal with my noble friend’s second point first. There are decisions of the domestic courts here that support the fact that you cannot bring prosecutions for what was the unlawful sexual intercourse offence under Section 6, nor can you even bring a prosecution for sexual assault based on the same facts, because that would transgress the prohibition in Article 7. As regards the time limit, Section 9 of the 2003 Act has no time limitations in it, which is the usual principle of criminal offences in this country, but for this tiny cohort of behaviour—it really is very small—you could not prosecute under Section 9 because of Article 7. Section 6 no longer exists, and you cannot get round it by using Section 9, but it really is a very small number of cases.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am so sorry to labour the point, but I think it is so important that we understand, and if it cannot be dealt with now, perhaps the Minister could write to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the Committee. I am looking at Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act, on “Sexual activity with a child”, which I understand to be the section that the noble Baroness is seeking to amend in her amendment. Section 9(3)(a) allows summary conviction for that offence, and the maximum penalty is

“imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months”,

or the statutory maximum fine.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am of course more than happy to write to my noble friend, and it must be my fault I am not explaining this properly. There is no time limit for prosecutions brought under Section 9 generally, unless it refers to particular behaviour—so that would be an offence committed against a girl aged between 13 and 15—that took place before the repeal of the 1956 Act and the bringing into force of the 2003 Act. You could not prosecute that under Section 9 because the time limit has expired for bringing it under Section 6, in the same way that you cannot prosecute for sexual assault for the same behaviour because you cannot bring a prosecution under Section 6. I had better write, because I can see from the puzzled look on my noble friend’s face that I have not explained it very well.

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We have made much progress on intimate image abuse and tech-facilitated abuse, but it is vital that we always remain one step ahead of those who seek to harm others in this appalling way and put in place clear, comprehensive legislation. I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise in support of all the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge. I signed two of the offences in relation to the time-limit extension, and therefore I share the noble Baroness’s pleasure that the Government have effectively accepted that principle and brought forward their own amendments as I understand it.

The noble Baroness’s other amendments, it seems to me, are worthy of an equivalent response. I need not repeat the reasons for this, because her speech was so comprehensive and clear. I will just say that, in a still relatively short period of time, not just in this Committee but in this House, the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, has raised herself to one of the leading human rights campaigners in this country. Let that silence all those who think that relative youth is a disqualification for being in your Lordships’ House.

With that in mind, and as a brief reminder of the two new sections of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 that are really down to the campaigning of the noble Baroness, I wonder if my noble friend the Minister, in her reply to the group, could give the Committee some insight into the timetable for implementing what will be, I believe, Sections 66E and 66F of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. These are the new offences of creating, and of requesting the creation of, sexually explicit deepfake images without consent. These were passed in the Data (Use and Access) Act earlier this year, after a great deal of sweat, toil and solidarity from around the House for the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. I am sure that my noble friend the Minister will be keen to get these implemented as soon as possible. In the light of frustrations expressed in earlier groups about the speed of implementing these policies, I wonder if we could hear on that.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I enthusiastically join my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti in praising the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. I was in the House—it was on a Friday—when she first moved her Private Member’s Bill. The Minister then was the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and he promised that the Government would review and come to the assistance of the noble Baroness. What she is doing now is quite amazing, with a number of very detailed amendments. I will hold myself here to await what my noble friend the Minister will say in reply, but I do hope she will be very positive.

Sentencing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 124A tabled by my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, I shall speak also to Amendments 124B to 124F. I note that there is also a Clause 35 stand part notice in this group in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which has the same aims—we have just taken different routes to the same intended outcome.

These amendments are linked with one aim. If we are serious about reducing reoffending and rebuilding lives, we cannot allow public humiliation to be smuggled into the justice system through the back door—but that is exactly what Clause 35 does. It proposes giving Probation Service providers the power to publish the names and photographs of people carrying out unpaid work as part of their sentence. What could be the purpose of this measure? What problem is it solving? It does not support rehabilitation. It is not going to reduce reoffending. It appears to make humiliation part of the sentence given to the offender, and not just the offender but the people around them—their family and friends, potentially. This is a significant departure from evidence-based practice and threatens to undermine the goals that we claim to be pursuing.

I note that the Chief Inspector of Probation has warned that naming and shaming offenders is likely to act as a disincentive to rehabilitation and that, instead of encouraging compliance, it risks pushing people away from engagement entirely. If someone is planning to turn up, do the work and meet the terms of the order, why on earth would we introduce a measure that is likely to be an active discouragement for that? The evidence tells us that reintegration into their community, into employment, is what prevents reoffending. Public exposure will have the opposite effect. Probation officers, through their union, have raised alarm about the outcome for families, especially for children, who can bear the weight of a sentence for a crime that they did not commit. We know of cases where children have been bullied, harassed and even forced to change schools because a parent’s offending has been publicly exposed.

This is not just the view of a few organisations; 24 charities and experts, people who are working day in and day out with children and families affected by the justice system, have put out a joint letter opposing this clause. They warn about photographing people on unpaid work and publishing the images online, where they may remain indefinitely. We now have photo recognition software, so we can expect this only to get worse in future, and that will follow people for life. It risks making it harder to get a job or secure housing; it risks vigilantism and violence, and it risks damaging the children. We have international obligations to uphold the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. We should consider the best interests of a child in every policy decision, yet this clause very clearly does not.

I can see that some other noble Lords wish to speak, so I will stop now, but I think there are very strong and unanimous feelings on this clause and the wrong direction that it is heading in.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. Parliamentary draftsmen have been appropriately euphemistic in the title of Clause 35, but they could have drafted it: “Naming and shaming of offenders in the community”. I oppose Clause 35, and therefore support the amendments in that vein, because it is contrary to the ambitions of the Bill as a whole, undermines rehabilitation and therefore the prevention of further crimes and is outwith the philosophy of the Bill. I hope and believe that the Government are better than Clause 35, and I know that my noble friend the Minister is better than this. With his characteristic humility, he described himself as a simple entrepreneur who ran a business to mend shoes, but he also ran a business to mend humans—in both cases attempting to save “soles”.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am sorry. It is nearly Christmas, and it is late.

There are policies that sit on shelves in Westminster and Whitehall for many years, and over the years and the decades people reach for the shelf and pull them off. It is very easy to blame civil servants, but the special adviser class—a cross-party class—have their files on the shelves too, and this naming and shaming thing has been doing the rounds for decades. Our lovely friends the special advisers are not here in the Chamber at this time; they are at the Spectator party or the New Statesman party or whatever it happens to be this evening, but naming and shaming of offenders is a really bad idea.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. The one point of difference is that, if one were to be charitable, one would say it is really important that the public have faith and confidence in community orders. I agree with that, so I would support a slight alternative to this approach, so that we are not naming and shaming particular offenders but taking other steps to make very clear in the community that this was built, cleaned or done by offenders serving sentences in the community. That would achieve the best ambitions of this policy without the cruelty and humiliation that the noble Baroness rightly identifies. That is what I ask my noble friends the Ministers to take back to the department and reflect upon. I think that would be something the Government could think about before Report.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I oppose this clause standing part of the Bill. It seems to me that everything that has been said by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Chakrabarti, is right. I also agree with the suggestion by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that there is nothing at all wrong with saying that work of a particular kind was done by offenders as part of their community order. What I object to is, as she says, the naming and shaming.

But it goes further than that—it is, by definition, naming and shaming of offenders under supervision, because it is only offenders who are undertaking an unpaid work requirement who will be subject to this clause. I suggest that the compulsory photographing of such offenders—by probation officers, if you please—and the publication of those photographs and the offenders’ names, would be profoundly damaging. I, like the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, regard this clause as likely to damage relationships between probation officers and their clients, undermine offenders within their communities and make it more difficult for those offenders to integrate within those communities. The clause is overwhelmingly unlikely to do anything to rehabilitate offenders or reduce reoffending. It is, in short, largely vindictive only. Since one can expect the publication of names and photographs mostly to be by local media outlets, such publication is likely to fuel hostility to offenders whom we are trying to rehabilitate among their community and likely to encourage what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester earlier today called “penal populism”, with what, I suggest, could be only damaging effects.

We completely accept the position put by the noble Lord that community sentences are punishment and are intended to be punishment. They are punitive in the sense of restricting an offender’s liberty and imposing requirements that may be onerous on offenders, but they are also primarily directed at enabling rehabilitation and reducing reoffending. For such sentences to work, friendly and constructive relationships between probation officers and offenders, their clients, under their supervision and efforts to enable those offenders to be settled in their communities are vital. These proposals are, frankly, inimical to those ends. I have come across no evidence whatever that this kind of naming and shaming will do any good or reduce reoffending in any way. I believe it can only do harm. For that reason, I oppose this clause, and I invite the Government to abandon it.

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Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

140: After Clause 41, insert the following new Clause—
“Removal of power to remand in custody for a person’s own protection or welfare(1) Schedule 1 to the Bail Act 1976 (persons entitled to bail: supplementary provisions) is amended as follows.(2) In Part 1 of that Schedule omit paragraph 3.(3) In Part 1A of that Schedule omit paragraph 5.(4) In Part 2 of that Schedule omit paragraph 3.”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment would repeal the power of the courts to remand a person in custody for their own protection or, if they are a child or young person, for their welfare.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I wish I could offer every Member of the Committee who is still here an espresso at this point. Instead, I will try to be short and lively.

This amendment is the only amendment that I have tabled to a Bill that I broadly support, for reasons that need little explanation at this point, but Amendment 140 in my name—by the way, I also support Amendment 147 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Foster of Bath and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames—has been on my conscience. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for signing it. Of course, she was the first and distinguished chair of your Lordships’ Justice and Home and Affairs Committee.

This amendment concerns a provision in the Bail Act 1976 that, to my shame, I was unaware of until relatively few weeks ago, notwithstanding working in this area of law and policy for over 30 years. It really is on my conscience, and I think it should be on the conscience of the Government and the Committee. The provision states that vulnerable people may be remanded in custody for their own protection, even when they are charged with non-custodial offences. I would like to know from my noble friend the Minister’s reply, among other things, how this is conscionable and how it squares with the Government’s commitment to Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which sets very tight criteria for detaining people.

I was extremely grateful, as always, for a conversation about this with my noble friend the Minister and his officials two weeks ago. However, as a former government lawyer, I am always concerned about the danger of resistance to amendments because they “weren’t invented here”. I plead with my noble friend and other Members of the Committee to engage with a scandal. It is not a scandal on the scale of IPP. I did not speak in that debate to spare the Committee’s time, but I associate myself with all those who spoke on the IPP amendment. This is not indefinite detention, with all the lost hope, but it is about detaining vulnerable people who should not be detained for their own protection on remand in the criminal justice system.

I am advised by a coalition of NGOs—noble Lords in the Committee will have received their joint briefing—and Justice in particular. I am grateful to Emma Snell, a brilliant young lawyer at Justice, who has educated me about this provision. The coalition is broad; it includes Nacro, Inquest, the Centre for Women’s Justice, the Prison Reform Trust, the Howard League and so on.

Most of the people who appear to be detained for their own protection, including when charged with a non-custodial offence, are being detained because they have an acute mental health crisis, are suffering from addiction or are homeless. Some of them are at risk from others; that could be reprisals in the community or it could be from criminal gangs, and so on. However, none of that is justification for taking someone’s liberty, as opposed to keeping them safe and helping them. This is not something that we would do to witnesses. We would surely put a witness in a safe house rather than detain them for their own protection. I am incredibly concerned that we persist with this.

Furthermore, the Labour Party spoke against this in opposition only a couple of years ago, and it has been criticised by all the experts in the sector: the independent non-governmental bodies, the chief inspectors, et cetera. To my mind, it is unconscionable that we should detain somebody for their vulnerability and not for a danger that they pose to others. The classic and other grounds for remanding in custody, rather than on bail, are, “You will reoffend”, or, “You will interfere with witnesses”, and so on, but the idea that you should be detained for your own protection or, in the case of children, for your welfare is something that needs to be addressed.

To be fair to the Government, they are already proposing in the Mental Health Bill that this should not be on mental health grounds alone. That is progress, necessary and to be commended. But necessary is not sufficient, because there are other vulnerable people who will not be diagnosed as being vulnerable because of a mental health condition. That could include vulnerable women, homeless people and people who fear reprisals from criminal gangs. They should be made safe, and there are provisions to make them safe in other ways. I think the Committee would want to move away from the idea that we as a political community and a society can only care for and protect people through detention and coercion, and certainly the Bill, in its general thrust, is attempting to do that. I beg to move.

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[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her amendment and for taking the time to discuss her related concerns with my noble friend Lord Timpson. I also thank her for her support for the Bill and its overall intentions—that is very much appreciated coming from someone with her track record.

Amendment 140 would remove an important safeguard which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said, is very rarely used but remains an option for the courts as a measure of last resort and out of concern for the defendant. Eliminating this provision could leave vulnerable individuals without any viable protection, particularly where alternative care arrangements were simply unavailable or could not be implemented swiftly enough. We fear that those may be the consequences. Examples where it may be used include where it is the only option available to the court to keep someone safe, such as in cases where the defendant is a member of a gang and could be subject to repercussions if they were not protected.

I hope it will also reassure your Lordships that the Mental Health Bill, which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to, is now in the other place. It includes a reform to end the use of remand for one’s own protection under the Bail Act where the court’s sole concern is the defendant’s mental health. This reform should ensure that remand for one’s own protection is, therefore, used only as a last resort in the circumstances I have outlined.

At this stage, repeal would leave a gap in the available provision. Courts must retain the flexibility to act decisively in safeguarding individuals when no other option exists. The amendment would risk unintended consequences for vulnerable defendants and undermine the protective function of the justice system.

Amendment 147, which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foster, for tabling, seeks to allow prisoners held on remand to access rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support before the start of their sentence. The Government’s view is that the amendment is not necessary, given that remand prisoners can already access those programmes where prisons run them.

There is also an important legal distinction here that I should highlight to your Lordships. Remand prisoners are held in custody pending trial or sentencing, and some have not yet been convicted. Of course, we recognise that people are spending more time on remand; therefore, as I have said, where these services are available and in the right circumstances, they should be able to access them. However, remand prisoners are legally distinct from sentenced prisoners, and we have to reflect that in the priorities for resources.

There are already mechanisms in place to support remand prisoners, including access to healthcare. At the moment, the Government have no plans to expand all rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support to remand prisoners. This would require substantial changes to prison operations and resourcing, and could divert resources from those already convicted and serving sentences. We recognise, however, some of the changes in the remand population. My noble friend the Minister and I would be very happy to continue to talk to the noble Lord, Lord Foster, about these matters but, given what I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am so grateful once more to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but, I have to say, I am disappointed in the responses from both Front Benches on this occasion. They were uncharacteristic, knee-jerk responses that do not display a broader understanding of the other laws of England and Wales that deal—or should deal—with vulnerable people.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, mentioned children. There are ample measures for protecting children under the Children Act 1989 and looking after them in more appropriate circumstances than in criminal justice detention. I remind the Committee that we are talking about defendants who are being detained not for the classic justifications that they would commit further offences, interfere with witnesses and so on, but for their own protection. Of course, the criminal justice estate is not a place of safety or protection for anyone.

I did not hear a reply to my question about how this can be justified under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but perhaps my noble friend the Minister could drop a note on that and offer it to other Members of the Committee. There will not be too many to send it to because there are not many Members here, but I would be hugely grateful for that.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, had it right when she talked about a Victorian hangover. There are too many Victorian hangovers in this area of law and policy, and I know that my noble friend Lord Timpson is well aware of that. The thrust of the Bill, in general, is about departing from such Victorian hangovers, such as social death and locking people up and throwing away the key. I urge further reflection.

If I am a member of a criminal gang who wants to turn King’s evidence but I am not charged with a minor offence, I will have to be put in a safe house, and there are schemes and measures to do that. But if I happen to be charged with a low-level offence that does not attract a custodial penalty, I am told that it is a last resort and that I am going to be locked up in a prison system where I will be more at danger from the criminal gang than I ever would be in a safe house. These are rather disappointing arguments from members of the Committee who, on reflection, may think again. I shall certainly return to this on Report, but I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 140 withdrawn.

Sentencing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 26th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Foster of Bath (LD)]

My Lords, I will briefly challenge some of what has been said. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, rather implied that it was his belief that the Bill intends to remove all short sentences. From the Minister’s opening remarks and those of others, that is clearly not the case. There is, however, very good reason for reducing the number.

The Minister pointed out that there is a significant reduction in the level of reoffending. He has not given the figures, so I will share them with the Committee, as a result of the work of your Lordships’ Justice and Home Affairs Committee, which I chair, in a report that was done during the chairmanship of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. It showed the figures then—they have been replicated by more recent research—that, of offenders who are put in prison for short sentences and are released, 60% reoffend, whereas the average reoffending rate for those on custodial sentences is only 24%. As that report said, and as we will discuss in future amendments, there are very good ways in which we can improve non-custodial sentences to reduce the rate of reoffending even more.

I am going to disagree during our deliberations over the three sessions that we will have on the Bill—maybe more—with a lot of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, says, but I entirely agree with him, and it has been reflected by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend, that none of these measures we are talking about will succeed unless we have the resources to do the job. Again, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and others that there are amendments coming later where we can address the need for more probation officers and more people in our prisons. There is not currently, as far as I am aware, an amendment on police numbers, but there would be time to put one down.

The only other thing I want to say is how much I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, about getting rid of the list argument, which has also been picked up. I hope the Government will listen to his proposal about finding language that can be used about those people we know we would not want to put on short sentences, but not necessarily have the sentence inflation that has, sadly, caused a problem for us and is one reason we have so many prisoners in our prisons today.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, said, save that I think that the Bill already deals with the problem identified by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe. It is important to look at the text of the Bill: this is a “presumption” against short sentences; it is not a bar to them. Of course, there is a philosophy behind the presumption: the authors of the Bill and the Government have taken the view, which is not a revolutionary view in relation to the evidence that has been collected over many years, that, generally, short sentences are not a great idea. They do not lead to rehabilitation; they do not help with reoffending.

If you disagree with that and think that a short, sharp shock is a jolly good thing, you are obviously going to disagree with the Bill and these provisions. Having lists of various offences is a good wheeze, but it is not consistent with the philosophy of the Bill, which is that, in general, short sentences do not work—they do not keep the public safe because they do not rehabilitate anyone and, in fact, some people go to the university of crime for a short course of less than 12 months and come out with drug problems, relationship breakdown and other issues that they did not have before. But this is only a presumption; it is not a bar. To respond to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, with whom I so often agree, I do not think that anything else is required as an alternative to the list approach of exceptions, because there is the residual discretion provided in the Bill for exceptional circumstances.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Is this not a case for the Sentencing Council to express some guidance on these matters rather than go down the route of the list system in a statutory form?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I find myself back in the comfortable spot where I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Of course, that is something that we will come to later, no doubt, when we discuss the independence and the constitutional role of the Sentencing Council. If noble Lords are worried that I am being too glib, because “exceptional circumstances” seems too vague an alternative to a prescriptive list of offences which are exceptional, the answer is, on the one hand, to trust the judges—this is about their discretion, and they know jolly well about the awful case that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned, and about situations where people are repeatedly not paying their fines or breaching community orders, which should be exceptions to the 12-month presumption.

The second part of the argument is that the judicial limb of our constitution has in the form of its Sentencing Council—and I use that language deliberately because I am for the independence of the Sentencing Council—a council to help guide judges so that there can be an element of consistency in courts around the country as to the approach on what is exceptional, and therefore what type of case justifies the exception to the presumption and the philosophy of this measure that short sentences are a bad idea.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I hesitate to intervene on this matter, but I wonder what thought has been given by the Ministry of Justice to simplification. The Sentencing Code is now a very lengthy document. The way in which the title of the clause has been put is very sensible: it says that there is a presumption for a suspended sentence. However, one goes on to read the entirety of this text, with the words “the court must … unless”, and then there is a whole series of exceptions to that order. Why do we have to have complexity?

There are two strong reasons against it. First, there will not be parliamentary time to alter this if we get it wrong. Secondly, it is much better to leave this to the guidance of the Sentencing Council. If the Bill could say “the Sentencing Council will provide guidelines to bring about that there should be a presumption against short sentences”, would that not achieve what we want without language? I heavily criticise the parliamentary draftsmen for this unnecessary complexity. Can we go not go back to the Victorian age and do things simply? I know these words are likely to fall on deaf ears, but it would be so much better if we had simple sentencing legislation and left it to the Sentencing Council, which can adjust it as we see whether it works, because one thing experience shows is that we try one type of sentence and, a few years later, we want to tinker with it.

Separation Centres: Terrorist Offenders

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

Separation centres protect the public from the most serious offenders. A small number of prisoners are held in these centres. The regime is purposeful activity, limited association and rehabilitation; the noble Lord will know that rehabilitation is really important to me. Having met the staff who work in separation centres, it is very clear that they are not all classically trained prison officers. A number are psychiatrists, psychologists, experts in security and so on. There is a team effort to make sure we run good regimes that have a real focus on rehabilitation. I look forward to getting into more of the detail on Jonathan Hall’s report when it and its recommendations are published because it will be very helpful to us as we look to the future of how we run these very specialist areas of the justice system.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Does my noble friend agree that there is no inconsistency between having adequate separation of terrorism offenders and complying with our most basic and fundamental human rights obligations? In the light of the question from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and, crucially, the decision of Mr Justice Sheldon last week, all we need to do is to ensure that appropriate mental health provision is made for any offender, particularly those who are isolated for long periods in the day. I know my noble friend is an expert in these matters.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend. We are carefully considering the High Court ruling on the Abu case, including considering appealing the decision. Our decisions are based on risk, and the proportionality of our response to that risk is how we make our decisions. Someone’s mental health throughout the justice system is a very important factor in how we manage everyone’s risk, whether they are on the first night of their first time in prison or they have been in the system for a very long time.

I am proud of so many of my colleagues who spend so much of their time in our prisons, and of our probation staff, who go out of their way to support people with their mental health requirements. The support we give our NHS and health providers in our prisons is clearly important too. We need to enable them to have the right space and time to work with people who are often very vulnerable.

Prisoner Releases in Error

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Thursday 13th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, but on this occasion also to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for the bipartisan nature of his question focusing on this lack of digitisation, which I find completely flabbergasting in the context of such a massive prison estate when we live in such a digital world. This is not just about record-keeping; it is about sentence calculation as well in the context of an incredibly complex statute book. I am sometimes sceptical about artificial intelligence, but on this occasion I think it is an obvious fit for something that is essentially a complex mathematical equation that could be greatly assisted by AI. Can the Minister assure the House that that aspect of his answer will be prioritised, that the contract for the development of this technology will be firmly gripped in the context of procurement and that the sovereign capacity will be beefed up?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)]

My Lords, as has been said, prisoners have been released in error for decades. I know because I used to advise on sentence calculation in the 1990s in the Home Office legal advisers branch and I was the Prison Service legal adviser. It was difficult then; it is now fiendishly difficult because of all the changes to the statute book that have happened since then, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, knows well, because she was with me at the Home Office.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

The noble Lord was my boss.

[Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)]

I was indeed. The statute book is a total mess as far as trying to calculate when a release date applies for a particular prisoner. Prisoners are all in a different position. Some have additional days; some have served a different remand time. All these factors need to be taken into account. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, a digital answer has to be the way forward. As the noble Baroness said, it will obviously work here because you can punch in the details of the sentence to work out exactly when the release date is. It will have to be updated, of course, as additional days are added to the sentence and so on. We must go to a digital solution, but how long will it take for that to be up and running? There needs to be a procurement process. These things take ages, and we do not have ages. We have identified a crisis taking place. Is there any estimate of when this will be up and running and functioning to stop these releases?

Sentencing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 12th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I must add to the tributes to that great, brave and humane soul, Baroness Newlove.

It is, as we have heard, over 30 years since two political pugilists faced off from opposite Dispatch Boxes in the other place and triggered a law and order arms race from which our criminal justice system and the society it is supposed to serve have yet to recover. For decades, this excited expectations that Governments could legislate their way to headlines and re-election by diminished due process and tougher sentencing. They purported to do this even when imposing economic austerity, in the form of cuts to living standards and the justice system in particular, as well as youth, mental health and addiction services. Today, we reap the bitter harvest in both the human and the financial costs of a justice and penal system that is on its knees, in which few members of the public have faith.

By contrast, and with no disrespect to the elected Chamber, my noble friend Lord Timpson is a perfect example of the finest Government Ministers sitting in your Lordships’ House, bringing a wealth of experience, expertise and vocation for genuine reform. Not, perhaps, since the fictional progressive prison warden Henry Brubaker, played by the late Robert Redford in the 1980 Hollywood film, went inside disguised as a convict, has one man attempted such a brave reforming challenge. Of course, my noble friend comes disguised not as an inmate but as a politician. None the less, I pay tribute to him, and indeed to the much respected Conservative Lord Chancellor, David Gauke, whose sentencing review has inspired so much of the Bill before us. In particular, I commend a focus on preventing and reducing crime and diverting people away from prison so far as possible. Such aims are nothing short of a sea change from decades of crime and sentencing legislation drafted, if not quite on the back of a cigarette packet, on the back of rainforests of press releases full of punitive talk and sentence inflation.

Talk is cheap and legislation not much more expensive. The exorbitant cost comes later, in failed sentences and overstuffed prisons where rehabilitation programmes are all but impossible. The continuing cost is of reoffending and the revolving door—and I do not mean the one outside your Lordships’ House. The Bill must, of course, come with sufficient funds to implement it—adequate funds for our crumbling courts and demoralised probation, third sector and prison services—otherwise, this once-in-a-generation possibility of reversing the vicious cycle will be set up to fail.

I wholeheartedly welcome the presumption against short sentences, and the discretion to suspend short custodial sentences in the light of decades of data on reoffending. How hollow were those slogans of yesteryear about a “short, sharp shock” and how “prison works”? However, it is vital that suspended sentences translate into less custody, not fewer community orders, as we heard from the noble Baroness. Investment, training, monitoring and constant evaluation in every part of the system will be key.

By contrast, the new consent process for the Sentencing Council smacks a little more of the press release than sound policy. The will of the people on matters of sentencing is properly expressed by Parliament’s role in scrutinising and enacting sentencing legislation. The Sentencing Council exists to help the independent judiciary achieve consistency within the realm of its discretion. The Lord Chancellor of the day is, in practice, the initiator of sentencing legislation; they need not and should not be co-signing off on the Sentencing Council’s business plan and guidance documents. It is an encroachment on the independent judiciary, worthy of some of the political judge-bashing of the past. If the new process is not to be dropped, at the very least perhaps the Justice Committee rather than the Lord Chancellor should co-sign with the Lady Chief Justice. In any event, that committee is more reflective of Parliament than a senior member of the Executive is.

In the context of standard custodial sentences, the new progression model will need careful consideration. I urge my noble friends in government carefully to read the concerns of both Justice and the Howard League for Penal Reform. I know that many noble Lords are appreciative of their work in general and providing detailed written briefings on this Bill in particular. Only adequate, purposeful activity in prison can ensure progression rather than regression. There must be clear guidance on how the model should be implemented; the prison adjudication system must be reviewed as to fairness and potential discrimination, not least against disabled and otherwise vulnerable prisoners. The increase in the possibility of added days for bad behaviour must be carefully monitored and reviewed. There is a risk of some prisoners not being released until the very end of their sentence, with no subsequent probation requirements in the community.

Greater public faith and government investment in community orders is at the heart of the Bill. Care must be taken over the fairness, proportionality and unintended consequences of intensive supervision, restriction zones and electronic tagging. Offenders must be supported as well as supervised—and not set up to fail.

Clause 35 is of serious concern, with its powers to publish the names and photographs of those serving orders in the community. I am reminded of an informal meeting I had as director of Liberty with a Home Office political adviser around 20 years ago. During the encounter, the adviser’s phone rang; when they realised who the caller was, they turned very pale and left the table for a few minutes. On their return, they asked me what I thought of an idea to force those on community orders to wear striped uniforms while performing unpaid manual work in the community. “What do you think I’ll say?”, I replied. “What do you really think in terms of safety, decency, rehabilitation and public order?” The adviser nodded silently but looked very anxious. The call had come from the editor of a national newspaper, demanding the policy as a story for the next day. As journalism is currently under fire, I shall withhold the name of the editor and paper concerned. I believe that the pillory was abolished in 1837, and the stocks fell out of use in around the 1870s, so let us not revive them in time for the 2030s.

Finally, I welcome the Bill’s amendments to the Bail Act 1976; in particular, adding to courts’ considerations a defendant’s pregnancy, primary care giving or situation as a victim of domestic abuse. I urge the department to go further and build on reforms in the Mental Health Bill to abolish remand in custody of people, including children, for their own welfare or protection, even for non-custodial offences. This is surely one of the most obvious symbols and examples of our criminal justice system being used as a dumping ground for social problems and vulnerable people who would be far better cared for and protected elsewhere, and at far less financial and human cost.

Overall, I congratulate the Government on creating such an opportunity for enlightened and effective reform. Because it is in his nature, I know that my noble friend Lord Timpson will seek to collaborate across the House on ensuring that this opportunity is taken to the best of our shared ability—including, I hope, on IPPs. I wish him well in his task and look forward to playing my own small part.

Prison Services: Insourcing

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Wednesday 5th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

The noble Lord is right that drugs are a huge problem: 49% of prisoners who arrive in prison declare to us that they are addicted to drugs and alcohol. We then put them in prison with many serious organised criminals, who make their livelihood from supplying drugs. That is where we have the problem. We need more drug-free living wings. They are important and they help people turn their lives around. I also agree that we need to trust our governors and our leaders in prisons to make the right decisions for their prisoners.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government are clearly very fortunate to have my noble friend the Minister in this vital role, with his commercial and prison-reform expertise. Following the intervention made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, when the Minister is considering the 2031 review, will he think not just about the commercial, value-for-money aspects but about the constitutional aspects of privatised incarceration and coercion as well?

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for the question. What is really important is that we make sure that we hold all operators to account between now and 2031. This applies to us, running 115 prison sites, and to the private sector. Hopefully there will be announcements soon on the direction we will be going in.

Adult Prison Estate: Support for Young People

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Monday 3rd November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

Let me take the example of the female prison population. Young adult women aged 18 to 25 make up 12% of the female prison population, but they account for just under 50% of all instances of self-harm. For me, that is a very distressing figure. What was clear from going round women’s prisons, as I have done recently, is that I saw a lot of young women there who I believe are very ill, and it is about how we support them. It may be that prison is the right place for them, but it may be that we need to support them in a secure hospital environment that will help them manage their issues as well.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for all his answers so far. Is he aware—I am embarrassed that I was not—that people can still be remanded in custody, even pending trial for a non-custodial offence, for their own protection? This has a disproportionate effect on children and women. Will the Government consider abolishing that provision?

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for the question. I am not aware of the detailed numbers of young people in that position, but I do know that the number of children in prison has fallen considerably over the last few years. There are 461 children in prison today: just a few years ago, we had over 1,000. But we need to make sure that we always have a place in prison for those people who need to be there and that, where we can divert young people away from prison, we do so.

“Hillsborough Law”

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Thursday 24th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I agree with the way that the noble Lord has framed his question. There was an establishment cover-up, which must never happen again. The Prime Minister has made a personal commitment to the affected families to work with them constructively to come up with an appropriate law. Regarding the duty of candour, the Government are clear that what happened following the Hillsborough disaster must never happen again. Under the Hillsborough law, public officials will be bound by a duty of candour with criminal and professional consequences. We are committed to achieving a true cultural change. The Bill cannot change culture on its own, but it can and should act as a catalyst, and we remain committed to launching a programme to encourage cultural change alongside the Bill.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend, as always, for repeating the Government’s commitment to introduce the Hillsborough law, but I am afraid that the families and their representatives feel a little less positive about the engagement that they have had so far. Some worry that they have been briefed against to the newspapers and, generally speaking, they worry about the dilution that the noble Lord, Lord Storey, has warned against.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I am sorry to hear that from my noble friend. I am aware of very recent interaction with the families in Liverpool. My understanding is that those talks have been going positively, and it is very much hoped that we will be able to reach some form of agreement in the coming weeks and months.