Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord is right about EU arrangements. I remember as an MEP fighting hard on the inadmissibility provisions in EU directives. On the Dublin arrangements, my understanding is that the UNHCR is satisfied that those arrangements were compliant with the refugee convention. I contend that Clause 15 is not, hence I have put my name to some of the amendments in this group. My noble friend will propose that Clause 15 be removed altogether, as it fails to recognise the need to share asylum responsibilities with other countries in order for the international system to work effectively, but at least some changes to the clause are necessary, and so I have co-signed the amendments suggested by the JCHR, tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs.

Amendments 69, 70, 71 and 75 all seek to restrict and improve the operation of the scheme proposed in Clause 15. I also support Amendment 68, and convey the apologies of my noble friend Lord Oates, who has a conflict with other business. Clause 15 is about proposals whereby the UK would attempt to persuade some other country to take responsibility for the asylum applicant if it considered that there was a connection to that state, broadly defined, or even if there was no connection at all.

Amendment 69 seeks to ensure that the definition of “safe third State” means it affords the protection and rights to which the person is entitled, so there is no real risk of them experiencing persecution, a violation of their human rights or refoulement, and that there is access to fair and efficient asylum procedures and refugee convention rights. Amendment 70 seeks to ensure that any removal should be only to a state with which the person has a connection. Amendment 71 requires that, unless formal and legal binding return arrangements are in place with the state in question—such as was the case with Dublin, which is why the UNHCR gave it its blessing—and removal takes place within a reasonable period. Absent those conditions, there must be no declaration of inadmissibility and the claim must be considered in the UK. Amendment 75 removes and rejects the suggestion that the UK can remove a claimant to a country in which the UK Government think it would have been reasonable for them to have made a claim, even if they had never visited that country.

As I said, even if these four amendments were adopted, Clause 15 would still be flawed. It would create yet greater delays, backlogs and costs in the asylum system. As we keep saying, the Home Office says the system is broken yet it wants to shoot itself in the foot by having ever-more complicated and long-winded procedures. It would also create greater anxieties for claimants and disruption to the international system. Therefore, Clause 15 must be at least amended, if not removed.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, unsurprisingly, I agree with everyone who has spoken so far except, I am afraid, for the noble Lord, Lord Horam. This is why: we are out of the EU now and have taken back control of our borders and laws. This is the Government’s policy. We are no longer in this family of nations, this bloc called the EU. Therefore, on what logical basis should we be saying that, by definition, we will never consider a claim made by an asylum seeker from that group?

It is one thing when you are in the EU to say that we do not need to be taking refugees from the EU because there is free movement in the EU and we are part of that bloc. You might well say that it will be inadmissible and that we do not consider refugee claims from within that family of nations of which we are a part, but we are not in it anymore. We have taken back control. Therefore, we are no longer able to assert pressure on others in that group to buck up their ideas about human rights or to threaten the Hungarians with being ejected from the EU if they do not sort out their human rights record. We do not have that leverage anymore. Therefore, it is our obligation as global Britain, as great believers in human rights and a signatory to the refugee convention, that if Hungarians are being persecuted we will consider their claims for asylum because we are better than them and we have taken back control in a lovely global Britain sort of way. It is totally illogical for Clause 14 to be part of the Bill.

More generally, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, made an important point about complexity and efficiency. In an earlier group, everyone in the Committee agreed that decision-making needs to be faster and better. That is in everybody’s interest, whichever side of the argument we are on. Creating lots of convoluted provisions about what is inadmissible, before you even consider whether someone is being persecuted, will only make life harder for caseworkers in the home department. I have seen Governments of both persuasions do this over the years. They think they are making it easier, but they actually make it harder by creating more convoluted hoops for people to jump through before their claim is even considered. It is better to have a clean slate and to consider somebody’s circumstances: do they qualify for asylum or not? It would be much easier without all these hoops, so Clauses 14 and 15 should go.

Just consider the claims: if countries are safe, they are safe. If people are not telling the truth, test their credibility and make that decision. Of course, I agree with everything my noble friend Lord Dubs said about safe countries, who has or does not have an association with one and the Government making the decision for them on a spurious basis.

Finally, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, it is a well-established principle of refugee convention jurisprudence the world over that you do not have to be persecuted just by agents of the state. States have a duty to protect all the people in their state. If they do not do it, there can be behaviour and persecution by non-state agents within that territory. If the state is not offering protection, if there is no effective rule of law, it is not enforcing the criminal law and is allowing Roma or gay people or whoever to be persecuted by fascist skinheads in Hungary or whatever it is, that is persecution for the purposes of the refugee convention.

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I will be brief. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for moving Amendment 68 and associate my name with this amendment. It deals with a glaring omission. I hope the Government will accept the amendment because, as has been rightly said, the Bill states:

“The Secretary of State must declare an asylum claim made by a person who is a national of a member State inadmissible … For the purposes of subsection (4) exceptional circumstances”.


This is where Amendment 68 beautifully sits and deals with that omission because intolerance is on the rise on the grounds of many protected characteristics listed within the Equality Act not only in Hungary, but in Poland and other parts of the EU. Indeed, the EU is somewhat restricted in what it can do with independent member states on some of these issues. I hope that the Minister will indicate that the Government will move on this, and the other positive amendments within this group, because in the end we are dealing with issues of human rights.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but my feeling about these amendments is that that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, is right and that the best answer is to strike out the clause.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am so sorry but would the noble Lord remove his mask for a moment so we could better hear his wisdom?

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

Was everything I said even more incomprehensible than usual? Basically, I am saying that we can amend and improve this a bit, but it would be much better to get rid of it.

I also have one point of detail. I am struck by the double reference to the definition of a safe third country, which I believe is irrelevant because the refugee convention says what it says. The definition is that a safe third country

“is one from which a person will not be sent to another State … otherwise than in accordance with the Refugee Convention”

and that is repeated later. Of course, there is absolutely nothing in the refugee convention about sending somebody to a safe third country, or sending somebody to any country, except there is the firm ban on refoulement, that is, sending somebody back to the country where he had the justified fear of persecution. I understand why the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has that phrase in his amendment. He is thinking about refoulement, but the Government, when they put it in the Bill, are not thinking just about refoulement. They are thinking about their doctrine of having to seek asylum in the first safe country. They are thinking about their strange reading of Article 31 of the refugee convention. They are not letting Article 1 speak for itself, and their reading of the convention is a quite different one, as was explained by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Etherton, Lord Brown and Lord Clarke, with a different definition from the one that has become the jurisprudence of this country.

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I understand the spirit of Amendments 69, 69A and 73A in seeking to define a safe third state to ensure that an individual removed to that country is provided with adequate protection, and that their individual rights as a refugee are recognised under the refugee convention.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Briefly, on the Minister’s previous point in response to the right reverend Prelate about refugees being able to fly here instead of making perilous crossings, will she make a commitment that the Government will not slap transit visa restrictions on jurisdictions that produce a lot of genuine refugees because of what is happening over there, and that they will not use carriers’ liability as a deterrent for people trying to escape through that safer method?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

Can I write to the noble Baroness on that? I suspect that I will misspeak if I try to answer because there are several things in that question that I am thinking about. I hope that she is okay for me to write to her.

The definition of a safe third state is already set out in the clause. It ensures that, even if a country is not a signatory to the refugee convention, the principles of the convention should be met if we are to remove an individual to that country. It defines safe third countries as states where an individual will not be sent to another state where they would be at risk of persecution or a breach of their Article 3 ECHR rights. This is consistent with our obligation under the refugee convention to ensure that individuals are not subject to refoulement; I keep pronouncing it as “refowlment”, which is completely wrong. This definition has been part of our previous legislation on safe countries and is a widely recognised definition of a safe third state; it is used in EU law under the procedures directive.

I want to come to point made by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, that the UNHCR says that we are breaking the refugee convention. There are three groups of amendments on this in Committee—not today, but shortly, so I will not go too much into the convention. We have already touched on it. We think that everything we are doing complies with our international obligations, including the convention. The first safe country principle is the fastest route to safety and widely recognised internationally. It is a fundamental feature of the Common European Asylum System. It is self-evident that those in need of protection should claim in the first safe country and that is the fastest route to safety.

There are different ways in which an individual may be protected and not all of them require entitlements that fall under the refugee convention. To define a safe third state in the way that is suggested by these amendments ignores the fact that other forms of protection are available to individuals which ensure that these countries are safe for them to be removed to. We will only ever remove inadmissible claimants to countries that are safe. Using this definition is not a new approach. It has been part of our previous legislation on safe countries. I do not think these amendments are necessary.

On Amendment 70, the ability to remove an individual declared inadmissible to any safe country has formed a part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to the Immigration Rules in December 2020. This amendment would remove a provision that Parliament has already had the opportunity to scrutinise. The aim of these provisions is to disincentivise people from seeking to enter the UK by dangerous means facilitated by criminals. They send a clear message that those arriving via an irregular route may be eligible to be transferred to another safe country, not of their choosing, to be processed.

I do not agree with the premise of Amendments 71 to 73A and 195. Agreements by a safe third country to accept an asylum seeker may not always be via a reciprocal or formal arrangement. It is right to seek removals on a case-by-case basis where appropriate. Doing so has formed a part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to the Immigration Rules in December 2020. I do not think that these provisions are unworkable without formal agreements in place. That said, I do not disagree with the need to get formal agreements in place. Without providing that running commentary, that is what we are working on doing.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to the five amendments in this group—Amendments 83, 88, 90B, 95A and 137, and the question of whether Clause 25 should stand part—all of which I have co-signed or are in my name. The four I have co-signed are inspired by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and are in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. He has had to leave and has asked me to give his apologies.

The provisions whereby the presentation of evidence, after a date specified by the Home Office or in a priority removal notice, is required to be treated as damaging to credibility or to be given minimal weight are unfair, unjustifiable and should be removed. I agree with everything the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said.

I have also tabled Amendments 90B and 95A in the alternative, as it were. Under Clauses 21 and 25, the decision maker on priority removal notices or in an asylum or human rights claim would at least be obliged to consider whether the presumption of damage to credibility was fair, rather than looking solely at whether there were good reasons for the delay. Taking lateness into account should be rejected if it would be unfair.

The motivation for all these amendments is fair access to justice—both to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights and, as set out in Amendment 137 about removal notices, to uphold a common-law right to access justice. Yesterday, I had the pleasure of being at the Joint Committee on Human Rights session at which the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, gave evidence. We discussed having the common law as an inspiration, as well as the ECHR, in the application of human rights. I am sure the noble Lord will be able to tell me that the Government at least accept Amendment 137.

I do not need to say more because the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, put it very well. To say that evidence is not convincing is one thing; to say that, because it has not been submitted by date X it is incredible or has no weight, is putting process over substance.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak against Clause 25 standing part. I agree with so much of what has already been said. This is a particularly tawdry little clause in an outrageous Bill, which, as we have heard, has been slammed by UNHCR, the custodian of the refugee convention, by the JHCR, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and everybody, it seems, except noble Lords opposite.

My noble friend Lord Coaker need not apologise for not being a lawyer. It is not necessary to be a lawyer to see how tawdry Clause 25 is and how it absolutely puts process over substance.

This area of the law is not about parking regulations, or the tax owed to the Revenue or even major civil or commercial litigation between powerful opposing forces. This is the David and Goliath situation referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. When an asylum seeker presents themselves to whoever—the Border Force or the Home Office—they are putting themselves in the trust of Her Majesty’s Government in the hope that this is the right place to be.

Noble Lords have been making arguments in Committee, and those opposite have been making arguments about forum shopping, wanting better lives and all those things as if they are terrible but, in essence, the refugee convention is about desperate people escaping and having a fair crack at being believed. They may not all be telling the truth. Whether they are or not, they may not all qualify for convention protection, but there should at least be a kind and fair reception and a fair crack of the whip. That means not taking tawdry little process points such as this.

I have been a refugee lawyer, in and outside the Home Office. When I worked as a lawyer in the Home Office—I am going back now to before the new Labour Government, when my first boss was the noble Lord, Lord Howard—we did not take tawdry process points like this. That was in 1996.

In a moment, the ever-avuncular and brilliant advocate, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, will get up and tell us not to worry, because this will come into play only when there are no good reasons. So, fear not, Women for Refugee Women, UNHCR, Amnesty International, ILPA and every other bleeding heart. The Home Secretary would call them activist human rights lawyers and they are perhaps almost as contemptible as refugees in her eyes. The noble Lord will say not to worry because, where there are good reasons, this does not come into play and there will not be an issue about evidence.

But why put this in the statute book? Immigration officers, the Secretary of State, the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal and SIAC—these bodies are well capable of looking at evidence and credibility. It is an insult to their intelligence for them to look at whether there were or were not good reasons for late evidence. Sometimes late evidence is incredible and sometimes it is perfectly valid, because there are very good reasons—a host of good reasons, more good reasons than not—in relation to trauma.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

Would the noble Baroness like to say whether evidence is ever deliberately produced late in order that it is impossible to remove people for whom such a decision has been made?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I have no doubt that that is sometimes the case, but my point is that you do not need Clause 25 to deal with that case, because the decision-makers listed here are well capable of looking at evidence whenever it is served. If the idea is that this is late, incredible or mischievous evidence, or the other concerns of the noble Lord, these decision-makers are capable of getting there by themselves. They do not need this insult to their intelligence that they must give it minimal weight. I never knew about this principle of minimal weight. It has been invented. Sometimes late evidence is good and sometimes it is bad, but this is asylum; refugees are at stake.

The noble Lord opposite always wants to talk about the numbers. He is very concerned about the numbers and I appreciate that, but this is not about numbers. It is about getting decisions right and protecting even the one claimant in a thousand who is the torture victim, who has been persecuted, who may be a child and who may have been trafficked. To turn this into a matter of a parking fine or commercial litigation, in which your case is prejudiced because you were only just advised that being gay is relevant and that you do not have to be afraid to say so, because this is Britain and Hungary, is tawdry. To make that process point, when we are talking about life or death—not big bucks or small bucks but life and death—is totally tawdry.

Clause 25 does not help. If anything, it will make life more difficult for the Home Office because, I promise you, there will be endless litigation about what good reasons are. That is why the amendments are helpful, because they are beginning to tease out what will eventually be the subjects of litigation. We do not need it. We all know that late evidence is sometimes an abuse and is sometimes incredible, but sometimes it emerges because people have only just got decent translators or lawyers, or country or other vital information, which is sometimes hard to get.

I am sorry to hear that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, is unwell. I am sure that the Committee will join me in wishing her a swift and full recovery.

On the point about identifying documents, let us go back to the history of the refugee convention. Some of the most genuine refugees have to escape without identifying documents, and some of the least oppressed people are the ones who have fantastic documents. That is why Amendment 85 has to go. This is not the biggest problem in a terrible Bill, but Clause 25 is a tawdry little clause, unworthy of Her Majesty’s Government; let us strike it from the Bill.

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I have deep concerns about Clauses 17, 19 and 25. Others have already expressed why, so I will not overly repeat myself. I congratulate my noble friend Lord Coaker on brilliantly moving the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser. Equally, I associate myself with the amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, my noble friend Lord Dubs and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton.

The reality of what is sometimes the last line of defence, not only in LGBTQ issues but in other vulnerable situations, is that it is the last thing you want to have to deal with yourself. Sometimes the very notion of coming out to yourself is deeply painful, because the recognition in certain cultures, countries and religions means to shut yourself off, not only from a body of support, your religion or community, but from your family. Initially, to come out to yourself is a huge step. Then you have to make the decision, day in and day out, whether to come out in other, very ordinary situations. You are here and you have put in your claim, and someone might say, “How was your weekend? Did you spend it with your girlfriend?” You have to decide whether to lie or tell the truth. If you tell the truth, you may become isolated in the asylum community, and perhaps from your country or religion. This is the community that you associated yourself with, to give yourself support and belonging, in a country where you seek to belong. Then you come out in late evidence, with that last line of defence. If your claim is rejected, you are possibly putting yourself in danger at home, in that you could be returned to one of the seven countries where you are criminalised simply for the reason of being LGBTQI+, or to one of the 11 countries where you could face the death penalty.

I remember in the 1990s working on the case of an 18 year-old Iranian who came out in this country. His asylum application was going to be rejected. A group of us were privileged to intervene on his behalf. What that teenager had said publicly would have been recorded and noted back home. We were successful—I do not say this boastfully, but it is one of the few things I am proud of in my life—in preventing that young man being returned to Iran, where, like three other young men in the weeks before, he could have been hung by his neck on the gallows until he was dead. How will the Government deal with exceptional cases where people bring in late evidence in order to substantiate their claim?

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Let me come to that point in a second. First, let me say that I almost took it as implicit in the request from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that the Committee would like to have the guidance, but I have heard the point made, and I will certainly pass it on. I do not want to go over points I have already made, and I think when the noble Lord looks in Hansard, he will see that I have set out quite clearly why, first, we need to have a system whereby, in particular cases, the date can be extended or adjusted, but also, secondly, why that does not undercut the principle of actually having a date and having this structure. However, I am very happy to look again at what the noble Lord has just said. If, having read it, it seems to me that I can add to what I have already said, I will; otherwise, I respectfully direct him to what I said earlier.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It may be that, because it has been a long day, I have missed something, or it may be that I have jumped the gun and the Minister was about to come to this point, but I have not yet heard the justification for having Clause 25 at all.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

In that case, I will certainly read it over the weekend. I know that those in the Home Office responsible for this area are obviously looking at the debate and will have picked up what the noble Baroness has said.

I was just dealing with Amendment 95, after which I will come to Clause 25 itself. I lost count of how many times the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, used the word “tawdry”. It really is not, if I may say so. We obviously disagree, and I will make no comparisons either to parking fines or international commercial litigation. At one point it seemed to me that the noble Baroness was saying that, on the one hand, this clause was terrible and, on the other, that this is what tribunals do in any event and we can trust them to do the right thing.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am saying that, if we trust—as I am sure the Government do—immigration officers, the Secretary of State, the First-tier Tribunal, et cetera, to be intelligent, effective operators in the system, they are by definition capable of looking at late evidence on a case-by-case, open-textured, well-reasoned basis and determining those occasions where there is a good reason and those where there is not. That goes without saying, so why do we have to have this diktat in the Bill, with “must” give it “minimal weight”? I suspect it is because, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggested, the Government are trying to dictate to the tribunals in particular what is and is not a good reason. That is the sinister aspect of this. It is also impractical, because you then have to have arguments about what is and is not a good reason. I promise the Minister that this will be litigated ad nauseam. It would be better, as he said to other noble Lords, to leave this to open-textured judgment and decision-makers who are capable of applying it.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

As regards the in terrorem threat that things will be litigated ad nauseam, I am tempted to say that that is not really a change from the current position. More substantively, and with respect, to say that the clause sets out that the tribunal “must give … minimal weight” to the evidence, as the noble Baroness just put it, is not what it does at all.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It says that they have to have good reason.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

It does not do that either.

It does not say that the tribunal “must give the evidence minimal weight”; it says that the tribunal

“must, in considering it, have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence”.

The tribunal is perfectly entitled to say, “Well, we’ve looked at that principle. Actually, we’re not going to apply it here”—for reasons A, B and C. There is no requirement and no fettering of the tribunal; there is no compulsion that the evidence be given minimal weight. What the decision-maker has to do is have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to any late evidence unless there are good reasons why it is provided late.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I promise that this is my final intervention on the Minister, but I do not understand why we have to have the provision at all. He is saying that it is perfectly open-textured enough, that good reasons do not have to be specified in the Bill because the Government are not going to put glosses on it or be overly prescriptive, that they can be objective good reasons or subjective good reasons, that it is only about having regard to the new principle that they are inventing et cetera. Why have this at all?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

It is because there is absolutely nothing wrong with Parliament saying to a tribunal, “We want you to have regard to this principle, but of course the final decision is yours”. We do that in other areas of the law as well. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, kindly said, I gave evidence yesterday to her committee in what I hope was an interesting session. One thing we talked about was Section 12 of the Human Rights Act. The layout there was not a million miles away from this. It too gives a very clear direction to the court, but ultimately it is the court’s decision. I find it slightly surprising that, on the one hand, the noble Baroness is saying that this is tawdry and dreadful but, on the other, is saying, “Actually, you don’t need it all because the same result is going to eventuate”. Both points cannot be right at the same time.

As we all know, the asylum and the legal systems in this regard are overwhelmed. We see repeated unmeritorious claims at the very last minute designed to delay removal. This clause is a proper part of an overall system to make sure that we give protection to those who need it—I always put that first; that is the most important thing—and at the same time to identify unmeritorious claims.

Finally, Amendment 137 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, seeks to implement a recommendation made by the JCHR in its ninth report. Of course, we welcome the JCHR’s positive comments on Clause 45. Migrants who are subject to removal must be given sufficient opportunity to access justice. The clause improves and enhances the status quo. It gives a statutory guarantee that migrants will receive a minimum notice period of five working days. As a result, some migrants will get more time compared to the current policy. It introduces a separate statutory requirement for a notice of departure details to be provided to the migrant before removal.

On a practical level, Clause 45 will be supplemented by policy guidance that accords further respect to the common-law right to access to justice. I say respectfully that it is not clear to me what deficiency in Clause 45 Amendment 137 tries to address. I would genuinely welcome engagement from the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, to identify what offending aspects of Clause 45 there may be and how Amendment 137 would solve them.

Therefore, having taken probably too much of the Committee’s time already, I invite the various noble Lords to consider not pressing their amendments.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

We exist to be an effective scrutinising House. After this, we will come to an IPP amendment. We went so badly wrong on that after full scrutiny. This is such an important measure. It is about a mandatory life sentence. Therefore, although I have thought earnestly about the advice I have been given, I have not thought it appropriate to withdraw my amendment. In those circumstances, I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise in support of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who is, as your Lordships will appreciate, a former Lord Chancellor and law officer.

I reiterate that the Government came here on 8 December to commend Harper’s law to your Lordships’ House. However, in the course of that debate, to which I listened with great care, concerns were raised by every single group in your Lordships’ House about the potential unintended consequences that went beyond the Harper’s law case—a case of severe criminality that included dangerous driving that led to manslaughter. In particular, one-punch manslaughter was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and many other noble Lords; as my noble and learned friend said, there was huge concern.

The reason why my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer is right to ventilate this today goes beyond what we believe about Harper’s law, mandatory sentences, or even judicial discretion. All of these should be of particular concern to this second, revising Chamber. The reason he is right to ventilate this issue is that where significant, potentially controversial and rights-impacting measures are to be introduced, it seems to me—and I believe to other Members of your Lordships’ House—that there should at least be two bites at the cherry. The measures should at least be looked at twice.

Without the aid of my noble and learned friend, what will happen is this: it is presented and debated once in the second Chamber—not even in the first Chamber and then the second Chamber. The vote is on the same day and that is it—because, let us be honest, this is not going to have detailed consideration when your Lordships’ amendments go back to the other place. Whatever my noble and learned friend decides—and with the greatest of respect, I totally agree with the clerk about the irregularity of his amendment in terms of procedure at Third Reading—we are forced into a gentlemen’s agreement that is not reciprocated in the other direction. There must be adequate time, and it seems to me that, going forward, any significant and controversial measure must at least be looked at twice, so that there can be an opportunity to ventilate, study it, and correct any potential glaring, unintended consequences.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I came cold to this debate, as it were, to hear what was to be said. I am certainly not an expert on the law, but I have had quite a bit to do with the Companion over the years, and I remember vividly a time when it was quite routine, on Third Reading, to present amendments that clearly should have been debated earlier. The authorities of the House at the time—and I may have been part of that—decided that we needed to tighten up the circumstances in which amendments could be laid at Third Reading. But—and this is a huge “but”, which my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer has already dealt with—it was always assumed that there would be flexibility in the decision about the admissibility of amendments at Third Reading.

There were occasions—I would have come armed with them if I had anticipated this debate—when the usual channels would get together, during or after Report, and say, “Look we really can’t resolve this now, we need to put down an amendment at Third Reading”. Had it been challenged by either Front Bench or by anyone among the usual channels, that would have been resolved at that point. But nearly always, there was such a common-sense argument about, “Well, we’ll let this one go at Third Reading, the air needs to be cleared with this at Third Reading”, that it was agreed among the usual channels; it was never seen as completely Stalinist rule. Indeed, as my noble and learned friend has said, there is flexibility actually written into it. But I can say with confidence that this issue has been addressed in the past. It seems to me overwhelmingly the case, in the way my noble and learned friend described it, that quite clearly it should come within the auspices of the Companion, with the agreement of the usual channels, to be able to debate this hugely important issue at Third Reading.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Lords Hansard - part two & Report stage
Wednesday 15th December 2021 Lords Chamber

Obviously, that is linked with Amendment 89. Of course, Scotland has regularised its new age of criminal responsibility to 12. For many years, the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland was eight but in practice it was only ever administered at 12. I understand that the rules have changed in Scotland so now it is 12. That raises an interesting question about what would happen if an 11 year-old was living in Scotland but committed a crime in England. How would that youth potentially be brought to justice in England when what they had been alleged to have done would not have been an offence in Scotland? I am sure there will be an appropriate way of dealing with that situation. Nevertheless, the Labour Party’s view, and my view, is that the age of criminal responsibility should remain at 10. I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords,

“No child should suffer such appalling abuse, especially from those who should love and care for them most.”


Who said that? It is not a Christmas quiz. It was the Minister repeating a sentence what feels like a long time ago, but it was earlier this evening in proceedings on this Bill in your Lordships’ House. What if the same child victim of cruelty or neglect survives and grows to act out as a damaged little person as a result of that neglect or abuse?

I am very disappointed to hear about my own party’s position on the age of criminal responsibility, not least because I was reading David Lammy’s comments in the Guardian just a couple of years ago in relation to concern that our age of criminal responsibility, at 10, is too young. I think that we as a society are failing some of our most vulnerable children, including victims of neglect and abuse, and we should not be criminalising them. Given what we know about child development, 10 is way too young. It makes us as a jurisdiction an outlier in the civilised world and that is not something to be proud of.

Perhaps understandably, much of the debate in Committee focused on some of the most notorious cases, including that of Thompson and Venables, but such horrific and notorious cases are few and far between. More often, we are talking about offences such as criminal damage, and it is often looked-after children who are criminalised for offences of that nature. They have already been let down in their lives by their natural parents and/or their adopted parents and are looked after by the state. They then get involved in something that is treated as criminal damage in a care environment and for which neither noble Lords’ children and grandchildren nor mine would ever be criminalised.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I have dealt with that exact point in my time as a youth court magistrate. It is not just children aged 10 or 11. In the past few years—let us say the past five years—I have never seen any child brought to court for criminal damage in their care home. They used to be brought to court because it was an insurance-related issue and a conviction was needed to get the insurance money, but that has been resolved as an issue. In my experience, care homes do not charge their children for criminal damage.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend; obviously I do not have his personal experience as a magistrate but just today I looked at published statistics from 2018, which showed that a small number of children were criminalised for criminal damage.

Whether children end up in court or not, if they have criminal responsibility, they can be criminalised. They may never get to court—they may accept an out-of-court disposal—but they will be criminalised and will potentially have a conviction that follows them around for a very long time. This is amoral; it is not the way to treat a vulnerable little person who has probably been neglected and/or abused. They are not ready for criminal responsibility—they are not responsible. All the scientific evidence suggests that their brains are not developed enough at the age of 10.

We weep hot tears for these children when we see them as victims of abuse and neglect, but we do not do so when some of them manage to survive but act out in ways that children will. Some children will never be criminalised for minor theft or criminal damage because they have the protection of their privilege. Other children will sometimes be criminalised, which is wrong in principle and says something very embarrassing about this jurisdiction—even compared with the neighbouring jurisdiction north of the border, as my noble friend pointed out. I do not want to repeat what I said about this in Committee, but I thank and pay tribute to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, who have campaigned on this issue for many years to stop us being an outlier in the world.

I note that next year my noble friend Lord Adonis will bring forward a Private Member’s Bill to lower the voting age from 18 to 16—something I will support but I suspect the Government will resist. The Government will insist on 18 for voting purposes and the age of majority, and perhaps take the view that children and young people are not mature enough to vote until they are 18, but heap criminal responsibility on them at the age of 10. That is a mismatch of eight years. Of course. children and young people—indeed, all people—develop slightly differently. Personally, in an ideal world, I would support 16 as a decent compromise. However, that is not the point.

The amendment in the name of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, to which I have added my name, settles on just 12. I am afraid that the fact that neither the Government nor my own party can support that, despite report after report from the UN on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, is an embarrassment. We are choosing some children over others. These difficult issues about children and criminality are always about other people’s children. However, the difference between believing in and promoting human rights and not doing so is whether you care about other people’s children, and not just at Christmas—and not determining, as a noble and learned Lord said earlier, who is naughty or nice but caring for everyone’s children and all children.

With that, I will spare your Lordships any more of my thoughts on this issue—I feel very strongly about it. I wish your Lordships and your children and grandchildren a very good Christmas when it comes.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I agree with every word she just said. She noted that the UK is an outlier in the world in having an age of criminal responsibility of 10. However, I notice that my native Australia is now in the middle of the process of looking to raise its age from 10, which I think was inherited from UK law. With that development in Australia, we will be even more of an outlier.

I shall speak to Amendment 90, which appears in my name, but I stress that this is not in any way meant to compete with Amendment 89. I would support Amendment 89 but, like the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I think it does not go far enough. My idea of a review is that if you were to hold a review, as the Justice Committee in the other place recommended last year, you would arrive at a figure higher than 12. Fourteen is the obvious one.

I apologise that I was not available to present the corresponding amendment in Committee because I was at the COP 26 climate talks. However, I thank my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb for doing a great job of presenting it then, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for supporting me at that stage. I also apologise for an administrative oversight on my part. There was extensive debate on the wording of proposed new subsection (2)(b). It was my intention to change the wording but I am afraid I did not. However, I hope noble Lords will look at the overall intention of this amendment rather than getting into the depths of discussion on the detail of the wording, since I have no intention of pressing this amendment to a vote tonight.

In particular, I want briefly to draw attention to proposed new subsection (4) in this amendment:

“The panel must consult with an advisory panel made up of young people currently and formerly in the youth justice system.”


There is a principle there that we should be following much more: people who have the lived experience of knowing what it is like to be the subject of the system have to be listened to, and we have to understand what the lived experience is like.

There is a risk in the situation I find myself in of thinking that everything has been said but not by me. I will try very hard not to do that. Rather than repeat all the arguments made in Committee, I will pick up one sentence said then by the Minister in response to the noble and learned Lady, Baroness Butler-Sloss:

“I have sought to set out why we believe that 10 is the correct age, given the way that our criminal justice system deals with children.”—[Official Report, 17/11/21; col. 263.]


In that context, I point to comments made by the former Children’s Commissioner, Anne Longfield, in late 2019. She called for a wholesale review of the youth justice system, saying that the youth court was

“not a child-friendly environment where you could really help a young person and is not meeting standards that we had hoped.”

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 17th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I also rise to support Amendment 220. When I was chairman of the Commission on Justice in Wales, we looked at this issue and had extensive evidence, including from the Children’s Commissioner for Wales. Without hesitation, we recommended that, were it free to do so, Wales should raise the age of criminal responsibility to 12, consistent with United Nations obligations it has untaken.

I agree completely with what has been said about the profound changes in the understanding of mental capacity that have taken place over the last 10 years in particular. I urge the Government not to delay any further a change to make our country no longer a laggard on this issue but one that is at least catching up. There are problems, such as knife crime, but the age of criminal responsibility is not the way to deal with them.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is very good to see the Committee refreshed and to have the opportunity to meet earlier in the day, so I thank the powers-that-be for making this possible.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I may begin by saying that I support Amendment 220. I endorse it completely and have nothing further to say on it. Noble Lords have spoken with great eloquence and force. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has explained, my Amendment 221ZA, is a probing amendment designed to correct the terms of a subsection in Amendment 221 in case that amendment goes forward and the Government are interested. Let me explain.

I should say at once that Amendment 221 is, in principle, good. If accepted, it would require the Government to carry out a review of the age of criminal responsibility. I have no argument with that whatever. The issue that I raise is with the list of factors to be considered by any such review and, in particular, the use of the word “gender”. The right word there should be “sex”. The requirement in Amendment 221 is that the review should take into account certain factors. It can take other factors into account, but the following are mandatory:

“age, gender and ethnic background”.

My focus is on gender. Those noble Lords who sat through the important debate on Monday night will have heard lengthy discussion of those terms and their use in legislation. I will come back to that.

When I drafted my amendment rather hurriedly on the Thursday, I focused on the terms in the Equality Act. Why I did so will become obvious in a moment. I used too many words; I just lifted other factors in order to include them. I am now satisfied that the only proper course is to remove the term “gender” and substitute that with “sex and gender reassignment”. The cohort, if the review were to take place, will be those under 18 and, for the large part, those materially younger. One could call them children. Importantly, “sex” is established in statute and describes physiology. It is not a social construct. It is easily identified, and is listed and defined, as I shall explain, in the Equality Act. It should be noted that “gender” is not so defined. I say that for noble Lords who were not here on Monday or have not studied the Act in detail.

Section 11 of that Act states:

“In relation to the protected characteristic of sex … a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a man or to a woman; … a reference to persons who share a protected characteristic is a reference to persons of the same sex.”


There is further elaboration in Section 212, which defines “man” and “woman”—in other words, the terminology that has just been explained. It states that,

“ ‘man’ means a male of any age … ‘woman’ means a female of any age.”

There we have it all clearly defined. Sex is a physiological condition and, importantly for the purposes of a review, it is an objective fact, not someone’s opinion. It is not what someone identifies as. We are talking here about people under 18, usually those much younger. Also, we all know that sex is registered at birth. It is on the birth certificate.

In the case of a small number of people who are under 18 and may fall within the ambit of the review, there may be those to whom the term “gender assignment” will apply. They will be few, but if that does apply within the meaning of the legislation, that, too, will be a fact, not an opinion. That is because gender reassignment is also a protected characteristic under the Equality Act. Section 7(1) of that Act defines gender reassignment as follows:

“A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person's sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex.”


So gender reassignment likewise refers to a physiological process and does not include mere self-identification or opinion. Lastly, in case anyone were to ask, “What about gender recognition certificates?”, they simply do not apply. One cannot have one of those if one is under 18. I say that so that everyone knows where we are.

Put simply, if there is to be such a review, the mandatory—if that is the right word—considerations should be age, sex, gender reassignment and ethnic background, but not gender. I commend this approach and await with interest the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I should say briefly in the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle—perhaps it is not my place to do so because it was her amendment that I signed—that I should thank the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. We have been using various terms in Committee, but on this occasion he must be right. If one were considering children under 18 in the context of a review of the age of criminal responsibility, it would be a glaring omission to include “gender” instead of “sex” in the legislation.

Sometimes it may be appropriate to use both terms, and I supported that position on Monday in the particular context of a different amendment about hostility towards people. What I tried to suggest, and which Twitter does not reflect, is that hostility can be towards people in broader categories than those protected under the Equality Act. I would not want someone to be subjected to violent hostility, even on grounds that are not currently in the Equality Act, because they were non-binary or whatever. That is not really the point in this context. If I may say so, the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, put it very well.

What is more, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, will forgive me for making that concession, given that this is a probing amendment and her list of factors to be considered in any review was inclusive and not closed. I hope it is helpful to respond to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in this way.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I broadly support a rise in the age of criminal responsibility. I think the review is a good idea, and of course it should be science-based. The danger of going for 12 years, which is an improvement, is that it could be higher if only we thought about it well. I would be open-minded on whether it needs to be a matter of law or a government commitment to carry out a review.

There is just one area which I hope such a review might consider. The Bulger case is often referred to, for obvious reasons. Hard cases can make very bad law; we are aware of that. But I do think that that type of case imposes a duty on government to consider people’s concerns. There are two concerns that people might have if they lived in the area. One is where the child would live on return to society. That could be covered through care proceedings—you can control where someone lives and who they live with. The second is their occupation. If, at the age of 18, the murderers were released—as they were in the Bulger case—and wanted to go into childcare, or any of the care professions, would people be content with that? There would at least be a question about whether that would be wise. If they only have a care proceeding against them, they would be perfectly entitled not to declare what they were involved in at the age of 10. My point is not that they should be criminalised and therefore always carry that with them, but about how you manage their occupation, subsequent to their reaching an adult stage. It can be managed without criminalisation, but such a review might want to consider how that could be done most efficiently.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord German. I know that he has an immense amount of experience in matters around education, from both his personal experience of teaching in earlier decades and his work in the Welsh Assembly Government. I probably support his amendment, but I am much less interested in the amendments here than in achieving a shared purpose, which is that children who are in custody have the chance of a quality education which will enable them to go on to higher education, where appropriate, good apprenticeships and other forms of training which will give them a decent chance in life—most of them not having had a chance in life. I am afraid it is a truism, at least in my experience of visiting many institutions holding children, that for many of them, that institution is the most comfortable and secure place, emotionally, that they have ever lived. That is a sad commentary on their situation.

I carried out some voluntary work for the Howard League some years ago, and it involved visiting Oakhill, Rainsbrook and, indeed, Feltham—a place which has been through good and bad patches over the years but, from what I hear from people who work there, is at the moment pretty challenging and not providing children with a particularly good education.

The ambition that we surely all share is that there should be a consistent level of good education throughout those institutions. I will give an illustration of why. When I was doing the voluntary work for the Howard League, of which the current president is another Member of your Lordships’ House, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven—I am very happy to see him in that role—I went to one of the institutions that I have named. I was taken around and a boy of about 16 asked me to go into his room, as he called it. I went into his room and all over the wall there were maths certificates, including a grade A GCSE maths certificate. I said something really silly like, “You must be very good at maths.” He said, “I love it, sir. I want to be a maths teacher when I leave this place.” I do not know what happened to him, but he certainly had the ability to be a maths teacher. The reason he got that maths GCSE was because there was one really inspired teacher in that institution who spotted his talent at maths and had taken it to that level. I said to this boy, “Did you like maths when you were at school before you came here?” He replied, and I will never forget these words: “I never went to school, sir.” The capacity of education in these institutions and the opportunity it provides are enormous, but it has to be consistent.

Charlie Taylor, who has been referred to in this debate, did some very valuable work. I was very fortunate in that I was a consultee for him from time to time. He absolutely shares the views I expressed in the last few minutes. I ask the Government to accept that the ambitions I have expressed are shared by the Government too and that, whatever we call these institutions, whoever runs them—I do not really care, to be frank, as long as they reach the requisite standard—will try to reach standards that have been reached in the past. Noble Lords will remember Peper Harow, which was a very fine institution run in the voluntary sector by a number of trustees who would have been familiar in some way or another to Members of your Lordships’ House. It came to a slightly abrupt end because there was an accident there, but people who left Peper Harow, having had their education, commonly went straight to university and achieved university degrees, or did other training that gave them a good life after custody.

I say to the Minister: please can we have an assurance that we are not getting bogged down in process and the name we give to these educational institutions, and that we are actually trying to achieve a gold standard of quality with young people who are bored of being in an institution and for whom education is a really welcome change if it is good enough?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am sorry, I was looking around the Chamber to see who was poised and trying to be too polite. It is an absolute pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who many members of the Committee will associate with his legal expertise, but it is to be remembered that he has a considerable track record, to say the least, in matters of penal reform.

It is also a pleasure to have my name associated with this amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord German and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. It seems totally anomalous that local authorities should be excluded from giving this provision, for all the compelling reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord German, about the expertise that they have accumulated in relation to education, children, care and so on. It can be only an ideological justification—I must not be too smug about ideology because I have a little of my own. Although there are always political debates about the role of the state in relation to all sorts of goods and services, most people, across politics and across the Committee, have some sort of notion of the irreducible core of the state. Personally, I think that, as with policing and the Army, incarceration ought in general to be a primary responsibility of the state itself, for obvious reasons to do with the vulnerability of those incarcerated and the responsibility, including democratic responsibility, of politicians, whether at local or national level, in relation to powers of coercion and the incredible vulnerability of people who, of course, cannot even vote.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, the late intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, was helpful in suggesting to the Minister that what I think we would all acknowledge is a complex, sensitive and controversial issue would benefit from a sensible roundtable discussion in which the Prison Service was open to some scrutiny. Part of the issue around gender, sex and identity in government as a whole is that policy has been developed mainly by officials who have come under the influence of certain groups, which Ministers have basically accepted and it has not been subjected to proper scrutiny.

My major appeal to the Minister tonight is to allow for that and to open up a dialogue in which those of us who are gender-critical are not accused of being transphobic or under the pay of alt-right American organisations, something which, I am afraid, has all too often clouded the debate. I have an Oral Question tomorrow about Professor Kathleen Stock—a classic case of someone who has expressed quite legitimate views being subjected to horrendous abuse and basically left simply to put up with it herself; it was very late on that the university came her defence. There are so many examples of this, mainly affecting women. There is a lot of misogyny in this debate, and women are left defenceless by pathetic public bodies which are frightened to upset certain groups such as Stonewall. We know this—in how many government departments has policy been developed by officials, with Ministers having virtually no say?

My appeal to the Minister tonight is to take this seriously and to say there is a legitimate debate—not one in which we call each other names, but where we actually start to discuss these issues. It has never been allowed; there has been no real public debate or scrutiny in Parliament. These issues are so sensitive, and with every Bill that goes through, this debate will take place. We know that the Government are split on this, but they have got to get themselves together and start to have a proper dialogue. That is the appeal I make to the Minister.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am afraid it is not just the Government who are split on this. With two notable exceptions, rarely have so many noble Barons spoken with such passion and at such length for the dignity of women—and there is nothing wrong with late-flowering feminism. I say that quite sincerely to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who I had the privilege of advising as a young lawyer in the Home Office some years ago now. There is nothing wrong with late-flowering feminism and, indeed, nothing wrong with speaking up for the dignity of all people. I say that as a self-identifying feminist and human rights campaigner.

The debate has ranged widely, which may be fine even at this late hour, but it has ranged beyond the specific issue. Noble Lords have brought up various issues to do with the lexicon and whether people feel that their dignity is lost, or that somehow their femaleness, or their womanhood, is challenged by newcomers, migrants to their sex, et cetera. To get back to the actual issue, life is complicated, prisons are vulnerable spaces and everybody in prison is inherently potentially threatening but also potentially vulnerable. I want to get back to the actual substance of this amendment and what it is trying to address. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that, if he and I were trapped in a lift with a third person—this is just a hypothetical, not an invitation, I promise—and the third person was a cis woman, born a woman, still a woman, always a woman, but none the less a white supremacist with previous convictions as long as your arm for violence against non-white women, I would feel much more threatened by the presence of that offender than by the presence of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. He is looking quizzical, but my point is that the Secretary of State has responsibilities to people in custody, in particular, and to people in vulnerable spaces that cannot be dealt with using the blunt instrument of an amendment like this.

I am not making nit-picking points. I am trying to address points that I think the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, tried to make early on. Forgive me—it is no criticism, but some noble Lords responded subsequently with speeches which were understandably carefully prepared in advance, without the opportunity to hear her rather sensitive and thoughtful setting out of the way in which the Government to date are trying to address their administrative and serious human rights responsibilities to deal with all vulnerable people in prison.

I suggest to the noble Lord that in the hypothetical lift I would be at far greater risk from the white supremacist with previous convictions. This is not a total hypothetical, because this has happened in male prisons where non-white offenders have been murdered by fellow cis males—that being the term for people born and always a man—because of a lack of diligence about the offending and attitudinal profile of a person.

If we really care about people being safe in custody, which we must, this will not be resolved by a blunt instrument. This is not a drafting point or a nit-picking point. In my view, we have too many people—and I suggest too many women—in prison anyway, and we need to pay more attention to who is with whom and how we are taking care of them.

Something like this amendment, which says that your birth sex is always your sex for the purposes of imprisonment and incarceration, would mean that someone born a woman who then went through hormone therapy, possibly more interventionist therapies and even surgery would always be in a women’s prison. That would not necessarily always be the right outcome.

What I am trying to suggest is that, yes, I care about being a woman and, yes, I care about being a feminist, but I am a human first and foremost. I do not hate men. I do not fear all men. I am not a self-loathing cis woman. I believe that in this Committee, perhaps more than anywhere, we should be capable of taking some of the heat out of these sensitive issues, as I think we tried to do in an earlier—I called it historic—debate. Debates about the lexicon and wider dignity, important and heated though they are, will not make women safer and they will not make prisoners safer.

[Baroness Meyer (Con)]

We are talking about men who feel they are women but who have male genitalia being in a women’s prison. We are not talking about men who had operations. We are talking about men who, after being in a prison for several months, might have needs and could attack women. Some of those men are paedophiles and are violent.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I hear the noble Baroness, and I do not call her a late-flowering human rights spokesperson or feminist. I know that when she spoke on another Bill about parental alienation, she very clearly identified and recognised that people of both sexes were capable of this behaviour. Perhaps if she had had the opportunity to listen to the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, before she prepared hers—I make no criticism of that, because we all do it—she would recognise that the Government are already moving quite a long way to deal with these difficult administrative duties of care.

I believe that people of good will and good faith, as I consider this Committee to be, can deal with this without using some of the language that—forgive me— some noble Lords have used repeatedly. Repeatedly calling people one sex even though it is very important to them to be another does not help. This place—this Committee and your Lordships’ House—should not be a place of culture war. This should be a place where we make difficult things a little bit easier because of rational thought and the respect that we pay each other and therefore everyone else.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I want to respond to that because I think another point that follows from what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said is that the other argument that comes up all the time is that if you raise these issues you want a culture war, which I think the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, was implying.

On terminology, if we are all going to get offended, I do not particularly find descriptions of people as “cis” very helpful either, so when it comes to language issues, the point is that there are tensions that exist outside this place. We know that and it is disingenuous to pretend that there are not.

The noble Baroness rightly pointed out that this is a question of administrative duties of care. This amendment has been very carefully worded in a very narrow way about a very specific issue. What is the objection to that? This is precisely a responsible administrative duty of care, regardless of any hyperbole that people do not like other people using even when they use it.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that intervention. If I offended her in any way by my remarks—

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Not me.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

—I apologise. Clearly one of the reasons this is so sensitive is that, beyond this Committee and this Chamber, there is not yet even a settled courtesy about some of these matters. If I have offended any Member of the Committee, I apologise.

I was born a woman, and I still identify as a woman, but I have always tried to disagree well with people, including those on the Benches opposite, who I disagree with across the piece. I have never seen all men as a threat, and I have certainly never seen people of other races, sexualities or sex as a threat, and I am not calling anybody names in this debate.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, this is an important debate. I think I am perfectly entitled to intervene; I do not see why I cannot. I agree with a lot of what my noble friend said about the tone of the debate. My problem is the accusation of transphobia.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

But I did not make it.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

No, my noble friend did not make it, but it is made by many people. Those who are perhaps arguing from my noble friend’s point of view never defend people such as Kathleen Stock when they suffer such abuse. I welcome this debate, which is why I intervened, because, frankly, it is very helpful to try to set a place here. I agree with my noble friend that the Lords is, above all else, a place where we can start to have some reasoned discussion, but there are huge tensions and sensitivities on both sides. I must come back to the Minister: the fact is—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My noble friend is intervening on me.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

That is very true. My noble friend is right. I will take that and ask her to respond to me.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful for that. Forgive me, again, if I have called anybody names. That has not been my intention. This is difficult terrain. The path of human rights does not run smooth and there are all sorts of difficult issues to be dealt with. There are some people beyond this Committee and your Lordships’ House who seek to set people against each other. The focus of this legislation, and your Lordships’ focus in this Committee, should be to ensure the safety of vulnerable people in prison, whatever sex they were born and whatever sex they now identify as. I was trying to suggest that that is not just about biology. It is also to do with criminality, profile, attitude and so on. I believe we have too many people in prison and that we therefore have too many women in prison.

I would defend academic freedom and debate, by the way. Forgive me if I have not been seen to do so. I believe that my record on free speech matters is decent enough. I urge noble Lords to send a signal to the wider world that, in this place at least, we can disagree well and focus on protecting all vulnerable people in prison.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission. As most noble Lords will know, we are the body charged with protecting the protected characteristic of sex as well as that of gender reassignment and the fundamentally important human right of freedom of expression. All those things have been discussed today relatively calmly, on the whole. On debating well, I start from first principles and say that we should never try to close down debate—and yes, we should debate well.

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra, Lord Morrow and Lord Farmer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, for proposing this amendment, which basically seeks to ensure that female prisoners are protected from harm. This is a complex area, where the rights of trans women prisoners to have their legal sex recognised has to be balanced with those of female prisoners, who may be fearful of attack, if they know that a dangerous sex offender with male anatomy is housed with them, for example. The important point is that, when you are incarcerated and do not have the liberty to leave a place of danger, the state’s duty to look after you is profound. You do not have the choices that other people have.

The noble Lords and noble Baroness have proposed that prisoners with a gender recognition certificate who are suspected or convicted of a “violent or sexual offence” are treated

“by reference to the sex registered at their birth.”

I understand the intent behind this amendment, which is essentially to secure the safety of natal women. However, it raises some issues that require further thought—for example, the risk of violence towards trans women prisoners housed in a male prison as well as to trans men in a female prison. I urge noble Lords not to frame this serious and complex issue either in a numbers game—are there very few or not so few?—or in what may or may not be our personal outlook, if we find ourselves in that position. The law is frequently a straitjacket, and it is not sufficiently malleable to accommodate the complexity of identities around us.

At the heart of this issue is the need to protect female prisoners and ensure that they have access to single-sex spaces, including bathrooms, sleeping accommodation and other areas that they need. Violent and sexual offenders are a threat to their fellow inmates, regardless of their sex or gender identity. Cases of assault sadly already happen in single-sex prisons. However, in the case of trans prisoners who may be violent or who may have committed crimes involving sexual assault, it is right that we now need to give additional thought to how they are housed. As it stands, the law stands calls for these decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis. While this will be right in many situations, it may also raise the question of how female prisoners can have confidence in their ability to safely access spaces such as toilets within the prison, precisely because they cannot know the outcome of a case-by-case assessment, as opposed to the generality of a law that exists for them. Further thought needs to be given to the facilities provided to trans people and whether provision can be expanded for trans people that ensures that all sides of that debate can be safe and secure within the prison estate.

A further problem with the amendment is that, oddly, it is too narrow and does not capture the issue of trans men or trans women who do not have a gender recognition certificate but, nevertheless, self-identify in the gender and can therefore apply and be granted a place in the relevant prison estate. I do not think the noble Lords who put down the amendment intended for it to be quite so narrow—certainly their speeches do not reflect the narrowness of the written words. These are not straightforward issues, and it is right that we properly consider the balance of rights of different prisoners. I do not believe that the amendment gets that balance right, but it does ask serious and important questions that need to be addressed in law.

If the Minister is minded to pursue these arguments through Report, I ask that he give extremely serious consideration to the importance of getting the balance of rights correct and ensuring that all prisoners have the duty of the state to safeguard them upheld as we go forward.

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[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly—the noble Lord, Lord Russell, will be pleased to know—to offer the Green group’s support for Amendment 219 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove. I shall simply make two points, one of which draws on the recent intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Russell.

First, the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, referred to the origins of this amendment. Nottinghamshire Police Force has been a pioneer in this area. In my contribution on this subject on the Domestic Abuse Bill, I looked back beyond that. If you look at the history of how Nottingham police came to be doing it, it began with a group called Nottingham Citizens and a survey it conducted among the people of Nottingham. That led to a conference held at the Nottingham Women’s Centre, which informed the police and police action. This is something that very much grew from the grass roots up. In response to many of the contributions from people advocating Amendment 219A instead: this has been proven to work. It is there demonstrably on the ground. The fact is there.

For my second point, I refer to the author Caroline Criado Perez and quote her:

“There is enough data to know that men who kill women do not suddenly kill women, they work up to killing women … If only we were to listen to women and pay attention to the misogyny and aggression and violence that they deal with on a daily basis.”


That is what Amendment 219 seeks to do. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, suggests that we have to wait and wait and wait. I would suggest we have been waiting lifetimes—centuries—for this action. We have a proven model that has been shown to work. Let us put it into effect.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, her noble friend Lord Polak, my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. I want to focus on the amendment, not on a wide-ranging debate about everything that is wrong in relation to sex and gender or discourse in society.

I want to congratulate the noble Baroness because it is a simple and focused amendment. The word “misogyny” does not even appear in it. It is not thought crime. It is not even a speech offence. It follows a well-trodden path of adding protected characteristics or certain characteristics to a list. Hostility towards people with these characteristics will be an aggravating factor in a crime that already exists and has already been proven or admitted beyond reasonable doubt in a court. I say to noble Lords who are worried that I will come back to their fears and try to assuage them.

It seems totally unconscionable to me that, for example, race and religion have been aggravating factors in the code for so long but not hostility towards women. Hence, in the waiting millennia—certainly decades—since the code, these factors have been added. Some people will say that we never needed to add aggravating factors at all, and we could always trust the courts to get it right. Whether that is true or not—and I am not sure it is—we have a well-trodden system, and it is unconscionable, particularly at this moment when women and girls are feeling the way they are, that we should say we must wait because it is all very complex. If it is not complex in relation to race, religion and sexuality, it is not complicated in relation to sex. These are people who have already committed a criminal offence.

Why add aggravation at all? If somebody gets drunk on a Friday night and gets into fights with people they come across, that is bad enough. But if they go out after a few drinks on a Friday night to single out a particular group or a particular type of person based on their race or religion, or go out beating up women, that is an additional public policy problem, and that is why aggravation in relation to the group is a matter for this Committee and for policymakers.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the right reverend Prelate and precede, I think, the noble Lord over there. I just want to say, it all may have been said, but not by me. None the less, I will be brief because—it is not often I feel like saying this—it has been an absolute privilege to listen to today’s debate. Every point of morality, sensible practice and detail on this compelling menu of amendments has been made.

I want to make the briefest of pleas to the Minister, who has been a distinguished commercial barrister for many years; I, by contrast, have been a humble student of the miserable world of justice and home affairs. I also want to make a political point, of all things, in a debate that has been so rarely elevated above politics. I believe that today presents the beginning of an historic opportunity in our politics in this country. For most of my adult life—indeed, pretty much all of it—we have been embroiled in an arms race, particularly around incarceration, that has put us on a path which is more like the American one than a sensible path from anywhere else, let alone the path we might be on. How often do you hear someone of the stature of my noble friend Lord Blunkett say, “This was a mistake. Hands up; it is a fair cop. I am offering a bipartisan hand to help set this right”? I have not heard anything like that in justice and home affairs in my time as a student of these issues.

What is more, this is about rectifying a mistake that the Minister’s party already accepts was a mistake; that is why these sentences are no longer available to new offenders. The Minister, his party and his Government ought to be half way—indeed, three-quarters of the way—there already, in rectifying what my friend, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, called “the great stain”. We are so close. The Minister has an historic opportunity to begin to put this right. How often does an opportunity like that come about? The point about this stain is that it is wrong in itself, and it is terrible for all those hopeless people whom the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, and other noble Lords mentioned. It is also a symbol of both injustice and the arms race I mentioned. That is why this opportunity is so precious and important.

It is ever harder to justify an unelected second Chamber—your Lordships’ House—nearly a quarter of the way into the 21st century but, if the Minister listens to the debate and does not slam the door closed to reason, today might just be enough for the moment.

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support all the amendments in this group, not least because the cause of prisoners serving indeterminate sentences has been languishing ever since such sentences were formally abolished by LASPO in 2012.

I commend the tireless work of my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood on their behalf. For nearly 27 years, since my first inspection as Chief Inspector of Prisons, I have been campaigning for changes to be made to the operational management structure of the Prison Service to bring it in line with the practice in every business, hospital or school: to appoint named people responsible and accountable for particular functions within the organisation concerned.

In the case of prisons, I have campaigned for separate directors to be appointed for every type of prison, and for certain types of prisoners—lifers, sex offenders, women, young offenders, the elderly, foreign nationals, and those serving indeterminate sentences. Imagine how easy it would be for Ministers interested in IPP, for example, to send for the relevant director and question him or her about what was happening or not happening to all prisoners in that category. I had hoped that somewhere in the 298 pages of this monstrous Bill, space might have been found for something so practical. However, as that is clearly not going to happen, I stringently commend the change to the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendments 210 and 211, and congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, on their introductions.

I am at one with the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on this issue. When he was Prisons Minister, Rory Stewart once attended a conference on the issue, organised by Nacro, which as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, has led on this for a long time. Some brave prison governors risk censure by using release on temporary licence to avoid release on Fridays. I have never understood why the Department for Work and Pensions does not make staff from jobcentres go into prisons to work out a prisoner’s entitlement to benefits, including universal credit, so that they do not leave prison with a discharge grant, but with the first payment of whatever benefit they are entitled to. In that way, they can pick up the next benefit the next week rather than having to wait six weeks following release before they can apply.

In many ways, the Government are setting people up to fail by, first, releasing prisoners on Fridays and, secondly, insisting on a six-week delay; I defy anyone to exist all that time even on an increased discharge grant.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am sure that the fabulous quintet of noble Lords led by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, and so on, will be delighted by that endorsement from the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, as there has never been a clearer or braver voice for penal reform in my adult lifetime.

I briefly add my own three cheers for these two amendments and for everything that goes with them. They have highlighted the piteous state of provision for prisoners from the moment of their release, quite often into destitution, and a total deficit of support. I hope that that will be taken on board, as well as the precise amendment, by the Minister in his reply. Notwithstanding comments made during the last group that law is not everything and practice is important, sometimes law is very important in itself, particularly release dates because they have to be enshrined in law. So, while there is no doubt that other provision, referred to by my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett and others, needs to be made, this matter requires urgent legislative attention. I think I agree with the noble Earl that, on reflection, something more like Amendment 211 is probably better.

To deal with the concern of my noble friend Lady Lister about Scotland would not take much, would it? Off the top of my head—forgive me, parliamentary counsel will do better—the “may” in Amendment 211 becomes “must” and the words

“at the discretion of the governor of the prison”

are moved to the gap between “on a day” and

“within the previous five working days”.

In other words, the discretionary part is which day within the previous five days. However, there is no discretion; there is a mandatory requirement that the prisoner must not be discharged on a Friday or a weekend. Something of that kind would be delivered very easily—and it really must be delivered. I hope that there will be none of the antics that we heard described in the other place to justify the totally illogical, impractical and unjustifiable status quo.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak on behalf of my noble friend Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, who is unfortunately unwell and unable to be in her place. She wanted to speak to Amendment 211 in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Bird, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, to which she added her name. She would have spoken about her personal experience, so I shall just read the words that she had hoped to say had she been here.

The routine releasing of prisoners on a Friday, especially before a bank holiday, can cause both services and the prisoners themselves significant problems. Finding accommodation on a Friday afternoon can be extremely difficult. Those who have managed to get clean of substance abuse while in prison find themselves desperate and start using, begin criminal activity again or, in some cases, both. For 10 years, my noble friend was a councillor on South Somerset District Council where there were marvellous officers who worked tirelessly to try to ensure that no one was left with nowhere to stay. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, made a powerful case for the amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, similarly made the case for not releasing prisoners on Fridays or bank holidays. This is a matter that my noble friend feels very strongly about, so I will share two cases sent to her by the officers of South Somerset.

First, prisoner A was released on a Friday from Guys Marsh prison near Shaftesbury. He was given a rail warrant and got on a train to Yeovil. He contacted his family, realised he did not have accommodation to return to and went to see his offender manager at the probation office, who contacted the housing team. By this time, it was 3 pm and they had very little options available for him at that time of day. It was too late for them to find suitable accommodation and although they managed to get him into a hostel in Yeovil, that was not the best place for him, He had left prison clean of drugs and had to stay in a hostel with very easy access to illegal substances. Unfortunately, he used again, the accommodation broke down, he reoffended and was recalled to prison.

Case two was prisoner B, who was released from prison in Bristol on a Friday and got a train back to Yeovil. He then got a bus to Chard, some 17 miles away, to collect his possessions from his old tenancy. He then returned to Yeovil, by which time the offices had closed. He spent the weekend rough sleeping before he could contact the district council again. South Somerset District Council is fortunate to have secured funding to employ a prison release worker who tries to contact prisoners before they are released so they can plan ahead and help them. However, when people are on short sentences, the prisons rarely have time to work with the prisoners, so they get released without the council being informed. My noble friend Lord German has tabled amendments on those serving short sentences.

Other prisoners think they are okay and have homes to return to. These often do not materialise and by the time they realise they are homeless, it is 5 pm on a Friday. Sadly, one of the people in these case studies died over the weekend of 16 and 17 October aged only 45. He was quite a prolific offender and spent a lot of his time in prison. He had been in care from the age of two and did not have the best start in life. The council tried to help him on a number of occasions and sometimes succeeded, but not always. These are just some examples of what happens when prisoners are released on Fridays. This could be avoided by flexibility being used both in the courts and in the prisons. I hope the Minister will agree that this is a very sensible, non-controversial amendment which could prevent reoffending for the want of a roof over the heads of prisoners who have finished their sentences. I fully support Amendment 211 and look forward to the Minister’s response.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 10th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Does the Minister not agree that good law is about a combination of rules and discretion? I quite understand that he is here to advocate his new scheme and approach, which the Government have considered and think is the way forward, but why not have a little residual discretion for some of the examples that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave? The Minister said that a simple caution is really a bare warning but, occasionally, is not a bare warning better than nothing at all in terms of a police officer, in reality—sometimes underresourced, in difficult times—doing his job in the community?

Why do we have to be so rigid that we make a simple caution—which of course is not ideal and does not have the diversions and other things suggested— impossible to give? In circumstance where there is a student who is annoyingly drunk but has not really harmed anybody—as in the example given—why not allow a bare warning rather than no warning and no action at all?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Without turning this afternoon into a jurisprudential seminar, I certainly agree with the thrust of the point made by the noble Baroness that good law is often a combination of rules and discretion. At the level of generality, I would agree. However, it is not right to say that this is rigid; the conditions that can be applied are extremely flexible.

There are really two parts to the answer. First, within the new cautions regime, there is a great deal of flexibility as to the conditions that can be set out. If the noble Baroness looks at Clause 80 for diversionary cautions—which is mirrored in Clause 89 for community cautions—subsection (4) sets out the restrictive conditions and goes down to the one I mentioned in my response to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which is

“not to engage in specified conduct”.

That is, essentially, the lowest form of engagement when no other suitable conditions exist. That really creates a condition where the offender is expected not to commit any further offences. That is a very low level of engagement, and when that is suitable will be a matter for the code of practice.

The second part of the answer is to repeat the point I made earlier that other forms of out of court disposal are still available—I mentioned fixed penalty notices and community resolution—so, with respect, I do not agree that we are putting in place a rigid regime. The conditions are flexible and there are some disposals that are outside the cautions structure, even now.

I do not think I did so before, but I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

As I said a moment ago, this relates to Clause 80(4) and Clause 89(4), if the noble Lord looks at the last condition in each of those subsections. The code of practice, as I said in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will make further provision for the circumstances in which that would be appropriate. Importantly, and I think differently from the simple caution, the police would still need to monitor conduct to ensure that someone had not reoffended, but that would be less onerous. This is a good example of where the new structure that we are putting in place preserves the best of the old regime but still has it on a more structured basis, focused on preventing reoffending as well as on the rehabilitation of the offender.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Forgive me, but I sense an element of unworldliness about this. If it is appropriate in a given case for there to be just words spoken and a warning, and it would be proportionate, do we really need the constable in question to go through the process of the recording and the monitoring?

I say no more on that but, if the Committee will indulge me, I would like to mention that Mr Gareth Dowling, the doorkeeper, is retiring today after some years of service and I hope that the Committee, if not the whole House, will join me in congratulating him and wishing him all the best for the future.

[Noble Lords]

Hear, hear.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I am very interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said. Although, again, I am not strictly following the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I very strongly support it and ask the Government to think again.

I happen to have had some limited personal experience of young people who had offended between the ages of 12 and 18 and who were acting for youth groups, mentoring other young people to prevent them from offending, because they had learned. I have met half a dozen of them. All were black and doing valuable work in their 20s, but were having the most appalling difficulty in finding a decent job that would be commensurate with their undoubted abilities. I will tell you the sort of case that happens. A child of 14 won a prize at school and took it home to show his family. His elder brother threw it away and said, “Don’t be so stupid. Why don’t you behave like us? That’s an utter waste of time.” He then went on to offend, and, aged 19 or 20, he told me that he had learned that this did not pay and that he had to lead a proper life. He was doing the most wonderful job, teaching other young black people, under the age of 18, how not to offend. It is crucial that what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said is picked up by the Government and taken forward.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I have to agree with the three Members of the Committee who have just spoken. I will deal with the two proposals in turn, first that relating to children and their convictions being spent when they turn 18. That is absolutely compelling as an argument. I have just one thing to add: there is a huge differential in the experiences of different children in our communities. For example, there are looked-after children—the state not being the best parent—who will be prosecuted and will attract convictions, before their majority, for bad behaviour that simply does not get prosecuted when a child behaves in that way in the family home. This could be common assault or criminal damage. It is common practice for looked-after children to be in the criminal justice system in circumstances where their peers elsewhere would not. To not to get a second chance on turning 18 is a terrible indictment on our society.

I encourage the Minister to take the expert advice from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, with all his experience of penal reform, and to do something about this. Things are compounded still by there being no right to be forgotten when it comes to the internet. The law has to push back even harder to try to rehabilitate people, particularly children, in the light of so much of our lives and our histories being on the internet.

I shall respond briefly to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. A non-court disposal administered initially by a police officer should be immediately spent, as a matter of good practice but also as a matter of principle. If someone has given up the opportunity to have the matter dealt with in court, that should happen in many cases. However, there should be a benefit, and that should be that the disposal is immediately spent. It is an incentive to engage with it, but it is also right in principle. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 was a wonderful thing, but we are a long way from its ethos and principles. It has been undermined by an exemption order that has grown, in my experience, every year and it has been undermined by the growth and rise of the internet. This Committee really needs to listen to the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Paddick, in their proposals, and push back very hard in the opposite direction.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I will make a very brief point in support of what has just been said by the noble Baroness and the noble and learned Baroness. There are a number of professions where you have to establish that you are a fit and proper person. I act as a legal assessor to the Nursing and Midwifery Council, and I am aware of the registration process: you have to assert that you are a fit and proper person. I can see that a caution of the kind that we have been discussing might stand in the way of a registration being effective, and that would be a great tragedy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The purpose of a minimum sentence is that unless the threshold is met—we will debate in another group what that threshold should be—the minimum sentence is imposed. There is nothing between us on how it works; there obviously is on whether it is a good idea. I hope that is fair.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister but in sentencing law and in the criminal justice system, minimum sentences are currently referred to as “mandatory minimum sentences”, subject to thresholds and exceptions such as exceptional circumstances. That is a very long tradition. As lawyers we must be fair to lay Members of the Committee as well. It is unfair to say that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has missed the point. It is very common in the parlance of sentencing law and criminal justice law to refer to minimum sentences as “mandatory minimum sentences”, subject to whatever thresholds and exceptions there are.

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

That is exactly what it says in the paperwork we have.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

It is not a mandatory sentence, because you can impose more. Let us be clear: it is a minimum sentence, which has to be imposed unless the exceptions are met. To take it outside this clause, if you have a minimum sentence of two years unless there is an exception, the first question is: is the exception met? If it is not, you have to give at least two years. You do not have to give two years; you could give two and a half years. I am not sure I am saying anything different. Reference has been made to America. In other jurisdictions, when they say mandatory, it can be mandatory without exceptional circumstances or any other provision. I am not sure we are saying anything different. I think we are all clear about what we mean. I would prefer to use the phrase “a minimum sentence”, which is the phrase used in the Bill, unless the exception applies.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am so sorry to elongate this, but it is important. The Minister, sitting in a Government with a massive majority, gets to rewrite the statute book, but he does not get to change terms that are well understood by lawyers and sentencers in this jurisdiction and others. He is proposing a mandatory minimum sentence subject to certain exceptions. The common parlance—perhaps not on the street, but in the profession and on the Bench—is that this is a mandatory minimum sentence. He can argue for it and say that it is good policy, but it is not helpful to the Committee, anyone outside it or anyone reading Hansard for us to suggest that this is something totally different from a mandatory minimum sentence subject to exceptional circumstances.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am really not sure that we are saying anything different. As I said, we will come in a later group to how many offenders do not get the minimum sentence with some sentences. There must come a point at which so many offenders do not get it that using the word “mandatory” to describe it is itself misleading. I suggest we are better off sticking to the terms used in the Bill, which are both accurate and appropriate.

I underline the point that the change we are proposing does not mean that all 16 and 17 year-olds will receive the minimum sentence. The courts will retain the discretion not to apply the minimum where there are exceptional circumstances which relate to either the offender or the offence and which would justify doing so.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, there is so much to get through. First, I disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier; secondly, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, about the clause not standing part.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, has partly pre-empted my concern regarding his Amendment 150. Some of us in this Committee and more generally in your Lordships’ House have an allergy to reverse burdens in the criminal law because they generally go against the golden thread of English justice: that it is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and not for defendants to prove their innocence. That is a general principle which some of us hold dear. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, is quite right that over many years that principle has been eroded.

He referred to a number of regulatory offences, which I take to be offences in a confined area of privilege. Regulatory offences are appropriate for activities that might even be licensed, such as driving a vehicle or practising medicine. Regulatory offences are not the right analogy to make with just going about your life, including as a citizen who seeks to protest against issues such as GM foods or climate catastrophe. Therefore, his analogy seems quite wrongheaded. From a human rights perspective, he is aggravating the pre-existing damage of the problematic offence of aggravated trespass.

Trespass and nuisance ought generally to be a civil matter. Trespass is usually dealt with and resolved between reasonable citizens without recourse to law. I believe in civil legal aid if necessary, even though it has been all but obliterated in this country, but neighbour disputes generally ought to be a matter between me and my neighbour, not a matter for the criminal law, unless what my neighbour is doing to me crosses a line that offends all in society. I have a general problem with criminalising the civil law, but worse than that, in the context of aggravated trespass—aggravated by the intervention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier—certain types of trespass are singled out for criminal treatment, are they not? It is not the trespass of my neighbour who is polluting my land or building on my land, cutting over the margins of the boundary for reasons of profit or greed. It is the trespass of my neighbour who comes on to my land to protest and obstruct—for example, an environmental protestor—because in doing damage to my land I am damaging the environment. Therefore, with respect, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, is once more prosecuting a culture war in which people he may or may not disagree with are being treated worse in relation to their freedom of expression or, potentially, their property rights, than those who choose to pollute the land, for example. In my view, that is a mistake.

Finally on Amendment 150—again, to be fair, this has been pre-empted by the noble and learned Lord—subsection (a), on the reverse burden defence, suggests that in the offence of aggravated trespass, it is for the defendant to prove that they were not trespassing. That is astonishing: it is like saying that in my defence for assault, I must demonstrate to the civil standard that it was not me who assaulted my noble friend—who was sitting there quite innocently until I metaphorically assaulted him.

That is really quite rich indeed, and shows the underlying thinking here: some people, whose opinions are clearly not considered worthy by some Members of this Committee, are to be guilty until proven innocent, and they seem, in this context, to be demonstrators. In the broader context, in this Part of the Bill, the guilty ones are of course Travellers—as a job lot. This was put so well by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I will not repeat her reasons, save to say that there is something so inherently unattractive about discriminating against a particular group. We have seen it in many societies, including in our own over so many years. I thought we were in a better place than this.

If people are committing burglaries, let them be prosecuted for burglary. If people are perpetrating nuisances, let them be dealt with like anyone else; there are burglaries in urban and rural areas and there are nuisances everywhere. Let everyone be dealt with equally. Please do not single out one of the most vulnerable minorities, in size, economic power and everything else; do not single out a particular community for less favourable, targeted and demonising treatment. That is essentially why I do not think that Clause 63 should stand part of the Bill.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, may I just intervene very briefly? I agree with the noble Baroness when she says that, in general, trespass should be a civil remedy. I am absolutely clear that she is right about that, but it is important to keep in mind that securing a civil remedy is not a rapid process: it really takes quite a long time to get the required order from a court. I represented a rural constituency for more than 30 years, and I know that the kind of trespass to which my noble and learned friend is addressing his amendment, which is encompassed in Clause 63, causes an immense amount of distress to the rural community. There is a very special reason to abrogate the general rule, which does of course make the civil remedy the appropriate one for trespass. I commend this provision to the Committee, subject to the amendment, on which my noble and learned friend is entirely right.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to support the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in tabling this amendment, and it is the reason that we first met. When I heard about this commander down in Brixton who had an innovative way of dealing with cannabis possession, I went down there very quickly to meet him and find out exactly what he was doing, and I was very impressed.

He has laid out the rationale behind the amendment extremely thoroughly and with great insider knowledge, but I will throw in what the Green Party has been saying for the past 50 years. Our drugs policy is to create a regulated drug and alcohol market that is focused on safety and harm reduction, which our current policy is clearly not. In the interim, decriminalisation is important, but it will never be as effective at reducing crime and improving health outcomes as a fully regulated system.

Many police forces have de facto decriminalised cannabis. They have seen that it just does not work to keep on with this targeted racist behaviour. The amendment would be a very welcome step. At the moment, it is a gateway power which allows the state to interfere with people and search them for something that should not even be illegal. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said very clearly, it alienates communities at the very point at which you need those communities to help the police with intelligence. I have been out with quite a few stop and search teams. I have seen it done well, but that was the exception. I have seen it done okay and done extremely badly. It is an issue of training as well as for the law itself, and it is used in discriminatory ways. This is a brilliant amendment. Well done to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for tabling it.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 276, to which I have added my name. Suspicionless stop and search is a significant problem for community relations in this country. It is a significant problem for trust in the police. In recent days, we have rightly given a great deal of time and attention on all sides of your Lordships’ House, including in this Committee, to trust and confidence on the part of women, and young women in particular, but we must not forget other aspects of broader trust and confidence, including the issue of young black men and policing.

Decades after the Lawrence inquiry, we still need to keep returning to this issue. No power or set of powers has probably done more to weigh against the strides made by the late Sir William Macpherson and by everyone across politics, including former Prime Minister, Theresa May, to try to address problems with stop and search. No power has been more problematic than that of suspicionless stop and search in general and Section 60 in particular.

This is really not a partisan issue. Your Lordships know that, long before I came to this House, I was a civil liberties campaigner and not popular with Governments of either stripe in relation to powers such as these. In my view, there has been an authoritarian arms race about law and order in this country for too long. No Government are perfect. No Opposition are perfect. This is a good moment to look at stop and search. There is no better parliamentarian to be leading us in this conversation than the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

The problem with suspicionless stop and search is this. No human is perfect; therefore, no police officer is perfect. Stop and search, conducted by humans of other humans, even with reasonable suspicion, is problematic, but there is no choice if we want to combat crime and investigate offences that have happened or that might yet take place. We have to have powers to stop and search. They are problematic, even when based on reasonable suspicion because what is reasonable suspicion? Who do we think is going equipped? Who do we think meets the profile of somebody who committed an offence a few hours ago? Of course, it is hard for any citizen, including constables, to rid themselves of all the baggage that comes with being in this—or any—society. Those problems are so compounded when reasonable suspicion is taken out of the equation.

Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act gives the power—which is triggered by a senior police officer, but a police officer none the less—effectively to change the criminal law in an area for the period in which that power is triggered. In that particular part of town, there is effectively a suspicionless stop and search zone. We are often talking about urban areas, and areas with a very high density of people from certain communities. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, can correct me if I am wrong. Within that area, young black men in particular know that that is a stop and search zone. Their first encounters with the police service are often very negative.

Because of the rise of the internet, mobile phone use and videos of incidents, this material is now there to be viewed. I have seen some very disturbing scenes of quite young boys being stopped and searched, without suspicion, on streets not many miles from here. These young boys and men do not have the protections that they have post-arrest in the police station. Arrest is based on reasonable suspicion. Officers usually stop a young man. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave the statistics. If you are a young black man you are many more times likely to be stopped and searched than if you are a young white woman, let alone a middle-aged woman like me.

Sometimes officers will be situated in a particular place. I understand their reasons. They are worried about knife use, for example. Some young men are being stopped on a routine basis. Sometimes big, burly officers make a human wall around a boy of perhaps 13 or 14 years-old. I have seen the pictures. People in that community—bystanders, if it happens in the daytime—will be trying to remonstrate with the officers. They will be held back. This young man—13, 14 or 15 years-old —is having his first encounter with the authorities. He is frightened. He is behind this human wall of big, burly officers. There is not even reasonable suspicion that he has done something wrong.

It seems to me that this is very dangerous—and it is not an occasion where I can even blame the police. It is an occasion when I have to look to the statute book itself, because this is about legislators, not police officers. I have been critical in other debates, and I am afraid that I will have to be critical about some decisions that the police have made. But this is a legislative problem, because legislators from both major parties have allowed this regime to be triggered for suspicionless stop and search, and it has created problems over many years. It really is time to address this.

This seems like a radical probing amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but if Section 60 were removed from the statute book, what would be the consequence? There would still be ordinary, democratic, rule of law-based powers to stop and search with reasonable suspicion. That is a fairly low threshold in any event, I would argue, but this ability and power to designate particular areas—everybody knows where those areas are and who is affected in them—would go. I cannot think of a more positive signal and progressive step for any Government, any party and any legislator who cares about race relations in this country, and cares about rebuilding trust in policing and the rule of law.

So once more I find myself thanking the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I feel that I will do so again a few more times in this Committee.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I have some questions for the Government on Amendment 129, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

Drugs policy and the drugs trade have come up in our debates on this Bill as part of the debate on the serious violence reduction duty, particularly regarding child exploitation and county lines. It will come up again shortly when we look at the groups of amendments on road safety and dangerous driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol. There is a complexity of links in multiple areas of policy, be they poverty, health or criminal justice. On the serious violence reduction duty, the Government’s stated aim is to reduce serious violence through a public health approach. So my question to the Minister is: what work is being done alongside those plans to look at a coherent public health approach to drugs policy? As with serious violence, there needs to be a focus on what reduces harm, not just what deals with the symptoms.

Amendment 129 is specifically about removing the power of the police to search people for drugs for personal use only. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave a very informative history lesson, if you like, on his part in the “no arrest” policy in Brixton. I thought I might update what he was saying with my perception as a magistrate who sits in criminal and youth courts in London. I can say with reasonable confidence that I very rarely see in front of me, for the possession of class B drugs alone, either a youth or an adult who is of good character. I really cannot remember the last time I saw that in a court in which I was sitting. In my experience, when that is charged, other matters are charged as well, or the amount of drugs found on the person is at a much higher level but, nevertheless, the CPS chooses to charge that person only with possession rather than possession with intent to supply. Nevertheless, it is an interesting amendment, and the noble Lord raised a number of interesting points about the appropriateness of that power of the police under Amendment 129.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Could I put an ethical and constitutional question to my noble friend, who is both an experienced parliamentarian and a magistrate? When I go to the airport, I understand that I shall be subject to some search, and I have no problem with that—first, because I understand that an airport is a very sensitive place and, secondly, because everybody will be subject to the same search as me. Therefore, I feel no disgruntlement. Equally, with ordinary stop and search powers, if I am stopped and searched on reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence, I may know that I am completely innocent but I shall understand that I have been stopped and searched on reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence.

What is the ethical and constitutional justification for stop and search without suspicion, when everybody is not stopped and searched, as at the airport? If not a suspect and if not everybody, who then? My fear is that, subject to the answer that my noble friend—and, I hope, in due course, the Minister—will give, the answer is that that in-between stop and search, a suspicion under Section 60-type stop and search, is almost inevitably an arbitrary and therefore potentially discriminatory stop and search.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, made a very interesting speech. For about the first 40 years of my life, I lived in north-west London and—on this discrimination point—I have never been stopped and searched by the police. I have had my vehicle stopped a few times, but I can perfectly well understand why the police did it. So it is quite an interesting point on discrimination.

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As part of our Section 60 pilot, the Government asked the College of Policing to update its stop and search guidance to ensure fair and proportionate use. The updated guidance was published in July 2020 and provides best-practice examples for forces to use on community engagement and scrutiny. We expect that forces will follow the guidance in their use of the powers. The Government will always give the police the tools they need to tackle serious violence and other crimes, and I do not think it is in the best interests of public safety to repeal these important powers. I hope that, with those words, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Before the Minister sits down, will she briefly address the question I put to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, because I think it is crucial to what a legitimate use of Section 60 looks like. If I am a young man who feels I might be particularly affected by this, and after a crime there is an area that has been designated and cordoned off and everybody is being stopped and searched when they enter those two streets—like at the airport—I can understand that. Similarly, if I am stopped and searched under “reasonable suspicion” powers, I understand: I may be innocent, but there is a reasonable suspicion that I meet the profile of the suspect, or I have otherwise given rise to suspicion in my conduct. But how is Section 60 ever to be used in a way that is not arbitrary, and therefore most likely discriminatory? Why have I been targeted for a suspicionless search? How can I be legitimately targeted for a suspicionless search?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

Of course, Section 60 is based on local policing intelligence in specific local areas. The noble Baroness has already pointed that out. I have talked about the safeguards, including statutory codes of practice, the use of body-worn video and external scrutiny; I will also talk about the use of data. The Home Office collects more data on stop and search than ever before. The data is published online, allowing local scrutiny groups, PCCs and others to hold forces to account and we discuss it with the relative NPCC leads in forces to understand why disparities occur, if they occur. HMICFRS inspects forces’ stop and search data annually, and extensive data is also published to increase trust and transparency. So, there are a number of things on which we test ourselves and are scrutinised to ensure that stop and search is not being used in an illegal and discriminatory way.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Lib Dem and Labour Front Benches on tabling these amendments. I had to laugh when I saw them, because you sort of assume you can expect duty of candour; it really should not have to be emphasised in the way that it has been here.

I have had a number of clashes—perhaps I should say experiences—with the police not exercising candour in situations where they really ought to have done. Examples include freedom of information requests, subject action requests, legal proceedings, police complaints and the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The end result of all these processes, which others have gone through as well, has been a great deal of frustration and anger and very little progress. I trusted the police less; I am sure most people would find this to be their experience. Rather than feeling that wrongdoing had been put right and the truth exposed, I felt there were cover-ups.

Obviously, if we pass this amendment, we ought to expect candour in the other place as well, but I feel that would be a step too far. I am afraid that the Government are not very honest—in fact, they are duplicitous. The Minister—the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson—talked earlier about what they have done today as being morally right, but I think that is absolutely wrong. It is wrong of him even to say that; it was not morally right. Coming back to the amendment, I say that a duty of candour is something we ought to expect from our Government, but we absolutely cannot. Therefore I am not very optimistic about these amendments, but the Government really should put them in the Bill.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am more optimistic about these amendments than the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and want to help her find some optimism. However, I first pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I feel that his speech is historic and will be remembered in this country for a very long time. It must have been so hard to make; we all know that it is hard to speak out of turn in general, but it is particularly hard when you are speaking about your own profession, service, career and friends. I hope that Members across this Committee will share that tribute to him.

I hope the noble Lord will forgive me—he has trailed this already—that in terms of these amendments we have to prefer that tabled by my noble friend Lord Rosser. I congratulate my noble friend on not just his speech but this amendment, which was no doubt prepared with his colleagues and team. This is why I am optimistic. I do not believe that the Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Williams—is unsympathetic on this issue. There is not really a problem with something like the amendment proposed by my noble friend, not least because he anticipates the potential challenges that might come the other way. For example, there is of course a need to protect privacy, data protection and national security. Any duty of candour would have to be subject to those things, but my noble friend has already done so much of the thinking. The Minister also has the considerable resources and expertise of government, the government legal service and parliamentary counsel at her disposal, but I remind her that the Daniel Morgan review was commissioned by a Conservative Home Secretary, who had been and gone as Prime Minister before the review was published, with its excoriating comments, some of which I repeated on Monday evening.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

My Lords, I did not participate in Second Reading on the Bill, but I did get some correspondence that explained to me what was going on, and I just could not believe it. I am not going to repeat the arguments which were so eloquently put by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the supporters of the amendment but I could not believe it. As an employer, I am required to do criminal record checks and if I got a response that said someone was guilty of hate crime, I am afraid their application would go straight in the bin. Yet we discover that people can be put on such a list without their knowledge, as my noble friend Lady Noakes said, and that their name will stay there indefinitely. That of course does not apply to people who have actually been convicted of crimes, so they are in the worst of all positions.

Then there is the arbitrary nature of this recording, so I wondered how big a problem this is. I am told that there have been 119,934 of these incidents recorded by 34 police forces and that 2,130 of them were done by children. It is extraordinary that this could be happening and is part of a wider concern where our free speech is being undermined. I went on Twitter; I think I lasted about three months. I have spent 40 years offending and upsetting people with the things that I said. So far as I know, I am not on a list as having committed a hate crime.

However, the essence of our democracy is that there should be free speech and that our police should be in the business of finding out what the evidence is, not turning into the people who conclude and are, in effect, prosecutors. I will not detain the House but among the examples given was someone who expressed the view that trans women should not have access to women-only spaces. Well, I believe that; is it a hate crime? Am I not allowed to say that? The fact that someone could be put on such a list indefinitely offends against our democracy.

I am sure my noble friend the Minister will have a brief, because all Ministers always do. I am sure she will have her brief from the Home Office—I worked in the Home Office for a while—and it will say that the amendment is not perfectly drafted and that some provision elsewhere could cover it, and all the rest. I hope she will throw that away and give an undertaking not only to bring forward a government amendment but, this very day, to get on to the College of Policing and end this absolute outrage.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I think I am probably quite woke, and proud to be so; none the less, I support the broad thrust of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, subject to a couple of caveats. The first caveat is a slightly light-hearted one. As a serial offender, I gently say to noble Lords and friends across the Committee that the overuse of adjectives named for great writers does not always help the cause of human rights. We have all done it: “Dickensian” for socioeconomic rights and “Orwellian” or even “Kafkaesque” for civil liberties. “Chilling” is similar. In fact, an online wit once said of my overuse of these terms: “That Chakrabarti woman finds everything chilling. She sees refrigerators everywhere.” That is just a gentle point about the way we frame this.

I support the broad thrust of this, but the problem is not just about allegations of hate. It is about soft information, as it is sometimes called, or allegations that are not capable of sustaining a criminal charge and should not sit on databases for years and years, or indefinitely. This problem has been growing for many years with the rise of the database state and the potential to hold all sorts of data, even if it never matures into a charge. That is dangerous.

In my previous role as director of Liberty, I saw many cases of this kind. Not all involved free speech. I remember one woman who had allowed her small children to play in the park while she went to a kiosk, and people thought they were unattended. She was cautioned by the police because she was at the borderline, they thought, of neglect, but there was no question of pursuing a charge. None the less, this data sat around for years and was hugely detrimental to her when she sought to work in positions of care.

This is not just about the glorious culture wars that have got everyone to their feet today. It is not about your views on trans inclusion or not, but about whether so-called soft information or police intelligence that never matures into a charge should sit unregulated, off the statute book, as a matter of police discretion and administration. Whatever our views on the free speech point, we surely have to agree with procedural point that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, was right to make clear.

I remind noble Lords that free speech is a two-way street. It is not just about the woke and so-called cancel culture; it is also about protesters who feel that they attend demonstrations and sit on police databases for many years just because they have been caught on CCTV. We in your Lordships’ House would do a great service to the nation if, whenever we consider these so-called culture wars that centre around identity politics and in particular free speech, we remember that it is a two-way street. It is people on either side of very contentious arguments who sometimes want to “cancel” each other, and we should remember that.

My final point is a substantive one about the way I urge the Minister to take this forward. Given that the concern is about not just hate incidents but all soft information that may be held indefinitely, can the Minister’s response today—or on Report, with, I hope, substantive government safeguards—be comprehensive and address not just non-crime hate incidents but all soft intelligence and all police data about individuals that could be to their detriment going forward, whether it touches on free speech rights or other rights such as Article 8 rights to privacy and autonomy? Can this soft information that has been held administratively by the police be on the statute book and brought under proper regulation and control?

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, the issue is very simple. We surely have to decide whether hate crime and non-hate crime, and all their different manifestations, should be left to police guidance, or whether the issue is far more important than that and should be brought under the process of Parliament—legislative control and legislative process. To me, the answer is perfectly clear: the latter.